At present only PDF and raw text is avaiable for this file at: http://ratical.org/radiation/CNR/Barnwell1972.pdf http://ratical.org/radiation/CNR/Barnwell1972.txt T-11 SOME IMPORTANT UNEXAMINED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE BARNWELL NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT John W. Gofman, M. D., Ph.D. Division of Medical Physics University of California Berkeley, California TESTIMONY BEFORE THE NUCLEAR STUDY COMMITTEE THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. January 7, 1972 Main P.0.B. 11207, San Francisco , CA 94101. -1 Introduction I consider it a privilege to discuss with you some crucial questions concerning the siting and operation of the proposed Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant of Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services . And I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. H. J. Larson, President, and Mr. R. I. Newman, Vice President of the Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services Company. They have both been gracious and totally cooperative in making available to me for study the full Environmental Report on the proposed Barnwell Plant. More than that, they have both expressed their sincere desire to have my comments and suggestions. Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil Corporation s are two of our foremost U.S. industrial corporations. I accept completely the statement of Mr. R. I. Newman in a recent letter to me that: "It has been, is and will continue to be our prime goal to insure the safety of the public as well as our workers, and to insure that our operations have a negligible, if any, impact on the environment." Ther efo r e , the issues I shall raise her e are addressed to these two great Amer ican corporations, as well as to the South Carolina Legislatu r e. As we get into the discu ssi ons more deeply, I hope it wil l become clea r th at th e Barnwel l facility ra i ses question s requ iring th at ~he nece ssar y par ticipant s are far beyond Allied -Gulf and Sout h Caro lina -indeed, we must truly cons i de r th,0 i.nterests of everyone livin g on the Easte rn Seaboard of the United States, c1s wPll as those of more inlan d States. Some of the considerat ion s will demonstra te that because of potential ri sk of re quiring evacuation of Washington , D.C., the entire National inte res t is definite ly involved in our con si de rations. -2 Some of you may have heard that I am a "nuclear critic". Let me assure you that this is absolutely correct. I am a critic because I have found through my long period of association with and -research in nuclear energy that some extremely serious questions concerning nuclear power generation have not been adequately examined, while the industry moves forward at a rapid rate. But while critical questions are being ra ised, let me assure you that I have no interest in doomsday predictions, no interest in alarmism. We in America all must á share in the task of insuring a good quality of life for Americans, and that means due attention á to providing energy, including electric energy, for our industry and our home uses, to sustaining a he althy economy (and here I am particularly cognizant of South Carolina's needs for industry and jobs), and ~bove all, to insuring th at we provide such energy consistent with the good health and safety of Americans. You of the South Carolina Legislature surely share these views, and I am certain that the All ie d Chemical Corporation and Gulf Oil Corporation both share these views completely. It is precisely because of the enthusiasm al l of us share about "gett ing on with the job", that we must pause to examine whether we may not have overlooked some very disturbing possibilities associated with nuclear fu el reprocessing plants such as the Barnwell Facili ty . While it may seem that a facility ultimately employing only some 300 employees ( 1000 during construction) is a small industry, other associated factors make this industr y and its development one of the most far -reaching, significant industrial developments of all time. Neither the South Carolina Legisla t ure nor the Board of Directors of both Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil can aff or d to leave questions of all-time importance unanswered. I hardly think th e -3 sto ckholders of these two great corporations would appreciate a venture that might ultimately destroy these Corporations. Nor would the people of South Carolina appreciate the overlooking, by this Legislature, of questions that deal with the possible evacuation of a large part of the State of South Carolina. It will be necessary for us, mutually, to examine two major areas: (a) The question of financial liability and how it relates to critical examination of the dangers of tqe Barnwell Facility. (b) The technical question of possible accidents at Barnwell and thei r local and national conse quences. Financial Liability and Critical Evaluation of Risks Every great corpo rat ion must necessarily cons~der f in an ci al liability for its ventures and the implications of such liability for the Corporation's f ut ure. Unfortunately, thr ough th e existence of the so-called Pri ce-Anderson Act , liability for the consequences of a ser ious acci dent at Barnwell is limited to 560-Million Dolla rs. But I propose to di scuss with you acciden ts that could eas ily lead to damages i n th e ne ig hborhood of 10-Billi on Dollars or more, to sa y nothing of th e most massive civilian disloc ati ons and suffer ing in peacetime histo ry. The existence of the Price -Anderson Act means th at ~~ carries the financial liability for about 95%of the damages that could accrue -no one at all . I happen to regard the Price-Anderso n Act as unconstitutional . There i s a bill in th e U.S. Senate, introduced by Senator Gravel , to repeal t his Act. So the Act may be repealed, or there may in ti me be a Supreme Court tes t of its constitut ionality. If this Act is repealed or decla red unconstitutional, are the Allied Chemical Corporat i on and the Gulf Oil -4 Corporation prepared to risk their assets, even though large, on a $10-Bil lion liability? Even if the Price-Anderson Act is not repealed, the situation for these two corporations is hardly better. There can be no doubt that if an accident involving $10-Billion in wicompensable damages occurs, the reputa tio n of both corporations will suffer irreparably, and the revulsion in the ~ public may, in effect, destroy both corporations and much of the value of their securities in the marketplace. It is neither my intent nor my ability to estimate the probability of such an acciden t occurring. But I am frankly amazed that both the South Carolina Legislature and the Boards of Directors of both great corporations involved have not ins i ste d upon a fully independent engineeri ng assessmen t of such probabilities, including especially the possible effects of i~ternal or external sabotage. We live in perilous times, and to neglect such possibilities as sabotage is simply to bury our heads in the sand in the fashion of ostriches. I have a hi gh regard for the detailed efforts of Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services and their consultants who prepared the Environmental Report on Barnwell. But simple, hard-headed business sense tells us th at this must necessaril y be the last source one would go to for a critical, independent assessment of t he probability of a serious accident. What is required is assi cnment of responsibility to an independent group of engineers to figure out all the ways it is possible for such an accident to occur, and to try to as sess the probability of its occurring . Such assessment would not be very costly . I believe the South Carolina Legislature and the Boards of Directors of both major corporations can accept no less. I have seen no such independent assessment. Under no circumstances should reviews either -5 by the Atomic Energy Commission or any . of its Licensing or Advisory Boards be misconstrued as an acceptable assessment. Once such an independent assessment is made; the evidence on both sides deserves debate and presentation in a full open public forum. Nothing less will allay public concern, a concern that will grow. If everything goes as planned and as considered in the AGNS Envir onmental Report, there is probably no problem of health, safety, or environ mental damage. I would hardly wish to quibble over minor questions I have about that report, especially when viewed against the vastly more important questions that must be answered, and which are not described in that Report . There are two very simple questions I propose to discuss wit h you: (1) What are the consequences of 1% (that is, one-hundredth) of th e radioactive inventory of Barnwell at f'ull operation being released to the env i ronment? (2) What are the consequences of 0 . 01% (that is, one-ten thousandth) of the radioactive inventory being released? To do this we must turn our attention to some simple technical r ealities of Barnwell at full operation. The Radioactivit y Inventory at Barnwell at Full Opera ti on The Barnwell facility proposes t o process 5 metric tons of spent nucl ear fuel per day, or 1500 metric tons per year. The long-lived radioac t ive wast e, a~er processing, will remain at Barnwell between 5 and 10 years, assuming optimistically that some Federal repository can be developed, whi ch is very much in doubt. Let us minimize the problem, and assume that the radioactiv e wast e is at Barnwell for only 5 years even though it may remain in South Carolina indefinitely. -6 The processing of 5 metric tons per day of spent uranium f'uel means the servicing of about the equivalent of 50 large nuclear power plants, each, say, of 1000 megawatts electrical [MW(e)] generating capacity. Since each plant discharges 1/3 of its fuel each year, the Barnwell receipts will be of fuel elements each having spent an average of 2 years in the power plant. The equivalent delivery to Barnwell is 2/3 of the yearly long-lived radioactivity produced in the 50 plants, which is equivalent to the output of 35 such 1000 MW(e) plants. Each 1000 MW plant produces, in one year, the long-lived radioactivity of 22 megatons of atomic fission bombs. So, 35 x 22 = 770 megatons of bombs. And for a five-year storage period, this means 5 x 770, or 3850 megaton s. Note, nothing of this should be misconstrued to mean any explosive power of this radioactive waste. It is simply necessary to give you an idea of the astronomical quantity of radioactive waste in inventory at Barnwell, at f'u.11 operation. We may express this in three ways: The radioactivity (lo ng-lived) in the Barnwell i nvent ory will be: (a) Approximately fi~een times as much as all the fission product radioactivity produced by all atmospheric weapons tests in all t ime by the combined testing of the USA plus the USSR. (b) Approximately the radioactivity that would be left decaying for l O' s and lOO's of years from a large, full-scale nuclear war. (c) Approximately the long-lived radioactivity of 192,00 0 Hiroshima or Nagasaki atom bombs. Let us turn to the kinds of radioactive substances present a~er the Barnwell plan t has been in full operation, using the 5-year residence time f or radioa ct i ve waste (r emembering that the AGNS report suggests an even higher residence time). Again, from the point of view of minimizing -7 the pot ent i al h azard, I shall consider only the major radioactive materials, and shall consi der only tho se species which produ ce a hard gamma ray on decay, (more than 400 KEV). The AGNS Environment al Report will serve as a source to ascertain t he total radioac t ivity inventory at 5 years of operation. (Table 3.6 -1, page 74, Section 3, of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Environmental Report). "' I shall add one add i.tio nal ra dioactive subs t anc e , St r ontiUlll -90, which although it does 1:.ot emit a hard gamma ray, is very importan t for consideration of cert ain ac cident consequ enc es. After correcting for radi oacti ve. decay, one reaches the final figures fo r radioacti ve inventory of hard gamma emitters presented in the following t able, (Table 1). TABLE 1 Har d Gamma Ray Contributor s Built Up in the Fuel Reprocessing Plan t Inventory at Five Years Megacurie s Megacuries Final Equ ilibrium Inventory at Is oto pe Half -Life per ton per 5 tons 5 years , correc t ed for decay daily input daily input (Megacuries) Zr95 65 days 0.37 74 1.887 176.2 Nb95 35 days 0. 7127 3.564 180 . 0 Ru103 40 days 0.1329 0.66 5 38.4 106 :~i.! 1. 0 yea.r 0.7641 3,821 2011. 0 " 31 Cs.!. 4 2.1 years 0.2031 1.016 1128.8 Csl37 30 years 0 .1 329 0 . 665 1165 .l* :~ota: 4700 Megacuries * Thi :: Csl37 i nventory bas bee n corr ected for th e slig ht decay it undergoes whi le in stor age . Sinc e we will require i t later, the Sr90 inventory is expected to be 91/ 133 x csl37 invento ry, or (0.68)xcsl37 invento ry. In megacur ie s, this is 792 megacuries of Sr90 . -8 The Consequences of a One Percent Release of the Barnwell Inventory We shall consider here how large an area and how many people might require evacuation if one percent of the inventory of t he Barnwell plant were to be released to the atmosphere . Note, it is not our purpose to examine the probability of such an occurrence, but the consequences. If the consequences arc very serious, then the fullest indeEendent assessment of the pro bability is urgent and essential. Prediction of which region of the United States will be affected and how much affected depends, of course, on the weather circumstances at the ti me of the release. We shall consider a couple of possibilities, including the local Sout h Carolina situation and that for more distant regions. With dif fering weather conditions, the regions affected will, of course, be different, but the order of magnitude of consequences not very different. Some Consequences at a Distance. 1. Assume 1% of the radioactivity inventory released to the atmosphere. 2. It is approximately 465 miles, straight line, from Barnwell, S.C. to Washington, D.C. 3, Assume a wind in the direction of Washington, D.C. of 19.3 miles per hour. Thus , in 24 hours, the center of the rad'ioactive "cloud" will be over the Washington, D.C. area. Fr om the reports of Tamplin (Tamplin, A.R. , "Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man From Fall out of Nuclear Devices I. Estimation of the Maximum Contamination of Agricultura l Land, UCRL-50163 Part 1, January 3, 1967) , the ra dius of such a cloud at 24 hour s is approx i matel y 103 miles. (Using th e radius as 2a -two times th e horizontal standard deviation of dispersion of the material) ! . a= 51.6 miles at 24 hours. -9 Now let us consider that rainfall occurred at this time, which at a maximum, can wash all the radioactivity to earth in the .region 1.lllder the cloud. What is the deposition on the ground? 2 The Area of the Cloud= n(103) = 33,400 sq. miles. One percent of Barnwell Inventory= (0.01)(4700) = 47 megacuries or 47,000,000 cuáries . (1 megacurie = 1-million curies). __4 7, oootooo Deposition, average, per sq. mile --= 1407 curies/sq.mile 33, 00 Now, from the book, "Effects of Nuclear Weapons, p. 491 -2 , Samuel Glass ton e, Editor, USAEC, 1962", it is known that a deposition of hard gamma -4 I emitt ers of 1 curie I sq .mile leads to a dose of 1.2 x 10 R day from external radiation, just by being in such an environment. No eating of contaminated foods is required. J ust being there guarantees the radiation. But we have 1407 curies/sq.mile, so th~ dose will be (1407) (1.2 x 10-4) = 0.169 R per day . The R unit is a measure of radiation exposure. Note th at 0 .16 9 R is equal to the so-call ed "allowable" exposure for~ whole year for peaceful atomic energy purposes, and it is widely agreed th at th is latter exposure would have serio us consequences. So,people in this vi cinity would get th eir ye arly '' allowanc e" in ~day. In a year they woul d get roug hly 300 t ime s as much, or about . 50 R. While there will be some decay, it will not be reduced to 25 R per year for several years, and will conti nue at nearly th at level for over a decade. It is obvious that suc h exposure is not think able, and th at evacuatio n of th e affected area must be considered . This means evacuat ion of Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Maryland, Annapolis, Maryland, Wilmington, Delaware -everyw here within a radi us of 100 miles from Wa:-;hi.nGt.on, D.C. In ef fect, this includ es all of the District of Columbi.a, most of Marylan d, most of Delaware, a good part of Virginia and West Virginia. -10 /' -I If the wind were blowing a little faster, before -the radioactive cloud encountered a rainstorm, it could center on Trenton, New Jersey, in which case it would be necessary to evacuate Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, New York City, most of New Jersey, a fair part of eastern Pennsylvania, and a fair part of southern New York State . It is seen that we are dealing with a situation that might require evacuating millions, or tens of millions , of people, or acc~ptance of the severe radiation injuries, in the form of cancer and leukemia, that would otherwise result . If anyone doubts that the economic consequences of such evacuation coul d run into tens of billions of dollars, he is not being realistic . .And thi s says nothing of the societal dislocation of evacuation of Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States. Of course, the wind might blow in a different direction, and a rainstorm might intersect the radioact iv e cloud in a region with somewhat fewer people. In any event, whichever way the wind is blowing; some 33,000 square miles of the U.S. would become uninhabitable. The winds might be such th at it would mean evacu at ion of most of the State of Florida instead. Some More Local Possible Consequences. Columbia, South Carolina is about 55 miles from Barnwell. Atlanta, Geor gia is about 180 miles from Barnwell. Let us conside r the prospects at 8 hours af t.er release of 1% of 111,, l\:1t á11w,¥l l i11v,,r1f.t1rá.v, with winds to pla r.r. the cloud ovr. r Col11mhi.a, Snut h Carolina (requires 7 miles per hour wind) or over Atlanta, Georgia (requires 22 miles per hour wind). If the radioacti ve cloud then encountered a rain sto rm, over one or the oth er of these areas, we can calculate the dosage. -11 The radius of the cloud at 8 hours is approximately 36 miles (again, using 2a as the radius). The area of deposition is rr (36)2 = 4076 square miles. = 11,530 curies/sq. mile. The dosage received by being in this vicinity is (11,530)(1.2 x 10-4) = 1.38 R per day, or about 400 R per year. This is simply deadly, and in the one case Columbia, South Carolina and everything on a radius of 36 miles from Columbia would obviously have to be evacuated. In the other case, Atlanta, Georgia and everything 36 miles away from it must be evacuated . In summary, under highly credible meteorological conditions, the consequences of a li release of the radioactivity inventory at Barnwell would be a disaster unimagined for any peacetime situation in the United States. The economic cost, to say nothing of making millions of people ref'ugees from radioactivity, will undoubtedly be measured in the billions or tens of billions of dollars. -12 In Case There is No Rain: Agricultural Consequences of a 1% Release of the Radioactivity Inventory at Barnwell at Full Operation We might suppose that "luck" would be on our side, and that the radioactivity cloud won't run into a washout by rain, after a 1% release of the Barnwell radi oactivity inventory. In that case we will, of course, still have what is known as "dry" fallout. While this may mean we wouldn 1 t face evacuation of millions of people, the agricultural consequences, as we shall see below, can be almost equally devastating. Let us consider the "no-rain" situation in detail. l. Let us assume the wind were blowing at about 15 miles per hour in the direction of Buffalo, New York. 2, The distance from Buf'falo to Barnwell is about 750 miles, so the center of the radioactive cloud will reach the US border at Niagara Falls at some !~8 hours. From Tamplin's data*on maximum expected by fallout at 48 hours, we can expect the fraction of tbe total cloud radioactivity that wilJ. fall out is -14 8 x 10 per sq. meter. Now, let us estimate the agricultural contamination. At 48 hours, dispersion of the cloud will make the cloud diameter approximately 293 miles (0-= l .1 8xl05 meters, di ameter in 4xQ""; so diameter = 4. 72 x 105 meters, or 293 mi.1.cs) . So, a sector of the country, centering upon Barnwell wilJ. be involved. 750 miles The overall area involved will be (750~(~9) ) + 1/2 the Cloud Area, or 2 - 110,000 + 1/ 2 (67,800) 110000 + 33,900 = 144,ooo sq. miles. * See previous Tamplin reference now badly will milk f rom this region of 144,000 square mile s be contaminated? We can be conservative , and thereby under estimate the seriousness of the proble m by con sidering all parts of the re gion to be contaminated only as badly as the most distant region -that is at 750 miles from Barnwell. We can be certain that in all re gions clo ser to Barnwell the contamination will be~ severe . We reca ll t hat our inv entory (Table I ) contains c6 137 1165 megacuries, err 1165 X 1012 microcuries. Cs134 1129 megacuries, or 1129 X 1012 microcuries . sr96 792 megacuries, or --792 X 1012 microcuries . (1 Megacurie = 1012 microcuries) The dry fal lout depositions, for 1% inventory release, will be 12 14 For cs137 (11. 65x10) (8 x 10-) = 0.93 microcuries/sq. meter Csl34 (11 .29xlo 12) (8 x 10-14) * 0 .90 microcu ries/sq. meter Sr90 (7.92 x 1012 ) (8 x 10-14 ) = o.64 microcuries/sq . meter And from Table 3, we can estimate the dosage to be received via milk for forage receiving such depositions . These are tabulated in Table 2 . Table 2 Dosage to Chil dren via the Milk Pathway Radionuclide Deposition Deposition required .. Dosage in Rads to g~ve l Rad v~a lWhole Body) Milk via Milk (Whole Body) Microcur ie / Mic r ocurie / Sq meter sq . meter 157Cs 0 .1 2 Csl34 0.90 0.058 sr90 o.64 0.038 16.9 Total Dosage in Rads (via Milk) 40. 3 Rads It is absolutely unthinkable that milk conta minated to this degree can be consumed. Children dri nking such milk would have a four -fold increase in risk -14 or cancer and leukemia. Fresh agricultural produce from this .region of 144,000 square miles would be obviously unsalable. While, after a period of months, t he milk l evel will be much reduced, the agricultural produce from the reg i on would be unacceptable for many years, because of radioactivity acquired in the produce via the soil-root :i;:athway (much, much less active than the early milk, but WlB.cceptable). It is important to have a good idea of what 144,000 square miles of agricul t ural land be ing rendered unusable really means. For the wind direction in g cons id er ed , this would mean render/ unusable for agriculture the following: Approx. 1/10 of South Carolina plus app rox. 1/ 10 of North Carolina plu s approx. 1/5 of Virginia plus most of West Virginia plus approx . 1/6 of Ohio plus more than 1/2 of Pennsylvania plus approx. 1/4 of New York State plus a si gnific ant part of Ontario province in Canada. Thi s represents a minimum tabulation, for fallout rendering agricultural land unusable will still be occurring beyond 48 hours, and hence encompassing more of Ontario province, Quebec and much more of New York State. The economic costs alone will undoubtedly be in the multi-billion dollar cate Bory, not to mention indignation , rage, fear, and dislocation. And of course, if the wind were blowin g in some different di recti on, the ~involved will be the same, but the victimized states would be diffe ren t . It would only be lessen ed if the wind happened to be blowing to the Southeast, since much of the fallout would then be over the ocean. Thus, t he overall magnitude of th e disaster will be comparable with that previous ly described fo r rainout of the radioactivity. In one case (wi th rain ) w~ contemplate evacuation of milli ons of people; in th e other case (witho ut rain), the agricultural loss is stagg ering beyond usual comprehension. The Conseguences of an 0.01% Release of the Barnwell Inventory (One-ten thousandth of the Total Inventory ) We have seen above that l'{o release can lead to massive evacuation of major populatio n centers. And we shall now see the very serious economic consequences of even one-hund redth of this quantity released . For this we shall direct our ' attention to the ef fec t of deposited radioactivity upon forage, thence to milk to be consumed by chil dren . We shall consider three radionuclides, cs 137, cs 134, and sr90. From Table l we have the inventory at 5 years as ll65 Megacuries of Csl37, 1129 Megacuries of cs 134, and separately, that there would be 792 Megacuries of Sr9 0. Ng and co-workers* have calculated the minimum deposition of these radio nuclides required to deliver l Rad to children drinking 1 liter of milk per day. This is the ao-called "grass -cow-milk -child" pathway. The values are listed below in Table 3. (1 Rad is approximately equivalent to lR). Table "3 Minimum Deposition on Forage to Give 1 Rad to Children Via th e Forage to Milk Pathway (Whole Body) Radi onuclide Half Lif'e Minimum Deoosition reauired to gi ve l Rad** microcuriesLsg. meter cur i es Lsg. m1le Csl37 30 years 1.2 X 10-1 0.31 134 2 Cs 2.1 years 5.8 X 10-0.15 2 Sr90 28 years 3.8 X 10 0.0 98 Let us consider the case described above, rainout at 24 hour s, such that 33,400 sq. miles of land r eceives th e depo sition . Since we are here conc erne d with a gr icultural land, it is of little moment what the wind direct ion or speed is . *UCRL 50163 Part DI, May l l~, 1968. Cs137 **Dr. Ng (personal communicatio n) suggests the and cs134 values may be raised , from more recent data, which would reduce their contribution to dosage. However, the changes would nQt mateiially alter conclusions about unacceptability of milk contaminated by cs 1Jr csl3 and sr90 ' ' -16 l of the invent ory at Barnwell to be involved in And we are a ssumi ng 10, 000 the deposition. Therefore 1 X 1165 =0.1 165 megacurie s Csl37 ( 116,500 curies) 10000 1 X 1129 = 0.1129 mega curies Cs1:;4 ( 112900 curies) 10000 .. Sr 90 curie l X 792 = 0.0792 megacuries (7 9,200 s ) 10000 Depos ition s are For C 137 116500 = 3.5 curies/sq . mile s ' 33400 134 112200 For Cs , = 3.4 curies/sq. mil e 33400 90 12~00 For Sr , = 2.4 curies/sq . mile 33400 Translating these into rads delivered via the milk pathway Csl37 ::: For 3.5/0.31 11.2 rads Csl34 For 3,. 4/0.15 = 22 . 7 rads Eor Sr90 2.4/0 .098 = 24.5 rads Total 58.4 rads Children drinking such milk would receive 58.4 rads, which is more than 100 times the yearly "allowable" dose. Such a dose would cause a many-fold increase in cancers and leukemias in such children. It is obvious that milk from these 33,400 square miles is unthinkable for drinking purposes . The loss to agriculture from thi s and cr op contamination would be phenomenal. In time, the csl34, cs 137, and Sr9 0 would find their way into the soil, having been weathered off the forage. But the agricultural problem is not over, for we must now consider crops grown in the ar ea, the so -called "soil-root pathway". From Ng et al, we have the data for the deposition required to give one Rad by the soil -root pathway, present ed in Table IV. -1 7 Table l~ Minimur:1 Deposition Requi red to Give 1 Rad to Children via the Soil -Root Pathway Radionuc lide Half Li fe De osition Re uired t o Give l rad microcuries s meter curies s . mile Csl 57 50 years X 4.2 102 1090 Csl34 2.1 years 1.3 X 103 3370 Sr 28 years 4.8 X 10 124 Csl 37 ;;;: Contribution from 3 .5 / 1090-0.003 rads c sl 34 ;;;: 3.4 /33 70 = 0.001 rads Sr90 2 . 4/ 124 = 0 . 019 rads Total = 0.023 rads While the se doses are not "disastrously" high, I would doubt that such agricu l tu ral products would be sal able, and the effect would last fo r many years. The combina tion of severe early contamination of milk and crops fr om such a region, followed by lon g term significant, unacce ptable contamina tion of crops from an area like 33, 000 square mil es (that happens to be an area just a little larger than South Caroli na ) would represent economic lo sses in the bill ion dollar clas s. And all this if only one ten-thousandth of the Barnwell inven to r y of radioactivity were re leas ed to the atmosphe re . Some Side Effects of Either Type of Acciden át There is little doubt about one primary effect of eith e r type of accident, which would be an immediate demand by the public for a shutdown, not only of Ba rrn:e 11 but also of the entire nuclear power industry. And I must say I believe this reuctio n woul d be t o tally approp riat e, since th e warnings concerning such possi bilit ies have been quite broadly presented. The:ce woulcl be no reasonable excuse by the nuclear industry . And th e wide spread public antipathy to Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil Corporat ion might lead to boycotts that could shake these industries economically beyond repair . The South Carolina Legislature would have a great deal of explaining to do to the citizens of South caroli na and other states. -18 The Plutonium Product There are two oroduct s of the Barnwell Fa cility, uranium and plutonium. There is little, if any reason to be concerned about the uranium product . There are several reasons to con s ider that the plutonium product may be a tota l nightmare . The AGNS report states carefully that plutonium must be absolutely contained in the course of shipment away from the plant. And it states further that there exists considerable difference of opinion concerning how thi s may be accomplished . But one does not acquire a real feeling for the fantastic implications of the quantities of plutonium that will be shipped. There are two problems pr esented by the plutonium product: ( 1) The Safeguards Problem ( 2) The Extreme Toxicity of Plutonium The Safeguards Problem Plutonium has other uses besides its being a fu el for electric pqwer production. Specifically it is the basic ingredient for the simple fabrication of atom bombs. Throughout th e world, authorities on nucle ar energy regard the danger of diversion of plutonium by black DBrket techniques either to governments or to private organizations as a ma.jor, unsolved problem. Let us consider some of the quantities involved in Barnwell shipments and compare them with the 14 pounds (7 kilograms) widely stated to be about the amount requi r ed for a 20 Kiloton atom bomb like that which demolished Nagasaki. From Table 3.6-1 in the Barnwell report, the datum is given that each ton of uranium processed will yield 338Curies of Plutonium -239, the desired product. One Curie of Plutonium represents approximately 16 grams of Pu239, In one year at Barnwell, there will be 1500 tons of uranium process ed, so the annual plutonium product requiring shipment will be (338)(16)(1500) ¥ 8,J.10,000 grams of plutonium, or á8110 kilograms. That's enough to mke about 1100 Nagasaki-type atom bombs, a very interesting quantity indeed for the future black market in plutonium. On page 30, Append-ix VII of the Barnwell Environmental Report, it is stated that the plutonium will be shipped in solution as plutonium nitrate in containers, each holding 25 kilograms of plutonium. It is stated there that 2 to 3 such containers will be carried per truck shipment. So we can ~y that on the avera ge , there will be approximately 63 ki~ograms of plutonium per shipment. For a total of 8110 kilograms of plutonium, this means 8110 , or about 125 separate 63 shipments per year out of Barnwell. . Each shipment represents enough plutonium for about 9 atom bombs (Nagasaki size). Can such shipments be hijacked? Before answering this question, it i s worthwhile asking another question. If, two years ago, one had been asked about the liklihood that three huge airliners would be successfully hijacked to the Middle East within~ week by terrorists, I am sure the probabil ity estimate would have been vanishingly small. Unti l it happened. Anyone who underestimates the ingenuity of determined terrorists and underworld operators does so at grave peril. The probability that a plutonium shipment will be hijacked successfully will .be estimated as very low until the first shipment is hijacked . The Toxicit y of Plutonium There is a great deal in the Barnwell Report about the i r radiatio n of bone by pluto nium. I am more concerned about the production of lung cancer by plutonium . My colleague:, Donald Geesaman; ha::; publis hed estimates táhat the inhalation of 10, 000 par ti cle s of pluto nium dioxide rnny produce one fata l human lung cance r . I t doezn ' t require that Q.Q£.person inhale all 10,000 particle s -th is is a statistical problem, and it means that for every 10,000 particles inhaled into human lungs, there will be one lung cancer . Ten people inhaling 1000 particles each will r~áo,h:cc the sarni; cff0.ct n:, one person inhalin r, 10,000 p'.lrticlc:; . * GT-1 ~?1-70. Plutonium and Public Hea lth . Presented at Univ of Colorado , Boulder, Cul uru do, /\pdl 19, 19'/0 . -20 Let us go through the arithmetic relating to these plutonium shipments. For example, let us suppose that some terrorists were desirous of spreading plutonium oxide around near a major metropolitan center. Let us suppose that that one container with 25 kilograms of plutonium were exploded open by bombing or by some combination of bombing and fire. With high temperature~ much of the plutonium nitrate would be probably converted to plutonium oxide. We. can explore the worst case, namely all 25 kilograms conirerted to particles averaging one micron in diameter. -13 1 micron diameter means each particle has a volume of 5 x 10 cc. The den si ty of plutonium dioxide is ll.46 gms/cc. So each such particle has 13 10-12 (11.46)(5xlo- ) or 5.7 x grams of plutonium oxide.* So, for 25 kilograms, we get 25,000 or 4 .4 x 10 l5 particles. If 12 5.7 X 10all the se particles ultimately found their way into human lungs, that represents = 4.4 x 1011 lung cancers, Enough plutonium for 440 billion human lung cancers. Now, there are only 3 billion , people on earth, so we aren't going to get 440 billion lung cancers in any hurry. So, let us suppose there are a number of inefficiencies in this whole process, and as a result, only one particle out of ten million potential plutonium oxide particles finds its way into human inhalation pathways. That still means 44000 lung cancers could be produced as a result of this terrorist act. That's a lot of diplomatic leverage for terrorists. Please note that all the inhalation needn't occur right away. The plutonium oxide particles can settle to the ground, be resuspended and carried by winds over and over, even to very great distances from the point of original dispe rsal . With a half -life of 24,000 years, such plutonium will be around to pro duce ca ses of lun g cancer for periods of more than fifty times as long as world history from the birth of Christ to the present time. Every 10, 000 p:i.rticles inhaled can represent one fatal human cancer, where.Ver and for all practical *Barnwell Plutonium is even worse than Pu239, because of contamination with Pu23~ and Pu24-0. -21 purposes, whenever the plutonium is inhaled. We spread plutonium around Palomares, S:i;ain when one of our bombers crashed th ere. A massive clean-up campaign was carried through and shiploads of contaminated soil were collected to be returned to the USA. But people in Palomares are not too convinced all is well. Palomares is reported to be a ghost town area now. How many people will enjoy living near a site of a massive plutonium dispersal? If we ship enough plutonium on our highways, there are going to be some terrorist explosions and dispersal, and I would suspect there are going to be ghost towns in addition to old mining towns in Nevada and California. The Barnwell Facility points up some good reasons for the widespread concern over diversion of plutonium into the bands of terr~rists and the underworld. One small atom bomb, properly placed on the Barnwell Facility could, I would suspect, release a good deal more than one percent of the radioactivity inventory there. And we have already discussed the catastrophic potential consequences of a ~percent release. Recommendati ons We can all hope that neither the 1% release or the 0.01% release accidents ever occur at Barnwell. But hope alone is not enough. As stated at the outset, I am in no position to estimate the probability of either accident, from sabotage, from cooling equipment failure, from earthquake, or from hostile action. Certainly t he Barnwell Environmental Report provides nothing in the way of reassurance that such a ccidents cannot occur. Everything hinges on the probability that such re l eases may occ ur. I doubt that anyone can seriously chall enge the possible conse quences if the r el eases of this magnitude occur. Depending upon t he weather, t he pr ecise ma~ni tude of t he disaster, and i t s for m, can vary, but t he broad out lines ar e not overs tat ed . And we can all~ that plutonium diversion or dispersal into the environment will not occur. I am completely convinced that Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services feels it is doing its very best to make such accidents remote. But that is not sufficient assurance. That the AEC or its advisory committees have reviewed the project is also not good enough. No one of totally independent stature bas been ass .igned the specific job, of figuring out how such releases could occur, what all the vulnerabilities are, and what the chances are of such occurrence. And it is the absence of such critical engineering adversary review that is precisely what has been missing from every aspect of the entire nuclear power industry. The Board of Directors of the Allied Chemical Corporation should be demanding such an independent review. The Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation should be demanding this review. The Legislature of the State of Sout~ Carolina should be demanding this review. The health and fate of ten million or more Americans rray depend upon the answers. Perhaps this discussion may help clarify why an increasing body of opinion expresses concern over the development of the nuclear power industry. The morality of going ahead with the nuclear power industry deserves serious questioning. Especially is this true when the prospects are so bright for alternatives, such as generation of all the electricity we could~ require from solar energy. South Carolina, and Barnwell County in particular, needs industry and needs jobs. How much brighter our discussions today would be if Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil Corporations were proposing a major solar electricity research and development program at Barnwell. Such a facility providing 3000 jobs, not 300, ., would make excel l ent sense for the Corpora t ion~, for South Caroli na, and for the world . Soone r or later, thi s is inevitable, Why not sooner, and in South Carolina? Why not A.G.s.y. -Allied-Gulf Solar Facility? Toward a bright fu ture, rat her than a radioactive one. -...... - SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NUCLEAR STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA John W. Gofman, M. D., Ph.D. Division of Medical Physics University of California Berkeley, California A Supplement to Detailed Testi mony January 7, l 972 Summary Recommendations In the accompanying testimony I have estimated for you the potential conseque nces of certain relea ses of part of th e radioactivity inventory at ( the Bar nwell Fuel Reprocess in g Facili ty , at f ull ope ra tion. Those conse quences can be summarized in three very ~ bri ef statemen t s: (a) The possib l e evacuation of milli ons of humans bec ause of th e rende rin g of such citie s as Washington, D. C. , Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, or New York City uninhabit able. (b) Possible damages in the neighborhood of 10-Billion Dollars from a single such release . (c) Diversion of plutonium for black market atom bombs or plutonium poisoning . These es timates are, of course, a bit distu r bing . I hav e c arefull y avoided estim ating the chance of such an occurrence, because such an estimate is outside my area of expertise. But the South Carolina Legisl ature and the Boards of Directors of both Allied Chemical and Gul f Oil cannot avoid, and must not . avoid, acquisi tio n of reliable, independent assessment of such probabilities . It i s, of cours e, human nature to shy away from having to think about the unthinkabl e . And, hence , there is every reason to expect that, from several quarters, th e kinds of accidents discussed in the full testimony wi ll be dismissed out of hand. I have a const ru ctive suggestion to propose to you as a simple and rap i d met hod for elimin ation of obfuscatio n and cobweb-ado rn ed t hinking on such matters. -2-á I. Let us assume that the Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services CorJ;>oration deems the prospect of such accidents to be ridiculously small. II. If that should be the case, AGNS and the parent corporations would assuredly be happy to back that opinion with a full assurance of financial liability. At present, since liability is limited to 560-million dollars, it is clear that 95%of damages from a 10-billion dollar accident would necessarily be uncompensable. Therefore, I propose that the Legislature of South Carolina consider proposing to Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil the provision of a legal contract as follows: "In the event of an accident at the Barnwell Facility, the full financial resources of Allied Chemical and Gulf Oil CorJ;>orations will be available for compensation claims, over and above those covered by the , Price-Anderson Act insurance." Such a simple contractual document will provide an enormously effective fog-cutter on these matters. If, by any chance, the question is raised that such a contract conflicts in any way with Federal pre-emption, then I offer a second suggestion. That suggestion is that the Legislature of South Carolina will defer consideration of permitting f'uel reprocessing in South Carolina until the Price-Anderson Act is repealed, and financial responsibility is thereby restored to the nuclear power industry. The Allied Chemical Corporation, the Gulf Oil CorJ;>oration, and the Electric Utility Industry all should, of course, be in the forefront of a National demand for repeal of the Price-Anderson Act. These great industries -. .. -3 have so o~en expressed their full confidence in the safety of the nuclear power industry. The time has arrived for them, therefore, to take the lea.d. in removing those ominous clouds of doubt occasioned by the absence of adequate financial responsibility for this industry.