Failure to Audit Health
ICRP Publication 2 (1959) is one of special interest since it clearly
states that radiation-induced severe genetic defects and cancer deaths
resulting from the recommended standards would be expected to be
rare and hardly distinguishable from `natural' variations due to
non-radiation causes. The document goes on to point out that mild
mutations in offspring and general ill health in those exposed would
be the most frequent health effects of exposure, but these could not be
`detected' except by epidemiological surveys. ICRP Publication 2
made no recommendation that this more subtle widespread degradation of
public health be measured, although they mentioned that it
could be measured.[33]
At no time has there been an effort on
the part of governments to document fully the more subtle health
effects.
Workers,
military service personnel and the general public have
been given the impression that exposure to radiation involves a slight
risk of dying of cancer and that one's chances of escaping this are
better than the chances of escaping an automobile accident. The
probabilities of early occurrence of heart disease, diabetes mellitus,
arthritis, asthma or severe allergies -- all resulting in a prolonged state
of ill health -- are never mentioned. Most people are unaware of the
fact that ionising radiation can cause spontaneous abortions,
stillbirths, infant deaths, asthmas, severe allergies, depressed immune
systems (with greater risk of bacterial and viral infections),
leukaemia, solid tumours, birth defects, or mental and physical
retardation in children. Most of the above-mentioned tragedies affect
the individual or family unit directly and society only indirectly. Dr
R. Mole, a member of ICRP and the British NRPB, stated: `The most
important consideration is the generally accepted value judgment that
early embryonic losses are of little personal or social
concern.'[34]
There are similar value judgments made with respect to other health
effects. The health problems are externalised, i.e. placed beyond the
responsibility of government, and they
are borne by individuals and their families.
The
risk/benefit decision making which arose from balancing `health
effects' against `economic and social benefit' is based on risk and
benefit to society, i.e. governments, rather than cost to the individual
or family unit. Value judgments have been made as to the level of
health effects and deaths `acceptable' to the public. Because of
military control of A-bomb studies and military need for personnel to
handle radioactive materials, many of these value judgments were
cloaked in secrecy for the sake of `national security'. The subject was
made to seem complicated to outsiders; the decisions were reserved
for the experts. The now famous words of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, `Keep the public
confused'[35]
about nuclear fission so that
the government could gain public acceptance of above-ground weapon
testing in Nevada, have certainly been accomplished. A growing
number of people in the USA and elsewhere have lost all faith in
statements made by government officials, because of the scientific
jargon used to mask the truth.
In
the USA, external radiation exposure records (film badge and
TLD[a]
readings) are carefully kept for workers, but corresponding
health records for workers are not kept and analysed nationally. In
other countries, especially those with socialised medicine, excellent
health records are kept but accurate radiation exposure records are
neglected. Collection and analysis of radiation exposure records
together with experience of ill health, including chronic long-term
(non-fatal) problems, are required in order accurately to assess
radiation-related health problems. Merely recording the first cause of
death for workers is not sufficient.
The
public is at an even greater disadvantage than the worker. There
are no cumulative records of radiation exposures for individual
members of the public from nuclear testing, military or commercial
nuclear industries anywhere in the world. Because of this
record-keeping vacuum, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
challenge ICRP predictions.
Inadequate
collection of information on public health by
governments makes it difficult for scientists concerned about rising
radiation exposure levels to document changes in public health. The
problem is not that they are poor scientists, but that they do not have
access to detailed information, since governments have failed to
collect it. The health changes which can be detected, in spite of poor
records, represent only a minute proportion of the undocumented
whole.
One
key to understanding what priority a country places on the
health consequences of national defence and energy choices is the
precision of its measurements of resultant health effects. Measurements
of health effects can be made through controlled
animal experiments or observation of the effects of unplanned human
exposures. These measurements serve as an audit of human health
effects or as an after-the-fact check on the accuracy of predictions. This
technique of controlled observation is normally applied when a
new drug or new medical procedure is introduced into general use. A
prediction must prove its worth in real life.
As
one would expect, predictive dose/response estimates for
radiation exposure and specifically chosen severe health effects have
been prolific in the USA. Not only has the USA maintained a tight
control over and interest in research on the Japanese survivors of
radiation exposure from the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, it also has a system of government-sponsored research
laboratories controlled successively by the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration
and the Department of Energy. These bodies have been the source of
almost all the original research papers published between 1945 and
1977 on the health effects of ionising radiation. Because
radiation-related health effects are the result of the production, testing
and use of atomic weapons, military goals and military secrecy have
influenced both the selection of research questions and release of
findings in the USA. The nuclear age is predicated on public
acceptance of its consequences, hence `proving' that public
acceptance is `rational' has a very high priority for government and
industry-employed scientists. They have a vested interest in verifying
the status quo.
Prior
to the above-ground nuclear weapon test ban in 1963, the USA
set off at least 183 atmospheric nuclear tests, more than all the other
nations of the world combined. About half these tests were set off near
the Pacific Trust Territory of Micronesia, given into US protection by
the United Nations after the Second World War, and
the other half were set off on the 1,350 square miles at the Nevada
Test Site north of Las Vegas. By 1978 the USA had set off an
additional 400 nuclear bombs below ground in Nevada, some of which
were officially admitted to have `leaked' large amounts of radioactive
chemicals. Some of the tests were of UK weapons since it also uses
the Nevada test site. Underground tests are still taking place in the
USA,[36]
the USSR and French Polynesia. In the Northern Hemisphere,
above-ground tests have also been detonated by the USSR, China and
India and in the Southern Hemisphere by France and South Africa.
The
Nevada nuclear tests have spread radiation poisons throughout
central and eastern United States and Canada, and produced in the
stratosphere a layer of radioactive material which encircles the
globe. They also cause nitric oxides to form in the atmosphere which then
descend on earth as acid rain. Radioactive chemicals can now be
found in the organs, tissues and bones of every individual in the
Northern Hemisphere, and the contamination from past nuclear
explosions will continue to cause environmental and health problems
for hundreds of thousands of years, even if all nuclear activities are
stopped today. Siberian tests affect the north polar region.
Pollution
of the Southern Hemisphere, though less than in the North,
is progressing along the same path. Although the United States and
Great Britain have ceased nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, France
has not ceased them, and it appears that South Africa has begun to
test. Brazil, Argentina and other nations are thought to be developing
a nuclear weapon capability.
A
1977 report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation stated that twenty atmospheric nuclear
tests -- six in the Northern Hemisphere and fourteen in the Southern
Hemisphere -- plus unnumbered underground tests, took place between
1972 and 1977. As a result of this nuclear testing radiation doses to
the population increased by about 2 percent in the Northern
Hemisphere, and 6 percent in the Southern Hemisphere over the dose
estimated in 1970. The nuclear weapon testing carried out between
1972 and 1977 was insignificant when compared to that between 1945
and 1963.
The total global dose commitment for each individual from all
nuclear explosions carried out before 1976 ranges from about 100
mrad (in the gonads) to about 200 mrad (in the bone-lining cells). In
the northern temperate zone the values are about 50 percent
higher, and in the southern temperate zone about 50 percent lower
than these
estimates.[37]
This estimate does not include the dose from radioactive carbon
(carbon 14) which, because of its 5730-year half-life, persists in the
human food chain and has not yet taken its total human toll. For
comparison purposes, 100 mrad is about equal to the amount of
radiation a person receives from naturally occurring radiation in one
year of chronological ageing. The dose commitment from nuclear
weapon testing is spread over a fifty-year period, with most of the dose
being delivered in the first year.
There
has been no lack of victims of radiation pollution in the West
to study both for refinement of predictions of biological harm and
checks of adequacy of predictions relative to the real-life
situation. Checking adequacy of predictions means including
all hidden costs which must eventually be paid, including damage to
agriculture and the biosphere. Government oversight should also include full
disclosure of findings to the public as a test of the acceptability of
such costs and as an evaluation of the judgments made for society by
the nuclear experts.
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