PROPAGANDA
THE FORMATION OF MEN’S ATTITUDES
JACQUES ELLUL
AUTHOR OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
PROPAGANDA
The Formation of
Men’s Attitudes
BY
JACQUES ELLUL
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
KONRAD KELLEN AND JEAN LERNER
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
KONRAD KELLEN
VINTAGE BOOKS
A DIVISION OF RANDOM HOUSE
NEW YORK
Introduction
Jacques Ellul’s view of propaganda and his approach to the study
of propaganda are new. The principal difference between his
thought edifice and most other literature on propaganda is that
Ellul regards propaganda as a sociological phenomenon rather
than as something made by certain people for certain purposes.
Propaganda exists and thrives; it is the Siamese twin of our tech-
nological society. Only in the technological society can there be
anything of the type and order of magnitude of modem propa-
ganda, which is with us forever; and only with the all-pervading
effects that flow from propaganda can the technological society
hold itself together and further expand.
Most people are easy prey for propaganda, Ellul says, because
of their firm but entirely erroneous conviction that it is composed
only of lies and "tall stories” and that, conversely, what is true
cannot be propaganda. But modem propaganda has long dis-
dained the ridiculous lies of past and outmoded forms of propa-
ganda. It operates instead with many different lands of truth—
half truth, limited truth, truth out of context. Even Goebbels
always insisted that Wehrmacht communiques be as accurate as
possible.
A second basic misconception that makes people vulnerable to
propaganda is the notion that it serves only to change opinions.
oi)
That is one of its aims, but a limited, subordinate one. Much more
importantly, it aims to intensify existing trends, to sharpen and
focus them, and, above all, to lead men to action (or, when it is
directed at immovable opponents, to non-action through terror
or discouragement, to prevent them from interfering). Therefore
Ellul distinguishes various forms of propaganda and calls his book
Propagandas—that plural is one of the keys to his concept. The
most trenchant distinction made by Ellul is between agitation
propaganda and integration propaganda. The former leads men
from mere resentment to rebellion; the latter aims at making them
adjust themselves to desired patterns. The two types rely on en-
tirely different means. Both exist all over the world. Integration
propaganda is needed especially for the technological society to
flourish, and its technological means—mass media among them
^-in turn make such integration propaganda possible.
A related point, central in Ellul's thesis, is that modem propa-
ganda cannot work without “education"; he thus reverses the
widespread notion that education is the best prophylactic against
propaganda. On the contrary* he says, education, or what usually
goes by that word in the modem world, is the absolute prerequisite
for propaganda. In fact, education is largely identical with what
Ellul calls “pre-propaganda”—the conditioning of minds with vast
amounts of incoherent information, already dispensed for ulterior
purposes and posing as “facts” and as “education.” Ellul follows
through by designating intellectuals as virtually the most vul-
nerable of all to modem propaganda, for three reasons: (1) they
absorb the largest amount of secondhand, unverifiable informa-
tion; (2) they feel a compelling need to have an opinion on every
important question of our time, and thus easily succumb to opin-
ions offered to them by propaganda on all such indigestible pieces
of information; (3) they consider themselves capable of “judging
for themselves.” They literally need propaganda.
In fact, the need for propaganda on the part of the “propa-
gandee” is one of the most powerful elements of Elluls thesis.
Cast out of the disintegrating microgroups of the past, such as
family, church, or village, the individual is plunged into mass
society and thrown back upon his own inadequate resources, his
isolation, his loneliness, his ineffectuality. Propaganda then hands
him in veritable abundance what he needs: a raison cFStre, per-
sonal involvement and participation in important events, an outlet
Introduction (vii
and excuse for some of his more doubtful impulses, righteousness
—all factitious, to be sure, all more or less spurious; but he drinks
it all in and asks for more. Without this intense collaboration by
the propagandee the propagandist would be helpless.
Thus propaganda, by first creating pseudo-needs through
"pre-propaganda" and then providing pseudo-satisfactions for
them, is pernicious. Can wholesome propaganda be made for a
wholesome cause? Can Democracy, Christianity, Humanism be
propagated by modem propaganda techniques? Ellul traces the
similarities among all propaganda efforts—Communist, Nazi,
Democratic. He thinks that no one can use this intrinsically un-
democratic weapon—or, rather, abandon himself to it—unscathed
or without undergoing deep transformations in the process. He
shows the inevitable, unwilled propaganda effects of which the
"good" propagandist is unaware, die "fallout" from any major
propaganda activity and all its pernicious consequences. Most
pernicious of all: the process, once fully launched, tends to become
irreversible.
Ellul critically reviews what most American authors have writ-
ten on the subject of propaganda and mass media, having studied
the literature from Lasswell to Riesman with great thoroughness.
Accepting some of their findings, he rejects others, particularly
the efforts to gauge the effects of propaganda. Ellul believes that,
on the whole, propaganda is much more effective, and effective
in many more ways, than most American analysis shows. Particu-
larly, he rejects as unrealistic and meaningless all experiments that
have been conducted with small groups; propaganda is a unique
phenomenon that results from the totality of forces pressing in
upon an individual in his society, and therefore cannot be dupli-
cated in a test tube.
To make his many original points, Ellul never relies on statistics
or quantification, which he heartily disdains, but on observation
and logic. His treatise is a fully integrated structure of thought
in which every piece fits in with all the others—be they a hundred
pages apart. In this respect his work resembles Schopenhauer s
The World as Will and Idea, of which the philosopher said that
the reader, really to understand the book, must read it twice
because no page in the book could be fully understood without
knowledge of die whole. This procedure can hardly be suggested
to the reader in our busy days. But he ought to be warned that to
via)
leaf through this book will not suffice. Paul Pickrel, in Harpers
Magazine, said of Ellul's The Technological Society that Ellul—
“a great man"—had written with “monumental calm and madden-
ing thoroughness ... a magnificent book." Elluls Propaganda is
no less maddening, monumental, and thorough.
What, in Ellul's view, can mankind do? At the end of this book,
Ellul reaches neither a pessimistic nor an optimistic conclusion
with regard to the future. He merely states that, in his view,
propaganda is today a greater danger to mankind than any of the
other more grandly advertised threats hanging over the human
race. His super-analysis ends with a warning, not a prophecy.
February 1965
Konrad Kellen
Preface
Propaganda, by whatever name we may call it, has become a very
general phenomenon in the modem world. Differences in political
regimes matter little; differences in social levels are more impor-
tant; and most important is national self-awareness. In the world
today there are three great propaganda blocs: the U.S.S.R., China,
and the United States. These are the most important propaganda
systems in terms of scope, depth, and coherence. Incidentally,
they represent three entirely different types and methods of propa-
ganda.
Next are the propaganda systems—in various stages of develop-
ment and effectiveness, but less advanced than in the “Three”—
of a whole group of countries. These are the socialist republics of
Europe and Asia: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
East Germany, North Vietnam; they model their propaganda on
that of the U.S.S.R., albeit with some gaps, some lack of under-
standing, and without adequate resources. Then there are West
Germany, France, Spain, Egypt, South Vietnam, and Korea, with
less elaborate and rather diffuse forms of propaganda. Countries
such as Italy and Argentina, which once had powerful propaganda
systems, no longer use this weapon.
Whatever the diversity of countries and methods, they have one
*)
characteristic in common: concern with effectiveness.1 Propa-
ganda is made, first of all, because of a will to action, for the
purpose of effectively arming policy and giving irresistible power
to its decisions.2 Whoever handles this instrument can be con-
cerned solely with effectiveness. This is the supreme law, which
must never be forgotten when the phenomenon of propaganda is
analyzed. Ineffective propaganda is no propaganda. This instru-
ment belongs to the technological universe, shares its characteris-
tics, and is indissolubly linked to it.
Not only is propaganda itself a technique, it is also an indis-
pensable condition for the development of technical progress and
the establishment of a technological civilization. And, as with all
techniques, propaganda is subject to the law of efficiency. But
whereas it is relatively easy to study a precise technique, whose
scope can be defined, a study of propaganda runs into some ex-
traordinary obstacles.
From the outset it is obvious that there is great uncertainty
about the phenomenon itself, arising first of all from a priori
moral or political concepts. Propaganda is usually regarded as an
evil; this in itself makes a study difficult. To study anything prop-
erly, one must put aside ethical judgments. Perhaps an objective
study will lead us back to them, but only later, and with full
cognizance of the facts.
A second source of confusion is the general conviction, derived
from past experience, that propaganda consists mainly of utall
stories” disseminated by means of lies. To adopt this view is
to prevent oneself from understanding anything about the ac-
tual phenomenon, which is very different from what it was in the
past.
Even when these obstacles have been removed, it is still very
difficult to determine what constitutes propaganda in our world
and what the nature of propaganda is. This is because it is a secret
action. The temptation is then twofold: to agree with Jacques * *
1 Goebbels said: "We do not talk to say something, but to obtain a certain effect"
And F. C. Bartlett accurately states that the goal of propaganda is not to increase
political understanding of events, but to obtain results through action.
* Harold D. Lasswelis definition of the goal of propaganda is accurate: "To
maximize the power at home by subordinating groups and individuals, while
reducing the material cost of power.” Similarly, in war, propaganda is an attempt
to win victory with a minimum of physical expense. Before the war, propaganaa
is a substitute for physical violence; during the war, it is a supplement to it
Preface ( x i
Driencourt that “everything is propaganda” because everything
in the political or economic spheres seems to be penetrated and
molded by this force; or, as certain modem American social scien-
tists have done, to abandon the term propaganda altogether be-
cause it cannot be defined with any degree of precision. Either
course is inadmissible intellectual surrender. To adopt either atti-
tude would lead us to abandon the study of a phenomenon that
exists and needs to be defined.
We then came up against the extreme difficulty of definition.
We can immediately discard such simplistic definitions as Mar-
bury B. Ogle's: “Propaganda is any effort to change opinions or
attitudes. ... The propagandist is anyone who communicates his
ideas with the intent of influencing his listener.” Such a definition
would include the teacher, the priest, indeed any person convers-
ing with another on any topic. Such a broad definition clearly
does not help us to understand the specific character of propa-
ganda.
As far as definitions are concerned, there has been a character-
istic evolution in the United States. From 1920 to about 1933 the
main emphasis was on the psychological: Propaganda is a mani-
pulation of psychological symbols having goals of which the
listener is not conscious.*
Since the appearance of LasswelTs studies, propaganda by
other means and with stated objectives has been considered pos-
sible. Attention then became focused on the intention of the
propagandist. In more recent books, the aim to indoctrinate—
particularly in regard to political, economic, and social matters
—has been regarded as the hallmark of propaganda. Within this
frame of reference one could determine what constitutes propa-
ganda by looking at the propagandist—such and such a person
is a propagandist, therefore his words and deeds are propaganda.
But it appears that American authors eventually accepted the
definition given by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis and
inspired by Lasswell:
“Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions carried out
deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing
•John Albig has named these elements of definition: the secret character of the
sources and goals of propaganda; the intention to modify opinions; the dissemina-
tion of conclusions of doubtful validity; the notion of inculcating ideas rather than
explaining them. This is partially correct, but outdated.
xii)
the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predeter-
mined ends and through psychological manipulations.”4
We could quote definitions for pages on end. An Italian author,
Antonio Miotto, says that propaganda is a “technique of social
pressure which tends to create psychological or social groups with
a unified structure across the homogeneity of the affective and
mental states of the individuals under consideration." For Leonard
W. Doob, the well-known American specialist, it is “an attempt
to modify personalities and control the behavior of individuals
in relation to goals considered non-scientific or of doubtful value
in a specific society and time period."
And we would find even more remote definitions, if we exam-
ined the German or Russian literature on the subject.
I will not give a definition of my own here. I only wanted to
show the uncertainty among specialists on the question. I consider
it more useful to proceed with the analysis of the characteristics
of propaganda as an existing sociological phenomenon. It is per-
haps proper to underline this term. We shall examine propaganda
in both its past and present forms; for obviously we cannot elimi-
nate from our study the highly developed propaganda systems of
Hitlers Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Fascist Italy. This seems
obvious, but is not: many writers do not agree with this approach.
They establish a certain image or definition of propaganda, and
proceed to the study of whatever corresponds to their definition;
or, yielding to the attraction of a scientific study, they try to ex-
periment with some particular method of propaganda on small
groups and in small doses—at which moment it ceases to be
propaganda.
To study propaganda we must turn not to the psychologist, but
to the propagandist; we must examine not a test group, but a
whole nation subjected to real and effective propaganda. Of
course this excludes all so-called scientific (that is, statistical)
types of study, but at least we shall have respected the object of
our study—unlike many present-day specialists who establish a
rigorous method of observation, but, in order to apply it, lose the *
* The idea is often added that propaganda deals with “controversial questions in a
group.” More profound is Daniel Lemer’s idea that propaganda is a means of
altering power ratios in a group by modifying attitudes through manipulation of
symboG. However, I am not entirely in agreement with the exclusively psychological
character of this definition.
Preface (xiii
object to be studied. Rather, we shall consider what the nature
of propaganda is wherever it is applied and wherever it is domi-
nated by a concern for effectiveness.
Finally, we take the term propaganda in its broadest sense, so
that it embraces the following areas:
Psychological action: The propagandist seeks to modify opinions
by purely psychological means; most often he pursues a semi-
educative objective and addresses himself to his fellow citizens.
Psychological warfare: Here the propagandist is dealing with a
foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by psycho-
logical means so that the opponent begins to doubt the validity
of his beliefs and actions.8
Re-education and brainwashing: Complex methods of transform-
ing an adversary into an ally which can be used only on prisoners.
Public and human relations: These must necessarily be included
in propaganda. This statement may shock some readers, but we
shall show that these activities are propaganda because they seek
to adapt the individual to a society, to a living standard, to an
activity. They serve to make him conform, which is the aim of
all propaganda.
Propaganda in its broad sense includes all of these. In the nar-
row sense it is characterized by an institutional quality. In propa-
ganda we find techniques of psychological influence combined
with techniques of organization and the envelopment of people
with the intention of sparking action. This, then, will be the broad
field of our inquiry.
From this complete universe of propaganda I have deliberately
excluded the following subjects found in most propaganda studies:
Historical accounts of propaganda, particularly of the recent
past: propaganda in 1914 or 1940, and so forth.
Propaganda and public opinion as an entity, considering public
opinion, its formation, and so forth, as the major problem, and
propaganda as a simple instrument for forming or changing
opinion as the minor problem.
Psychological foundations of propaganda: On what prejudices,
drives, motivations, passions, complexes, does the propagandist
play? What psychic force does he utilize to obtain his results?
The techniques of propaganda: How does the propagandist 5 *
5 Maurice M^gret’s analysis distinguishes three parts: a propaganda agency (support
of military operations); a politico-military action (to insure the submission of the
population by technical, non-violent means); a coherent thought system.
xio)
put the psychic force into action, how can he reach people, how
can he induce them to act?
The media of propaganda: the mass media of communication.
Such are the five chapter headings found everywhere. Some-
what less common are studies on the characteristics of the great
examples of propaganda: Hitlerite, Stalinist, American, and so on.
These are omitted here precisely because they have been fre-
quently analyzed. The reader will find in the bibliography all that
is useful to laiow on each of these questions. I have instead tried
to examine aspects of propaganda very rarely treated—to adopt a
point of view, a perspective, an unorthodox view. I have sought
to use a method that is neither abstract nor statistical, but occa-
sionally relies on existing studies. The reader should know that he
is not dealing with an Encyclopedia of Propaganda, but with a
work that assumes his familiarity with its psychological founda-
tions, techniques, and methods, and that endeavors to bring con-
temporary man a step closer to an awareness of propaganda—the
very phenomenon that conditions and regulates him.
On the other hand, I have considered propaganda as a whole.
It is usual to pass ethical judgments on its ends, judgments that
then redound on propaganda considered as a means, such as:
Because democracy is good and dictatorship bad, propaganda
serving a democracy is good even if as a technique it is identical
with propaganda serving a dictatorship. Or, because Socialism is
good and Fascism bad, propaganda is not altogether evil in the
hands of Socialists, but is totally evil in Fascist hands.81 repudiate
this attitude. Propaganda as a phenomenon is essentially the same
in China or the Soviet Union or the United States or Algeria.
Techniques tend to align themselves with one another. The media
of dissemination may be more or less perfected, more or less
directly used, just as organizations may be more or less effective,
but that does not change the heart of the problem: those who
accept the principle of propaganda and decide to utilize it will
inevitably employ the most effective organization and methods.7
Moreover, the premise of this book is that propaganda, no matter
who makes it—be he the most upright and best-intentioned of
8 This is what Serge Tchakhotin claims.
7 As M^gret has said, the officers in Indochina who came in contact with North
Vietnamese propaganda had an “over-all political view” that substituted itself for
the “fragmented use of the technical means” of propaganda; all this is part of the
progression from old ideas to new phenomena.
Preface (xv
men—has certain identical results in Communism or Hitlerism
or Western democracy, inevitable results on the individual or
groups, and different from the doctrine promulgated, or the
regime supported, by that propaganda. In other words, Hitlerism
as a regime had certain effects, and the propaganda used by the
Nazis undeniably had certain specific characteristics. But whereas
most analysts stop at this specificity, I have tried to eliminate it
in order to look only at the most general characteristics, the effects
common to all cases, to all methods of propaganda. Therefore I
have adopted the same perspective and the same method in study-
ing propaganda as in studying any other technique.
I shall devote much space to the fact that propaganda has
become an inescapable necessity for everyone. In this connection
I have come upon a source of much misunderstanding. Modem
man worships “facts”—that is, he accepts “facts” as the ultimate
reality. He is convinced that what is, is good. He believes that
facts in themselves provide evidence and proof, and he willingly
subordinates values to them; he obeys what he believes to be
necessity, which he somehow connects with the idea of progress.
This stereotyped ideological attitude inevitably results in a con-
fusion between judgments of probability and judgments of value.
Because fact is the sole criterion, it must be good. Consequently
it is assumed that anyone who states a fact (even without passing
judgment on it) is, therefore, in favor of it. Anyone who asserts
(simply stating a judgment of probability) that the Communists
will win some elections is immediately considered pro-Communist;
anyone who says that all human activity is increasingly dominated
by technology is viewed as a “technocrat”; and so on.
As we proceed to analyze the development of propaganda, to
consider its inescapable influence in the modem world and its
connection with all structures of our society, the reader will be
tempted to see an approval of propaganda. Because propaganda
is presented as a necessity, such a work would therefore force the
author to make propaganda, to foster it, to intensify it. I want to
emphasize that nothing is further from my mind; such an assump-
tion is possible only by those who worship facts and power. In
my opinion, necessity never establishes legitimacy; the world of
necessity is a world of weakness, a world that denies man. To say
that a phenomenon is necessary means, for me, that it denies man:
its necessity is proof of its power, not proof of its excellence.
xvi)
However, confronted by a necessity, man must become aware
of it, if he is to master it. As long as man denies the inevitability
of a phenomenon, as long as he avoids facing up to it, he will go
astray. He will delude himself, by submitting in fact to * neces-
sity” while pretending that he is free “in spite of it,” and simply
because he claims to be free. Only when he realizes his delusion
will he experience the beginning of genuine freedom—in the act
of realization itself—be it only from the effort to stand back and
look squarely at the phenomenon and reduce it to raw fact.
The force of propaganda is a direct attack against man. The
question is to determine how great is the danger. Most replies
are based on unconscious a priori dogmas. Thus the Communists,
who do not believe in human nature but only in the human con-
dition, believe that propaganda is all-powerful, legitimate (when-
ever they employ it), and instrumental in creating a new type
of man. American sociologists scientifically try to play down the
effectiveness of propaganda because they cannot accept the idea
that the individual—that cornerstone of democracy—can be so
fragile; and because they retain their ultimate trust in man. Per-
sonally, I, too, tend to believe in the pre-eminence of man and,
consequently, in his invincibility. Nevertheless, as I observe the
facts, I realize man is terribly malleable, uncertain of himself,
ready to accept and to follow many suggestions, and is tossed
about by all die winds of doctrine. But when, in the course of
these pages, I shall reveal the full power of propaganda against
man, when I advance to the very threshold of showing the most
profound changes in his personality, it does not mean I am anti-
democratic.
The strength of propaganda reveals, of course, one of the most
dangerous flaws of democracy. But that has nothing to do with
my own opinions. If I am in favor of democracy, I can only re-
gret that propaganda renders the true exercise of it almost impos-
sible. But I think it would be even worse to entertain any illusions
about a co-existence of true democracy and propaganda. Nothing
is worse in times of danger than to live in a dream world. To
warn a political system of the menace hanging over it does not
imply an attack against it, but is the greatest service one can
render the system. The same goes for man: to warn him of
his weakness is not to attempt to destroy him, but rather to
encourage him to strengthen himself. I have no sympathy with
\
Preface (xvii
the haughty aristocratic intellectual who judges from on high,
believing himself invulnerable to the destructive forces of his
time, and disdainfully considers the common people as cattle to
be manipulated, to be molded by the action of propaganda in the
most intimate aspects of their being. I insist that to give such
warning is an act in the defense of man, that I am not judging
propaganda with Olympian detachment, and that having suffered,
felt, and analyzed the impact of the power of propaganda on my-
self, having been time and again, and still being, the object of
propaganda, I want to speak of it as a menace which threatens
the total personality.
In order to delineate the real dimensions of propaganda we
must always consider it within the context of civilization. Per-
haps the most fundamental defect of most studies made on the
subject is their attempt to analyze propaganda as an isolated phe-
nomenon. This corresponds to the rather prevalent attitude that
separates socio-political phenomena from each other and of not
establishing any correlation between parts, an attitude that in
turn reassures die student of the validity of the various systems.
Democracy, for example, is studied as if the citizen were an en-
tity separate from the State, as if public opinion were a “thing
in itself"; meanwhile, the scientific study of public opinion and
propaganda is left to other specialists, and the specialist in public
opinion in turn relies on the jurist to define a suitable legal frame-
work for democracy. The problems of the technological society
are studied without reference to their possible influence on mental
and emotional life; the labor movement is examined without atten-
tion to the changes brought about by psychological means, and so
on.
Again I want to emphasize that the study of propaganda must
be conducted within the context of the technological society.
Propaganda is called upon to solve problems created by tech-
nology, to play on maladjustments, and to integrate the individ-
ual into a technological world. Propaganda is a good deal less
the political weapon of a regime (it is that also) than the effect
of a technological society that embraces the entire man and tends
to be a completely integrated society. At the present time, prop-
aganda is the innermost, and most elusive, manifestation of
this trend. Propaganda must be seen as situated at the center
of the growing powers of the State and governmental and ad-
xv Hi)
ministrative techniques. People keep saying: “Everything depends
on what kind of a State makes use of propaganda.” But if we
really have understood the technological State, such a statement
becomes meaningless. In the midst of increasing mechanization
and technological organization, propaganda is simply the means
used to prevent these things from being felt as too oppressive
and to persuade man to submit with good grace. When man
will be fully adapted to this technological society, when he will
end by obeying with enthusiasm, convinced of the excellence of
what he is forced to do, the constraint of the organization will
no longer be felt by him; the truth is, it will no longer be a con-
straint, and the police will have nothing to do. The civic and
technological good will and the enthusiasm for the right social
myths—both created by propaganda—will finally have solved the
problem of man.
2962
Jacques Ellul
Contents
chapter The Characteristics of Propaganda
1. EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS 6
The Individual and the Masses 6
Total Propaganda g
Continuity and Duration of Propaganda 17
Organization of Propaganda 20
Orthopraxy 25
2. INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS 33
Knowledge of the Psychological Terrain 33
Fundamental Currents in Society 38
Timeliness 43
Propaganda and the Undecided 48
Propaganda and Truth 52
The Problem of Factuality 53
Intentions and Interpretations 57
3. CATEGORIES OF PROPAGANDA 6l
Political Propaganda and Sociological Propaganda 62
Propaganda of Agitation and Propaganda of Integration 70
Vertical and Horizontal Propaganda
Rational and Irrational Propaganda
79
84
chapter 11—The Conditions for the Existence
of Propaganda
1. THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 90
Individualist Society and Mass Society 90
Opinion 99
The Mass Media of Communication 102
2. OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF TOTAL
PROPAGANDA 1°5
The Need of an Average Standard of Living 105
An Average Culture 108
Information 112
The Ideologies 116
chapter hi—The Necessity for Propaganda
1. THE STATENS NECESSITY 121
The Dilemma of the Modern State 121
The State and Its Function 133
2. THE individual’s NECESSITY 13®
The Objective Situation 139
The Subjective Situation 147
chapter iv—Psychological Effects of Propaganda
Psychological Crystallization 163
Alienation through Propaganda 169
The Psychic Dissociation Effect of Propaganda 178
Creation of the Need for Propaganda 182
Mithridatization 183
Sensibilization 184
The Ambiguity of Psychological Effects 187
Contents
(xxi
chapter y—The Socio-Political Effects
1. PROPAGANDA AND IDEOLOGY 193
The Traditional Relationship 193
The New Relationship 196
2. EFFECTS ON THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC
OPINION 202
Modification of the Constituent Elements of Public
Opinion 203
From Opinion to Action 207
3. PROPAGANDA AND GROUPING 212
The Partitioning of Groups 212
Effects on Political Parties 216
Effects on the World of Labor 222
Effects on the Churches 228
4. PROPAGANDA AND DEMOCRACY 232
Democracy3s Need of Propaganda 232
Democratic Propaganda 235
Effects of International Propaganda 242
Effects of Internal Propaganda 250
appendix 1—Effectiveness of Propaganda
1. DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING
EFFECTIVENESS 259
Difficulty of the Subject 260
Inadequacy of Methods
2. INEFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA 2ff
3. EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA 287
4. THE LIMITS OF PROPAGANDA 294
xxii)
appendix ii—Mao Tse-tungs Propaganda
i. the war: from 1926 to 1949 304
Education 304
Organization 305
2. SINCE 1949 307
Education 308
Encirclement 310
3. BRAINWASHING 311
BIBLIOGRAPHY 315
INDEX fottowt page 320
PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER
CO
THE
CHARACTERISTICS
OF PROPAGANDA
True modern propaganda can only function within the context
of the modem scientific system. But what is it? Many observers
look upon propaganda as a collection of “gimmicks” and of more
or less serious practices.1 And psychologists and sociologists very
often reject the scientific character of these practices. For our part,
we completely agree that propaganda is a technique rather than
a science.1 2 But it is a modem technique—that is, it is based on
one or more branches of science. Propaganda is the expression of
these branches of science; it moves with them, shares in their suc-
1Most French psychologists and psycho-sociologists do not regard propaganda
as a serious practice or as having much influence.
2 In this connection Albig is right to stress that propaganda cannot be a science
because in the field in which it applies there can be neither valid generalizations
nor constant factors.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
4)
cesses, and bears witness to their failures. The time is past when
propaganda was a matter of individual inspiration, personal sub-
tlety, or the use of unsophisticated tricks. Now science has entered
propaganda, as we shall reveal from four different points of view.
First of all, modem propaganda is based on scientific analyses
of psychology and sociology. Step by step, the propagandist builds
his techniques on the basis of his knowledge of man, his tenden-
cies, his desires, his needs, his psychic mechanisms, his condition-
ing—and as much on social psychology as on depth psychology.
He shapes his procedures on the basis of our knowledge of groups
and their laws of formation and dissolution, of mass influences, and
of environmental limitations. Without the scientific research of
modem psychology and sociology there would be no propaganda,
or rather we still would be in the primitive stages of propaganda
that existed in the time of Pericles or Augustus. Of course, propa-
gandists may be insufficiently versed in these branches of science;
they may misunderstand them, go beyond the cautious conclusions
of the psychologists, or claim to apply certain psychological dis-
coveries that, in fact, do not apply at all. But all this only shows
efforts to find new ways: only for the past fifty years have men
sought to apply the psychological and sociological sciences. The
important thing is that propaganda has decided to submit itself
to science and to make use of it. Of course, psychologists may be
scandalized and say that this is a misuse of their science. But this
argument carries no weight; the same applies to our physicists
and the atomic bomb. The scientist should know that he lives in
a world in which his discoveries will be utilized. Propagandists
inevitably will have a better understanding of sociology and psy-
chology, use them with increasing precision, and as a result be-
come more effective.
Second, propaganda is scientific in that it tends to establish a
set of rules, rigorous, precise, and tested, that are not merely
recipes but impose themselves on every propagandist, who is less
and less free to follow his own impulses. He must apply, increas-
ingly and exactly, certain precise formulas that can be applied by
anybody with the proper training—clearly a characteristic of a
technique based on science.
Third, what is needed nowadays is an exact analysis of both
the environment and the individual to be subjected to propaganda.
No longer does the man of talent determine the method, the ap-
Propaganda (5
proach, or the subject; all that is now being calculated (or must
be calculated). Therefore, one type of propaganda will be found
suitable in one situation and completely useless in another. To
undertake an active propaganda operation, it is necessary to make
a scientific, sociological, and psychological analysis first, and then
utilize those branches of science, which are becoming increasingly
well known. But, here again, proper training is necessary for
those who want to use them with their full effectiveness.
Finally, one last trait reveals the scientific character of modem
propaganda: the increasing attempt to control its use, measure
its results, define its effects. This is very difficult, but the propa-
gandist is no longer content to have obtained, or to believe he
has obtained, a certain result; he seeks precise evidence. Even
successful political results do not completely satisfy him. He wants
to understand the how and why of them and measure their exact
effect. He is prompted by a certain spirit of experimentation and
a desire to ponder the results. From this point on, one can see
the beginning of scientific method. Admittedly, it is not yet very
widespread, and those who analyze results are not active propa-
gandists but philosophers. Granted, that reveals a certain division
of labor, nothing more. It indicates that propaganda is no longer
a self-contained action, covering up for evil deeds. It is an object
of serious thought, and proceeds along scientific channels.
Some people object to this. One frequently hears psychologists
ridicule the claim to a scientific basis advanced by the propa-
gandist and reject the latter9s claims of having employed scientific
techniques. “The psychology he uses is not scientific psychology;
the sociology he uses is not scientific sociology." But after a
careful look at the controversy one comes to this conclusion:
Stalinist propaganda was in great measure founded on Pavlovs
theory of the conditioned reflex. Hitlerian propaganda was in great
measure founded on Freud’s theory of repression and libido.
American propaganda is founded in great measure on Dewey’s
theory of teaching. Now, if a psychologist does not accept the
idea of the conditioned reflex and doubts that it can be created in
man, he then rejects Pavlov’s interpretation of psychological
phenomena and concludes that all propaganda based on it is
pseudo-scientific. It is obviously the same for those who question
the findings of Freud, Dewey, or anybody else.
What does this mean, then? That propaganda does not rest on
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
e)
a scientific base? Certainly not. Rather, that scientists are not
agreed among themselves on the domains, methods, or conclusions
of psychology and sociology. A psychologist who rejects the theory
of one of his colleagues rejects a scientific theory and not merely
the inferences that a technician may draw from it. One cannot
blame the propagandist if he has confidence in a particular sociolo-
gist or psychologist whose theory is generally accepted and who
is, at a given time and in a given country, considered a scientist
Moreover, let us not forget that if this theory, put to use by the
propagandist, brings results and proves to be effective, it thereby
receives additional confirmation and that simple doctrinal criti-
cism can then no longer demonstrate its inaccuracy.
2. External Characteristics
The Individual and the Masses
Any modem propaganda will, first of all, address itself at one
and the same time to the individual and to the masses* It cannot
separate the two elements. For propaganda to address itself to
the individual, in his isolation, apart from the crowd, is impossible.
The individual is of no interest to the propagandist; as an isolated
unit he presents much too much resistance to external action. To
be effective, propaganda cannot be concerned with detail, not
only because to win men over one by one takes much too long,
but also because to create certain convictions in an isolated in-
dividual is much too difficult. Propaganda ceases where simple
dialogue begins. And that is why, in particular, experiments un-
dertaken in the United States to gauge the effectiveness of certain
propaganda methods or arguments on isolated individuals are not
conclusive: they do not reproduce the real propaganda situation.
Conversely, propaganda does not aim simply at the mass, the
crowd. A propaganda that functioned only where individuals are
gathered together would be incomplete and insufficient. Also, any
propaganda aimed only at groups as such—as if a mass were a
specific body having a soul and reactions and feelings entirely
different from individuals' souls, reactions, and feelings—would
be an abstract propaganda that likewise would have no effec-
tiveness. Modem propaganda reaches individuals enclosed in the
mass and as participants in that mass, yet it also aims at a crowd,
but only as a body composed of individuals.
Propaganda (7
What does this mean? First of all, that the individual never is
considered as an individual, but always in terms of what he has
in common with others, such as his motivations, his feelings, or
his myths. He is reduced to an average; and, except for a small
percentage, action based on averages will be effectual. Moreover,
the individual is considered part of the mass and included in it
(and so far as possible systematically integrated into it), because
in that way his psychic defenses are weakened, his reactions are
easier to provoke, and the propagandist profits from the process of
diffusion of emotions through the mass, and, at the same time,
from the pressures felt by an individual when in a group. Emotion-
alism, impulsiveness, excess, etc.—all these characteristics of the
individual caught up in a mass are well known and very helpful
to propaganda. Therefore, the individual must never be consid-
ered as being alone; the listener to a radio broadcast, though
actually alone, is nevertheless part of a large group, and he is
aware of it. Radio listeners have been found to exhibit a mass
mentality. All are tied together and constitute a sort of society
in which all individuals are accomplices and influence each other
without knowing it. The same holds true for propaganda that is
carried on by door-to-door visits (direct contacts, petitions for
signatures); although apparently one deals here with a single
individual, one deals in reality with a unit submerged into an in-
visible crowd composed of all those who have been interviewed,
who are being interviewed, and who will be interviewed, because
they hold similar ideas and live by the same myths, and especially
because they are targets of the same organism. Being the target
of a party or an administration is enough to immerse the individual
in that sector of the population which the propagandist has in his
sights; this simple fact makes the individual part of the mass. He
is no longer Mr. X, but part of a current flowing in a particular
direction. The current flows through the canvasser (who is not a
person speaking in his own name with his own arguments, but
one segment of an administration, an organization, a collective
movement); when he enters a room to canvass a person, the mass,
and moreover the organized, leveled mass, enters with him. No
relationship exists here between man and man; the organization
is what exerts its attraction on an individual already part of a mass
because he is in the same sights as all the others being canvassed.
Conversely, when propaganda is addressed to a crowd, it must
touch each individual in that crowd, in that whole group. To be
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
8)
effective, it must give the impression of being personal, for we
must never forget that the mass is composed of individuals, and
is in fact nothing but assembled individuals. Actually, just be-
cause men are in a group, and therefore weakened, receptive,
and in a state of psychological regression, they pretend all the
more to be “strong individuals.” The mass man is clearly sub-
human, but pretends to be superman. He is more suggestible,
but insists he is more forceful; he is more unstable, but thinks he
is firm in his convictions. If one openly treats the mass as a mass,
the individuals who form it will feel themselves belittled and will
refuse to participate. If one treats these individuals as children
(and they are children because they are in a group), they will
not accept their leader’s projections or identify with him. They
will withdraw and we will not be able to get anything out of them.
On the contrary, each one must feel individualized, each must
have the impression that he is being looked at, that he is being
addressed personally. Only then will he respond and cease to be
anonymous (although in reality remaining anonymous).
Thus all modem propaganda profits from the structure of the
mass, but exploits the individuals need for self-affirmation; and
the two actions must be conducted jointly, simultaneously. Of
course this operation is greatly facilitated by the existence of the
modem mass media of communication, which have precisely this
remarkable effect of reaching the whole crowd all at once, and yet
reaching each one in that crowd. Headers of the evening paper,
radio listeners, movie or TV viewers certainly constitute a mass
that has an organic existence, although it is diffused and not
assembled at one point. These individuals are moved by the same
motives, receive die same impulses and impressions, find them-
selves focused on the same centers of interest, experience the
same feelings, have generally the same order of reactions and
ideas, participate in the same myths—and all this at the same
time: what we have here is really a psychological, if not a biologi-
cal mass. And the individuals in it are modified by this existence,
even if they do not know it. Yet each one is alone—the newspaper
reader, the radio listener. He therefore feels himself individually
concerned as a person, as a participant. The movie spectator also
is alone; though elbow to elbow with his neighbors, he still is,
because of the darkness and the hypnotic attraction of the screen,
perfectly alone. This is the situation of the “lonely crowd,” or of
Propaganda (9
isolation in the mass, which is a natural product of present-day
society and which is both used and deepened by the mass media.
The most favorable moment to seize a man and influence him is
when he is alone in the mass: it is at this point that propaganda
can be most effective.
We must emphasize this circle which we shall meet again
and again: the structure of present-day society places the in-
dividual where he is most easily reached by propaganda. The
media of mass communication, which are part of the technical
evolution of this society, deepen this situation while making it
possible to reach the individual man, integrated in the mass; and
what these media do is exactly what propaganda must do in order
to attain its objectives. In reality propaganda cannot exist without
using these mass media. If, by chance, propaganda is addressed
to an organized group, it can have practically no effect on in-
dividuals before that group has been fragmented.8 Such frag-
mentation can be achieved through action, but it is equally
possible to fragment a group by psychological means. The trans-
formation of very small groups by purely psychological means
is one of the most important techniques of propaganda. Only
when very small groups are thus annihilated, when the individual
finds no more defenses, no equilibrium, no resistance exercised
by the group to which he belongs, does total action by propaganda
become possible.* 4
Total Propaganda
Propaganda must be total. The propagandist must utilize all
of the technical means at his disposal—the press, radio, TV,
movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing. Modern prop-
aganda must utilize all of these media. There is no propaganda
as long as one makes use, in sporadic fashion and at random, of
a newspaper article here, a poster or a radio program there, or-
ganizes a few meetings and lectures, writes a few slogans on walls;
that is not propaganda. Each usable medium has its own partic-
ular way of penetration—specific, but at the same time localized
8 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz have demonstrated the importance of
the group in the face of propaganda; the Germans, they claim, did not yield
earlier in World War II because the various groups of their military structure
held fast. Propaganda cannot do much when the social group has not disinte-
grated: the play of opinions has relatively little importance. See below, Appendix L
4 See below. Appendix II.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
10)
and limited; by itself it cannot attack the individual, break down
his resistance, make his decisions for him. A movie does not play
on the same motives, does not produce the same feelings, does not
provoke the same reactions as a newspaper. The very fact that
the effectiveness of each medium is limited to one particular area
clearly shows the necessity of complementing it with other media.
A word spoken on the radio is not the same, does not produce the
same effect, does not have the same impact as the identical word
spoken in private conversation or in a public speech before a large
crowd. To draw the individual into the net of propaganda, each
technique must be utilized in its own specific way, directed to-
ward producing the effect it can best produce, and fused with all
the other media, each of them reaching the individual in a specific
fashion and making him react anew to the same theme—in the
same direction, but differently.
Thus one leaves no part of the intellectual or emotional life
alone; man is surrounded on all sides—man and men, for we must
also bear in mind that these media do not all reach the same public
in the same way. Those who go to the movies three times a week
are not the same people who read the newspapers with care. The
tools of propaganda are thus oriented in terms of their public
and must be used in a concerted fashion to reach the greatest pos-
sible number of individuals. For example, the poster is a popular
medium for reaching those without automobiles. Radio newscasts
are listened to in the better circles. We must note, finally, that
each medium includes a third aspect of specialization—saving for
later our analysis of the fact that there are quite diverse forms of
propaganda.
Each medium is particularly suited to a certain type of propa-
ganda. The movies and human contacts are the best media for
sociological propaganda in terms of social climate, slow infiltra-
tion, progressive inroads, and over-all integration. Public meetings
and posters are more suitable tools for providing shock propa-
ganda, intense but temporary, leading to immediate action. The
press tends more to shape general views; radio is likely to be an
instrument of international action and psychological warfare,
whereas the press is used domestically. In any case, it is under-
stood that because of this specialization not one of these instru-
ments may be left out: they must all be used in combination. The
propagandist uses a keyboard and composes a symphony.
Propaganda (11
It is a matter of reaching and encircling the whole man and
all men. Propaganda tries to surround man by all possible routes,
in the realm of feelings as well as ideas, by playing on his will
or on his needs, through his conscious and his unconscious, as-
sailing him in both his private and his public life. It furnishes him
with a complete system for explaining the world, and provides im-
mediate incentives to action. We are here in the presence of an
organized myth that tries to take hold of the entire person.
Through the myth it creates, propaganda imposes a complete
range of intuitive knowledge, susceptible of only one interpreta-
tion, unique and one-sided, and precluding any divergence. This
myth becomes so powerful that it invades every area of con-
sciousness, leaving no faculty or motivation intact. It stimulates in
the individual a feeling of exclusiveness, and produces a biased
attitude. The myth has such motive force that, once accepted, it
controls the whole of the individual, who becomes immune to any
other influence. This explains the totalitarian attitude that the
individual adopts—wherever a myth has been successfully created
—and that simply reflects the totalitarian action of propaganda on
him.
Not only does propaganda seek to invade the whole man, to
lead him to adopt a mystical attitude and reach him through all
possible psychological channels, but, more, it speaks to all men.
Propaganda cannot be satisfied with partial successes, for it does
not tolerate discussion; by its very nature, it excludes contradic-
tion and discussion. As long as a noticeable or expressed tension
or a conflict of action remains, propaganda cannot be said to have
accomplished its aim. It must produce quasi-unanimity, and the
opposing faction must become negligible, or in any case cease to
be vocal. Extreme propaganda must win over the adversary and
at least use him by integrating him into its own frame of refer-
ence. That is why it was so important to have an Englishman
speak on the Nazi radio or a General Paulus on the Soviet radio;
why it was so important for the propaganda of the fellagha to
make use of articles in VObservateur and L’Express and for
French propaganda to obtain statements from repentant feUagha.
Clearly, the ultimate was achieved by Soviet propaganda in the
self-criticism of its opponents. That the enemy of a regime (or of
the faction in power) can be made to declare, while he is still
the enemy, that this regime was right, that his opposition was
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
12)
criminal, and that his condemnation is just—that is the ultimate
result of totalitarian propaganda. The enemy (while still re-
maining the enemy, and because he is the enemy) is converted
into a supporter of the regime. This is not simply a very useful
and effective means of propaganda. Let us also note that, under
the Khrushchev regime, die propaganda of self-criticism con-
tinued to function just as before (Marshal Bulganins self-criticism
was the most characteristic example). Here we are seeing the
total, all-devouring propaganda mechanism in action: it cannot
leave any segment of opinion outside its sphere; it cannot tolerate
any sort of independence. Everything must be brought back into
this unique sphere of action, which is an end in itself and can be
justified only if virtually every man ends up by participating in it
This brings us to another aspect of total propaganda. The propa-
gandist must combine the elements of propaganda as in a real
orchestration. On the one hand he must keep in mind the stimuli
that can be utilized at a given moment, and must organize them.
This results in a propaganda “campaign.”5 On the other hand, the
propagandist must use various instruments, each in relation to all
the others. Alongside the mass media of communication propa-
ganda employs censorship, legal texts, proposed legislation, inter-
national conferences, and so forth—thus introducing elements
seemingly alien to propaganda. We should not only consider the
mass media: personal contacts are considered increasingly ef- 8
8 Many analyses of various possible topics, of “gimmicks,” have been made often.
The most elementary was made in 1942 by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis
(see Eugene L. Hartley: Fundamentals of Social Psychology. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf; 1952). A more profound analysis is that of Lenin’s strategy of propa-
ganda: first stage—the creation in each organization of solid cores of well-
indoctrinated men; second stage—cooperation with allies in political tasks that
can compromise them; third stage—when the maximum advantage is reached—
propaganda to demoralize the adversaries (inevitability of the Communist vic-
tory, injustice of the adversary’s cause, failure of his means, etc.). The analysis
of the type of campaign conducted by Hitler has been well done (Curt Riess:
Joseph Goebbels: A Biography [New York: Doubleday & Company; 1948]),
demonstrating the precise timing of the moment when a campaign should start
and when it should stop, the silences and the verbal assaults; a schedule of the
use of rumors, neutral information, commentaries, monumental mass meetings.
Crowning all, and aiming at "concentrating the fire” of all media on one particular
point—a single theme, a single enemy, a single idea—the campaign uses this
concentration of all media, but progressively, for the public will take better to
gradual attacks. (A good analysis of a Hitlerian campaign has been made by
Jerome S. Bruner, in Katz et aLi Public Opinion and Propaganda [New York:
Dryden Press; 1954], and on propaganda campaigns in general by Leonard W.
Doob: Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique [New York: Henry Holt &
Company; 1935]*)
Propaganda (13
fective. Educational methods play an immense role in political
indoctrination (Lenin, Mao). A conference on Lenin's Doctrine
of the State is propaganda. Information is extremely helpful to
propaganda, as we shall demonstrate. “To explain correctly the
present state of affairs is the great task of the agitator." Mao em-
phasizes that in 1928 an effective form of propaganda was the
release of prisoners after they had been indoctrinated. The same
was true of the care given to the enemy wounded; all this was to
show the good will of the Communists. Everything can serve as a
means of propaganda and everything must be utilized.
In this way diplomacy becomes inseparable from propaganda.
We shall study this fact in Chapter IV. Education and training are
inevitably taken over, as the Napoleonic Empire demonstrated
for the first time. No contrast can be tolerated between teaching
and propaganda, between the critical spirit formed by higher
education and the exclusion of independent thought. One must
utilize the education of the young to condition them to what
comes later. The schools and all methods of instruction are trans-
formed under such conditions, with the child integrated into
the conformist group in such a way that the individualist is tol-
erated not by the authorities but by his peers. Religion and the
churches are constrained to hold on to their own places in the
orchestra if they want to survive.6 Napoleon expressly formulated
the doctrine of propaganda by the Church. The judicial apparatus
is also utilized.7 Of course, a trial can be an admirable spring-
board of propaganda for the accused, who can spread his ideas
in his defense and exert an influence by the way he suffers his
punishment. This holds true in the democracies. But the situation
is reversed where a totalitarian state makes propaganda. During
8 This was the case in the Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R. during the war.
7In France, an example is the trial of the Jeanson network (September i960),
which aided the propaganda against insubordination and aid to die F.L.N. It is
interesting to find this same idea of "educational” trials in Goebbels and Soviet
jurists. The law itself in the U.S.S.R. is an instrument of propaganda intended to
make people like the Soviet order. The tribunal is a means of preaching to the
public. Finally, Mao has shown how the army can become a most effective
propaganda instrument for those who are in it and for the occupied peoples. The
French army tried to do the same in Algeria, but with less success. It is evident
that information itself becomes propaganda, or rather, wherever propaganda ap-
pears, there follows an inextricable confusion between propaganda and informa-
tion. Amusements, distractions, or games can be instruments of propaganda, as
well as films for children (in die U.S.S.R.) and the games used in American so-
cial group work.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
14)
a trial there, the judge is forced to demonstrate a lesson for the
education of the public: verdicts are educational. And, we know
the importance of confessions in the great show trials (e.g., the
Reichstag fire, the Moscow trials of 1936, the Nuremberg trials,
and innumerable trials in the People's Democracies after 1945).
Finally, propaganda will take over literature (present and past)
and history, which must be rewritten according to propaganda's
needs. We must not say: this is done by tyrannical, autocratic,
totalitarian governments. In fact, it is the result of propaganda
itself. Propaganda carries within itself, of intrinsic necessity, the
power to take over everything that can serve it. Let us remember
the innocent example of democratic, liberal, republican propa-
ganda, which without hesitation took over many things in the
nineteenth century (perhaps without realizing it and in good
faith, but that is not an excuse). Let us remember the Athenian
democracy, the Roman Republic, the movement of the medieval
Communes, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. History was
hardly less modified then than Russian history was by the Bol-
sheviks. We know, on the other hand, how propaganda takes
over the literature of the past, furnishing it with contexts and
explanations designed to re-integrate it into the present. From a
thousand examples, we will choose just one:
In an article in Pravda in May 1957, the Chinese writer Mao
Dun wrote that the ancient poets of China used the following
words to express the striving of the people toward a better life:
“The flowers perfume the air, the moon shines, man has a long
life.” And he added: “Allow me to give a new explanation of these
poetic terms. The flowers perfume the air—this means that the
flowers of the art of socialist realism are incomparably beautiful.
The moon shines—this means that the sputnik has opened a new
era in the conquest of space. Man has a long life—this means
that the great Soviet Union will live tens and tens of thousands
of years.”
When one reads this once, one smiles. If one reads it a thousand
times, and no longer reads anything else, one must undergo a
change. And we must reflect on the transformation of perspective
already suffered by a whole society in which texts like this (pub-
lished by the thousands) can be distributed and taken seriously not
only by the authorities but by the intellectuals. This complete
change of perspective of the Weltanschauung is the primary totali-
tarian element of propaganda.
Propaganda (15
Finally, the propagandist must use not only all of the instru-
ments, but also different forms of propaganda. There are many
types of propaganda, though there is a present tendency to com-
bine them. Direct propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and
attitudes, must be preceded by propaganda that is sociological
in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an at-
mosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes. No direct propa-
ganda can be effective without pre-propaganda, which, without
direct or noticeable aggression, is limited to creating ambiguities,
reducing prejudices, and spreading images, apparently without
purpose. The spectator will be much more disposed to believe
in the grandeur of France when he has seen a dozen films on
French petroleum, railroads, or jetliners. The ground must be
sociologically prepared before one can proceed to direct prompt-
ing. Sociological propaganda can be compared to plowing, direct
propaganda to sowing; you cannot do the one without doing the
other first. Both techniques must be used. For sociological propa-
ganda alone will never induce an individual to change his actions.
It leaves him at the level of his everyday life, and will not lead
him to make decisions. Propaganda of the word and propaganda
of the deed are complementary. Talk must correspond to some-
thing visible; the visible, active element must be explained by
talk. Oral or written propaganda, which plays on opinions or
sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which
produces new attitudes and thus joins the individual firmly to a
certain movement. Here again, you cannot have one without the
other.
We must also distinguish between covert propaganda and overt
propaganda. The former tends to hide its aims, identity, signifi-
cance, and source. The people are not aware that someone is trying
to influence them, and do not feel that they are being pushed in
a certain direction. This is often called “black propaganda.” It
also make use of mystery and silence. The other kind, “white
propaganda,” is open and aboveboard. There is a Ministry of
Propaganda; one admits that propaganda is being made; its source
is known; its aims and intentions are identified. The public knows
that an attempt is being made to influence it.
The propagandist is forced to use both kinds, to combine them,
for they pursue different objectives. Overt propaganda is neces-
sary for attacking enemies; it alone is capable of reassuring one's
own forces, it is a manifestation of strength and good organiza-
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
16)
tion, a token of victory. But covert propaganda is more effective
if the aim is to push one's supporters in a certain direction without
their being aware of it. Also, it is necessary to use sometimes one,
sometimes the other on the same group; the Nazis knew very
well how to alternate long silences, mystery, the secret revealed,
the waiting period that raises anxiety levels, and then, suddenly,
the explosive decision, the tempest, the Sturm that seems all the
more violent because it breaks into the silence. Finally, we well
know that the combination of covert propaganda and overt propa-
ganda is increasingly conducted so that white propaganda actually
becomes a cover and mask for black propaganda—that is, one
openly admits the existence of one kind of propaganda and of its
organization, means, and objectives, but all this is only a fagade
to capture the attention of individuals and neutralize their in-
stinct to resist, while other individuals, behind the scenes, work
on public opinion in a totally different direction, seeking to arouse
very different reactions, utilizing even existing resistance to overt
propaganda.8
Let us give one last example of this combination of differing
types of propaganda. Lasswell divides propaganda into two main
streams according to whether it produces direct incitement
or indirect incitement. Direct incitement is that by which
the propagandist himself acts, becomes involved, demonstrates
his conviction, his belief, his good faith. He commits himself
to the course of action that he proposes and supports, and in order
to obtain a similar action, he solicits a corresponding response
from the propagandee. Democratic propaganda—in which the
politician extends a hand to the citizen—is of this type. Indirect
incitement is that which rests on a difference between the states-
man, who takes action, and the public, which is limited to passive
acceptance and compliance. There is a coercive influence and
8 The secret element can be a theoretically independent “faction,** a network of
rumors, and so on. The same effect is obtained by contrasting the real methods
of action, which are never acknowledged, with totally different overt propaganda
proclamations. This is the most frequently used system in the Soviet Union. In
this case it is necessary to have an overt propaganda, in accordance with Goebbels:
“We openly admit that we wish to influence our people. To admit this is the best
method of attaining it.** Hence the creation of an official Ministry of Propaganda.
In any case, as Goebbels also said, when the news to be disseminated is unbeliev-
able it must be disseminated by secret, black propaganda. As for censorship, it
should be as hidden and secret as possible. Moreover, all serious propagandists
know that censorship should be used as little as possible.
Propaganda (ij
there is obedience; this is one of the characteristics of authori-
tarian propaganda.
Although this distinction is not altogether useless, we must
again point out that every modem propagandist combines the
two types of propaganda because each responds to different sec-
tors of action. These two types no longer belong to different politi-
cal regimes, but are differing needs of the same propaganda and of
the various levels on which propaganda is organized. Propaganda
of action presupposes positive incitement; propaganda through
mass media will generally be contrasted incitement. Similarly,
on the level of the performer in direct contact with the crowd,
there must be positive incitement (it is better if the radio speaker
believes in his cause); on the level of the organizer, that of propa-
ganda strategy, there must be separation from the public. (We
shall return to this point below.) These examples suffice to show
that propaganda must be total.
Continuity and Duration of Propaganda
Propaganda must be continuous and lasting—continuous in
that it must not leave any gaps, but must fill the citizen’s whole
day and all his days; lasting in that it must function over a very
long period of time.9 Propaganda tends to make the individual live
in a separate world; he must not have outside points of reference.
He must not be allowed a moment of meditation or reflection in
which to see himself vis-^-vis the propagandist, as happens when
the propaganda is not continuous. At that moment the individual
emerges from the grip of propaganda. Instead, successful propa-
ganda will occupy every moment of the individual’s life: through
posters and loudspeakers when he is out walking, through radio
and newspapers at home, through meetings and movies in the
evening. The individual must not be allowed to recover, to col-
lect himself, to remain untouched by propaganda during any
relatively long period, for propaganda is not the touch of the
magic wand. It is based on slow, constant impregnation. It creates
9 The famous principle of repetition, which is not in itself significant, plays a
part only in this situation. Hitler was undoubtedly right when he said that the
masses take a long time to understand and remember, thus it is necessary to
repeat; but the emphasis must be placed on “a long time”: the public must be
conditioned to accept the claims that are made. In any case, repetition must be
discontinued when the public has been conditioned, for at that point repetition
will begin to irritate and provoke fresh doubts with respect to former certainties.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
18)
convictions and compliance through imperceptible influences
that are effective only by continuous repetition. It must create a
complete environment for the individual, one from which he never
emerges. And to prevent him from finding external points of
reference, it protects him by censoring everything that might
come in from the outside. The slow building up of reflexes and
myths, of psychological environment and prejudices, requires
propaganda of very long duration. Propaganda is not a stimulus
that disappears quickly; it consists of successive impulses and
shocks aimed at various feelings or thoughts by means of the many
instruments previously mentioned. A relay system is thus estab-
lished. Propaganda is a continuous action, without failure or in-
terruption: as soon as the effect of one impulse is weakened, it is
renewed by another. At no point does it fail to subject its recipi-
ent to its influence. As soon as one effect wears off, it is followed
by a new shock.
Continuous propaganda exceeds the individuals capacities for
attention or adaptation and thus his capabilities of resistance.
This trait of continuity explains why propaganda can indulge in
sudden twists and turns.1 It is always surprising that the content
of propaganda can be so inconsistent that it can approve today
what it condemned yesterday. Antonio Miotto considers this
changeability of propaganda an indication of its nature. Actually
it is only an indication of the grip it exerts, of the reality of its
effects. We must not think that a man ceases to follow the line
when there is a sharp turn. He continues to follow it because he is
caught up in the system. Of course, he notices the change that
has taken place, and he is surprised. He may even be tempted
to resist—as the Communists were at the time of the German-
Soviet pact. But will he then engage in a sustained effort to re-
sist propaganda? Will he disavow his past actions? Will he break
with the environment in which his propaganda is active? Will he
stop reading a particular newspaper? Such breaks are too painful;
faced with them, the individual, feeling that the change in line
is not an attack on his real self, prefers to retain his habits.
1 The propagandist does not necessarily have to worry about coherence and unity
in his claims. Claims can be varied and even contradictory, depending on the
setting (for example, Goebbels promised an increase in the price of grain in
the country and, at the same time, a decrease in the price of bread in the city);
and the occasion (for example. Hitler's propaganda against democracy in 1936
and for democracy in 1943).
Propaganda (ig
Immediately thereafter he will hear the new truth reassessed a
hundred times, he will find it explained and proved, and he does
not have the strength to fight against it each day on the basis
of yesterday's truth. He does not even become fully involved in
this battle. Propaganda continues its assault without an instant s
respite; his resistance is fragmentary and sporadic. He is caught
up in professional tasks and personal preoccupations, and each
time he emerges from them he hears and sees the new truth
proclaimed. The steadiness of the propaganda prevails over his
sporadic attention and makes him follow all the turns from the
time he has begun to eat of this bread.
That is why one cannot really speak of propaganda in connec-
tion with an election campaign that lasts only two weeks. At such
a time, some intellectual always will show that election propa-
ganda is ineffectual; that its gross methods, its inscriptions on
walls, can convince nobody; that opposing arguments neutralize
each other. And it is true that the population is often indifferent
to election propaganda. But it is not surprising that such propa-
ganda has little effect: none of the great techniques of propaganda
can be effective in two weeks.
Having no more relation to real propaganda are the experi-
ments often undertaken to discover whether some propaganda
method is effective on a group of individuals being used as guinea
pigs. Such experiments are basically vitiated by the fact that they
are of short duration. Moreover, the individual can clearly dis-
cern any propaganda when it suddenly appears in a social en-
vironment normally not subject to this type of influence; if one
isolated item of propaganda or one campaign appears without
a massive effort, the contrast is so strong that the individual can
recognize it clearly as propaganda and begin to be wary. That
is precisely what happens in an election campaign; the individual
can defend himself when left to himself in his everyday situation.
This is why it is fatal to the effectiveness of propaganda to pro-
ceed in spurts, with big noisy campaigns separated by long gaps.
In such circumstances the individual will always find his bearings
again; he will know how to distinguish propaganda from the rest
of what the press carries in normal times. Moreover, the more
intense the propaganda campaign, the more alert he will become
—comparing this sudden intensity with the great calm that
reigned before.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
20 )
What is needed, then, is continuous agitation produced arti-
ficially even when nothing in the events of the day justifies or
arouses excitement. Therefore, continuing propaganda must
slowly create a climate first, and then prevent the individual from
noticing a particular propaganda operation in contrast to ordinary
daily events.
Organization of Propaganda
To begin with, propaganda must be organized in several ways.
To give it the above-mentioned characteristics (continuity, dura-
tion, combination of different media), an organization is required
that controls the mass media, is capable of using them correctly,
of calculating the effect of one or another slogan or of replacing
one campaign with another. There must be an administrative
organization; every modem state is expected to have a Ministry
of Propaganda, whatever its actual name may be. Just as techni-
cians are needed to make films &nd radio broadcasts, so one needs
"technicians of influence”—sociologists and psychologists. But this
indispensable administrative organization is not what we are
speaking of here. What we mean is that propaganda is always
institutionalized to the extent of the existence of an “Apparat”
in the German sense of the term—a machine. It is tied to realities.
A great error, which interferes with propaganda analysis, is to
believe that propaganda is solely a psychological affair, a manipu-
lation of symbols, an abstract influence on opinions. A large num-
ber of American studies on propaganda are not valid for that
reason. These studies are concerned only with means of psycholog-
ical influence and regard only such means as propaganda, whereas
all great modem practitioners of propaganda have rigorously tied
together psychological and physical action as inseparable ele-
ments. No propaganda is possible unless psychological influence
rests on reality,2 and the recruiting of individuals into cadres
or movements goes hand in hand with psychological manipula-
tion.
As long as no physical influence is exerted by an organization
on the individual, there is no propaganda. This is decidedly not *
* Obviously propaganda directed at the enemy succeeds when it is coupled with
victories. German propaganda in France during the Occupation failed because of
the presence in France of German soldiers. (Thus the more victories, the more
necessary propaganda becomes, said Goebbels.)
Propaganda (21
an invention of Mao Tse-tung, or merely an accessory of propa-
ganda, or the expression of a particular type of propaganda.
Separation of the psychological and physical elements is an ar-
bitrary simplification that prevents all understanding of exactly
what propaganda is. Of course, the physical organization can be
of various types. It can be a party organization (Nazi, Fascist,
Communist) in which those who are won over are absorbed and
made to participate in action; such an organization, moreover,
uses force and fear in the form of Macht Propaganda. Or such
physical organization can be the integration of an entire popula-
tion into cells by agents in each block of residences; in that case,
it operates inside a society by integrating the whole social body.
(Of course, this is accompanied by all the psychological work
needed to press people into cells.) Or an effective transformation
can be made in the economic, political, or social domain. We know
that the propagandist is also a psychological consultant to govern-
ments; he indicates what measures should or should not be taken
to facilitate certain psychological manipulations. It is too often
believed that propaganda serves the purpose of sugar-coating
bitter pills, of making people accept policies they would not ac-
cept spontaneously. But in most cases propaganda seeks to point
out courses of action desirable in themselves, such as helpful
reforms. Propaganda then becomes this mixture of the actual satis-
faction given to the people by the reforms and subsequent ex-
ploitation of that satisfaction.
Propaganda cannot operate in a vacuum. It must be rooted in
action, in a reality that is part of it. Some positive and welcome
measure may be only a means of propaganda; conversely, coercive
propaganda must be tied to physical coercion. For example, a
big blow to the propaganda of the Forces de Liberation Nationale
(F.L.N.) in France in 1958 was the noisy threat of the referendum
that the roads leading to the polls would be mined and booby-
trapped; that voters would be massacred and their corpses dis-
played; that there would be a check in each douar of those who
had dared to go to the polls. But none of these threats was carried
out. Failure to take action is in itself counter-propaganda.
Because propaganda enterprises are limited by the necessity
for physical organization and action—without which propaganda
is practically non-existent—effective propaganda can work only
inside a group, principally inside a nation. Propaganda outside
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
22)
the group—toward other nations for example, or toward an enemy
—is necessarily weak.8 The principal reason for this is undoubtedly
the absence of physical organization and of encirclement of the
individual. One cannot reach another nation except by way of
symbols, through press or radio, and even then only in sporadic
fashion. Such an effort may at best raise some doubts, plant some
sense of ambiguity, make people ask themselves questions, in-
fluence them by suggestion. In case of war, the enemy will not
be demoralized by such abstract propaganda unless he is at the
same time beaten by armies and pounded by bombers. We can
hardly expect great results from a simple dissemination of words
unless we prepare for it by education (pre-propaganda) and
sustain it by organization and action.
This points up a major difference between Communist and
Western countries. Western countries conduct their propaganda
against Soviet nations solely by psychological means, with the
propaganda clearly emanating from a base situated in the demo-
cratic countries themselves.* 4 By contrast, the Soviet Union makes
very little propaganda itself; it does not seek to reach Western
peoples by its radio. It confines its propaganda to organizations
in the form of national Communist parties inside the national
boundaries of the people to be propagandized. Because such
parties are external propaganda structures of the Soviet Union,
their propaganda is effective precisely because it is attached to a
concrete organization capable of encirclement and continuity.
One should note here die tremendous counter-propagandistic
effect that ensued when the United States, after all the promises
by the Voice of America, failed ,to come to the aid of Hungary
during the 1956 rebellion. To be sure, it was hardly possible for
the Americans to come to the aid of the Hungarians. Neverthe-
less, all propaganda that makes false promises turns against the
propagandist.
The fact that the presence of an internal organization is in-
dispensable to propaganda explains in large measure why the
same statements advanced by a democracy and by an authoritar-
ian government do not have the same credibility. When France
and England proclaimed that the elections held in Syria and
8 See below. Appendix I.
4 Nevertheless, die Soviet Union's concern with this form of purely psychological
propaganda confirms its effectiveness.
Propaganda (23
Egypt in connection with the formation of the United Arab Re-
public had been a fraud and evidence of a dictatorial govern-
ment, they aroused no repercussions. It was a simple affirmation
from the outside which was not repeated often enough, and not
heard by the people. Yet when Nasser launched a propaganda
campaign a year later on the same theme, claiming that the
election results in Iraq had been "falsified by the imperialists”
and that the Iraqi parliament was mockery, he set off reverbera-
tions. The Egyptian people reacted,5 the Iraqi people followed
suit, and international opinion was troubled. Thus the propaganda
apparatus moves the people to action and the popular move-
ment adds weight to the argument abroad. Propaganda, then,
is no longer mere words; it incites an enormous demonstration
by the masses and thus becomes a fact—which gives strength
to the words outside the frontiers.
We must not, however, conclude from the decisive importance
of organization that psychological action is futile. It is one—but
not the only one—indispensable piece of the propaganda mechan-
ism. The manipulation of symbols is necessary for three reasons.
First of all, it persuades the individual to enter the framework of
an organization. Second, it furnishes him with reasons, justifica-
tions, motivations for action. Third, it obtains his total allegiance.
More and more we are learning that genuine compliance is es-
sential if action is to be effective. The worker, the soldier, and the
partisan must believe in what they are doing, must put all their
heart and their good will into it; they must also find their
equilibrium, their satisfactions, in their actions. All this is the re-
sult of psychological influence, which cannot attain great results
alone, but which can attempt anything when combined with or-
ganization.
Finally, the presence of organization creates one more phe-
nomenon: the propagandist is always separated from the propa-
gandee, he remains a stranger to him.6 Even in the actual contact
5 The Egyptian campaign, launched in May 1958, was to get a hearing before
the United Nations and to lead to the decision of August 22, whereas the Anglo-
French protestations on the annexation of Syria in 1957 led to no action.
6A note that appeared in Le Monde (August 2, 1961) criticizing the psycho-
logical campaign in Algeria shows clearly that its ineffectiveness was due in part
to the “self-intoxication” of the propagandists, who came to believe so much in
their system that they were no longer capable of considering reality; they were
caught in their own trap.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
24)
of human relations, at meetings, in door-to-door visits, the propa-
gandist is of a different order; he is nothing else and nothing
more than the representative of the organization—or, rather, a
delegated fraction of it. He remains a manipulator, in the shadow
of the machine. He knows why he speaks certain words and what
effect they should have. His words are no longer human words
but technically calculated words; they no longer express a feeling
or a spontaneous idea, but reflect an organization even when they
seem entirely spontaneous. Thus the propagandist is never asked
to be involved in what he is saying, for, if it becomes necessary,
he may be asked to say the exact opposite with similar conviction.
He must, of course, believe in the cause he serves, but not in his
particular argument. On the other hand, the propagandee hears
the word spoken to him here and now and the argument presented
to him in which he is asked to believe. He must take them to
be human words, spontaneous and carried by conviction. Obvi-
ously, if the propagandist were left to himself, if it were only
a matter of psychological action, he would end up by being taken
in by his own trick, by believing it. He would then be the prisoner
of his own formulas and would lose all effectiveness as a propa-
gandist. What protects him from this is precisely the organization
to which he belongs, which rigidly maintains a line. The propa-
gandist thus becomes more and more the technician who treats
his patients in various ways but keeps himself cold and aloof,
selecting his words and actions for purely technical reasons. The
patient is an object to be saved or sacrificed according to the
necessities of the cause.
But then, the reader may ask, why the system of human con-
tacts, why the importance of door-to-door visits? Only a technical
necessity dictates them. We know how important human relations
can be to the individual and how essential personal contact is in
making decisions. We know that the distant word of the radio
must be complemented by the warmth of a personal presence.
This is exactly what puts the human-relations technique of propa-
ganda into play. But this human contact is false and merely
simulated; the presence is not that of the individual who has
come forward, but that of the organization behind him. In the
very act of pretending to speak as man to man, the propagandist
is reaching the summit of his mendacity and falsifications, even
when he is not conscious of it.
Propaganda
(25
Orthopraxy
We now come to an absolutely decisive fact. Propaganda is
very frequently described as a manipulation for the purpose of
changing ideas or opinions, of making individuals “believe” some
idea or fact, and finally of making them adhere to some doctrine—
all matters of mind. Or, to put it differently, propaganda is de-
scribed as dealing with beliefs or ideas. If the individual is a
Marxist, it tries to destroy his conviction and turn him into an
anti-Marxist, and so on. It calls on all the psychological mechan-
isms, but appeals to reason as well. It tries to convince, to bring
about a decision, to create a firm adherence to some truth. Then,
obviously, if the conviction is sufficiently strong, after some soul
searching, the individual is ready for action.
This line of reasoning is completely wrong. To view propa-
ganda as still being what it was in 1850 is to cling to an obsolete
concept of man and of the means to influence him; it is to con-
demn oneself to understand nothing about modem propaganda.
The aim of modem propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but
to provoke action. It is no longer to change adherence to a doc-
trine, but to make the individual cling irrationally to a process
of action. It is no longer to lead to a choice, but to loosen the re-
flexes. It is no longer to transform an opinion, but to arouse an
active and mythical belief.
Let us note here in passing how badly equipped opinion sur-
veys are to gauge propaganda. We will have to come back to this
point in the study of propaganda effects. Simply to ask an in-
dividual if he believes this or that, or if he has this or that idea,
gives absolutely no indication of what behavior he will adopt or
what action he will take; only action is of concern to modem
propaganda, for its aim is to precipitate an individual's action,
with maximum effectiveness and economy.7 The propagandist
7 When one analyzes the great modern systems of propaganda one always finds
this primary aim of producing action, of mobilizing the individual. Occasionally
it is expressly stated, as when Goebbels distinguished between Haltung (behavior)
and Stimmung (morale). But the former is of greater importance. After a bloody
raid Goebbels could state: “The Stimmung is quite low but that means little; the
Haltung holds well.” The Stimmung is volatile and varies readily; therefore, above
all, the right action must be obtained, the right behavior maintained. In the
analysis of propaganda, specialists have especially noted this desire to obtain im-
mediate action rather than a change of opinion. The same idea is held by Mao
Tse-tung: propaganda aims at mobilizing the masses, thus it is not necessary
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
26)
therefore does not normally address himself to the individual's in-
telligence, for the process of intellectual persuasion is long and
uncertain, and the road from such intellectual conviction to ac-
tion even more so. The individual rarely acts purely on the basis of
an idea. Moreover, to place propaganda efforts on the intellectual
level would require that the propagandist engage in individual
debate with each person—an unthinkable method. It is necessary
to obtain at least a minimum of participation from everybody.* 8
It can be active or passive, but in any case it is not simply a matter
of public opinion. To see propaganda only as something related
to public opinion implies a great intellectual independence on the
part of the propagandee, who is, after all, only a third party in
any political action, and who is asked only one opinion. This
obviously coincides with a conception of liberal democracy, which
assumes that the most one can do with a citizen is to change
his opinion in such fashion as to win his vote at election time.
The concept of a close relationship between public opinion and
propaganda rests on the presumption of an independent popular
will. If this concept were right, the role of propaganda would be
to modify that popular will which, of course, expresses itself
in votes. But what this concept does not take into consideration is
that the injection of propaganda into the mechanism of popular
action actually suppresses liberal democracy, after which we are
no longer dealing with votes or the people's sovereignty; propa-
ganda therefore aims solely at participation. The participation
may be active or passive: active, if propaganda has been able to
mobilize the individual for action; passive, if the individual does
not act directly but psychologically supports that action.
But, one may ask, does this not bring us right back to public
opinion? Certainly not, for opinion leaves the individual a mere
spectator who may eventually, but not necessarily, resort to
action. Therefore, the idea of participation is much stronger. The
to change their opinions but to make all individuals jointly attack a task. Even
political education, so important with Mao, aims essentially at mobili2ation. And
in the Soviet Union political education has occasionally been criticized for taking
some intellectual and purely domestic turn to secure action, and then failing in
its aim; the task of agitation is not to educate but to mobilize people. And there
is always the matter of actual involvement in precise tasks defined by the party,
for example to obtain increased productivity.
8 This passive participation is what Goebbels meant when he said: “I conceive of a
radio program that will make each listener participate in the events of the nation.”
But at the same time the listener is forced into passivity by the dictator.
Propaganda (27
supporter of a football team, though not physically in the game,
makes his presence felt psychologically by rooting for the players,
exciting them, and pushing them to outdo themselves. Similarly
the faithful who attend Mass do not interfere physically, but their
communicant participation is positive and changes the nature
of the phenomenon. These two examples illustrate what we mean
by passive participation obtained through propaganda.
Such an action cannot be obtained by the process of choice and
deliberation. To be effective, propaganda must constantly short-
circuit all thought and decision.9 It must operate on the in-
dividual at the level of the unconscious. He must not know that
he is being shaped by outside forces (this is one of the condi-
tions for the success of propaganda), but some central core in
him must be reached in order to release the mechanism in the
unconscious which will provide the appropriate—and expected
—action.
We have just said that action exactly suited to its ends must
be obtained. This leads us to state that if the classic but out-
moded view of propaganda consists in defining it as an adherence
of man to an orthodoxy, true modern propaganda seeks, on the
contrary, to obtain an orthopraxy—an action that in itself, and not
because of the value judgments of the person who is acting, leads
directly to a goal, which for the individual is not a conscious and
intentional objective to be attained, but which is considered such
by the propagandist. The propagandist knows what objective
should be sought and what action should be accomplished, and
he maneuvers the instrument that will secure precisely this ac-
tion.
This is a particular example of a more general problem: the
separation of thought and action in our society. We are living in
a time when systematically—though without our wanting it so—
action and thought are being separated. In our society, he who
thinks can no longer act for himself; he must act through the
agency of others, and in many cases he cannot act at all. He who
acts cannot first think out his action, either because of lack of
time and the burden of his personal problems, or because society's
plan demands that he translate others' thoughts into action. And
we see the same division within the individual himself. For he can
use his mind only outside the area of his job—in order to find
9 The application of “motivational research studies” to advertising also leads to this.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
28)
himself, to use his leisure to better himself, to discover what
best suits him, and thus to individualize himself; whereas in the
context of his work he yields to the common necessity, the com-
mon method, the need to incorporate his own work into the over-
all plan. Escape into dreams is suggested to him while he performs
wholly mechanized actions.
Propaganda creates the same division. Of course it does not
cancel out personality; it leaves man complete freedom of thought,
except in his political or social action where we find him chan-
neled and engaged in actions that do not necessarily conform
to his private beliefs. He even can have political convictions,
and still be led to act in a manner apparently contradictory to
them. Thus the twists and turns of skillful propaganda do not
present insurmountable difficulties. The propagandist can mo-
bilize man for action that is not in accord with his previous con-
victions. Modem psychologists are well aware that there is not
necessarily any continuity between conviction and action1 and
no intrinsic rationality in opinions or acts. Into these gaps in
continuity propaganda inserts its lever. It does not seek to create
wise or reasonable men, but proselytes and militants.
This brings us back to the question of organization. For the
proselyte incited to action by propaganda cannot be left alone,
cannot be entrusted to himself. If the action obtained by propa-
ganda is to be appropriate, it cannot be individual; it must be
collective. Propaganda has meaning only when it obtains con-
vergence, coexistence of a multiplicity of individual action-reflexes
whose coordination can be achieved only through the intermediary
of an organization.
Moreover, the action-reflex obtained by propaganda is only a
beginning, a point of departure; it will develop harmoniously
1 There is a certain distance and divergence between opinion and action, between
morale and behavior. A man may have a favorable opinion of Jews and still exhibit
hostile behavior; the morale of a military unit may be very low and yet it may
still fight well. Similarly we observe that people rarely know in advance what they
want, and even less what they want to do. Once they have taken action, they are
Capable of declaring in good faith that they acted in a way other than the way
they actually did act. Man does not obey his clear opinions or what he believes to
be his deliberate will. To control opinion one must be aware that there is an abyss
between what a man says and what he does. His actions often do not correspond
to any clear motive, or to what one would have expected from a previous impres-
sion he made. Because of this difference between opinion and action, the propa-
gandist who seeks to obtain action by changing opinions cannot be at all certain
of success; he must, therefore, find other ways to secure action.
Propaganda (29
only if there is an organization in which (and thanks to which)
the proselyte becomes militant.2 Without organization, psycho-
logical incitement leads to excesses and deviation of action in the
very course of its development. Through organization, the pro-
selyte receives an overwhelming impulse that makes him act with
the whole of his being. He is actually transformed into a religious
man in the psycho-sociological sense of the term; justice enters
into the action he performs because of the organization of
which he is a part. Thus his action is integrated into a group
of conforming actions. Not only does such integration seem to be
the principal aim of all propaganda today; it is also what makes
the effect of propaganda endure.
For action makes propaganda's effect irreversible.8 He who acts
in obedience to propaganda can never go back. He is now obliged
to believe in that propaganda because of his past action. He is
obliged to receive from it his justification and authority, without
which his action will seem to him absurd or unjust, which would
be intolerable. He is obliged to continue to advance in the direc-
tion indicated by propaganda, for action demands more action.
He is what one calls committed—which is certainly what the
Communist party anticipates, for example, and what the Nazis
accomplished. The man who has acted in accordance with the
existing propaganda has taken his place in society. From then on
he has enemies. Often he has broken with his milieu or his family;
he may be compromised. He is forced to accept the new milieu
and the new friends that propaganda makes for him. Often he
has committed an act reprehensible by traditional moral standards * *
2 We must insist again that organization is an intrinsic part of propaganda. It is
illusory to think one can separate them. Since 1928, an agitator in the Soviet Union
must be an organizer of the masses; before that, Lenin said that a newspaper is
propaganda, collective agitation, and collective organization. Similarly Mao Tse-tung
insists on the difference between Communist and Capitalist armies, reminding us
that the former is responsible for mobilizing the masses through propaganda
and organization. He always ties these two elements together; propaganda among
the masses goes hand in hand with organization of the masses. And Maurice
M£gret, recalls the relationship between the two elements in connection with the
May 13 demonstrations in Algiers. These examples demonstrate the error made
by writers who want to separate propaganda and organization.
*This recourse to action permits the propagandist to compensate for a particular
weakness of propaganda at the psychological level and to engage the individual in
action, either because he is included in a small group, which as a whole is
action-oriented, or because the role of the propagandist—located on the level
of human relations—is to give an example of action and to bring others into this
action. Thus the Soviet agitator's first duty is to “set a shining example of effort,
discipline, and sacrifice."
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
30;
and has disturbed a certain order; he needs a justification for this
—and he gets more deeply involved by repeating the act in order
to prove that it was just. Thus he is caught up in a movement
that develops until it totally occupies the breadth of his conscience.
Propaganda now masters him completely—and we must bear in
mind that any propaganda that does not lead to this kind of par-
ticipation is mere child's play.
But we may properly ask how propaganda can achieve such
a result, a type of reflex action, by short-circuiting the intellectual
process. The claim that such results are indeed obtained by
propaganda will beget skepticism from the average observer,
strenuous denial from the psychologist, and the accusation that
this is mere fantasy contradicted by experience. Later, we shall
examine the validity of experiments made by psychologists in
these fields, and their adequacy in regard to the subject. For the
moment we shall confine ourselves to stating that observation
of men who were subjected to a real propaganda, Nazi or Com-
munist, confirms the accuracy of the schema we have just drawn.
We must, however, qualify our statement. We do not say that
any man can be made to obey any incitement to action in any
way whatever from one day to the next. We do not say that in
each individual prior elementary mechanisms exist on which it
is easy to play and which will unfailingly produce a certain effect
We do not hold with a mechanistic view of man. But we must
divide propaganda into two phases. There is pre-propaganda
(or sub-propaganda) and there is active propaganda. This follows
from what we have said earlier about the continuous and per-
manent nature of propaganda. Obviously, what must be con-
tinuous is not the active, intense propaganda of crisis but the
sub-propaganda that aims at mobilizing individuals, or, in the
etymological sense, to make them mobile4 and mobilizable in
order to thrust them into action at the appropriate moment. It is
obvious that we cannot simply throw a man into action without
any preparation, without having mobilized him psychologically
and made him responsive, not to mention physically ready.
The essential objective of pre-propaganda is to prepare man for
a particular action, to make him sensitive to some influence, to
get him into condition for the time when he will effectively, and
4 The term “to mobilize” is constantly applied by Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Goebbels,
and others to the work that precedes propaganda itself.
Propaganda (31
without delay or hesitation, participate in an action. Seen from
this angle, pre-propaganda does not have a precise ideological
objective; it has nothing to do with an opinion, an idea, a doc-
trine. It proceeds by psychological manipulations, by character
modifications, by the creation of feelings or stereotypes useful
when the time comes. It must be continuous, slow, imperceptible.
Man must be penetrated in order to shape such tendencies. He
must be made to live in a certain psychological climate.
The two great routes that this sub-propaganda takes are the
conditioned reflex and the myth. Propaganda tries first of all to
create conditioned reflexes in the individual by training him so
that certain words, signs, or symbols, even certain persons or
facts, provoke unfailing reactions. Despite many protests from
psychologists, creating such conditioned reflexes, collectively as
well as individually, is definitely possible. But of course in order
for such a procedure to succeed, a certain amount of time must
elapse, a period of training and repetition. One cannot hope to
obtain automatic reactions after only a few weeks' repetition of
the same formulas. A real psychic re-formation must be under-
taken, so that after months of patient work a crowd will react
automatically in the hoped-for direction to some image. But this
preparatory work is not yet propaganda, for it is not yet immedi-
ately applicable to a concrete case. What is visible in propaganda,
what is spectacular and seems to us often incomprehensible or
unbelievable, is possible only because of such slow and not very
explicit preparation; without it nothing would be possible.
On the other hand, the propagandist tries to create myths by
which man will live, which respond to his sense of the sacred.
By "myth” we mean an all-encompassing, activating image: a
sort of vision of desirable objectives that have lost their material,
practical character and have become strongly colored, over-
whelming, all-encompassing, and which displace from the con-
scious all that is not related to it. Such an image pushes man to
action precisely because it includes all that he feels is good, just,
and true. Without giving a metaphysical analysis of the myth,
we will mention the great myths that have been created by vari-
ous propagandas: the myth of race, of the proletariat, of the
Fiihrer, of Communist society, of productivity. Eventually the
myth takes possession of a man s mind so completely that his life
is consecrated to it. But that effect can be created only by slow.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
32)
patient work by all the methods of propaganda, not by any im-
mediate propaganda operation. Only when conditioned reflexes
have been created in a man and he lives in a collective myth can
he be readily mobilized.
Although the two methods of myth and conditioned reflex can
be used in combination, each has separate advantages. The United
States prefers to utilize the myth; the Soviet Union has for a long
time preferred the reflex. The important thing is that when the
time is ripe, the individual can be thrown into action by active
propaganda, by the utilization of the psychological levers that
have been set up, and by the evocation of the myth. No connec-
tion necessarily exists between his action and the reflex or the con-
tent of the myth. The action is not necessarily psychologically
conditioned by some aspect of the myth. For the most surprising
thing is that the preparatory work leads only to man’s readiness.
Once he is ready, he can be mobilized effectively in very different
directions—but of course the myth and the reflex must be con-
tinually rejuvenated and revived or they will atrophy. That is
why pre-propaganda must be constant, whereas active propaganda
can be sporadic when the goal is a particular action or involve-
ment.5
5 Political education, in Lenin and Mao’s sense, corresponds exactly to our idea of
sub-propaganda, or basic propaganda, as Goebbels would say. For this education
is in no way objective or disinterested. Its only goal is to create in the individual a
new Weltanschauung, inside which each of the propositions of propaganda will
become logical; each of its demands will be indisputable. It is a matter of forming
new presuppositions, new stereotypes that are prior justifications for the reasons
and objectives which propaganda will give to the individual. But while the pre-
judices and stereotypes in our societies are created in a somewhat incoherent fashion
—singly and haphazardly—in political education we have the systematic and de-
liberate creation of a coherent set of presuppositions that are above challenge.
Probably, at the beginning of the Soviet revolution such political education did not
have precise objectives or practical aims; indoctrination was an end in itself. But
since 1930 this concept has changed, and political education has become the
foundation of propaganda. Mao has done this even earlier. In the Soviet Union
ideological indoctrination is now the means of achieving an end; it is the founda-
tion on which propaganda can convince the individual hie et nunc of whatever it
wants to convince him.
To make this clear we will use the classic terms of propaganda and agitation,
taken in a new sense. Propaganda is the elucidation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
(and corresponds to pre-propaganda); agitation’s goal is to make individuals act
hie et nunc, as a function of their political education and also in terms of this
“education” (which corresponds to what we call propaganda). Active experience,
in effect, makes further education easier. The different elements are easily mixed:
the radio network is given the task to increase "political knowledge” and "political
awareness” (pre-propaganda) and to rally the population to support the policy of
the party and the government (propaganda). The film industry is given orders that
Propaganda
(33
2. Internal Characteristics
Knowledge of the Psychological Terrain
The power of propaganda to incite action has often been chal-
lenged by the alleged fact that propaganda cannot really modify
or create anything in man. We frequently find that psychological
manipulations do not appreciably change an individual's firmly
established opinion. A Communist or a Christian with strong
beliefs is very little, if at all, shaken by adverse propaganda.
Similarly, a prejudice or a stereotype is hardly ever changed by
propaganda; for example it is almost impossible to break down
racial prejudice by propaganda. What people think of Negroes,
Jews, bourgeois, or colonialists will be only slightly altered by
propaganda attempts. Similarly, a reflex or myth cannot be created
out of nothing, as if the individual were neutral and empty ground
on which anything oould be built. Furthermore, even when the
reflex has been created, it cannot be utilized to make an indi-
vidual act in just any direction; the individual cannot be manipu-
lated as if he were an object, an automaton—the automatic nature
of created reflexes does not transform him into a robot.
We can conclude from a large body of experience that the
propagandist cannot go contrary to what is in an individual; he
cannot create just any new psychological mechanism or obtain
just any decision or action. But psychologists who make these
observations draw a very hasty conclusion from them: that propa-
ganda has very little effect, that it has so limited a field of action
that it hardly seems useful. We shall show later why we consider
this conclusion incorrect. But the observations themselves give
us some very good indications as to what is effective propaganda.
The propagandist must first of all know as precisely as possible
even comedies “must organize the thoughts and feelings of the audience in the
required proletarian direction.” The effects of such political education are often
described by Mao: it creates class-consciousness; it destroys the individualist and
petit-bourgeois spirit while assimilating the individual in a collectivity of thought;
it creates ideological conformity in a new framework; it leads to understanding the
necessity for the sharing of property, obedience to the state, creation of authority
and hierarchy; it leads the comrade to vote for suitable representatives, and to
withstand the weariness and the difficulties of the battle for increased production.
This describes perfectly the role of infrastructure assigned to political education
in the process of propaganda.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
34)
the terrain on which he is operating. He must know the senti-
ments and opinions, the current tendencies and the stereotypes
among the public he is trying to reach.6 An obvious point of de-
parture is the analysis of the characteristics of the group and its
current myths, opinions, and sociological structure. One cannot
make just any propaganda any place for anybody. Methods and
arguments must be tailored to the type of man to be reached.
Propaganda is definitely not an arsenal of ready-made, valid tech-
niques and arguments, suitable for use anywhere.7 Obvious errors
in this direction have been made in the recent course of propa-
ganda’s history.8 The technique of propaganda consists in precisely
calculating the desired action in terms of the individual who is
to be made to act.
The second conclusion seems to us embodied in the follow-
ing rule: never make a direct attack on an established, reasoned,
durable opinion or an accepted cliche, a fixed pattern. The propa-
gandist wears himself out to no avail in such a contest. A propa-
gandist who tries to change mass opinion on a precise and
well-established point is a bad propagandist. But that does not
mean that he must then leave things as they are and conclude
•The propagandist must know the principal symbols of the culture he wishes to
attack and the symbols which express each attitude if he is to be effective. The
Communists always make a thorough study of the content of opinion before
launching their propaganda. A person is not sufficient unto himself; he belongs to
that whole called culture by the Americans. Each person s psychology is shaped
by that culture. He is conditioned by the symbols of that culture, and is also a
transmitter of that culture; each time its symbols are changed he is deeply affected.
Thus, one can change him by changing these symbols. The propagandist will act
on this, keeping in mind that the most important man to be reached is the so-
called marginal man: that is, the man who does not believe what the propagandist
says, but who is interested because he does not believe the opposition either; the
man who in battle has good reason to lay down his arms.
7 Beyond this, propaganda must vary according to circumstances. The propagandist
must constantly readjust it according to changes in the situation and also according
to changes made by his opponent; the content of propaganda has special reference
to the opponent and must therefore change if he changes.
8 Here one can see the famous boomerang: When he is wrong in his analysis of a
milieu, the propagandist may create the reverse effect of what he expected, and
his propaganda can turn against him. There are innumerable examples of this. For
instance, during the Korean War the Americans, who wanted to show that prisoners
were well treated, distributed in China and Korea pictures of war prisoners at play,
engaging in sports, and so forth. So that the prisoners should not be recognized and
persecuted by the Communists after the war, their eyes were blacked out in the
pictures. These photos were interpreted by the Chinese to mean “the Americans
gouge out the eyes of their prisoners,” an interpretation which stemmed from their
prior belief that it is impossible to treat prisoners well, and normal to gouge out
their eyes.
\
Propaganda (35
that nothing can be done. He need only understand two subtle
aspects of this problem.
First of all, we recall that there is not necessarily any continuity
between opinion or fixed patterns and action. There is neither
consistency nor logic, and a man can perfecdy well hold on to
his property, his business, and his factory, and still vote Com-
munist—or he can be enthusiastic about social justice and peace
as described by the Communists, and still vote for a conservative
party. Attacking an established opinion or stereotype head on
would make the propagandee aware of basic inconsistencies and
would produce unexpected results.® The skillful propagandist
will seek to obtain action without demanding consistency, without
fighting prejudices and images, by taking his stance deliberately
on inconsistencies.
Second, the propagandist can alter opinions by diverting them
from their accepted course, by changing them, or by placing them
in an ambiguous context.* 1 Starting from apparently fixed and
immovable positions, we can lead a man where he does not want
to go, without his being aware of it, over paths that he will not
notice. In this way propaganda against German rearmament,
organized by the “partisans of peace” and ultimately favorable
to the Soviet Union, utilized the anti-German sentiment of the
French Right.
Thus, existing opinion is not to be contradicted, but utilized.
Each individual harbors a large number of stereotypes and estab-
lished tendencies; from this arsenal the propagandist must select
those easiest to mobilize, those which will give the greatest
strength to the action he wants to precipitate. Writers who insist
that propaganda against established opinion is ineffective would
be right if man were a simple being, having only one opinion with
fixed limits. This is rarely the case among those who have not
yet been propagandized, although it is frequently the case among
individuals who have been subjected to propaganda for a long
time. But the ordinary man in our democracies has a wide range
8 The most frequent response is that of flight. In the face of direct propaganda
against a prejudice the propagandee flees: he rejects (often unconsciously) what
he is told; he wants no part of it; he justifies himself by dissociating himself from
what is attacked, projecting the attack onto another person, and so on—but he
does not change.
1 Other methods of altering opinion are to offer forms of action, or to provoke rifts
in a group, or to turn a feeling of aggression toward some specified object
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
36)
of feelings and ideas.1 2 * Propaganda need only determine which
opinions must not be attacked head on, and be content to under-
mine them gradually and to weaken them by cloaking them in
ambiguity.8
The third important conclusion, drawn from experiments made
chiefly in the United States, is that propaganda cannot create
something out of nothing. It must attach itself to a feeling, an
idea; it must build on a foundation already present in the indi-
vidual. The conditioned reflex can be established only on an
innate reflex or a prior conditioned reflex. The myth does not
expand helter-skelter; it must respond to a group of spontaneous
beliefs. Action cannot be obtained unless it responds to a group
of already established tendencies or attitudes stemming from
the schools, the environment, the regime, the churches, and so on.
Propaganda is confined to utilizing existing material; it does not
create it.
This material falls into four categories. First there are the psy-
chological “mechanisms” that permit the propagandist to know
more or less precisely that the individual will respond in a certain
way to a certain stimulus. Here the psychologists are far from
agreement; behaviorism, depth psychology, and the psychology
of instincts postulate very different psychic mechanisms and see
essentially different connections and motivations. Here the propa-
gandist is at the mercy of these interpretations. Second, opinions,
conventional patterns and stereotypes exist concretely in a par-
ticular milieu or individual. Third, ideologies exist which are more
or less consciously shared, accepted, and disseminated, and which
form the only intellectual, or rather para-intellectual, element that
must be reckoned with in propaganda.
Fourth and finally, the propagandist must concern himself above
all with the needs of those whom he wishes to reach.4 * All propa-
1 This is true of individuals and groups. It has been said quite accurately, for ex-
ample, that if public opinion were really unanimous there would be no way for
propaganda to work. It is only because in any body of public opinion there are
groups of private opinions that propaganda can use these as seeds with which to
reverse the trend of opinion.
1 It goes without saying that propaganda must also change Us character according
to the results it wishes to attain in given circumstances. For example, propaganda
must be strongly personalized when it seeks to create a feeling of guilt in the adver-
sary (e.g., “the French are colonialists”). On the other hand it must be impersonal
when it seeks to create confidence and exaltation (e.g., “France is great”).
4 At the most elementary level, propaganda will play on the need for physical
survival (in time of war). This can be further utilized, either to weaken resistance
or to stiffen it. For example, Goebbels used this theme in 1945 to prolong resistance:
“By fighting you have a chance for survival.**
Propaganda (37
ganda must respond to a need, whether it be a concrete need
(bread, peace, security, work) or a psychological need.8 (We
shall discuss this last point at length later on.) Propaganda can-
not be gratuitous. The propagandist cannot simply decide to
make propaganda in such and such a direction on this or that
group. The group must need something, and the propaganda
must respond to that need. (One weakness of tests made in the
United States is that far too often the experimental propaganda
used did not correspond to a single need of the persons tested.)
A frequent error on the part of propagandists “pushing” something
is the failure to take into account whether or not the propagandee
needs it.
Of course, when we say that the propagandist has to use exist-
ing elements, we do not mean that he must use them in direct
or unequivocal fashion. We have already indicated that he often
must use them in indirect and equivocal fashion. When he does
so, he can indeed create something new. The propagandist's need
to base himself on what already exists does not prevent him from
going further. If committed to a particular opinion, would he be
obligated simply to repeat it indefinitely? Because he must pay lip
service to a certain stereotype, is he limited to do nothing but
reproduce that stereotype? Obviously not. What exists is only
the raw material from which the propagandist can create some-
thing strictly new, which in all probability would not have sprung
up spontaneously. Take, for example, unhappy workers, threat-
ened by unemployment, exploited, poorly paid, and without hope
of improving their situation: Karl Marx has clearly demonstrated
that they might have a certain spontaneous reaction of revolt,
and that some sporadic outbursts might occur, but that this will
not develop into anything else and will lead nowhere. With
propaganda, however, this same situation and the existing senti-
ments might be used to create a class-consciousness and a lasting
and organized revolutionary trend.
Similarly, if we take a population, not necessarily of the same
race or language or history, but inhabiting the same territory,
oppressed by the same conqueror, feeling a common resentment
or hatred toward the occupying force (a sentiment generally
found at a purely individual level), and in the grip of the enemy
5 Propaganda must also consider the image that the propagandee has of the ways
in which his needs can be satisfied (structure of expectation). Propaganda also aims
at modifying this image of what people expect.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
38)
administration, only a few individual acts of violence will occur
spontaneously—and more often nothing at all. But propaganda
can “take it from there” and arouse a nationalism, the founda-
tions of which are perfectly natural but which as an integrated
force is entirely fabricated. This is true for Algerian, Yugoslavian,
or African nationalism.
In this way propaganda can be creative. And it is in complete
control of its creations; the passions or prejudices that it instills
in a man serve to strengthen its hold on him and thus make him
do what he would never have done otherwise. It is not true that
propaganda is powerless simply because at the start it is limited
to what already exists. It can attack from the rear, wear down
slowly, provide new centers of interest, which cause the neglect
of previously acquired positions; it can divert a prejudice; or it
can elicit an action contrary to an opinion held by the individual,
without his being clearly aware of it.
Finally, it is obvious that propaganda must not concern itself
with what is best in man—the highest goals humanity sets for
itself, its noblest and most precious feelings. Propaganda does
not aim to elevate man, but to make him serve. It must therefore
utilize the most common feelings, the most widespread ideas, the
crudest patterns, and in so doing place itself on a very low level
with regard to what it wants man to do and to what end.6 Hate,
hunger, and pride make better levers of propaganda than do love
or impartiality.
Fundamental Currents in Society
Propaganda must not only attach itself to what already exists
in the individual, but also express the fundamental currents of
the society it seeks to influence. Propaganda must be familiar
with collective sociological presuppositions, spontaneous myths,
and broad ideologies. By this we do not mean political currents
or temporary opinions that will change in a few months, but the
fundamental psycho-sociological bases on which a whole society
6 Propaganda must stay at the human level. It must not propose aims so lofty that
they will seem inaccessible; this creates the risk of a boomerang effect. Propaganda
must confine itself to simple, elementary messages (Have confidence in our leader,
our party. . . . Hate our enemies, etc.) without fear of being ridiculous. It must
speak the most simple, everyday language, familiar, individualized—the language
of the group that is being addressed, and the language with which a person is
familiar.
Propaganda (39
rests, the presuppositions and myths not just of individuals or of
particular groups but those shared by all individuals in a society,
including men of opposite political inclinations and class loyalties.
A propaganda pitting itself against this fundamental and ac-
cepted structure would have no chance of success. Rather, all
effective propaganda is based on these fundamental currents and
expresses them.7 Only if it rests on the proper collective beliefs
will it be understood and accepted. It is part of a complex of
civilization, consisting of material elements, beliefs, ideas, and
institutions, and it cannot be separated from them. No propaganda
could succeed by going against these structural elements of so-
ciety. But propaganda’s main task clearly is the psychological
reflection of these structures.
It seems to us that this reflection is found in two essential
forms: the collective sociological presuppositions and the social
myths. By presuppositions we mean a collection of feelings, be-
liefs, and images by which one unconsciously judges events and
things without questioning them, or even noticing them. This
collection is shared by all who belong to the same society or
group. It draws its strength from the fact that it rests on general
tacit agreement. Whatever the differences of opinion are among
people, one can discover beneath the differences the same beliefs
—in Americans and in Russians, in Communists and in Chris-
tians. These presuppositions are sociological in that they are pro-
vided for us by the surrounding milieu and carry us along in the
sociological current. They are what keeps us in harmony with our
environment.
It seems to us that there are four great collective sociological
presuppositions in the modem world. By this we mean not only
the Western world, but all the world that shares a modem tech-
nology and is structured into nations, including the Communist
world, though not yet the African or Asian worlds. These common
presuppositions of bourgeois and proletarian are that man’s aim
in life is happiness, that man is naturally good, that history de-
velops in endless progress, and that everything is matter.8
The other great psychological reflection of social reality is the
7 It must be associated with the dominant cultural values of the entire society.
8 Formulated in this way, they seem to be philosophical notions but are not. We
certainly do not see here any of the philosophical schools, hedonism or materialism,
but only the instinctive popular belief marking our epoch and shared by all,
expressing itself in very concrete forms.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
40)
myth. The myth expresses the deep inclinations of a society. With-
out it, the masses would not cling to a certain civilization or its
process of development and crisis. It is a vigorous impulse, strongly
colored, irrational, and charged with all of man’s power to believe.
It contains a religious element. In our society the two great funda-
mental myths on which all other myths rest are Science and His-
tory. And based on them are the collective myths that are mans
principal orientations: the myth of Work, the myth of Happiness
(which is not the same thing as the presupposition of happi-
ness), the myth of the Nation, the myth of Youth, the myth of
the Hero.
Propaganda is forced to build on these presuppositions and to
express these myths, for without them nobody would listen to
it. And in so building it must always go in the same direction as
society; it can only reinforce society. A propaganda that stresses
virtue over happiness and presents man’s future as one domi-
nated by austerity and contemplation would have no audience
at all. A propaganda that questions progress or work would arouse
disdain and reach nobody; it would immediately be branded as
an ideology of the intellectuals, since most people feel that the
serious things are material things because they are related to
labor, and so on.
It is remarkable how the various presuppositions and aspects
of myths complement each other, support each other, mutually
defend each other: If the propagandist attacks the network at
one point, all myths react to the attack. Propaganda must be
based on current beliefs and symbols to reach man and win him
over. On the other hand, propaganda must also follow the general
direction of evolution, which includes the belief in progress. A
normal, spontaneous evolution is more or less expected, even if
man is completely unaware of it, and in order to succeed, propa-
ganda must move in the direction of that evolution.
The progress of technology is continuous; propaganda must
voice this reality, which is one of man’s convictions. All propa-
ganda must play on the fact that the nation will be industrialized,
more will be produced, greater progress is imminent, and so on.
No propaganda can succeed if it defends outdated production
methods or obsolete social or administrative institutions. Though
occasionally advertising may profitably evoke the good old days,
political propaganda may not. Rather, it must evoke the future,
Propaganda (41
the tomorrows that beckon, precisely because such visions impel
the individual to act.9 Propaganda is carried along on this cur-
rent and cannot oppose it; it must confirm it and reinforce it.
Thus, propaganda will turn a normal feeling of patriotism into
a raging nationalism. It not only reflects myths and presupposi-
tions, it hardens them, sharpens them, invests them with the
power of shock and action.
It is virtually impossible to reverse this trend. In a country in
which administrative centralization does not yet exist, one can
propagandize for centralization because modem man firmly be-
lieves in the strength of a centrally administered State. But where
centralization does exist, no propaganda can be made against it.
Federalist propaganda (true federalism, which is opposed to na-
tional centralism; not such supemationalism as the so-called
Soviet or European federalism) can never succeed because it is
a challenge to both the national myth and the myth of progress;
every reduction, whether to a work unit or an administrative unit,
is seen as regression.
Of course, when we analyze this necessary subordination of
propaganda to presuppositions and myths, we do not mean that
propaganda must express them clearly all the time; it need not
speak constantly of progress and happiness (although these are
always profitable themes), but in its general line and its infra-
structure it must allow for the same presuppositions and follow
the same myths as those prevalent in its audience. There is some
tacit agreement: for example, a speaker does not have to say
that he believes “man is good”: this is clear from his behavior,
language, and attitudes, and each man unconsciously feels that
the others share the same presuppositions and myths. It is the
same with propaganda: a person listens to a particular propaganda
because it reflects his deepest unconscious convictions without
expressing them directly. Similarly, because of the myth of prog-
ress, it is much easier to sell a man an electric razor than a straight-
edged one. •
• But in this straining toward the future the propagandist must always beware of
making precise promises, assurances, commitments. Goebbels constantly protested
the affirmations of victory emanating from the Flihrer’s headquarters. The pull
toward the future should refer to general currents of society rather than to precise
events. Nevertheless, the promise made by Khrushchev that Communism would be
achieved by 1980 leaves enough margin; for though the desired effect is obtained
in 1961, the promise will be forgotten in 1980 if it has not been fulfilled.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
42)
Finally, alongside the fundamental currents reflected in pre-
suppositions and myths, we must consider two other elements.
Obviously the material character of a society and its evolution, its
fundamental sociological currents, are linked to its very structure.
Propaganda must operate in line with those material currents and
at the level of material progress. It must be associated with all
economic, administrative, political, and educational development,
otherwise it is nothing. It must also reflect local and national
idiosyncrasies. Thus, in France, the general trend toward sociali-
zation can be neither overridden nor questioned. The political
Left is respectable; the Right has to justify itself before the ideol-
ogy of the Left (in which even Rightists participate). All propa-
ganda in France must contain—and evoke—the principal elements
of the ideology of the Left in order to be accepted.
But a conflict is possible between a local milieu and the na-
tional society. The tendencies of the group may be contrary to
those of the broader society; in that case one cannot lay down
general rules. Sometimes the tendencies of the local group win
out because of the group's solidarity; sometimes the general
society wins out because it represents the mass and, therefore,
unanimity. In any case, propaganda must always choose the trend
that normally will triumph because it agrees with the great myths
of the time, common to all men. The Negro problem in the Ameri-
can South is typical of this sort of conflict. The local Southern
milieu is hostile to Negroes and favorable to discrimination,
whereas American society as a whole is hostile to racism. It is
almost certain, therefore, despite the deep-rooted prejudices and
the local solidarities, that racism will be overcome. The South-
erners are on the defensive; they have no springboard for external
propaganda—for example, toward the European nations. Propa-
ganda can go only in the direction of world opinion—that of Asia,
Africa, almost all of Europe. Above all, when it is anti-racist, it
is helped along by the myth of progress.
It follows that propaganda cannot be applied everywhere alike,
and that—at least up to now—propaganda in both Africa and
Asia must be essentially different from propaganda in the rest of
the world. We stress “at least up to now” because those countries
are being progressively won over by Western myths and are
developing national and technological forms of society. But for
the moment these myths are not yet everyday reality, flesh and
Propaganda (43
blood, spiritual bread, sacred inheritance, as they are with us. To
sum up, propaganda must express the fundamental currents of
society.1
Timeliness
Propaganda in its explicit form must relate solely to what is
timely.1 2 * Man can be captured and mobilized only if there is
consonance between his own deep social beliefs and those under-
lying the propaganda directed at him, and he will be aroused
and moved to action only if the propaganda pushes him toward
a timely action. These two elements are not contradictory but
complementary, for the only interesting and enticing news is
that which presents a timely, spectacular aspect of society s pro-
found reality. A man will become excited over a new automobile
because it is immediate evidence of his deep belief in progress
and technology. Between news that can be utilized by propa-
ganda and fundamental currents of society the same relationship
exists as between waves and the sea. The waves exist only be-
cause the underlying mass supports them; without it there would
be nothing. But man sees only the waves; they are what attracts,
entices, and fascinates him. Through them he grasps the grandeur
and majesty of the sea, though this grandeur exists only in the
immense mass of water. Similarly, propaganda can have solid
reality and power over man only because of its rapport with
fundamental currents, but it has seductive excitement and a
capacity to move him only by its ties to the most volatile imme-
diacy.8 And the timely event that man considers worth retaining,
preserving, and disseminating is always an event related to the
expression of the myths and presuppositions of a given time and
place.
Besides, the public is sensitive only to contemporary events.
1 In this respect, a high-ranking officer made a completely valid criticism of the
psychological campaign in Algeria (Le Monde, August 2, 1961) when he pointed
out that the weakness of the Lacheroy system was to stress the material environment
of the Algerian population without taking into account its instincts and myths, its
nationalism, and its adherence to Western ideologies.
2 The history of Soviet propaganda is full of such reminders of the necessity for a
propaganda of timeliness, relating to practical problems, and it rejects vague and
dogmatic propaganda. For example, public acceptance must be obtained for new
work norms, salary reforms, and so on.
* Propaganda must remember: “Goebbels said that the face of politics changes
each day, but die lines of propaganda must change only imperceptibly.*
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
44)
They alone concern and challenge it. Obviously, propaganda can
succeed only when man feels challenged. It can have no influ-
ence when the individual is stabilized, relaxing in his slippers
in the midst of total security. Neither past events nor great meta-
physical problems challenge the average individual, the ordinary
man of our times. He is not sensitive to what is tragic in life; he
is not anguished by a question that God might put to him; he
does not feel challenged except by current events, political or
economic. Therefore, propaganda must start with current events;
it would not reach anybody if it tried to base itself on historical
facts. We have seen Vichy propaganda fail when it tried to evoke
the images of Napoleon and Joan of Arc in hopes of arousing the
French to turn against England. Even facts so basic and deeply
rooted in the French consciousness are not a good springboard
for propaganda; they pass quickly into the realm of history, and
consequently into neutrality and indifference: A survey made in
May 1959 showed that among French boys of fourteen and fifteen,
70 percent had no idea who Hitler and Mussolini were, 80 per-
cent had forgotten the Russians in the list of victors of 1945,
and not a single one recognized the words Danzig or Munich as
having figured in relatively recent events.
We must also bear in mind that the individual is at the mercy
of events. Hardly has an event taken place before it is outdated;
even if its significance is still considerable, it is no longer of
interest, and if man experiences the feeling of having escaped it,
he is no longer concerned. In addition, he obviously has a very
limited capacity for attention and awareness; one event pushes
the preceding one into oblivion. And as man's memory is short,
the event that has been supplanted by another is forgotten; it
no longer exists; nobody is interested in it any more.4 In Novem-
ber 1957, a Bordeaux association organized a lecture on the atomic
bomb by a well-known specialist; the lecture would surely have
been of great interest (and not for propaganda purposes). A wide
4 Man remembers no specific news. He retains only a general impression (which
propaganda furnishes him) inserted in the collective current of society. This ob-
viously facilitates the work of the propagandist and permits extraordinary con-
tradictions. What the listener retains, in the long run determines his loyalties. A
remarkable study by Carl I. Hovland and Walter Weiss has shown that the in-
dividual who questions an item of information because he distrusts the informant,
ultimately forgets the suspicious nature of the source and retains only the impres-
sion of the information. In the long run, belief in a reliable source of information
decreases and belief in information from the suspicious source increases.
Propaganda (45
distribution of leaflets had announced it to the student public,
but not a single student came. Why? Because this happened at
exactly the same time as Sputnik’s success, and the public was
concerned only with this single piece of news; its sole interest was
in Sputnik, and the permanent problem was “forgotten.”
Actually, the public is prodigiously sensitive to current news. Its
attention is focused immediately on any spectacular event that
fits in with its myths. At the same time, the public will fix its inter-
est and its passion on one point, to the exclusion of all the rest.
Besides, people have already become accustomed to, and have
accommodated themselves to “the rest” (yesterday’s news or that
of the day before yesterday). We are dealing here not just with
forgetfulness, but also with plain loss of interest.
A good example is Khrushchev’s ultimatum at the beginning of
1959, when he set a time limit of three months to solve the Berlin
problem. Two weeks passed; no war broke out. Even though the
same problem remained, public opinion grew accustomed to it
and lost interest—so much so, that on the expiration date of
Khrushchev’s ultimatum (27 May 1959), people were surprised
when they were reminded of it. Khrushchev himself said nothing
on May 27; not having obtained anything, he simply counted on
the fact that everyone had “forgotten” his ultimatum5—which
shows what a subtle propagandist he is. It is impossible to base
a propaganda campaign on an event that no longer worries
the public; it is forgotten and the public has grown accus-
tomed to it. On November 30, 1957, the Communist states met
and signed an agreement concerning several political problems
and the problem of peace; its text was truly remarkable, one of the
best that has been drawn up. But nobody discussed this important
matter. The progressives were not troubled by it; the partisans
of peace did not say one word—though in itself, objectively, the
text was excellent. But everything it contained was “old hat” to
the public; and the public could not get interested all over again
in an outdated theme when it was not uneasy over a specific threat
of war.
It would appear that propaganda for peace can bear fruit only
5 Exactly the same thing happened in 1961 with the second ultimatum on Berlin:
on June 15 Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to be met by the end of the year, and
on August 2 he announced that he would use force to secure compliance. By the
end of the year everyone had forgotten.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
46)
when there is fear of war. The particular skill of Communist
propaganda in this area is that it creates a threat of war while
conducting peace propaganda. The constant threat of war, arising
from Stalin’s posture, made the propaganda of the partisans for
peace effective and led non-Communists to attach themselves to
the fringe of the party via that propaganda. But in 1957, when
the threat of war seemed much less real, because Khrushchev
had succeeded Stalin, such propaganda had no hold at all on
the public. The news about Hungary seemed far more important
to the Western world than the general problem of world peace.
These various elements explain why the well-written text on the
problem of peace fell flat, though it would have aroused con-
siderable attention at some other time. Once again we note that
propaganda should be continuous, should never relax, and must
vary its themes with the tide of events.
The terms, the words, the subjects that propaganda utilizes
must have in themselves the power to break the barrier of the
individual’s indifference. They must penetrate like bullets; they
must spontaneously evoke a set of images and have a certain
grandeur of their own. To circulate outdated words or pick new
one that can penetrate only by force is unavailing, for timeliness
furnishes the "operational words” with their explosive and affec-
tive power. Part of the power of propaganda is due to its use of
the mass media, but this power will be dissipated if propaganda
relies on operational words that have lost their force. In Western
Europe, the word Bolshevik in 1925, the word Fascist in 1936,
the word Collaborator in 1944, the word Peace in 1948, the word
Integration in 1958, were all strong operational terms; they lost
their shock value when their immediacy passed.
To the extent that propaganda is based on current news, it can-
not permit time for thought or reflection. A man caught up in the
news must remain on the surface of the event; he is carried along
in the current, and can at no time take a respite to judge and
appreciate; he can never stop to reflect. There is never any aware-
ness—of himself, of his condition, of his society—for the man who
lives by current events. Such a man never stops to investigate
any one point, any more than he will tie together a series of news
events. We already have mentioned man’s inability to consider
several facts or events simultaneously and to make a synthesis
of them in order to face or to oppose them. One thought drives
Propaganda (47
away another; old facts are chased by new ones. Under these
conditions there can be no thought. And, in fact, modern man
does not think about current problems; he feels them. He reacts,
but he does not understand them any more than he takes re-
sponsibility for them. He is even less capable of spotting any
inconsistency between successive facts; man's capacity to forget
is unlimited. This is one of the most important and useful points
for the propagandist, who can always be sure that a particular
propaganda theme, statement, or event will be forgotten within
a few weeks. Moreover, there is a spontaneous defensive reaction
in the individual against an excess of information and—to the
extent that he clings (unconsciously) to the unity of his own
person—against inconsistencies. The best defense here is to forget
the preceding event. In so doing, man denies his own continuity;
to the same extent that he lives on the surface of events and makes
today's events his life by obliterating yesterday's news, he refuses
to see the contradictions in his own life and condemns himself
to a life of successive moments, discontinuous and fragmented.8
This situation makes the "current-events man" a ready target
for propaganda. Indeed, such a man is highly sensitive to the
influence of present-day currents; lacking landmarks, he follows
all currents. He is unstable because he runs after what happened
today; he relates to the event, and therefore cannot resist any
impulse coming from that event. Because he is immersed in cur-
rent affairs, this man has a psychological weakness that puts him
at the mercy of the propagandist. No confrontation ever occurs
between the event and the truth; no relationship ever exists be-
tween the event and the person. Real information never concerns
such a person. What could be more striking, more distressing,
more decisive than the splitting of the atom, apart from the bomb
itself? And yet this great development is kept in the background,
behind the fleeting and spectacular result of some catastrophe
or sports event because that is the superficial news the average
man wants. Propaganda addresses itself to that man; like him, it
can relate only to the most superficial aspect of a spectacular
event, which alone can interest man and lead him to make a cer-
tain decision or adopt a certain attitude.
But here we must make an important qualification. The news
•All this is also true of those who claim to be “informed” because they read some
weekly periodical filled with political revelations.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
48)
event may be a real fact, existing objectively, or it may be only
an item of information, the dissemination of a supposed fact.
What makes it news is its dissemination, not its objective reality.
The problem of Berlin is a constant one, and for that reason it
does not interest the public; it is not news. But when Khrushchev
decrees that the problem is dramatic, that it merits the risk of war,
that it must be solved immediately, and when he demands that
the West yield, then (though there is objectively nothing new in
Berlin), the question becomes news—only to disappear as soon
as Khrushchev stops waving the threat. Remember that when
this happened in 1961, it was for the fourth time.
The same thing occurred with Soviet agitation about supposed
Turkish aggression plans in November 1957. An editorial in Le
Monde on this subject contained a remark essentially as follows:
“If the events of recent days can teach us a lesson, it is that we
must not attach too much importance to the anxieties created by
the proclamations of the Soviets. The supposed bacteriological
warfare, among other examples, has shown that they are capable
of carrying on a full campaign of agitation, of accusing others
of the worst intentions and crimes, and of decreeing one fine day
that the danger has passed, only to revive it several days or
months later.”
We shall examine elsewhere the problem of “fact” in the con-
text of propaganda. But here we must emphasize that the current
news to which a man is sensitive, in which he places himself,
need have no objective or effective origins; in one way this greatly
facilitates the work of propaganda. For propaganda can suggest,
in the context of news, a group of “facts” which becomes actual-
ity for a man who feels personally concerned. Propaganda can
then exploit his concern for its own purposes.
Propaganda and the Undecided
All of the foregoing can be clarified by a brief examination of
a question familiar to political scientists, that of the Undecided—
those people whose opinions are vague, who form the great mass
of citizens, and who constitute the most fertile public for the
propagandist. The Undecided are not the Indifferent—those who
say they are apolitical, or without opinion and who constitute no
more than 10 percent of the population. The Undecided, far from
being outside the group, are participants in the life of the group,
Propaganda (49
but do not know what decision to make on problems that seem
urgent to them. They are susceptible to the control of public
opinion or attitudes, and the role of propaganda is to bring them
under this control, transforming their potential into real effect.
But that is possible only if an undecided man is “concerned”
about the group he lives in. How is this revealed? What is the
true situation of the Undecided?
One strong factor here is the individual's degree of integration
in the collective life. Propaganda can play only on individuals
more or less intensely involved in social currents. The isolated
mountaineer or forester, having only occasional contact with
society at the village market, is hardly sensitive to propaganda.
For him it does not even exist. He will begin to notice it only when
a strict regulation imposed on his activities changes his way of
life, or when economic problems prevent him from selling his
products in the usual way. This clash with society may open the
doors to propaganda, but it will soon lose its effect again in the
silence of the mountain or the forest.
Conversely, propaganda acts on the person embroiled in the
conflicts of his time, who shares the “foci of interest” of his so-
ciety. If I read a good newspaper advertisement for a particular
automobile, I will not have the slightest interest in it if I am
indifferent to automobiles. This advertisement can affect me only
to the extent that I share, with my contemporaries, the mania
for automobiles. A prior general interest must exist for propaganda
to be effective. Propaganda is effective not when based on an
individual prejudice, but when based on a collective center of
interest, shared by the crowds.
That is why religious propaganda, for example, is not very suc-
cessful; society as a whole is no longer interested in religious
problems. At Byzantium, crowds fought in the streets over theo-
logical questions, so that in those days religious propaganda made
sense. At present, only isolated individuals are interested in reli-
gion. It is part of their private opinions, and no real public opinion
exists on this subject. On the other hand, propaganda related to
technology is sure to arouse response, for everybody is as pas-
sionately interested in technology as in politics. Only within the
limits of collective foci of interest can propaganda be effective.
We are not dealing here with prejudices or stereotypes, which
imply minds that are already made up; we are dealing with foci
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
So)
of interest, where minds are not necessarily made up as yet. For
example, politics is presently a focus of interest; it was not so in
the twelfth century. The prejudices of the Right or the Left come
later; that is already more individual, whereas the focus of interest
on politics as such is truly collective. (Not individual prejudices,
but the collective shared foci of interest are the best fields of
action for propaganda.) Prejudices and stereotypes can be the
result of a person's background, stemming from his education,
work, environment, and so on; but the foci of interest are truly
produced by the whole of society. Why is modem man obsessed
with technology? One can answer that question only by an analy-
sis of present-day society as a whole. This goes for all the centers
of interest of contemporary man. It should be noted, incidentally,
that these centers of interest are becoming more alike in all parts
of the world. Thus a focus of political interest is developing among
the Asian peoples, the Moslems, and the Africans. This expansion
of interest inevitably entails a simultaneous expansion of propa-
ganda, which may not be identical in all countries, but which
will be able to operate in the same basic patterns and be related
to the same centers of interest everywhere.
We now take up another basic trait of the social psychology of
propaganda: the more intense the life of a group to which an
individual belongs, the more active and effective propaganda is.
A group in which feelings of belonging are weak, in which com-
mon objectives are imprecise or the structure is in the process
of changing, in which conflicts are rare, and which is not tied to
a collective focus of interest, cannot make valid propaganda either
to its members or to those outside. But where the vitality of a
group finds expression in the forms mentioned, it not only can
make effective propaganda but also can make its members in-
creasingly sensitive to propaganda in general. The more active
and alive a group, the more its members will listen to propaganda
and believe it.7
But this holds true only for propaganda by the group itself
toward its members. If we go a bit further, we meet the connected
7 The more the individual is integrated into a group, the more he is receptive to
propaganda, and the more he is apt to participate in the political life of his group.
The group does not even have to be solidly structured; thus, in a group of friends,
when almost all vote the same way, there is little chance of any of them going
astray. The friendly group involuntarily exerts pressure.
Propaganda (51
but more general problem of the intensity of collective life. Vig-
orous groups can definitely have a collective life of little intensity;
conversely, weak groups can have an intense collective life. His-
torically we can observe that an intense collective life develops
even while a society is disintegrating—as in the Roman Empire
about the fourth century, in Germany at the time of the Weimar
Republic, or in France today. Whether or not this collective life
is wholesome matters little. What counts for propaganda is the
intensity of that life, whatever its sources. In a trend toward social
disintegration, this intensity predisposes individuals to accept
propaganda without determining its meaning in advance. Such
individuals are not prepared to accept this or that orientation, but
they are more easily subjected to psychological pressure.
Furthermore, it matters little whether the intensity of such
collective life is spontaneous or artificial. It can result from a
striving, a restlessness, or a conviction deriving directly from
social or political conditions, as in France in 1848, or in the
medieval city-states. It can result from manipulation of the group,
as in Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. In all such cases the result
is the same: the individual who is part of an intense collective
life is prone to submit to the influence of propaganda. And any-
one who succeeds in keeping aloof from the intense collective
life is generally outside the influence of propaganda, because of
his ability to escape that intensity.
Of course, the intensity is connected with the centers of inter-
est; it is not an unformed or indeterminate current without direc-
tion. It is not just a haphazard explosion. Rather, it is a force for
which the focus of interest is the compass needle. Social relations
in the group are often very active because of its focus of interest:
for example, the interest in politics invigorated social relations in
all Europe during the nineteenth century. In any case, intensity
will be greatest around such an interest. For example, an impor-
tant center of interest today is one's profession; an individual who
cares little for the social life of his group, his family life, or books
reacts vigorously on the subject of his profession. And his reaction
is not individual; it is the result of his participation in the group.
Thus we can present the following three principles:
(1) The propagandist must place his propaganda inside the
limits of the foci of interest.
(2) The propagandist must understand that his propaganda
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
52)
has the greatest chance for success where the collective life of
the individuals he seeks to influence is most intense.
(3) The propagandist must remember that collective life is
most intense where it revolves around a focus of interest.
On the basis of these principles the propagandist can reach the
Undecided and act on the majority of 93 percent;8 and only in
connection with this mass of Undecided can one truly speak of
ambiguity, majority effect, tension, frustration, and so on.
Propaganda and Truth
We have not yet considered a problem, familiar but too often
ignored: the relationship between propaganda and truth or,
rather, between propaganda and accuracy of facts. We shall
speak henceforth of accuracy or reality, and not of “truth,” which
is an inappropriate term here.
The most generally held,concept of propaganda is that it is a
series of tall stories, a tissue of lies, and that lies are necessary
for effective propaganda. Hitler himself apparently confirmed
this point of view when he said that the bigger the He, the more
its chance of being beheved. This concept leads to two attitudes
among the pubhc. The first is: “Of course we shall not be victims
of propaganda because we are capable of distinguishing truth
from falsehood.” Anyone holding that conviction is extremely
susceptible to propaganda, because when propaganda does tell
the “truth,” he is then convinced that it is no longer propaganda;
moreover, his self-confidence makes him all the more vulnerable
to attacks of which he is unaware.
The second attitude is: “We beheve nothing that the enemy
says because everything he says is necessarily untrue.” But if the
enemy can demonstrate that he has told the truth, a sudden turn
in his favor will result. Much of the success of Communist propa-
ganda in 1945-48 stemmed from the fact that as long as Com-
munism was presented as the enemy, both in the Balkans and in
the West, everything the Soviet Union said about its economic
progress or its mihtary strength was declared false. But after 1943,
8 On the subject of this 93 percent, it is often stated—and opinion surveys tend to
confirm this—-that between 7 and 10 percent of all individuals consciously and
voluntarily adhere to a trend, to a grouping, whereas about 90 percent fluctuate
according to the circumstances. The first correct estimate of this apparently was
made by Napoleon. It was revived by Hitler.
Propaganda (S3
the visible military and economic strength of the Soviet Union
led to a complete turnabout: "What the Soviet Union said in 1937
was true; therefore it always speaks the truth.”
The idea that propaganda consists of lies (which makes it harm-
less and even a little ridiculous in the eyes of the public) is still
maintained by some specialists; for example, Frederick C. Irion
gives it as the basic trait in his definition of propaganda.9 But it
is certainly not so. For a long time propagandists have recognized
that lying must be avoided.1 "In propaganda, truth pays off”—
this formula has been increasingly accepted. Lenin proclaimed it.
And alongside Hitler s statement on lying one must place Goeb-
bels’s insistence that facts to be disseminated must be accurate.* 1 2
How can we explain this contradiction? It seems that in propa-
ganda we must make a radical distinction between a fact on the
one hand and intentions or interpretations on the other; in brief,
between the material and the moral elements. The truth that pays
off is in the realm of facts. The necessary falsehoods, which also
pay off, are in the realm of intentions and interpretations. This is
a fundamental rule for propaganda analysis.
The Problem of Factuality. It is well known that veracity and
exactness are important elements in advertising. The customer
9 It Is true that for a long time propaganda was made up of lies. In Falsehood in
Wartime, Ponsonby said: "When war is declared truth is the first victim. . . .
Falsehood is the most useful weapon in case of war.” He revealed innumerable lies,
deliberate or not, used during the war of 1914-18. Today, too, the propagandist
may be a liar, he may invent stories about his adversaries, falsify statistics, create
news, and so on. The public, however, is firmly convinced that such is always the
case in propaganda; that propaganda is never true.
1 Certain authors have strongly stressed this danger of falsehood: Alfred Sauvy
shows that the "creative lie” can be justified only by success, and he recalls the
famous words: "We shall win because we are the stronger.” The public, when it
recognizes a lie, will turn completely against its authors. Goebbels's great method
for ruining English propaganda in 1940 was to recall England's 1916 propaganda
lies, which had since been admitted. This cast doubt on English propaganda as a
whole.
2 This idea is now generally accepted. In the United States it is the Number One
rule in propaganda manuals, except for unbelievable and harmful truths, about
which it is better to be silent. SHAEF said in its manual: "When there is no com-
pelling reason to suppress a fact, tell it. . . . Aside from considerations of military
security, the only reason to suppress a piece of news is if it is unbelievable. . . .
When the listener catches you in a lie, your power diminishes. . . . For this reason,
never tell a lie which can be discovered.” As far back as 1940 the American psycho-
logical services already had orders to tell the truth; in carrying them out, for ex-
ample, they distributed the same newspapers to American and German soldiers.
In the Communist bloc we find exactly the same attitude: Mao has always been
very careful to state the facts exactly, including bad news. On the basis of Lenin's
general theory of information, it is incorrect that the dissemination of false news
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
54)
must be able to have confidence in the advertisement. When he
has been deceived several times, the result is obviously unfav-
orable. That is why advertisers make it a rule to be accurate and
organize a bureau of standards to denounce false claims. But here
we refer to an essential factor: experience. The customer has good
or bad experiences with a product. In political matters, how-
ever, personal experience is very rare, difficult to come by, and
inconclusive. Thus one must distinguish between local facts,
which can be checked, and others. Obviously, propaganda must
respect local facts, otherwise it would destroy itself. It cannot
hold out for long against local evidence unless the population is
so securely in the palm of the propagandist’s hand that he could
say absolutely anything and still be believed; but that is a rare
condition.
With regard to larger or more remote facts that cannot be the
object of direct experience, one can say that accuracy is now
generally respected in propaganda. One may concede, for ex-
ample, that statistics given out by the Soviets or the Americans
are accurate. There is little reason to falsify statistics. Similarly,
there is no good reason to launch a propaganda campaign based
on unbelievable or false facts. The best example of the latter
was the Communist campaign on bacteriological warfare. Of
course it was useful from certain points of view, and the true
believers still believe what was said at the time. But among the
Undecided it had a rather negative effect because of its extreme
improbability and its contradictions. However, although many,
especially in Western Europe, considered it a blunder, the cam-
paign produced considerable credence in North Africa and India.
Consequently, falsehood bearing on fact is neither entirely useless
does not create problems. French propagandists also have discovered that truth-
fulness is effective, and that it is better to spread a piece of bad news oneself
than to wait until it is revealed by others.
There remains the problem of Goebbels’s reputation. He wore the title of Big
Liar (bestowed by Anglo-Saxon propaganda) and yet he never stopped battling
for propaganda to be as accurate as possible. He preferred being cynical and
brutal to being caught in a lie. He used to say: “Everybody must know what the
situation is.” He was always the first to announce disastrous events or difficult sit-
uations, without hiding anything. The result was a general belief, between 1939 and
1942, that German communiques not only were more concise, clearer, and less
cluttered, but were more truthful than Allied communiques (American and neutral
opinion)—and, furthermore, that the Germans published all the news two or three
days before the Allies. All this is so true that pinning the title of Big Liar on
Goebbels must be considered quite a propaganda success.
Propaganda (5 5
nor to be strictly avoided. Nevertheless, bear in mind that it is
increasingly rare.8
Three qualifications of this statement must be made. First of
all, propaganda can effectively rest on a claim that some fact
is untrue which may actually be true but is difficult to prove.
Khrushchev made a specialty of this kind of operation; he de-
nounced lies on the part of his predecessors in order to give a
ring of truth to his own pronouncements. Thus, when he called
Malenkov an *‘inveterate liar” before the Central Committee of
the Communist Party in December 1958 and declared that
Malenkov’s statistics were false, there was no reason to believe
Khrushchev more than Malenkov. But the foray made sense. First
of all, as Khrushchev was denouncing a lie, it seemed that he
must, therefore, be telling the truth. Secondly, by lowering the
figures given by Malenkov, Khrushchev could show a much
higher rise in production since 1952. If it is true that in 1958, 9.2
billion pounds of grain were produced, and if Malenkov’s figure
of 8 billion in 1952 was accurate, that meant a 15 percent increase
in six years. If, however, the 1952 figure was only 5.6 billion, as
Khrushchev claimed, that meant an increase of 75 percent—a
triumph. It seems more reasonable to consider Malenkov’s figures
accurate, rather than Khrushchev’s—until proved otherwise.* 4
A second qualification obviously concerns the presentation of
facts; when these are used by propaganda, one is asked to swallow
the bald fact as accurate. Also, most of the time the fact is pre-
sented in such a fashion that the listener or reader cannot really
understand it or draw any conclusions from it. For example, a
figure may be given without reference to anything, without a cor-
relation or a percentage or a ratio. One states that production has
risen by 30 percent, without indicating the base year, or that the
standard of living has risen by 15 percent, without indicating how
it is calculated, or that such and such a movement has grown by
so many people, without giving figures for previous years. The lack
8 As we have emphasized, such lies must not be told except about completely
unverifiable facts. For example, Goebbels’s lies could be on the successes achieved
by German U-boats, because only the captain of the U-boat knew if he had sunk
a ship or not. It was easy to spread detailed news on such a subject without fear of
contradiction.
4 This evaluation, written in 1959, has been proved true since we learned (in 1961)
of the disaster of Soviet agriculture.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
56)
of coherence and cohesion of such data is entirely deliberate.5 Of
course, starting with such data, it is not impossible to reconstruct
the whole; with much patience, work, and research, one can bring
order into such facts and relate them to each other. But that is a
job for a specialist, and the results would not appear until long
after the propaganda action had obtained its effect. Besides, they
would be published as a technical study and be seen by only a
handful of readers. Therefore, the publication of a true fact in its
raw state is not dangerous. When it would be dangerous to let
a fact be known, the modem propagandist prefers to hide it, to say
nothing rather than to lie. About one fifth of all press directives
given by Goebbels between 1939 and 1944 were orders to keep
silent on one subject or another. Soviet propaganda acts the same
way. Well-known facts are simply made to disappear; occasion-
ally they are discovered after much delay. The famous Khrushchev
report to the Twentieth Congress is an example: the Communist
press in France, Italy, and elsewhere simply did not speak of it for
weeks. Similarly, the Egyptian people did not learn of the events
in Hungary until May i960; up to that time the Egyptian press had
not said one word about them. Another example is Khrushchev’s
silence on the Chinese communes in his report to the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party in December 1958.
Silence is also one way to pervert known facts by modifying
their context. There were admirable examples of this in the propa-
ganda against Mend&s-France. Propaganda said: Mend&s-France
has abandoned Indochina, Mend&s-France has abandoned Tunisia,
Mend&s-France has liquidated the French banks in India, and so
on. Those were the plain facts. But there was complete silence
on past policies in Indochina, past events in Morocco that had
led to events in Tunisia, and agreements on Indian banks signed
by the preceding government.6
Finally, there is the use of accurate facts by propaganda.
Based on them, the mechanism of suggestion can work best
Americans call this technique innuendo. Facts are treated in such
a fashion that they draw their listener into an irresistible socio-
logical current. The public is left to draw obvious conclusions
5 Sauvy states that this type of propaganda consists in “respecting detail in order to
eventually compose a static whole which gives misleading information on the
movement. Thus . . . truth becomes the principal form of Falsehood.”
6 This technique, called selection by American authors, leads to an effective distor-
tion of reality. The propagandist automatically chooses the array of facts which
will be favorable to him and distorts them by using them out of context
Propaganda (57
from a cleverly presented truth,7 and the great majority comes
to the same conclusions. To obtain this result, propaganda must
be based on some truth that can be said in few words and is able
to linger in the collective consciousness. In such cases the enemy
cannot go against the tide, which he might do if the basis of
the propaganda were a lie or the sort of truth requiring a proof
to make it stick. On the contrary, the enemy now must provide
proof, but it no longer changes the conclusions that the propa-
gandee already has drawn from the suggestions.
Intentions and Interpretations. This is the real realm of the lie;
but it is exactly here that it cannot be detected. If one falsifies
a fact, one may be confronted with unquestionable proof to the
contrary. (To deny that torture was used in Algeria became
increasingly difficult.) But no proof can be furnished where
motivations or intentions are concerned or interpretation of a
fact is involved. A fact has different significance, depending on
whether it is analyzed by a bourgeois economist or a Soviet
economist, a liberal historian, a Christian historian, or a Marxist
historian. The difference is even greater when a phenomenon
created deliberately by propaganda is involved. How can one
suspect a man who talks peace of having the opposite intent—
without incurring the wrath of public opinion? And if the same
man starts a war, he can always say that the others forced it on
him, that events proved stronger than his intentions. We forget
that between 1936 and 1939 Hitler made many speeches about
his desire for peace, for the peaceful settlement of all prob-
lems, for conferences. He never expressed an explicit desire for
war. Naturally, he was arming because of “encirclement.” And,
in fact, he did manage to get a declaration of war from France
and England; so he was not the one who started the war.8
7 The only element in the publication of a fact which one must scrupulously take
into account is its probability or credibility. Much news was suppressed during
the war because it would not have been believed by the public; it would have been
branded as pure propaganda. A 1942 incident is an excellent example of this. At
the moment of Montgomery’s decisive victory in North Africa, Rommel was absent
The Nazis had not expected an attack at that time and had called Rommel back to
Germany. But Goebbels gave the order not to reveal this fact because everybody
would have considered it a lie to explain the defeat and prove that Rommel had
not really been beaten. Truth was not probable enough to be told.
8 The confusion between judgment of fact and judgment of value occurs at the
level of these qualifications of fact and interpretation. For example: All bombings
by the enemy are acts of savagery aimed only at civilian objectives, whereas all
bombings by one’s own planes are proof of one’s superiority, and they never destroy
anything but military objectives. Similarly, when another government shows good
will, it is a sign of weakness; when it shows authority, it wants war or dictatorship.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
5 8)
Propaganda by its very nature is an enterprise for perverting
the significance of events and of insinuating false intentions.
There are two salient aspects of this fact. First of all, the propa-
gandist must insist on the purity of his own intentions and, at
the same time, hurl accusations at his enemy. But the accusa-
tion is never made haphazardly or groundlessly.® The propa-
gandist will not accuse the enemy of just any misdeed; he will
accuse him of the very intention that he himself has and of trying
to commit the very crime that he himself is about to commit.
He who wants to provoke a war not only proclaims his own
peaceful intentions but also accuses the other party of provoca-
tion. He who uses concentration camps accuses his neighbor
of doing so. He who intends to establish a dictatorship always
insists that his adversaries are bent on dictatorship. The accusa-
tion aimed at the others intention clearly reveals the intention
of the accuser. But the public cannot see this because the
revelation is interwoven with facts.
The mechanism used here is to slip from the facts, which
would demand factual judgment, to moral terrain and to ethical
judgment. At the time of Suez the confusion of the two levels in
Egyptian and progressivist propaganda was particularly success-
ful: Nasser’s intentions were hidden behind the fully revealed
intentions of the French and English governments. Such an
example, among many others, permits the conclusion that even
intelligent people can be made to swallow professed intentions
by well-executed propaganda. The breadth of the Suez propa-
ganda operation can be compared only with that which succeeded
at the time of Munich, when there was the same inversion of the
interpretation of facts. We also find exactly the same process in
the propaganda of the F.L.N. in France and in that of Fidel
Castro.
The second element of falsehood is that the propagandist nat-
urally cannot reveal the true intentions of the principal for whom
he acts: government, party chief, general, company director.
Propaganda never can reveal its true projects and plans or 8
8 Because political problems are difficult and often confusing, and their significance
and their import not obvious, the propagandist can easily present them in moral
language—and here we leave the realm of fact, to enter into that of passion.
Facts, then, come to be discussed in the language of indignation, a tone which is
almost always the mark of propaganda.
Propaganda (59
divulge government secrets. That would be to submit the projects
to public discussion, to the scrutiny of public opinion, and thus
to prevent their success. More serious, it would make the projects
vulnerable to enemy action by forewarning him so that he could
take all the proper precautions to make them fail. Propaganda
must serve instead as a veil for such projects, masking true
intentions.1 It must be in effect a smokescreen. Maneuvers take
place behind protective screens of words on which public atten-
tion is fixed. Propaganda is necessarily a declaration of one’s
intentions. It is a declaration of purity that will never be realized,
a declaration of peace, of truth, of social justice. Of course, one
must not be too precise at the top level, or promise short-term
reforms, for it would be risky to invite a comparison between what
was promised and what was done. Such comparison would be
possible if propaganda operated in the realm of future fact.
Therefore, it should be confined to intentions, to the moral realm,
to values, to generalities. And if some angry man were to point
out the contradictions, in the end his argument would carry no
weight with the public.
Propaganda is necessarily false when it speaks of values, of
truth, of good, of justice, of happiness—and when it interprets
and colors facts and imputes meaning to them. It is true when it
serves up the plain fact, but does so only for the sake of establish-
ing a pretense and only as an example of the interpretation that
it supports with that fact. When Khrushchev made his great claims
in 1957, proving that the Soviet Union was catching up with the
United States in the production of consumer goods, he cited
several figures to prove that the growth of agricultural production
over ten years showed such a trend. On the basis of these figures
he concluded that in 1958 the Soviets would have as much butter
as the United States (which even in 1959 was still not true);
and that in i960 they would have as much meat (in 1959 they
1 Many authors have stressed this role of covert propaganda. Speier says that the
role of the propagandist is to hide political reality by talking about it. Sauvy says
that the propagandist administers the anesthetic so the surgeon can operate
without public interference. This is why, in many cases, according to M6gret, com-
plete secrecy is a handicap to the propagandist; he must be free to speak, for only
then can he sufficiently confuse things, reveal elements too disconnected to be put
together, and so on. He must keep the public from understanding reality, while
giving the public the opposite impression, that it understands everything clearly.
Riess says he must give the public distorted news and intentions, knowing clearly
beforehand what conclusions the public will draw from them.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
6o)
were very far from it). And he provoked his audience to laughter
by ridiculing his economists, who estimated that such levels
would not be reached until 1975. At that moment he drew a veil
over reality in the very act of interpreting it.
Lies about intentions and interpretations permit the integra-
tion of the diverse methods of propaganda. In fact Hitlers
propaganda was able to make the he a precise and systematic
instrument, designed to transform certain values, to modify cer-
tain current concepts, to provoke psychological twists in the
individual. The he was the essential instrument for that, but this
was not just a falsification of some figure or fact. As Hermann
Rauschning shows, it was falsehood in depth.2 Stalinist propaganda
was the same. On the other hand, American and Leninist propa-
ganda* * * 8 seek the truth, but they resemble the preceding types
of propaganda in that they provoke a general system of false
claims. When the United States poses as the defender of liberty
—of all, everywhere and always—it uses a system of false repre-
sentation. When the Soviet Union poses as the defender of true
democracy, it is also employing a system of false representation.
But the hes are not always dehberately set up; they may be an
expression of a behef, of good faith—which leads to a he regard-
ing intentions because the behef is only a rationalization, a veil
drawn dehberately over a reality one wishes not to see. Thus it
is possible that when the United States makes its propaganda
for freedom, it really thinks it is defending freedom; and that the
Soviet Union, when presenting itself as the champion of democ-
racy, really imagines itself to be a champion of democracy. But
these behefs lead definitely to false claims, due in part to propa-
ganda itself. Certainly a part of the success of Communist
propaganda against capitalism comes from the effective denuncia-
tion of capitalism's claims; the false “truth” of Communist propa-
ganda consists in exposing the contradiction between the values
stressed by the bourgeois society (the virtue of work, the family,
liberty, political democracy) and the reality of that society
* Except that Goebbels used falsehood very subtly to discredit the enemy; he
secretly disseminated false news about Germany to enemy intelligence agents; then
he proved publicly that their news was false, thus that the enemy lied.
8 Alex Inkeles has emphasized that Lenin did not have the same cynical attitude
towards the masses as did Hitler, and that he was less concerned with technique
Propaganda (61
(poverty, unemployment, and so on). These values are false
because they are only claims of self-justification. But the Com-
munist system expresses false claims of the same kind.
Propaganda feeds, develops, and spreads the system of false
claims—lies aimed at the complete transformation of minds, judg-
ments, values, and actions (and constituting a frame of reference
for systematic falsification). When the eyeglasses are out of focus,
everything one sees through them is distorted. This was not
always so in the past. The difference today lies in the voluntary
and deliberate character of inaccurate representation circulated
by propaganda. While we credit the United States and the Soviet
Union with some good faith in their beliefs, as soon as a system
of propaganda is organized around false claims, all good faith
disappears, the entire operation becomes self-conscious, and the
falsified values are recognized for what they are. The lie reveals
itself to the liar. One cannot make propaganda in pretended
good faith. Propaganda reveals our hoaxes even as it encloses and
hardens us into this system of hoaxes from which we can no
longer escape.
Having analyzed these traits, we can now advance a definition
of propaganda—not an exhaustive definition, unique and exclu-
sive of all others, but at least a partial one: Propaganda is a set
of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring
about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of
individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipu-
lations and incorporated in an organization.
3. Categories of Propaganda
Despite a general belief, propaganda is not a simple phe-
nomenon, and one cannot lump together all of its forms. Types of
propaganda can be distinguished by the regimes that employ
them. Soviet propaganda and American propaganda do not
resemble each other either in method or in psychological tech-
nique. Hitler's propaganda was very different from present-day
Chinese propaganda, but it substantially resembled Stalinist
propaganda. The propaganda of the F.L.N. in Algeria cannot be
compared to French propaganda. Even within the same regime
completely different conceptions can co-exist; the Soviet Union is
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
62)
the most striking example of this. The propagandas of Lenin,
Stalin, and Khrushchev offer three types which differ in their tech-
niques, in their themes, and in their symbolism; so much so that
when we set up too narrow a frame for the definition of propa-
ganda, part of the phenomenon eludes us. Those who think
of Soviet propaganda only as it was under Stalin are inclined
to say that Khrushchev does not make propaganda. But Khrush-
chev's propaganda was as extensive as Stalin's and perhaps more
so; he carried certain propaganda techiques to their very limits.
But aside from these political and external categories of propa-
ganda, one must define other differences that rest on certain
internal traits of propaganda.
Political Propaganda and Sociological Propaganda
First we must distinguish between political propaganda and
sociological propaganda. We shall not dwell long on the former
because it is the type called immediately to mind by the word
propaganda itself. It involves techniques of influence employed
by a government, a party, an administration, a pressure group,
with a view to changing the behavior of the public. The choice
of methods used is deliberate and calculated; the desired goals
are clearly distinguished and quite precise, though generally
limited. Most often the themes and the objectives are political,
as for example with Hitler's or Stalin's propaganda. This is the
type of propaganda that can be most clearly distinguished from
advertising: the latter has economic ends, the former political
ends. Political propaganda can be either strategic or tactical. The
former establishes the general line, the array of arguments, the
staggering of the campaigns; the latter seeks to obtain immediate
results within that framework (such as wartime pamphlets and
loudspeakers to obtain the immediate surrender of the enemy).
But this does not cover all propaganda, which also encom-
passes phenomena much more vast and less certain: the group
of manifestations by which any society seeks to integrate the
maximum number of individuals into itself, to unify its members'
behavior according to a pattern, to spread its style of life abroad,
and thus to impose itself on other groups. We call this phenomenon
"sociological" propaganda, to show, first of all, that the entire
group, consciously or not, expresses itself in this fashion; and to
indicate, secondly, that its influence aims much more at an entire
Propaganda (63
style of life than at opinions or even one particular course of
behavior.4
Of course, within the compass of sociological propaganda itself
one or more political propagandas can be expressed. The propa-
ganda of Christianity in the middle ages is an example of this
type of sociological propaganda; Benjamin Constant meant just
this when he said of France, in 1793: “The entire nation was a
vast propaganda operation.” And in present times certainly the
most accomplished models of this type are American and Chinese
propaganda. Although we do not include here the more or less
effective campaigns and methods employed by governments, but
rather the over-all phenomenon, we find that sociological propa-
ganda combines extremely diverse forms within itself. At this
level, advertising as the spreading of a certain style of life can be
said to be included in such propaganda, and in the United States
this is also true of public relations, human relations, human
engineering, the motion pictures, and so on. It is characteristic
of a nation living by sociological propaganda that all these in-
fluences converge toward the same point, whereas in a society
such as France in i960, they are divergent in their objectives and
their intentions.
Sociological propaganda is a phenomenon much more diffi-
cult to grasp than political propaganda, and is rarely discussed.
Basically it is the penetration of an ideology by means of its
sociological context. This phenomenon is the reverse of what we
have been studying up to now. Propaganda as it is traditionally
known implies an attempt to spread an ideology through the
mass media of communication in order to lead the public to
accept some political or economic structure or to participate in
some action. That is the one element common to all the propa-
ganda we have studied. Ideology is disseminated for the purpose
of making various political acts acceptable to the people.
But in sociological propaganda the movement is reversed. The
existing economic, political, and sociological factors progressively
allow an ideology to penetrate individuals or masses. Through the
4 This notion is a little broader than that of Doob on unintentional propaganda.
Doob includes in the term the involuntary effects obtained by the propagandist. He
is the first to have stressed the possibility of this unintentional character of propa-
ganda, contrary to all American thought on the subject, except for David Krech
and Richard S. Crutchfield, who go even further in gauging the range of unin-
tentional propaganda, which they even find in books on mathematics.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
64)
medium of economic and political structures a certain ideology
is established, which leads to the active participation of the
masses and the adaptation of individuals. The important thing is
to make the individual participate actively and to adapt him as
much as possible to a specific sociological context.
Such propaganda is essentially diffuse. It is rarely conveyed by
catchwords or expressed intentions. Instead it is based on a gen-
eral climate, an atmosphere that influences people imperceptibly
without having the appearance of propaganda; it gets to man
through his customs, through his most unconscious habits. It
creates new habits in him; it is a sort of persuasion from within.
As a result, man adopts new criteria of judgment and choice,
adopts them spontaneously, as if he had chosen them himself.
But all these criteria are in conformity with the environment and
are essentially of a collective nature. Sociological propaganda pro-
duces a progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, a
certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously molds
individuals and makes them conform to society.
Sociological propaganda springs up spontaneously; it is not the
result of deliberate propaganda action. No propagandists de-
liberately use this method, though many practice it unwittingly,
and tend in this direction without realizing it. For example, when
an American producer makes a film, he has certain definite ideas
he wants to express, which are not intended to be propaganda.
Rather, the propaganda element is in the American way of life
with which he is permeated and which he expresses in his film
without realizing it. We see here the force of expansion of a
vigorous society, which is totalitarian in the sense of the integra-
tion of the individual, and which leads to involuntary behavior.
Sociological propaganda expresses itself in many different ways
—in advertising, in the movies (commercial and non-political
films), in technology in general, in education, in the Readers
Digest; and in social service, case work, and settlement houses.
All these influences are in basic accord with each other and lead
spontaneously in the same direction; one hesitates to call all this
propaganda. Such influences, which mold behavior, seem a far cry
from Hitlers great propaganda setup. Unintentional (at least in
the first stage), non-political, organized along spontaneous pat-
terns and rhythms, the activities we have lumped together (from
a concept that might be judged arbitrary or artificial) are not
Propaganda (65
considered propaganda by either sociologists or the average
public.
And yet with deeper and more objective analysis, what does
one find? These influences are expressed through the same media
as propaganda. They are really directed by those who make propa-
ganda. To me this fact seems essential. A government, for ex-
ample, will have its own public relations, and will also make
propaganda. Most of the activities described in this chapter have
identical purposes. Besides, these influences follow the same
stereotypes and prejudices as propaganda; they stir the same feel-
ings and act on the individual in the same fashion. These are the
similarities, which bring these two aspects of propaganda closer
together, more than the differences, noted earlier, separate them.
But there is more. Such activities are propaganda to the extent
that the combination of advertising, public relations, social wel-
fare, and so on produces a certain general conception of society,
a particular way' of life. We have not grouped these activities
together arbitrarily—they express the same basic notions and
interact to make man adopt this particular way of life. From then
on, the individual in the clutches of such sociological propa-
ganda believes that those who live this way are on the side of the
angels, and those who don't are bad; those who have this con-
ception of society are right, and those who have another concep-
tion are in error. Consequently, just as with ordinary propaganda,
it is a matter of propagating behavior and myths both good and
bad. Furthermore, such propaganda becomes increasingly effec-
tive when those subjected to it accept its doctrines on what is
good or bad (for example, the American Way of Life). There,
a whole society actually expresses itself through this propaganda
by advertising its kind of life.
By doing that, a society engages in propaganda on the deepest
level. Sociologists have recognized that, above all, propaganda
must change a person's environment. Krech and Crutchfield in-
sist on this fact, and show that a simple modification of the
psychological context can bring about changes of attitude without
ever directly attacking particular attitudes or opinions. Similarly,
MacDougall says: "One must avoid attacking any trend frontally.
It is better to concentrate one's efforts on the creation of psycho-
logical conditions so that the desired result seems to come from
them naturally." The modification of the psychological climate
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
66)
brings about still other consequences that one cannot obtain
directly. This is what Ogle calls “suggestibility"; the degree of
suggestibility depends on a man's environment and psychologi-
cal climate. And that is precisely what modifies the activities
mentioned above. It is what makes them propaganda, for their
aim is simply to instill in the public an attitude that will prepare
the ground for the main propaganda to follow.
Sociological propaganda must act gently. It conditions; it
introduces a truth, an ethic in various benign forms, which,
although sporadic, end by creating a fully established personality
structure. It acts slowly, by penetration, and is most effective
in a relatively stable and active society, or in the tensions be-
tween an expanding society and one that is disintegrating (or in
an expanding group within a disintegrating society). Under these
conditions it is sufficient in itself; it is not merely a preliminary
sub-propaganda. But sociological propaganda is inadequate in a
moment of crisis. Nor is it able to move the masses to action
in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, it must sometimes be
strengthened by the classic kind of propaganda, which leads to
action.
At such times sociological propaganda will appear to be the
medium that has prepared the ground for direct propaganda; it
becomes identified with sub-propaganda. Nothing is easier than
to graft a direct propaganda onto a setting prepared by sociologi-
cal propaganda; besides, sociological propaganda may itself be
transformed into direct propaganda. Then, by a series of inter-
mediate stages, we not only see one turn into the other, but also
a smooth transition from what was merely a spontaneous affirma-
tion of a way of life to the deliberate affirmation of a truth.
This process has been described in an article by Edward L.
Bemays: this so-called “engineering approach" is tied to a com-
bination of professional research methods through which one gets
people to adopt and actively support certain ideas or programs
as soon as they become aware of them. This applies also to politi-
cal matters; and since 1936 the National Association of Manu-
facturers has attempted to fight the development of leftist
trends with such methods. In 1938 the N.A.M. spent a half-milhon
dollars to support the type of capitalism it represents. This sum
was increased to three million in 1945 and to five million in
1946; this propaganda paved the way for the Taft-Hardey Law.
It was a matter of “selling" the American economic system. Here
Propaganda (67
we are truly in the domain of propaganda; and we see the multiple
methods employed to influence opinion, as well as the strong tie
between sociological and direct propaganda.
Sociological propaganda, involuntary at first, becomes more and
more deliberate, and ends up by exercising influence. One example
is the code drawn up by the Motion Picture Association, which
requires films to promote “the highest types of social life,” “the
proper conception of society,” “the proper standards of life,”
and to avoid “any ridicule of the law (natural or human) or
sympathy for those who violate the law.” Another is J. Arthur
Rank's explanation of the purpose of his films: “When does an
export article become more than an export article? When it is a
British film. W^hen the magnificent productions of Ealing Studios
appear in the world, they represent something better than just
a step forward toward a higher level of export. . . .” Such films
are then propaganda for the British way of life.
The first element of awareness in the context of sociological
propaganda is extremely simple, and from it everything else de-
rives. What starts out as a simple situation gradually turns into a
definite ideology, because the way of life in which man thinks
he is so indisputably well off becomes a criterion of value for him.
This does not mean that objectively he is well off, but that, re-
gardless of the merits of his actual condition, he thinks he is.
He is perfectly adapted to his environment, like “a fish in water.”
From that moment on, everything that expresses this particular
way of life, that reinforces and improves it, is good; everything
that tends to disturb, criticize, or destroy it is bad.
This leads people to believe that the civilization representing
their way of life is best. This belief then commits the French to
the same course as the Americans, who are by far the most
advanced in this direction. Obviously, one tries to imitate and
catch up to those who are furthest advanced; the first one becomes
the model. And such imitation makes the French adopt the same
criteria of judgment, the same sociological structures, the same
spontaneous ideologies, and, in the end, the same type of man.
Sociological propaganda is then a precise form of propaganda; it
is comparatively simple because it uses all social currents, but is
slower than other types of propaganda because it aims at long-term
penetration and progressive adaptation.
But from the instant a man uses that way of life as his criterion
of good and evil, he is led to make judgments: for example, any-
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
68)
thing un-American is evil. From then on, genuine propaganda
limits itself to the use of this tendency and to leading man into
actions of either compliance with or defense of the established
order.
This sociological propaganda in the United States is a natural
result of the fundamental elements of American life. In the begin-
ning, the United States had to unify a disparate population that
came from all the countries of Europe and had diverse traditions
and tendencies. A way of rapid assimilation had to be found;
that was the great political problem of the United States at the
end of the nineteenth century. The solution was psychological
standardization—that is, simply to use a way of life as the basis
of unification and as an instrument of propaganda. In addition,
this uniformity plays another decisive role—an economic role—
in the life of the United States; it determines the extent of the
American market. Mass production requires mass consumption,
but there cannot be mas$ consumption without widespread
identical views as to what the necessities of life are. One must
be sure that the market will react rapidly and massively to a
given proposal or suggestion. One therefore needs fundamental
psychological unity on which advertising can play with certainty
when manipulating public opinion. And in order for public opinion
to respond, it must be convinced of the excellence of all that is
“American.” Thus conformity of life and conformity of thought
are indissolubly linked.
But such conformity can lead to unexpected extremes. Given
American liberalism and the confidence of Americans in their
economic strength and their political system, it is difficult to
understand the “wave of collective hysteria” which occurred after
1948 and culminated in McCarthyism. That hysteria probably
sprang from a vague feeling of ideological weakness, a certain
inability to define the foundations of American society. That is
why Americans seek to define the American way of life, to make
it conscious, explicit, theoretical, worthy. Therefore the soul-
searching and inflexibility, with excessive affirmations designed
to mask the weakness of the ideological position. All this obvi-
ously constitutes an ideal framework for organized propaganda.
We encounter such organized propaganda on many levels: on
the government level, for one. Then there are the different pres-
sure groups: the Political Action Committee, the American Medi-
Propaganda (6 q
cal Association, the American Bar Association, the National Small
Business Mens Association—all have as their aim the defense
of the private interests of the Big Three: Big Business, Big Labor,
and Big Agriculture. Other groups aim at social and political
reforms: the American Legion, the League of Women Voters,
and the like. These groups employ lobbying to influence the
government and the classic forms of propaganda to influence the
public; through films, meetings, and radio, they try to make
the public aware of their ideological aims.
Another very curious and recent phenomenon (confirmed by
several American sociologists) is the appearance of “agitators”
alongside politicians and political propagandists. The pure agita-
tor, who stirs public opinion in a “disinterested” fashion, func-
tions as a nationalist. He does not appeal to a doctrine or principle,
nor does he propose specific reforms. He is the “true” prophet of
the American Way of Life. Usually he is against the New Deal
and for laissez-faire liberalism; against plutocrats, internationalists,
and socialists—bankers and Communists alike are the “hateful
other party in spite of which well-informed T survives.” The
agitator is especially active in the most unorganized groups of the
United States. He uses the anxiety psychoses of the lower middle
class, the neo-proletarian, the immigrant, the demobilized soldier
—people who are not yet integrated into American society or
who have not yet adopted ready-made habits and ideas. The
agitator uses the American Way of Life to provoke anti-Semitic,
anti-Communist, anti-Negro, and xenophobic currents of opinion.
He makes groups act in the illogical yet coherent, Manichaean
universe of propaganda, of which we will have more to say. The
most remarkable thing about this phenomenon is that these
agitators do not work for a political party; it is not clear which
interests they serve. They are neither Capitalists nor Communists,
but they deeply influence American public opinion, and their
influence may crystalize suddenly in unexpected forms.
The more conscious such sociological propaganda is, the more
it tends to express itself externally, and hence to expand its in-
fluence abroad, as for example in Europe. It frequently retains
its sociological character, and thus does not appear to be pure
and simple propaganda. There is no doubt, for example, that the
Marshall Plan—which was above all a real form of aid to under-
developed countries—also had propaganda elements, such as the
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
70)
spreading of American products and films coupled with publicity
about what the United States was doing to aid underprivileged
nations. These two aspects of indirect propaganda are altogether
sociological. But they may be accompanied by specific propa-
ganda, as when, in 1948, subsidies of fifteen million dollars were
poured into American publications appearing in Europe. The
French edition of the New York Herald Tribune stated that it
received important sums in Marshall credits for the purpose of
making American propaganda. Along with reviews specializing
in propaganda, such as France-AmSrique, and with film centers
and libraries sponsored by the Americans in Europe, we should
include the Readers Digest, whose circulation has reached millions
of copies per issue in Europe and is so successful that it no longer
needs a subsidy.
However, the success of such American propaganda is very
uneven. Technical publications have an assured audience, but
bulletins and brochures have little effect because the Americans
have a “superiority complex,” which expresses itself in such pub-
lications and displeases foreigners. The presentation of the Amer-
ican Way of Life as the only way to salvation exasperates French
opinion and makes such propaganda largely ineffective in France.
At the same time, French opinion has been won over by the
obvious superiority of American technical methods.
All forms of sociological propaganda are obviously very diffuse,
and aimed much more at the promulgation of ideas and prejudices,
of a style of life, than of a doctrine, or at inciting action or calling
for formal adherence. They represent a penetration in depth until
a precise point is struck at which action will occur. It should be
noted, for example, that in all the French dSpartements in which
there were Americans and propaganda bureaus, the number of
Communist voters decreased between 1951 and 1953.
Propaganda of Agitation and Propaganda of Integration
The second great distinction within the general phenomenon
of propaganda is the distinction between propaganda of agitation
and propaganda of integration. Here we find such a summa
divisio that we may ask ourselves: if the methods, themes, char-
acteristics, publics, and objectives are so different, are we not
really dealing with two separate entities rather than two aspects
of the same phenomenon?
Propaganda (71
This distinction corresponds in part to the well-known distinc-
tion of Lenin between “agitation” and “propaganda”—but here
the meaning of these terms is reversed. It is also somewhat similar
to the distinction between propaganda of subversion (with regard
to an enemy) and propaganda of collaboration (with the same
enemy).
Propaganda of agitation, being the most visible and widespread,
generally attracts all the attention. It is most often subversive
propaganda and has the stamp of opposition. It is led by a party
seeking to destroy the government or the established order. It
seeks rebellion or war. It has always had a place in the course of
history. All revolutionary movements, all popular wars have been
nourished by such propaganda of agitation. Spartacus relied on
this land of propaganda, as did the communes, the Crusades, the
French movement of 1793, and so on. But it reached its height
with Lenin, which leads us to note that, though it is most often
an opposition’s propaganda, the propaganda of agitation can also
be made by government. For example, when a government wants
to galvanize energies to mobilize the entire nation for war, it will
use a propaganda of agitation. At that moment the subversion is
aimed at the enemy, whose strength must be destroyed by psycho-
logical as well as physical means, and whose force must be over-
come by the vigor of one’s own nation.
Governments also employ this propaganda of agitation when,
after having been installed in power, they want to pursue a
revolutionary course of action. Thus Lenin, having installed the
Soviets, organized the agitprops and developed the long campaign
of agitation in Russia to conquer resistance and crush the kulaks.
In such a case, subversion aims at the resistance of a segment or
a class, and an internal enemy is chosen for attack. Similarly,
most of Hitler’s propaganda was propaganda of agitation. Hitler
could work his sweeping social and economic transformations
only by constant agitation, by overexcitement, by straining ener-
gies to the utmost. Nazism grew by successive waves of feverish
enthusiasm and thus attained its revolutionary objectives. Fi-
nally, the great campaigns in Communist China were precisely
propaganda of agitation. Only such propaganda could produce
those “great leaps forward.” The system of the communes was
accepted only because of propaganda of agitation which un-
leashed simultaneously physical action by the population and a
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
72)
change in their behavior, by subverting habits, customs, and
beliefs that were obstacles to the “great leap forward.” This was
internal propaganda. And Mao was perfectly right in saying that
the enemy is found within each person.5 Propaganda of agitation
addresses itself, then, to internal elements in each of us, but it is
always translated into reality by physical involvement in a tense
and overexcited activity. By making the individual participate in
this activity, the propagandist releases the internal brakes, the
psychological barriers of habit, belief, and judgment.
The Piatiletka campaign in the Soviet Union must also be
classified as propaganda of agitation. Like the Chinese campaign,
its aim was to stretch energies to the maximum in order to obtain
the highest possible work output. Thus for a while propaganda
of agitation can serve productivity, and the principal examples
of propaganda of agitation conducted by governments are of
that type. But agitation propaganda most often is revolutionary
propaganda in the ordinary sense of the term. Thus Communist
propaganda in the West, which provokes strikes or riots, is of this
type. The propaganda of Fidel Castro, that of Ho Chi Minh before
he seized power, and that of the F.L.N. are the most typical
recent examples.
In all cases, propaganda of agitation tries to stretch energies
to the utmost, obtain substantial sacrifices, and induce the in-
dividual to bear heavy ordeals. It takes him out of his everyday
life, his normal framework, and plunges him into enthusiasm and
adventure; it opens to him hitherto unsuspected possibilities, and
suggests extraordinary goals that nevertheless seem to him com-
pletely within reach. Propaganda of agitation thus unleashes an
explosive movement; it operates inside a crisis or actually provokes
the crisis itself. On the other hand, such propaganda can obtain
only effects of relatively short duration. If the proposed objective
is not achieved fast enough, enthusiasm will give way to discour-
agement and despair. Therefore, specialists in agitation propa-
ganda break up die desired goals into a series of stages to be
reached one by one. There is a period of pressure to obtain some
result, then a period of relaxation and rest; this is how Hider,
Lenin, and Mao operated. A people or a party cannot be kept too
long at the highest level of sacrifice, conviction, and devotion. 1
1 Mao’s theory of the “mold.” See below. Appendix H.
Propaganda (73
The individual cannot be made to live in a state of perpetual
enthusiasm and insecurity. After a certain amount of combat he
needs a respite and a familiar universe to which he is accustomed.
This subversive propaganda of agitation is obviously the flash-
iest: it attracts attention because of its explosive and revolutionary
character. It is also the easiest to make; in order to succeed, it
need only be addressed to the most simple and violent sentiments
through the most elementary means. Hate is generally its most
profitable resource. It is extremely easy to launch a revolutionary
movement based on hatred of a particular enemy. Hatred is prob-
ably the most spontaneous and common sentiment; it consists
of attributing one's misfortunes and sins to “another,” who must
be killed in order to assure the disappearance of those misfortunes
and sins. Whether the object of hatred is the bourgeois, the Com-
munist, the Jew, the colonialist, or the saboteur makes no differ-
ence. Propaganda of agitation succeeds each time it designates
someone as the source of all misery, provided that he is not too
powerful.
Of course, one cannot draw basic conclusions from a movement
launched in this way. It is extraordinary to see intellectuals, for
example, take anti-white sentiments of Algerians or Negroes seri-
ously and believe that these express fundamental feelings. To
label the white man (who is the invader and the exploiter, it is
true) as the source of all ills, and to provoke revolts against him,
is an extremely easy job; but it proves neither that the white
man is the source of all evil nor that the Negro automatically
hates him. However, hatred once provoked continues to repro-
duce itself.
Along with this universal sentiment, found in all propaganda
of agitation (even when provoked by the government, and even
in the movement of the Chinese communes), are secondary
motives more or less adapted to the circumstances. A sure ex-
pedient is the call to liberty among an oppressed, conquered,
invaded, or colonized people: calls summoning the Cuban or
Algerian people to liberty, for example, are assured of sympathy
and support. The same is true for the promise of bread to the
hungry, the promise of land to the plundered, and the call to
truth among the religious.
As a whole these are appeals to simple, elementary sentiments
requiring no refinement, and thanks to which the propagandist can
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
74)
gain acceptance for the biggest lies, the worst delusions—senti-
ments that act immediately, provoke violent reactions, and awaken
such passions that they justify all sacrifices. Such sentiments
correspond to the primary needs of all men: the need to eat, to
be ones own master, to hate. Given the ease of releasing such
sentiments, the material and psychological means employed can
be simple: the pamphlet, the speech, the poster, the rumor. In
order to make propaganda of agitation, it is not necessary to have
the mass media of communication at one’s disposal, for such
propaganda feeds on itself, and each person seized by it becomes
in turn a propagandist. Just because it does not need a large
technical apparatus, it is extremely useful as subversive propa-
ganda. Nor is it necessary to be concerned with probability or
veracity. Any statement whatever, no matter how stupid, any
“tall tale” will be believed once it enters into the passionate cur-
rent of hatred. A characteristic example occurred in July i960,
when Patrice Lumumba claimed that the Belgians had provoked
the revolt of the Congolese soldiers in the camp at Thysville.
Finally, the less educated and informed the people to whom
propaganda of agitation is addressed, the easier it is to make
such propaganda. That is why it is particularly suited for use
among the so-called lower classes (the proletariat) and among
African peoples. There it can rely on some key words of magical
import, which are believed without question even though the
hearers cannot attribute any real content to them and do not
fully understand them. Among colonized peoples, one of these
words is Independence, an extremely profitable word from the
point of view of effective subversion. It is useless to try to explain
to people that national independence is not at all the same as
individual liberty; that the black peoples generally have not
developed to the point at which they can live in political inde-
pendence in the Western manner; that the economy of their
countries permits them merely to change masters. But no reason
can prevail against the magic of the word. And it is the least
intelligent people who are most likely to be thrown into a revolu-
tionary movement by such summary appeals.
In contrast to this propaganda of agitation is the propaganda
of integration—the propaganda of developed nations and char-
acteristic of our civilization; in fact it did not exist before the
twentieth century. It is a propaganda of conformity. It is related
Propaganda (75
to the fact, analyzed earlier, that in Western society it is no longer
sufficient to obtain a transitory political act (such as a vote); one
needs total adherence to a society’s truths and behavioral patterns.
As the more perfectly uniform the society, the stronger its power
and effectiveness, each member should be only an organic and
functional fragment of it, perfectly adapted and integrated. He
must share the stereotypes, beliefs, and reactions of the group;
he must be an active participant in its economic, ethical, esthetic,
and political doings. All his activities, all his sentiments are
dependent on this collectivity. And, as he is often reminded, he
can fulfill himself only through this collectivity, as a member
of the group.6 Propaganda of integration thus aims at making the
individual participate in his society in every way. It is a long-term
propaganda, a self-reproducing propaganda that seeks to obtain
stable behavior, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, to
reshape his thoughts and behavior in terms of the permanent
social setting. We can see that this propaganda is more extensive
and complex than propaganda of agitation. It must be permanent,
for the individual can no longer be left to himself.
In many cases such propaganda is confined to rationalizing an
existing situation, to transforming unconscious actions of members
of a society into consciously desired activity that is visible, laud-
able, and justified—Pearlin and Rosenberg call this “the elabora-
tion of latent consequences” In such cases it must be proved that
the listeners, the citizens in general, are the beneficiaries of the
resultant socio-political developments.
Integration propaganda aims at stabilizing the social body, at
unifying and reinforcing it. It is thus the preferred instrument
of government, though properly speaking it is not exclusively
political propaganda. Since 1930 the propaganda of the Soviet
Union, as well as that, since the war, of all the People’s Republics,
has been a propaganda of integration.7 But this type of propa-
ganda can also be made by a group of organizations other than
those of government, going in the same direction, more or less
spontaneously, more or less planned by the state. The most im-
portant example of the use of such propaganda is the United
8 This is one of the points common to all American works on micro-sociology.
7 At the conference on ideological problems held in Moscow at the end of
December 1961, the need to “shape the Communist was reaffirmed, and die
propagandists were blamed for the twenty-year delay in achieving this goaL
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
76)
States. Obviously, integration propaganda is much more subtle
and complex than agitation propaganda. It seeks not a temporary
excitement but a total molding of the person in depth. Here all
psychological and opinion analyses must be utilized, as well as
the mass media of communication. It is primarily this integration
propaganda that we shall discuss in our study, for it is the most
important of our time despite the success and the spectacular
character of subversive propaganda.
Let us note right away a find aspect of integration propaganda:
the more comfortable, cultivated, and informed the milieu to
which it is addressed, the better it works. Intellectuals are more
sensitive than peasants to integration propaganda. In fact, they
share the stereotypes of a society even when they are political
opponents of the society. Take a recent example: French intel-
lectuals opposed to war in Algeria seemed hostile to integration
propaganda. Nevertheless, they shared all the stereotypes and
myths of French society—Technology, Nation, Progress; all their
actions were based on those myths. They were thoroughly ripe
for an integration propaganda, for they were already adapted to
its demands. Their temporary opposition was not of the slightest
importance; just changing the color of the flag was enough to
find them again among the most conformist groups.
One essential problem remains. When a revolutionary move-
ment is launched, it operates, as we have said, with agitation
propaganda; but once the revolutionary party has taken power,
it must begin immediately to operate with integration propaganda
(save for the exceptions mentioned). That is the way to balance
its power and stabilize the situation. But the transition from one
type of propaganda to the other is extremely delicate and difficult
After one has, over the years, excited the masses, flung them into
adventures, fed their hopes and their hatreds, opened the gates
of action to them, and assured them that all their actions were
justified, it is difficult to make them re-enter the ranks, to inte-
grate them into the normal framework of politics and economics.
What has been unleashed cannot be brought under control so
easily, particularly habits of violence or of taking the law into one's
own hands—these disappear very slowly. This is all the more
true because the results achieved by revolution are usually de-
ceptive; just to seize power is not enough. The people want to
give full vent to the hatred developed by agitation propaganda.
Propaganda (77
and to have the promised bread or land immediately. And the
troops that helped in the seizure of power rapidly become the
opposition and continue to act as they did under the influence
of subversion propaganda. The newly established government
must then use propaganda to eliminate these difficulties and to
prevent the continuation of the battle. But this must be propa-
ganda designed to incorporate individuals into the "New Order,”
to transform their opponents into collaborators of the State, to
make them accept delays in the fulfillment of promises—in other
words, it must be integration propaganda.
Generally, only one element—hatred—can be immediately
satisfied; everything else must be changed. Obviously, this con-
version of propaganda is very difficult: the techniques and methods
of agitation propaganda cannot be used; the same feelings can-
not be aroused. Other propagandists must be employed, as totally
different qualities are required for integration propaganda. The
greatest difficulty is that agitation propaganda produces very rapid
and spectacular effects, whereas integration propaganda acts
slowly, gradually, and imperceptibly. After the masses have been
subjected to agitation propaganda, to neutralize their aroused
impulses with integration propaganda without being swept away
by the masses is a delicate problem. In some cases it is actually
impossible to regain control of the masses. The Belgian Congo
is a good example: the black people, very excited since 1959 by
Lumumbas propaganda, first released their excitement by battling
among themselves; then, once the black government was installed,
they ran wild and it was impossible to get them under control.
That was the direct effect of Lumumbas unrestrained propaganda
against the Belgians. It seems that only a dictatorship can help
this situation.8
Another good example is given by Sauvy: during the war, broad-
casts from London and Algiers aroused the French people on the
subject of food shortages and accused the Germans of artificially
creating scarcity through requisitioning (which was not true).
After Liberation, the government was unable to overcome the
effects of this propaganda; abundance was expected to return
immediately. It was impossible to control inflation and maintain
rationing; integration failed because of prior agitation.
In some cases, agitation propaganda leads to a partial failure.
8 Written in September i960.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
78)
Sometimes there is a very long period of trouble and unhappiness,
during which it is impossible to restore order, and only after a
dozen years of integration propaganda can the situation be con-
trolled again. Obviously, the best example is the Soviet Union.
As early as 1920, integration propaganda as conceived by Lenin
was employed, but it dampened the revolutionary mentality only
very slowly. Only after 1929 did the effects of agitation propa-
ganda finally disappear. The Kronstadt Rebellion was a striking
example.
In other cases the government must follow the crowds, which
cannot be held back once they are set off; the government is
forced, step by step, to satisfy appetites aroused by agitation
propaganda. Tliis was partly the case with Hitler. After taking
power, he continued to control the people by agitation propa-
ganda; he thus had to hold out something new all the time on
die road to war—rearmament, the Rhineland, Spain, Austria,
Czechoslovakia. The propaganda aimed at the S.A. and S.S. was
agitation propaganda, as was the propaganda pushing the German
people into war in 1937-9. At the same time, the population as a
whole was subjected to a propaganda of assimilation. Thus Hitler
used two kinds of propaganda simultaneously. Similarly, in the
Soviet Union, agitation propaganda against imperialists and sab-
oteurs, or for the fulfillment of the Plan, is employed simultane-
ously with propaganda of integration into the system (using
different arguments and media) through political education, youth
movements, and so on. This is exactly the situation today of Castro
in Cuba; he is incapable of integrating and can only pursue his
agitation propaganda. This will lead him inevitably to dictator-
ship, and probably to war.
Other regimes, however, have managed perfectly well to pass
from one propaganda to the other, and to make integration
propaganda take the lead rapidly. This was the case of North
Vietnam and China, and was owing to the remarkable conception
of propaganda which they have had since the time of the revolu-
tion. In fact, since 1927 Mao’s propaganda has been subversive;
it appeals to the most basic feelings in order to arouse revolt, it
leads to combat, it conditions people, and it relies on slogans.
But, at the same time, as soon as file individual is pressed into
the army he is subjected to an integration propaganda that Mao
calls political education. Long-winded explanations tell him why
Propaganda (7 g
it is necessary to act in a particular way; a biased but seemingly
objective news system is set up as part of that propaganda; be-
havior is regimented and disciplined. The integration of the rev-
olutionary rebel into a prodigiously disciplined, organized, and
regimented army, which goes hand in hand with his intellectual
and moral indoctrination, prepares him to be taken into custody
by integration propaganda after victory, and to be inserted into
the new society without resistance or anarchical excursions. This
patient and meticulous shaping of the whole man, this “putting
into the mold,” as Mao calls it, is certainly his principal success.
Of course, he began with a situation in which man was already
well integrated into the group, and he substituted one complete
framework for another. Also, he needed only to shape the minds
of people who had had very little education (in the Western sense
of the term), so that they learned to understand everything
through images, stereotypes, slogans, and interpretations that he
knew how to inculcate. Under such conditions, integration is easy
and practically irreversible.
Lastly, the distinction between the two types of propaganda
partly explains the defeat of French propaganda in Algeria since
1955. On one side, the propaganda of the F.L.N. was an act of
agitation designed to arouse feelings of subversion and combat;
against this the French army pitted a propaganda of integration,
of assimilation into a French framework and into the French
administration, French political concepts, education, professional
training, and ideology. But a world of difference lay between
the two as to speed, ease, and effectiveness; which explains why,
in this competition between propagandas, the F.L.N. won out
at almost every stage. This does not mean that F.L.N. propaganda
reflected the real feeling of the Algerians. But if some say: “You
are unhappy, so rise and slay your master and tomorrow you will
be free,” and others say: “We will help you, work with you, and
in the end all your problems will be solved,” there is little ques-
tion as to who will command allegiance. In spite of everything,
however, integration propaganda, as we have said above, is by
far the most important new fact of our day.
Vertical and Horizontal Propaganda
Classic propaganda, as one usually thinks of it, is a vertical
propaganda—in the sense that it is made by a leader, a tech-
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
8o)
nician, a political or religious head who acts from the superior
position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd below.
Such propaganda comes from above. It is conceived in the secret
recesses of political enclaves; it uses all technical methods of
centralized mass communication; it envelops a mass of individuals;
but those who practice it are on the outside. Let us recall here
the distinction, cited above, made by Lasswell between direct
propaganda and effect propaganda, though both are forms of
vertical propaganda.
One trait of vertical propaganda is that the propagandee re-
mains alone even though he is part of a crowd. His shouts of
enthusiasm or hatred, though part of the shouts of the crowd,
do not put him in communication with others; his shouts are only
a response to the leader. Finally, this kind of propaganda requires
a passive attitude from those subjected to it. They are seized, they
are manipulated, they are committed; they experience what they
are asked to experience; they are really transformed into objects.
Consider, for instance, the quasi-hypnotic condition of those propa-
gandized at a meeting. There, the individual is depersonalized;
his decisions are no longer his own but those suggested by the
leader, imposed by a conditioned reflex. When we say that this
is a passive attitude, we do not mean that the propagandee does
not act; on the contrary, he acts with vigor and passion. But, as
we shall see, his action is not his own, though he believes it is.
Throughout, it is conceived and willed outside of him; the propa-
gandist is acting through him, reducing him to the condition of
a passive instrument. He is mechanized, dominated, hence passive.
This is all the more so because he often is plunged into a mass
of propagandees in which he loses his individuality and becomes
one element among others, inseparable from the crowd and in-
conceivable without it.
In any case, vertical propaganda is by far the most widespread
—whether Hitler s or Stalin’s, that of the French government since
3.950, or that of the United States. It is in one sense the easiest
to make, but its direct effects are extremely perishable, and it
must be renewed constantly. It is primarily useful for agitation
propaganda.
Horizontal propaganda is a much more recent development.
We know it in two forms: Chinese propaganda and group dy-
namics in human relations. The first is political propaganda; the
Propaganda
(Si
second is sociological propaganda; both are integration propa-
ganda. Their characteristics are identical, surprising as that may
seem when we consider their totally different origins—in context,
research methods, and perspective.
This propaganda can be called horizontal because it is made
inside die group (not from the top), where, in principle, all
individuals are equal and there is no leader. The individual makes
contact with others at his own level rather than with a leader;
such propaganda therefore always seeks “conscious adherence.”
Its content is presented in didactic fashion and addressed to the
intelligence. The leader, the propagandist, is there only as a
sort of animator or discussion leader; sometimes his presence and
his identity are not even known—for example, the “ghost writer”
in certain American groups, or the “police spy” in Chinese groups.
The individual's adherence to his group is “conscious” because
he is aware of it and recognizes it, but it is ultimately involuntary
because he is trapped in a dialectic and in a group that leads
him unfailingly to this adherence. His adherence is also “intel-
lectual” because he can express his conviction clearly and logically,
but it is not genuine because the information, the data, the
reasoning that have led him to adhere to the group were them-
selves deliberately falsified in order to lead him there.
But the most remarkable characteristic of horizontal propaganda
is the small group. The individual participates actively in the life
of this group, in a genuine and lively dialogue. In China the group
is watched carefully to see that each member speaks, expresses
himself, gives his opinions. Only in speaking will the individual
gradually discover his own convictions (which also will be those
of the group), become irrevocably involved, and help others to
form their opinions (which are identical). Each individual helps
to form the opinion of the group, but the group helps each
individual to discover the correct line. For, miraculously, it is
always the correct line, the anticipated solution, the “proper”
convictions, which are eventually discovered. All the participants
are placed on an equal footing, meetings are intimate, discussion
is informal, and no leader presides. Progress is slow; there must
be many meetings, each recalling events of the preceding one,
so that a common experience can be shared. To produce “volun-
tary” rather than mechanical adherence, and to create a solution
that is “found” by the individual rather than imposed from above.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
82)
is indeed a very advanced method, much more effective and
binding than the mechanical action of vertical propaganda. When
the individual is mechanized, he can be manipulated easily. But
to put the individual in a position where he apparently has a free-
dom of choice and still obtain from him what one expects, is much
more subtle and risky.
Vertical propaganda needs the huge apparatus of the mass
media of communication; horizontal propaganda needs a huge
organization of people. Each individual must be inserted into
a group, if possible into several groups with convergent actions.
The groups must be homogeneous, specialized, and small: fifteen
to twenty is the optimum figure to permit active participation by
each person. The group must comprise individuals of the same
sex, class, age, and environment. Most friction between individuals
can then be ironed out and all factors eliminated which might
distract attention, splinter motivations, and prevent the establish-
ment of the proper line.
Therefore, a great many groups are needed (there are millions
in China), as well as a great many group leaders. That is the
principal problem. For if, according to Mao’s formula, “each
must be a propagandist for all,” it is equally true that there must
be liaison men between the authorities and each group. Such men
must be unswerving, integrated into the group themselves, and
must exert a stabilizing and lasting influence. They must be mem-
bers of an integrated political body, in this case the Communist
Party.
This form of propaganda needs two conditions: first of all, a
lack of contact between groups. A member of a small group must
not belong to other groups in which he would be subjected to
other influences; that would give him a chance to find himself
again and, with it, the strength to resist. This is why the Chinese
Communists insisted on breaking up traditional groups, such as
the family. A private and heterogeneous group (with different
ages, sexes, and occupations), the family is a tremendous obstacle
to such propaganda. In China, where the family was still very
powerful, it had to be broken up. The problem is very different
in the United States and in the Western societies; there the social
structures are sufficiently flexible and disintegrated to be no
obstacle. It is not necessary to break up the family in order to
make the group dynamic and fully effective: the family already
Propaganda (83
is broken up. It no longer has the power to envelop the individual;
it is no longer the place where the individual is formed and has
his roots. The field is clear for the influence of small groups.
The other condition for horizontal propaganda is identity be-
tween propaganda and education. The small group is a center
of total moral, intellectual, psychological, and civic education
(information, documentation, catechization), but it is primarily
a political group, and everything it does is related to politics.
Education has no meaning there except in relation to politics.
This is equally true for American groups, despite appearances
to the contraiy. But the term politics must be taken here in its
broadest sense. The political education given by Mao is on the
level of a catechism, which is most effective in small groups. In-
dividuals are taught what it is to be a member of a Communist
society; and though the verbal factor (formulas to learn, which
are the basic tenets of Marxist Communism) is important, the
propagandist seeks above all to habituate the group members to
a particular new behavior, to instill belief in a human type that
the propagandist wishes to create, to put its members in touch
with reality through group experience. In this sense the education
is very complete, with complete coordination between what is
learned “intellectually” and what is “lived” in practice.
Obviously, no political “instruction” is possible in American
groups. All Americans already know the great principles and in-
stitutions of democracy. Yet these groups are political: their
education is specifically democratic—that is to say, individuals
are taught how to take action and how to behave as members
of a democracy. It is indeed a civic education, a thorough educa-
tion addressed to the entire man.
These groups are a means of education, but such education is
only one of the elements of propaganda aimed at obtaining ad-
herence to a society, its priciples, its ideology, and its myths—and
to the behavior required by the authorities. The small groups are
the chosen place for this active education, and the regime em-
ploying horizontal propaganda can permit no other style or form
of instruction and education than these. We have already seen
that the importance of these small groups requires the breaking
up of other groups, such as the family. Now we must understand
that the education given in the political small groups requires
either the disappearance of academic education, or its integration
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
84)
into the system. In The Organization Man, William H. Whyte
clearly shows the way in which the American school is becoming
more and more a simple mechanism to adapt youngsters to Amer-
ican society. As for the Chinese school, it is only a system of
propaganda charged with catechizing children while teaching
them to read.
Horizontal propaganda thus is very hard to make (particularly
because it needs so many instructors), but it is exceptionally
efficient through its meticulous encirclement of everybody,
through the effective participation of all present, and through
their public declarations of adherence. It is peculiarly a system
that seems to coincide perfectly with egalitarian societies claim-
ing to be based on the will of the people and calling themselves
democratic: each group is composed of persons who are alike,
and one actually can formulate the will of such a group. But all
this is ultimately much more stringent and totalitarian than ex-
plosive propaganda. Thanks to this system, Mao has succeeded
in passing from subversive propaganda to integration propa-
ganda.
Rational and Irrational Propaganda
That propaganda has an irrational character is still a well-estab-
lished and well-recognized truth. The distinction between propa-
ganda and information is often made: information is addressed to
reason and experience—it furnishes facts; propaganda is addressed
to feelings and passions—it is irrational. There is, of course, some
truth in this, but the reality is not so simple. For there is such a
thing as rational propaganda, just as there is rational advertising.
Advertisements for automobiles or electrical appliances are gen-
erally based on technical descriptions or proved performance—
rational elements used for advertising purposes. Similarly there is a
propaganda based exclusively on facts, statistics, economic ideas.
Soviet propaganda, especially since 1950, has been based on the
undeniable scientific progress and economic development of the
Soviet Union; but it is still propaganda, for it uses these facts to
demonstrate, rationally, the superiority of its system and to de-
mand everybody's support.
It has often been noted that in wartime the successful propa-
ganda is that based directly on obvious facts: when an enemy army
has just suffered a defeat, an appeal to enemy soldiers to surrender
Propaganda (85
will seem rational. When the superiority of one of the combatants
becomes apparent, his appeal for surrender is an appeal to reason.
Similarly, the propaganda of French grandeur since 1958 is
a rational and factual propaganda; French films in particular are
almost all centered around French technological successes. The
film AlgSrie frangaise is an economic film, overloaded with eco-
nomic geography and statistics. But it is still propaganda. Such
rational propaganda is practiced by various regimes. The educa-
tion provided by Mao in China is based on pseudo-rational proofs,
but they are effective for those who pay attention to them and
accept them. American propaganda, out of concern for honesty
and democratic conviction, also attempts to be rational and factual.
The news bulletins of the American services are a typical example
of rational propaganda based on “knowledge” and information.
And nothing resembles these American publications more than
the Review of the German Democratic Republic, which has taken
over exactly the same propaganda style. We can say that the more
progress we make, the more propaganda becomes rational and
the more it is based on serious arguments, on dissemination of
knowledge, on factual information, figures, and statistics.9
Purely impassioned and emotional propaganda is disappearing.
Even such propaganda contained elements of fact: Hitler's most
inflammatory speeches always contained some facts which served
as base or pretext. It is unusual nowadays to find a frenzied
propaganda composed solely of claims without relation to reality.
It is still found in Egyptian propaganda, and it appeared in July
i960 in Lumumba's propaganda in the Belgian Congo. Such
propaganda is now discredited, but it still convinces and always
excites.
Modem man needs a relation to facts, a self-justification to
convince himself that by acting in a certain way he is obeying
reason and proved experience. We must therefore study the close
relationship between information and propaganda. Propaganda's
content increasingly resembles information. It has even clearly
been proved that a violent, excessive, shock-provoking propa-
ganda text leads ultimately to less conviction and participation
9 Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites have correctly noted the differences, in this con-
nection, between the propaganda of 1914 and that of 1940: the latter is more sober
and informative, less emotional and moralistic. As we say in fashionable parlance,
it is addressed less to the superego and more to the ego.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA
86)
than does a more “informative” and reasonable text on the same
subject. A large dose of fear precipitates immediate action; a
reasonably small dose produces lasting support. The listener s
critical powers decrease if the propaganda message is more
rational and less violent.
Propaganda s content therefore tends to be rational and factual.
But is this enough to show that propaganda is rational? Besides
content, there is the receiver of the content, the individual who
undergoes the barrage of propaganda or information. When an
individual has read a technical and factual advertisement of a
television set or a new automobile engine, and if he is not an
electrician or a mechanic, what does he remember? Can he
describe a transistor or a new type of wheel-suspension? Of
course not. All those technical descriptions and exact details will
form a general picture in his head, rather vague but highly
colored—and when he speaks of the engine, he will say: “Its
terrific!”
It is exactly the same with all rational, logical, factual propa-
ganda. After having read an article on wheat in the United States
or on steel in the Soviet Union, does the reader remember the
figures and statistics, has he understood the economic mechanisms,
has he absorbed the line of reasoning? If he is not an economist
by profession, he will retain an over-all impression, a general
conviction that “these Americans (or Russians) are amazing. .. .
They have methods_____Progress is important after all,” and so on.
Similarly, emerging from the showing of a film such as AlgSrie
frangaise, he forgets all the figures and logical proofs and retains
only a feeling of rightful pride in the accomplishments of France
in Algeria. Thereafter, what remains with the individual affected
by this propaganda is a perfectly irrational picture, a purely
emotional feeling, a myth. The facts, the data, the reasoning—all
are forgotten, and only the impression remains. And this is
indeed what the propagandist ultimately seeks, for the individual
will never begin to act on the basis of facts, or engage in purely
rational behavior. What makes him act is the emotional pressure,
the vision of a future, the myth. The problem is to create an irra-
tional response on the basis of rational and factual elements.
That response must be fed with facts, those frenzies must be pro-
voked by rigorously logical proofs. Thus propaganda in itself
becomes honest, strict, exact, but its effect remains irrational
Propaganda (87
because of the spontaneous transformation of all its contents by
the individual.
We emphasize that this is true not just for propaganda but
also for information. Except for the specialist, information, even
when it is very well presented, gives people only a broad image
of the world. And much of the information disseminated nowa-
days—research findings, facts, statistics, explanations, analyses—
eliminate personal judgment and the capacity to form one’s own
opinion even more surely than the most extravagant propaganda.
This claim may seem shocking; but it is a fact that excessive
data do not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him.
He cannot remember them all, or coordinate them, or understand
them; if he does not want to risk losing his mind, he will merely
draw a general picture from them. And the more facts supplied,
the more simplistic the image. If a man is given one item of in-
formation, he will retain it; if he is given a hundred data in one
field, on one question, he will have only a general idea of that
question. But if he is given a hundred items of information on all
die political and economic aspects of a nation, he will arrive at
a summary judgment—“The Russians are terrific!” and so on.
A surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make judg-
ments and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actu-
ally paralyzes them. They are caught in a web of facts and
must remain at the level of the facts they have been given.
They cannot even form a choice or a judgment in other areas
or on other subjects. Thus the mechanisms of modem informa-
tion induce a sort of hypnosis in the individual, who cannot get
out of the field that has been laid out for him by the information.
His opinion will ultimately be formed solely on the basis of the
facts transmitted to him, and not on the basis of his choice
and his personal experience. The more the techniques of dis-
tributing information develop, the more the individual is shaped
by such information. It is not true that he can choose freely
with regard to what is presented to him as the truth. And because
rational propaganda thus creates an irrational situation, it re-
mains, above all, propaganda—that is, an inner control over the
individual by a social force, which means that it deprives him of
himself.
CHAPTER
DC
THE CONDITIONS
FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF
PROPAGANDA
Why and how does propaganda exist?
We have already noted that propaganda was not the same in
the past as it is today, that its nature has changed. We have
also said that one cannot simply make any propaganda just
anywhere, at anytime, or in any fashion. Without a certain
milieu propaganda cannot exist. Only under certain conditions can
the phenomenon of propaganda appear and grow. The most
obvious of these are accidental or purely historical conditions.
Beyond that, it is clear, for example, that the emergence of propa-
ganda is connected with a number of scientific discoveries.
Propaganda (89
Modem propaganda could not exist without the mass media—
the inventions that produced press, radio, television, and motion
pictures, or those that produced the means of modem trans-
portation and which permit crowds of diverse individuals from
all over to assemble easily and frequently. Present-day propa-
ganda meetings no longer bear any relation to past assemblies,
to the meetings of the Athenians in the Agora or of the Romans
in the Forum. Then there is the scientific research in all the
other fields—sociology and psychology, for example. Without
the discoveries made in the past half-century by scientists who
"never wanted this,” there would be no propaganda. The findings
of social psychology, depth psychology, behavorism, group sociol-
ogy, sociology of public opinion are the very foundations of the
propagandist's work.
In a different sense, political circumstances have also been
effective and immediate causes of the development of massive
propaganda. The first World War; the Russian revolution of
1917; Hitler's revolution of 1933; the second World War; the
further development of revolutionary wars since 1944 in China,
Indochina, and Algeria, as well as the Cold War—each was a step
in the development of modem propaganda. With each of these
events propaganda developed further, increased in depth, dis-
covered new methods. At the same time it conquered new nations
and new territories: To reach the enemy, one must use his
weapons; this undeniable argument is the key to the systematic
development of propaganda. And in this way propaganda has
become a permanent feature in nations that actually despise it,
such as the United States and France.
Let us also note the influence of doctrines and men. It is clear
that a particular doctrine can make propaganda the very center
of political life, the essence of political action, rather than merely
an accessory or an incidental and rather suspect instrument.
Leninism as developed by Mao is really a doctrine of propaganda
plus action, indissolubly linked to Marxism, of which it is an
expression. As Leninism spreads, propaganda develops with it
—by necessity and not by choice. In addition, certain men have
greatly helped the development of propaganda: Hitler and
Goebbels, for example, had a genius for it. But the role of such
men is never decisive. They do not invent propaganda; it does
not exist just because they want it to. They are only the pro-
go) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
ducers and directors, the catalysts, who profit from the confluence
of favorable circumstances. All this is too well known and too
obvious to dwell on.
But the sum of certain conditions is still not enough to explain
the development of propaganda. The over-all sociological condi-
tions in a society must provide a favorable environment for
propaganda to succeed.1
I. The Sociological Conditions
Individualist Society and Mass Society
For propaganda to succeed, a society must first have two
complementary qualities: it must be both an individualist and a
mass society. These two qualities are often considered contra-
dictory. It is believed that an individualist society, in which the
individual is thought to have a higher value than the group,
tends to destroy groups that limit the individual’s range of action,
whereas a mass society negates the individual and reduces him to
a cipher. But this contradiction is purely theoretical and a de-
lusion. In actual fact, an individualist society must be a mass
society, because the first move toward liberation of the indi-
vidual is to break up the small groups that are an organic
fact of the entire society. In this process the individual frees
himself completely from family, village, parish, or brotherhood
bonds—only to find himself directly vis-^-vis the entire society.
When individuals are not held together by local structures, the
only form in which they can live together is in an unstructured
mass society. Similarly, a mass society can only be based on
individuals—that is, on men in their isolation, whose identities
are determined by their relationships with one another. Precisely
because the individual claims to be equal to all other individuals,
he becomes an abstraction and is in effect reduced to a cipher.
1 The same factors of influence will have different weight and effectiveness in differ-
ent contexts. The media employed by the propagandists can work only in a partic-
ular sociological structure. This reciprocal influence of propaganda and social
structure is precisely one of the problems that need to be studied.
Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites have properly noted that public responses to the
impact of propaganda have changed considerably in the past few decades and
that this change is the result of trends in the psycho-sociological conditions of
twentieth-century life.
Propaganda (gi
As soon as local organic groupings are reformed, society
tends to cease being individualistic, and thereby to lose its mass
character as well. What then occurs is the formation of organic
groups of elite in what remains a mass society, but which rests
on the framework of strongly structured and centralized political
parties, unions, and so on. These organizations reach only an
active minority, and the members of this minority cease to be
individualistic by being integrated into such organic associa-
tions. From this perspective, individualist society and mass society
are two corollary aspects of the same reality. This corresponds
to what we have said about the mass media: to perform a
propagandists function they must capture the individual and
the mass at the same time.
Propaganda can be effective only in an individualist society,
by which we do not mean the theoretical individualism of the
nineteenth century, but the genuine individualism of our society.
Of course, the two are not diametrically opposed. Where the
greatest value is attributed to the individual, the end result is
a society composed in essence only of individuals, and therefore
one that is not integrated. But although theory and reality are
not in total opposition, a great difference nevertheless exists
between them. In individualist theory the individual has eminent
value, man himself is the master of his life; in individualist
reality each human being is subject to innumerable forces and
influences, and is not at all master of his own life. As long as
solidly constituted groups exist, those who are integrated into
them are subject to them. But at the same time they are pro-
tected by them against such external influences as propaganda.
An individual can be influenced by forces such as propaganda
only when he is cut off from membership in local groups. Because
such groups are organic and have a well-structured material,
spiritual, and emotional life, they are not easily penetrated by
propaganda. For example, it is much more difficult today for
outside propaganda to influence a soldier integrated into a mili-
tary group, or a militant member of a monolithic party, than to
influence the same man when he is a mere citizen. Nor is the
organic group sensitive to psychological contagion, which is so
important to the success of mass propaganda.
One can say, generally, that nineteenth-century individualist
society came about through the disintegration of such small groups
Q 2 ) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
as the family or the church. Once these groups lost their im-
portance, the individual was left substantially isolated. He was
plunged into a new environment, generally urban, and thereby
“uprooted.” He no longer had a traditional place in which to live;
he was no longer geographically attached to a fixed place, or
historically to his ancestry. An individual thus uprooted can
only be part of a mass. He is on his own, and individualist think-
ing asks of him something he has never been required to do
before: that he, the individual, become the measure of all
things. Thus he begins to judge everything for himself. In fact he
must make his own judgments. He is thrown entirely on his
own resources; he can find criteria only in himself. He is clearly
responsible for his own decisions, both personal and social. He
becomes the beginning and the end of everything. Before him
there was nothing; after him there will be nothing. His own life
becomes the only criterion of justice and injustice, of Good and
Evil.
In theory this is admirable. But in practice what actually hap-
pens? The individual is placed in a minority position and
burdened at the same time with a total, crushing responsibility.
Such conditions make an individualist society fertile ground
for modem propaganda. The permanent uncertainty, the social
mobility, the absence of sociological protection and of traditional
frames of reference—all these inevitably provide propaganda
with a malleable environment that can be fed information from
the outside and conditioned at will.
The individual left to himself is defenseless, the more so be-
cause he may be caught up in a social current, thus becoming
easy prey for propaganda. As a member of a small group he
was fairly well protected from collective influences, customs,
and suggestions. He was relatively unaffected by changes in the
society at large. He obeyed only if his entire group obeyed.
This does not mean that he was freer, but only that he was
determined by his local environment and by his restricted group,
and very little by broad ideological influences or collective psychic
stimuli. The common error was to believe that if the individual
were liberated from the smaller organic groups he would be set
free. But in actual fact he was exposed to the influence of mass
currents, to the influence of the state, and direct integration into
mass society. Finally, he became a victim of propaganda. Physi-
Propaganda (93
cally and psychologically uprooted, the individual became much
less stable. The stability of the peasantry, for example, is one of
the reasons why this group is relatively unaffected by propa-
ganda. Goebbels himself recognized that the peasants could be
reached only if their structured milieu was shattered; and the
difficulties that Lenin experienced in integrating the Russian
peasantry into the pattern of the revolution are well known.
Thus, here is one of the first conditions for the growth and
development of modem propaganda: It emerged in western
Europe in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twenti-
eth precisely because that was when society was becoming in-
creasingly individualistic and its organic structures were breaking
down.
But for propaganda to develop, society must also be a mass
society. It cannot be a society that is simply breaking up or
dissolving. It cannot be a society about to disappear, which
might well be a society in which small groups are breaking
up. The society that favors the development of propaganda must
be a society maintaining itself but at the same time taking on a
new structure, that of the mass society.2
The relationship between masses and crowds has been much
discussed, and distinctions have been drawn between masses and
massification. The first is the gathering of a temporary crowd;
the second, the involvement of individuals in a permanent social
cycle. Certainly a crowd gathered at a given point is not, properly
speaking, a mass. A mass society is a society with considerable
population density in which local structures and organizations are
weak, currents of opinion are strongly felt, men are grouped into
large and influential collectives, the individual is part of these
collectives, and a certain psychological unity exists. Mass society,
moreover, is characterized by a certain uniformity of material
life. Despite differences of environment, training, or situation, the
men of a mass society have the same preoccupations, the same
interest in technical matters, the same mythical beliefs, the same
2 Of the Innumerable books on the masses. The Revolt of the Masses, by Jos6
Ortega y Gasset, is still valid despite the criticism of many sociologists.
Elmo Roper's classification of influential groups in the United States is well
known: about 90 percent of the population is "politically inert”; they become
active only accidentally, when they are set into motion, but they are normally
"inactive, inattentive, manipulable, and without critical faculty”—qualities that
form the masses. (Roper: "Who Tells the Storytellers?” Saturday Review, July 31,
1954.) Throughout we are discussing this pass man, the average man.
94) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
prejudices.8 The individuals making up the mass in the grip
of propaganda may seem quite diversified, but they have enough
in common for propaganda to act on them directly.
In contemporary society there actually is a close relation be-
tween mass and crowd. Because a mass society exists, crowds can
gather frequently—that is, the individual constantly moves from
one crowd to another, from a street crowd to a factory crowd, or a
theater crowd, a subway crowd, a crowd gathered at a meeting.
Conversely, the very fact of belonging to crowds turns the indi-
vidual more and more into a mass man and thus modifies his
very being. There is no question that man's psychic being is modi-
fied by his belonging to a mass society; this modification takes
place even if no propaganda appeal is made to the soul of the
crowd or the spirit of the collective. This individual produced by
a mass society is more readily available, more credulous, more
suggestible, more excitable. Under such conditions propaganda
can develop best. Because a mass society existed in western
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth, propaganda became possible and necessary.
From mass society emerge the psychological elements most
favorable to propaganda: symbols and stereotypes. Of course these
also exist in small groups and limited societies, but there they are
not of the same kind, number, or degree of abstraction. In a mass
society they are more detached from reality, more manipulable,
more numerous, more likely to provoke intense but fleeting emo-
tions, and at the same time less significant, less inherent in per-
sonal life. The symbols in a primitive society do not permit the
free and flexible play of propaganda because they are rigid,
stable, and small in number. Their nature is also different: of
religious origin at first, they become political (in the broad sense).
In mass society, finally, we find the maximum deviation between
public opinions and latent private opinions, which are either re-
pressed or progressively eliminated.
Thus the masses in contemporary society have made propa-
ganda possible; in fact propaganda can act only where man’s
psychology is influenced by the crowd or mass to which he be-
longs. Besides, as we have already pointed out, the means of *
* A mass society is also a strongly organized society. John Albig makes a profound
observation when he says that propaganda is an inevitable concomitant of the
growth and organization of society.
Propaganda (q 5
disseminating propaganda depend on the existence of the masses;
in the United States these means are called the mass media of
communications with good reason: without the mass to receive
propaganda and carry it along, propaganda is impossible.
We must also consider the importance of public opinion in this
connection. Public opinion as we presently think of it also needs
a mass society. In fact, in the presence of a stimulus or an act
there must be exchanges of opinion, actions, and interactions,
which are the first steps in the formation of public opinion. There
must also be an awareness of existing opinions, of private opinions
or implicit public opinions. Finally, there must be a reappraisal
of values and attitudes. Only then is there really a crystalized
public opinion. It is obvious that in order for this entire process
to take place, a very close relationship among a great number
of people is necessary. The kind of public opinion we mean, the
kind used by propaganda and necessary for it, cannot exist in a
community of fifty or one hundred persons, isolated from the
outside world (whether it be a monastery or a village of the
fifteenth century), or in a society of very low population density
in which a man has only very distant contacts with other men.
Meeting once a month at the market place, for instance, does not
permit the wide dissemination of personal views needed to form
public opinion.
Thus, for propaganda to be effective psychologically and socio-
logically, a combination of demographic phenomena is required.
The first is population density, with a high frequency of diversi-
fied human contacts, exchanges of opinions and experiences, and
with primary importance placed on the feeling of togetherness.
The second is urban concentration, which, resulting from the
fusion between mass and crowd, gives the mass its psychological
and sociological character. Only then can propaganda utilize
crowd effects; only then can it profit from the psychological modi-
fications that collective life produces in the individual and without
which practically none of the propaganda would “take.” Much
more, the instruments of propaganda find their principal source
of support in the urban concentration.
Buying a newspaper or a radio set or listening to a broadcast is
a social act that presumes a mass structure of society, a total
subordination to certain imperatives felt only when one is plunged
into a mass in which each person places value on the accomplish-
96) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
ment of this social act. Even more, to go to the movies or a politi-
cal meeting presumes a physical proximity and, therefore, the
existence of concentrated masses. In fact, a political organizer
will not bother to hold his meeting if he knows he can get to-
gether only ten or fifteen people; and individuals will not come
readily from a great distance. Because regular attendance is essen-
tial for attaining propaganda effects through meetings or films,
the mass is indispensable. The ‘majority effect,” so essential as a
means of propaganda, can be felt only in a mass society; for
example, the argument that “all Frenchmen want peace in
Algeria” or, on the other hand, “all Frenchmen want to hold on to
Algeria” is valid only if “all Frenchmen” represents an immedi-
ate and massive reality. Thus the mass society was a primary
condition for the emergence of propaganda; once formed, it
evoked the power and functions of propaganda.
Although we shall not go into the matter of individual psy-
chology, we must remember, in Stoetzel’s excellent words, that
“the conditions of life in mass societies tend to multiply individual
frustrations. They produce abstract fragmentary relations be-
tween people.., totally devoid of intimacy__One can show how
the feeling of insecurity or anxiety develops; trace the contradic-
tions of our environment—the conflicts between socially accepted
competition and the preaching of fraternal love, between the
constant stimulation of our needs through advertising and our
limited finances, between our legal rights and the shackles of
reality.”
Propaganda responds psychologically to this situation. The
fact that propaganda addresses itself to the individual but acts
on the mass explains, for example, the unity between the types
of propaganda that are apparently diverse—such as propaganda
based on the prestige of the leader (of the hero, or even of the
expert) and propaganda based on the prestige of the majority. Of
course in the exercise of propaganda both types have specific
functions. But it is important to emphasize here that these two
types are not very different from each other.
The leader or expert who enjoys authority and prestige among
the mass is the man who best speaks for that mass. The ordinary
man must see himself reflected in his leader. The leader must be
a sublimation of the “ordinary man.” He must not seem to be of a
different quality. The ordinary man must not feel that the leader
transcends him. This quality of the average men in the Hero
Propaganda (97
(actor, dictator, sports champion) has been clearly demonstrated
in the history of the past thirty years. It is what E. Morin empha-
sizes in his study of the deification of film stars.
When a man follows the leader, he actually follows the mass,
the majority group that the leader so perfectly represents. The
leader loses all power when he is separated from his group; no
propaganda can emanate from a solitary leader. Moses is dead
on the propaganda level; all we have left is a “J0^115011" or
“De Gaulle,” stripped of individual characteristics and clad in the
aura of the majority.
Some may raise objections to this analysis, which sees a funda-
mental requirement for the development of propaganda in the
creation of an individualist society and a mass society, because
only in that combination can the material means and dictatorial
will of the state take shape. The first objection is based on the
emergence in our society of new local organic groups—for ex-
ample, political parties and labor unions, which seem to be
contrary to the existence of the individualist structure and the
mass structure. The answer to this is, first, that such groups are
still far from having the solidity, the resistance, the structuring
of old organic groups. They have not had time to consolidate
themselves. One has only to look at their fragility, their fluctua-
tions, their changes. They are not really groups of resistance
against mass influence, though, like a party that exchanges a demo-
cratic for a monolithic form, they try to be by taking on authori-
tarian structures.
Second, such new groups cannot be real obstacles to total
propaganda. They can resist one particular propaganda, but not
the general phenomenon of propaganda, for the development of
the groups takes place simultaneously with development of propa-
ganda. These groups develop inside a society propagandized
to the extreme; they are themselves loci of propaganda; they
are instruments of propaganda and are integrated into its tech-
niques. We are no longer in a sociological situation comparable
to that of traditional societies in which there was barely any
mass propaganda and almost nothing other than local psycho-
logical influences. And when propaganda did enter into such
societies, it had to fight existing local groups and try to influence
and modify them; and these organic groups resisted.
At present we are witnessing the emergence of organic groups
in which individuals tend to be integrated. These groups have
98) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
certain traits of the old organic groups, but their collective life,
their intellectual, emotional, and spiritual life is determined by
propaganda, and they can no longer maintain themselves without
it. They become organic groups in the mass society only if they
subject themselves to, and serve as agents of, propaganda. Our
society has been completely transformed: when we left the purely
individualist stage, which permitted propaganda to develop, we
arrived at a society in which primary group structures could still
exist, but in which total propaganda was established and the
group no longer could be separated from such propaganda. It is
curious to see how the few remaining organic groups, such as
the family and the church, try at all costs to live by propaganda:
families are protected by family associations; churches try to take
over the methods of psychological influence. They are now the
very negation of the old organic groups. And what is more, the
new primary groups (such as political parties or unions) are im-
portant relay stations in the flow of total propaganda; they are
mobilized and used as instruments and thus offer no fulcrum
for individual resistance. On the contrary, through them the
entrapped individual is made ready for propaganda.
Another objection comes to mind immediately. Propaganda has
developed in societies that were neither individualist nor mass:
the Russian society of 1917, present-day China, Indochina, the
Arab world. But the point here is precisely that these societies
could not and cannot be captured, manipulated, and mobilized by
propaganda, except when their traditional structures disintegrate
and a new society is developed which is both individualistic and
massive. Where this fails to happen, propaganda remains ineffec-
tive. Therefore, if the new society does not constitute itself spon-
taneously, it is sometimes formed by force by authoritarian states,
which only then can utilize propaganda. In the Soviet Union,
the Caucasus and Azerbaijan were the nursery of agitprop in
1917 because the cosmopolitanism of the region, the great currents
of population displacement (Russian and Moslem), the uproot-
ings, the vigor of a nationalist myth, tended to shape mass society.
In Soviet Russia, propaganda has progressed exactly in line with
the destruction of the old organic groups and the creation of mass
society.4
4 We know too that the establishment of the Viet-Minh organization in Indochina
permitted the structuring of a complete administrative society imposing itself on
Propaganda (qq
We also find this true in Communist China, which attained
in three years, through violence, what the Soviet Union took
twenty years to attain and what developed naturally in the West
in 150 years: the establishment of sociological conditions specific
to an environment in which propaganda can be completely effec-
tive. It seems that the Chinese government understood perfectly
the need to structure a new society. When the French wondered
whether the methods of propaganda which had succeeded in
Indochina could be applied in Algeria, they faced problems of the
same sociological order.5 6 * 8 We find in the ultra-rapid, forced, and
systematic transformation of these societies a dramatic confirma-
tion of our analysis showing that a certain “massification” of
society is required for propaganda to be able to develop.
Opinion
We must add to all this the problem of public opinion. We
have already said that, on the one hand, propaganda is no longer
primarily a matter of opinion, and that, on the other, the existence
of a public opinion is connected with the appearance of a mass
society.6 We would like to stress here that opinion formed in
primary groups, or small groups, has other characteristics than
that which exists in large societies. In small groups, with direct
traditional groups. The Lien-Viet, with its independent and centralized hierarchy,
artificially provoked a new splitting of the traditional groups of inhabitants, up-
setting families, villages, and neighborhoods, and exploding the old forms in order
to integrate individuals into new groups. A person is classified according to his age,
sex, and occupation. The family group is thus destroyed; children do not belong to
the same groups as their parents. Each group thus created is an approximately
homogeneous bloc of members with the same needs, the same tastes, the same
functions; propaganda can then easily develop and capture individuals forced into
these artificial groups. There can be sessions of directed discussion (the themes
in the youth groups will be very different from those in the adult groups); sessions
of self-criticism (youth can engage in sincere and easy self-criticism when not under
parental control). French propaganda in Indochina failed partly because it re-
spected traditional society and its structured small groups.
5 The attempt of the F.L.N. (Forces de Liberation Nationale) to imitate the North
Vietnamese, coupled with the establishment of a million Arabs in relocation camps
by the French authorities, brought about—each in its turn, each by its particular
methods—this same sociological transformation. These operations are conducted
simultaneously, and in both cases the desire to create a fertile ground for propa-
ganda is not overlooked (far from it).
8 The conditions under which a group changes its opinion have often been analyzed;
we know the problems of ambiguity, opinions based on prejudices, appearances
that suddenly collapse, majority effects, and so on. Many limited studies on such
local conditions have been made, but their findings have little value by themselves
when considered outside the setting of mass society.
1 00 ) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
contacts between individuals, interpersonal relations are the
dominant relations, and the formation of public opinion depends
on these direct contacts. Opinion in these is determined by what
has properly been called the “preponderant” opinion, which im-
poses itself automatically on the group as a whole. Interpersonal
relations lead to a dominant opinion because, first of all, leadership
in such groups is recognized spontaneously. Also, group opinion is
called on to regulate concrete situations or common experiences
that bring into play the common interests of all the individuals
in the group. Moreover, the social level of individuals in such
groups is generally the same.
Thus, such primary groups are spontaneously democratic. In
fact, opinion is formed directly, for the individuals are directly
in contact with the events that demand their participation. Once
formed, this opinion is expressed directly and known to every-
body. The leaders of the group know what the group opinion is
and take it into consideration; they have contributed amply to
its formation. But these groups are by no means liberal; minori-
ties within them appear as foreign bodies—for in a relationship
such as this, opposition weakens inter-group communication.
Sanctions are generally diffuse but energetic. There is no equality;
the members accept leadership, and of course small groups also
recognize instituted authorities (the father of the family, for ex-
ample). Dominant personalities play a considerable role, and often
group opinion will be formed by individuals who are known to
all the members of the group, and whose authority is accepted.
Secondary or large societies obviously have a totally different
character. In these societies (generally the only ones considered
by public opinion studies) individuals do not know and have no
direct contact with each other. Moreover, they do not share the
direct experience of problems on which they must make decisions.
Interpersonal relations do not exist, only over-all relations—
those of the individual with the group as a whole. To some extent,
the opinion that prevails in such groups will be a majority opinion
(which is not to say that public opinion is that of the majority).
In such groups, the formation of public opinion is very complex,
and a host of theories exists on the subject. In any event, public
opinion has three characteristics. It can shape itself only in a
society in which institutionalized channels of information give
the people the facts on which they will take a position. Thus,
Propaganda (101
some steps intervene between fact and opinion. The information
reaching the people is only indirect, but without it there would
be no opinion at all. Moreover, to the extent that we are dealing
with information disseminated by intermediaries, opinion does
not form itself by simple personal contact. And nowadays, opinion
depends to a large extent on such intermediate channels of in-
formation.
A second characteristic of public opinion is that it cannot ex-
press itself directly, but only through channels. A constituted
public opinion is as yet nothing, and does not express itself
spontaneously. It will express itself in elections (when electoral
opinion and public opinion coincide), through political parties,
associations in the newspapers, referenda, and so on. But all
that is not enough.
The third characteristic of public opinion is that this opinion
is formed by a veiy large number of people who cannot possibly
experience the same fact in the same fashion, who judge it by
different standards, speak a different language, and share neither
the same culture nor the same social position. Normally, every-
thing separates them. They really should not be able to form a
public opinion, and yet they do. This is possible only when all
these people are not really apprised of the facts, but only of
abstract symbols that give the facts a shape in which they can
serve as a base for public opinion. Public opinion forms itself
around attitudes and theoretical problems not clearly related to
the actual situation. And the symbols most effective in the forma-
tion of public opinion are those most remote from reality. There-
fore, public opinion always rests on problems that do not
correspond to reality.
We have pointed out several times before that original small
groups are obstacles to propaganda. The opinion structure of
these primary groups is opposed to action outside the group (of
course, we do not call the group leaders actions propaganda, but
this does not mean that the group members are free from propa-
ganda; on the contrary, we have already noted that they are not).
Because direct experience, immediate grasp of facts and problems,
and personal acquaintance between individuals exist in the small
group, propaganda cannot function in such a group. Only in
“second-hand” opinion can propaganda play its role; in fact, it
cannot fail to play it there. In order for public opinion to form
10 2) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
itself in large groups, channels of information and manipulation
of symbols must be available. Where public opinion exists, propa-
ganda crystalizes that opinion from the pre-conscious individual
state to the conscious public state. Propaganda can function only
in secondary groups in which secondary opinion can form itself.
But we must remember that we cannot simply juxtapose those two
types of groups, because a whole society is also composed of
multiple groups. A conflict between primary and secondary
opinions will arise. One will dominate the other. Propaganda can
exist only in societies in which second-hand opinion definitely
dominates primary opinion and the latter is reduced and driven
into a minority position; then, when the individual finds himself
between the two conflicting types of opinion, he will normally
grasp the general, public opinion. This corresponds to what we
have said about the mass society.
The Mass Media of Communication
Finally, one more condition is basic for propaganda. We have
just stated again that an opinion cannot form itself in entire so-
cieties unless mass media of communication exist. This much is
evident: without the mass media there can be no modem propa-
ganda. But we must point to a dual factor necessary if the mass
media are really to become instruments of propaganda. For they
are not such instruments automatically or under just any condi-
tions. They must be subject to centralized control on the one
hand, and well diversified with regard to their products on the
other. Where film production, the press, and radio transmission
are not centrally controlled, no propaganda is possible. As long
as a large number of independent news agencies, newsreel pro-
ducers, and diverse local papers function, no conscious and direct
propaganda is possible. This is not because the reader or viewer
has real freedom of choice—which he has not, as we shall see
later—but because none of the media has enough power to hold
the individual constantly and through all channels. Local influ-
ences are sufficiently strong to neutralize the great national press,
to give just one example. To make the organization of propaganda
possible, the media must be concentrated, the number of news
agencies reduced, the press brought under single control, and
radio and film monopolies established. The effect will be still
greater if the various media are concentrated in the same hands.
Propaganda (103
When a newspaper trust also extends its control over films and
radio, propaganda can be directed at the masses and the individ-
ual can be caught in the wide net of media.
Only through concentration in a few hands of a large number
of media can one attain a true orchestration, a continuity, and
an application of scientific methods of influencing individuals. A
state monopoly, or a private monopoly, is equally effective. Such
a situation is in the making in the United States, France, and
Germany—the fact is well known. The number of newspapers
decreases while the number of readers increases. Production costs
constantly increase and necessitate greater concentration; all
statistics converge on that. This concentration itself keeps accel-
erating, thus making the situation increasingly favorable to propa-
ganda. Of course, one must not conclude from this that the
concentration of mass media inevitably produces propaganda.
Such concentration is merely a prerequisite for it. But that the
media be concentrated is not enough; it is also necessary that
the individual will listen to them. This seems to be a truism:
Why produce a propaganda paper if nobody will buy it?
Buying a paper, going to the movies are unimportant acts in
an individual’s life; he does them easily. But reception must be
equally assured by radio or TV; here we encounter the problem
of distributing sets—here the propagandee must take a very posi-
tive step: he must buy a set. Only where enough sets are installed
can propaganda be effective. Obviously, where not enough TV
sets are in use, it makes no sense to conduct propaganda via TV;
this happened in 1950 to the TV propaganda of the Voice of
America beamed to some Communist countries. But the act of
acquiring a set brings up a point that we will discuss at con-
siderable length: the complicity of the propagandee. If he is a
propagandee, it is because he wants to be, for he is ready to buy
a paper, go to the movies, pay for a radio or TV set. Of course,
he does not buy these in order to be propagandized—his motiva-
tions are more complex. But in doing these things he must know
that he opens the door to propaganda, that he subjects himself
to it. Where he is conscious of this, the attraction of owning a
radio is so much greater than the fear of propaganda that he
voluntarily agrees to receive propaganda. This is even more true
where transmission is by collective receiving sets, as in Communist
countries. The hearers gather, even though they know that what
10 4 ) THE conditions for the existence of propaganda
they hear is necessarily propaganda. But they cannot escape the
attraction of the radio or the hypnotism of TV.
The fact is even more striking with regard to the newspapers,
for the reader buys a paper he likes, a paper in which he finds
his own ideas and opinions well reflected. This is the only paper
he wants, so that one can say he really wants to be propagandized.
He wants to submit to this influence and actually exercises his
choice in the direction of the propaganda he wishes to receive.
If by chance he finds in “his” newspaper an article he dislikes
or an opinion that deviates a little from his own, he cancels his
subscription. He cannot stand anything that does not run on his
rails. TTiis is the very mentality of the propagandee, as we shall
see.
Let no one say: “This reader does not submit to propaganda;
first he has such and such ideas and opinions, and then he buys
the paper that corresponds to them.” Such an argument is sim-
plistic, removed from reality, and based on liberal idealism. In
reality, propaganda is at work here, for what is involved is a
progression from vague, diffuse opinion on the part of the reader
to rigorous, exciting, active expression of that opinion. A feeling
or an impression is transformed into a motive for action. Con-
fused thoughts are crystalized. Myths and the reader s conditioned
reflexes are reinforced if he reads that paper. All this is char-
acteristic of propaganda. The reader is really subject to propa-
ganda, even though it be propaganda of his choice. Why always
fall into the error of seeing in propaganda nothing but a device
to change opinions? Propaganda is also a means of reinforcing
opinions, of transforming them into action. The reader himself
offers his throat to the knife of the propaganda he chooses.
We have said that no propaganda can exist unless a mass can
be reached and set into motion. Yet, the peculiar and remarkable
fact is that the mass media really create their own public; the
propagandist need no longer beat the drum and lead the parade
in order to establish a following. This happens all by itself through
the effects of the communication media—they have their own
power of attraction and act on individuals in such a fashion as
to transform them into a collective, a public, a mass. The buying
of a TV set, though an individual act, inserts the individual into
the psychological and behavioral structure of the mass. He obeys
the collective motivations when he buys it, and through his act
Propaganda (105
opens the doors to propaganda. Where this dual process of con-
centration of the sources of propaganda and wide diffusion of its
recipients does not take place, no modem propaganda can func-
tion in a society.
2. Objective Conditions of Total Propaganda
The Need of an Average Standard of Living
Just as there are societies not susceptible to propaganda, there
are individuals not susceptible to it. We have just seen, for ex-
ample, that it takes an individual to read the newspaper and buy
a radio or TV set—an individual with a certain standard of
living. Modem integration propaganda cannot affect individuals
who live on the fringes of our civilization or who have too low
a living standard. In capitalist countries, the very poor, who have
no radio or TV and rarely go to the movies, cannot be reached
by propaganda. Communist countries meet this problem with
community receivers and free movies. Thus even the poorest can
be reached by propaganda.
But other obstacles intervene. The really poor cannot be sub-
jected to integration propaganda because the immediate concerns
of daily life absorb all their capacities and efforts. To be sure,
the poor can be pushed into rebellion, into an explosion of violence;
they can be subjected to agitation propaganda and excited to the
point of theft and murder. But they cannot be trained by propa-
ganda, kept in hand, channeled, and oriented.
More advanced propaganda can influence only a man who is
not completely haunted by poverty, a man who can view things
from a certain distance and be reasonably unconcerned about his
daily bread, and who therefore can take an interest in more
general matters and mobilize his actions for purposes other than
merely earning a living. It is well known that in Western countries
propaganda is particularly effective in the upper segment of the
working class and in the middle classes. It faces much greater
problems with the proletariat or the peasantry. We shall come
back to that.
One must also keep in mind that propaganda must concentrate
on the densest mass—it must be organized for the enormous mass
I O 6 ) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
of individuals. This great majority is not found among the very
rich or the very poor; propaganda therefore is made for those
who have attained an average standard of living. In Western
countries propaganda addresses itself to the large average mass,
which alone represents a real force. But, one might say, in the very
poor countries, such as India or the Arab nations, propaganda
is addressed to another mass, to the very poor, the feUahin. Well,
the point is that these poor react only very little and very slowly
to any propaganda that is not pure agitation propaganda. The
students and merchants react—the poor do not. This explains
the weakness of propaganda in India and Egypt. For propaganda
to be effective, the propagandee must have a certain store of ideas
and a number of conditioned reflexes. These are acquired only
with a little affluence, some education, and peace of mind spring-
ing from relative security.
Conversely, all propagandists come from the upper middle
class, whether Soviet, Nazi, Japanese, or American propagandists.
The wealthy and very cultured class provides no propagandists
because it is remote from the people and does not understand
them well enough to influence them. The lower class does not
furnish any because its members rarely have the means of educat-
ing themselves (even in the U.S.S.R.); more important, they can-
not stand back and look at their class with the perspective needed
to devise symbols for it. Thus studies show that most propagandists
are recruited from the middle class.
The range of propaganda influence is larger and encompasses
the lower middle class and the upper working class as well. But by
raising people’s living standard one does not immunize them
against propaganda—on the contrary. Of course, if everybody
were to find himself at the upper-middle-class level, present-day
propaganda might have less chance of success. But in view of the
fact that the ascent to that level is gradual, the rising living stan-
dard—in the West, as well as in the East and in Africa—makes
the coming generations much more susceptible to propaganda.
The latter establishes its influence while working conditions, food,
and housing improve, and while at the same time a certain stan-
dardization of men, their transformation into what is regarded as
normal, typical people, sets in.7 But whereas the emergence of such
7 This is what Lenin said when he called for a total cultural transformation, with
changes in medicine, in the relations between men and women, in the use of alcohol,
and so on. This transformation of the entire way of life was linked to agitprop.
Propaganda (107
a “normal” type used to be automatic and spontaneous, it now be-
comes more and more a systematic creation, conscious, planned,
and intended. The technical aspects of men’s work, a clear concept
of social relations and national goals, the establishment of a mode
of common life—all this leads to the creation of a type of normal
man, and conveniently leads all men toward that norm via a multi-
tude of paths.
That is why adjustment has become one of the key words of all
psychological influence. Whether it is a question of adaptation to
working conditions, to consumption, or to milieu, a clear and
conscious intent to integrate people into the “normal” pattern
prevails everywhere. This is the summit of propaganda action. For
example, there is not much difference between Mao’s theory of the
“mold” and McCarthyism. In both cases the aim is normalcy, in
conformance with a certain way of life. For Mao, normalcy is a
sort of ideal man, the prototype of the Communist, who must be
shaped, and this can be done only by pressing the individual into
a mold in which he will assume the desired shape. As this cannot
be done overnight, the individual must be pressed again and again
into the mold; and Mao says that the individual himself is fully
aware that he must submit to the operation. Mao adds that this
normalcy does not take shape “except at a certain level of con-
sciousness—that is, at a certain standard of living.”8 We are face to
face here with the most total concept of propaganda.
On the other side, and with other formulas, there is McCarthy-
ism. McCarthyism is no accident. It expresses, and at the same
time exploits, a deep current in American opinion against all that
is “un-American.” It deals less with opinions than with a way of
life. To find that belonging to a milieu, a group, or a family in
which there are Communists is regarded as reprehensible in the
United States is surprising, because what matters here is not ideas
but a different way of life. This leads to the association of alcohol-
ism and homosexuality with Communism in the literature on un-
American activities, and to the rules, promulgated in 1952, which
established the “poor security risk” and led to the screening of
7,000 functionaries. No reason for this identification existed other
than that the Communist is “abnormal” because he fails to accept
the “normal”—that is, the American—way of life. These “abnor-
mal” persons must, of course, be treated as such, relieved of all
8See below. Appendix II.
108) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
responsibility, and re-educated. Thus American prisoners in the
Korean War who appeared to have been contaminated by Com-
munism were hospitalized after their release and given psychiatric
and medical treatment in a hospital at Valley Forge. In current
American opinion, all efforts to root out what fails to correspond to
the American Way of Life and endangers it, are necessarily re-
garded as good works.
To sum up: The creation of normalcy in our society can take
one of two shapes. It can be the result of scientific, psycho-socio-
logical analysis based on statistics—that is, the American type of
normalcy. It can also be ideological and doctrinaire—that is, the
Communist type. But the results are identical: such normalcy
necessarily gives rise to propaganda that can reduce the individual
to the pattern most useful to society.
An Average Culture
In addition to a certain living standard, another condition must
be met: if man is to be successfully propagandized, he needs at
least a minimum of culture. Propaganda cannot succeed where
people have no trace of Western culture. We are not speaking here
of intelligence; some primitive tribes are surely intelligent, but
have an intelligence foreign to our concepts and customs. A base
is needed—for example, education; a man who cannot read will
escape most propaganda, as will a man who is not interested in
reading. People used to think that learning to read evidenced
human progress; they still celebrate the decline of illiteracy as a
great victory; they condemn countries with a large proportion of
illiterates; they think that reading is a road to freedom. All this is
debatable, for the important thing is not to be able to read, but
to understand what one reads, to reflect on and judge what one
reads. Outside of that, reading has no meaning (and even destroys
certain automatic qualities of memory and observation). But to
talk about critical faculties and discernment is to talk about some-
thing far above primary education and to consider a very small
minority. The vast majority of people, perhaps 90 percent, know
how to read, but do not exercise their intelligence beyond this.
They attribute authority and eminent value to the printed word, or,
conversely, reject it altogether. As these people do not possess
enough knowledge to reflect and discern, they believe—or dis-
believe—in toto what they read. And as such people, moreover,
Propaganda (109
will select the easiest, not the hardest, reading matter, they are
precisely on the level at which the printed word can seize and con-
vince them without opposition. They are perfectly adapted to
propaganda.
Let us not say: “If one gave them good things to read... if these
people received a better education ...” Such an argument has no
validity because things just are not that way. Let us not say, either:
“This is only the first stage; soon their education will be better; one
must begin somewhere.” First of all, it takes a very long time to
pass from the first to the second stage; in France, the first stage
was reached half a century ago, and we still are very far from
attaining the second. There is more, unfortunately. This first stage
has placed man at the disposal of propaganda. Before he can pass
to the second stage, he will find himself in a universe of propa-
ganda. He will be already formed, adapted, integrated. This is
why the development of culture in the U.S.S.R. can take place
without danger. One can reach a higher level of culture without
ceasing to be a propagandee as long as one was a propagandee
before acquiring critical faculties, and as long as that culture itself
is integrated into a universe of propaganda. Actually, the most
obvious result of primary education in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centimes was to make the individual susceptible to super-
propaganda.® There is no chance of raising the intellectual level
of Western populations sufficiently and rapidly enough to com-
pensate for the progress of propaganda. Propaganda techniques
have advanced so much faster than the reasoning capacity of the
average man that to close this gap and shape this man intellectually
outside the framework of propaganda is almost impossible. In fact,
what happens and what we see all around us is the claim that
propaganda itself is our culture and what the masses ought to
learn. Only in and through propaganda have the masses access to
political economy, politics, art, or literature. Primary education
makes it possible to enter the realm of propaganda, in which
people then receive their intellectual and cultural environment.
The uncultured man cannot be reached by propaganda. Ex-
perience and research done by the Germans between 1933 and 9
9 Because he considered the newspaper the principal instrument of propaganda,
Lenin insisted on the necessity of teaching reading. It was even more the catchword
of the New Economic Policy: the school became the place to prepare students to
receive propaganda.
no) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
1938 showed that in remote areas, where people hardly knew how
to read, propaganda had no effect. The same holds true for the
enormous effort in the Communist world to teach people how to
read. In Korea, the local script was terribly difficult and compli-
cated; so, in North Korea, the Communists created an entirely new
alphabet and a simple script in order to teach all the people how
to read. In China, Mao simplified the script in his battle with
illiteracy, and in some places in China new alphabets are being
created. This would have no particular significance except that
the texts used to teach the adult students how to read—and which
are the only texts to which they have access—are exclusively
propaganda texts; they are political tracts, poems to the glory of
the Communist regime, extracts of classical Marxism. Among the
Tibetans, the Mongols, the Ouighbours, the Manchus, the only
texts in the new script are Mao’s works. Thus, we see here a won-
derful shaping tool: The illiterates are taught to read only the
new script; nothing is published in that script except propaganda
texts; therefore, the illiterates cannot possibly read—or know—
anything else.
Also, one of the most effective propaganda methods in Asia was
to establish “teachers” to teach reading and indoctrinate people
at the same time. The prestige of the intellectual—“marked with
God’s finger”—allowed political assertions to appear as Truth,
while the prestige of the printed word one learned to decipher con-
firmed the validity of what the teachers said. These facts leave
no doubt that the development of primary education is a funda-
mental condition for the organization of propaganda, even though
such a conclusion may run counter to many prejudices, best ex-
pressed by Paul Rivet’s pointed but completely unrealistic words:
“A person who cannot read a newspaper is not free.”
This need of a certain cultural level to make people susceptible
to propaganda1 is best understood if one looks at one of propa-
1 We also must consider the fact that in a society in which propaganda—whether
direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious—absorbs all the means of communica-
tion or education (as in practically all societies in i960), propaganda forms
culture and in a certain sense is culture. When film and novel, newspaper and
television are instruments either of political propaganda in the restricted sense or
in that of human relations (social propaganda), culture is perfectly integrated into
propaganda; as a consequence, the more cultivated a man is, the more he is
propagandized. Here one can also see the idealist illusion of those who hope that
the mass media of communication will create a mass culture. This “culture” is
merely a way of destroying a personality.
Propaganda (ill
gandas most important devices, the manipulation of symbols. The
more an individual participates in the society in which he lives,
the more he will cling to stereotyped symbols expressing collec-
tive notions about the past and the future of his group. The more
stereotypes in a culture, the easier it is to form public opinion, and
the more an individual participates in that culture, the more
susceptible he becomes to the manipulation of these symbols.
The number of propaganda campaigns in the West which have
first taken hold in cultured settings is remarkable. This is not
only true for doctrinaire propaganda, which is based on exact
facts and acts on the level of the most highly developed people
who have a sense of values and know a good deal about political
realities, such as, for example, the propaganda on the injustice of
capitalism, on economic crises, or on colonialism; it is only normal
that the most educated people (intellectuals) are the first to be
reached by such propaganda. But this is also true for the crudest
kind of propaganda; for example, the campaign on Peace and
the campaign on bacteriological warfare were first successful in
educated milieus. In France, the intellectuals went along most
readily with the bacteriological warfare propaganda. All this
runs counter to pat notions that only the public swallows propa-
ganda. Naturally, the educated man does not believe in propa-
ganda; he shrugs and is convinced that propaganda has no effect
on him. This is, in fact, one of his great weaknesses, and propa-
gandists are well aware that in order to reach someone, one must
first convince him that propaganda is ineffectual and not very
clever. Because he is convinced of his own superiority, the intel-
lectual is much more vulnerable than anybody else to this maneu-
ver, even though basically a high intelligence, a broad culture, a
constant exercise of the critical faculties, and full and objective
information are still the best weapons against propaganda. This
danger has been recognized in the U.S.S.R., where so much
importance is attached to political indoctrination and education,
and has frequently been expressed there: too much discussion,
too much depth of doctrine risk creating divergent currents and
permitting the intellectual to escape social control.
Finally, propaganda can have an effect on the masses who lack
any culture. Examples: the Leninist propaganda directed at the
Russian peasantry and the Maoist propaganda directed at the
Chinese peasantry. But these propaganda methods, are basically
112) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
the creation of conditioned reflexes on the one hand, and the slow
creation of the necessary cultural base on the other. To illustrate
the creation of the conditioned reflex: after several months of
propaganda in Honan in 1928, children at play would call their
opponents “Imperialists.”
As noted earlier, poor and uncultured populations are appro-
priate objects of propaganda of agitation and subversion. The
more miserable and ignorant a person is, the more easily will he
be plunged into a rebel movement. But to go beyond this, to do a
more profound propaganda job on him, one must educate him.
This corresponds to the need for “political education.” Conversely,
an individual of the middle class, of good general culture, will be
less susceptible to agitation propaganda but ideal prey of integra-
tion propaganda. This has also been observed by Lipset, who
holds that ignorance in politics and economics makes the conflicts
in these spheres less clear and therefore less intense to the ob-
server, and for this reason the ignorant are less susceptible to
propaganda on such questions.
Information
Of course, basic education permits the dissemination not only
of propaganda but of information in general. But here we meet
with a new condition for propaganda. Contrary to the simplistic
differentiation between propaganda and information, we have
demonstrated a close relationship between the two. In reality,
to distinguish exactly between propaganda and information is
impossible. Besides, information is an essential element of propa-
ganda; for propaganda to succeed, it must have reference to
political or economic reality. Doctrinal or historical argument is
only incidentally effective in propaganda; it has power only in
connection with the interpretation of events. It has an effect only
when opinion is already aroused, troubled, or oriented in a certain
direction by a political or economic event. It grafts itself onto an
already existing psychological reality. Such psychological reac-
tions are generally of brief duration, and must be systematically
sustained and renewed. To the extent that they will be prolonged
and renewed, they will create an “informed opinion.”
This informed opinion is indispensable for propaganda. Where
we have no informed opinion with regard to political or economic
affairs, propaganda cannot exist. For this reason, in most of the
Propaganda (113
older countries, propaganda was localized and restricted to those
groups which had direct contact with political life; it was not de-
signed for the masses indifferent to such questions—indifferent
because they were uninformed. The masses cannot be interested
in political and economic questions or in the great ideological
debates based on them, until mass media of communication
disseminate information to the public. We know that the most
difficult to reach are the peasants, for a variety of reasons already
pointed out; but another essential reason is that they are unin-
formed. Studies of rural milieus have shown that propaganda
begins to “bite” among peasants at the exact moment when
information is promulgated there, when facts become known and
attention to certain questions is aroused. Obviously, if I do not
know that war is being waged in Korea, or that North Korea and
China are Communist, or that the United States occupies South
Korea and that it represents the UN in Korea, any Communist
propaganda on alleged American biological warfare means noth-
ing to me. Propaganda means precisely nothing without prelimi-
nary information; therefore propaganda to politically ignorant
groups can be made only if preceded by extensive, profound, and
serious information work.2 The broader and more objective the
information, the more effective subsequent propaganda will be.
Once again, propaganda does not base itself on errors, but on
exact facts. It. even seems that the more informed public or private
opinion is (notice I say “more,” not “better”), the more suscept-
ible it is to propaganda. The greater a persons knowledge of
political and economic facts, the more sensitive and vulnerable is
his judgment. Intellectuals are most easily reached by propa-
ganda, particularly if it employs ambiguity. The reader of a num-
ber of newspapers expressing diverse attitudes—just because he
is better informed—is more subjected than anyone else to a propa-
ganda that he cannot perceive, even though he claims to retain
free choice in the mastery of all this information. Actually, he is
being conditioned to absorb all the propaganda that coordinates
2 This is why in the Soviet Union one does not distinguish between the tasks of
information and propaganda. The agitator is, above all, a dispenser of information;
radio and the press are, above all, media of propaganda. Mr. Palgounov, director
of the Tass agency, said in 1956: “Information should be didactic and educative.'*
Not to mention the fact that pure information is an excellent medium of propa-
ganda; bald information without commentary can lead to acceptance of a whole
propaganda line.
114) THE conditions for the existence of propaganda
and explains the facts he believes himself to be mastering. Thus,
information not only provides the basis for propaganda but gives
propaganda the means to operate; for information actually gener-
ates the problems that propaganda exploits and for which it
pretends to offer solutions. In fact, no propaganda can work until
the moment when a set of facts has become a problem in the eyes
of those who constitute public opinion.
At the moment such problems begin to confront public opinion,
propaganda on the part of a government, a party, or a man can
begin to develop fully by magnifying that problem on the one
hand and promising solutions for it on the other. But propaganda
cannot easily create a political or economic problem out of
nothing. There must be some reason in reality. The problem need
not actually exist, but there must be a reason why it might exist
For example, if the dispensation of daily information leads a man
into the labyrinth of economic realities, he will find it difficult to
understand these complicated and various facts, and he will
therefore conclude that some problems of an economic nature
exist. But this takes on an entirely different and much more pro-
nounced aspect when this opinion is in any way connected with
personal experience. If he were ignorant of what went on in the na-
tion and in the world, and if his only sources of information were
equally uninformed neighbors; in that case propaganda would be
impossible, even if that man were actually to suffer personal
difficulties as a result of certain political or economic situations.
Propaganda had no effect on the populations of the nineteenth
century, even when a village was plundered by an army, because
in the face of personal experiences people respond spontaneously
or by group reflexes, but in any event only to a local and limited
situation. They would find it very difficult to generalize the situa-
tion, to look upon it as a generally valid phenomenon and to
build a specific response to such a generalization—that would
demand a considerable amount of voluntary intellectual labor.
Thus propaganda becomes possible only when people develop a
consciousness of general problems and specific responses to
them.
The formation of such responses is precisely what the promul-
gation of information creates in individuals who have only limited
personal contact with social reality. Through information, the
individual is placed in a context and learns to understand the
Propaganda (115
reality of his own situation with respect to society as a whole.
This will then entice him to social and political action. Take, for
example, the problem of the standard of living: The worker who
knows nothing about prices and salaries, except from personal
experience (or those of his neighbors), may in the event of sharp
discontent experience feelings of rebellion, and may eventually
rebel against his immediate superiors. And it is well known that
such rebellion leads nowhere; that was the great discovery of the
nineteenth century. But information will teach this worker that
he shares his fate with millions of others, and that among them
there can be a community of interest and action. Information
allows him also to put his situation into the general economic
context and to understand the general situation of management.
Finally, information will teach him to evaluate his personal situ-
ation. This is what led to the class consciousness of the nineteenth-
century workers, a process which—as the socialists rightly
maintain—was much more one of information than one of propa-
ganda. At that very moment (when information is absorbed) the
spirit of rebellion transforms itself into the spirit of revolution. As
a result of information, individuals come to feel that their own
personal problems are really invested with the dignity of a general
social problem.
From the moment when that sort of information is acquired,
propaganda finds the doors open. The elementary form of propa-
ganda in which a few leaders address a few rebels is then re-
placed by the complex modem propaganda based on mass
movements, on knowledge of the great politico-economic realities,
and on involvement in certain broad currents fed everywhere by
identical information.8
Thus information prepares the ground for propaganda. To the
extent that a large number of individuals receive the same in-
formation, their reactions will be similar. As a result, identical
“centers of interest” will be produced and then become the great
8 Moreover, the newer the problems raised, the more vulnerable men will be. The
role of information is to introduce individuals to knowledge of new facts and prob-
lems. Specialists in opinion research are well aware that the individual is easier
to influence by propaganda when he is in new situations, when he is not familiar
with possible solutions, when he cannot relate to previous patterns—when, in
brief, opinion is *non-structured.” The task of information is to put the individual
in this situation of non-structured opinion and thus make him more susceptible to
influence.
Il6) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PROPAGANDA
questions of our time made public by press and radio, and group
opinions will be formed which will establish contact with each
other—one of the essential processes in the formation of public
opinion. Moreover, this leads to the formation of common reflexes
and common prejudices. Naturally, there are deviationists—in-
dividuals who do not share the same responses to the same
information, because they already hold other prejudices, because
they are “strong personalities,” or simply because of habitual
contrariness. But their number is much smaller than is generally
believed. They are unimportant, and the polarization of attention
on certain questions, and on certain aspects of these questions
singled out by information, rapidly creates what has been called
mass psychology—one of the indispensable conditions for the
existence of propaganda.
The Ideologies
Finally, the last condition for the development of propaganda
is the prevalence of strong myths and ideologies in a society. At
this point a few words are needed on the term ideology.
To begin with, we subscribe to Raymond Aron’s statement that
an ideology is any set of ideas accepted by individuals or peoples,
without attention to their origin or value. But one must perhaps
add, with Q. Wright, (1) an element of valuation (cherished
ideas), (2) an element of actuality (ideas relating to the present),
and (3) an element of belief (believed, rather than proved,
ideas).
Ideology differs from myth in three important respects: first,
the myth is imbedded much more deeply in the soul, sinks its
roots farther down, is more permanent, and provides man with a
fundamental image of his condition and the world at large.
Second, the myth is much less “doctrinaire”; an ideology (which
is not a doctrine because it is believed and not proved) is first of
all a set of ideas, which, even when they are irrational, are still
ideas. The myth is more intellectually diffuse; it is part emotional-
ism, part affective response, part a sacred feeling, and more im-
portant. Third, the myth has stronger powers of activation,
whereas ideology is more passive (one can believe in an ideology
and yet remain on the sidelines). The myth does not leave man
passive; it drives him to action. What myth and ideology have in
common, however, is that they are collective phenomena and
Propaganda (117
their persuasive force springs from the power of collective partici-
pation.
Thus one can distinguish: the fundamental myths of our society
are the myths of Work, Progress, Happiness; the fundamental
ideologies are Nationalism, Democracy, Socialism. Communism
shares in both elements. It is an ideology in that it is a basic
doctrine, and a myth in that it has an explanation for all questions
and an image of a future world in which all contradictions will
be resolved. Myths have existed in all societies, but there have not
always been ideologies. The nineteenth century was a great
breeding ground of ideology, and propaganda needed an ideo-
logical setting to develop.
Ideology in the service of propaganda is very flexible and fluid.
Propaganda in support of the French Revolution, or of United
States life in the twenties, or of Soviet life in the forties, can all be
traced back to the ideology of democracy. These three entirely
different types and concepts of propaganda all refer to the same
ideology. One must not think, for this reason, that ideology
determines a given propaganda merely because it provides the
themes and contents. Ideology serves propaganda as a peg, a
pretext. Propaganda seizes what springs up spontaneously and
gives it a new form, a structure, an effective channel, and can
eventually transform ideology into myth. We shall return later to
the connection between ideology and propaganda.
CHAPTER
M
THE NECESSITY
FOR PROPAGANDA
A common view of propaganda is that it is the work of a few evil
men, seducers of the people, cheats and authoritarian rulers
who want to dominate a population; that it is the handmaiden of
more or less illegitimate powers. This view always thinks of propa-
ganda as being made voluntarily; it assumes that a man decides
“to make propaganda,” that a government establishes a Propa-
ganda Ministry, and that things just develop from there on.
According to this view, the public is just an object, a passive
crowd that one can manipulate, influence, and use. And this
notion is held not only by those who think one can manipulate the
crowds but also by those who think propaganda is not very effec-
tive and can be resisted easily.
In other words, this view distinguishes between an active factor
—the propagandist—and a passive factor—the crowd, the mass,
man.1 Seen from that angle, it is easy to understand the moralists
1 According to this conception, propaganda is a “sinister invention of the military
caste,” whereas actually it is the expression of modem society as a whole.
Propaganda (119
hostility to propaganda: man is the innocent victim pushed into
evil ways by the propagandist; the propagandee is entirely with-
out blame because he has been fooled and has fallen into a trap.
The militant Nazi and Communist are just poor victims who must
not be fought but must be psychologically liberated from that
trap, readapted to freedom, and shown the truth. In any event, the
propagandee is seen in the role of the poor devil who cannot help
himself, who has no means of defense against the bird of prey who
swoops down on him from the skies. A similar point of view can
be found in studies on advertising which regard the buyer as
victim and prey. In all this the propagandee is never charged with
the slightest responsibility for a phenomenon regarded as origi-
nating entirely outside of himself.
This view seems to me completely wrong. A simple fact should
lead us at least to question it: nowadays propaganda pervades all
aspects of public life. We know that the psychological factor,
which includes encirclement, integration into a group, and partic-
ipation in action, in addition to personal conviction, is decisive.
To draw up plans for an organization, a system of work, political
methods, and institutions is not enough; the individual must
participate in all this from the bottom of his heart, with pleasure
and deep satisfaction. If the Common Market is wanted, a unit
must be set up to psychologically prepare the people for the
Common Market; this is absolutely necessary because the in-
stitutions mean nothing by themselves. NATO also needs propa-
ganda for its members. Gasperi’s proposal of 1956 to create a
Demform that would correspond to the Cominform is extremely
significant. Present political warfare is very inadequate; from the
economic point of view one may well say that the recession was
much more a psychological than a technical or economic develop-
ment.2 In order to assure that reforms will have vigor and effec-
tiveness, one must first convince the people that no recession has
occurred and that they have nothing to fear. And this is not just
Dr. Coup’s method of self-imploration, but active participation
in an effective recovery.
A specific example: Agricultural “reconstruction” in France is
first of all a psychological problem. “Services of Popularization”
2 As early as 1928, Edward Bemays stated: "Propaganda is the modem instrument
by which . . . intelligent men can fight for productive ends and help to bring
order out of chaos.”
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
120)
are created, which furnish not only technical consultants but
primarily psychological agitators, on the pattern of the famous
county agents in the United States or the counselors in Scandi-
navia. Efforts at popularizing and at instilling convictions take
place simultaneously. The U.S.S.R. is still much more advanced
in the direction of a full-fledged agricultural propaganda, with
technically perfect propaganda campaigns at harvest time, hun-
dreds of thousands of propaganda agents roaming through the
villages expostulating “motherland” and “production,” radio
broadcasts and films, and daily publication of harvest results, as
in a pennant race. Joining in this campaign are the local papers,
the Komsomols, the teamsters, the festivities, dances, folk songs,
rewards, decorations, and citations.
The Soviets employ the same methods in factory work, and the
formula that best explains the whole effort is: “Full understanding
on the part of the workers is the decisive factor in raising produc-
tivity.” It is necessary to obtain the worker’s allegiance to the
cause of productivity; he must accept and search for innovations,
like his work, support his organization, understand the function
of labor. All this is attained by psychological manipulation, by a
propaganda conducted with precision over a considerable length
of time.
In armies, such techniques are of equal importance. The best
example is the new German army; the German soldier must be
convinced of the validity of what he defends and patriotism is no
longer territorial but ideological. This psychological approach is
designed to give the soldiers a personal discipline, with a capacity
for decision and choice; military techniques are no longer suffi-
cient. All this is pure propaganda, including the notion of the per-
sonal decision, for as soon as the individual has been indoctrinated
with the “truth”, he will act as he is expected to act, from the
“spontaneity” of his conscience. This was the principal aim of
propaganda in Hitlers army, and the individual German soldiers
capacity for personal initiative in 1940 was truly remarkable.
One final example in a different field: In connection with the
1959 census in the U.S.S.R., a gigantic propaganda campaign was
unleashed, because both the speed with which such a census can
be taken and the accuracy of the results depend on the good will
and truthfulness of the citizens. So, in order to obtain speed and
accuracy, opinion was mobilized. The entire press and all mass
organizations sprang into action in order to envelop the citizens in
Propaganda (121
propaganda, and propagandists roamed the country far and wide
to explain to the people what was being planned, to alleviate their
prejudices and suspicions with regard to the questions that they
would be asked.
These are all examples of entirely different applications of
propaganda. But in order for propaganda to be so far-ranging, it
must correspond to a need. The State has that need: Propaganda
obviously is a necessary instrument for the State and the author-
ities. But while this fact may dispel the concept of the propa-
gandist as simply an evil-doer, it still leaves the idea of propaganda
as an active power vs. passive masses. And we insist that this idea,
too, must be dispelled: For propaganda to succeed, it must cor-
respond to a need for propaganda on the individual’s part. One
can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink; one cannot
reach through propaganda those who do not need what it offers.
The propagandee is by no means just an innocent victim. He pro-
vokes the psychological action of propaganda, and not merely
lends himself to it, but even derives satisfaction from it. Without
this previous, implicit consent, without this need for propaganda
experienced by practically every citizen of the technological age,
propaganda could not spread. There is not just a wicked propa-
gandist at work who sets up means to ensnare the innocent citizen.
Rather, there is a citizen who craves propaganda from the bottom
of his being and a propagandist who responds to this craving. Prop-
agandists would not exist without potential propagandees to
begin with. To understand that propaganda is not just a deliberate
and more or less arbitrary creation by some people in power is
therefore essential. It is a strictly sociological phenomenon, in the
sense that it has its roots and reasons in the need of the group
that will sustain it. We are thus face to face with a dual need: the
need on the part of regimes to make propaganda, and the need
of the propagandee. These two conditions correspond to and
complement each other in the development of propaganda.
2. The States Necessity
The Dilemma of the Modem State
Propaganda is needed in the exercise of power for the simple
reason that the masses have come to participate in political affairs.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
122)
Let us not call this democracy; this is only one aspect of it. To
begin with, there is the concrete reality of masses. In a sparsely
populated country, politics can be made by small groups, sepa-
rated from each other and from the masses, which will not form
a public opinion and are remote from the centers of power. The
nearness of the masses to the seats of power is very important.
Pericles and Tiberius were well aware of it, as were Louis XIV
and Napoleon: they installed themselves in the countryside, far
from the crowds, in order to govern in peace outside the reach
of the pressure of the masses, which, even without clearly wanting
to, affect the conditions of power by their mere proximity. This
simple fact explains why politics can no longer be the game of
princes and diplomats, and why palace revolutions have been
replaced by popular revolutions.
Nowadays the ruler can no longer detach himself from the
masses and conduct a more or less secret policy; he no longer has
an ivory tower; and everywhere he is confronted with this
multiple presence. He cannot escape the mass simply because of
the present population density—the mass is everywhere. More-
over, as a result of the modem means of -transportation, the
government is not only in constant contact with the population of
the capital, but also with the entire country. In their relations
with the governing powers, there is hardly any difference now
between the population of the capital and that of the countryside.
This physical proximity is itself a political factor. Moreover, the
mass knows its rulers through the press, radio, and TV—the Chief
of State is in contact with the people. He can no longer prevent
people from knowing a certain number of political facts. This
development is not the result of some applied doctrine; it is not
because democratic doctrine demands the masses’ participation in
public power that this relationship between mass and government
has developed. It is a simple fact, and the inevitable result of
demographic changes. Hence, if the ruler wants to play the game
by himself and follow secret policies, he must present a decoy to
the masses. He cannot escape the mass; but he can draw between
himself and that mass an invisible curtain, a screen, on which the
mass will see projected the mirage of some politics, while the
real politics are being made behind it.
Except for this subterfuge, the government is in fact under the
control of the people—not juridical control, but the kind of
Propaganda (12 3
control that stems from the simple fact that the people are in-
terested in politics and try to keep up with and understand
governmental action, as well as make their opinions known. For,
after all, the masses are interested in politics.8 This, too, is new.
Even those who do not read the papers carefully are appalled at
the thought of censorship, particularly when they feel that the
government wants to hide something or leave them in the dark.
Nowadays the masses are accustomed to making political judg-
ments; as the result of the democratic process they are accustomed
to be consulted on political alternatives and to receive political
information. This may only be a habit, but it is deeply ingrained
by now; to try to reverse it would immediately provoke feelings
of frustration and cries of injustice. That the masses are interested
in politics, whether deeply or superficially, is a fact. Besides, one
very simple reason explains this: today, as never before in history,
political decisions affect everybody. In the old days, a war affected
a small number of soldiers and a negligible piece of territory;
today everybody is a soldier, and the entire population and the
whole territory of a nation are involved. Therefore, everybody
wants to have his say on the subject of war and peace.
Similarly, taxes have increased at least tenfold since the seven-
teenth century, and those who pay them naturally want some con-
trol over their use. The sacrifices demanded by political life keep
increasing and affect everybody; therefore everybody wants to
participate in this game, which affects him directly. Because the
States decisions will affect me, I intend to influence them. As
a result, governments can no longer govern without the masses—
without their influence, presence, knowledge, and pressure. But
how, then, can they govern?
The rule of public opinion is regarded as a simple and natural
fact. The government is regarded as the product of this opinion,
from which it draws its strength. It expresses public opinion. To
quote Napoleon’s famous words: “Power is based on opinion. What
is a government not supported by opinion? Nothing.” Theoretic-
ally, democracy is political expression of mass opinion. Most
people consider it simple to translate this opinion into action, and *
* Democracy rests on the conviction that the citizen can choose the right man and
the right policy. Because this is not exactly the case, the crowd is propagandized
in order to make it participate. Under such conditions, how could the mass not
be convinced that it is deeply concerned?
THE NECESSITY FOH PROPAGANDA
124)
consider it legitimate that the government should bend to the
popular will. Unfortunately, in reality all this is much less clear
and not so simple. More and more we know, for example, that
public opinion does not express itself at the polls and is a long
way from expressing itself clearly in political trends. We know,
too, that public opinion is very unstable, fluctuating, never settled.
Furthermore, this opinion is irrational and develops in unforesee-
able fashion. It is by no means composed of a majority of rational
decisions in the face of political problems, as some simplistic
vision would have it. The majority vote is by no means the real
public opinion. Its basically irrational character greatly reduces
its power to rule in a democracy. Democracy is based on the con-
cept that man is rational and capable of seeing clearly what is in
his own interest, but the study of public opinion suggests this is
a highly doubtful proposition. And the bearer of public opinion
is generally a mass man, psychologically speaking, which makes
him quite unsuited to properly exercise his right of citizenship.
This leads us to the following consideration: On the one hand,
the government can no longer operate outside the pressure of the
masses and public opinion; on the other hand, public opinion does
not express itself in the democratic form of government. To be
sure, the government must know and constantly probe public
opinion.4 The modem State must constantly undertake press and
opinion surveys and sound out public opinion in a variety of other
ways. But the fundamental question is: Does the State then obey
and express and follow that opinion? Our unequivocal answer is
that even in a democratic State it does not. Such obeisance by the
State to public opinion is impossible—first, because of the very
nature of public opinion, and second, because of the nature of
modem political activities.
Public opinion is so variable and fluctuating that government
could never base a course of action on it; no sooner would govern-
ment begin to pursue certain aims favored in an opinion poll,
than opinion would turn against it. To the degree that opinion
4 The Soviet Union, despite its authoritarian character and the absence of opinion
surveys, makes just as much effort to keep informed of public opinion—through
agitators (who inform the government on die people's state of mind) and through
letters to the press. The government does not consult opinion in order to obey it,
however, but to know at what level it exists and to determine what propaganda
action is needed to win it over. The Party must neither anticipate public opinion
nor lag behind it. To determine the State’s rhythm of action, it must know the
masses’ state of mind.
Propaganda (125
changes are rapid, policy changes would have to be equally rapid;
to the extent that opinion is irrational, political action would have
to be equally irrational. And as public opinion, ultimately, is
always “the opinion of incompetents,” political decisions would
therefore be surrendered to them.
Aside from the near-impossibility of simply following public
opinion, the government has certain functions—particularly those
of a technical nature—entirely outside such opinion. With regard
to an enterprise that involves billions and lasts for years, it is
not a question of following opinion—either at its inception, when
opinion has not yet crystalized, or later, when the enterprise has
gone too far to turn back. In such matters as French oil policy in
the Sahara or electrification in the Soviet Union, public opinion
can play no role whatever. The same holds true even where
enterprises are being nationalized, regardless of an apparent
socialist opinion. In many instances, political decisions must be
made to suit new problems emerging precisely from the new
political configurations in our age, and such problems do not fit
the stereotypes and patterns of established public opinion. Nor
can public opinion crystalize overnight—and the government
cannot postpone actions and decisions until vague images and
myths eventually coalesce into opinion. In the present world of
politics, action must at all times be the forerunner of opinion.
Even where public opinion is already formed, it can be disastrous
to follow it. Recent studies have shown the catastrophic role of
public opinion in matters of foreign policy. The masses are in-
capable of resolving the conflict between morality and State
policy, or of conceiving a long-term foreign policy. They push
the government toward a disastrous foreign policy, as in Franklin
Roosevelt’s policy toward the Soviet Union, or Johnson’s push-
button policy. The greatest danger in connection with foreign
policy is that of public opinion manifesting itself in the shape of
crisis, in an explosion. Obviously, public opinion knows little about
foreign affairs and cares less; tom by contradictory desires,
divided on principal questions, it permits the government to
conduct whatever foreign policy it deems best. But all at once,
for a variety of reasons, opinion converges on one point, tempera-
tures rise, men become excited and assert themselves (for ex-
ample, on the question of German rearmament). And should this
opinion be followed? To the same extent that opinion expresses
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
126)
itself sporadically, that it wells up in fits and starts, it runs counter
to the necessary continuity of foreign policy and tends to overturn
previous agreements and existing alliances. Because such opinion
is intermittent and fragmentary, the government could not follow
it even if it wanted to.
Ergo: even in a democracy, a government that is honest, serious,
benevolent, and respects the voter cannot follow public opinion.
But it cannot escape it either. The masses are there; they are
interested in politics. The government cannot act without them.
So, what can it do?
Only one solution is possible: as the government cannot follow
opinion, opinion must follow the government. One must convince
this present, ponderous, impassioned mass that the government’s
decisions are legitimate and good and that its foreign policy is
correct. The democratic State, precisely because it believes in the
expression of public opinion and does not gag it, must channel
and shape that opinion if it wants to be realistic and not follow
an ideological dream. The Gordian knot cannot be cut any other
way. Of course, the political parties already have the role of
adjusting public opinion to that of the government. Numerous
studies have shown that political parties often do not agree with
that opinion, that the voters—and even party members—fre-
quently do not know their parties’ doctrines, and that people
belong to parties for reasons other than ideological ones. But the
parties channel free-floating opinion into existing formulas, polar-
izing it on opposites that do not necessarily correspond to the
original tenets of such opinion. Because parties are so rigid, be-
cause they deal with only a part of any question, and because they
are purely politically motivated, they distort public opinion and
prevent it from forming naturally. But even beyond party in-
fluence, which is already propaganda influence, government
action exists in and by itself.
The most benevolent State will inform the people of what it
does.5 For the government to explain how it acts, why it acts, and
what the problems are, makes sense; but when dispensing such
information, the government cannot remain coldly objective; it
must plead its case, inevitably, if only to counteract opposing
5 Is it normal, for example, for the "Plan” in France to be the expression of a
closed technocracy, and for the public never to be really correctly informed
about it?
Propaganda (127
propaganda.6 Because information alone is ineffective, its dis-
semination leads necessarily to propaganda, particularly when the
government is obliged to defend its own actions or the life of the
nation against private enterprise. The giant corporations and
pressure groups, pushing their special interests, are resorting in-
creasingly to psychological manipulation. Must the government
permit this without reacting? And just because pure and simple
information cannot prevail against modem propaganda tech-
niques, the government, too, must act through propaganda. In
France this situation arose in 1954, when the army used films and
pamphlets to challenge the government’s E.D.C. (European De-
fense Community) propaganda. But from the moment the soldier
can vote, he is subjected to propaganda from outside groups and
is himself a member of a pressure group—and what a group! The
army itself is potentially a formidable pressure group, and the
famous political malaise in France is partly owing to the efforts of
successive governments to influence that group by psychological
means, and to break it up. How can one deny to the government
the right to do what all the other groups do? How can one de-
mand of a modem State that it tolerate an independent group?
Pleven’s demand of 1954, to the effect that “there must be no
propaganda in one direction or the other,” is morally most satisfy-
ing, but purely theoretical and unrealistic. Moreover, he went on
to claim that what had been called propaganda was government-
dispensed information, pure and simple. In fact the two realities
—information and propaganda—are so little distinct from one
another that what the enemy says is nothing but propaganda,
whereas what our side says is nothing but information.7
But there is more: in a democracy, the citizens must be tied to
the decisions of the government. This is the great role propaganda
must perform. It must give the people the feeling—which they
crave and which satisfies them—“to have wanted what the govern-
ment is doing, to be responsible for its actions, to be involved in
defending them and making them succeed, to be ‘with it.’ ”8 The
6 This will be examined elsewhere in greater detail.
7 It is known that in French opinion everything that comes from the State, even
what is most honest, will be automatically and without examination called propa-
ganda; so propagandized, rather than free and critical, is the contemporary French-
man. This is what happened to the speeches by Mend&s-France and the commu-
niques concerning the war in Algeria.
8 L60 Hamon: "Le P on voir et T opinion” Le Monde, April 1959.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
128)
writer L60 Hamon is of the opinion that this is the main task of
political parties, unions, and associations. But it is not the whole
answer. More direct and evocative action is needed to tie opinion,
not just to anything, but to acts of political power. The American
writer Bradford Westerfield has said: “In the United States, the
government almost always conducts its foreign policies on its own
initiative, but where the public is interested in a particular ques-
tion, it can only proceed with the apparent support of a substan-
tial majority of the people.” Westerfield stresses that at times con-
cessions must be made to the people, but “if the President really
directs opinion, and if the public accepts the foreign policy of the
government as a whole, no great concessions will have to be made
to elicit the necessary support.”9 Here we find confirmation that
any modem State, even a democratic one, is burdened with the
task of acting through propaganda.* 1 It cannot act otherwise.
But the same analysis must be made from another point of
departure. We have traced the dilemma of the modem State.
Since the eighteenth century, the democratic movement has
pronounced, and eventually impregnated the masses with, the
idea of the legitimacy of power; and after a series of theories on
that legitimacy we have now reached the famous theory of the
sovereignty of the people. Power is regarded as legitimate when
it derives from the sovereignty of the people, rests on the popular
will, expresses and follows this popular will. The validity of this
concept can be debated ad infinitum from the theoretical point of
view; one can examine it throughout history and ask if it is what
Rousseau had in mind. In any event, this rather abstract philo-
sophic theory has become a well-developed and irrefutable idea
9 Bradford Westerfield: "Opinion and Parties in American Foreign Policy,”
(A.F.S.P., 1954).
1The State can no longer govern without its citizens being directly involved in
its enterprises. Goebbels stated that in 1934 the majority of Germans were for
Hitler. But were they active? Were they happy with this political participation?
Finally, could one hope for continued compliance? To assure such compliance
propaganda is necessary. According to M6gret, “psychological action in a de-
mocracy is nothing else than this invisible and discreet servant ... of the great
functions of the State. ... It is a way of being, doing, and providing, through
the allegiance of minds, the success of legitimate government actions.”
This necessary participation is not necessarily spontaneous. Individuals who claim
to control politics are at the same time very passive. On the one hand, they do not
believe what they are told; on the other, they tend to put their private lives before
everything else and to take refuge in them. The state must compel the individual to
participate (at the most elementary level, it must force him to vote). The principal
role of propaganda, then, would be to fight against opposition and indifference.
Propaganda (129
in the mind of the average man. For the average Westerner, the
will of the people is sacred, and a government that fails to repre-
sent that will is an abominable dictatorship. Each time the people
speak their minds the government must go along; no other source
of legitimacy exists. This is the fundamental image, the collective
prejudice which has become a self-evident belief and is no longer
merely a doctrine or a rational theory. This belief has spread very
rapidly in the past thirty years. We now find the same unshakable
and absolute belief in all Communist countries, and begin to see
it even in Islamic countries, where it should be rather remote.
The contagious force of such a formula seems to be inexhaustible.
Conversely, a government does not feel legitimate and cannot
claim to be so unless it rests on this sovereignty of the people,
unless it can prove that it expresses the will of the people; other-
wise it would be thrown out immediately. Because of this mystical
belief in the people’s' sovereignty, all dictators try to demonstrate
that they are the expression of that sovereignty. For a long time
the theory of the people’s sovereignty was believed to be tied to
the concept of democracy. But it should be remembered that
when that doctrine was applied for the first time, it led to the
emergence of the most stringent dictatorship—that of the Ja-
cobins. Therefore, we can hardly complain when modem dictators
talk about the sovereignty of the people.
Such is the force of this belief that no government can exist
without satisfying it or giving the appearance of sharing it. From
this belief springs the necessity for dictators to have themselves
elected by plebiscite. Hitler, Stalin, Tito, Mussolini were all able
to claim that they obtained their power from the people. This
is true even of a Gomulka or a Rakosi: every plebiscite shows
the famous result, which fluctuates between 99.1 and 99.9 percent
of the votes. It is obvious to everybody, including those elected,
that this is just for the sake of appearance, a “consultation” of
the people without any significance—but it is equally obvious that
one cannot do without it. And the ceremony must be repeated
periodically to demonstrate that the legitimacy is still there, that
the people are still in full accord with their representatives. The
people lend themselves to all this; after all, it cannot be denied
that the voters really vote, and that they vote in the desired way—
the results are not faked. There is compliance.
Could it be that the people’s sovereignty is actually something
THE NECESSITY FOB PROPAGANDA
130)
other than compliance? Might it be hoped that without any prior
attempts at influencing the people, a true constitutional form
could emerge from the people? Such a supposition is absurd. The
only reality is to propose to the people something with which they
agree. Up to now we have not seen a single example of people
not eventually complying with what was proposed to them. In a
plebiscite or referendum the “ayes" always exceed the “nays."
We see here once again the instrument used to influence the
masses, the propaganda by which the government provides itself
with legitimacy through public compliance.
This leads to two further considerations: First, compliance must
be obtained, not just with the form of government but with all its
important actions. As Drouin has aptly said, “nothing is more
irritating to a people than to have the feeling of being directed
by Mandarins who let their decisions fall from the height of their
power." Thus the need to “inform" the people better. “That the
decisions should be wise does not suffice; the reasons for them
must be given. For an enterprise ... to function well, it is best
to take it apart in public without concealing its weaknesses, with-
out hiding its cost . . . and to make clear the meaning of the
sacrifices demanded of the people."2 But such information really
aims at compliance and participation; it is, in other words, propa-
ganda in the deepest sense. But we have become used to seeing
our governments act this way.
In 1957, when the Soviet people were called upon to study
and discuss Khrushchev s Theses on Economic Reorganization,
we witnessed a truly remarkable operation. The underlying theme
of it all was, of course, that everything is being decided by the
people. How can the people then not be in agreement afterwards?
How can they fail to comply completely with what they have
decided in the first place? The Theses were submitted to the
people first. Naturally, they were then explained in all the Party
organizations, in the Komsomols, in the unions, in the local
soviets, in the factories, and so on, by agitprop specialists. Then
the discussions took place. Next, Pravda opened its columns to
the public, and numerous citizens sent in comments, expressed
their views, suggested amendments. After that, what happened?
The entire government program, without the slightest modified-
* “Sur le Regime de la V* R^publique ” Le Monde, April igsg.
Propaganda (131
tion, was passed by the Supreme Soviet. Even amendments pre-
sented and supported by individual deputies were rejected, and
all the more those presented by individual citizens; for they
were only individual (minority) opinions, and from the demo-
cratic (majority) point of view insignificant. But the people
were given the immense satisfaction of having been consulted,
of having been given a chance to debate, of having—so it seemed
to them—their opinions solicited and weighed.* This is the
democratic appearance that no authoritarian government can do
without.
Beyond that, such practices lead the government to embrace a
method which derives logically from the principle of popular
democracy, but which could develop only as a result of modem
propaganda: the government is now in the habit of acting through
the masses as intermediary in two ways. First, it goes to the peo-
ple more and more frequently for the support of its policies. When
a decision seems to meet with resistance or is not fully accepted,
propaganda is addressed to the masses to set them in motion;
the simple motion of the mass is enough to invest the decisions
with validity: it is only an extension of the plebiscite. When
the People's Democracy installed itself in Czechoslovakia after
a police coup <T6tat, gigantic meetings of the working population
were held—well staged, organized, and kindled—to demonstrate
that the people were in full agreement. When Fidel Castro wanted
to show that his power was based on democratic sentiment, he
organized the Day of Justice, during which the whole population
was called upon to sit in judgment of the past regime, and to
express its sentiments through massive demonstrations. These
demonstrations were meant to “legalize" the death sentences
handed down by the State courts and thus give a “democratic
sanction" to the judgments. In doing this, Castro won the people’s
profound allegiance by satisfying the need for revenge against
the former regime and the thirst for blood. He tied the people to
his government by the strongest of bonds: the ritual crime. That
Day of Justice (January 21,1959) was undoubtedly a great propa-
gandists discovery. If it caused Castro some embarrassment
abroad, it certainly was a great success at home. It should be noted
* Goebbels declared that it was necessary "to expose the acts of government so that
the people can recognize by themselves the necessity for the measures taken.**
THE NECESSITY FOB PROPAGANDA
132)
that such provocation of popular action always serves to support
governmental action. It is in no way spontaneous, and in no way
expresses an intrinsic desire of the people: it merely expresses,
through a million throats of the crowd, the cry of governmental
propaganda.
Second—and this is a subtler process—governmental propa-
ganda suggests that public opinion demand this or that decision;
it provokes the will of a people, who spontaneously would say
nothing. But, once evoked, formed, and crystalized on a point,
that will becomes the people's will; and whereas the government
really acts on its own, it gives the impression of obeying public
opinion—after first having built that public opinion. The point
is to make the masses demand of the government what the
government has already decided to do. If it follows this procedure,
the government can no longer be called authoritarian, because
the will of the people demands what is being done. In this fashion,
when German public opinion unanimously demanded the liber-
ation of Czechoslovakia, the German government had no choice
but to invade that country in obedience to the people. It yielded
to opinion as soon as opinion—through propaganda—had be-
come strong enough to appear to influence the government.
Castro's Day of Justice was cut from the same cloth: it was pre-
pared by an excellent propaganda campaign, and the people who
had been aroused with great care then demanded that their gov-
ernment carry out the acts of “justice." Thus the government did
not merely obtain agreement for its acts; the people actually
demanded from the government incisive punitive measures, and
the popular government merely fulfilled that demand, which,
of course, had been manufactured by government propaganda.
This constant propaganda action, which makes the people demand
what was decided beforehand and makes it appear as though the
spontaneous, innermost desires of the people were being carried
out by a democratic and benevolent government, best character-
izes the present-day “Mass-Government" relationship. This sys-
tem has been put to use in the U.S.S.R. particularly, and in this
respect Nikita Khrushchev liberalized nothing—on the contrary.
However, the emergence of this particular phenomenon was pre-
dictable from the day when the principle of popular sovereignty
began to take hold. From that point on, the development of propa-
ganda cannot be regarded as a deviation or an accident.
Propaganda (133
The State and Its Function
From the government point of view, two additional factors
must be kept in mind—the competitive situation in which democ-
racy finds itself in the world and the disintegration of national
and civic virtues.
Why a totalitarian regime would want to use propaganda is
easily understood. Democratic regimes, if we give diem the bene-
fit of the doubt, feel some compunction and revulsion against the
use of propaganda. But such democratic regimes are driven into
its use because of the external challenges they have to meet.
Ever since Hider, democracy has been subjected to relendess
psychological warfare. The question, then, is which regime will
prevail, for both types claim to be of universal validity and bene-
fit; this obliges them to act upon each other. As the Communist
regime claims to be the harbinger of the people's happiness, it
has no choice but to destroy all other regimes in order to supplant
them. But for the Western democracies the problem is the same:
in their eyes the Communist regime is a horrible dictatorship.
Thus one must intervene against one's neighbor, mainly through
propaganda and also, so far as the Communists are concerned,
through Communist parties in non-Communist countries. This
in turn forces the democracies to make internal propaganda: if
they are to prevail against those Communist parties and against
the U.S.S.R., economic progress must be accelerated. In fact, the
competition between the two regimes unfolds pardy in the eco-
nomic realm. We all know Khrushchev's economic challenge. This
acceleration of the economic development demands an organi-
zation, a mobilization of the latent forces in the heart of the
democracies, which requires psychological work, special training;
and a permanent propaganda campaign on the necessity for
increased production. It is one result of the competition between
regimes.
But this competition takes place on another level as well: no
man in the world can remain unaffected by the competition of the
two regimes. Unfortunately, this is the result of global solidarity
that some welcome: no people can remain outside the conflict
between the Big Two. Democracy feels that it must conquer and
hold all the small nations, which otherwise would fall into the
Communist orbit. In the pursuit of this objective two means are
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
134)
used in conjunction: the economic weapon and propaganda. In
the days of classic imperialism, the economic weapon, supported
on occasion by brief military action, was sufficient. Nowadays, the
successive failures of the United States prove that the economic
weapon is ineffective without propaganda. For example, in i960
the United States gave three times as much assistance to under-
developed nations as did the Soviet Union; thanks to propaganda,
it is the Soviet Union who is regarded as the great helper and
benefactor in whom one can put one’s trust. The hearts and
minds of the people must be won if economic assistance, which
by itself has no effect on opinion, is to succeed. Similarly, propa-
ganda by itself accomplishes nothing; it must be accompanied by
spectacular economic acts. Without doubt, the democracies have
lost out so far in the contest for the African and Asian peoples
only because of the inferiority of their propaganda and their re-
luctance to use it. Thus, the democracies are now irresistibly
pushed toward the use of propaganda to stave off decisive defeat.
Psychological warfare has become the daily bread of peace policy.
The psychological conquest of entire populations has become
necessary, and nobody can escape it. One no longer must decide
whether or not to use the propaganda weapon; one has no choice.
Good reasons exist for analyzing this new form of aggression.
Military aggression has been replaced by indirect aggression—
economic or ideological. Propaganda saps the strength of the
regimes that are its victims, depriving them of the support of their
own public opinion. Austria and Czechoslovakia had been re-
duced to impotence by Nazi propaganda before they were in-
vaded; other countries with not a single expansionist aim are
constantly subjected to this aggression. They cannot defend them-
selves except by using the same means of psychological warfare,
for no international organization or court of justice can protect
them against this form of aggression; psychological action is too
protean, too hard to nail down, and cannot be legally adjudicated.
Above all, in legally defending against psychological aggression,
one must not deny the freedom of opinion and speech guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. The problem thus springs directly from the
given situation. Every State must accept the burden of defending
itself against propaganda aggression. As soon as one country has
taken this road, all other countries must eventually follow suit or
be destroyed.
Propaganda (135
A democracy is generally poorly organized for effective psycho-
logical warfare. French specialists have said with some justifica-
tion: "Only the army can engage in psychological warfare, be-
cause of its structure." But in the face of the democratic regimes'
need to conduct propaganda, it has also been said that "in a
world of the cold war, domestic political thought must become
strategic”* Therefore the problem is to resolve the dichotomy be-
tween the political and the military and to define and integrate
the army's political function. As a result of the necessity to con-
duct propaganda, democracy finds itself compelled to change its
structure. But the cold war does not merely demand action against
the external enemy who tries to interfere; it also demands that
things be "kept firmly in hand" at home. The State must psycho-
logically arm, protect, and defend its citizens, all the more when
the ideological structure of a democracy is weak.
Here we face a new problem: in today's world, much more than
in the past, a nation can survive only if its values are secure, its
citizens loyal and unanimous, and if they practice the civic
virtues. But at this time a crisis of basic values and a relaxation
of civic virtues is occurring in a number of Western democracies.
Governments are forced to reconstruct their nations psychologi-
cally and ideologically, and this need, in turn, justifies psycho-
logical action. In fact, in this connection, hardly anybody objects
to such psychological action. Everybody seems to consider it
necessary and justified "as long as one limits oneself to the moral
education of the soldier and the dissemination of the truth." But
many object to putting pressure on people's minds. Though they
mean well, those who object simply fail to see that the two ele-
ments they seek to separate—the telling of the truth and the ex-
ercise of pressure on the minds—are, in fact, identical. How can
one rebuild civic virtues—rapidly, in order to reap quick benefits
—without using pressure to change people's points of view?
From the moment when the need of reconstructing a nation
ideologically makes itself felt, methods become inevitable which
are propaganda pure and simple. Of course, the objectives pur-
sued are pure. For example, the French Army says:
... far from engaging in psychological action in order to enslave
minds, most colonels aim only at securing human liberty. . . . 4
4T. Albord, Le Monde, 1958.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
136)
They understand that one cannot permit a man of free choice to
let himself be captured by a doctrine that would reduce him to an
object. . . . They know that a possible future war would include
an attack against the mind, more precisely against one of the
minds functions: the will. . . . Psychological action in the army
aims only at furnishing the men with adequate means for the
defense of freedom where it still exists. To this end it is enough
to strengthen the will of the resistance if that will to resistance
comes under attack. The endangered men must be taught our
aims, our mission, and our means of attaining them.5
Here psychological action is presented in its most favorable
light. We cannot even object to the reasoning: it corresponds to
the feelings of most liberals. Here psychological action presents
itself as a sort of national education. According to another French
writer, psychological action “is designed to shape and develop and
sustain the morale, and to immunize the soldiers against enemy
psychological attacks.” This is intended for wartime, when the
first task is to shape an army which “must preserve its proper
internal spiritual cohesion.” It is described thus:
... a civic and moral education of all people placed under
military command, within a context of objective information,
opposed to propaganda, designed only to spiritually arm the
citizen of a free democracy. . . . The methods employed are
those of education and human relations; their principal aim
is to engage the cooperation of the individual to whom they
are addressed, to explain to him and make him understand the
different aspects of problems that confront him.
In other words, the aim is the civic education of the troops.
The soldier must learn the civic realities and the values of civili-
zation. This is not just a French problem, incidentally; in Germany
we find precisely the same orientation. But it is obvious that the
education of the army cannot restrict itself to the troops. Such
work becomes infinitely easier if young recruits are already in-
doctrinated. On the other hand, if the army were alone in main-
taining the civic virtues, it would feel isolated. For such work
to be effective, it must be done by the entire nation. In this fashion
the army will be tempted to become the nation's educator; a psy-
chological action by the State on the entire nation then becomes
5 Colonel Villiers de Lisle Adam, Le Monde, October 1958.
Propaganda (137
a necessity. The Provisional Proclamation on Psychological Ac-
tion of 1957 stated that neutralism on the part of the government
invited subversion and placed it in a perilous position; that the
absence of civic education leads young people to a lack of
patriotism, to social egotism, and to nihilism.
This shows the perfectly good intentions, the legitimate con-
cerns, and the serious objectives behind psychological action.
But is there not a considerable amount of illusion in the rigorous
distinction between psychological action and propaganda, be-
tween the enemy’s methods and one’s own? In fact, one is faced
with a mass of individuals who must be formed, involved, given
certain nationalistic reflexes; a scale of values must be introduced
by which the individual can judge everything. If one had a great
deal of time, a vast supply of good educators, stable institutions,
and lots of money, and if France were not engaged in war or in
international competition, it might be possible to eventually re-
build civic virtues through information and good example. But
that is not the case. Action must be fast, with few educators
at hand; therefore only one way can be taken: the utilization of
the most effective instruments and the proved methods of propa-
ganda. In a battle between propagandas, only propaganda can
respond effectively and quickly.
As a result, the effects of one’s own propaganda on the person-
ality are exactly the same as those of enemy propaganda (we say
on the personality, not on some specific opinions). These effects
will be analyzed at length later. In any event, one cannot possibly
say: we act in order to preserve man’s freedom. For propaganda,
regardless of origin, destroys man’s personality and freedom. If
one were merely to say: "The enemy must be defeated, and to
this end all means are good,” we would not object. That would
mean recognizing and accepting the fact that democracy, whether
it wants to be or not, is engaged in propaganda. But the illusion
that one engages in psychological action as a defense, while
respecting the values of democracy and human personality, is
more pernicious than any cynicism which looks frankly at the true
situation.
A thorough study of Information, Education, Human Relations,
and Propaganda reveals that in practice no essential differences
exist among them. Any politically oriented education which
creates certain "special values” is propaganda. And our reference
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
138)
to “special values” leads to yet another consideration. The inclu-
sion of such special values as patriotism in the struggle for civic
reconstruction excludes such others as internationalism, anarch-
ism, and pacifism. One assumes that one's national values are
given and justified in themselves. And from that one concludes
that one faces only the problem of education because these na-
tional values are the only values. But this is not so. In reality,
the affirmation of certain values which one wants to inculcate,
and the rejection of others which one wants to eradicate from
the minds of the listeners is precisely a propaganda operation.
Thus, by different roads, we keep arriving at the same con-
clusion: a modem State, even if it be liberal, democratic,
and humanist, finds itself objectively and sociologically in a
situation in which it must use propaganda as a means of govern-
ing. It cannot do otherwise.
2. The Individuals Necessity
If we admit that the government has no choice but to make
propaganda, there still remains the image of the aggressive and
totalitarian political machine which pounces on the innocent
victim—the individual. The individual then appears helpless and
crushed by gigantic forces. But I think that propaganda fills a
need of modem man, a need that creates in him an unconscious
desire for propaganda. He is in the position of needing outside
help to be able to face his condition. And that aid is propaganda.
Naturally, he does not say: “I want propaganda.” On the con-
trary, in line with preconceived notions, he abhors propaganda
and considers himself a “free and mature” person. But in reality
he calls for and desires propaganda that wifi permit him to ward
off certain attacks and reduce certain tensions. This leads to the
following puzzle: “Propaganda by itself has no power over an
individual. It needs certain already existing pillars of support. It
creates nothing. And yet, the effectiveness of propaganda is un-
deniable, even though it seems impossible to define exactly those
already existing pillars of support on which it builds.” The solu-
tion is that these pillars are the individual's need for propaganda.
The secret of propaganda success or failure is this: Has it or
has it not satisfied the unconscious need of the individual whom
Propaganda (13 9
it addressed? No propaganda can have an effect unless it is
needed, though the need may not be expressed as such but
remain unconscious.6 And if we take into consideration that
propaganda exists in all "civilized” countries and accompanies
all “progress toward civilization” in underdeveloped countries,
this need appears to be practically universal; it is an intrinsic
part of the setting in which man finds himself in the technological
society.7 We shall first examine the objective situation of man
which generates this need for propaganda, then his psychological
situation.
The Objective Situation
We have stressed that the State can no longer govern without
the masses, which nowadays are closely involved in politics. But
these masses are composed of individuals. From their point of
view, the problem is slightly different: they are interested in
politics and consider themselves concerned with politics; even if
they are not forced to participate actively because they live in
a democracy, they embrace politics as soon as somebody wants
to take the democratic regime away from them. But this presents
them with problems that are way over their heads. They are
faced with choices and decisions which demand maturity, knowl-
edge, and a range of information which they do not and cannot
have. Elections are limited to the selection of individuals, which
reduces the problem of participation to its simplest form. But
the individual wishes to participate in other ways than just elec-
tions. He wants to be conversant with economic questions. In
fact, his government asks him to be. He wants to form an opinion
on foreign policy. But in reality he can't. He is caught between
his desire and his inability, which he refuses to accept. For no
citizen will believe that he is unable to have opinions. Public
opinion surveys always reveal that people have opinions even
on the most complicated questions, except for a small minority
6 In the Soviet Union it is expressly stated that propaganda results from a dialectical
process between the needs of individuals, which the local agitator communicates
to the authorities, and the objectives of the Party.
7 The existence of this universal need is also clearly revealed by circulation of
rumors. Why are there rumors? Why do they circulate? They serve the need for
explanations in a given situation, and ease emotional tension because man seeks
in them answers to what disturbs him. Propaganda responds to the same needs in
a much more effective fashion. But spontaneous rumors demonstrate the existence
of these needs.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
140)
(usually the most informed and those who have reflected most).
The majority prefers expressing stupidities to not expressing any
opinion: this gives them the feeling of participation. For this
they need simple thoughts, elementary explanations, a “key” that
will permit them to take a position, and even ready-made
opinions. As most people have the desire and at the same time
the incapacity to participate, they are ready to accept a propa-
ganda that will permit them to participate, and which hides
their incapacity beneath explanations, judgments, and news, en-
abling them to satisfy their desire without eliminating their
incompetence. The more complex, general, and accelerated politi-
cal and economic phenomena become, the more do individuals
feel concerned, the more do they want to be involved. In a cer-
tain sense this is democracy’s gain, but it also leads to more
propaganda. And the individual does not want information, but
only value judgments and preconceived positions. Here one must
also take into account the individuals laziness, which plays a
decisive role in the entire propaganda phenomenon, and the
impossibility of transmitting all information fast enough to keep
up with developments in the modem world. Besides, the de-
velopments are not merely beyond man’s intellectual scope; they
are also beyond him in volume and intensity; he simply cannot
grasp the world’s economic and political problems. Faced with
such matters, he feels his weakness, his inconsistency, his lack
of effectiveness. He realizes that he depends on decisions over
which he has no control, and that realization drives him to
despair. Man cannot stay in this situation too long. He needs an
ideological veil to cover the harsh reality, some consolation, a
raison cTetre, a sense of values. And only propaganda offers him
a remedy for a basically intolerable situation.
Besides, modem man is called upon for enormous sacrifices,
which probably exceed anything known in the past. First of all,
work has assumed an all-pervading role in modem life. Never
have men worked so much as in our society. Contrary to what
is often said, man works much more nowadays than, for example,
in the eighteenth century. Only the working hours have de-
creased. But the omnipresence of the duties of his work, the
obligations and constraints, the actual working conditions, the
intensity of work that never ends, make it weigh much more
heavily on men today than on men in the past. Every modem
Propaganda (141
man works more than the slave of long ago; standards have been
adjusted downward. But whereas the slave worked only because
he was forced to, modem man, who believes in his freedom and
dignity, needs reasons and justifications to make himself work.
Even the children in a modem nation do an amount of work
at school which no child was ever asked to do before the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century; there, too, justifications are
needed. One cannot make people live forever in the state of
assiduous, intense, never-ending labor without giving them good
reasons and creating by example a virtue of Work, like that of
the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century, or a myth of liberation
through Work, like that of the Nazis or Communists.
Such dedication to work does not happen by itself or spontane-
ously. Its creation is properly the task of propaganda, which must
give the individual psychological and ideological reasons why he
needs to be where he is. One cannot get good, steady work out
of a man merely by pointing to the need for such work, or even
to its monetary rewards. One must give him psychological satis-
factions of a higher order; man wants a profound and significant
reason for what he does. And as all this is a collective situation,
it will be furnished him by collective means. To furnish the col-
lective ideological motivations driving man to action is propa-
ganda s exact task; every time the sum total of labor is to be
increased, the increase is accomplished through propaganda. The
Soviet Union, with its Five Year Plan, set the example, and the
Chinese ‘leaps forward” are also typical.8 In France, all increase
in production rests on an enormous propaganda campaign. And
the citizen really cannot be happy in his work unless he is sus-
tained by such psychological nourishment, by the combination of
promises (such as a few years of hard work and a thousand years
of happiness) and the value of the motives handed him. The
exigencies of work and economic life in the modem world create
in man the need for propaganda; in the United States this takes
8 This leads to a comparison of the agitator with the shock worker (oudamik).
The agitator, who remains a political force, must at the same time be an exemplary
worker; he must introduce new workers into the industrial order, push workers to
accomplish the norms. Agitation for “production” was the most important propa-
ganda of the i93o’s in the U.S.S.R. The press itself was engaged in this “agitation
for production,” for very often in its “heroic period” the government had no other
means for resolving economic problems than that of propaganda to improve produc-
tivity and discipline. But we must not think this was limited to the 1930*8. The
same movement resumed in 1950 with the reintroduction of Stakhanovism.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
142)
the form of Human Relations. American writers have often said
that the drive toward efficiency cannot be expected to develop
by itself. The man who is subjected to the demands for efficiency
will ask: “Efficiency for what?* It is then up to propaganda to
give him the answer.
But modem man is not only forced to make sacrifices in his
work; he is also saddled by his government with other sacrifices,
such as ever-increasing taxes. Every citizen of a modem state
pays more taxes than the most heavily taxed people in pre-
Napoleonic days. Then the subject was forced to pay, whereas
the free citizen of today must pay for reasons of conviction. His
conviction will not come about spontaneously, particularly when
the taxes are really heavy. The Conviction must therefore be
manufactured, ideals must be stimulated in order to give true
significance to such a “contribution to the nation"; here, too,
propaganda is needed. This is the exact opposite of political
freedom.
Let us take the most serious of all sacrifices. The modem
citizen is asked to participate in wars such as have never been
seen before. All men must prepare for war, and for a dreadful
type of war at that—dreadful because of its duration, the im-
mensity of its operations, its tremendous losses, and the atrocity
of the means employed. Moreover, participation in war is no
longer limited to the duration of the war itself; there is the
period of preparation for war, which becomes more and more
intense and costly. Then there is the period in which to repair
the ravages of war. People really live in a permanent atmosphere
of war, and a superhuman war in every respect (the strain of
“holding out" for days under bombardment is a much greater
strain than a day of traditional battle). Nowadays everybody
is affected by war; everybody lives under its threat.
Naturally, it was always necessary to give men ideological and
sentimental motivations to get them to lay down their lives. But
in our modem form of war the traditional motives—protection of
one’s family, defense of ones own country, personal hatred for
a known enemy—no longer exist. They must be replaced by
others. And the more demanded of man, the more powerful must
be those motivations. The man of whom such super-sacrifices are
demanded finds himself in the middle of an incessant world con-
flict, pushed to the very limit of his nervous and mental en-
Propaganda (*43
durance, and in a sort of constant preparation for ultimate
sacrifice. He cannot live this way unless sustained by powerful
motivations, which he will not find either inside himself, or
spontaneously. They must be furnished him by society, which
will respond to the need that arises from the individual’s actual
situation. Obviously, some simple “information” on the interna-
tional situation or on the need to defend one’s country is in-
sufficient here. Man must be plunged into a mystical atmosphere,
he must be given strong enough impulses as well as good enough
reasons for his sacrifices, and, at the same time, a drug that will
sustain his nerves and his morale. Patriotism must become
"ideological.” Only propaganda can put man into a state of
nervous endurance that will permit him to face the tension of
war.9
Aside from all these sacrifices, man is not automatically adjusted
to the living conditions imposed on him by modem society.
Psychologists and sociologists are aware of the great problem of
adjusting the normal man to a technological environment—to the
increasing pace, the working hours, the noise, the crowded cities,
the tempo of work, the housing shortage, and so on. Then there is
the difficulty of accepting the never-changing daily routine, the
lack of personal accomplishment, the absence of an apparent
meaning in life, the family insecurity provoked by these living
conditions, the anonymity of the individual in the big cities and
at work. The individual is not equipped to face these disturbing,
paralyzing, traumatic influences. Here again he needs a psycho-
logical aid; to endure such a life, he needs to be given motivations
that will restore his equilibrium. One cannot leave modem man
alone in a situation such as this. What can one do?
One can surround him with a network of psychological rela-
tions (Human Relations) that will artificially soothe his discom-
forts, reduce his tensions, and place him in some human context.
Or one can have him live in a myth strong enough to offset the
concrete disadvantages, or give them a shade of meaning, a value
that makes them acceptable. To make man’s condition acceptable
to him, one must transcend it. This is the function of Soviet and
9 When propaganda Is missing, people do not really become involved in war: for
instance, the ridiculous French Government propaganda in 1939, the propaganda
toward Indochina (which went too far), and the propaganda on the Algerian war
(hasty and clumsy as opposed to the remarkably good leftist and F.L.N. propa-
ganda).
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
144)
Chinese propaganda. In both cases there is psychological manip-
ulation of the individual—an operation that must be classified
as propaganda in the broad sense of the word. Such propaganda
has a ‘political” character, if one takes the term political, in its
broadest sense, as referring to the collective life in a polis.
Finally, to understand the need for propaganda that springs
from modem man's actual condition, one must remember that
one is dealing with an informed person. Having analyzed in the
preceding chapter how information actually supports propaganda,
we must now turn to the manner in which the dispensing of in-
formation lays the psychological foundations for a man s be-
coming a propagandee. If we look at the average man, and not
at those few intellectuals whose special business it is to be in-
formed, what do we actually mean when we say this man is in-
formed? It means that, aside from spending eight hours at work
and two more commuting, this man reads a newspaper or, more
precisely, looks at the headlines and glances at a few stories. He
may also listen to news broadcasts, or watch it on TV; and once
a week he will look at the photos in a picture magazine. This
is the case of the reasonably well informed man, that is, of 98
percent of all people.
What happens next to a man who wishes to be informed and
receives a great deal of news each day? First, straight news re-
porting never gives him anything but factual details; the event
of the day is always only a part, for news can never deal with
the whole. Theoretically, the reporter could relate these details
to other details, put them into context and even provide certain
interpretations—but that would no longer be pure information.1
Besides, this could be done only for the most important events,
whereas most news items deal with less important matters. But
if you shower the public with the thousands of items that occur
in the course of a day or week, the average person, even if he
tries hard, will simply retain thousands of items which mean
nothing to him. He would need a remarkable memory to tie some
event to another that happened three weeks or three months ago.
Moreover, the array of categories is bewildering—economics,
politics, geography, and so on—and topics and categories change
every day. To be sure, certain major stories, such as Indochina
1I could give a hundred examples of complete distortion of facts by competent
and honest journalists, whose interpretative articles appear in serious newspapers.
Propaganda (*45
and Hungary, become the subject of continuous reporting for
several weeks or months, but that is not typical. Ordinarily,
a follow-up story on a previous news item appears two weeks to
a month later. To obtain a rounded picture, one would have to
do research, but the average person has neither the desire nor the
time for it. As a result, he finds himself in a land of kaleidoscope
in which thousands of unconnected images follow each other
rapidly. His attention is continually diverted to new matters, new
centers of interest, and is dissipated on a thousand things, which
disappear from one day to the next. The world becomes remark-
ably changeable and uncertain; he feels as though he is at the
hub of a merry-go-round, and can find no fixed point or con-
tinuity; this is the first effect information has on him. Even with
major events, an immense effort is required to get a proper broad
view from the thousand little strokes, the variations of color,
intensity, and dimension, which his paper gives him. The world
thus looks like a pointilliste canvas—a thousand details make a
thousand points. Moreover, blank spots on the canvas also pre-
vent a coherent view.
Our reader then would have to be able to stand back and get
a panoramic view from a distance; but the law of news is that
it is a daily affair. Man can never stand back to get a broad view
because he immediately receives a new batch of news, which
supersedes the old and demands a new point of focus, for which
our reader has no time. To the average man who tries to keep
informed, a world emerges that is astonishingly incoherent, ab-
surd, and irrational, which changes rapidly and constantly for
reasons he cannot understand. And as the most frequent news
story is about an accident or a calamity, our reader takes a
catastrophic view of the world around him. What he learns from
the papers is inevitably the event that disturbs the order of
things. He is not told about the ordinary—and uninteresting—
course of events, but only of unusual disasters which disturb
that course. He does not read about the thousands of trains that
every day arrive normally at their destination, but he learns all
the details of a train accident.
In the world of politics and economics, the same holds true.
The news is only about trouble, danger, and problems. This gives
man the notion that he lives in a terrible and frightening era,
that he lives amid catastrophes in a world where everything threat-
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
146)
ens his safety. Man cannot stand this; he cannot live in an absurd
and incoherent world (for this he would have to be heroic, and
even Camus, who considered this the only honest posture, was
not really able to stick to it); nor can he accept die idea that
the problems, which sprout all around him, cannot be solved,
or that he himself has no value as an individual and is subject
to the turn of events. The man who keeps himself informed needs
a framework in which all this information can be put in order;
he needs explanations and comprehensive answers to general
problems; he needs coherence. And he needs an affirmation of his
own worth. All this is the immediate effect of information. And
the more complicated the problems are, the more simple the
explanations must be; the more fragmented the canvas, the
simpler the pattern; the more difficult the question, the more all-
embracing the solution; the more menacing the reduction of his
own worth, the greater the need for boosting his ego. All this
propaganda—and only propaganda—can give him. Of course,
an outstanding man of vast culture, great intelligence, and ex-
ceptional energy can find answers for himself, reconcile himself
to the absurd, and plan his own action. But we are not thinking
here of the outstanding man (who, naturally, we all imagine our-
selves to be), but of the ordinary man.2
An analysis of propaganda therefore shows that it succeeds
primarily because it corresponds exactly to a need of the masses.
Let us remember just two aspects of this: the need for explan-
ations and the need for values, which both spring largely, though
not entirely, from the promulgation of news. Effective propaganda
needs to give man an all-embracing view of the world, a view
rather than a doctrine. Such a view will first of all encompass
a general panorama of history, economics, and politics. This
panorama itself is the foundation of the power of propaganda
because it provides justification for the actions of those who make
propaganda; the point is to show that one travels in the direction
of history and progress. That panorama allows the individual to
give the proper classification to all the news items he receives; to
exercise a critical judgment, to sharply accentuate certain facts
21 know, of course, that It is fashionable today to deny the existence of “superior,*'
“inferior,” and “average” men. That argument is generally factitious, and even its
proponents usually follow up by analyzing the psycho-sociology of man, describing
certain behavior as and using the statistical method.
Propaganda i147
and suppress others, depending on how well they fit into the
framework. This is a necessary protection against being flooded
with facts without being able to establish a perspective.
Propaganda must also furnish an explanation for all happenings,
a key to understand the whys and the reasons for economic and
political developments. News loses its frightening character when
it offers information for which the listener already has a ready
explanation in his mind, or for which he can easily find one. The
great force of propaganda lies in giving modem man all-
embracing, simple explanations and massive, doctrinal causes,
without which he could not live with the news. Man is doubly
reassured by propaganda: first, because it tells him the reasons
behind the developments which unfold, and second, because it
promises a solution for all the problems that arise, which would
otherwise seem insoluble.
Just as information is necessary for awareness, propaganda is
necessary to prevent this awareness from being desperate.
The Subjective Situation
Some psychological characteristics of modem man, partly re-
sults of his reality situation, also explain his irrepressible need
for propaganda. Most studies on propaganda merely examine how
the propagandist can use this or that trait or tendency of a man
to influence him. But it seems to us that a prior question needs to
be examined: Why does a man involuntarily provoke the propa-
ganda operation?
Without going into the theory of the “mass man” or the “organi-
zation man,” which is unproven and debatable, let us recall
some frequently analyzed traits of the man who lives in the
Western world and is plunged into its overcrowded population;
let us accept as a premise that he is more susceptible to sug-
gestion, more credulous, more easily excited. Above all he is a
victim of emptiness—he is a man devoid of meaning. He is very
busy, but he is emotionally empty, open to all entreaties and in
search of only one thing—something to fill his inner void. To
fill this void he goes to the movies—only a very temporary remedy.
He seeks some deeper and more fulfilling attraction. He is avail-
able, and ready to listen to propaganda. He is the lonely man (The
Lonely Crowd), and the larger the crowd in which he lives, the
more isolated he is. Despite the pleasure he might derive from
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
148)
his solitude, he suffers deeply from it. He feels the most violent
need to be re-integrated into a community, to have a setting, to
experience ideological and affective communication. That loneli-
ness inside the crowd is perhaps the most terrible ordeal of
modem man; that loneliness in which he can share nothing, talk
to nobody, and expect nothing from anybody, leads to severe
personality disturbances. For it, propaganda, encompassing
Human Relations, is an incomparable remedy. It corresponds to
the need to share, to be a member of a community, to lose oneself
in a group, to embrace a collective ideology that will end loneli-
ness. Propaganda is the true remedy for loneliness. It also cor-
responds to deep and constant needs, more developed today,
perhaps, than ever before: the need to believe and obey, to create
and hear fables, to communicate in the language of myths. It
also responds to man’s intellectual sloth and desire for security—
intrinsic characteristics of the real man as distinguished from the
theoretical man of the Existentialists. All this turns man against
information, which cannot satisfy any of these needs, and leads
him to crave propaganda, which can satisfy them.
This situation has another aspect. In our society, man is being
pushed more and more into passivity. He is thrust into vast
organizations which function collectively and in which each man
has his own small part to play. But he cannot act on his own;
he can act only as the result of somebody else’s decision. Man
is more and more trained to participate in group movements and
to act only on signal and in the way he has been taught. There
is training for big and small matters—training for his job, for
the driver and the pedestrian, for the consumer, for the movie-
goer, for the apartment house dweller, and so on. The consumer
gets his signal from the advertiser that the purchase of some
product is desirable; the driver learns from the green light that
he may proceed. The individual becomes less and less capable of
acting by himself; he needs the collective signals which integrate
his actions into the complete mechanism. Modem life induces
us to wait until we are told to act. Here again propaganda comes
to the rescue. To the extent that government can no longer func-
tion without the mass (as we have demonstrated above), propa-
ganda is the signal to act, the bridge from the individual’s
mere interest in politics to his political action. It serves to over-
come collective passivity. It enters into the general current of
Propaganda i149
society, which develops multiple conditioned reflexes, which in
turn become signals for man to play his part in the group.
At the same time, the individual feds himself diminished. For
one thing, he gets the feeling that he is under constant supervision
and can never exercise his independent initiative; for another,
he thinks he is always being pushed down to a lower level. He
is a minor in that he can never act with his full authority. To
be sure, we re talking of the average man; obviously a corporation
president, high-level administrator, or professional man does not
feel diminished, but that fact does not change the general situ-
ation. The feeling of being unimportant stems from general work-
ing conditions, such as mechanization and regimentation; from
housing conditions, with small rooms, noise, and lack of privacy;
from family conditions, with loss of authority over children; from
submission to an ever-growing number of authorities (no one
will ever be able to assess fully the disastrous effect on the
human soul of all the bureaus and agencies); in short, from
participation in mass society. We know that the individual
plunged into the mass experiences a feeling of being reduced and
weakened. He loses his human rights and the means to satisfy
his ambitions. The multitudes around him oppress him and give
him an unhealthy awareness of his own unimportance. He is
drowned in the mass, and becomes convinced that he is only a
cipher and that he really cannot be considered otherwise in such
a large number of individuals. Urban life gives a feeling of weak-
ness and dependence to the individual: he is dependent on
everything—public transportation, the tax-collector, the police-
man, his employer, the city’s public utilities. Separately, these
elements would not affect him, but combined they produce
this feeling of diminution in modem man.
But man cannot stand being unimportant; he cannot accept the
status of a cipher. He needs to assert himself, to see himself as
a hero. He needs to feel he is somebody and to be considered as
such. He needs to express his authority, the drive for power and
domination that is in every man. Under our present conditions,
that instinct is completely frustrated. Though some routes of
escape exist—the movies give the viewer a chance to experience
self-esteem by identification with the hero, for example—that is
not enough. Only propaganda provides the individual with a fully
satisfactory response to his profound need.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
150)
The more his needs increase in the collective society, the more
propaganda must give man the feeling that he is a free individual.
Propaganda alone can create this feeling, which, in turn, will
integrate the individual into collective movements. Thus, it is a
powerful boost to his self-esteem. Though a mass instrument, it
addresses itself to each individual. It appeals to me. It appeals to
my common sense, my desires, and provokes my wrath and my
indignation. It evokes my feelings of justice and my desire for
freedom. It gives me violent feelings, which lift me out of the
daily grind. As soon as I have been politicized by propaganda,
I can from my heights look down on daily trifles. My boss, who
does not share my convictions, is merely a poor fool, a prey to the
illusions of an evil world. I take my revenge upon him by being
enlightened; I have understood the situation and know what
ought to be done; I hold the key to events and am involved
in dangerous and exciting activities. This feeling will be all the
stronger when propaganda appeals to my decision and seems
to be greatly concerned with my action: “Everything is in the
clutches of evil. There is a way out. But only if everybody
participates. You must participate. If you don’t, all will be lost,
through your fault.” This is the feeling that propaganda must
generate. My opinion, which society once scorned, now becomes
important and decisive. No longer has it importance only for me,
but also for the whole range of political affairs and the entire
social body. A voter may well feel that his vote has no importance
or value. But propaganda demonstrates that the action in which it
involves us is of fundamental importance, and that everything
depends on me. It boosts my ego by giving me a strong sense
of my responsibility; it leads me to assume a posture of authority
among my fellows, makes me take myself seriously by appealing
to me in impassioned tones, with total conviction, and gives me
the feeling that it's a question of All or Nothing. Thanks to such
propaganda, the diminished individual obtains the very satisfac-
tion he needs.
Propaganda in colonial countries plays on this same need of
diminished peoples for self-assertion. Africans are even more
susceptible to almost any propaganda, because they lived under
the guardianship of their colonizers and were reduced to a
position of inferiority. But one must not conclude that a feeling
of inferiority is to be found only in the oppressed; it is the normal
Propaganda (151
condition of almost every person in a mass society. Also, to the
extent that modem man is diminished, he finds himself faced
with the almost constant need for repression. Most of his natural
tendencies are suppressed by social constraints.
We live in an increasingly organized and ordered society which
permits less and less free and spontaneous expression of mans
profound drives (which, it must be admitted, would be largely
anti-social if completely unleashed). Modem man is tied to a
timetable and rarely can act on the spur of the moment; he must
pay constant attention to what goes on around him. He cannot
make the noise he may want to make; he must obey a growing
number of rules of all sorts; he cannot give free reign to his
sexual instinct or his inclination to violence. For despite present-
day “immorality," of which people complain, contemporary man
is much less free in these matters than was the man of the six-
teenth and seventeenth century. And in the world of politics,
modem man constantly faces obstacles which suppress his ten-
dencies and impulses. But it is impossible to keep die individual
in such a situation for long.
The individual who feels himself in conflict with the group,
whose personal values are different from those of his milieu, who
feels tension toward his society and even toward the group in
which he participates—that individual is in a tragic situation
in modern society. Until recendy, such an individual enjoyed a
certain freedom, a certain independence, which allowed him to
release his tension in external—and quite acceptable—actions.
He had a circle of personal activities through which he could
express his own values and live out his conflicts. That was the
best way of maintaining his equilibrium. But in the technological
society, the individual no longer has either the independence or
the choice of activities sufficient to release his tensions properly.
He is forced to keep them inside himself. Under such conditions
the tension becomes extreme and can cause illness. At that very
moment propaganda will intervene as the (fake) instrument for
reducing these tensions by external action.8 To seal all oudets
and suppress man in all areas is dangerous. Man needs to express
8 It is well known to what extent modem man needs escape. Escape is a general
phenomenon of our civilization because man has to battle against far too many
contradictions and tensions imposed on him by the conditions of life. He seeks to
flee these difficulties, and is encouraged to do so by the contemporary ideology of
happiness. Propaganda offers him an extraordinary possibility of escape into action.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
1S2)
his passions and desires; collective social repression can have the
same effect as individual repression, which is the concern of
psychoanalysts. Either sublimation or release is necessary. On
the collective level, the latter is easier than the former, though
some of the most oppressed groups were the most easily led
to acts of heroism and sacrifice for the benefit of their oppressors.
In the need for release we find some spontaneous expression;
surely, jazz is a means, for many young people, of releasing re-
pressed impulses, and so are violent displays (James Dean, black
leather jackets, the rebellion in Sweden in 1957, and so on.)
But whereas these possibilities of release are very limited, prop-
aganda offers release on a grand scale. For example, propaganda
will permit what so far was prohibited, such as hatred, which is
a dangerous and destructive feeling and fought by society. But
man always has a certain need to hate, just as he hides in his
heart the urge to kill. Propaganda offers him an object of hatred,
for all propaganda is aimed at an enemy.4 And the hatred it offers
him is not shameful, evil hatred that he must hide, but a legitimate
hatred, which he can justly feel. Moreover, propaganda points
out enemies that must be slain, transforming crime into a praise-
worthy act. Almost every man feels a desire to kill his neighbor,
but this is forbidden, and in most cases the individual will refrain
from it for fear of the consequences. But propaganda opens the
door and allows him to kill the Jews, the bourgeois, the Commu-
nists, and so on, and such murder even becomes an achievement.
Similarly, in the nineteenth century, when a man felt like cheating
on his wife, or divorcing her, he found this was frowned on. So,
at the end of that century a propaganda appeared that legitimized
adultery and divorce. In such cases the individual attaches him-
self passionately to the source of such propaganda, which, for him,
provides liberation. Where transgression becomes virtue, the lifter
of the ban becomes a hero, a demi-god, and we consecrate our-
selves to serve him because he has liberated our repressed
passions. A good deal of popular allegiance to the republic and
of the failure of Catholicism in France at the end of the nine-
teenth century can be traced to this battle over adultery and
divorce.
Propaganda can also provide release through devious channels.
4 Propaganda thus displaces and liberates feelings of aggression by offering specific
objects of hatred to the citizen; this generally suffices to channelize passion.
Propaganda (153
Authoritarian regimes know that people held very firmly in hand
need some decompression, some safety valves. The government
offers these itself. This role is played by satirical journals attacking
the authorities, yet tolerated by the dictator (for example,
Krokodil),5 or by a wild holiday set aside for ridiculing the
regime, yet paid for by the dictator (for example, the Friday
of Sorrows in Guatemala). Clearly, such instruments are con-
trolled by the regime. They serve the function of giving the peo-
ple the impression that they are free, and of singling out those
about to be purged by the government as guilty of all that the
people dislike. Thus these instruments of criticism serve to con-
solidate power and make people cling even more to the regime
by providing artificial release of tendencies that the state must
keep in check. In such situations, propaganda has an almost
therapeutic and compensatory function.
This role is even more prominent in the presence of another
phenomenon: anxiety. Anxiety is perhaps the most widespread
psychological trait in our society. Many studies indicate that
fear is one of the strongest and most prevalent feelings in our
society. Of course, man has good reasons to be afraid—of Com-
munist subversion, revolution, Fascism, H-bombs, conflict be-
tween East and West, unemployment, sickness. On the one hand,
the number of dangers is increasing and, because of the news
media, man is more aware of them; on the other, religious beliefs,
which allowed man to face fear, have disappeared almost en-
tirely. Man is disarmed in the face of the perils threatening him,
and is increasingly alarmed by these perils because he keeps
reading about them. For example, the many medical articles on
illnesses in the major papers are disastrous because they attract
mans attention to the presence of illness: information provokes
5 Self-criticism in the Soviet Union is well known. It is used to denounce short-
comings and errors of persons and institutions. It is also the means for control of
the bureaucracy. But it particularly serves the purpose of relaxing tensions, channel-
izing aggressive tendencies, and responding to the “poor slob” (lampiste) who
addresses himself to the government. Thus expressed, criticism ceases to endanger
the government and the social order. The bureaucrat becomes the scapegoat and
the Party remains above reproach. The same operation is found in the use of
letters from readers. It is one of the best propaganda operations: the more criticism
of the bureaucrat is permitted, the more the citizen is tied to the government. This
practice was greatly expanded by Khrushchev. It is not a matter of liberalization,
but of integrating the individual in society and consolidating the power of the
State. It is the same method as that of counseling in American Human Relations
practices.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
154)
fear. This largely explains why the dominant fears in our society
are “social” fears, tied to such collective and general phenomena
as political situations, much more dominant than such individual
fears as those of death or of ghosts. But fear tied to a real threat
and of a degree proportionate to that threat is not anxiety.
Karen Homey was right in stating that an essential difference
between fear and anxiety is that anxiety is a reaction dispropor-
tionate to the actual danger or a reaction to an imaginary danger.
She was also right in pointing out that anxiety is actually tied to
the conditions of our civilization, though the dangers to which a
person responds with anxiety may remain hidden from him. The
anxiety may be proportionate to the situation, but it still may
be experienced for unknown reasons.
With regard to real and conscious threats, a frequent reaction
is to expand them Tvith fables. Americans create fables about the
Communist peril, just as the Communists create fables about the
Fascist peril—and at that moment anxiety sets in. It is tied to
rumors, to the fact that the real situation is inassessable, to the
diffuse climate of fear, and to the ricocheting of fear from one
person to the next.
However that may be, anxiety exists and spreads. It is irra-
tional, and any attempt to calm it with reason or facts must fail.
To demonstrate factually in a climate of anxiety that the feared
danger is much smaller than it is believed to be, only increases
anxiety; the information is used to prove that there is reason for
fear. Of course, in psychoanalysis anxiety is often regarded as
the source of neurosis. But, as we maintain here that anxiety is
a collective phenomenon affecting a very large number of in-
dividuals in our society, we do not want to say that all these
people are neurotics in the clinical sense. Anxiety provoked by
social conflicts or political threats rarely goes so far as to cause
neurosis. But such a progression is not impossible; we will simply
say that individuals find themselves in a situation in which
neurosis is a constant possibility. And neurosis can actually be-
come collective when some event throws a whole group into
frenzied anxiety or irrational considerations.
Man also feels himself the prey of the hostile impulses of
others, another source of anxiety. Besides, he is plunged into
conflicts inherent in our society which place him in conflict with
himself, or rather place his experiences in conflict with the social
Propaganda (i55
imperatives. Karen Homey has described some of these conflicts,
but many more exist. Aside from the conflict between the govern-
ment's proclaimed respect for our needs and their frustration
in reality, between the advertised freedom and the real con-
straints, peace is worshipped in societies that prepare for war,
culture is spread that cannot be absorbed, and so on. The ex-
perience of contradiction is certainly one of the prevalent experi-
ences in our society. But man cannot endure contradiction; anxiety
results, and man struggles to resolve the contradiction in order
to dissolve his anxiety.
Finally, as a result of all the threats and contradictions in
contemporary society, man feels accused, guilty. He cannot feel
that he is right and good as long as he is exposed to contra-
dictions, which place him in conflict with one of his group's
imperatives no matter which solution he adopts. But one of man's
greatest inner needs is to feel that he is right. This need takes
several forms. First, man needs to be right in his own eyes. He
must be able to assert that he is right, that he does what he should,
that he is worthy of his own respect. Then, man needs to be right
in the eyes of those around him, his family, his milieu, his
co-workers, his friends, his country. Finally, he feels the need
to belong to a group, which he considers right and which he can
proclaim as just, noble, and good. But that righteousness is not
absolute righteousness, true and authentic justice. What matters
is not to be just, or to act just, or that the group to which one
belongs is just—but to seem just, to find reasons for asserting that
one is just, and to have these reasons shared by one's audience.
This corresponds to man's refusal to see reality—his own
reality first of all—as it is, for that would be intolerable; it also
corresponds to his refusal to acknowledge that he may be wrong.
Before himself and others, man is constantly pleading his own case
and working to find good reasons for what he does or has done.
Of course, the whole process is unconscious.6
Such justification corresponds at least partly to what American
psychologists call rationalization, f.e., the search for good reasons.
But rationalization covers less territory than justification. Ra-
tionalization occurs when the individual is prey to the difficulties 8
8 The individual reconstructs his past to demonstrate that his conduct was right.
But this is justification rather than explanation of behavior. Man thus lives in seem-
ingly reasonable fiction.
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
156)
of social life. The collision with various groups and other in-
dividuals provokes tension, conflicts, frustrations, failures, and
anxieties for which man has a low tolerance. He tries to avoid all
this, but cannot. He therefore gives himself excuses and good
reasons for avoiding the disagreeable consequences of such con-
flicts, or fabricates a conclusion, which explains his failure and
gives it the appearance of success ("sour grapes”); or he justifies
everything by creating a scapegoat, or justifies his conduct by
showing that the other party is to blame (racial prejudice), and
so forth. Clearly, the individual believes the reasons he gives,
all the more so as these reasons are "good” to the extent that they
are shared by a large number of people, if not by everybody.
The individual who justifies himself is always scandalized if told
that the reasons he gives for his conduct are false, that he has
acted for other reasons, and that his explanations are only
embroideries to make his conduct acceptable and to win praise
for it.
This need seems abnormal. On the individual level, it is often
considered pathological, because it shows a dissociation from the
self. But in reality this judgment was discarded because of its
moral implications, the process involved being nothing other than
hypocrisy. It was then concluded that there is nothing patho-
logical in this need—for two reasons. The first is the universality
of the phenomenon. Practically everybody justifies himself all the
time, to himself and to his group, and it is difficult to call a
general attitude pathological. The second is the usefulness of the
process: it is generally accepted nowadays that in his psychic
life man automatically finds what is useful for him and permits
him to exercise "economies.” Justification is undeniably useful.
Through justification man not only defends himself against ten-
sions and anxieties, transforming failure into success, but also
asserts his sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice. Often
a man’s true beliefs are revealed only through this channel
(justification).
Such hypocrisy has another use: it permits man to cast off some
of his inhibitions without having to assert anti-moral or anti-social
convictions publicly. Whereas inhibited behavior is damaging
to society, an overloud declaration of immoral or asocial con-
victions is damaging too. Here we encounter the old problem:
Is it better to behave badly and hide it, as in 1900, or to behave
Propaganda (157
badly and advertise it, as in i960 (taking into account that the
man of i960 uses different Justifications)? The process of justifi-
cation is thus found everywhere because of its great utility.
On the collective level one can say that most ideologies and
political or economic theories are justifications. A study by M.
Rubel7 has shown that Marx's rigid and seemingly uncom-
promising doctrine was one gigantic intellectual justification for
sentimental and spontaneous positions taken by him in his youth.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to accept reality as it is and
acknowledge the true reasons for our behavior, or to see clearly
the motivations of a group to which we belong. If we practice a
profession, we cannot limit ourselves to its financial rewards; we
must also invest it with idealistic or moral justification. It becomes
our calling, and we will not tolerate its being questioned. Even
the most pragmatic, such as the Nazis, try to give their actions
moral or social justification: for example, the concern for main-
taining the superiority of the Aryan race justified the sadism of
the concentration camps. Even the greatest materialists, such as
the Communists, try to justify themselves with ideals: for example,
humanitarian interests will justify a certain tactic. In the conflict
between necessity and moral or religious imperatives, everybody
covers himself with the cloak of rationalization to assert that no
conflict exists. When a man obeys necessity, he wants to prove
that such is not the case and that he really obeys his conscience.
On the day when the draft is introduced, everybody discovers he
has a fervent love for his country. On the day when Stalin allies
himself with Hitler, the Communists discover the excellence of
German Socialism. And on the day when the Hungarian Govern-
ment forces the Christian Church to make peace propaganda, the
Church discovers voluntarily that peace is a Christian virtue.
Obviously, the prodigious universality of justification makes it
so effective: the man who justifies himself and unconsciously plays
this farce not only believes it himself but also has the need for
others to believe it. And, in fact, the others do believe it, because
they use the same rationalizations and become accomplices of
the play in which they are themselves actors. Justification really
attains its effectiveness only on the basis of this complicity, which
is so all-pervasive that even those who are the victims of justifica-
7 Karl Marx, Essai de biographie inteUectuelle, 1957-
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
158)
tion go along with it. For example, the racist justifies his prejudice
by saying that the “inferior” group is lazy, anti-social, immoral,
biologically inferior; and in many instances members of the
stigmatized group will accept such judgments and experience a
feeling of inferiority that will justify discrimination in their own
eyes. That is because they, too, use justifications on other levels.
The tremendous diversity of these personal and collective justi-
fications derives from three sources. First, the traditional explana-
tions transmitted to us by the group to which we belong and
instilled in us through school and so forth. For example, the
judgment of the worker by the bourgeoisie, which goes back to
1815 and is carefully transmitted from generation to generation:
“The worker is a lazy brute and a drunk.” Or take France’s mission
to “spread civilization,” used to justify colonialism. Second, there
are the rationalizations which we ourselves fabricate sponta-
neously. These usually deal with our own conduct rather than with
that of the group.
What interests us most here is the third type of rationalizations,
which are both individual and collective, which deal with new
situations and unforeseen necessities, and to which traditional
solutions do not apply. These rationalizations are the fruit of
propaganda. Propaganda attaches itself to man and forces him to
play its game because of his overpowering need to be right and
just. In every situation propaganda hands him the proof that he,
personally, is in the right, that the action demanded of him is just,
even if he has the dark, strong feeling that it is not. Propaganda
appeases his tensions and resolves his conflicts. It offers facile,
ready-made justifications, which are transmitted by society and
easily believed. At the same time, propaganda has the freshness
and novelty which correspond to new situations and give man the
impression of having invented new ideals. It provides man with a
high ideal that permits him to give in to his passions while seeming
to accomplish a great mission. It is precisely when propaganda
furnishes man with these justifications, at once individual and
collective, that propaganda is most effective. We are not talking
here of a simple explanation but of a more profound rationaliza-
tion, thanks to which man finds himself in full accord with his
group and with society, and fully adjusted to his environment, as
well as purged, at the same time, of his pangs of conscience and
personal uncertainty.
Propaganda (159
Man, eager for self-justification, throws himself in the direction
of a propaganda that justifies him and thus eliminates one of the
sources of his anxiety. Propaganda dissolves contradictions and
restores to man a unitary world in which the demands are in
accord with the facts. It gives man a clear and simple call to
action that takes precedence over all else. It permits him to par-
ticipate in the world around him without being in conflict with it,
because the action he has been called upon to perform will surely
remove all obstacles from the path of realizing the proclaimed
ideal.
Here, propaganda plays a completely idealistic role, by involv-
ing a man caught in the world of reality and making him live by
anticipation in a world based on principle. From then on man no
longer sees contradiction as a threat to himself or as a distortion of
his personality: the contradiction, through propaganda, becomes
an active source of conquest and combat. He is no longer alone
when trying to solve his conflicts, but is plunged into a collective
on the march, which is always “at the point” of solving all conflicts
and leading man and his world to a satisfying monism. One is
always at the point of finishing the war—in Algeria or Vietnam
or the Congo, of overtaking the United States, of repelling the
Communist threat, of eliminating all frustrations.
Finally, propaganda also eliminates anxieties stemming from
irrational and disproportionate fears, for it gives man assurances
equivalent to those formerly given him by religion. It offers him a
simple and clear explanation of the world in which he lives—to
be sure, a false explanation far removed from reality, but one
that is obvious and satisfying. It hands him a key with which
he can open all doors; there is no more mystery; everything can
be explained, thanks to propaganda. It gives him special glasses
through which he can look at present-day history and clearly
understand what it means. It hands him a guide line with which
he can recover the general line running through all incoherent
events. Now the world ceases to be hostile and menacing. The
propagandee experiences feelings of mastery over and lucidity
toward this menacing and chaotic world, all the more because
propaganda provides him with a solution for all threats and a
posture to assume in the face of them. Crowds go mad when they
no longer know what posture to assume toward a threat. Propa-
ganda provides the perfect posture with which to place the adver-
THE NECESSITY FOR PROPAGANDA
l6o)
sary at a disadvantage. There is no question here of reassuring the
people or of demonstrating the reality of a situation to them; noth-
ing could upset them more. The point is to excite them, to arouse
their sense of power, their desire to assert themselves, and to arm
them psychologically so that they can feel superior to the threat.
And the man who seeks to escape his strangling anxiety by any
means will feel miraculously delivered as soon as he can partici-
pate in the campaign mounted by propaganda, as soon as he can
dive into this liberating activity, which resolves his inner conflicts
by making him think that he is helping to solve those of society.
For all these reasons contemporary man needs propaganda; he
asks for it; in fact, he almost instigates it. The development of
propaganda is no accident. The politician who uses it is not a mon-
ster; he fills a social demand. Tlie propagandee is a close accom-
plice of the propagandist. Only with the propagandee’s
unconscious complicity can propaganda fulfill its function; and
because propaganda satisfies him—even if he protests against
propaganda in abstracto, or considers himself immune to it—he
follows its route.
We have demonstrated that propaganda, far from being an
accident, performs an indispensable function in society. One
always tries to present propaganda as something accidental, un-
usual, exceptional, connected with such abnormal conditions as
wars. True, in such cases propaganda may become sharper and
more crystalized, but the roots of propaganda go much deeper.
Propaganda is the inevitable result of the various components of
the technological society, and plays so central a role in the life of
that society that no economic or political development can take
place without the influence of its great power. Human Relations
in social relationships, advertising or Human Engineering in the
economy, propaganda in the strictest sense in the field of politics
—the need for psychological influence to spur allegiance and
action is everywhere the decisive factor, which progress demands
and which the individual seeks in order to be delivered from his
own self.
CHAPTER
CM
PSYCHOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF
PROPAGANDA
Let us begin by examining what psychological effects propa-
ganda operations have on the individual. Aside from the effects
that the propagandist seeks to obtain directly—a persons vote,
for example—his psychological manipulations evoke certain
forces in the unconscious and traumatize the individual in various
ways. A person subjected to propaganda does not remain intact
or undamaged: not only will his opinions and attitudes be modi-
fied, but also his impulses and his mental and emotional struc-
tures. Propaganda's effect is more than external; it produces
profound changes.
One must also distinguish between different effects produced
by different media. Each has its own effects on attitudes or opin-
ions, whether the propagandist purposely provokes them or not
When a man goes to the movies, he receives certain impressions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
162)
and his inner life is modified independently of all propaganda.
Such psychological effects or changes of opinion, specific to each
of the communications media, join those specifically produced by
propaganda operations. To analyze where one ends and the other
begins is very difficult. If one looks at a propaganda campaign
conducted by radio, it is almost impossible to divide its effects
into those produced by the campaign and those produced by
radio broadcasts in general. Many monographs have been written
on the basic effects—independent of propaganda—of the press,
radio, and TV, but the effects are also present when those media
are used for propaganda. The propagandist cannot separate the
general and specific effects. When he launches a radio campaign,
he knows that the effects of his campaign and the effects of radio
broadcasts in general will be combined. And, as each medium has
specific and partial effects, the propagandist will be tempted to
combine them because they complement one another. Thus, the
propagandist orchestrates.
To study the psychological effects of propaganda, one would
therefore have to study the effects of each of the communications
media separately, and then the effects of their combination with
the specific propaganda techniques. We cannot do this here, but
the reader should at all times keep in mind this complementary
character of propaganda.
Psychological Crystallization
Under the influence of propaganda certain latent drives that
are vague, unclear, and often without any particular objective
suddenly become powerful, direct, and precise. Propaganda fur-
nishes objectives, organizes the traits of an individual's person-
ality into a system, and freezes them into a mold. For example,
prejudices that exist about any event become greatly reinforced
and hardened by propaganda; the individual is told that he is
right in harboring diem; he discovers reasons and justifications for
a prejudice when it is clearly shared by many and proclaimed
openly.1 Moreover, the stronger the conflicts in a society, the
stronger the prejudices, and propaganda that intensifies conflicts
simultaneously intensifies prejudices in this very fashion.
Once propaganda begins to utilize and direct an individual's
1 Much more, this hardening of an individual's prejudices permits him to resist
facts and the pressure of contrary events.
Propaganda (163
hatreds, he no longer has any chance to retreat, to reduce his
animosities, or to seek reconciliations with his opponents. More-
over, he now has a supply of ready-made judgments where he
had only some vague notions before the propaganda set in; and
those judgments permit him to face any situation. He will never
again have reason to change judgments that he will thereafter
consider the one and only truth.
In this fashion, propaganda standardizes current ideas,3 hard-
ens prevailing stereotypes, and furnishes thought patterns in all
areas. Thus it codifies social, political, and moral standards.8 Of * *
2 Propaganda gives the individual the stereotypes he no longer takes the trouble to
work out for himself; it furnishes these in the form of labels, slogans, ready-made
judgments. It transforms ideas into slogans, and by giving the "Word,” convinces
the individual that he has an opinion.
* Symbols are related to the psychological phenomenon of the stereotype. A stereo-
type is a seeming value judgment, acquired by belonging to a group, without any
intellectual labor, and reproducing itself automatically with each specific stimulation.
The stereotype arises from feelings one has for one’s own group, or against the
"out-group." Man attaches himself passionately to the values represented by his
group and rejects the cliches of the out-group. "To share the prejudices of a group
is only to demonstrate one's affiliation to this group. Stereotypes correspond to
situations which the individual occupies in society, to his groups and his metier.”
The stereotype, Stoetzel says, is a "genuine category ... a manner of thinking, of
interpreting experience, of behaving”—but founded solely on affective reactions.
The stereotype is specific: it relates to a given name or image, which must be
precise in order for the stereotype to work. (Jean Stoetzel: Esquisse (Tune thSorie
des opinions [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France; 1943], pp. 311 ff.)
The stereotype, which is stable, helps man to avoid thinking, to take a personal
position, to form his own opinion. Man reacts constantly, as if by reflex, in the
presence of the stimulus evoking the stereotype. This reflex permits him to have a
ready-made, though apparently spontaneous, opinion in any situation; in fact, it
gives him the sense of a situation; and with regard to an ethical problem the
stereotype is the criterion of values. It is usually formed in a limited group, but
tends to develop, to extend itself to an entire collective. It is endowed with a force
of expansion; moreover, it gradually detaches itself from the primordial images that
have aroused it and takes on a life of its own.
In propaganda, existing stereotypes are awakened by symbols. The symbol
permits the formation of a favorable response that can be transferred to persons and
objects associated with it. To ask a group what it thinks of some sentence written
by Victor Hugo, results in the Hugo stereotype; but to ask their opinion of the same
sentence without giving the author, evokes no stereotype and elicits a very dif-
ferent opinion.
In a bourgeois milieu the proposition "Communism desires Justice” provokes an
unfavorable reaction. But the reaction is favorable among parties that stress justice.
Here the stereotype "Justice” wins out; in the former case it is the stereotype
"Communism” that is dominant.
If we adopt Lasswell’s analysis, we can divide symbols into three categories.
There are symbols of demand, which express the aspirations of a group seeking to
produce events. Then symbols of identification, which define the protagonist who
acts for us, or the antagonist against whom we act. Finally, symbols of expectation,
which present facts as immediate or future objectives, but facts that are, in reality,
abstracts of themselves and have become simple symbols.
The use of symbols divides the individual conscience against itself. Effective
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
164)
course, man needs to establish such standards and categories.4
The difference is that propaganda gives an overwhelming force to
the process: man can no longer modify his judgments and
thought patterns. This force springs, on the one hand, from the
character of the media employed, which give the appearance of
objectivity to subjective impulses, and, on the other, from every-
body's adherence to the same standards and prejudices.8
At the same time, these collective beliefs, which the individual
assumes to be his own, these scales of values and stereotypes,
which play only a small part in the psychological life of a person
unaffected by propaganda, become big and important; by the
propaganda uses multiple symbols linked in such a way that some evoke known
images and appeal to the conscience, whereas others violate the conscience and tend
to destroy it or deny it. The symbol is an effective instrument for progressively
separating the individual from primitive impulses, from his natural attitudes, and for
creating “counter-attitudes” and "counter-behaviors.” By this procedure, propaganda
succeeds in weakening the individual’s conscience and consciousness and in unset-
tling individual attitudes during a period of transition with a view to furnishing
them with a new content. One does not, for example, destroy symbols of authority
in order to substitute an attitude of independence; one replaces them with new
symbols of authority. But this use of symbols presumes a very advanced propa-
ganda. It is what we find, for example, in Stalinist propaganda.
At a much more elementary stage, all symbols have the purpose of awakening
stereotypes, an appropriate function because by their nature they already unite
the emotional and the intellectual life.
This function is served by photos and images, which have a special power to
evoke the reality and immediacy of the stereotype—itself an image, it is fed by
certain other images. The Statue of Liberty, the Arc de Triomphe provoke im-
mediate reactions. The photo carries with it intrinsic qualities of the situation that
it represents; it thereby reinforces the stereotype while stimulating it
Another particularly evocative symbol is the slogan, which contains the demands,
the expectations, the hopes of the mass, and at the same time expresses the estab-
lished values of a group. Slogans determine with considerable precision each type
of group toward which an individual is oriented, whether or not he is a member.
Above all, the slogan assures the continuity of the stereotype, which is fixed
as a function of the past. But the individual finds himself constantly faced with
new situations that the stereotype alone does not permit him to master; the slogan
is the connection used by the propagandist to permit the individual to apply his old
stereotypes to a new situation. He brushes up and adjusts the ready-made image;
at the same time, he integrates the new situation into a classic context, familiar and
unconfusing. That is why the slogan flourishes in times of crisis, war, and revolu-
tion. It explains also the attraction the slogan has: thanks to it, the individual is
not intellectually lost. He clings to it not only because the slogan is easy to under-
stand and to retain, but also because it permits him to "find himself in it” It tends,
further, to produce stereotypes in men who did not have them before the crisis
situation.
4 Man works out these simplifications spontaneously in order to avoid effort, error,
and difficult choices.
5 We shall then have what Alfred Sauvy calls an "error by force” or an "effective
error” (erreur force); although the opinion and judgment are incorrect, they be-
come unimpeachable through the strength of collective belief.
Propaganda (165
process of crystallization, these images begin to occupy a person s
entire consciousness, and to push out other feelings and judg-
ments. All truly personal activity on the part of the individual is
diminished, and man finally is filled with nothing but these preju-
dices and beliefs around which all else revolves. In his personal
life, man will eventually judge everything by such crystalized
standards. To return to Stoetzel, public opinion within an indi-
vidual grows as it becomes crystalized through the effects of
propaganda while his private opinion decreases.
Another aspect of crystallization pertains to self-justification for
which man has great need, as we have seen in the preceding
chapter. To the extent that man needs justifications, propaganda
provides them. But whereas his ordinary justifications are fragile
and may always be open to doubts, those furnished by propa-
ganda are irrefutable and solid. The individual believes them and
considers them to be eternal truths. He can throw off all sense of
guilt; he loses all feeling for the harm he might do,® all sense of
responsibility other than the responsibility propaganda instills in
him. Thus he becomes perfectly adapted to objective situations
and nothing can create a split within him.
Through such a process of intense rationalization, propaganda
builds monolithic individuals. It eliminates inner conflicts, ten-
sions, self-criticism, self-doubt. And in this fashion it also builds
a one-dimensional being without depth or range of possibilities.
Such an individual will have rationalizations not only for past
actions, but for the future as well. He marches forward with full
assurance of his righteousness. He is formidable in his equilib-
rium, all the more so because it is very difficult to break his har-
ness of justifications. Experiments made with Nazi prisoners
proved this point.
Tensions are always a threat to the individual, who tries every-
thing to escape them because of his instinct of self-preservation.
Ordinarily the individual will try to reduce his own tensions in
his own way, but in our present society many of these tensions
are produced by the general situation, and such tensions are less
easily reduced. One might almost say that for collective problems
only collective remedies suffice. Here propaganda renders spec-
tacular service: by making man live in a familiar climate of opin- •
• On the contrary, he attributes to the enemy exactly the atrocities that he himself
is in the process of committing.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
166)
ion and by manipulating his symbols, it reduces tensions. Propa-
ganda eliminates one of the causes of tension by driving man
straight into such a climate of opinion. This greatly simplifies his
life and gives him stability, much security, and a certain satis-
faction.
At the same time, this crystallization closes his mind to all new
ideas. The individual now has a set of prejudices and beliefs, as
well as objective justifications. His entire personality now re-
volves around those elements. Every new idea will therefore be
troublesome to his entire being. He will defend himself against it
because it threatens to destroy his certainties. He thus actually
comes to hate everything opposed to what propaganda has made
him acquire.7 Propaganda has created in him a system of opinions
and tendencies which may not be subjected to criticism. That
system leaves no room for ambiguity or mitigation of feelings; the
individual has received irrational certainties from propaganda,
and precisely because they are irrational, they seem to him part
of his personality. He feels personally attacked when these cer-
tainties are attacked. There is a feeling here akin to that of some-
thing sacred. And this genuine taboo prevents the individual from
entertaining any new ideas that might create ambiguity within
him.
Incidentally, this refusal to listen to new ideas usually takes on
an ironic aspect: the man who has been successfully subjected to
a vigorous propaganda will declare that all new ideas are propa-
ganda. To the degree that all his stereotypes, prejudices, and
justifications are the fruit of propaganda, man will be ready to
consider all other ideas as being propaganda and to assert his
distrust in propaganda. One can almost postulate that those who
call every idea they do not share “propaganda” are themselves
almost completely products of propaganda. Their refusal to ex-
amine and question ideas other than their own is characteristic of
their condition.
One might go further and say that propaganda tends to give a
person a religious personality:8 his psychological life is organized
around an irrational, external, and collective tenet that provides
7 What Sauvy calls the "reactions of defense against the destroyer” (of security,
of the myth).
8 All this is of course confirmed by the religious character that propaganda readily
takes on, which tends to create the "sacred” around man and to make him adhere
to "sacred” values.
Propaganda (1 6 7
a scale of values, rules of behavior, and a principle of social inte-
gration. In a society in the process of secularization, propaganda
responds to the religious need, but lends much more vigor and
intransigence to the resulting religious personality, in the pejora-
tive sense of that term (as liberals employed it in the nineteenth
century): a limited and rigid personality that mechanically ap-
plies divine commandments, is incapable of engaging in human
dialogue, and will never question values that it has placed above
the individual. All this is produced by propaganda, which pre-
tends to have lost none of its humanity, to act for the good of
mankind, and to represent the highest type of human being. In
this respect, strict orthodoxies always have been the same.
We may now ask: If propaganda modifies psychological life in
this fashion, will it not eventually lead to neurosis? Karen
Homey9 deserves the credit for having shown that the neurotic
personality is tied to a social structure and a culture (in the
American sense of that term), and that certain neuroses share
certain essential characteristics springing directly from the prob-
lems found in our society. In the face of problems produced by
society, propaganda seems a means of remedying personal de-
ficiencies; at the same time it plunges the individual into a neu-
rotic state. This is apparent from the rigid responses of the
propagandee, his unimaginative and stereotyped attitude, his
sterility with regard to the socio-political process, his inability to
adjust to situations other than those created by propaganda, his
need for strict opposites—black and white, good and bad—his
involvement in unreal conflicts created and blown up by propa-
ganda. To mistake an artificial conflict for a real one is a charac-
teristic of neurosis. So is the tendency of the propagandee to give
everything his own narrow interpretation, to deprive facts of their
real meaning in order to integrate them into his system and give
them an emotional coloration, which the non-neurotic would not
attribute to them.
Similarly, the neurotic anxiously seeks the esteem and affection
of the largest number of people, just as the propagandee can live
only in accord with his comrades, sharing the same reflexes and
judgments with those of his group (subjected to the identical
propaganda). He does not deviate by one iota, for to remove
9 The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton & Company;
1937), Ch. 1.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
168)
himself from the affection of the milieu means profound suffering;
and that affection is tied to a particular external behavior and an
identical response to propaganda. Naturally, what corresponds to
this is the neurotic's hostility toward those who refuse his friend-
ship and those who remain outside his group; the same holds true
for the propagandee.
In the neurotic, the extraordinary need for self-justification
(which resides in everyone and leads him to insincerity) ex-
presses itself in the projection of hostile motives to the outside
world; he feels that destructive impulses do not emanate from
him, but from someone or something outside. He does not want
to fool or exploit others—others want to do that to him; and this
mechanism is reproduced by propaganda with great precision. He
who wants to make war projects this intention onto his enemy;
then the projected intention spreads to the propagandee who is
then being mobilized and prepared for war, whose hostilities are
aroused at the same time as he is made to project his own aggres-
sion onto the enemy. As with the neurotic, the “victim-enemy-
scapegoat” cycle assumes enormous proportions in the mind of the
propagandee, even if we admit that in addition to this process
some legitimate reasons always exist for such reactions.
To sum up: When reading Karen Homey's description of the
neurotic cycle stemming from the neurotic's environment, one
might almost be reading about the cycle typical for the propa-
gandee:
Anxiety, hostility, reduction of self-respect . .. striving for power
... reinforcement of hostility and anxiety ... a tendency to with-
draw in the face of competition, accompanied by tendencies to
self-depreciation . . . failures and disproportion between capabili-
ties and accomplishments . . . reinforcement of feelings of super-
iority . . . reinforcement of grandiose ideas . . . increase of
sensitivity with an inclination to withdraw ... increase of hostility
and anxiety . . .
These responses of the neurotic are identical with those of the
propagandee, even if we take into account that propaganda ulti-
mately eliminates conscious anxiety and tranquilizes the propa-
gandee.
Propaganda
(ie9
Alienation through Propaganda
To be alienated means to be someone other (alienus) than one-
self; it also can mean to belong to someone else. In a more pro-
found sense, it means to be deprived of one's self, to be subjected
to, or even identified with, someone else. That is definitely the
effect of propaganda.1 Propaganda strips the individual, robs him
of part of himself, and makes him live an alien and artificial life,
to such an extent that he becomes another person and obeys im-
pulses foreign to him. He obeys someone else.1 2
Once again, to produce this effect, propaganda restricts itself
to utilizing, increasing, and reinforcing the individual's inclina-
tion to lose himself in something bigger than he is, to dissipate his
individuality, to free his ego of all doubt, conflict, and suffering
—through fusion with others; to devote himself to a great leader
and a great cause. In large groups, man feels united with others,
and he therefore tries to free himself of himself by blending with
a large group. Indeed, propaganda offers him that possibility in
an exceptionally easy and satisfying fashion. But it pushes the
individual into the mass until he disappears entirely.
To begin with, what is it that propaganda makes disappear?
Everything in the nature of critical and personal judgment. Ob-
viously, propaganda limits the application of thought. It limits
the propagandee's field of thought to the extent that it provides
him with ready-made (and, moreover, unreal) thoughts and
stereotypes. It orients him toward very limited ends and pre-
vents him from using his mind or experimenting on his own. It
determines the core from which all his thoughts must derive and
draws from the beginning a sort of guideline that permits neither
criticism nor imagination. More precisely, his imagination will
lead only to small digressions from the fixed line and to only
slightly deviant, preliminary responses within the framework. In
this fashion we see the progressives make some “variations”
around the basic propaganda tenets of the Communist party. But
the field of such variations is strictly limited.
The acceptance of this line, of such ends and limitations, pre-
1 Consider the role assigned by the Communist Party to propaganda: it must change
the very conscience of the Soviet citizen; and we find the same idea in Mao.
2 But, as we have often recalled, “the persons subjected to propaganda do not
consider themselves influenced by it Each thinks that he himself has found 'the
road to truth.'"
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
170)
supposes the suppression of all critical judgment, which in turn is
a result of the crystalization of thoughts and attitudes and the
creation of taboos. As Jules Monnerot has accurately said: All
individual passion leads to the suppression of all critical judgment
with regard to the object of that passion. Beyond that, in the
collective passion created by propaganda, critical judgment dis-
appears altogether, for in no way can there ever be collective
critical judgment. Man becomes incapable of “separation,” of
discernment (the word critical is derived from the Greek krino,
separate). The individual can no longer judge for himself because
he inescapably relates his thoughts to the entire complex of
values and prejudices established by propaganda. With regard to
political situations, he is given ready-made value judgments8 in-
vested with the power of truth by the number of supporters and
the word of experts. The individual has no chance to exercise his
judgment either on principal questions or on their implication;
this leads to the atrophy of a faculty not comfortably exercised
under any conditions.
What the individual loses is never easy to revive. Once personal
judgment and critical faculties have disappeared or have been
atrophied, they will not simply reappear when propaganda
has been suppressed. In fact, we are dealing here with one of
propagandas most durable effects: years of intellectual and
spiritual education would be needed to restore such faculties. The
propagandee, if deprived of one propaganda, will immediately
adopt another; this will spare him the agony of finding himself
vis-k-vis some event without a ready-made opinion, and obliged
to judge it for himself.* 4 At the same time, propaganda presents
facts, judgments, and values in such confusion and with so many
methods that it is literally impossible for the average man to
proceed with discernment. He has neither the intellectual ca-
pacity nor the sources of information. He is therefore forced
either to accept, or reject, everything in toto.
We thus reach the same point via different routes: on the one
hand, propaganda destroys the critical faculty; on the other, it
presents objectives on which that faculty could not be exercised,
and thus renders it useless.
8 Recent events (1962) show, unfortunately, that students and Intellectuals In-
tegrated in propaganda are no more armed with critical judgment than others are.
4 This is one of the reasons why the propagandee, as soon as he is separated from
his group, disintegrates morally. He needs die collective morale in order to exist
Propaganda (171
All tins obviously leads to the elimination of personal judg-
ment, which takes place as soon as the individual accepts public
opinion as his own. When he expresses public opinion in his
words and gestures, he no longer expresses himself, but his so-
ciety, his group. To be sure, the individual always will express
the group, more or less. But in this case he will, express it totally
and in response to a systematic operation.
Moreover, this impersonal public opinion, when produced by
propaganda, is artificial. It corresponds to nothing authentic; yet
it is precisely this artificial opinion that the individual absorbs.
He is filled with it; he no longer expresses his ideas, but those of
his group, and with great fervor at that—it is a propaganda pre-
requisite that he should assert them with firmness and conviction.
He absorbs the collective judgments, the creatures of propa-
ganda; he absorbs them like the nourishment which they have, in
fact, become. He expounds them as his own. He takes a vigorous
stand, begins to oppose others. He asserts himself at the very
moment that he denies his own self without realizing it. When he
recites his propaganda lesson and says that he is thinking for
himself, when his eyes see nothing and his mouth only produces
sounds previously stenciled into his brain, when he says that he
is indeed expressing his judgment—then he really demonstrates
that he no longer thinks at all, ever, and that he does not exist as
a person. When the propagandee tries to assert himself as a living
reality, he demonstrates his total alienation most clearly; for he
shows that he can no longer even distinguish between himself
and society. He is then perfectly integrated, he is the social group,
there is nothing in him not of the group, there is no opinion in him
that is not the group’s opinion. He is nothing except what propa-
ganda has taught him. He is merely a channel that ingests the
truths of propaganda and dispenses them with the conviction that
is the result of his absence as a person. He cannot take a single
step back to look at events under such conditions; there can be
no distance of any kind between him and propaganda.
This mechanism of alienation generally corresponds either to
projection into, and identification with, a hero and leader, or to
a fusion with the mass. These two mechanisms are not mutually
exclusive: When a Hitler Youth projected himself into his Fiihrer,
he entered by that very act into the mass integrated by propa-
ganda. When the young Komsomol surrendered himself to the
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
172)
cult of Stalin’s personality, lie became, at that very moment,
altogether part of the mass. It is important to note that when the
propagandee believes to be expressing the highest ideal of per-
sonality, he is at the lowest point of alienation. Did we not hear
often enough Fascism’s claim that it restored Personality to its
place of honor? But through one channel or another, the same
alienation is produced by any propaganda, for the creation of a
hero is just as much the result of propaganda as is the integration
of an individual in an activated mass. When propaganda makes
the individual participate in a collective movement, it not only
makes him share in an artificial activity, but also evokes in
him a psychology of participation, a “crowd psychology.” This
psychic modification, which automatically takes place in the
presence of other participants, is systematically produced by
propaganda. It is the creation of mass psychology, with man’s
individual psychology integrated into the crowd.
In this process of alienation, the individual loses control and
submits to external impulses; his personal inclinations and tastes
give way to participation in the collective. But that collective will
always be best idealized, patterned, and represented by the hero.
The cult of the hero is the absolutely necessary complement of
the classification of society. We see the automatic creation of this
cult in connection with champion athletes, movie stars, and even
such abstractions as Davy Crockett in the United States and
Canada in 1955. This exaltation of the hero proves that one lives
in a mass society. The individual who is prevented by circum-
stances from becoming a real person, who can no longer express
himself through personal thought or action, who finds his aspira-
tions frustrated, projects onto the hero all he would wish to be.
He lives vicariously and experiences the athletic or amorous or
military exploits of the god with whom he lives in spiritual sym-
biosis. The well-known mechanism of identifying with movie
stars is almost impossible to avoid for the member of modem
society who comes to admire himself in the person of the hero.
There he reveals the powers of which he unconsciously dreams,
projects his desires, identifies himself with this success and that
adventure. The hero becomes model and father, power and
mythical realization of all that the individual cannot be.8 5 *
5 At the same time the interests of the hero become the personal interests of the
propagandee.
Propaganda (173
Propaganda uses all these mechanisms, but actually does even
more to reinforce, stabilize, and spread them. The propagandee is
alienated and transposed into the person promoted by propa-
ganda (publicity campaigns for movie stars and propaganda
campaigns are almost identical). For this, incidentally, no totali-
tarian organization is needed—such alienation does not take
place merely in the event of a Hitler or a Stalin, but also in that
of a Khrushchev, a Clemenceau, a Coolidge, or a Churchill (the
myth surrounding Coolidge is very remarkable in this respect).
The propagandee finds himself in a psychological situation
composed of the following elements: he lives vicariously, through
an intermediary. He feels, thinks, and acts through the hero. He
is under the guardianship and protection of his living god; he
accepts being a child; he ceases to defend his own interests, for
he knows his hero loves him and everything his hero decides is
for the propagandees own good; he thus compensates for the
rigor of the sacrifices imposed on him. For this reason every
regime that demands a certain amount of heroism must develop
this propaganda of projection onto the hero (leader).
In this connection one can really speak of alienation, and of
regression to an infantile state caused by propaganda. Young is
of the opinion that the propagandee no longer develops intel-
lectually, but becomes arrested in an infantile neurotic pattern;
regression sets in when the individual is submerged in mass
psychology. This is confirmed by Stoetzel, who says that propa-
ganda destroys all individuality, is capable of creating only a
collective personality, and that it is an obstacle to the free devel-
opment of the personality.
Such extensive alienation is by no means exceptional. The
reader may think we have described an extreme, almost patho-
logical case. Unfortunately, he is a common type, even in his
acute state. Everywhere we find men who pronounce as highly
personal truths what they have read in the papers only an hour
before, and whose beliefs are merely the result of a powerful
propaganda. Everywhere we find people who have blind confi-
dence in a political party, a general, a movie star, a country, or
a cause, and who will not tolerate the slightest challenge to that
god. Everywhere we meet people who, because they are filled
with the consciousness of Higher Interests they must serve unto
death, are no longer capable of making the simplest moral or
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
174)
intellectual distinctions or of engaging in the most elementary
reasoning. Yet all this is acquired without effort, experience, re-
flection, or criticism—by the destructive shock effect of well-
made propaganda. We meet this alienated man at every turn, and
are possibly already one ourselves.
Aside from the alienation that takes place when the rational
individual retreats into the irrational collective, there are other
forms of alienation—for example, through the artificial satisfac-
tion of real needs, or the real satisfaction of artificial needs (pub-
licity and advertising).
The first case is the one we have already discussed, in which
propaganda develops from the contemporary sociological situa-
tion in order to give man artificial satisfaction for real needs.
Because man is restless and frustrated, because he understands
nothing of the world in which he lives and acts, because he still
is asked to make very great sacrifices and efforts—because erf all
that, propaganda develops.8 It satisfies man, but with false and
illusory satisfactions. It gives him explanations of the World in
which he lives, but explanations that are mendacious and irra-
tional. It reassures or excites him, but always at the wrong mo-
ment. It makes him tremble with fear of some biological warfare
that never did exist, and makes him believe in the peaceful inten-
tions of countries that have no desire for peace. It gives him
reasons for the sacrifices demanded of him, but not the real rea-
sons. Thus, in 1914, it called on him to lay down his life for his
country, but remained silent on the wars economic causes, for
which he certainly would not have fought.
Propaganda satisfies man’s need for release and certainty, it
eases his tensions and compensates for his frustrations, but with
purely artificial means. If, for example, the worker has reasons—
given his actual economic situation—to feel frustrated, alienated,
or exploited, propaganda, which can really “solve” the workers
problems, as it has already done in the U.S.S.R., alienates him
even more by making him oblivious of his frustration and aliena-
tion, and by calming and satisfying him. When man is subjected
to the abnormal conditions of a big city or a battlefield and has
good reason to feel tense, fearful, and out of step, propaganda 6
6 Goebbels stated expressly that propaganda should reduce frustration, artificially
resolve real problems, announce the frustrations to come when one cannot avoid
them, and so forth.
Propaganda (275
that adjusts him to such conditions and resolves his conflicts
artificially, without changing his situation in the least, is particu-
larly pernicious. Of course, it seems like a cure. But it is like the
cure that would heal the liver of an alcoholic in such a way that
he could continue to get drunk without feeling pain in his liver.
Propaganda’s artificial and unreal answers for modem man’s psy-
chological suffering are precisely of that kind: they allow him to
continue living abnormally under the conditions in which society
places him. Propaganda suppresses the warning signals that his
anxieties, maladjustments, rebellions, and demands once sup-
plied.
All this is also at work when propaganda liberates our deepest
impulses and tendencies, such as our erotic drives, guilt feelings,
and desire for power. But such liberation does not provide true
and genuine satisfaction for such drives, any more than it justifies
our demands and aggressions by permitting us to feel righteous in
spite of them. Man can no more pick the object of his aggression
than he can give free reign to his erotic drive. The satisfactions
and liberations offered by propaganda are ersatz. Their aim is to
provide a certain decompression or to use the shock effect of these
tremendous forces somewhere else, to use them in support of
actions that would otherwise lack impetus. This shows how the
propaganda process deprives the individual of his true person-
ality.
Modem man deeply craves friendship, confidence, close per-
sonal relationships.7 But he is plunged into a world of competi-
tion, hostility, and anonymity. He needs to meet someone whom
he can trust completely, for whom he can feel pure friendship,
and to whom he can mean something in return. That is hard to
find in his daily life, but apparently confidence in a leader, a
hero, a movie star, or a TV personality is much more satisfying.
TV, for example, creates feelings of friendship, a new intimacy,
and thus fully satisfies those needs. But such satisfactions are
purely illusory and fallacious because there is no true friendship
of any kind between the TV personality and the viewer who feels
that personality to be his friend. Here is a typical mendacious
satisfaction of a genuine need. And what TV spontaneously pro-
7 This Is what gives value and effectiveness to the technique of propaganda by
personal contacts (see above, p. 7).
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
176)
duces is systematically exploited by propaganda: the “Little
Father” is always present.
Another example: In 1958 Khrushchev promised the transition
to integrated Communism in the U.S.S.R.; later he declared that
it would be realized very soon. Based on this theme was an entire
irrational propaganda campaign whose principal argument was
that Communism would soon be fully attained because by 1975
the U.S.S.R. would have reached the production level of the
United States—which would mean that the United States would
then be ready to achieve Communism. Incidentally, the year
given by Khrushchev in 1958 for the occurrence of this phenome-
non was 1975, but in April i960, the year he gave was 1980. This
campaign was designed to satisfy the needs of the Soviet masses,
to regain their confidence and appease their demands. What we
see here is a purely theoretical answer, but it satisfies because it
is believed by the masses and thus made true and real by the
mechanism of propaganda.
Let us now look at the other side of the coin. Propaganda
creates artificial needs. Just as propaganda creates political prob-
lems that would never arise by themselves,8 but for which public
opinion will then demand a solution, it arouses in us an increase
of certain desires, prejudices, and needs which were by no means
imperative to begin with. They become so only as a result of
propaganda, which here plays the same role as advertising. Be-
sides, propaganda is helped by advertising, which gives certain
twists and orientations to individual drives, while propaganda ex-
tends the effects of advertising by promising psychological relief
of tensions in general. Under the impact of propaganda, certain
prejudices (racial or economic), certain needs (for equality or
success), become all-devouring, destructive passions, occupying
the entire range of a person’s consciousness, superseding all other
aspects of life, and demanding answers.
As a result of propaganda, these superficial tendencies end up
by becoming identified with our deepest needs and become con-
fused with what is most personal and profound within us. Pre-
cisely in this fashion the genuine need for freedom has been
diluted and adulterated into an abominable mixture of liberalism
under the impact of various forms of propaganda of the nine-
81 reserve this study for a subsequent work.
Propaganda (17 7
teenth and twentieth centuries. In this psychic confusion, created
by propaganda, propaganda alone then imposes order. Just as it
is a fact that mass communication media create new needs (for
example, the existence of TV creates the need to buy a set and
turn it on), it is even more the case when these means are used by
propaganda.
And just as propaganda acts to create new needs, it also creates
the demand for their solutions. We have shown how propaganda
can relieve and resolve tensions. These tensions are purposely
provoked by the propagandist, who holds out their remedy at the
same time. He is master of both excitation and satisfaction. One
may even say that if he has provoked a particular tension, it was
in order to lead the individual to accept a particular remedy, to
demand some suitable action (suitable from the propagandist’s
viewpoint), and to submit to a system that will alleviate that
tension. He thus places the individual in a universe of artificially
created political needs, needs that are artificial even if their roots
were once completely genuine.
For example, by creating class-consciousness in the proletariat,
propaganda adds a corresponding tension to the workers misery.
Similarly, by creating an equality complex, it adds another ten-
sion to all the natural demands of the “have-nots.” But propa-
ganda simultaneously offers the means to reduce these tensions.
It opens a door to the individual, and we have seen that that is
one of the most effective propaganda devices. The only trouble is
that all it really offers is a profound alienation: when an individ-
ual reacts to these artificially provoked tensions, when he re-
sponds to these artificially created stimuli, or when he submits to
the manipulations that make him repress certain personal im-
pulses to make room for abstract drives and reduction of these
tensions, he is no more himself than he is when he reacts biologi-
cally to a tranquilizer. This will appear to be a true remedy,
which in fact it is—but for a sickness deliberately provoked to
fit the remedy.
As we have frequently noted, these artificial needs assume
considerable importance because of their universal nature and
the means (the mass media) by which they are propagated. They
become more demanding and imperative for the individual than
his own private needs and lead him to sacrifice his private satis-
factions. In politics as in economics, the development of artificial
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
178)
Deeds progressively eliminates personal needs and inclinations.
Thus, what takes place is truly an expulsion of the individual
outside of himself, designed to deliver him to the abstract forces
of technically oriented mechanisms.
On this level, too, the more the individual is convinced that he
thinks, feels, and acts on his own, the greater the alienation will
be. The psychologist Biddle has demonstrated in detail that an
individual subjected to propaganda behaves as though his reac-
tions depended on his own decisions. He obeys, he trembles with
fear and expands or contracts on command, but nothing in this
obedience is passive or automatic; even when yielding to sugges-
tion, he decides “for himself” and thinks himself free—in fact the
more he is subjected to propaganda, the freer he thinks he is. He
is energetic and chooses his own action. In fact, propaganda, to
reduce the tension it has created in the first place, offers him one,
two, even three possible courses of action, and the propagandee
considers himself a well-organized, fully aware individual when
he chooses one of them. Of course, this takes little effort on his
part. The propagandee does not need much energy to make his
decision, for that decision corresponds with his group, with sug-
gestion, and with the sociological forces. Under the influence of
propaganda he always takes the easy way, the path of least re-
sistance, even if it costs him his life. But even while coasting
downhill, he claims he is climbing uphill and performing a per-
sonal, heroic act. For propaganda has aroused his energy, per-
sonality, and sense of responsibility—or rather their verbal
images, because the forces themselves were long ago destroyed
by propaganda. This duplicity is propaganda’s most destructive
act. And it leads us to consider next propaganda’s effect of psychic
dissociation.
The Psychic Dissociation Effect of Propaganda
Philippe de Felice9 has said that propaganda creates a tend-
ency to manic-depressive (cyclothymic) neurosis. This is obvi-
ously an exaggeration, but it is true that propaganda puts the
individual through successive periods of exaltation and depres-
sion, caused by exposing him to alternate propaganda themes.
We have already analyzed the necessity for alternating themes. 8
8Foules en dilire, extases collectives (Paris: A. Michel; 1947), Ch. 4.
Propaganda (179
for example, alternating those of terror and of self-assertion. The
result is a continuous emotional contrast, which can become very
dangerous for individuals exposed to it.1 Like the shock of con-
tradictory propaganda, this can be one of the causes of psychic
dissociation, though it does not have to lead to mental illness, as
Felice suggests.
At this point, we shall lay aside the observable dissociations in
the propagandee between public opinion and his personal opin-
ion; we have already said that propaganda produces a deep sepa-
ration between the two.1 2 Instead we shall stress the dissociation
between thought and action, which seems to us one of the most
disturbing facts of our time. Nowadays, man acts without think-
ing, and in turn his thought can no longer be translated into action.
Thinking has become a superfluous exercise, without reference
to reality; it is purely internal, without compelling force, more
or less a game. It is literature's domain; and I am not referring
solely to “intellectual” thought, but to all thought, whether it
concerns work or politics or family life. In sum, thought and re-
flection have been rendered thoroughly pointless by the circum-
stances in which modem man lives and acts. He does not need
to think in order to act; his action is determined by the techniques
he uses and by the sociological conditions. He acts without really
wanting to, without ever reflecting on the meaning of or reason
for his actions. This situation is the result of the whole evolution
1 One element we must remember is the overexcitement that propaganda provokes.
Hie propagandee is constantly urged to action and often prevented from
accomplishing it. His certainties are absolute; he is constantly overexcited by them;
and his ever-renewed aggression toward the symbols of his own culture (as one saw
among the French subjected to propaganda against the i960 Algerian war) leads
him rather quickly to disintegration as a result of the extreme discrepancies
between this overexcitement and his social milieu.
2One aspect of the dissociation which Stolypine has justly emphasized (“Evolu-
tion psychologique en U.R.S.S.,” Economie Contemporaine, 195a) is the division
of “consciousness” into three “compartments.” Aligned consciousness, a term fre-
quently employed in the Stalin regime, refers to the “conscious citizen of the
Socialist epoch,” who lives in official truth, performs a consistent action, and is
completely socialized. This aligned consciousness is a creation of propaganda. But
beneath it exists a premeditated consciousness, the level at which the citizen per-
sonalizes the data of propaganda and persuades himself that the regime is good,
the level at which he works out justifications and decisions for behavior which will
conform to social demands in such a way as to make him least aware of his bad
conscience. Finally, there exists a secret consciousness, comprising the refusals, the
protestations, the judgments against the regime, combined with a tendency toward
cynicism or belief in Christianity. But this secret consciousness is completely re-
pressed, encircled, and constrained, and must struggle against interdictions such
as man's spontaneous impulses have never before encountered.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
l8o)
of our society. The schools, the press, and social pragmatism are
just as responsible for this as psychotechnics, the modem political
structure, and the obsession with productivity. But the two deci-
sive factors are the mechanization of work and propaganda.
The mechanization of work is based entirely on dissociation:
those who think, establish the schedules, or set the norms, never
act—and those who act must do so according to rules, patterns,
and plans imposed on them from outside. Above all, they must
not reflect on their actions. They cannot do so anyhow, because
of the speed with which they work. The modem ideal appears to
be a reduction of action to complete automatism. This is con-
sidered to be a great benefit to the worker, who can dream or
think of “other things” while working. But this dissociation, which
lasts eight hours a day, must necessarily affect all the rest of his
behavior.
The other element that plays a decisive role in this connection
is propaganda. Remember that propaganda seeks to induce action,
adherence, and participation—with as little thought as possible.8
According to propaganda, it is useless, even harmful for man to
think; thinking prevents him from acting with the required
righteousness and simplicity. Action must come direcdy from the
depths of the unconscious; it must release tension, become a
reflex. This presumes that thought unfolds on an entirely unreal
level, that it never engages in political decisions. And this is in
fact so. No political thought that is at all coherent or distinct
can possibly be applied. What man thinks either is totally with-
out effect or must remain unsaid. This is the basic condition of
the political organization of the modem world, and propaganda
is the instrument to attain this effect. An example that shows the
radical devaluation of thought is the transformation of words in
propaganda; there, language, the instrument of the mind, becomes
“pure sound,” a symbol directly evoking feelings and reflexes.
This is one of the most serious dissociations that propaganda
causes. There is another: the dissociation between the verbal
universe, in which propaganda makes us live, and reality.* 4 Propa-
ganda sometimes deliberately separates from man s real world
* To this Is connected, for example, the phenomena of privatization and elasticity
of reasoning, as well as the divergence between opinion and action, which we have
studied above.
41 intend to study this important phenomenon in my next work.
jPropaganda (181
the verbal world that it creates; it then tends to destroy man s
conscience.
In connection with the problem of dissociation we must now
examine the case of an individual subjected to two intense, op-
posing propagandas equally close to him. Such a situation can
occur in a democracy. It is sometimes said that two competing
propagandas cancel each other out; if, however, one regards
propaganda not as a debate of ideas or the promulgation of a
doctrine, but as psychological manipulation designed to produce
action, one understands that these two propagandas, far from
canceling each other out because they are contradictory, have
a cumulative effect. A boxer, groggy from a left hook, does not
return to normal when he is hit with a right hook; he becomes
groggier. Now, the modem propagandist likes to speak of his
“shock effect.” And it is indeed a psychological shock that the
individual subjected to propaganda suffers. But a second shock
from another angle certainly does not revive him.5 On the con-
trary, a second phenomenon is then produced by these contradic-
tory propagandas: the man whose psychological mechanisms have
been set in motion to make him take one action is stopped by the
second shock, which acts on the same mechanisms to produce
another action. The fact that this man will finally vote for any-
body at all is not the important point. What counts is that his
normal psychological processes are perverted and will continue
to be, constantly. To defend himself against that, man automati-
cally reacts in one of two ways.
(a) He takes refuge in inertia,6 in which case propaganda may
provoke his rejection. The conflicting propaganda of opposing
parties is essentially what leads to political abstention. But this
is not the abstention of the free spirit which asserts itself; it is
the result of resignation, the external symptom of a series of
inhibitions. Such a man has not decided to abstain; under diverse
pressures, subjected to shocks and distortions, he can no longer
(even if he wanted to) perform a political act. What is even more
5 The effect of this double shock is so well known that it is utilized as a technique
in a single propaganda by the use of either contradictory news or a tranquilizing
propaganda designed to appease the public before launching a great shock that will
be felt all the more violently: for example, making propaganda for peace before
releasing a violent psychological offensive.
6 In the same way escape—into private life, exoticism, the “ideal”—is explained
as a means of fleeing the contradictions of modem life.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
182)
serious is that this inhibition not only is political, but also pro-
gressively takes over the whole of his being and leads to a general
attitude of surrender. As long as political debates were of little
importance and election propaganda dealt with water supplies
or rural electrification, this escape reflex was not affecting peoples
entire lives. But propaganda grows in effectiveness as its themes
cause more anxiety. Today, when we are concerned with the Rise
of Dictators and the Approach of War, the individual cannot avoid
feeling himself drawn in. He cannot just shrug his shoulders, but
he is rendered passive by propaganda.
The same situation can be found when two contradictory propa-
gandas succeed each other in time. The often-studied skepticism
of German youth after 1945, that famous formula Ohne Mich,
arose from the counter-shock of a propaganda opposed to Nazi
propaganda. Similarly, after the Hungarian Revolution of October
1.956, youth threw itself into nihilism, into indifference and per-
sonal concerns. These examples demonstrate not the ineffective-
ness of propaganda, but, on the contrary, its power to profoundly
disturb psychic life.
(b) The other defensive reflex is flight into involvement. Politi-
cal involvement is widespread today because man can no longer
bear to remain aloof in an arena of aggressive competition between
propagandas. No longer capable of resisting these opposing pulls,
which reach the deepest levels of his personality, the individual
becomes “'involved.” He joins a party, to which he then ties him-
self as totally and deeply as propaganda had intended. From then
on his problem will be solved. He escapes the opposing clash of
propagandas; now, all that his side says is true and right; all that
comes from elsewhere is false and wrong. Thus one propaganda
arms him against the other propagandas. This dualism is not
entirely contradictory; it can be complementary: To illustrate, in
3.959 the Conseil Frangais des Mouvements de Jeunesse observed
that youths were distrustful of all political action, but were at
the same time inclined to extreme solutions.
Creation of the Need for Propaganda
A final psychological effect of propaganda is the appearance
of the need for propaganda. The individual subjected to propa-
ganda can no longer do without it. This is a form of "snowball-
ing”: the more propaganda there is, the more the public wants.
Propaganda (183
The same is true of advertising, which has been said to “feed
on its own success.** It was believed, for example, that advertising
on television would supplant newspaper advertising; but it was
found, on the contrary, that television actually increased the total
volume of advertising business. The need for a growing volume
of propaganda involves two apparently contradictory phenomena:
mithridatization and sensibilization.7
Mithridatization. It is known that under the effect of propaganda
the individual gradually closes up. Having suffered too many
propaganda shocks, he becomes accustomed and insensitive to
them. He no longer looks at posters; to him they are just splashes
of color. He no longer hears a radio speech; it is nothing but sound,
a background noise for his activity. He no longer reads the news-
paper, but merely skims distractedly over it. One may therefore
be tempted to say: “You see how the excess of propaganda no
longer has a hold on this man; he reacts with indifference, he
escapes it; he is mithridatized against propaganda.”
Nevertheless, this same individual continues to turn on his
radio and buy his newspaper. He is mithridatized, yes, but to
what? Only to the objective and intellectual content of propa-
ganda. True, he has become indifferent to the theme of propa-
ganda, the idea, the argument—to everything that could form his
opinion. He no longer needs to read the newspaper or listen to
the speech because he knows their ideological content in advance
and that it would change none of his attitudes.
But though it is true that after a certain time the individual
becomes indifferent to the propaganda content, that does not
mean that he has become insensitive to propaganda, that he turns
from it, that he is immune. It means exactly the opposite, for not
only does he keep buying his newspaper, but he also continues
to follow the trend and obey the rules. He continues to obey the
catchwords of propaganda, though he no longer listens to it. His
reflexes still function, i.e.y he has not become independent through
mithridatization. He is deeply imbued with the symbols of propa-
ganda; he is entirely dominated and manipulated. He no longer
needs to see and read the poster; the simple splash of color is
enough to awaken the desired reflexes in him. In reality, though
7Mithridatization Is a “toxin anti-toxin” process whereby a person is rendered
immune to a poison by tolerating gradually increased doses of it Sensibilization
is the increase of sensitivity or susceptibility. (Trans.)
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
184)
he is mithridatized to ideological content, he is sensitized to propa-
ganda itself.
Sensibilization. The more the individual is captured by propa-
ganda, the more sensitive he is—not to its content, but to the
impetus it gives him, to the excitement it makes him feel. The
smallest excitement, the feeblest stimulus, activates his condi-
tioned reflexes, awakens the myth, and produces the action that
the myth demands. Up to this point an enormous amount of
manipulation, a substantial dose of cleverly coordinated stimuli
was required to achieve this in him. The motivating drives of
his psyche had to be reached, the doors of his unconscious had
to be forced open, his attitudes and habits had to be broken and
new behavior determined. This meant the use of methods and
techniques at once subtle and crushing.
But once the individual has been filled with and reshaped by
propaganda, action by so many methods is no longer necessary.
The smallest dose now suffices. It is enough to *‘refresh,1* to give
a “booster shot,” to repaint, and the individual obeys in striking
fashion—like certain drunks who become intoxicated on one glass
of wine. The individual no longer offers any resistance to propa-
ganda; moreover, he has ceased to believe in it consciously. He
no longer attaches importance to what it says, to its proclaimed
objectives, but he acts according to the proper stimuli. Here we
find again the dissociation between action and thought of which
we spoke earlier. The individual is arrested and crystalized with
regard to his thinking. It is in this domain of opinion that mith-
ridatization takes place. But in the domain of action he is actually
mobilized. He responds to the changing propaganda inputs; he
acts with vigor and certainty, indeed with precipitation. He is a
ready activist, but his action is purely irrational. That is the effect
of his sensibilization to propaganda.
An individual who has arrived at this point has a constant and
irresistible need for propaganda. He cannot bear to have it stop.
We can readily understand why this is so when we think of his
condition.
(a) He lived in anxiety, and propaganda gave him certainty.
Now his anxiety doubles at the very instant when propaganda
stops. All the more so because—in this terrible silence that sud-
denly surrounds him—he, who permitted himself to be led, no
longer knows where to go; and all around him he hears the vio-
Propaganda (185
lent clamor of other propagandas seeking to influence him and
seduce him, and which increase his confusion.
(b) Propaganda removed him from his subhuman situation
and gave him a feeling of self-importance. It permitted him to
assert himself and satisfied his need for active participation. When
it stops, he finds himself more powerless than before, with a
feeling of impotence all the more intense because he had come
to believe in the effectiveness of his actions. He is suddenly
plunged into apathy and has no personal way of getting out of
it. He acquires a conviction of his unworthiness much more vio-
lent than he has felt before because for a while he has believed
in his worth.
(c) Finally, propaganda gave him justification. The individual
needs to have this justification constantly renewed. He needs it
in some form at every step, for every action, as a guarantee that
he is on the right path. When propaganda ceases, he loses his
justification; he no longer has confidence in himself. He feels
guilty because under the influence of propaganda he performed
deeds that he now dreads or for which he is remorseful. Thus he
has even more need for justification. And he plunges into despair
when propaganda ceases to provide him with the certainty of his
justice and his motives.
When propaganda ceases in a group where it has had powerful
effect, what do we see? A social disintegration of the group and
a corresponding internal disintegration of the individuals within
it. They completely withdraw into themselves and reject all par-
ticipation in social or political life—through uncertainty, through
fear, through discouragement. They begin to feel that everything
is useless, that there is no need to have opinions or participate
in political life. They are now wholly disinterested in all that was
the center of their lives. As far as they are concerned, everything
will go on henceforth “without me.” The group as such loses its
value in the eyes of the individual, and its disintegration follows
from this attitude of its members. Egocentricity is the product
of the cessation of propaganda—in such fashion that it appears
irremediable. Not only egocentric withdrawal, but also genuine
nervous or mental troubles—such as schizophrenia, paranoia, and
guilt complexes—are sometimes found in those who have been
dominated by a propaganda that has ceased. Such individuals
must then compensate for the absence of propaganda with psy-
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
186)
chiatric treatment. These effects could be seen in countries where
propaganda suddenly stopped, as in Hitler's Germany in 1945
or in the United States in 1946, to take two very different exam-
ples.
The reaction just described corresponds well to the alienation
effected by propaganda. Man is diminished; he can no longer live
alone, decide for himself, or alone assume the burden of his life;
he needs a guardian, a director of conscience, and feels ill when
he does not have them.8 Thus a need for propaganda arises, which
education can no longer change. From the moment the individual
is caught, he needs his ration of pseudo-intellectual nourishment,
of nervous and emotional stimulation, of catchwords, and of
social integration. Propaganda must therefore be unceasing.
This leads us back to a question we raised earlier: the durabil-
ity of propaganda effects. Through the creation of a need for
propaganda and the required psychic transformations, propa-
ganda has profound and relatively durable effects. But the specific
content of propaganda—the substance that at any given time
serves to satisfy this need and to reduce tensions—obviously has
only a temporary and momentary effect, and must therefore be
refreshed and renewed all the time, particularly as the satisfac-
tions that propaganda gives are always in the immediate present
For this reason propaganda is not very durable.
But this statement must be qualified. We have said that propa-
ganda cannot run counter to an epoch's deep-seated trends and
collective presuppositions. But when propaganda acts in the direc-
tion and support of these, its effect becomes very durable on
both the intellectual and the emotional level. Nowadays propa-
ganda hostile to the State, opposed to ‘‘progress," would have no
chance whatever of succeeding; but if it supports the State, it
will penetrate deeply into man's consciousness. The need for
propaganda then tends to make this penetration permanent. The
duration, the permanence of propaganda, thus leads to the genu-
ine durability of its effects. When these effects are constantly
reproduced and their stimulus is endlessly renewed, they obvi-
ously affect the individual in depth. He learns to act and react
8 Sometimes he is even aware of this. Riesman gives the remarkable example of
individuals who complain that their psychological services are not active enough,
that they have not been manipulated in such a manner as to enjoy the inconven-
iences in their lives.
Propaganda (18 7
in a particular way. (He has not, however, undergone a perma-
nent or total modification of his personality.)
Propaganda is concerned with the most pressing and at the
same time the most elementary actuality. It proposes immediate
action of the most ordinary kind.® It thus plunges the individual
into the immediate present, taking from him all mastery of his
life and all sense of the duration or continuity of any action or
thought. Thus the propagandee becomes a man without a past
and without a future, a man who receives from propaganda his
portion of thought and action for the day; his discontinuous
personality must be given continuity from the outside, and this
makes the need for propaganda very strong. When the propa-
gandee ceases to receive his propaganda, he experiences the feel-
ing of being cut off from his own past and of facing a completely
unpredictable future, of being separated from the world he lives
in. Because propaganda has been his only channel for perceiving
the world, he has the feeling of being delivered, tied hand and
foot, to an unknown destiny. Thus, from the moment propaganda
begins, with its machine and its organization, one can no longer
stop it. It can only grow and perfect itself, for its discontinuation
would ask too great a sacrifice of the propagandee, a too thorough
remaking of himself. This is more than he is ready to accept.
The Ambiguity of Psychological Effects
One of the deceptive qualities of an inquiry such as we will
attempt under this heading is the great uncertainty to which we
are ultimately led. For we realize that propaganda can and does
produce contradictory psychological results. This has been made
clear, but should be emphasized here again. We shall therefore
examine four examples of these contradictory effects (aside from
the fact, already studied, that propaganda satisfies certain needs
while arousing others).
Propaganda can simultaneously create some tensions and ease
others. We have shown how it responds to the need of the indi-
vidual in our society, who fives in an unhealthy state of anxiety;
how it consoles the individual and helps him to solve his con-
flicts. But it must not be forgotten that it also creates anxiety and 9
9 Otherwise it is no longer propaganda. It becomes academic, without effect. It is
less a matter of general ideas than of familiarizing the worker with the practical
decisions of the Party.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
I 88)
provokes tensions. Particularly after a propaganda of fear or terror,
the listener is left in a state of emotional tension which cannot
be resolved by kind words or suggestions. Only action can resolve
the conflict into which he was thrown. In the same way, purely
critical and negative propaganda seeks to stiffen the individual
against his environment; it plays on and stimulates instinctive
feelings of aggression and frustration. But even here the effect
can be one of two: either the individual will become more ag-
gressive toward the symbols of authority in his group or culture,
or he will be crushed by anxiety and reduced to passivity because
he cannot stand discord and opposition.
The propagandist must try to find the optimum degree of ten-
sion and anxiety. This rule was expressly stated, among others,
by Goebbels. Therefore one cannot say that tension is an acci-
dental psychological effect of propaganda. The propagandist
knows well what he is doing when he works in this way. As
Goebbels indicated, anxiety is a double-edged sword. Too much
tension can produce panic, demoralization, disorderly and im-
pulsive action; too little tension does not push people to act;
they remain complacent and seek to adapt themselves passively.
It is therefore necessary to reinforce anxiety in some cases (for
example, concerning the effects of a military defeat), in others,
to reduce tensions that become too strong for people to handle
by themselves (for example, the fear of air raids).
This ambivalence of propaganda, of creating tension in some
cases and reducing it in others, explains itself largely, it seems to
us, by the distinction between agitation propaganda and integra-
tion propaganda. The first, which aims at rapid, violent action,
must arouse feelings of frustration, conflict, and aggression, which
lead individuals to action. The latter, which seeks man s conform-
ity with his group (including participation in action), will aim
at the reduction of tensions, adjustment to the environment, and
acceptance of the symbols of authority. Moreover, the two fac-
tors can overlap. For example, a revolutionary political party, such
as the Communist or Nazi party, will employ propaganda of ten-
sion with respect to things outside the party, propaganda of
acceptance with respect to the party itself. This explains the
attitude of universal acceptance of all that is said or done in the
party, and the opposite attitude of universal challenge and rejec-
tion of everything outside it.
Propaganda (189
Connected with this is the second contradiction by which propa-
ganda creates self-justification and a good conscience, and at the
same time guilt feelings and a bad conscience.
We have seen the strength propaganda develops when it fur-
nishes the individual a feeling of security and righteousness. But
propaganda also stimulates guilt feelings. In fact, to develop such
feelings is its principal objective when it addresses a hostile
group. Propaganda seeks to deprive the enemy of confidence in
the justice of his own cause, his country, his army, and his group,
for the man who feels guilty loses his effectiveness and his desire
to fight. To convince a man that those on his side, if not he
himself, commit immoral and unjust acts is to bring on the
disintegration of the group to which he belongs. This type of
propaganda can be made against the government, the army, the
country’s war aims—even the values defended by an individuals
party or his nation. But it can also be made with respect to mere
efficiency; to convince the individual of the inadequacy of the
means employed by his group, or the uncertainty of its victory,
or the inability of its leaders, has the same effect. In addition,
propaganda can create a bad conscience in this way, strange as
that may seem, probably because of its connection with the primi-
tive belief that God makes good triumph over evil, that the best
man wins, that might makes right, that what is not effective is
neither true nor just. Of course, the psychological effect sought
varies according to the audience propaganda aims at. In any
event, propaganda creates a good conscience among its partisans
and a bad conscience among its enemies.
The latter effect will be particularly strong in a country or
group already beset by doubt. A propaganda of bad conscience
succeeded admirably in France in 1939, and even more so at the
beginning of 1957 in connection with the Algerian conflict, when
it created a general feeling of guilt, sustained by campaigns on
torture, colonialism, and the injustice of the French cause. This
is characteristically French. This feeling created by propaganda
(actually partially legitimate) was the essential cause of the vic-
tory of the F.L.N., a purely psychological victory, confirming the
tenets and conclusions of Mao.
A third contradiction: In certain cases propaganda is an agent
of attachment to the group, of cohesion; in other cases it is an
agent of disruption and dissolution. It can transform the symbols
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
1 9°)
of a group into absolute truth, inflate faith to the bursting point,
lead to a communal state, and induce the individual to completely
confuse his personal destiny with that of his group. This often
occurs with war propaganda demanding “national unity.” But
propaganda can also destroy the group, break it up—for example,
by stimulating contradictions between feelings of justice and of
loyalty, by destroying confidence in the accustomed sources of
information, by modifying standards of judgment, by exaggerat-
ing each crisis and conflict, or by setting groups against each
other.
Moreover, it is possible to provide successive stages for the
individual. While he is still a solid member of a group, propa-
ganda can introduce a factor of ambiguity, of doubt, of suspicion.
But the individual finds it very difficult to remain long in such
a situation. Ambiguity is painful to him, and he seeks to escape
it. But he cannot escape it by returning to his previous certainties
and total blind allegiance to his former group. This is impossible
because the doubt introduced can no longer be assuaged while
the individual remains in the original context of values and truths.
It is then, by going over to the enemy group, by compliance
with what provoked the ambiguity, that man escapes that am-
biguity. He then will enter into an absolute allegiance to the
truth of the enemy group. His compliance will be all the more
radical, his fusion with it all the more irrational, because it is
a flight from yesterday's truth and because it will have to protect
him against any return to, memory of, or nostalgia for the former
allegiance. There is no greater enemy of Christianity or Com-
munism than he who was once an absolute believer.
We shall stress one last type of contradiction. According to
circumstances, propaganda creates either politization or what
American sociologists call “privatization.” First of all, propaganda
must lead the individual to participate in political activities and
devote himself to political problems. It can be effective only if
in man it reveals the citizen, and if the citizen has the conviction
that his destiny, his truth, and his legitimacy are linked to politi-
cal activity—even more, that he can fulfill himself only in and
through the State, and that the answer to his destiny lies only
in politics. At that moment man is a victim perfectly prepared
to submit to every propaganda foray.
But the success of propaganda also requires that the individual
Propaganda (i g i
progressively lose interest in his personal and family affairs. To
sacrifice his wife and children to a political decision becomes the
ideal of the political hero, and that sacrifice will, of course, be
justified as being for the common good, for one’s country, or
some such symbol. Personal problems then seem paltry, egotisti-
cal, mediocre. Propaganda must always fight against “privatiza-
tion,” the feeling that leads man to consider his private affairs
as most important and produces skepticism toward the activities
of the State, the Ohne Mich ideology such as was rife in Germany
after 1945, a conviction that all is useless, that to vote means
nothing, that “it’s not worth-while to die for Danzig.” Propa-
ganda has absolutely no effect on those who live in such indif-
ference or skepticism. One of the great differences between propa-
ganda before and after 1940 was that in Western countries the
latter had to face skeptical and “privatized” individuals.
A modem State can function only if the citizens give it their
support, and that support can be obtained only if privatization is
erased, if propaganda succeeds in politizing all questions, in arous-
ing individual passions for political problems, in convincing men
that activity in politics is their duty. The churches often partici-
pate in campaigns (without understanding that they are propa-
ganda) designed to demonstrate that participation in civic affairs
is fundamentally a religious duty.
At the same time, and just as strongly, propaganda is an agent
of privatization. It produces this effect sometimes without intend-
ing to, sometimes deliberately. This reaction of privatization oc-
curs in the phenomenon of withdrawal and skepticism when two
opposing propagandas work on the same group with almost equal
force; then the privatization effect is involuntary. But in many
cases propaganda deliberately seeks to produce privatization; for
example, a propaganda of terror seeks to create a depressing effect
on the opponent and leads him to adopt a fatalistic attitude.1 He
must be made to believe that nothing helps, that the opposing
party or army is so strong that no resistance is possible. In this
connection, the appeal to the value of private life is used; the feel-
ing is aroused that one risks a death which has no meaning—a
decisive argument of privatization propaganda. Such arguments
are useful for paralyzing an enemy, making him give up the strug-
1 Terrorist action of the O.A.S. in 1962 was of this type.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA
192)
gle and withdraw into egoism; they are equally valid in political
or military conflict.
One aspect of privatization propaganda by the State seems to
us even more important: when it creates a situation in which the
State has a free hand because the citizenry is totally uninterested
in political matters. One of the most remarkable weapons of the
authoritarian State is propaganda that neutralizes and paralyzes
its opponents (or all of public opinion) by reiterating a simple
set of “truths” such as that the exercise of political power is very
complex, and must therefore be left to professional politicians;
that participation in political controversy is dangerous—so what
good does it serve? . . . Why should individuals involve them-
selves where power is exercised in the name of all and in the
public interest? ... Individuals receive their comfort, well-being,
and security from the State—it alone can plan ahead and organize.
Such propaganda is especially easy in an authoritarian system
because privatization is a spontaneous reaction of the individual
when there is disharmony between him and the leader of the
group. The individual protects himself by privatization. His skepti-
cism toward the State is then justified in his own eyes by the
actions of the State; but it is propaganda which sustains his atti-
tude of privatization and skepticism, leaving to the government
complete freedom to act as it thinks proper.
The “reasonable” appeal of such propaganda will be heeded
quite readily because in general man does not like to assume
responsibilities. It is enough to remember the sigh of relief that
went through all of France in 1852 when the Empire was created,
and again in 1958 when a semi-authoritarian State gave French-
men the feeling that they would no longer have to make decisions
for themselves, that these would now be made for them by others.
Thus the State, in various ways—by terror in Hitler’s Germany,
by “political education” in the Soviet Union—neutralizes the
masses, forces them into passivity, throws them back on their
private life and personal happiness (actually according them
some necessary satisfactions on this level), in order to leave a
free hand to those who are in power, to the active, to the mili-
tant. This method offers very great advantages for the State.
CHAPTER
m
THE
SOCIO-POLITICAL
EFFECTS
1. Propaganda and Ideology
The Traditional Relationship
A relationship between propaganda and ideology has always
existed. The pattern of that relationship became more or less
established toward the end of the nineteenth century. I will not
give here an original or specific definition of ideology, but will
merely say that society rests on certain beliefs and no social group
can exist without such beliefs. To the extent that members of
a group attribute intellectual validity to these beliefs, one may
speak of an ideology. One might also consider a different process
by which ideology is formed: ideologies emerge where doctrines
are degraded and vulgarized and when an element of belief enters
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
194)
into them. However that may be, it has long been known that
some ideologies are compatible with passive behavior, but most
of them are active—i.e., they push men into action.
Moreover, to the extent that members of a group believe their
ideology to represent the truth, they almost always assume an
aggressive posture and try to impose that ideology elsewhere. In
such cases ideology becomes bent on conquest.
The drive toward conquest may arise within a society as a
conflict between groups (for example, the proletarian ideology
vs others within a nation), or it can aim at targets outside, as
a nationalist ideology will. The expansion of an ideology can take
various forms: it can accompany the expansion of a group and
impose itself on collectivities being embraced by the group, as
with the republican ideology of 1793 or the Communist ideology
of 1945, which accompanied the armies.
Or an ideology such as that of Labor in a bourgeois society
may expand by its own momentum on a purely psychological
plane. In this case, the ideology assumes a non-imperialist atti-
tude; meanwhile it penetrates the group that represents such an
attitude. In this fashion the ideology of Labor helped bring about
the bourgeois orientation of all Western society in the nineteenth
century.
Finally, an ideology can expand by certain other means, with-
out force and without setting an entire group in motion: at that
point we find propaganda. Propaganda appears—spontaneously
or in organized fashion—as a means of spreading an ideology
beyond the borders of a group or of fortifying it within a group.
Evidendy, in such cases propaganda is direcdy inspired by ideol-
ogy in both form and content. It is equally evident that what
counts here is to spread the content of that ideology. Propaganda
does not lead a life of its own; it emerges only sporadically—when
an ideology tries to expand.
Propaganda organizes itself in conformity with that ideology,
so that in the course of history we find very different forms of
propaganda, depending on what ideological content was to be
promulgated. Also, propaganda is stricdy limited to its objective,
and its working processes are relatively simple in that it does not
try to take possession of the individual or dominate him by devious
means, but simply to transmit certain beliefs and ideas. That
is the current relationship between ideology and propaganda.
Propaganda (195
The classic pattern, still in existence in the nineteenth century—
and considered valid today by many observers—no longer pre-
vails; the situation has undergone profound changes.
Lenin and Hitler found a world in which the process of ideo-
logical expansion was more or less set. But their intervention in
this domain would be the same as their intervention in all others.
What actually was Lenin’s, and thereafter Hitler’s, great innova-
tion? It was to understand that the modem world is essentially
a world of "means”; that what is most important is to utilize all
the means at man’s disposal; and that ends and aims have been
completely transformed by the profusion of means. The fact that
man in the nineteenth century was still searching for ends led
him to neglect most of the available means. Lenin’s stroke of
genius was to see that, in reality, in our twentieth century, the
ends had come to be secondary to the means or, in many cases,
of no importance at all. What mattered was primarily to set all
available instruments in motion and to push them to their limits.
Moreover, Lenin was carried along by the conviction that such
extreme utilization of all means would, a priori, lead to the estab-
lishment of Socialist society. The end thus became a postulate
that was easily forgotten. That attitude agreed exactly with the
aspirations of the average man and with his firm belief in prog-
ress. That is why Lenin designed a strategy and a tactic on the
political plane. There as elsewhere he permitted the means to
assume first place; but that led him, on one hand, to modify
Marx’s doctrine, and on the other, to give the doctrine itself a
level of importance secondary to action. Tactics and the develop-
ment of means then became the principal objects even of political
science.
With Hitler one finds precisely the same tendency, but with
two differences: first of all, a total lack of restraint. Lenin en-
visaged the application of progressive, limited, adjusted means.
Hitler wanted to apply them all, and without delay. Second, the
end, the aim, the doctrine, which Lenin merely had demoted
to second place, disappeared altogether in Hitler’s case—the
vague millennium that he promised cannot be regarded as an aim,
nor can his anti-Semitism be considered a doctrine. Instead, we
pass here to the stage of pure action, action for action’s sake.
This completely transformed the relations between ideology
and propaganda: ideology was of interest to Lenin and Hitler
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
196;
only where it could serve an action or some plan or tactic. Where
it could not be used, it did not exist. Or it was used for propa-
ganda. Propaganda then became the major fact; with respect to
it, ideologies became mere epiphenomena. On the other hand,
ideological content came to be of much less importance than had
been thought possible. In most cases, propaganda can change
or modify this content as long as it respects such formal and cus-
tomary aspects of the ideology as its images and vocabulary.
Hitler modified the National Socialist ideology several times
according to the requirements of propaganda. Thus Hitler and
Lenin established an entirely new relationship between ideology
and propaganda. But one must not think that Hitlers defeat put
an end to that; actually, it has become more widespread. There
is no question that the demonstration was compelling from the
point of view of effectiveness. Moreover, the trend launched by
Lenin and Hitler touched on all prevailing ideologies, all of which
now exist “in connection' with propaganda (i.e., live by propa-
ganda) whether one likes it or not. It is no longer possible to
turn back; only adjustments can be made.
The New Relationship
These new propaganda methods have completely changed the
relationship between propaganda and ideology, and as a result
the role and value of ideologies in the present world have changed.
Propaganda s task is less and less to propagate ideologies; it now
obeys its own laws and becomes autonomous.
Propaganda no longer obeys an ideology.1 The propagandist is
not, and cannot be, a “believer." Moreover, he cannot believe in
the ideology he must use in his propaganda. He is merely a man
at the service of a party, a State, or some other organization, and
his task is to insure the efficiency of that organization. He no
more needs to share the official ideology than the prefect of a
1 Ideology plays a certain role in propaganda. It can prevent propaganda from
developing when the governmental centers themselves are the seat of an ideology.
We shall see later how democratic ideology accelerates the expansion of propa-
ganda. On die other hand, it has been shown how the belief in certain utopias
(goodwill of the people, harmonization of international interests, and so on) is also
a negative factor here, just as the ideology of democratic elites is less suitable than
that of an aristocracy as the basis for a propaganda plan. Conversely, when the
belief of the elites is progressive, it will lead to a powerful propaganda. Thus
ideology partly determines whether a climate is favorable or unfavorable to the
creation and use of propaganda, but it no longer is the decisive factor.
Propaganda (197
French department needs to share the political doctrines of the
national government. If the propagandist has any political con-
viction, he must put it aside in order to be able to use some popu-
lar mass ideology. He cannot even share that ideology for he
must use it as an object and manipulate it without the respect
that he would have for it if he believed in it. He quickly acquires
contempt for these popular images and beliefs; in his work, he
must change the propaganda themes so frequendy that he can-
not possibly attach himself to any formal, sentimental, political,
or other aspect of the ideology. More and more, the propagandist
is a technician using a keyboard of material media and psycho-
logical techniques; and in the midst of all that, ideology is only
one of the incidental and interchangeable cogs. It has often been
stated that the propagandist eventually comes to despise doc-
trines and men (Lasswell, Albig). This must be put into context
with the fact, analyzed above, that the organization served by
propaganda is not basically interested in disseminating a doc-
trine, spreading an ideology, or creating an orthodoxy. It seeks,
instead, to unite within itself as many individuals as possible,
to mobilize them, and to transform them into active militants in
the service of an orthopraxy.
Some will object that the great movements that have used
propaganda, such as Communism or Nazism, did have a doctrine
and did create an ideology. I reply that that was not their prin-
cipal object: ideology and doctrine were merely accessories used
by propaganda to mobilize individuals. The aim was the power
of the party or State, supported by the masses. Proceeding from
there, die problem is no longer whether or not a political ideology
is valid. The propagandist cannot ask himself that question. For
him, it is senseless to debate whether the Marxist view of history
has more validity than any other, or whether the racist doctrine
is true. That is of no importance in the framework of propaganda.
The only problem is that of effectiveness, of utility. The point
is not to ask oneself whether some economic or intellectual doc-
trine is valid, but only whether it can furnish effective catch-
words capable of mobilizing the masses here and now. Therefore,
when faced with an ideology that exists among the masses and
commands a certain amount of belief, the propagandist must ask
himself two questions: First, is this existing ideology an obstacle
to the action to be taken, does it lead the masses to disobey the
THE SOCIO-POLmCAL EFFECTS
198)
State, does it make them passive? (This last question is essential,
for example, for propagandists who operate in milieux influenced
by Buddhism.) In many cases such an ideology will indeed be
an obstacle to blind action, if only to the extent that it sparks
some intellectual activity, no matter how feeble, or provides
criteria, no matter how insecure, for judgment or action. In this
case the propagandist must be careful not to run head-on into a
prevailing ideology; all he can do is integrate it into his system,
use some parts of it, deflect it, and so on.2 Second, he must ask
himself whether the ideology, such as it is, can be used for his
propaganda; whether it has psychologically predisposed an indi-
vidual to submit to propaganda's impulsions.
In an Arab country colonized by whites, in view of the Islamic
ideology that has developed hatred for Christians, a perfect pre-
disposition to nationalist Arab and anti-colonialist propaganda
will exist. The propagandist will use that ideology directly, re-
gardless of its content. He can become an ardent protagonist of
Islam without believing in the least in its religious doctrine. Simi-
larly, a Communist propagandist can disseminate a nationalist
or a democratic ideology because it is useful, effective, and profit-
able, and because he finds it already formed and part of public
opinion, even if he himself is anti-nationalist and anti-democratic.
The fact that he reinforces a democratic belief in the public is
of no importance: one now knows that such beliefs are no obstacle
to the establishment of a dictatorship. By utilizing the democratic
ideology that Communism supports, the Communist party obtains
the consent of the masses to its action, which then puts the Com-
munist organization in control. Propaganda thus brings about
the transition from democratic beliefs to a new form of democ-
racy.
Public opinion is so uncertain and unclear as to the content of
its ideologies that it follows the one that says the magic words,
not realizing the contradictions between the proclamation of a
catchword and the action that follows it. Once the “Machine” is *
* This is why one ideology cannot serve as a weapon against another ideology.
Propaganda will never proclaim the superiority of an ideology over that of the
enemy, for in doing so it would immediately fail. Against an opposing ideology one
can only counter with a waiting attitude, an attitude of hope, and with questions
as to what the future will bring. By thus asking an ideological adversary concrete
questions pertaining to the future, the propagandist follows Marx's method of
"progressing from language to life."
Propaganda (199
in control, there can be no objection to it by those who adhered
to the previously prevailing ideology, which is always officially
adopted and proclaimed by the new organization in power. People
live therefore in the mental confusion that propaganda purposely
seeks to create.
In the face of existing, usable ideologies, the propagandist can
take one of two paths: he can either stimulate them, or my-
thologize them. In fact, ideologies lend themselves well to both
methods. On the one hand, an ideology can be expressed in a
catchword, a slogan. It can be reduced to a simple idea, deeply
anchored in the popular consciousness. And public opinion is
used to reacting automatically to the expressions of a former,
accepted ideology: words such as Democracy, Country, and So-
cial Justice can now set off the desired reflexes. They have been
reduced to stimuli capable of obtaining reflexes in public opin-
ion, which can turn from adoration to hatred without transition.
They evoke past actions and aspirations. To be sure, if a formula
is to be able to stimulate, it must correspond to existing condi-
tioned reflexes that were forged gradually in the course of history
by adherence to an ideology. The propagandist limits himself
to what is already present. From there on he can use any ideo-
logical content at all, no matter where or when. Differences in
application will be determined according to psychological, his-
torical, and economic criteria, to insure the best utilization of
ideology in the realm of action. I have said that ideology is a
complex system capable of evoking one aspect while leaving out
another; die propagandist's ability will consist precisely in mak-
ing these choices.
On the other hand, the propagandist can proceed by transform-
ing ideology into myth. Some ideologies can indeed serve as a
springboard for the creation of myths by the propagandist. Such
transformation rarely takes place spontaneously. Generally, ideol-
ogy is quite vague, has little power to move men to action, and
cannot control the individual's entire consciousness. But it fur-
nishes the elements of content and belief. It weds itself to myth
by the complicated mixture of ideas and sentiments, by grafting
the irrational onto political and economic elements. Ideology
differs radically from myth in that it has no basic roots, no relation
to humanity's great, primitive myths. I have already said that it
would be impossible to create a complete new myth through
THE SOaO-POLmCAL EFFECTS
200)
propaganda. However, the existence of an ideology within a
group is the best possible foundation for the elaboration of a myth.
In many cases, a precise operation and a more pressing and
incisive formulation will suffice. That the message must be formu-
lated for use by the mass media automatically contributes to this:
the fact that the widespread belief is now expressed in one third
the number of words and shouted through millions of loudspeak-
ers, gives it new force and urgency.
The coloration supplied by psychological techniques, the
power of efficiency demonstrated by the integration in an action,
the over-all nature attributed to the construction of an intellectual
universe in which ideology is the keystone—all that can be
accomplished by the propagandist. In such fashion Socialist ide-
ology was transformed into myth by Leninist propaganda, patri-
otic ideology became national myth, and the ideology of happi-
ness was transformed into myth at the end of the nineteenth
century. In this fashion, too, the myth of Progress was con-
structed from a group of propagandas based on bourgeois
ideology.
Finally, the propagandist can use ideology for purposes of
justification. I have shown on several occasions that justification
is an essential function of propaganda. The existence of a gener-
ally accepted ideology is a remarkable instrument for providing
a good conscience. When the propagandist refers to collective
beliefs, the man whom he induces to act in accord with those
beliefs will experience a feeling of almost unshakable self-justifi-
cation. To act in conformity with collective beliefs provides
security and a guarantee that one acts properly. Propaganda
reveals this consonance to the individual, renders the collective
belief perceptible, conscious, and personal for him. It gives him
a good conscience by making him aware of the collectivity of
beliefs. Propaganda rationalizes the justification that man discov-
ers in the prevailing ideology, and gives him the power to express
himself. This holds true, for example, for the ideology of peace
utilized by the Communist party: as soon as this ideology is used,
everything, even hatred, is justified by it.
For a long time, man’s actions, just as certain of his reactions,
have been partially inspired by ideology. The masses may act
because of a spontaneous belief, a succinct idea accepted by all,
or in pursuit of an objective more or less vaguely outlined by an
Propaganda (201
ideology; democratic ideology sparked such behavior. But the
relationship of ideology to propaganda has completely changed
this.
In a group in which modem propaganda is being made, man
no longer acts in accord with a spontaneous ideology, but only
through impulses that come to him from such propaganda. Only
the ignorant can still believe that ideas, doctrines, beliefs can
make man act without the utilization of psycho-sociological
methods. Ideology not used by propaganda is ineffective and not
taken seriously. The humanist ideology no longer provokes a re-
sponse: in the face of modem propaganda, intellectuals have
been completely disarmed and can no longer evoke the values of
humanism. Torture (of political enemies) is implicitly accepted by
public opinion, which expresses its dismay only in words, but not
in action. With regard to the war in Algeria, it is well known that
the most ardent defenders of P. H. Simon (a young lieutenant
who exposed the practice of torture dining that war) defended
him only verbally and when they could afford to: once they were
in combat, plunged into action, such “ideas” were relegated to a
secondary level, and the F.L.N. and military propaganda—which,
on both sides, accused the enemy of torture and thus legitimized
its own actions—took over again. The same is true for Christian
ideology, which no longer inspires action: Christians are caught
in a psycho-sociological mechanism that conditions them to cer-
tain practices, despite their attachment to other ideas. Those
ideas remain pure ideology because they are not being taken
over by propaganda; and they are not taken over because they
are not usable. In this fashion, such an ideology loses its reality
and becomes an abstraction. It loses all effectiveness in relation
to other ideologies being used by propaganda.
Moreover, in this relationship between ideology and action, we
emphasize that nowadays action creates ideology, not vice versa,
as the idealists who relate to past situations still would like to
believe. Through action one learns to believe in “some truth,” and
even to formulate it. Today, ideology progressively builds itself
around actions sanctioned by propaganda. (For example, in order
to justify certain actions in Algeria, an entire, complex ideology
was created.) Thus, in various ways—all the result of propaganda
—ideology is increasingly losing its importance in the modern
world. It is devalued whether propaganda uses it or not; in the
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
20 2)
latter case because it reveals its ineffectiveness and cannot pre-
vail against the competition; in the former, because when used,
it is broken up: some aspects of it are used and others pushed
aside.
The same holds true for ideology as for doctrine; when propa-
ganda uses it, it destroys it. The transformation of the Marxist
doctrine by propaganda, first Lenin's and then Stalin's, is well
known. Works such as those by P. Chambre, de Lef&vre, and
Lukacs explain this “evisceration” of doctrine by propaganda
very well. All that is believed, known, and accepted is what
propaganda has promulgated. It is the same for ideology, which
is merely a popular and sentimental derivation of doctrine. One
can no longer establish anything at all on genuine ideologies in
social groups; one can no longer hope to find in such ideologies a
solid point of support for redressing man or society. Ideology has
become part of the system of propaganda and depends on it.8
2. Effects on the Structure of Public Opinion
I shall not examine the entire problem of the relationship be-
tween propaganda and opinion. However, the effects of propa-
ganda on the psychic life of the individual, which I attempted to
sketch in the preceding chapter, obviously have collective con-
sequences, mass effects, if only because the mass is composed of
individuals and because propaganda designed to act on the mass
at the same time changes individuals who are part of that mass.
People become influenced and warped; this leads necessarily to
modifications in public opinion. But what we consider much
more important than mere changes in the content of public opin-
ion (for example, whether a favorable opinion of Negroes turns
into an unfavorable opinion) is its actual structure.* 4
8 This can have decisive consequences, for one must not forget that this is the road
by which a change in "culture” (in the American sense of the word) can take
place, that is, a true change of civilization, which was so far maintained by the
stability of ideologies and "chain-thinking.”
4 This coincides with the well-known fact that a relationship exists between the
structure of opinion and the size and organization of groups. Propaganda simultan-
eously modifies the structure of opinion and of the group where such opinion is
formed.
Propaganda
(203
Modification of the Constituent Elements of Public Opinion5 * *
To begin with, certain factors of change are easy to understand.
It has often been said that public opinion forms itself by ex-
changes of opinion on a controversial question, and shapes itself
by the interaction of these different viewpoints. But an examina-
tion of the effects of propaganda must radically destroy such a
view of the formation of public opinion. On the one hand, as I
have already shown, the questions that propaganda takes upon
itself cease to be controversial: “truths” are pronounced that do
not bear discussion; they are believed or not believed, and that is
all. At the same time, interpersonal communications cease. In a
propagandized milieu, communications no longer take place in
interpersonal patterns, but in patterns set by the propaganda
organization. There is action, but no interaction. As I have shown,
the propagandee and the non-propagandee cannot discuss: no
psychologically acceptable communication or exchange is pos-
sible between them. Finally, in large societies in which propa-
ganda is at work, opinion can no longer form itself except via the
centralized media of information. “No opinion is of any conse-
quence unless it is first communicated to the masses by the vast
media of dissemination and propaganda, and if it is not assimi-
lated on a massive scale/' Here we are facing structural
changes.
To understand to what extent propaganda can modify the
structure of public opinion, it will suffice to look at the “laws” on
the formation of public opinion indicated by Leonard W. Doob8
(who rejects the term ‘laws”). One can easily see that propaganda
plays precisely the role that Doob assigns to public opinion (to
reduce frustration, anxiety, and so on), and that propaganda
directly creates public opinion by eventually creating conformity
and externalizing inner opinions. But I will proceed along an-
other route.
The first effect I will try to analyze is what is vaguely called
crystallization of public opinion. Surely Stotzel is right when he
5 On this subject I will not repeat what Jean Stoetzel has already demonstrated
(in Esquisse d’une th^orie des opinions [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France;
1943])» but I am basing my text on his work.
8 Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt & Company; 1948), Ch.
S
THE SOdO-POLITlCAL EFFECTS
204)
says, on the basis of American analyses, that the process is not so
simple as it seems. Frequently it is said that a few scattered indi-
vidual opinions suddenly, by a mysterious operation, unite and
form public opinion. It is then said that one of the elements in
this process is propaganda. Stoetzel has shown that things do not
happen that way. Public opinion does not derive from individual
opinions: here we are faced with two heterogeneous problems.
One cannot speak of a crystallization of individual opinions.
Rather, a vague, inconsistent, unformulated, latent opinion,
which one might call “raw opinion,” is transformed by propa-
ganda through a true process of crystallization into explicit
opinion.
What does this imply? From here on we will be in the presence
of organized opinion having a certain structure or skeleton. There
is no progression at all from a state of private opinion to a state
of public opinion, but only from one state of public opinion to
another state of that same public opinion.
A changing and versatile opinion becomes fixed, is given strict
orientation; propaganda specifies precisely the objectives of that
opinion and delineates their exact outlines. In that way, propa-
ganda also affects the individual, reducing his field of thought and
angle of vision by the creation of stereotypes.
What were only vague inclinations until the intervention of
propaganda, now take the form of ideas. This is all the more re-
markable because propaganda, as we have seen, acts much more
through emotional shock than through reasoned conviction. It
nevertheless produces by that shock an ideological elaboration
that gives great precision and stability to the ensuing opinion.
But this hardening of the opinion is neither total nor coherent;
that is why I speak of a “skeleton.”7 Crystallization takes place at
certain points. Propaganda does not produce generalized, un-
differentiated ideas, but very specific opinions, which cannot be
applied just anywhere. And the degree of effectiveness of a propa-
ganda depends precisely on its choice of crystallization points. If
one can harden opinion on a certain key point, one can control
an entire sector of opinion from there.
7 This makes even more sense if one keeps in mind that the process of propaganda
consists in creating micro-groups, nuclei highly organized and endowed with great
strength of conviction. These are precisely destined to crystalize opinion, help it
to formulate, and thus to play the role of skeleton. This was Lenin's theory.
Propaganda (205
This hardening of opinion soon makes it impervious to all con-
trary reasoning, proof, and fact. MacDougall makes this point:
propaganda that plays on opinion influences that opinion without
offering proof; latent opinion subjected to such propaganda (if it
is well made) will absorb everything, believe everything, without
discrimination. This will cause opinion to pass to the stage of
crystallization, and from that moment on opinion will no longer
accept anything that is different. I already have shown that even
a proved fact can do nothing against crystalized opinion.
Such organization of opinion tends always to a certain unifica-
tion. Opinion will begin to eliminate its own contradictions and
establish itself as a function of identical catchwords that will
inevitably have a unifying effect. Besides, at that moment, indi-
vidual opinions also change, for the hardening of public opinion
destroys their originality. Details and nuances disappear. The
more active the propaganda, the more monolithic and less indi-
vidualized public opinion will be.
A good example of this process is the formation of class con-
sciousness by Marxist propaganda. After the creation of class
consciousness by the promulgation of information (of which I
have spoken above) came the transformation of this class con-
sciousness, by propaganda, into a system, a criterion of judgment,
a belief, a stereotype. Propaganda led to the elimination of all
deviant ideas and finally rendered labors opinion impenetrable
to all that did not conform to the initial pattern. Present-day class
consciousness is a typical product of propaganda.
This unifying character leads us to a second propaganda effect
on public opinion: by the process of simplification, propaganda
makes it take shape more rapidly. Without simplification no
public opinion can exist anyway; the more complex problems,
judgments, and criteria are, the more diffuse opinion will be.
Nuances and gradations prevent public opinion from forming; the
more complicated it is, the longer it takes to assume solid shape.
But in the case of such diffusion, propaganda intervenes with
a force of simplification.
Attitudes are reduced to two: positive and negative. In plain
view, propaganda will simply place anyone with more differen-
tiated opinions into one group or the other. For example, a man
not altogether favorably inclined toward Communism is simply
thrown into the Fascist clique by propaganda even if he tries to
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
206)
think in terms of social justice, and even if he rejects capitalism.
Without being an ally of bourgeois imperialism, he becomes one
in the eyes of all.
Problems are made simple. Goebbels wrote: “By simplifying
the thoughts of the masses and reducing them to primitive pat-
terns, propaganda was able to present the complex process of
political and economic life in the simplest terms. . . . We have
taken matters previously available only to experts and a small
number of specialists, and have carried them into the street and
hammered them into the brain of the little man.”8
Answers to problems are clear-cut, white and black; under
such conditions, public opinion forms rapidly, breaks loose, and
expresses itself with force. It then carries along on its irresistible
course all differentiated and average opinions that have appeared
too late for inclusion in the process of crystalizing opinion. We
already have seen how, from the psychological point of view,
propaganda reinforces and even creates stereotypes and preju-
dices. But prejudice is not, and cannot be, part of a solely
individual psychology; it is the individual in relation to others
who has prejudices, and their crystallization leads to a transforma-
tion of the structure of public opinion. Of course, prejudices arise
spontaneously; but propaganda uses them for the formation of
public opinion, which in turn becomes simplified, unreal, rigid,
and infantile. Public opinion shaped by propaganda loses all
authenticity.
A final propaganda effect we want to trace in this connection
is the separation very judiciously demonstrated by Stoetzel be-
tween individual and public opinion:
“The distinction between stereotyped opinions and profound
attitudes leads us back to the distinction between public and
private opinion. Stereotypes are the categories of public opinion.
Profound attitudes, on the other hand, exist where people live
by the laws of private opinions.”
Between the two there is a natural difference, and the two
types of opinion can co-exist without interchange or mutual
influence.
“We are thus thinking in two ways: as members of a social
body and as individuals. In the former case one may say that
8Wesen und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Junker und Diiimhaupt;
1935)-
Propaganda (207
we are abandoning ourselves to a thought that is not ours, and
there is no reason why diverse opinions of that land should be
coherent or unified in a system (that is the task of propaganda)
. . . But we also have our own private views . . .”
The effect of propaganda is to separate the two types of
opinion still more. Ordinarily, some interplay between the two
sectors continues. But this is being short-circuited, relations are
interrupted, when propaganda takes over public opinion. At
that moment, public opinion assumes a rigidity and a density
that make the expression of individual opinion impossible, and
moreover close it in on all sides. '
Private opinion clearly becomes devalued where public opin-
ion is organized by propaganda. The more progress we make, the
less private opinion can express itself through the mass media;
the development of the press and radio has considerably reduced
the number of people who can express their ideas and opinions
publicly. Far from permitting private opinion to express itself,
these media exclusively serve “public” opinion, which is no longer
fed by private opinion at all. Individual opinion is without value
or importance in a milieu and even in the individual himself as
public opinion assumes greater authority and exercises more
power.
From there on, private opinion can no longer absorb the
various elements of public opinion in order to re-think them
and integrate them. Propaganda makes public opinion impossible
to be assimilated by the individual; he can only follow imper-
sonally the current into which he is thrown. And the more public
opinion becomes massive and expresses itself in a “normal”
curve, the more individual opinions become fragmented. On the
collective plane, they express themselves in such a dispersed way
that their intrinsic uncertainty is revealed. In this fashion, man’s
psychological process is separated into two unrelated elements.
From Opinion to Action
I have said on several occasions that propaganda aims less at
modifying personal opinions than at leading people into action.
This is clearly its most striking result: when propaganda inter-
venes in public opinion, it transforms the public into an acting
crowd or, more precisely, into a participating crowd. Often,
propaganda translates itself only into “verbal action” (this will
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
208)
be examined later); but what matters is that the crowd pass from
the state of being mere spectators filled with opinions to the
state of participants.
Even if a movie-goer is "taken” with a film, he remains
passive. He has a personal opinion of the picture he sees. He will
soon participate in public opinion about it, but that remains
external. The spectator at a bullfight is in a somewhat different
situation; his participation in the killing ritual is sometimes pas-
sive, but sometimes active—when he storms into the ring. Propa-
ganda goes much further and demands an acceptance that is not
that of a spectator; it demands his support as a minimum, his
active participation as a maximum.9 Propaganda evidently plays
its part where normal, spontaneous development of opinion
would not have led to such action but would only have translated
itself into private, non-collective attitudes. Only very rarely does
opinion by itself lead to action. The great feat of propaganda is
to cause the progression from thought to action artificially.
It has often been said that propaganda does not create atti-
tudes but merely uses them. Taking the term in the specific sense
of social psychology, I must agree; but the fact is not so simple.
It is evident that propaganda itself does not modify attitudes.
But when propaganda leads to action, it modifies, first of all, the
response that would otherwise be a direct result of the funda-
mental attitude: the individual expressing his attitude would not
act, but under the influence of propaganda he does act. One
cannot overlook at this moment a certain warping of his attitudes,
which, if often repeated, will change his behavior pattern. More-
over, when the individual is engaged in action that has been
set in motion by propaganda, he cannot escape counter-blows,
an orientation different from that "preparation for action,” which
will be an attitude. For this attitude is also determined by the
action in which he is engaged, and by the social context. The
continuous and automatic action, into which propaganda plunges
the individual, undoubtedly also creates attitudes that determine
further actions.
How does this progression from opinion to action through the 8
8 On the subject of passive adherence, a last and remarkable example is contained
in a pamphlet by the O.A.S. (February 10, 1962), which states that “we do not
ask officers to join our ranks, but merely to show no zeal when applying govern-
ment directions.”
Propaganda (209
channel of propaganda take place? Doob is one of the few who
have tried to describe it.
“Attitudes affect external behavior if their force is so great
as to be irreducible except by action. This force, which may be
weak or strong in the beginning, accumulates when the individ-
ual feels that action is necessary, when he is shown the action
in which he might engage, when he thinks such action will be
profitable or rewarded. In short, the achievement of a prepared
response is only the last of a series of preliminary stages, which,
though necessary for the final action to take place, do not guar-
antee that it will.”
Seen in this perspective, action is the result of a certain number
of coordinated influences created by propaganda.1 Propaganda
can make the individual feel the urgency, the necessity, of some
action, its unique character. And at the same time propaganda
shows him what to da. The individual who bums with desire for
action but does not know what to do is a common type in our
society. He wants to act for the sake of justice, peace, progress,
but does not know how. If propaganda can show him this “how,”
it has won the game; action will surely follow.
The individual also must be convinced of the success of his
action, or of the possible reward or satisfaction he will get from
it. Man will act when he feels that a certain result needs to be
obtained and that the need is urgent. Advertising demonstrates
it to him in the commercial domain, propaganda demonstrates
it in politics. Finally, man will be helped in this progression to
action by example, by similar action all around him. But such
similar action would not come to his attention except through
the intermediary of propaganda.
This is undoubtedly the true pattern in many aspects. But one
element overlooked here is essential in my view:1 2 the element of
the mass, crowd, or group. Man subjected to propaganda would
never act if he were alone. Doob makes an analysis of man by
himself, though the mechanisms that he reveals can work only
with collective man. An individual can feel the urgency of an
1 One must offer the individual a specific, clear, simple task to be undertaken at a
given moment. From the moment propaganda succeeds in personalizing its appeal,
the individual who feels concerned is placed in a situation that demands a decision.
Mao has achieved this completely with his horizontal propaganda.
2 This pattern might be completed at several points: for example, the prestige of
the person who gives out the information pushes the listener toward action.
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
210)
action only if it promises to be effective because it is being car-
ried out by many; he cannot engage in action except with others.
This means that if propaganda is to lead to action, it must also
have a collective influence. That influence is composed of two
main factors;
1. Propaganda creates a strong integration of the group, and
at the same time activates the preoccupations of that group. The
mass media provoke an intense participation in the life of a
group and in collective activities; they provide a strong feeling
of community. In our society, the individual communicates with
the group only through the mass media of information. The in-
dispensable psychological contact among members of the group
is produced only by these media. For in the mass society, in-
dividuals have a tendency to withdraw from each other more
and more. Their relationship is only artificial; it is only the product
of the information media. Spontaneous relationships change
character when they become organized, systematized, deliberate;
at this point, personal relationships tend to create unanimity, in
the literal sense, and such unanimity always takes on a force of
expansion. When the group acquires a certain uniformity, it
inevitably experiences the need for proceeding to action. At that
moment, the psychological contact, the communication are cre-
ating not merely a feeling of communion, but a communal truth.
If such “truth” dealt with eternal verities, it would not push
the group into action. But, at the same time as the mass media
integrate the group, they place it in relation to the present. After
all, the content of press and radio can be nothing but news of the
moment. But this goes much further when the media are pur-
posely used for propaganda. Stoetzel has aptly said that “the
stereotypes of propaganda immediately appear to have the sig-
nificance of actuality.” It is an actuality made aggressive and
fertile, an actuality that is present. A group that is psychologically
unanimous and finds itself face to face with such planned actual-
ity feels concerned to the highest degree. What is this actuality?
It is precisely the world in which the group itself and its fate
are in doubt, and in which the group has the possibility of acting.
When propaganda integrates a group into an actuality, it
necessarily leads it to act in that actuality. The group cannot
remain passive and be content merely to have an opinion regard-
ing that actuality. To understand this mechanism, one must
Propaganda (211
remember that this group has no other frame of reference by
which it could take a different position. In other words, it has
only one point of view toward that actuality. The group, there-
fore, cannot consider it sub specie aetemitatis, because its frame
of reference is furnished by the very propaganda that unites it in
the actuality in the first place. And the group cannot judge its
own position; it can only act. At that moment, to participate in
any group whatever is to submit to actuality, to become a man
without past or future, to have no concern other than action, no
belief other than that promulgated by propaganda concerning
the present.
2. The other aspect of the progression to action is the great
power that propaganda gives to opinion. This opinion is no
longer a belief at times unsure of itself, spreading slowly by
word of mouth, and difficult for opinion surveys to pinpoint. It
is projected outside itself, meets itself and hears itself on the
screen and the airwaves invested with power, grandeur, mag-
nificence. Such opinion learns to believe in itself, certain now
that it is “truth” because it has seen itself revealed and promul-
gated on all sides by powerful media. Propaganda reveals such
public opinion in need of self-expression.
One can then say without exaggeration that propaganda replaces
the leader of the group. This is not the banal assertion that propa-
ganda is the instrument of the leader in the group or helps to
make a leader. It means that in a group without a leader, but
subjected to propaganda, the sociological and psychological
effects are the same as if there were a leader. Propaganda is a
substitute for him. If we remember the innumerable roles played
by the group leader, we can summarize them as Kimball Young
does:8 The leader of a group is the one who first defines a course
of action. He is at the same time the man who verbalizes and
crystalizes the feelings of the mass. Ultimately, a group subjected
to propaganda would not need a leader, but would behave as
though it had one. This substitution helps explain the real diminu-
tion of the role of local leaders and the abstract character of a
national leader. Even in a leadership or Fuhrerprinzip system,
the chief is never more than a reflection: he is not the real leader
of the group. The Gauleiter, like a People’s Commissar, is only
a surrogate, an administrator. These are not group chiefs. The *
* Social Psychology (New York: F. S. Crofts; 1947), Ch. 10,
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
212)
only real leader is the one who does not belong to the group—
which is, sociologically speaking, entirely abnormal—but who
substitutes for the true leader by propaganda and exists through
it. Whence comes the possibility of having a chief present when
he is absent. Merely an effigy, integrated into the circuit of
propagandas, suffices. The portraits of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Roose-
velt, play an abstract but sufficient role, for the effects that can
be expected from the leader s presence are obtained instead by
propaganda.
The leader is the one who leads his group to action. This is
the second element of the progression from opinion to direct
action.
3. Propaganda and Grouping
I have selected this rather vague heading because I cannot
undertake a complete study of the propaganda effects on the
aggregate of all groups and societies. For that I would need a
complete theoretical and experimental sociology. Besides, with
regard to the propaganda effect, one must distinguish between
the groups that make it and the groups that are subjected to it
Often, the two elements are closely related. This study will ex-
amine three examples: political parties, the world of labor, and
the churches.
The Partitioning of Groups
All propaganda has to set off its group from all the other
groups. Here we find again the fallacious character of the intel-
lectual communication media (press, radio), which, far from
uniting people and bringing them closer together, divide them
all the more.
When I talked about public opinion, I stressed that everybody
is susceptible to the propaganda of his group. He listens to it
and convinces himself of it. He is satisfied with it. But those
who belong to another milieu ignore it. According to an I.F.O.P.
survey (No. 1, 1954), everybody is satisfied with his own propa-
ganda. Similarly, Lazarsfeld,4 in his survey of radio broadcasts,
4 “The Effects of Radio on Public Opinion,” in Print, Radio and Film in a De-
mocracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1942).
Propaganda (213
cites the case of programs designed to acquaint the American
public with the value of each of the ethnic minority groups in
the American population. The point was to demonstrate the
contributions each group was making, with the purpose of pro-
moting mutual understanding and tolerance. The survey revealed
that each broadcast was listened to by the ethnic group in
question (for example, the Irish tuned in the program about the
Irish), but rarely by anybody else. In the same way, the Com-
munist press is read by Communist voters, the Protestant press
by Protestants.
What happens? Those who read the press of their group and
listen to the radio of their group are constantly reinforced in
their allegiance. They learn more and more that their group is
right, that its actions are justified; thus their beliefs are strength-
ened. At the same time, such propaganda contains elements of
criticism and refutation of other groups, which will never be
read or heard by a member of another group. That the Com-
munists attacked Bidault’s policies with solid arguments had no
effect on Bidault's party, for the supporters of Bidault did not
read VHumanitS. That the bourgeois paper Le Figaro will con-
tain valid criticism of and genuine facts about the dictatorship
in the Soviet Union will never reach a Communist. But this
criticism of ones neighbor, which is not heard by that neighbor,
is known to those inside the group that expresses it. The anti-
Communist will be constantly more convinced of the evilness
of the Communist, and vice versa. As a result, people ignore
each other more and more. They cease altogether to be open to
an exchange of reason, arguments, points of view.
This double foray on the part of propaganda, proving the
excellence of one’s own group and the evilness of the others,
produces an increasingly stringent partitioning of our society.
This partitioning takes place on different levels—-a unionist parti-
tioning, a religious partitioning, a partitioning of political parties
or classes; beyond that, a partitioning of nations, and, at the
summit, a partitioning of blocs of nations. But this diversity of
levels and objectives in no way changes the basic law, according
to which the more propaganda there is, the more partitioning
there is. For propaganda suppresses conversation; the man op-
posite is no longer an interlocutor but an enemy. And to the
extent that he rejects that role, the other becomes an unknown
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
214)
whose words can no longer be understood. Thus, we see before
our eyes how a world of closed minds establishes itself, a world
in which everybody talks to himself, everybody constantly re-
views his own certainty about himself and the wrongs done him
by the Others—a world in which nobody listens to anybody
else, everybody talks, and nobody listens. And the more one talks,
the more one isolates oneself, because the more one accuses
others and justifies oneself.
One must not think, incidentally, that such partitioning is in
conflict with the formation of public opinion. Although propa-
ganda partitions society, it affects opinion and transcends the
groups in which it operates. In the first place, it maintains its
effectiveness toward the mass of undecided who do not yet belong
to a group. Then, too, it is possible to affect those who belong
to a group of a different sort: for example, Communist propa-
ganda that will not affect militant Socialists might affect Protes-
tants; American propaganda that will not affect a Frenchman
in his capacity as a Frenchman might influence him with regard
to capitalism or the liberal system.
This is particularly important because there is a difference
of level between the groups. For example, a nationalist propa-
ganda results in building a barrier against other nations; how-
ever, domestically, it respects the isolation of inferior groups,
but still affects them by making them join a common collective
movement. This is a process comparable to that occurring in the
Middle Ages when Christian ideology expanded in the society
but in no way affected the aristocracy or the religious orders. A
national propaganda is perfectly effective inside a nation and
changes public opinion, whereas party propaganda or religious
propaganda is effective on another plane—each having the
power to modify public opinion on a certain level and to produce
a sociological partitioning on another. But only a superior group
can affect other groups. That is why, with respect to the two
current power blocs—East and West—where neither side is
superior, propaganda can only have the effect of increasingly
separating them.
A well-organized propaganda will work with all these different
elements. This explains the duality of some propagandas, for
example, in the U.S.S.R.: on one side, in the papers with large
circulation, or on the radio, one finds only ecstatic praise of the
Propaganda (215
regime or vague criticism of it, designed to satisfy the public,
but without basis in reality. On the other side, we find extremely
violent, specific, and profound criticism in specialized periodicals
—for example, in medical journals or magazines on city-planning.
If one really wants to know and understand the shortcomings
of the Soviet regime, one can find a mine of precise and impartial
information in these magazines. How can such duality be toler-
ated? It can be explained only by partitioning. One must tell
the public about the grandeur of the regime and the excellence
of the U.S.S.R.; the public must be made to understand this
even in the face of contrary personal experience, either to dis-
sociate the individual or to convince him that his personal ex-
perience is without importance, without any connection to Soviet
reality as a whole. A disappointing personal experience is only an
accident without meaning. Such propaganda (directed to the
masses), therefore, can only be positive.
Conversely, the violently critical propaganda addressed to
technicians in specialized periodicals aims at showing the Party’s
vigilance, its knowledge of detail, its centralized control, its de-
mand for Communist perfection. It is aimed at the mass of tech-
nicians, broken up into groups of specialists. Such propaganda
asserts that the regime is excellent, that all services are working
very well, except . . . the service in question—medical for the
doctors, and so on. How is such duality possible? Precisely by
virtue of the partitioning of society, which is to such a large
extent propagandas work. Because one knows that the doctor
will not read a magazine on city-planning, and because one
knows that the public at large will not read any of the specialized
journals, and because one knows that the Ukrainians will not read
Georgian newspapers, one can, according to necessity, make
contradictory assertions in any and all of them.
Obviously, this procedure further increases separation, for
everyone stops speaking the language of the others. No means
of communication remains. Different facts are given to different
people, the bases of judgment are diverse, the orientations are
opposites; there is no longer a meeting point within the confines
of the same propaganda, for this propaganda scientifically (not
spontaneously, as in the case studied earlier) develops dividing
lines, establishes psychological separations between groups, and
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
2l6)
does all this under a common collective cloak of unreality and
verbal fiction.
Effects on Political Parties
What happens when a political party stops acting more or
less haphazardly, starts to make systematic propaganda, and
instead of trying to win votes at election time, begins to mobilize
public opinion in a more permanent fashion? Actually, in the
democratic nations, practically no party has tried this. But we
can see the emergence of parties grafting themselves onto old
ones, or replacing them; and these new parties have such aims,
which their predecessors did not have. A transformation is taking
place in the political parties of the United States; for about a
dozen years now they have been making systematic propaganda.
But it is still too early to tell what transformations it may entail
in the parties themselves.
Therefore, we will study instead those parties that make prop-
aganda, as distinguished from those that do not, and consider
that their structure derives partially from their need to make
propaganda.
A party that makes propaganda must, first of all, have the
means to express it strongly. It is necessary that the party presents
itself as a community in which everybody has a set function,
and that its members at the bottom be rigorously organized and
strictly obedient. If one wants to reach public opinion constantly,
one must proceed with the help of sections and cells; the system
of committees, which express themselves weakly, leads only to
sporadic and fragmentary action.
In addition, propaganda demands vertical liaison among the
party’s organizations. This vertical liaison permits both homo-
geneity of propaganda and speed of application; and we have
seen that speed of action or reaction is essential to propaganda.
Conversely, in view of the effect of propaganda in creating
isolated social and local groups, any horizontal liaison inside the
party would be disastrous. Those at the base of the party would
not understand why one propaganda is made in one place,
another elsewhere. On the contrary, the partitioning by propa-
ganda must correspond to a partitioning within the party, and
the only liaison system must be vertical.
More important still is a system of executive cadres. This pro-
Propaganda (217
duces from the beginning a schism between the cadres and the
voters or sympathizers, and corresponds precisely to the separa-
tion into subjects and objects. Propaganda makes its agent a
subject who makes the decisions and uses those systems that
must obtain certain results; but the agent looks upon the mass
of potential voters or sympathizers as objects. He manipulates
them, works on them, tests them, changes them psychologically
or politically. They no longer have any personal importance,
especially when one realizes that good propaganda must be
objective and anonymous, and the masses are considered as
merely an instrument for attaining some objective. They are
treated as such; this is one of the elements of the profound con-
tempt that those making real propaganda have for all those on
the outside, even—and often particularly—for their sympathizers.
Propaganda accentuates this separation between manipulators
and sympathizers, even as it tends to personalize power within
the party. The inclination of the masses to admire personal
power cannot be shunned by good propaganda: it can only be
followed and exploited. To disregard it is to throw away an easy
and active propaganda element. Propaganda therefore intensi-
fies this inclination by creating the image of a leader and invest-
ing it with attributes of omnipresence and omniscience, and by
supporting with active evidence what public consciousness only
sensed and anticipated. Any party that avoids this personalization
of power loses a probably decisive card. We have seen this in
the American election of 1952, with Eisenhower.
In most cases this personalized power is closely tied to the
organization of propaganda itself. In connection with certain
parties, Duverger speaks of a “second power,” an obscure power
that sometimes dominates the direction of the party. This second
power sometimes consists of influential men on a paper whose
distribution assures the party's strength. This fact needs to be
generalized: In modem parties, the second power is likely to
consist of the corps of propagandists. (The same holds true for
the State itself.) The propaganda instruments tend to assume a
preponderant position, not without occasional serious conflicts,
for they are at one and the same time the hub of the entire party
and its raison (TStre.
These are the principal effects of the adoption of modem
propaganda on the structure of a political party.
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
2l8)
With regard to the relative effects on the interplay of parties
in the national fabric, the decisive element is the high cost of
propaganda. Propaganda is becoming more and more expensive,
partly because of the volume needed, partly because of the instru-
ments required. All parties may stick to traditional and low-
level propaganda (posters, newpapers) and go to the govern-
ment for the more expensive media (radio, TV). Such is the
case in France. Under such circumstances, there is a state of
equilibrium, but a precarious one. The situation is, in effect, un-
stable; if one party resorts to propaganda, the whole edifice
tumbles.
Our first such hypothesis: A single party takes big propaganda
action while the others cannot regroup or put into operation the
necessary big apparatus because they lack money, people, or-
ganization. From then on, we see such a party rise like a rocket,
as Hitlers party did in Germany in 1932, or the Communist
parties in France and Italy in 1945. This is clearly a menace to
democracy; we are face to face with an overwhelmingly strong
party that will capture the government. This party continues to
grow stronger as it becomes richer and assumes more solid propa-
ganda foundations. It definitely jeopardizes the democratic sys-
tem, even if it has no dictatorial ambitions; for the other parties,
incapable of regaining the mass of those 75 percent (more or
less) undecided, are increasingly unable to use big propaganda.
Such a development may, of course, be changed by external
influences: this happened when the progress of the Communist
parties in France and Italy came to an end after 1948 with a
regression of their propaganda, which was by no means at-
tributable to their past mistakes.
A second hypothesis: The opposition parties find a reply to big
propaganda. But this can only be through a regrouping of
forces, which is hard to attain because internal squabbles are
stronger than the need for a common counter-propaganda (as in
France between 1949 and 1958), or by an appeal to the govern-
ment, which may then put communication means and money at
the disposal of the party to oppose some totalitarian propaganda.
This was the case in Belgium in connection with Rexist counter-
propaganda.
The third hypothesis: A party or a bloc of parties almost as
powerful as the would-be runaway party starts big propaganda
Propaganda (219
before it is pushed to the wall. This is the case in the United
States, and might be in France if the regrouping of the Right
should become stabilized. In that situation one would neces-
sarily have, for financial reasons, a democracy reduced to two
parties, it being inconceivable that a larger number of parties
would have sufficient means to make such propaganda. This
would lead to a bipartite structure, not for reasons of doctrine
or tradition, but for technical propaganda reasons. This implies
the exclusion of new parties in the future. Not only are secondary
parties progressively eliminated, but it becomes impossible to
organize new political groups with any chance at all of making
them heard; in the midst of the concerted power of the forces
at work, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish a new pro-
gram. On the other hand, such a group would need, from the
beginning, a great deal of money, many members, and great
power. Under such conditions, a new party could only be bom
as Athena emerging fully grown from Zeus' forehead. A political
organism would have had to collect money for a long time in
advance, to have bought propaganda instruments, and united its
members before it made its appearance as a party capable of
resisting the pressures of those who possess the "media.”
Not just the mere organization of a new party is becoming in-
creasingly difficult—so is expression of a new political idea or
doctrine. Ideas no longer exist except through die media of in-
formation. When the latter are in the hands of the existing parties,
no truly revolutionary or new doctrine has any chance of ex-
pressing itself, i.e.y of existing. Yet innovation was one of the
principal characteristics of democracy. Now, because nobody
wants it any longer, it tends to disappear.
One can say that propaganda almost inevitably leads to a
two-party system. Not only would it be very difficult for several
parties to be rich enough to support such expensive campaigns
of propaganda, but also propaganda tends to schematize public
opinion. Where there is propaganda, we find fewer and fewer
nuances and refinements of detail or doctrine. Rather, opinions
are more incisive; there is only black and white, yes and no. Such
a state of public opinion leads direcdy to a two-party system and
the disappearance of a multi-party system.
The effects of propaganda can also be clearly seen in view
of what Duverger calls the party with the majority mandate
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
2.7.0)
and the party without that mandate. The party with the majority
mandate, which ordinarily should command an absolute majority
in parliament, is normally the one that has been created by propa-
ganda. Propaganda’s principal trumps then slip out of the hands
of the other parties. All the latter can do then is to make dema-
gogic propaganda, i.e., a false propaganda that is purely artificial,
considering what we have said about the relationship between
propaganda and reality. (In other words, the party out of power
must pick an artificial issue.)
In that case we find ourselves faced with two completely
contradictory propagandas. On one side is a propaganda power-
ful in media and techniques, but limited in its ends and modes
of expression, a propaganda strictly integrated into a given social
group, conformist and statist. On die other is a propaganda weak
in regard to media and techniques, but excessive in its ends and
expressions, a propaganda aimed against the existing order, against
the State, against prevailing group standards.
But one must never forget that the party with the majority
mandate, which adjusts its propaganda to that mandate and even
uses the mandate as a propaganda aim, is nevertheless also the
creation of propaganda, which hands it that mandate in a given
setting and for a long period of time.
Finally, a last word on the financial problems and their im-
plications: it is improbable that contributions alone would enable
a party to pay for the increasingly expensive propaganda media.
The parties are therefore forced to look for aid either to capitalists
—and thus indenture themselves to a financial oligarchy—or to
a government (national or foreign). In the second case, the State
comes close to appropriating the instruments. The State then lends
them to those who ask for them, which is very democratic, and
thus permits secondary parties to live; but this leads to an un-
stable situation, as I said earlier, and the State is then increasingly
forced to exercise censorship over what is being said by means of
these instruments. This censorship will be increasingly rigorous as
the State itself is forced to make more propaganda.
This leads us to examine the hypothesis of a State that ceases
to be neutral in the ideological domain and assumes a doctrine or
ideology of its own. At that moment, propaganda by the State
is imposed on all parties. To be sure, we are still dealing with
propaganda. We have seen in past decades with regard to all “state
Propaganda (221
religions” that power must first be used to shape public opinion,
without which they could not operate. Thus, at the beginnings
of the Nazi State, or of popular democracies, a certain competition
continued between the propaganda of the State and that of the
parties out of power. But in such competition the State necessarily
emerges victorious; it increasingly denies the use of the mass media
of communication to the opposition parties; it works on public
opinion until the moment arrives when it can simply suppress
opposition parties without fear. But the State can work on public
opinion only through the intermediary of a party. This is another
effect of propaganda. One could conceive of a State that would
suppress all parties and live by itself: that was the classic pat-
tern of dictatorship. However, that is no longer possible.
Once public opinion has been aroused and alerted to political
problems, it must be taken into consideration. The propaganda
mechanism of the State cannot function as an administrative unit;
it cannot have reality or efficiency except through the media of the
State party. It is impossible to imagine that a modem State could
command acceptance without working through a party establish-
ing contact between those who govern and public opinion. The
party’s fundamental role is to make propaganda for the govern-
ment, i.e., the propaganda that the government wishes to be
made. In one sense, incidentally, we find here the image of a
party in its purest state, for ultimately every party is a propa-
ganda machine. But this is much more hidden in other systems in
which there still can be nuances and discussions; in dictatorships,
the party no longer serves any ideological or political function,
no longer expresses social interests, and so on. It is an organ de-
signed to tame and train public opinion, and exists solely because
of the State’s need. As soon as that need diminishes, the role
and prestige of the party also diminish. This happened in Nazi
Germany in 1938,5 and in the Soviet Union after the purges of
1936. But as soon as propaganda again becomes important the
party resumes its role.
Propaganda very clearly gives direction to the life of political
parties, imposes certain forms and rules on them, sends them down
certain paths, and ends up by deciding their life or death until
the regime expands to the point at which propaganda and party
are totally fused. *
* After the concentration of all powers in the Fiihrer’s hands.
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
222)
In illuminating tie role of propaganda from this angle, I was not
trying to say that propaganda is the only factor in the evolution
of parties; it certainly combines with other elements, of which
one can say, however, that they either are of less importance
than propaganda, or are tied in with it
Effects on the World of Labor
We now come face to face with one of the modem world’s most
crucial problems: the world of labor, i.e., the condition of the
worker, created by technological developments, used in the begin-
ning by capitalism and used now by Socialism. Socialism has
claimed that the worker’s condition was the fruit of capitalism
and of the exploitation of workers by finance capital. This does
to some extent explain both the depressed condition of the
worker and, undoubtedly, the class struggle and certain of its
elements. But it is not the major factor. Labor conditions result
from the relation between man and machine, and are a conse-
quence of technological developments taken in the broad sense.
Urbanization, massification, streamlining, the disappearance of
the notion of “work,” mechanization, and so on—all these are
much more responsible for labor conditions than that the means
of production are privately owned. This last fact leads to prole-
tarization according to Marxist theory, but proletarization is only
one aspect of the problem. Once Socialism has taken the means
of production out of private hands, juridically speaking, the work-
ing class, abstractly speaking, is no longer the proletariat; but it
remains in the grip of the same concrete problems.
Undoubtedly the problem of poverty can be solved. But nothing
indicates that it can be more easily solved under Socialism than
under capitalism. Few workers (except farmers) in the United
States live in poverty. But one cannot say that the labor problem
has been solved even there.
If we look at the situation of labor in Socialist countries we see
that the worker still is subordinate to the machine, that he has
little personal life, that he is engulfed in the mass, and that he is
prey to the problems connected with mechanical work, artifi-
cially measured days, boredom, detachment from his work, false
culture, ignorance of environment, divorce from nature, artificial
life, and so on. But we also see that the problem of profits has not
been solved, and that the worker still is not properly paid. The
Propaganda (223
only difference is that the profit is made by the State and not by
private individuals.
In addition we see that in Socialist countries most social legis-
lation, though as advanced as in capitalist countries from the point
of view of security, family allocations, vacations, and all sorts of
financial rewards, has retrogressed with regard to unionism, the
right to strike, and work discipline. We see, finally, that the worker
in no way participates fundamentally in the life of his factory.
In Socialist countries, the works council may make suggestions
only with regard to secondary questions; with regard to principal
questions, it merely ratifies the decisions of a Five Year Plan.
Furthermore, collective ownership of the means of production
is pure fiction. The workers own nothing, and are, with regard
to the machines, in the same situation as workers under capitalism.
Whether it be the State or the entire collective (which must
necessarily be represented by some organization), the proprietor
has nothing to do with the workers in the factory. This notion
of collective ownership corresponds, on the economic plane, to
the old idea of the sovereignty of the people on the political
plane. And we know how much harm that idea, that fiction, that
abstraction has done to democracy and the power of the people. I
cannot pursue this point here, but I can assert that the situation
of labor has not really changed as the result of Socialism. Never-
theless, we must acknowledge that the attitude of the workers is
different
Except in rare cases, the working class has given its support to
the regimes in Communist countries. It is no longer a class in
opposition, but is really in accord with the regimes, and the
concrete situation seems to be that there no longer is an attitude
of rebellion. The workers put their hearts in their work, abandon
themselves to their work, no longer wish to engage in slowdowns
or strikes. This is so, no matter how much the anti-Communists
deny it.
Something undoubtedly has changed with regard to the labor
situation in Communist countries, for the workers have not been
integrated by force. What has changed, first of all, is the social
climate. The worker is no longer excluded from society. The feel-
ing of being excluded from society is felt very strongly by the
worker in a capitalist society. He is a pariah, an outsider. The
society obeys certain criteria and has certain basic structures, but
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
224)
the worker is not included in them. The problem of private
property is only a symbol of that exclusion, which, in turn, pro-
duces the proletariat. But in Socialist society, the worker is at the
center of a world that is being built. He is in an honored position.
The society is ennobled by the working class—this is said con-
stantly, and demonstrated in various cultural, political and eco-
nomic ways. This climate has changed the worker s reaction. He
is now convinced of his importance. He is also convinced that
society is not against him but for him; that this society is his
achievement, and that he is being granted, or will be granted, the
place he deserves because of the importance of his work. He is
thus filled with a positive conviction that lets him forget or neglect
the external reality of his situation. The worker in the Socialist
world no longer looks at this situation in the same way as before;
he is now filled with hope.
It is his hope that the coming world will be a just world or, more
precisely, a world in which the worker certainly will occupy first
place. It is also his conviction and hope that every piece of work,
every day of work put in by him has a purpose: to build Socialist
society; whereas in capitalist countries work serves only to pro-
duce a wage and profits only the capitalist. There the worker
experiences frustration; under Socialism, he experiences a feeling
of fulfillment.
The changes that have taken place in labor's situation are not
actual changes, but only those of a different perspective, con-
ception of life, conviction, and hope. This is indeed Socialism’s
only genuine innovation, but the transformation is effective; the
workers work more and better, put more heart in their work,
and accept strict discipline with conviction.®
This reminds me of what M. G. Friedmann has said on the im-
portance of the psychological factor in working conditions and
productivity. He believes that the psychological necessities can
be satisfied only by the Socialist perspective. Only in Socialism
can the worker, rid of his complexes and resentments, attain the
psychological freedom that permits him to dedicate himself to
his work. 8
8 In i960, at a conference in Moscow, Leonid Ilyichev, chief of agitprop, stated that
ideological education must aim at increasing productivity, the norms of the workers,
and personal sacrifices. I have already said that the principal function of propaganda
in the U.S.S.R. is to help fulfill the Five-Year Plan, to speed up work, i.e., to
increase the worker’s effort
Propaganda ( 2 2 5
But nothing indicates that this is the only solution. Even the
facts of Public Relations in the United States tend to show that
psychological means not only change the general climate consider-
ably, but also change the inner persuasion of each worker and
integrate him more into his enterprise. But this alteration has not
yet reached full bloom, and we must wait to see whether a pro-
found transformation of the working class by Public Relations
is possible.
This long detour leads us to say that the labor problem results
to some extent from the factual situation and to some extent from
psychological factors. If we want to be honest, we must admit that
for the factual situation no solution is available in any of the
social, political, or economic theories. Of course, one can make
the worker happy and give him security; a mixture of palliatives,
already known and partly utilized, can modify the consequences
of his situation, but not really the situation itself. One must
recognize, without trying to make a mystery out of the working
class, that no solution exists for its concrete problems.
There is, however, a psychological solution. The modification
that was attained by Socialist psychology can be attained by
other means, other forms of integration, other convictions, other
hopes.7 From the moment one knows that, unfortunately, Social-
ism has only psychological answers, one is forced to state that
what is involved here is a simple matter of propaganda. The
working class, fooled by the bourgeoisie, is fooled by Communism
in other ways. And just as Communism has taught bourgeois
governments the use of propaganda on the political plane, it is
now teaching them to use it on the social plane and on the prob-
lems of labor. Nowadays, we see complete disregard for the
problem of labor and a screen put around whatever problems
cannot be solved. As in all propaganda, the point is to make man
endure, with the help of psychological narcotics, what he could
not endure naturally, or to give him, artificially, reasons to con-
tinue his work and to do it well. This is a task of propaganda, and
there is no doubt that if it is done well, it will make possible
the integration of the working class and make it accept its condi-
tion happily. In one way or another, propaganda is called upon
7 According to the cynical formula reported by Vance Packard: *Make them
work and like it”
THE SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS
226)
to “solve” the labor problem, to the extent that the problem
becomes a political factor and can be treated as such in the
mechanism of the modem world.
Only those who do not know the capabilities of modem propa-
ganda can doubt the possibility of such a solution. Of course, to
make such integration propaganda of the labor class successful,
several conditions must obtain. First of all, the material conditions
of labor must improve. I have constantly stressed the link between
propaganda and true reforms. But that does not suffice in the least.
On the contrary the improvement of material conditions of the
worker can become a springboard for better revolutionary agita-
tion, as history shows. A certain development of technical edu-
cation and information is needed: the more the worker becomes a
technician, the more he becomes a conformist. At the same
time, if he is provided with a broader base of information, he will
become more susceptible to propaganda, according to the mech-
anism analyzed earlier.
Finally, some unity of psychological action is needed. As long
as the worker is enclosed in such organizations as parties or
unions, which subject him to a propaganda opposed to his inte-
gration in the society, the partitioning, which we discussed earlier,
takes place. One of the most important factors in this connection
is that in Socialist countries the unions have become organizations
in harmony with the society and make the same propaganda.
The same holds true in the United States; the unions, though
they defend their members, are also organs of the society and
in no way question the American Way of Life. Consequently,
the propaganda made by the unions is important for the integra-
tion of the workers. But such propaganda, by itself, transforms
the unions.
Like the political parties, the unions have felt the need to make
propaganda. One may say that, on the one hand, most of the
propaganda effects already studied with regard to political parties
also obtain for unions. But there are other, particular effects
here, which derive from the fact that unions are by nature organs
of combat, of defense, which represent more or less—but un-
deniably—foreign elements in a society. Whether the society
is capitalist or not, a union has its own battle to fight; this is
inherent in the structure and rationale of unions.
But from the moment that the union wants to engage in propa-
Propaganda (227
ganda, it runs head-on into the necessity of using the mass media
of communication.
Of course, union propaganda has a character of its own: it is
much more “human,” costs less, uses the devotion of union
members, their close human contact, and so on. But it cannot
help using the great media of modem propaganda, particularly
the newspaper and the poster, as the problem no longer is merely
one of getting people to attend meetings, but one of promulgating
policy positions and of setting up a true labor mentality. This
presumes a certain intellectual agility that the labor militants
do not possess.
From the moment the union begins to use newspapers and
posters, it runs into money problems. And the more propaganda
tries to reach individuals, die more it must use the important
media—and the more expensive it will be. The financial prob-
lems do not recede when the union becomes larger; the expenses
for propaganda grow more rapidly than revenues (except in the
United States). This leads the union either to acquire its own
instruments of propaganda, or to seek financial assistance of a
more or less dubious and constraining nature.8
When the union hits upon a successful propaganda, it reaches
public opinion. It wins this opinion over to the cause of labor,
alerts it to problems of social injustice, and mobilizes people pro
or con. Whether one wants it or not, this is the basic objective
of propaganda. This mobilized public opinion will then translate
the propaganda effect in one of two ways. First of all, union
membership will grow: propaganda obviously leads to increase
in the number of members. But here we see a well-known mass
effect: the more the union grows, the less revolutionary, the less
active, the less militant it becomes. Mass lends more weight
to its demands, but those demands become less decisive and
radical. The mass union becomes peaceful and bureaucratic; its
8 One can give the example of the American unions, which are the most powerful
in the world and which have become progressively modified by the very propaganda
that helped them attain their power. There are a few union publications with
editions of several hundred thousand copies. They also use film and TV. Over two
hundred transmissions from unions are broadcast each day in the United States. In
Chicago, a radio station belongs to a union. Here, the considerable expenses are
paid by contributions. But this rests on an accord between the unions and the
employers: the employers have agreed to employ only union labor (it is obligatory)
and to collect these contributions by deducting them from the employees' wages.
This means that all this enormous propaganda cannot endanger the economic
powers in the United States.
THE SOCIOPOLmCAL EFFECTS
228)
moves become less and less spontaneous; a gap opens between its
members and its general staff. That is the first result of alerting
public opinion through propaganda.
The second result derives from the fact that sooner or later
the government will be affected by this development. It will then
tend to legitimize and legalize such labor action in some way;
this is also an effect of propaganda. But when the government
legalizes a union, a relationship arises between union and govern-
ment, which is not one of conflict. Its legalization leads the union
to adapt itself, more or less, to its lawful status and to conduct its
social struggle on the legal plane. What matters then is to obtain
new legal concessions from the State. But that is a long way from
the original objectives of a union.
Thus propaganda leads a union to become a “have” rather
than a “have-not” organization, to present itself as a constituent
member of society, to play the social game. This is true integration
into society, and as a result the union is no longer in opposition:
its opposition is purely apparent and fictitious. Whether, from
then on, it becomes part of capitalist society, as in the United
States, or of Socialist society, as in the U.S.S.R., matters not in
the least; the results are identical. The union cannot win public
opinion without adapting itself to it, without accepting the essen-
tial premises of the society in which it seeks a public, an audience,
and supporters. Here we find again the conforming effect that I
have already analyzed, and which derives from propaganda.
Effects on the Churches
Obviously, church members are caught in the net of propa-
ganda and react pretty much like everyone else. As a result, an
almost complete dissociation takes place between their Chris-
tianity and their behavior. Their Christianity remains a spiritual
and purely internal thing. But their behavior is dictated by various
appurtenances, and particularly by propaganda. Of course, a cer-
tain gap has always existed between “ideals” and “action.” But
today this gap has become total, general, and deliberate. This
widening of the gap, particularly its systematic widening, is the
fruit of propaganda in the political or economic domain, and of
advertising in the private domain.
Because Christians are flooded with various propagandas, they
absolutely cannot see what they might do that would be effective
Propaganda (229
and at the same time be an expression of their Christianity. There-
fore, with different motivations and often with scruples, they limit
themselves to one or another course presented to them by propa-
ganda. They too take the panorama of the various propagandas
for living political reality, and do not see where they can insert
their Christianity in that fictitious panorama. Thus, like all the
others, they are stumped, and this fact removes all weight from
their belief.
At the same time, because of its psychological effects, propa-
ganda makes the propagation of Christianity increasingly diffi-
cult. The psychological structures built by propaganda are not
propitious to Christian beliefs. This also applies on the social
plane. For propaganda faces the church with the following
dilemma:
Either not to make propaganda—but then, while the churches
slowly and carefully win a man to Christianity, the mass media
quicldy mobilize the masses, and churchmen gain the impression
of being “out of step,” on the fringes of history, and without
power to change a thing.
Or to make propaganda—this dilemma is surely one of the
most cruel with which the churches are faced at present. For
it seems that people manipulated by propaganda become increas-
ingly impervious to spiritual realities, less and less suited for the
autonomy of a Christian life.
We are seeing a considerable religious transformation, by which
the religious element, through the means of the myth, is being
absorbed little by little by propaganda and becoming one of its
categories. But we must ask ourselves what happens if the church
gives in and resorts to propaganda.
I already have stressed the total character of propaganda. Chris-
tians often claim they can separate material devices from propa-
ganda techniques—i.e., break the system. For example, they
think they can use press and radio without using the psychological
principles or techniques that these media demand. Or that they
can use these media without having to appeal to conditioned
reflexes, myths, and so on. Or that they can use them from time
to time, with care and discretion.
The only answer one can give to these timid souls is that such
restraint would lead to a total lack of effectiveness. If a church
wants to use propaganda in order to be effective, just as all the
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
230)
others, it must use the entire system with all its resources; it
cannot pick what it likes, for such distinctions would destroy the
very effectiveness for which the church would make propaganda
in the first place. Propaganda is a total system that one must
accept or reject in its entirety.
If the church accepts it, two important consequences follow.
First of all, Christianity disseminated by such means is not
Christianity. We have already seen the effect of propaganda on
ideology. In fact, what happens as soon as the church avails itself
of propaganda is a reduction of Christianity to the level of all
other ideologies or secular religions.
This can be seen happening throughout history. Every time
a church tried to act through the propaganda devices accepted by
an epoch, the truth and authenticity of Christianity were debased.
This happened in the fourth, ninth, and seventeenth centuries
(of course, this does not mean that no more Christians were left
as a result).
In such moments (when acting through propaganda), Chris-
tianity ceases to be an overwhelming power and spiritual adven-
ture and becomes institutionalized in all its expressions and
compromised in all its actions. It serves everybody as an ideology
with the greatest of ease, and tends to be a hoax. In such times,
there appear innumerable sweetenings and adaptations, which
denature Christianity by adjusting it to the milieu.
Thus reduced to nothing more than an ideology, Christianity
will be treated as such by the propagandist. And in the modem
world we can repeat in connection with this particular ideology
what we have already said on the subject of ideologies in general.
What happens is that the church will be able to move the masses
and convert thousands of people to its ideology. But this ideology
will no longer be Christianity. It will be just another doctrine,
though it will still contain (sometimes, but not always) some of
the original principles and the Christian vocabulary.
The other consequence affects the church itself. When it uses
propaganda, the church succeeds, just as all other organizations.
It reaches the masses, influences collective opinions, leads socio-
logical movements, and even makes many people accept what
seems to be Christianity. But in doing that the church becomes
a false church. It acquires power and influence that are of this
world, and through them integrates itself into this world.
Propaganda (231
From the moment the church exposes itself to the conflict be-
tween sociological determinants and a contrary inspiration that
comes from God and is directed toward God—from the moment
the church uses propaganda and uses it successfully, it becomes,
unremittingly, a purely sociological organization. It loses the
spiritual part, for it now transmits only a false Christianity; it
subordinates the essence of its being to sociological determination;
it submits to the laws of efficiency in order to become a power
in the world, and, in fact, it succeeds: it does become such a
power. At that moment it has chosen power above truth.
When the church uses propaganda, it always tries to justify
itself in two ways: It says, first of all, that it puts these efficient
media in the service of Jesus Christ. But if one reflects for a
moment, one realizes that this means nothing. What is in the
service of Jesus Christ receives its character and effectiveness
from Jesus Christ. The media that possess in themselves all their
effectiveness and contain in themselves their own presuppositions
and ends, cannot be put in the service of Jesus Christ. They obey
their own rules, and this cannot be changed in the slightest, either
by the content of their transmissions or by theological reasoning,
despite what simplistic reasoning can make some people believe.
In fact, a statement by the church that it is placing the media
at the service of Christ, is not a logical or ethical explanation, but a
pious formula without content.
One tries to escape from this trap by saying that one cannot
see why the church should be prevented from using such an
instrument of dissemination or power, so long as it docs not put
its confidence in such instruments; for one recalls from the Bible
that confidence in anything other than God is condemned. But
here it is enough to ask oneself: if one really does not believe in
these instruments and really does not put ones confidence in
them, why use them? If one uses them, one has confidence in their
value and effectiveness; to deny this is hypocrisy. Of course,
in connection with all this, we are thinking of real propaganda, not
of some limited use of press or radio to transmit a Mass or
service.
At the end of this brief analysis we can conclude that propa-
ganda is one of the most powerful factors of de-Christianization
in the world through the psychological modifications that it
effects, through the ideological morass with which it has flooded
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
232)
the consciousness of the masses, through the reduction of Chris-
tianity to the level of an ideology, through the never-ending
temptation held out to the church—all this is the creation of a
mental universe foreign to Christianity. And this de-Christianiza-
tion through the effects of one instrument—propaganda—is much
greater than through all the anti-Christian doctrines.
4. Propaganda and Democracy
Democracy98 Need of Propaganda
On one fact there can be no debate: the need of democracy,
in its present situation, to “make propaganda.”9 We must
understand, besides, that private propaganda, even more than
governmental propaganda, is importantly linked to democracy.
Historically, from the moment a democratic regime establishes
itself, propaganda establishes itself alongside it under various
forms. This is inevitable, as democracy depends on public opinion
and competition between political parties. In order to come to
power, parties make propaganda to gain voters.
Let us remember that the advent of the masses through the
development of the democracies has provoked the use of propa-
ganda, and that this is precisely one of the arguments of defense
of the democratic State—that it appeals to the people, who are
mobilized by propaganda; that it defends itself against private
interests or anti-democratic parties. It is a remarkable fact worthy
of attention that modem propaganda should have begun in the
democratic States. During World War I we saw the combined
use of the mass media for the first time; the application of publicity
and advertising methods to political affairs, the search for the
9 Perceptive authors agree that without propaganda a democratic State is disarmed
at home (vis-^-vis the parties) and abroad, the latter as a result of the famous
“challenge” that sets the democracies and the totalitarian States against each other.
But one must not overlook the many setbacks that democracy has suffered for lack
of propaganda. Maurice M6gret shows (in VAction psychologique [Paris: A.
Fayard; 1959]) that the crisis in which the French Army found itself from 1950
on was in large part caused by an absence of psychological action on the part of
the government, and he demonstrates that the famous Plan was less than a great
success for the same reasons. Finally, we must remember that if the democratic
State is denied the right to make propaganda, such propaganda appears in the form
of Public Relations at the expense of the State, and is all the more dangerous
because camouflaged.
Propaganda (233
most effective psychological methods. But in those days German
propaganda was mediocre: the French, English, and American
democracies launched big propaganda. Similarly, the Leninist
movement, undeniably democratic at the start, developed and
perfected all propaganda methods. Contrary to some belief, the
authoritarian regimes were not the first to resort to this type of
action, though they eventually employed it beyond all limits.
This statement should make us think about the relationship be-
tween democracy and propaganda.
For it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles of
democracy—particularly its concept of the individual—and the
processes of propaganda. The notion of rational man, capable of
thinking and living according to reason, of controlling his passions
and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely
between good and evil—all this seems opposed to the secret in-
fluences, the mobilizations of myths, the swift appeals to the ir-
rational, so characteristic of propaganda.
But this development within the democratic framework can be
understood clearly if we look at it not from the level of principles
but from that of actual situations. If, so far, we have concluded
that inside a democracy propaganda is normal and indispensable,
even intrinsic in the regime, that there are one or more propa-
gandas at work, nothing seems to make propaganda obligatory
in external relations. There the situation is entirely different.
There the democratic State will want to present itself as the car-
rier of its entire public opinion, and the democratic nation will
want to present itself as a coherent whole. But that creates some
difficulty because such desire does not correspond to a true and
exact picture of democracy. Moreover, this implies an endemic,
permanent state of war. But, whereas it is easy to show that
permanent wars established themselves at the same time as demo-
cratic regimes, it is even easier to demonstrate that these regimes
express a strong desire for peace and do not systematically pre-
pare for war. By this I mean that the economic and sociological
conditions of the democracies possibly provoke general conflicts,
but that the regime, such as it is, is not organically tied to war.
It is led there, volens nolens. And it adjusts poorly to the situa-
tion of the Cold War, which is essentially psychological.
Another circumstance imprisons democracy in the ways of
propaganda: the persistence of some traits of the democratic
THE SOaO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
234)
ideology. The conviction of the invincible force of truth is tied
to the notion of progress and is a part of this ideology. Democra-
cies have been fed on the notion that truth may be hidden for
a while but will triumph in the end, that truth in itself carries
an explosive force, a power of fermentation that will necessarily
lead to the end of lies and the shining apparition of the true.
This truth was the implicit core of the democratic doctrine.
One must stress, furthermore, that this was in itself a truth of
an ideological kind that ended by making history because it im-
posed itself on history. This attitude contained die seeds of, but
was at the same time (and still is) the exact opposite of, the
current Marxist attitude that history is truth. Proof through history
is nowadays regarded as the proof. He in whose favor history
decides, was right. But what is "to be right” when one speaks
of history? It is to win, to survive, i.e., to be the strongest. This
would mean that the strongest and most efficient, nowadays, is the
possessor of the truth. Truth thus has no content of its own,
but exists only as history produces it; truth receives reality through
history.
One can easily see the relationship between the two attitudes
and how one can pass easily from one to the other: for if truth
possesses an invincible power that makes it triumph through
itself alone, it becomes logical—by a simple but dangerous step
—that triumph is truth. But—and this is frightening—the conse-
quences of the two attitudes are radically different.
To think that democracy must triumph because it is the truth
leads man to be democratic and to believe that when the demo-
cratic regime is opposed to regimes of oppression, its superiority
will be clear at first sight to the infallible judgment of man and
history. The choice is thus certain. What amazement is displayed
again and again by democrats, particularly Anglo-Saxon demo-
crats, when they see that a man selects something else, and that
history is indecisive. In such cases they decide to use information.
"Because democratic reality was not known, people have made a
bad choice,” they say, and even there we find the same conviction
of the power of truth. But it is not borne out by facts. We will
not establish a general law here, to be sure, but we will say that
it is not a general law that truth triumphs automatically, though
it may in certain periods of history or with respect to certain
verities. We cannot generalize here at all. History shows that plain
Propaganda (235
truth can be so thoroughly snuffed out that it disappears, and that
in certain periods the lie is all-powerful.
Even when truth triumphs, does it triumph through itself
(because it is truth)? After all, the eternal verities defended
by Antigone would, in the eyes of history, have yielded to Creon
even if Sophocles had not exited.
But in our time, the conviction of democracy and its claim
to inform people collide with the fact that propaganda follows
an entirely different mechanism, performs a function entirely
different from that of information, and that nowadays facts do
not assume reality in the people's eyes unless they are established
by propaganda. Propaganda, in fact, creates truth in the sense that
it creates in men subject to propaganda all the signs and indica-
tions of true believers.
For modem man, propaganda is really creating truth. This
means that truth is powerless without propaganda. And in view
of the challenge the democracies face, it is of supreme importance
that they abandon their confidence in truth as such and assimi-
late themselves to the methods of propaganda. Unless they do
so, considering the present tendencies of civilization, the demo-
cratic nations will lose the war conducted in this area.
Democratic Propaganda
Convinced of the necessity for using the means of propaganda,
students of that question have found themselves facing the follow-
ing problem. Totalitarian States have used propaganda to the
limit, domestically in order to create conformity, manipulate
public opinion, and adjust it to the decisions of the government;
externally to conduct the Cold War, undermine the public opinion
of nations considered enemies, and turn them into willing victims.
But if these instruments were used principally by authoritarian
States, and if democracies, whose structure seemed made for their
use, did not use them, can they now be used by democracies?
By that I mean that the propaganda of the authoritarian State has
certain special traits, which seem inseparable from that State.
Must democratic propaganda have other traits? Is it possible to
make democratic propaganda?
Let us quickly dismiss the idea that a simple difference of con-
tent would mean a difference in character. “From the moment
that propaganda is used to promulgate democratic ideas, it is
THE SOaO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
236)
good; if it is bad it is only because of its authoritarian content.”
Such a position is terribly idealistic and neglects the principal
condition of the modem world: the primacy of means over ends.
But one may say—and this is a matter worthy of reflection—
that democracy itself is not a good “propaganda object.” Practi-
cally all propaganda efforts to promulgate democracy have failed.
In fact, one would have to modify the entire concept of democ-
racy considerably to make it a good propaganda object, which at
present it is not.
Also, in passing, I will mention the following thought: “From
the moment that democracy uses this instrument (propaganda),
propaganda becomes democratic.” This thought is not often ex-
pressed quite so simply and aggressively, but it is an implicit
notion found in most American writers. Nothing can touch
democracy: on the contrary, it impresses its character on every-
thing it touches. This prejudice is important for understanding
the American democratic mythology and the tentative adoption of
this principle by other popular democracies.
Such positions are so superficial and so remote from the actual
situation that they do not need to be discussed. Besides, they
usually come from journalists or commentators, and not from men
who have seriously studied the problem of propaganda and its
effects. Even the majority of the latter, however, retain the con-
viction that one can set up a propaganda system that expresses
the democratic character and does not alter the working of
democracy. That is the double demand that one must make of
propaganda in a democratic regime.
It is argued that the first condition would be met by the absence
of a monopoly (in a democracy) of the means of propaganda, and
by the free interplay of various propagandas. True, compared
with the State monopoly and the unity of propaganda in totali-
tarian States, one finds a great diversity of press and radio in
democratic countries. But this fact must not be stressed too much:
although there is no State or legal monopoly, there is, neverthe-
less, indeed a private monopoly. Even where there are many
newspaper publishers, concentration as a result of “newspaper
chains” is well established, and the monopolization of news agen-
cies, of distribution and so on, is well known. In the field of radio
or of motion pictures the same situation prevails: obviously not
everybody can own propaganda media. In the United States, most
Propaganda (2 37
radio and motion picture corporations are very large. The others
are secondary and unable to compete, and centralization still goes
on. The trend everywhere is in the direction of a very few, very
powerful companies controlling all the propaganda media. Are
they still private? In any event, as we have already seen, the State
must make its propaganda, if only under the aspect of disseminat-
ing news.
Assuming that information is an indispensable element of
democracy, it is necessary that the information promulgated by
the State be credible. Without credibility, it will fail. But what
happens when a powerful private propaganda organization denies
facts and falsifies information? Who can tell where truth lies?
On whom can the citizen rely to judge the debate? It is on this
level that the dialogue really takes place. The problem then is
whether the State will support a private competitor who controls
media equal or superior to its own but makes different propa-
ganda. It may even be entirely legitimate for the State to suppress
or annex such a competitor.
Some will say: “Freedom of expression is democracy; to prevent
propaganda is to violate democracy.” Certainly, but it must be
remembered that the freedom of expression of one or two power-
ful companies that do not express the thoughts of the individual
or small groups, but of capitalist interests or an entire public,
does not exactly correspond to what was called freedom of ex-
pression a century ago. One must remember, further, that the
freedom of expression of one who makes a speech to a limited
audience is not the same as that of the speaker who has all the
radio sets in the country at his disposal, all the more as the science
of propaganda gives to these instruments a shock effect that the
non-initiated cannot equal.
I refer in this connection to the excellent study by Rivero,1
who demonstrates the immense difference between the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries in this respect:
In the nineteenth century, the problem of opinion formation
through the expression of thought was essentially a problem of
contacts between the State and the individual, and a problem
of acquisition of a freedom. But today, thanks to the mass media,
the individual finds himself outside the battle . . . the debate is
1 "Technique de formation de l’opinion publique,” in VOpinion Publiqtie (i957)-
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
238)
between the State and powerful groups. . . . Freedom to express
ideas is no longer at stake in this debate. . . . What we have is
mastery and domination by the State or by some powerful groups
over the whole of the technical media of opinion formation . . .
the individual has no access to them ... he is no longer a partici-
pant in this battle for the free expression of ideas: he is the stake.
What matters for him is which voice he will be permitted to hear
and which words will have the power to obsess him....
It is in the light of this perfect analysis that one must ask
oneself what freedom of expression still means in a democracy.
But even if the State held all the instruments of propaganda
(and this becomes increasingly probable for political, economic,
and financial reasons—particularly so far as TV2 is concerned),
what characterizes democracy is that it permits the expression
of different propagandas. This is true. But it is impossible to
permit the expression of all opinion. Immoral and aberrant
opinions are justifiably subject to censorship. Purely personal
opinions and, even more, certain political tendencies are neces-
sarily excluded. "No freedom for the enemies of freedom” is
the watchword then. Thus the democracies create for themselves
a problem of limitation and degree. Who then will exclude cer-
tain propaganda instruments? For the Fascist, the Communists
are the enemies of truth. For the Communists, the enemies of
freedom are the bourgeois, the Fascists, the cosmopolitans. And
for the democracy? Obviously all enemies of democracy.
Matters are even more serious. In time of war, everybody agrees
that news must be limited and controlled, and that all propaganda
not in the national interest must be prohibited. From that fact
grows a unified propaganda. The problem that now arises is
this: We have talked of the Cold War. But it seems that the
democracies have not yet learned that the Cold War is no longer
an exceptional state, a state analogous to hot war (which is
transitory), but is becoming a permanent and endemic state.
There are many reasons for that. I will name only one: propa-
ganda itself.
Propaganda directed to territories outside one’s borders is a
weapon of war. This does not depend on the will of those who
use it or on a doctrine, but is a result of the medium itself.
2 In France. (Trans.)
Propaganda (2 39
Propaganda has such an ability to effect psychological transforma-
tions and such an impact on the very core of man that it inevitably
has military force when used by a government and directed to
the outside. There is no “simple** use of propaganda; a propa-
ganda conflict is hardly less serious than an armed conflict. It is
inevitable, therefore, that in cold war the same attitude exists
as in the case of hot war: one feels the need to unify propaganda.
Here democracies are caught in a vicious circle from which they
seem unable to escape.
The other principal aspect of democratic propaganda is that
it is subject to certain values. It is not unfettered but fettered;8
it is an instrument not of passion but of reason.* 4 Therefore,
democratic propaganda must be essentially truthful. It must speak
only the truth and base itself only on facts. This can be ob-
served in American propaganda: it is undeniable that American
information and propaganda are truthful. But that does not seem
to me characteristic of democracy. The formula with which
Americans explain their attitude is: “The truth pays.” That is,
propaganda based on truth is more effective than any other.
Besides, Hitlers famous statement on the lie is not a typical trait
of propaganda. There is an unmistakable evolution here: lies
and falsifications are used less and less. We have already said that.
The use of precise facts is becoming increasingly common.
Conversely, the use of nuances and a certain suppleness reveals
an attitude peculiar to democracy. At bottom there is a certain
respect for the human being, unconscious perhaps, and becoming
steadily weaker, but nevertheless still there; even the most
Machiavellian of democrats respects the conscience of his listener
and does not treat him with haste or contempt. The tradition
of respecting the individual has not yet been eliminated, and this
leads to all sorts of consequences. First, it limits propaganda.
The democratic State uses propaganda only if driven by circum-
stances—for example, traditionally, after wars. But whereas
private and domestic propaganda is persistent in its effects, gov-
ernmental and external propaganda evaporate easily. Besides,
* Propaganda as such is limited in the democracies by law, by the separation of
powers, and so on.
4 See, for example, "Trends in Twentieth-Centur^ Propaganda," by Ernst Kris and
Nathan Leites, who contrast the appeal to the super-ego and to the irrational by
authoritarian propaganda with democratic propaganda, which is directed at the ego.
THE SOdO-POLITlCAL EFFECTS
240)
such propaganda is not total, does not seek to envelop all of
human life, to control every form of behavior, to attach itself
ultimately to one’s person. A third trait of democratic propa-
ganda is that it looks at both sides of the coin. The democratic
attitude is frequently close to that of a university: there is no
absolute truth, and it is acknowledged that the opponent has some
good faith, some justice, some reason on his side. It is a question
of nuances. There is no strict rule—except in time of war—
about Good on one side and Bad on the other.
Finally, the democratic propagandist or democratic State will
often have a bad conscience about using propaganda. The old
democratic conscience still gets in the way and burdens him;
he has the vague feeling that he is engaged in something illegiti-
mate. Thus, for the propagandist in a democracy to throw him-
self fully into his task it is necessary that he believe—i.e., that he
formulate his own convictions when he makes propaganda.
Lasswell has named still another difference between democratic
and totalitarian propaganda, pertaining to the technique of propa-
ganda itself, and distinguishing between “contrasted incitement”
and “positive incitement.” The first consists of a stimulus un-
leashed by the experimenter or the authorities in order to produce
in the masses an effect in which those in power do not participate.
This, according to Lasswell, is the customary method of despotism.
Conversely, the positive incitement, symbolizing the extended
brotherly hand, is a stimulus that springs from what the powers
that be really feel, in which they want to make the masses
participate. It is a communal action. This analysis is roughly
accurate.
All this represents the situation in which democracies find
themselves in the face of propaganda, and indicates the differ-
ences between democratic and authoritarian propaganda methods.
But I must now render a very serious judgment on such activity
(democratic propaganda): all that I have described adds up to
ineffectual propaganda. Precisely to the extent that the propa-
gandist retains his respect for the individual, he denies himself
the very penetration that is the ultimate aim of all propaganda:
that of provoking action without prior thought. By respecting
nuances, he neglects the major law of propaganda: every assertion
must be trenchant and total. To the extent that he remains partial,
he fails to use the mystique. But that mystique is indispensable
Propaganda (241
for well-made propaganda. To the extent that a democratic propa-
gandist has a bad conscience, he cannot do good work; nor can he
when he believes in his own propaganda. As concerns LasswelTs
distinction, the technique of propaganda demands one form or
the other, depending on circumstances. In any event, propa-
ganda always creates a schism between the government and the
mass, that same schism I have described in the book The Techno-
logical Society, and that is provoked by all the techniques, whose
practitioners constitute a sort of aristocracy of technicians and
who modify the structures of the State.
According to LasswelTs analysis, propaganda based on con-
trasted incitation expresses a despotism. I would rather say that
it expresses an aristocracy. But the famous “massive democracy"
corresponds to that, is that. Ultimately, even if one tries to
maintain confidence and communion between the government
and the governed, all propaganda ends up as a means by which
the prevailing powers manipulate the masses.
The true propagandist must be as cold, lucid, and rigorous as
a surgeon. There are subjects and objects. A propagandist who
believes in what he says and lets himself become a victim of his
own game will have the same weakness as a surgeon who operates
on a loved one or a judge who presides at a trial of a member of
his own family. To use the instrument of propaganda nowadays,
one must have a scientific approach—the lack of which was die
weakness that became apparent in Nazi propaganda in its last few
years: clearly, after 1943, one could see from its content that
Goebbels had begun to believe it himself.
Thus, some of democracy's fundamental aspects paralyze the
conduct of propaganda. There is, therefore, no “democratic"
propaganda. Propaganda made by the democracies is ineffective,
paralyzed, mediocre. We can say the same when there is a diver-
sity of propagandas: when various propagandas are permitted to
express themselves they become ineffective with respect to their
immediate objective. This ineffectiveness with regard to the citi-
zens of a democracy needs more analysis. Let us merely emphasize
here that our propaganda is outclassed by that of totalitarian
States. This means that ours does not do its job. But in view of
the challenge we face, it is imperative that ours be effective.
One must therefore abandon the traits that are characteristic of
democracy but paralyzing for propaganda; the combination of
THE SOdOPOUTTCAL EFFECTS
242)
effective propaganda and respect for the individual seems im-
possible.
There is a last element, which I shall mention briefly. Jacques
Driencourt has demonstrated that propaganda is totalitarian in
its essence, not because it is the handmaiden of the totalitarian
State, but because it has a tendency to absorb everything. This
finding is the best part of his work.5 It means that when one
takes that route, one cannot stop halfway: one must use all
instruments and all methods that make propaganda effective.
One must expect—and developments over the past dozen years
show it—that the democracies will abandon their precautions and
their nuances and throw themselves wholeheartedly into effective
propaganda action. But such action will no longer have a special
democratic character.
We must now examine the effects that the making of propa-
ganda has on democracy. To measure that, we must distinguish
between external and domestic propaganda. We must not retain
the illusion that propaganda is merely a neutral instrument that
one can use without being affected. It is comparable to radium,
and what happens to the radiologists is well known.
Effects of International Propaganda
In the domain of external politics and the propaganda that is
directed toward the outside, there is practically no more private
propaganda or any diversity of propagandas. Even parties in-
dentured to a foreign government, and thus making propaganda
different from that of their own national government, direct their
propaganda to the interior. But what character does this unique
form of propaganda (directed to the outside) take, and what re-
percussions has it on a democracy that conducts it? Can it be that
it really exists in the domain of information?
We have abundant proof nowadays that straight information
addressed to a foreign country is entirely useless.* 8 Where the
problem is to overcome national antipathies (which exist even
between friendly nations), allegiance to a different government,
to a different psychological and historical world, and finally to
5 La Propagande, nouveUe force politique (Paris: A. Colin; 1950).
8 We are talking here primarily of propaganda directed at the Communist coun-
tries.
Propaganda (243
an opposite propaganda, it is fruitless to expect anything from
straight information: the bare fact (the truth) can accomplish
nothing against such barriers. Facts are not believed. Other
than in exceptional cases (military occupation and so on), people
believe their own government over a foreign government. The
latter's facts are not believed. In fact, propaganda can penetrate
the consciousness of the masses of a foreign country only through
the myth. It cannot operate with simple arguments pro and con.
It does not address itself to already existing feelings, but must
create an image to act as a motive force. This image must have
an emotional character that leads to the allegiance of the entire
being, without thought. That is, it must be a myth.
But then democracy takes a path that needs watching. First
of all, it begins to play a game that drives man from the conscious
and rational into the arms of irrational and “obscure forces”;
but we already know that in this game the believer is not the
master, and that forces thus unleashed are rarely brought under
control again. To put it differently: mythical democratic propa-
ganda in no way prepares its listeners for democracy, but
strengthens their totalitarian tendencies, providing at best a differ-
ent direction for those tendencies. We will have to come back to
this. But above all we must ask ourselves what myth the democra-
cies should use. From experience we have seen that the democra-
cies have used the myths of Peace, of Freedom, of Justice, and so
on.
All that has now been used, and is all the more unacceptable
because everybody uses these words. But the myth used by propa-
ganda must be specific: the myth of Blood and Soil was remark-
able. What specific myths are left for democracy? Either subjects
that cannot possibly form the content of a myth, such as well-
being or the right to vote, or democracy itself.
Contrary to what one may think, the myth of democracy is far
from exhausted and can still furnish good propaganda material.
The fact that Communist authoritarian regimes also have chosen
democracy as the springboard of propaganda tends to prove its
propagandists value. And to the extent that democracy is pre-
sented, constructed, and organized as a myth, it can be a good
subject of propaganda. Propaganda appeals to belief: it rebuilds
the drive toward the lost paradise and uses man's fundamental
fear. Only from this aspect does democratic propaganda have
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
244)
some chance of penetration into non-democratic foreign coun-
tries. But one must then consider the consequences.
The first consequence is that any operation that transforms
democracy into a myth transforms the democratic ideal. Democ-
racy was not meant to be a myth. The question arose early—in
1791 in France. And we know what, shordy after, Jacobinism
made of French democracy. We must understand this: Jacobinism
saved the country. It claimed to have saved the Republic, but
it is clear that it only saved the Jacobin regime by destroying all
that was democratic. We cannot analyze here at length the in-
fluence of the myth on the abolition of democracy during 1793-5.
Let us merely say that democracy cannot be an object of faith,
of belief: it is expression of opinions. There is a fundamental
difference between regimes based on opinion and regimes based
on belief.
To make a myth of democracy is to present the opposite of
democracy. One must clearly realize that the use of ancient myths
and the creation of new ones is a regression toward primitive
mentality, regardless of material progress. The evocation of mysti-
cal feelings is a rejection of democratic feelings. Considerable
problems arise in the United States because of such diverse myths
as, for example, the Ku Klux Klan, the American Legion, or Father
Divine. These are anti-democratic, but they are localized, only
partial, and private. The matter becomes infinitely more serious
when the myth becomes public, generalized, and official, when
what is an anti-mystique becomes a mystique.
Of course, we have said that such democratic propaganda is
created for external use. People already subjected to totalitarian
propaganda can be reached only by the myth, and even that
does not change their behavior or mentality; it simply enters into
the existing mold and creates new beliefs there. But looking
at things this way implies two consequences.
First, we accept the fact that such external democratic propa-
ganda should be a weapon, that we are dealing here with psycho-
logical warfare, and that we adjust ourselves to the enemy’s train
of thought; and that, proceding from there, the people that we
subject to our propaganda are not those whom we want to see
become democratic but whom we want to defeat. If we actually
work on such a nation with the help of the myth, we confirm it
in a state of mind, in a behavior, and in a concept of life that
Propaganda (*45
is anti-democratic: we do not prepare it to become a democratic
nation, for on the one hand we reinforce or continue the methods
of its own authoritarian government; and on the other, we cannot
give the people, by such means, the desire to adhere to something
else in another way. We are simply asking for the same kind of
acceptance of something else, of another form of government. Is
this sufficient to make people switch allegiance? That is the
democratic propaganda problem in Germany and Japan.
In the second place, such methods imply that we consider
democracy an abstraction; for if we think that to cast different
ideas in the mold of propaganda is sufficient to change the nature
of propaganda, we make a mere theory or idea of democracy.
Propaganda, whatever its content, tends to create a particular
psychology and a determined behavior. Superficially there can
be differences, but they are illusory. To say, for example, that
Fascist propaganda, whose subject was the State, and Nazi prop-
aganda, whose subject was the race, were different from each
other because of their difference in content, is to become a victim
of unreal and academic distinctions. But “the democratic idea”
when promulgated by means that lead to non-democratic be-
havior only hardens the totalitarian man in his mold.
This does not take into account that this democratic veneer
and the myth of democracy as a propaganda subject are very
fragile. It is, in fact, one of propaganda’s essential laws that its
objects always adjust themselves to its forms. In this, as in so
many other domains of the modem world, the means impose
their own laws. To put it differently: the objects of propaganda
tend to become totalitarian because propaganda itself is totalitar-
ian. This is exactly what I said when I spoke of the necessity to
turn democracy into a myth.
Thus, such propaganda can be effective as a weapon of war,
but we must realize when using it that we simultaneously destroy
the possibility of building true democracy.
I have said that such propaganda was for external use, that the
myth was directed to the outside. But it is not certain that one
can impose such a limitation. When a government builds up the
democratic image in this fashion, it cannot isolate the external
and internal domains from each other. Therefore the people of the
country making such propaganda must also become convinced
of the excellence of this image. They must not merely know it,
THE SOQOPOIJnCAL EFFECTS
246)
but also follow it. This, incidentally, sets a limit to the degree to
which propaganda can he; a democratic government cannot pre-
sent to the outside world a radically inexact and mendacious pic-
ture of its policies, as can a totalitarian government.
But one must qualify this thought in two ways; on the one
hand a democratic nation is itself more or less in the grip of propa-
ganda and goes along with the idealistic image of its government
because of national pride; on the other, even authoritarian gov-
ernments are aware that in propaganda the truth pays, as I have
said; this explains the final form of propaganda adopted by
Goebbels in 1944.
From there on, the myth created for external use becomes
known at home and has repercussions there; even if one does
not try to influence people by making propaganda abroad, they
will react indirectly. Therefore, the repercussions on a democratic
population of the myth developed by its government for external
use must be analyzed; these repercussions will lead primarily to
the establishment of unanimity.
This is a primary and very simple consequence. A myth (an
image evoking belief) can stand no dilution, no half-measures, no
contradictions. One believes it or does not. The democratic myth
must display this same form, incisive and coherent; it is of the
same nature as other myths. In order for the myth to be effective
abroad, it must not be contradicted at home. No other voice must
arise at home that would reach the foreign propaganda target
and destroy the myth.
Can anyone believe that it was possible to make effective
propaganda, for example, toward Algeria, when it was imme-
diately contradicted at home? How could the Algerians—or any
other foreigners—take seriously a promise made by General de
Gaulle in the name of France when the press immediately de-
clared that one part of France was in disagreement with it?7
This will lead to the elimination of any opposition that would
show that the people are not unanimously behind the democracy
embodied by the government. Such opposition can completely de-
stroy all effectiveness of democratic propaganda. Besides, such
propaganda is made by a government supported by a majority.
The minority, though also democratic, will tend to be against
7 This non-coherence, leading to the ineffectuality of the myth, was the cause—
among many others—of years of unsuccessful negotiations.
Propaganda (*47
such propaganda merely because it comes from the government
(we saw this in France after 1945). From there on, though in
accord with the idea of democracy, this minority will show itself
hostile to the democratic myth. Then the government, if it wants
its propaganda to be effective, will be forced to reduce the
possibility of the minority's expressing itself—i.e., to interfere
with one of democracy's essential characteristics; we are already
used to this from wartime, as with censorship. Here we are face
to face with the fact discussed above: propaganda is by itself a
state of war; it demands the exclusion of opposite trends and
minorities—not total and official perhaps, but at least partial
and indirect exclusion.
If we pursue this train of thought, another factor emerges:
for the myth to have real weight, it must rest on popular belief.
To put it differently: one cannot simply project a myth to the
outside even by the powerful modem material means; such an
image will have no force unless it is already believed. The myth
is contagious because beliefs are contagious. It is indispensable,
therefore, that democratic people also believe the democratic
myth. Conversely, it is not useful that the government itself
should follow suit; but the government must be sure that its
propaganda abroad is identical with its propaganda at home, and
understand that its foreign propaganda will be strong only if it is
believed at home. (The United States understood this perfectly
between 1942 and 1945.) And the more the myth will appear to
be the expression of belief of the entire nation, the more effective
it will be. It thus presumes unanimity.
We have seen how all propaganda develops the cult of per-
sonality. This is particularly true in a democracy. There one exalts
the individual, who refuses to be anonymous, rejects the ‘mass,”
and eschews mechanization. He wants a human regime where
men are human beings. He needs a government whose leaders are
human beings. And propaganda must show them to him as such.
It must create these personalities. To be sure, the object at this
level is not idolatry, but idolatry cannot fail to follow if the
propaganda is done well. Whether such idolatry is given to a
man in uniform bursting with decorations, or a man in work shirt
and cap, or a man wearing a business suit and soft hat makes no
difference; those are simple adaptations of propaganda to the
feelings of the masses. The democratic masses will reject the
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
248)
uniform, but idolize the soft hat if it is well presented. There can
be no propaganda without a personality, a political chief. Clemen-
ceau, Daladier, De Gaulle, Churchill, Roosevelt, MacArthur are
obvious examples. And even more, Khrushchev, who, after having
denounced the cult of personality, slipped into the same role,
differently, but with the same ease and obeying the same neces-
sity. The nation's unanimity is necessary. Tliis unanimity is em-
bodied in one personality, in whom everyone finds himself, in
whom everyone hopes and projects himself, and for whom every-
thing is possible and permissible.
This need for unanimity is accepted by some of those who
have studied the problem of propaganda in democracy. It has
been claimed that this unanimity indicates the transition from
an old form of democracy to a new one: "massive and progressive
democracy.” In other words, a democracy of allegiance; a system
in which all will share the same conviction. This would not be
a centrifugal conviction, i.e., one expressing itself in diverse forms
and admitting the possibility of extreme divergences. It would
be a centripetal conviction with which everything would be
measured by the same yardstick; democracy would express itself
in a single voice, going further than just forms—all the way to
rites and liturgies. It would, on the other hand, be a democracy
of participation in which the citizen would be wholly engaged;
his complete life, his movements would be integrated into a
given social system. And one of the authors gives as an example
the Nuremberg Party Congress! What a strange example of
democracy.
It is true that only such a unanimous and unitary society can
produce propaganda that can be effectively carried beyond the
borders. But we must ask ourselves whether such a society is still
democratic. What is this democracy that no longer includes
minorities and opposition? As long as democracy is merely the
interplay of parties, there can be opposition; but when we hear
of a massive democracy, with grandiose ceremonies in which
the people participate at the prompting of the State, that signifies,
first of all, a confusion between the government and the State,
and indicates further that anyone who does not participate is not
merely in opposition, but excludes himself from the national com-
munity expressing itself in this participation. It is a truly ex-
traordinary transformation of the democratic structure, because
Propaganda (2 49
there can no longer be any respect for the minority opposition
to the State—an opposition that, lacking the means of propaganda
—or at least any means that can compete with those of the State—
can no longer make its voice heard.
The minority is heard even less because the effects of the
myth, inflated by propaganda, are always the same and always
antidemocratic. Anyone who participates in such a socio-political
body and is imbued with the truth of the myth, necessarily be-
comes sectarian. Repeated so many times, being driven in so
many different forms into the propagandee’s subconscious, this
truth, transmitted by propaganda, becomes for every participant
an absolute truth, which cannot be discussed without lies and
distortion. Democratic peoples are not exempt from what is
vaguely called “psychoses.” But such propaganda, if it is effective,
predisposes people to—or even causes—these psychoses.
If the people do not believe in the myth, it cannot serve to com-
bat totalitarian propaganda; but if the people do believe in it, they
are victims of these myths, which, though democratic on the
surface, have all the traits of all other myths, particularly the
impossibility, in the eyes of believers, of being questioned. But
this tends to eliminate all opposing truth, which is immediately
called “error.” Once democracy becomes the object of propa-
ganda, it also becomes as totalitarian, authoritarian, and exclusive
as dictatorship.
The enthusiasm and exaltation of a people who cling to a myth
necessarily lead to intransigeance and sectarianism. The myth of
democracy arose, for example, during the period of the Conven-
tion; there we had forms of massive democracy, with great cere-
monies and efforts at unanimity. But was that still democracy?
Are there not also changes in the mores of the United States when
everything is called un-American that is not strict conformism?
This term, un-American, so imprecise for the French, is in the
United States precise to the extent that it is a result of the belief
in the myth. To provoke such belief and launch a people on the
road to such exaltation, without which propaganda cannot exist,
really means to give a people feelings and reflexes incompatible
with life in a democracy.
This is really the ultimate problem: democracy is not just a
certain form of political organization or simply an ideology—it
is, first of all, a certain view of life and a form of behavior. If
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
250)
democracy were only a form of political organization, there would
be no problem; propaganda could adjust to it. This is the in-
stitutional argument: propaganda is democratic because there is
no unitary State centralized by propaganda. If, then, we were
merely in the presence of an ideology, there still would be no
problem: propaganda can transmit any ideology (subject to the
qualifications made above) and, therefore, also the democratic
ideology, for example. But if democracy is a way of life, composed
of tolerance, respect, degree, choice, diversity, and so on, all
propaganda that acts on behavior and feelings and transforms
them in depth turns man into someone who can no longer support
democracy because he no longer follows democratic behavior.
Yet propaganda cannot “create” democratic behavior by the
promulgation of a myth—which is the only way of making propa-
ganda on the outside, but which modifies the behavior of the
people at home. We shall find the same problem in examining
certain effects of domestic propaganda.
Effects of Internal Propaganda
I have tried to show elsewhere that propaganda has also be-
come a necessity for the internal life of a democracy. Nowadays
the State is forced to define an official truth. This is a change of
extreme seriousness. Even when the State is not motivated to do
this for reasons of action or prestige, it is led to it when fulfilling
its function of disseminating information.
We have seen how the growth of information inevitably leads
to the need for propaganda. This is truer in a democratic system
than in any other.
The public will accept news if it is arranged in a comprehen-
sible system, and if it does not speak only to the intelligence but
to the “heart.” This means, precisely, that the public wants
propaganda, and if the State does not wish to leave it to a
party, which will then provide explanations for everything (i.e.,
the truth), it must itself make propaganda. Thus, the demo-
cratic State, even if it does not want to, becomes a propagandist
State because of the need to dispense information. This entails
a profound constitutional and ideological transformation. It is,
in effect, a State that must proclaim an official, general, and ex-
plicit truth. The State can then no longer be objective or liberal,
but is forced to bring to the overinformed people a corpus in-
Propaganda (251
telligentiae. It can no longer tolerate competition, because a State
that assumes this function no longer has the right to err; if it did,
it would become the laughing stock of the citizenry, and its
information would lose its effect, together with its propaganda.
For the information it dispenses is believed only to the extent
that its propaganda is believed.
This State-proclaimed truth must be all-embracing: the facts,
which are the subjects of information, are becoming more and
more complex, are covering larger segments of life; thus the sys-
tem into which they are arranged must cover all of life. This
system must become a complete answer to all questions occurring
in the citizens' conscience. It must, therefore, be general and all-
valid: it cannot be a philosophy or a metaphysical system—for
such systems appeal to the intelligence of a minority. To describe
the system, we must go back to an ancient primitive notion:
the etiological myth. In fact, a propaganda that corresponds to the
body of information in a democratic State, and aims at allevi-
ating the troubles of its citizens, must offer them an etiological
myth.
This would not be necessary if the citizens were to work only
three or four hours a day and devote four hours daily to personal
reflection and cultural pursuits, if all citizens had a similar cul-
tural level, if the society were in a state of equilibrium and not
under the shadow of tomorrow's menace, and if the moral educa-
tion of the citizens enabled them to master their passions and
their egotism. But as these four conditions are not fulfilled, and
as the volume of information grows very rapidly, we are forced
to seek explanations hie et nunc, and publicly parade them in
accordance with popular demand.
But the creation of the etiological myth leads to an obligation
on the part of democracy to become religious. It can no longer
be secular but must create its religion. Besides, the creation of
a religion is one of the indispensable elements of effective propa-
ganda. The content of this religion is of little importance; what
matters is to satisfy the religious feelings of the masses; these
feelings are used to integrate the masses into the national collec-
tive. We must not delude ourselves: when one speaks to us of
“massive democracy" and “democratic participation," these are
only veiled terms that mean “religion.” Participation and unanim-
ity have always been characteristics of religious societies, and
THE SOaOPOLTHCAL EFFECTS
252)
only of religious societies. Thus we return by another route to the
problem of intolerance and the suppression of minorities.8
On the other hand, democracy is more and more conceived as
a simple external political structure, rather than as a complete
concept of society, of behavior of man. This concept, this Way of
Life, is tied to political democracy. Certain qualities on the
part of the citizens are needed if democracy is to exist. It is
easy to see that democracy wants to preserve this treasure that
is its reason for, and its way of, existing. The government must
maintain this Way of Life, without which democracy would
no longer be possible. It thus becomes understandable and
consistent that American prisoners, repatriated from Korea, were
put in quarantine and subjected to mental and psychological
treatment to detoxicate them of Communism. They had to be
given an American brainwashing, corresponding to the Chinese
brainwashing, to make them fit to live once again according to
the American Way of Life.
But what is left of a man after that? We understand that democ-
racy wants to control the mental and psychological state of the
people who serve it, according to the notion of the Security Risk.
Public servants cannot be permitted criminal or immoral conduct,
alcoholism, dope-addiction, or the like; they would be so far
removed from the virtues a democratic citizen must exhibit that
this exercise of control and the massive education by propaganda
for a life congruous with democracy are easy to understand. The
civic virtues created by the mass media will guarantee the main-
tenance of democracy. But what remains of liberty?
I want to touch upon one other fact: I have tried to show,
in my book The Technological Society, that modem technical
instruments have their own weight and by themselves change
8 Let us recall another effect of such propaganda on democracy: an aristocratic
category of men arises which has no common bond with democracy. The propa-
gandist is a technician and a member of an aristocracy of technicians that establishes
itself above the institutions of a democracy and acts outside its norms. Besides, the
employment of propaganda leads the propagandist to cynicism, disbelief in values,
non-submission to the law of numbers, doubts on the value of opinions, and con-
tempt for the propagandee and the elected representatives: he knows how public
opinion is fashioned. The propagandist cannot subject himself to popular judgment
and democracy. Finally, the propagandist is privy to all State secrets and acts at
the same time to shape opinions: he really has a position of fundamental direction.
The combination of these three elements makes the propagandist an aristocrat. It
cannot be otherwise. Every democracy that launches propaganda creates in and by
such propaganda its own enemy, an aristocracy that may destroy it.
Propaganda (253
political structures. Here I will ask only one question: What will
be the effect on democracy of the use of TV for propaganda?
One can see the first effects: TV brings us close to direct
democracy. Congressmen and cabinet members become known;
their faces and utterances come to be recognized; they are
brought closer to the voter. TV permits political contact to extend
beyond election campaigns and informs the voters directly on a
daily basis. More than that, TV could become a means of control
over public servants: In his capacity as TV viewer, the voter
could verify what use his representatives make of the mandate
with which he has entrusted them. Certain experiments con-
ducted in the United States showed that when sessions of Con-
gress were televised, they were much more dignified, serious, and
efficient; knowing that they were being observed, the congress-
men took greater pains to fulfill their function. But one must not
hope for too much in this respect:9 there is little chance that
governing bodies will accept this control. In reality, statesmen
fully understand how to use it for their propaganda, and that is
all. In fact, TV probably helped Eisenhower to win over Steven-
son, the Conservatives to win over Labour.* 1 The problem is first
one of money, second of technical skill. But the use of TV as a
democratic propaganda instrument entails the risk of a profound
modification of democracy's "style.”
What can democracy use for TV propaganda? Democracy is
not well adapted to that. So far, the technical instruments are
in accord with democratic activities: democracy speaks, and its
entire being is expressed in words (this is not meant ironically;
I believe that speech, in the most powerful and rhetorical sense,
is one of the highest expressions of man). The instruments of
propaganda, particularly press and radio, are made for words.
Conversely, democratic propaganda made by motion pictures
is weak. Democracy is not a visual form of government. The cere-
mony of the Flame under the Arc de Triomphe—one of the most
• John Albig states correctly that this "personification” by TV corrodes and inhibits
personal, analytical reflection, standardizes personal images, and transmits a "false
reality”: a televised session of Congress or the Cabinet is not a true session, cannot
be a true session. In such a televised session, "the public sees the responsible
government in action, but only as a political show performed by humanized stars
who play a role.” This seems an excellent description.
1 This has been challenged by Angus Campbell (in “Television and the Election”).
Campbell, on the other hand, gives important indications of TV”® decisive influence
on elections.
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS
25 4)
successful pictures—has little propaganda impact even though
it is spectacular. Actually, when democracy wants to use the
film for propaganda, it can think of nothing but military parades,
which cannot be presented too often. Propaganda needs both
repetition and diversity. So far, democracy’s inability to use mo-
tion pictures for its propaganda has not seemed serious, the
films being a secondary arm. But it seems that TV is destined
to become a principal arm, for it can totally mobilize the in-
dividual without demanding the slightest effort from him. TV
reaches him at home, like radio, in his own setting, his private
life. It asks no decision, no a priori participation, no move from
him (such as going to a meeting). But it holds him completely
and leaves him no possibility of engaging in other activities
(whereas radio leaves a good part of the individual unoccupied).
Moreover, TV has the shock effect of the picture, which is much
greater than that of sound.
But in order to use this remarkable arm, one must have some-
thing to show. A government official giving a speech is not a spec-
tacle. Democracies have nothing to show that can compare with
what is available to a dictatorship. If they do not want to be left
behind in this domain, which would be extremely dangerous,
they must find propaganda spectacles to televise. But nothing is
better than massive ceremonies, popular marches—the Hitler
youth and the Komsomols—or an entire population enthusias-
tically assembled to build new ships or a new university (as in
Yugoslavia). The exigencies of TV will lead democracy to engage
in such hardly democratic demonstrations.
We are now reaching the most important problem. Earlier, I
examined the psychological transformations that the individual
undergoes when subjected to an intense and continuous propa-
ganda. We have also seen that the existence of two contradictory
propagandas is no solution at all, as it in no way leads to a
“democratic” situation: the individual is not independent in the
presence of two combatants between whom he must choose.
He is not a spectator comparing two posters, or a supreme arbiter
when he decides in favor of the more honest and convincing one.
To look at things this way is childish idealism. The individual is
seized, manipulated, attacked from every side; the combatants of
two propaganda systems do not fight each other, but try to
capture him. As a result, the individual suffers the most profound
Propaganda (255
psychological influences and distortions. Man modified in this
fashion demands simple solutions, catchwords, certainties, con-
tinuity, commitment, a clear and simple division of the world
into Good and Evil, efficiency, and unity of thought. He cannot
bear ambiguity. He cannot bear that the opponent should in any
way whatever represent what is right or good. An additional effect
of contradictory propagandas is that the individual will escape
either into passivity or into total and unthinking support of one
of the two sides.
It is striking to see how this current, which is the point of de-
parture of totalitarian parties, is beginning to take hold in the
United States. These two different reactions—passivity or total
commitment—are completely antidemocratic. But they are the
consequence of some democratic types of propaganda. Here is
the hub of the problem. Propaganda ruins not only democratic
ideas but also democratic behavior—the foundation of democ-
racy, the very quality without which it cannot exist.
The question is not to reject propaganda in the name of free-
dom of public opinion—which, as we well know, is never virginal
—or in the name of freedom of individual opinion, which is
formed of everything and nothing—but to reject it in the name of
a very profound reality: the possibility of choice and differentia-
tion, which is the fundamental characteristic of the individual in
the democratic society.
Whatever the doctrine promulgated by propaganda, its psycho-
sociological results are the same. To be sure, some doctrines are
more coherent subject matter for propaganda than others, and
lead to a more efficient and insistent propaganda; other doctrines
—republican and democratic—are rather paralyzing and less
suitable. But the only result is the progressive weakening of the
doctrine by propaganda.
Conversely, what gives propaganda its destructive character
is not the singleness of some propagated doctrine; it is the instru-
ment of propaganda itself. Although it acts differently, according
to whether it promulgates a closed system or a diversity of opin-
ions, it has profound and destructive effects.
What am I saying then? That propaganda can promulgate a
democratic doctrine? Absolutely. That it can be used by a
government elected by majority vote? Absolutely. But this gives
us no guarantee that we still are dealing with democracy. With
THE SOdOPOLTIlCAL EFFECTS
256)
the help of propaganda, one can disseminate democratic ideas as
a credo and within the framework of a myth. With propaganda
one can lead citizens to the voting booth, where they seemingly
elect their representatives. But if democracy corresponds to a
certain type of human being, to a certain individual behavior, then
propaganda destroys the point of departure of the life of a
democracy, destroys its very foundations. It creates a man who
is suited to a totalitarian society, who is not at ease except when
integrated in the mass, who rejects critical judgments, choices,
and differentiations because he clings to clear certainties. He is
a man assimilated into uniform groups and wants it that way.
With the help of propaganda one can do almost anything, but
certainly not create the behavior of a free man or, to a lesser de-
gree, a democratic man. A man who lives in a democratic society
and who is subjected to propaganda is being drained of the
democratic content itself—of die style of democratic life, under-
standing of others, respect for minorities, re-examination of his
own opinions, absence of dogmatism. The means employed to
spread democratic ideas make the citizen, psychologically, a totali-
tarian man. The only difference between him and a Nazi is that
he is a "totalitarian man with democratic convictions,” but those
convictions do not change his behavior in the least. Such contra-
diction is in no way felt by the individual for whom democracy
has become a myth and a set of democratic imperatives, merely
stimuli that activate conditioned reflexes. The word democracy,
having become a simple incitation, no longer has anything to
do with democratic behavior. And the citizen can repeat indefi-
nitely "the sacred formulas of democracy” while acting like a
storm trooper.
All democracy that is maintained or propagated through prop-
aganda eventually scores this success, which is its own negation
with regard to the individual and the truth.
But can things really be that way?
I said above that, generally, those who tend to deny propa-
ganda’s efficacy unconsciously hold a concept of the inalienable
value of the individual. Those who accept its efficacy hold a
materialistic concept. So far as I am concerned, I would much
prefer to be able to assert that man is invulnerable, that few
dangers exist for him in present-day society, that propaganda
can do nothing to him. Unfortunately, the experiences of the
Propaganda (2 57
last half century are not encouraging in this respect. Moreover,
it seems to me that the belief in propaganda's harmlessness and
the spreading of this belief are ultimately detrimental to man.
For man then is reassured in the face of attacks, he believes
in his invulnerability and in the ineffectiveness of the attack,
and his will to resist is greatly diminished. Why lose one's time
and waste one's efforts defending oneself against propaganda if
propaganda is merely child's play and empty talk by ridiculous
tyrants? Why exert one's mind, one's personality, one's strength
of character if the tigers are paper tigers, if the methods are so
absurd and obvious that even the biggest fool can manage to
escape them? Why make discerning choices if propaganda, using
only what is already there and leading me along roads I would
have traveled without it, can in no way modify my actions?
If the propagandee takes that attitude, he is in the most favorable
position to obey without knowing it, to drift into the routine of
propaganda while claiming to be supremely superior.
The only truly serious attitude—serious because the danger
of man's destruction by propaganda is serious, serious because
no other attitude is truly responsible and serious—is to show
people the extreme effectiveness of the weapon used against
them, to rouse them to defend themselves by making them aware
of their frailty and their vulnerability, instead of soothing them
with the worst illusion, that of a security that neither man's nature
nor the techniques of propaganda permit him to possess. It is
merely convenient to realize that the side of freedom and truth
for man has not yet lost, but that it may well lose—and that in
this game, propaganda is undoubtedly the most formidable power,
acting in only one direction (toward the destruction of truth
and freedom), no matter what the good intentions or the good
will may be of those who manipulate it.
APPENDIX
CO
EFFECTIVENESS
OF PROPAGANDA
Approaching the problem of gauging propaganda results, we
must carefully distinguish between effectiveness and involuntary
effects. On the one hand, the propagandist aims at certain ob-
jectives: he wants to modify the content of an opinion, change
majority views, or destroy the morale of an enemy. With regard
to such aims we can speak of effectiveness: either the propa-
gandist attains his objective or he does not. This is what people
usually study under the subject heading “Propaganda Effects.”
But this is a misconception. For other effects are much deeper
and more important, even though not willed. I have tried to
analyze these in chapters IV and V.
In this appendix I will limit myself to examining direct effec-
tiveness.
I. Difficulties of Measuring Effectiveness
As soon as we pose the problem of effectiveness, we approach
the question of effects and the measurement of such effects (in
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
260)
this annex, I will take the word in its ordinary sense, as it is
generally used by students of propaganda—i.e., as desired effects
sought by the propagandist). Can the propagandist change an
opinion or can't he? This is what some people try to measure
(because, in line with contemporary scientific prejudices, only
what can be expressed in figures is certain).
Difficulty of the Subject
Let us begin by stating that propaganda sets itself a great
diversity of objectives, and that it is often difficult to distinguish
among them. The propagandist may seek to sustain the morale
of his troops, to reinforce their courage, to excite them, to get
them to sacrifice their lives. The existence of other propagandas
and the difficulty of measurement will combine here to make it
impossible to know and register the point of departure—i.e., the
degree of enthusiasm, and so on, before and after the propaganda
operation. It must be particularly stressed that, aside from the
difficulty of finding reliable testing methods, the individuals in
question were not untouched by propaganda in general before
a particular operation was launched. For instance, mobilized
troops already have been propagandized to some extent. We
cannot find a 4 zero" point from which to begin, not only because
none of us has remained immune to propaganda, but also be-
cause supporters of a cause have become supporters through
propaganda. From there on, mere modifications in consequence
of a propaganda campaign are of little significance.
A propagandist might also aim at neutralizing an enemy by
destroying his morale. But to measure the effectiveness of such
propaganda would require measuring the difference between
two propagandas, for the enemy also is subjected to positive
propaganda by his own side. And it is never possible to evaluate
the effects of two propagandas at the same time. No nation or
organization can undertake such an analysis at the time of the
propaganda operation. There can only be retrospective inquiries,
and we shall see later how insignificant they are.
The propagandist can aim at some external, formal, and tempo-
rary adherence, as in an election campaign by trying to get un-
decided voters to vote for a certain candidate. At this point
we generally encounter the traditional argument that because two
or three conflicting propagandas cancel each other out, the voter
Appendix (261
is free to make his own choice. In the event of a referendum,
there are as many arguments for as against advanced every-
where; therefore, it is maintained, no opinions are changed. This
is only partially correct, and one cannot reach decisive conclusions
as to propaganda effectiveness in general by noting the success
or failure of an election campaign. The shift of some votes is never
significant. In fact, one cannot really talk about propaganda in
connection with an election campaign. A campaign is the simplest,
most imperfect form of modem propaganda; the objective is in-
sufficient, the methods are incomplete, the duration is brief,
pre-propaganda is absent, and the campaign propagandist never
has all the media at his disposal. Thus, the one case in which
the measurement of effects is comparatively easy (shift of votes)
is also by far the least significant.
The propagandist may also aim at many other objectives, such
as the destruction of micro-groups, labor unions, associations, and
other groups; he may seek some determined action (strike, boy-
cott, pogrom) from a group more or less directly under his in-
fluence; he may seek to influence some public opinion, aiming not
at immediate actions, but only at changing a climate or evoking
an atmosphere of sympathy or antipathy; he may, finally, if he
is a commercial propagandist, simply try to get people to buy
some product.
I have pointed out the extreme diversity of possible objectives
in order to show that propagandas effectiveness cannot be meas-
ured on the basis of results obtained in one of these domains.
If I look at propaganda made within a large group and find that
it has failed to push the group toward some proposed action
(a strike, for example), I will be tempted to conclude that it was
ineffective. But if I find that this same propaganda campaign has
broken up some of an adversary's micro-groups, or has created
some strong resentment and restrained aggressiveness on the
part of a group of militants, I must conclude that from this point
of view propaganda has succeeded and can serve as basis for
future action. If I see that few votes were won and that the
undecided were not reached by the campaign, I will tend to
regard it as a failure. But the same propaganda may have gal-
vanized the militant group, reinforced the party, given it a
chance to experiment with new methods, or led to the solidarity
of certain micro-groups—equally important results. Therefore,
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
262)
given the diversity of effects sought by the propagandist, one
can draw absolutely no conclusions about the effectiveness of
his propaganda with regard to any of his objectives.
Moreover, even if one could isolate one from among the
many and prove that the propagandist aimed only at that particu-
lar one (for example, to obtain votes in a referendum), it is
absolutely impossible to transfer such findings to other domains
of propaganda. To do so would be to be hasty and to misunder-
stand basic differences. It has been well recognized, for example,
that certain advertising methods are ineffective in political
propaganda. Getting a man to adhere to a political movement
and getting him to buy a car are not the same problem. Nor is it
the same problem to get people to vote a certain way or to pro-
mote heroism in combat. It has also been clearly demonstrated
that propaganda directed toward other countries cannot be the
same as propaganda made at home. The techniques of exercising
influence will be different, as will the methods of measuring
effectiveness.1
Aside from the complexity of the problem itself, the extreme
difficulty of defining the facts themselves must also be taken into
account. Even on die simplest level, most easily translated into
figures, one cannot determine with any degree of accuracy how
many people are being reached by a propaganda campaign. We
know of the efforts made by some American services after
1944 to determine how many German soldiers had read American
leaflets. But the number remained completely uncertain. We also
know Lasswells effort to determine how many persons were
reached by Communist propaganda in Chicago: despite his
use of a very complicated method, the results are completely
unreliable.2 This also is true for Rossi s figures regarding Com-
munist propaganda in France. But if we do not even know
how many people are subjected to propaganda (on the simplest
level, by counting a single medium—leaflets, or meetings, or the
circulation figures of a newspaper), we certainly cannot estimate * *
1 It should be added that it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of "black"
propaganda, propaganda through unconventional channels, or rumors. Also, to
measure propaganda, it would be necessary to demand criteria of obvious effective-
ness; Daniel Lemer has tried this without much success. Finally, a direct correla-
tion would have to be established between the effects and the means, which is
practically impossible.
* Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock: World Revolutionary Propaganda
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1939), Ch. 11.
Appendix (263
the quantitative effect of propaganda because we cannot learn
the percentage of people reached as compared with the total
population, or the percentage of people affected as compared
with the total number reached. Therefore, we can have no solid
basis for evaluation.
When we leave this most elementary sphere of attempts at
evaluation, we encounter even greater difficulties. The question
becomes complicated from four points of view: first of all, propa-
ganda tends to affect people in depth, and not just with respect
to certain circumscribed actions. How, then, can we measure an
entire situation, particularly if the effects are latent?
A second difficulty is the delay—not always of the same dura-
tion—between the moment when the propagandist acts and the
one when certain effects begin to show. Doob maintains that we
see here a “period of indetermination.’’ Obviously, the propa-
gandist’s task is to reduce this period of indetermination as much
as possible. But he cannot eliminate it. And the student of
propaganda effects must take it into account. He must answer
this question: “At what point can one say that propaganda has
failed?”—i.e., at what point has opinion emerged from the period
of indetermination to take a direction different from that sug-
gested by propaganda? This question is hard to answer.
A third problem concerns die “payoff.” Propaganda becomes
increasingly expensive. Therefore die question inevitably arises:
do the results justify the costs? Are the returns worth the game?
Do constandy rising costs produce increased results? What is
the optimal level? These three questions concerning the returns
of propaganda efforts demand an answer, but we are far from
being able to answer them.8
The fourth difficulty derives from the propagandist’s need to
predict effects. Effects must be gauged beforehand because
propaganda must be directed and adjusted if maximum results
are to be obtained. But we are barely able to see past effects,
about which nothing can be done any longer. This is all the more
serious because propaganda consists of holding the masses in
hand in order to steer them in various directions; when we find
8 The question of returns is also asked in the U.S.S.R., but under a different aspect:
the cost of propaganda there is established in terms of the contribution that the
propaganda media can make to the effective administration of the country by the
Party. As a result, the problem of money is of less importance.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
264)
on the basis of past effects that some propaganda is failing, that
means that it has already failed; that the masses, failing to re-
spond, have escaped it. And propaganda can no longer recapture
them. This happened with Communist propaganda in France
between 1949 and 1952; &e masses ceased to obey, and the
Party’s self-criticism came too late. The same holds true for
the Psychological Action in Algeria; its failure became apparent
only in i960.
The difficulty of evaluating propaganda effects is increased by
the social interactions in which propaganda unfolds. Doob has
taken devilish pleasure in enumerating them. His definition of
these interactions: all propagandists are influenced by the public
opinion they seek to influence. Interest provokes propaganda, but
propaganda provokes an interest. Propaganda provokes habitual
responses, which are reinforced or modified by the simple fact of
being evoked by propaganda. The individual perceives only that
propaganda that his personality lets him perceive, but his person-
ality is changed by that propaganda.
The propagandist is influenced by public opinion and by pre-
ceding propaganda action. Propaganda is influenced by the prop-
agandist, by public opinion, and by the perception an individual
has of that propaganda. But the perception itself is influenced by
propaganda, public opinion, and the personality of the man who
perceives it. Such interactions, which make it impossible to isolate
a single propaganda effect in its pure state, can easily be multi-
plied.
Continuing in the same direction, we must understand that it
is impossible to dissociate propaganda effects from other factors,
as I pointed out in chapter I. We cannot name every factor work-
ing upon an individual. It would be wrong even to attempt this,
for propaganda is not an isolated phenomenon with clearly de-
lineated boundaries; it is completely integrated and immersed in
a social entity. It is related to the general sociological structure,
and to try to dissociate it and reduce it to its pure state would be
to strip it of its true nature.
Let us consider a final difficulty: it is practically impossible to
study propaganda effects exactly where they are made, in the
society in which they develop. The sociologist or psychologist
absolutely cannot work in the living, contemporary environment
of an intense propaganda, because this environment is much too
Appendix (26 s
polarized and activated for an analysis to be possible. Just as it
is not possible to make public opinion surveys or complicated
psychological observations during a battle, so one cannot make
them in this kind of psychological war, which all propaganda is.
It was completely impossible to research propaganda effectiveness
in Fascist and Nazi societies: Such research would have been
suspect, and the results could not have been published. Such
efforts would have collided not only with the resistance of the
authorities, but also with that of the interested parties, who either
would not be affected by the propaganda and therefore hostile to
the regime, without daring to say so in the course of a sociological
investigation, or would be partisans of the regime. This is the
situation in all countries where true propaganda is being made,
such as China, the U.S.S.R., Algeria, and so on. The researcher is
therefore forced to limit himself to an analysis in real-life situa-
tions in which there is no real propaganda or only limited or
sporadic propaganda in connection with an election campaign, a
referendum, or a minority party trying to gain members. One
could still try to measure effects a posteriori, but such measure-
ment is necessarily inexact.4 5 Finally, one can conduct tests, and
this will be discussed next in detail.
Inadequacy of Methods
In the face of total propaganda, it is clear that tests are useless;
the reality can never be duplicated. You cannot stop a man in the
heat of a meeting to ask him what he thinks. You cannot measure
with any precision the effects of a film because you cannot dis-
sociate it from current newspaper articles and radio broadcasts
on the same subject. Finally, in a country steeped in propaganda,
you cannot take a key group of supporters and measure the effects
on other groups of their bearing witness to the cause: both groups
already are shaped by earlier propaganda, and the difference
between the two means nothing. Considering propaganda as it
really is in its totality, tests are impossible.6
4 For example, as long as one cannot interrogate Nazis in Germany, one will inter-
rogate prisoners.
5 In “Le Dynamisme des groupes,” Revue cTAction Populaire (1958), Badin stresses
very convincingly the problem of “psychic continuity”: the use of experimental
groups assumes “ahistoric” groups, without a past and without context. From the
reactions of such groups can one really draw conclusions that apply to real groups
that have a past and are tied to the whole range of institutions in their society? f
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
266)
The problem itself defies definition. Also, the methods used to
analyze the effects generally are inadequate. One method has
been used frequently by American researchers: its object being
to determine whether some propaganda instrument could change
the opinions or prejudices of a group. Students were divided into
two or three groups, with one of them designated a control group
untouched by propaganda. The nature of their opinion on some
specific question, such as that of race, was then established. Then
the groups to be influenced were subjected to carefully prepared
psychological manipulations via pamphlets, films, conferences,
and so on. After the period of propaganda, an evaluation of opin-
ion changes by ordinary methods was attempted, with the control
group as basis of comparison. The evaluation of opinion took place
twice—once immediately after the manipulations, once after some
time, in order to establish the persistence of the modifications.
These experiments have been described by many American writ-
ers. Generally, the conclusion has been that such propaganda had
very little effect, that patterns and stereotypes were little changed,
and that group opinion remained unchanged. Moreover, the slim
results that were obtained disappeared rapidly.
I claim that such results mean nothing because the method is
totally inadequate. Its shortcomings are numerous. First, the ques-
tion under experimentation is the experimenter’s choice—it is not
a burning, explosive question of immediate concern. I have dem-
onstrated, however, that propaganda can only work in the face
of profound immediacy. Second, such propaganda efforts always
employ very modest means (some pamphlets, one or two films),
have no real orchestration, and are of short and inadequate dura-
tion. Evidently, we cannot expect to eradicate a race prejudice
after a few days or weeks of propaganda, no matter how well
made. Moreover, such experiments take place in a vacuum, in
that the individuals subjected to them are cut off from their nor-
mal milieu. The normal conditions under which propaganda works
are in no way reproduced. Such propaganda takes place in no
sociological context. Then, there is no crowd effect, no psycho-
logical tension, no interaction of individuals caught in a mass and
exciting each other—the experiment is shared by only a few, in
a laboratory atmosphere. These conditions are the very opposite
of propaganda. There is no participation in a general action, in a
general line, in party activities. There is no tie to any organiza-
Appendix (267
tion. There is no call for action, nor any chance of engaging in
any—but those are essential elements of propaganda. Finally,
these laboratory experiments mean nothing because they do not
reproduce the true milieu of real propaganda or its methods. They
are at best attempts at partial influence, and it is completely use-
less to draw conclusions from them about the efficacy of real
propaganda. To believe otherwise reveals considerable ignorance
of the phenomenon.
On the other hand, attempts at analyzing public opinion have
been made. Here the researcher at least deals with real situations.
A whole collection of devices has been used for such research,
which, however, has been carried out in diffuse and fragmentary
fashion. In this way researchers in the United States have analyzed
votes by groups, localities, classes; have systematically analyzed
the mail received by a newspaper after a particularly significant
article; have made surveys in theaters and movie houses in con-
nection with propaganda films, particularly war films. In the last-
named instances, various expressions of approval and disapproval
were scientifically collected. They have even tried to measure
noises in theaters by using special equipment (noise meters,
applause meters), but this turned out to be a failure because the
spectators soon realized what was going on and modified their
reactions. In principle, it is necessary that the analyst be com-
pletely hidden and neutral. Finally, certain words and the sig-
nificance attributed to them before and after a propaganda
campaign were analyzed. Of course, such analysis must be carried
out in extremely diversified milieux and places. The use of “key
words” is in fact very revealing with respect to unconscious
absorption of propaganda.
In such surveys the public must be unaware of the research
being done. However, when the method of “participants” is
used, the subjects of the experiment know they are under ob-
servation. The participating observer must live in a given group,
which should be localized and as unaware of him as possible;
and he must be progressively assimilated into the group. He
learns to know it inside out and becomes integrated into it. His
primary task is to observe daily events as an anthropologist ob-
serves primitive peoples, and these facts bearing on behavior
allow the researcher to classify successive effects of various forms
of propaganda. This will yield a complete pattern of individual
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
268)
attitudes and of changes in these attitudes within the social struc-
ture. This is probably the best and most precise method. From
the limited results it produces, certain conclusions are warranted.
But a major obstacle stands in the way: trained teams of observers
are needed—real social scientists, not partisans of a propaganda.
These people must be well paid for a long time for (appar-
ently) doing nothing. In reality, only the State can employ this
method.
Finally, there is a much easier and faster method, such as sur-
veys by Roper or Gallup. This method can be employed frequently
and yields reasonably sure, fast results. But it presumes genuine
education on the part of the public. The public must not only
understand the meaning of these services and lend itself to them,
but it must also be without fear. For this reason, the usefulness
of surveys to establish propaganda effects is limited; it cannot
be used in a totalitarian system because the connection between
the propaganda-makers and the police is well known in such
regimes and because the public cannot respond properly to the
questions asked. Similarly, surveys cannot gauge the effects of
terror propaganda because the public will be intimidated. Finally,
surveys cannot be used on minorities that feel oppressed: prole-
tarians, Negroes, other racial or religious minorities. Nevertheless,
surveys can evaluate what Franco is Bourricaud calls the elasticity
of propaganda, which is a sure indication of its effectiveness.
Vast propaganda sectors, therefore, cannot be measured with
the help of surveys. Moreover, surveys give much better results
in connection with "'instantaneous” propaganda—i.e., during pe-
riods of intense propaganda (elections) or crisis. They reveal
much less regarding sociological propaganda, propaganda promul-
gating a myth, or in periods of calm. In fact, surveys must ask
precise questions, offer limited choices, and refer to some localized
common experience.
Surveys are helpless in periods of calm and with regard to
propaganda’s broader aims: at best they can discern certain tend-
encies or establish whether some word is ‘more” or ‘less” on the
public’s mind. But they cannot penetrate the myth whose hold
on it the public does not recognize. There, psychoanalytic sur-
veys would be needed, but such research can be conducted only
on individuals.
Even from another point of view, such opinion surveys, designed
Appendix (269
to reveal propaganda influences, are very uncertain in their results.
They rest on two presuppositions that I consider very debatable.
The first is that propaganda's principal aim is to modify public
opinion, to replace some current of opinion, to manipulate indi-
vidual opinions. But that certainly is not accurate. There can be
profound propaganda effects that do not manifest themselves
outwardly by changes of public opinion on one subject or an-
other. The second presupposition is that surveys reveal the com-
position of public opinion, and that such composition is the only
thing that counts. But in reality another equally important ele-
ment needs to be studied: the intensity of opinion. That intensity
cannot be established by opinion analysis, despite all weighted
indices, the multiplicity of questions, the cross-questions, and
so on. It must be remembered that two groups of the same
size in a society may be entirely different with regard to the
intensity of their opinions and the degree of their integration
in society. For example, in 1948, to say that there were 25 per-
cent Communists and 25 percent anti-Communists in France (to
take the simplest possible example) means nothing. For on one
side, there are militants who are ready to throw themselves
headlong into action and to sacrifice themselves, and—what is
even more important—are well-organized; whereas on the other,
there are unorganized people who have no intention of emerging
from their passive individual state. And it must be understood
that propaganda operates increasingly on the qualitative level,
in the domain of intensities.
Any propaganda that had not changed a single vote, but had
pushed a revolutionary group to white heat or diminished the
conviction and devotion of another group, would have success
without an opinion analysis being able to register it. Conversely,
such analysis might register opinion changes—for example, among
the undecided—which appear in the wake of a “one-shot” propa-
ganda, but which ultimately surprise the propagandist by failing
to last.
Finally, I must raise a last question. Opinion surveys concern
themselves with public opinion and must address themselves to
the entire group whose opinion is to be analyzed. For this reason,
surveys operate with representative samples. Yet, an aggressive
propaganda will not necessarily address itself to all of public
opinion. It will take into its sights only a particular sub-group.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
270)
fraction, or tendency. Because propaganda has precise objectives,
it does not concern just anybody. To analyze whether such selec-
tive propaganda is effective, it would be necessary to analyze
only the target group or the particular tendency that was to be
modified. But, generally, it will not be known which sector will
be attacked by the propagandist, and when it is known, it will
be too late. For all these reasons, public opinion survey methods
are not really adequate to measure the effectiveness of propa-
ganda.
Analyses of individual cases are being made concerning indi-
viduals who have been subjected to propaganda. In the wake of
World War II, American and British psychologists and sociolo-
gists undertook a large job: they made studies of German soldiers
who surrendered in 1945 in an attempt to determine whether
American propaganda, aimed at persuading them to surrender,
had been effective (Shils and Janowitz, Dicks, Gurfein and Jano-
witz on German PWs); studies of German civilians in 1946, to
determine whether they had been affected by Nazi propaganda
(Padover); studies of captured elite troops in the United States
and Canada in 1945 (Hicks); studies of refugees from the U.S.S.R.,
to determine the effects of Soviet propaganda (Inkeles). A series
of investigations in the American army, undertaken in 1942-3,
to determine whether American soldiers were conscious of “war
aims*9 must be included in these research projects. Most of these
investigations had negative results—i.e., they showed that propa-
ganda had had no decisive effect. But I feel that all these studies
suffered from inadequate methods.
First of all, concerning Germans interrogated by the British and
Americans—what credibility can be accorded to statements by
men who are prisoners, vanquished, accused, who have gone
through tremendous ordeals and who are in the presence of their
masters, their victors, their eventual judges? To think that these
men spoke the truth simply because they were promised anonym-
ity or impunity is childish. Precisely because they had lived under
Nazism, and even more because they had accepted it, they
could not give the least credence to such guarantees—the Nazi
regime had used the same stratagems to uncover and eliminate
its enemies. These prisoners necessarily lived in a universe of
combat, of lies, of commitment, whereas the researchers placed
Appendix (271
themselves—and wanted to place the prisoners—in a liberal, un-
constrained, frank universe: this misunderstanding vitiated all
the findings of these investigations. Without being paradoxical,
one might even say that the more these investigations showed that
the prisoners had not been affected by propaganda, the more
they really proved that the men were still living the lives of
propagandees.
On the other hand, how can one believe in the sincerity of
responses concerning a man’s Nazis convictions in Germany after
3.945, when Nazism had been outlawed and Nazis were being
eliminated from the German administration? With regard to
prisoners, how can one fail to see that for a PW of one or two
years, no longer subjected to propaganda, his position vitiates
all conclusions one can possibly draw from such inquiries?8 Be-
cause only 15 percent express Nazi convictions, 10 percent ex-
press feelings favorable to Nazism, 50 percent are indifferent, and
25 percent are hostile, to assume that a mass of individuals sub-
jected for ten years to Hitler’s propaganda retained their critical
capacity vis-^-vis the regime is to draw conclusions that are en-
tirely uncertain, despite the enormous labor undertaken.
The most serious fault of all these investigations seems to be
the following: they preserve the old notion that the effect of
propaganda manifests itself in dear, conscious opinions and that
the propagandee will respond in a specific way according to the
propagandist’s slogans. But this is less and less true. One must
understand that just as there is dissociation between private and
public opinion, there is dissociation between opinion and action.
Propaganda works in that direction. It is not because some indi-
vidual holds clearly defined Nazi or Communist convictions that
he will behave for the benefit of the Nazi or Communist regime.
On the contrary. It is increasingly understood that those who have
dear, conscious convictions are potential heretics who discuss
action in the light of doctrine. Conversely, because a man cannot
clearly express his war aims does not mean he will comport
himself less well on the battlefield if he is properly indoctrinated
with propaganda—or fail to exterminate Jews just because he is 6
6 Some of these authors are aware of the shortcomings of this method: for example^
Gurfein says that German prisoners were not familiar with the methods of surveys,
were inhibited by their long subjection in Germany, and so on. Nevertheless, these
authors still use these methods and draw conclusions from their findings.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
272)
not an articulate racist,7 or fail to be a devoted militant because
he cannot formulate the dogma of the class struggle. What mat-
ters to the propagandist is to have a good soldier, a devoted mili-
tant, a pogromist Thus, to declare that 50 percent of German
PWs were indifferent to Nazism because of their negative re-
sponse to trick questions is to bypass the problem. What is impor-
tant to know is what they did. Did they participate in Jew hunts
and the destruction of ghettos, in executions of civilians, bombard-
ments of cities, torpedoing of hospital ships, and so on? If they
did these things, they did so because they had a motivation far
stronger than their opinions, one that will not be revealed by a
questionnaire of this sort.
Similarly, to conclude that propaganda had little effect on the
German soldiers and left them on a private, individualized level
merely because they were much more interested in the fate of
their families than in anything else seems to me to have little
relation to reality. When the average militant is captured, is out
of action and protected against propaganda, he will obviously
return to his personal problems. This does not mean that he was
not under the influence of propaganda when he was plunged
into action. On the contrary—as I have shown, the cessation of
propaganda leads the propagandee into “privatization.”
With regard to the inquiries of American soldiers, they suf-
fered from the same faults. To conclude that there is a contrast
between war propaganda and individual opinion because less
than 20 percent can name the officially promulgated war aims,
less than 10 percent know the basic points of the Atlantic Charter,
and more than 50 percent define their war aims in purely per-
sonal terms—is to think very negligently. For the aim of propa-
ganda obviously was to obtain the most courageous and efficient
soldiers, and not necessarily those inspired by a moral ideal.
7 A good example of such opposites is the following: In connection with the trial
of a Jewish defendant (Boricld), many judiciary chroniclers wrote anti-Semitic
reports, as revealed by Mrs. Hesse (Evidences, 1959). But none of these writers
was a racist. On the contrary, they were anti-Nazis, and they strongly protested
their friendship for the Jews. Still, their reports were what they were. While writ-
ing them and trying to explain the actions of the defendant by his origins, the
writers actually adhered to the stereotypes, images, and prejudices of anti-Semitic
propaganda, which had remained fully unconscious, but still determined their
actions, though on the conscious level they were absolutely not anti-Semites. And
when they became aware of what they had done, they insisted they had never
meant to say that
Appendix (273
Propaganda played on the most elementary drives to make a man
engage wholeheartedly in combat. In that, it was effective—
even if it could not express itself in ideological “war aims.” Or
it restricted itself to the formulation and dissemination of war
aims. Then it was a childish form of propaganda that could not
move anybody, and one must not be surprised if individuals
formulated their own war aims differently. Moreover, attention
must also be paid to the effect in depth that occurs when these
war aims (liberty, war against barbarism, etc.) are absorbed.
This effect can be very active but will not necessarily be expressed
by the propagandee in the same terms as by the newspapers. Dif-
ferences between propagandistic formulas and their repetition
by the propagandee do not mean that he fails to act.
It must be concluded that this entire research method cannot
measure propaganda effectiveness.
Finally, a word Qn efforts to measure tangible effects: shifting
of votes, increased sales in the wake of an advertising campaign,
joining a party as a result of a membership drive. This is all very
limited. Political parties always make such efforts to evaluate
their actions. They try to interpret all indications and to accord
propaganda the part that it played. A very good example of this
form of analysis has been furnished by Sergei Tchakhotin8 after
studying the 1932 election results in Germany; in that study
the effects of Social Democratic propaganda in Hesse emerge
very clearly. Then there are the research studies by American
political parties to explain the 1952 elections, and particularly
the shift of Catholic votes away from the Democrats. This was
apparently the result of a variety of propaganda efforts; propa-
ganda on un-American activities, nationalist propaganda, military
and even religious propaganda (hopes of seeing an American
pope). Eisenhower tied the struggle against Communism to reli-
gious nationalism (religion is the counterweight to tyranny). This
apparently greatly influenced Catholics.
Finally, the Communist party, after having made propaganda
in some district or village, evaluates the results by the number
of petitions, collections, signatures, and so on. But no real sig-
nificance can be attributed to such research operations. The
criticism of Tchakhotin s analysis is well known, as is the attribu- •
• The Rape of the Masses (New York: Alliance Book Co.; 1940).
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
274)
tion of entirely other causes than Social Democratic propaganda
to the election defeat in Hesse. Nothing certain emerges from
such analyses.
Other attempts at measuring effects are being tried by commer-
cial firms in regard to advertising. The object is different, but the
methods are related. Commercial firms are interested in immedi-
ate results in order to learn whether it is advantageous to ad-
vertise, whether advertising produces “side” benefits, when they
should advertise (before or after launching a new product), at
what time of the year, how far to go, how not to overshoot the
mark. At best, all this can emerge only from analyses of past effects.
But we must also ask who is reached by advertising. There are
thousands of ways of looking for this—loss leaders, free samples,
questionnaires, and so on. But they all disregard the influence
on the unconscious, the most important part. This education of
reflexes and instilling of habits is propaganda’s true effect, and
cannot be gauged by direct inquiry, but only by the massive
participation it evokes. What counts is to assess the total effect
of advertising. In the commercial world it will be measured in
money; the cost of advertising is compared with the returns.
Generally, advertising costs are between 5 percent and 20 per-
cent of the sales price. If they exceed 20 percent, one may doubt
that the returns justify the added expense, but there are excep-
tions when such costly campaigns are accompanied by a great
improvement in the quality of die product—for example, adver-
tising doubled the sales of the French cigarette Gitanes in one
year (1938). The problem of return is central in commercial
affairs.
The State does not always have to count propaganda costs
and limit them.9 In fact, the aim frequendy exceeds simple ques-
tions of money. If the object is to gain 10 percent more votes in
order to marshal unanimity behind some economic program,
stimulate energies, eliminate an opponent’s psychological resist-
ance, influence foreign public opinion—all this can be well meas-
ured, and the importance of the demarche is such that money is
spent without being counted. In other situations, the State fre-
9 It is easy to see the disproportion between the enormous sums expended and the
returns in the cases of Nazi Germany, the U.S.S.R., and also the Americans during
the war (the effects of the three billion leaflets showered on the German army
between June 1944 and March 1945 were obviously not in proportion to the effort
made).
Appendix (275
quently cannot even try to measure the propaganda returns; for
example, in wartime, propaganda directed to an enemy cannot
be measured by its repercussions (feed-back). In any event, if
the psychological shock succeeds, it must remain hidden, for
otherwise the propagandees would immediately be arrested by
their own police and all propaganda effect would stop. Besides,
if a government knows that some foreign propaganda is effective,
it will make appropriate counter-propaganda.
To sum up this analysis of the inadequacy of the various meth-
ods designed to evaluate the effectiveness of propaganda, let us
add the following observations:
1. Most sociologists and politicians consider the mathematical
method the most exact and efficient. But this method seems to me
not just debatable, but wrong. The mathematical methods (sta-
tistics, etc.) can be applied only within very narrow limits, and
to problems that generally have had to be taken out of context.
Most sociological phenomena defy this method. The desire to
reduce a situation to precise figures presumes a threefold prior
operation:
a. The removal of the fact to be quantified from its psycho-
logical, religious, sentimental, historic contexts and its removal
from the individuals Weltanschauung as a whole.
b. The reduction of the phenomenon to its simplest state,
by elimination of all complexities and subsidiary aspects—
which may actually be the most important.
c. Consideration of the external phenomena only, though
they may be merely extensions of more important, different
factors. But quantification must restrict itself to external aspects,
behavior, visible attitudes, and so on.
This would be barely acceptable if it were admitted that the
results are rather thin and relatively insignificant. But because
they are expressed in figures, and because we have a maniacal
faith in the exactness of mathematics, it is claimed that such
methods produce the truth itself, and that the rest is literature.
But it is precisely the rest that is most important, so long as we
do not have a total "robot" image of man. It is the rest that is
important, so long as we do not discount man altogether, as do
the Kinsey Report and others. What is particularly serious in this
connection is that the socio-psychologists, who use such mathe-
matical methods, are quick to claim that what cannot be reached
EFFECTIVENESS OF PBOPAGANDA
276)
by their methods does not exist. But I have tried to show that
such methods are inadequate for the problems studied here, and
I must add that the results attained and the figures arrived at
never go beyond what is already obvious and merely common
sense. To prove with figures, after long statistical inquiries, that
women are more receptive to emotional propaganda than men
is hardly an astounding revelation. Common sense also tells us
that man has a certain psychic stability that cannot be altered
radically by propaganda; figures, charts, and ratios add little to
that.
2. My second observation is that these so-called scientific meth-
ods are extremely partial. All analyses of effectiveness with regard
to propaganda that I have seen reveal an unconscious bias. To
give just one example: Most American studies on the relative
effectiveness of Nazi and American propaganda conclude that
Nazi propaganda did not have a profound effect on the Germans,
that Nazi propaganda in no way whatever reached American
opinion, but that American propaganda had certain tactical effects
on German soldiers, inducing them to surrender in 1945. But Goeb-
bels also had some rather thorough, systematic studies made that
invalidate the first two claims. With regard to the third, even the
American specialists themselves are in disagreement (Shils and
Warburg).
The psychologists and sociologists who have held that propa-
ganda had little effect all share certain views based on the choice
of values. They are humanists who believe in the resolute character
of human nature, the permanence of personality, the irrational
but stable foundations of psychic life, and who (unconsciously)
refuse to admit that men can be entirely mastered, dominated,
conditioned. Or they are convinced democrats who believe in
the democratic presupposition that the citizen must be able to
retain autonomy of will and judgment because without it elec-
tions would mean nothing, elected representatives would repre-
sent nothing, and there could no longer be talk of the sovereignty
of the people.
It is completely acceptable to have such a view of man, but
it is a metaphysical view. It is perfectly acceptable that a man
should remain an optimist and idealist, and for that reason de-
clare that propaganda is not very formidable and make it an act
of faith that man will always come out on top. But people should
Appendix ( 27 7
not claim to have reached such conclusions by scientific analysis,
statistics, and sociological experiments.1
3. Propaganda’s effectiveness—or the absence thereof—cannot
be established by such methods. It can be done only by observa-
tion of general phenomena, by the best possible use of our general
knowledge of man and his socio-political environment, by a mix-
ture of judgments of approximation, and by the best possible
use of the clearest of reasons. This cannot lead to figures or to
strict certainties, but it yields certain probabilities and, above
all, precludes the massive errors into which the exact methods
lead us.
2. Ineffectiveness of Propaganda
In the following we will look at four problems connected with
propaganda’s ineffectiveness.
On the basis of general considerations about the psychic life
of the individual, many psychologists, particularly the Americans,
reach the conclusion that propaganda is ineffective. I will select
two out of many examples. The first concerns the stability of
stereotypes. Most observers (Young, Krech and Crutchfield, Mac-
Dougall) think it practically impossible to change stereotypes
by psychological manipulation. I agree quite readily, without
investigating whether these stereotypes are spontaneous or pro-
duced by propaganda. It should be added that these stereotypes
are equally impervious to personal experience and hard facts, and
that if propaganda cannot budge them, information can budge
them even less. But it cannot be denied that certain stereotypes
are the result of propaganda. They acquire the same stability
and force as the others. For example, the stereotypes of the Com-
munist ideal, proletarian Messianism, and the identification of
the U.S.S.R. with peace and revolution (propaganda had little
trouble associating these two contradictory terms) produced
1 Let us also remember that the American socio-psychologists are not unanimous in
their estimates of effectiveness. In general, one can see the full success of all forms
of propaganda of justification: the individual always firmly believes in whatever
justifies him. I would also like to suggest a relatively simple experiment: study
Lenin’s propaganda principles and apply them to the actions of the Soviet leaders.
The results that they seek by propaganda almost always emerge very clearly and
are generally obtained.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
278;
by propaganda, have easily withstood the impact of such shock-
ing facts as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the deportations from the Baltic
countries and the Ukraine (1944-5), and the Hungarian massacre
(1956). Actually, such massive facts do shake opinion for a brief
time and momentarily efface stereotypes, but after a few weeks
the fact is relegated to the past. It becomes engulfed in explica-
tions, its obvious significance disappears, and the old stereotype,
completely unchanged, resumes its place and vigor. For example,
Sartre’s personal evolution lasted from October 1956 to January
1957. How can one, then, conclude from the existence of stereo-
types that propaganda is ineffective?
On the other hand, the non-relation between opinion and action
needs to be considered here once again. For example, in a recent
struggle over public schools, I found the following: Some of my
friends mouthed the stereotypes of support for public schools—
unity of youth, independence of the faculty, intellectual quality,
and so on. They expressed their views very clearly—but sent their
own children to private schools. This is not unusual. But I have
shown that propaganda is principally interested in shaping action
and behavior, and with little thought. For this reason, propa-
ganda’s comparative inability to modify stereotypes does not per-
mit the conclusion that it is ineffective so long as it is able to
obtain, beyond opinions, irrational acts; nevertheless, I will admit
this relative inability. The same holds true for my second example:
pre-existing attitudes.
The question of attitudes is now considered fundamental. It can
be defined in different ways:
Krueger states that an attitude is “a residue of experience that
conditions and controls activity. A mental organization that pre-
disposes an individual to a certain type of activity vis-^-vis people
or situations is installed.”
Young says that “attitude is a form of unconscious habit that
expresses profound tendencies in a drive toward action.”2
Krech and Crutchfield consider attitude “a durable organization
of the emotive, perceptive and cognitive motivations related to
one aspect of the world.”
These definitions suffice to show that on the basis of such con-
2 We have shown how, from that point on, the individual “selects” this or that
information and rejects this or that stimulus, or how the individual escapes all
attacks on his presuppositions.
Appendix ( 27 g
siderations attitude is a personal factor leading to action. Of
course, mans personality does not consist of one attitude, but
of a complex of integrated and interrelated attitudes. The way
in which an individual reacts to a stimulus depends on the entire
pattern of his attitudes. Whether the stimulus is a private or
public event makes no difference; nor does it make any difference
whether the stimulus is accidental or the result of a plan. Con-
sequently, a person in the grip of propaganda will react accord-
ing to his pre-existing attitudes and to the degree that these
attitudes lead him to react. Therefore propaganda must base
itself on existing tendencies to have the greatest effect. If it goes
against ingrained attitudes, it cannot have any effect.3 Mac-
Dougall says, for example, that Baptist propaganda does not reach
conscious Catholics and that Western propaganda does not reach
convinced Communists. Still, there are defections: some Catholics
do become Baptists and vice versa. The temptation then will be
to say that their previous attitudes were only superficial. But that
is not serious reasoning. It is like the argument of predestination
that will say of a Christian who has committed a trespass: this
proves that he did not have proper faith to begin with.
Doob goes further: “Any response to the stimulus of propaganda
depends entirely on the past experiences of the individual. Propa-
ganda limits itself to evoking a response he has already learned.
This response was already part of his personality. . . . The propa-
gandist must follow the current of public opinion.” In Doob s
view, if one were to examine whether propaganda has had an
effect, one would have to individually examine those who have
obeyed propaganda, in order to see whether they already had
attitudes pushing them toward action in a given direction. Doob
is sure they had.
This view has been criticized with good arguments by Miotto,
who reasons as follows:
1. How could Goebbels’s propaganda keep the Germans in line
8 Many experiences on which these statements are based are very debatable. For
example, Cartwright claims that the enormous propaganda in the United States,
between 1941 and 1945, to buy Defense Bonds did not change attitudes. In fact,
the reasons given by purchasers remained the same for four years despite the
diversity of those reasons: individual motivations did not change. Actually, this
proves that people need simple reasons for their acts. The propaganda reasons were
too complicated If a man has a clear reason for doing something, why should he
adopt other complicated and vapid reasons for doing the same thing?
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
280)
and fighting to the last minute against all evidence and feelings
of fear and their desire for peace?
2. How, on the other hand, can one explain the famous “unde-
cided” in elections and on all political questions? The undecided
do not make their decisions in consonance with pre-existing tend-
encies, but according to where they are being pushed by propa-
ganda.
3. The importance of pre-existing attitudes may be valid in
peacetime when the crowds are not subjected to psychic tensions
and social groups are stable. Propaganda must adapt itself to their
habits in such times. But inside a society in a state of disinte-
gration, with considerable class changes and high nervous tension,
propaganda need not move in traditional patterns; it can inter-
fere brutally and carry the decision beyond all accustomed con-
siderations.
4. Finally, how can one explain the violent twists and turns of
propaganda, as, for example, in the case of the Communists or
the Nazis? Attitudes have not the time to follow suit, and yet, in
most cases, the people follow. It cannot be said that they do this
through obedience. In following propaganda, the people believe it.
Let us add here a thought by Stoetzel. He has evolved a theory
that a person can have two opinions on the same subject—his
private opinion, which he keeps carefully to himself or expresses
only to a very small number of persons, and his “public” opinion,
which he shares with his group. Propaganda uses this coexistence
of two opinions. By doing so, it can “make an individual take an
action completely different from the action that would be sparked
by his private opinion.” But the expression of public opinion is
not necessarily based on pre-existing elements. It springs much
more frequently from circumstances, external currents, and so on.
Finally, two remarks: Obviously, a pre-existing attitude exists
in the face of one propaganda act. If one makes one speech, or
publishes one article, the response to it will obviously be condi-
tioned by people's prior positions. But that is not propaganda.
Does anyone believe that pre-established attitudes will resist a
real propaganda that surrounds the individual without pause from
morning to night, from childhood to old age, in all that he reads,
sees, hears, without giving him respite, a moment to pause, think,
catch his breath?
Under such conditions, pre-existing attitudes will fade quickly.
Appendix (281
They cannot resist the psychological bombardment of a real propa-
ganda campaign.
Even if one thinks that such a description applies only to propa-
ganda in totalitarian countries, we must remember what we have
said about sociological propaganda in other countries.
Thus, this theory (that propaganda is dependent on pre-existing
attitudes) does not mean much. On that basis, no psychological
explanation of propaganda is possible.
All that needs to be preserved of this theory is that propaganda
must always use existing tendencies, as I have already said. But
pre-existing attitudes are only a temporary factor of secondary
importance, which needs to be considered only at the inception
of a propaganda campaign.
Some have claimed to find proof of the ineffectiveness of propa-
ganda elsewhere. Propaganda, they say, generally leads to indif-
ference. When an individual in a democracy is placed between
two propagandas, there is no reason for him to decide Yes or
No, and the propagandas cancel each other out. The example
most frequently given is an election campaign. With regard to
totalitarian countries, where the individual is assailed by exces-
sively heavy propaganda, it is said that he knows that he is being
lied to and no longer listens, escaping into political absent-
mindedness. He closes up and can no longer be reached. Exam-
ples of this are said to be the attitudes of the Soviet people vis-i-vis
Stalinist propaganda, or Hungarian opinion; according to a 1958
survey: “The majority of the respondents were favorable toward
Kadar" (obviously!), but it was also noted that “Hungarians are
primarily interested in their personal and local problems, and very
little interested in political and international problems/' This, it
is claimed, shows propaganda s ineffectiveness.
In the same direction, the observations of Lazarsfeld: In the
United States, the FCC demands that every private radio and
TV station devote some hours to civic programs. But, says Lazars-
feld, the results are not very encouraging; the listeners and viewers
turn off their sets—“the difficulty is not to make the horse drink,
but to lead it to the water. ... It even has happened that out of
sheer contrariness the listener reinforced the prejudices and opin-
ions he was asked to surrender." This well-known effect is called
boomerang, and incidentally it often is cited in support of claims
of the ineffectiveness of propaganda.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
282)
But these examples are not very convincing. We have studied
the phenomenon of indifference in the case of unilateral propa-
ganda in totalitarian countries and have found that it is not a
failure but a success of propaganda. With regard to the alleged
ineffectiveness of two contradictory election propagandas, I will
limit myself to three remarks, complementary to what has already
been said on this subject:
1. Those who assert this independence on the part of the lis-
tener faced with opposing publicity campaigns are always intel-
lectuals, who look at the phenomenon from a distance; moreover,
they are always men who already have a fixed opinion and refuse
to let themselves be influenced.
2. It must be remembered how difficult it is to gauge the effec-
tiveness and intensity of a propaganda. Can we really speak of
two equal propagandas? It is hard to believe. Incidentally, this
does not mean that the more intense and better made propaganda
will win automatically and in short order. Even election propa-
ganda can have long-term effects if it is made systematically.
In France, between 1921 and 1936, the Communist party made
progress mainly as a result of election propaganda, and the same
was true for the Nazi party during 1929-33. It is, therefore, almost
impossible to claim that just because there are two propagandas,
they cancel each other out. This common sense objection is en-
tirely superficial. Let us add that, in any case, he who fails to
make propaganda will be defeated immediately. This at least
shows that propaganda is needed.
3. Let us return to the example of the American public’s not
being interested in civic programs on the radio. But are such
programs propaganda? We know that propaganda’s first requisite
is to be heard, to excite individuals and make them look or listen.
It must, therefore, be assumed, at the very least, that the tech-
niques employed are not the best. Let us look at the subject of
the broadcasts: the opening of a new hospital, with a full descrip-
tion of its services; the opening of a new public library, with
speeches on the value of reading matter; conferences on alcohol-
ism, friendship between peoples ... It was not necessary to make
a survey here; simply by looking at the list I could have told
Mr. Lazarsfeld that 75 percent of the listeners would turn off
the program. Here we have information that may be perfectly
honest but is ineffective. This is, as demonstrated elsewhere, an
Appendix (283
example of the great weakness on the part of information vis-k-vis
propaganda. The latter, not claiming to be educational, hurls peo-
ple into burning actuality, appeals to everything that excites them.
Then they do not turn off the program. The health bar that sells
fruit juice is evidently less attractive than the bar that sells liquor.
Marxism, too, readily takes a critical attitude with regard to the
effectiveness of propaganda. I will offer only one example. Mao
Tse-tung, in his report on the internal differences between Com-
munist countries, made in February 1951 (published in June
1957), declared that one cannot force a people to renounce ideal-
ism or to believe in Marxism. Propaganda, he said, can .“force”
people to become Marxist, but is ineffective in that case. Mao
added that “one must use democratic methods such as public
discussion, criticism, persuasion, appropriate education.” That
sounds like a program of Human and Public Relations. But one
must remember that the aim is, nevertheless, fixed and precise:
the people must become Marxist. Mao rejects only certain methods
of psychological pressure and the most elementary forms of propa-
ganda. But what is “appropriate education?” It is to teach chil-
dren a Marxist catechism, to give them a Marxist conception
of the world in history and science. What is public discussion
and criticism? Who will conduct the sessions if not a leader who
knows where they should lead and who will imperceptibly lead
his speakers to that point in the course of the discussion. What
is persuasion other than one of propaganda's most current forms?
Mao describes only the more modem and personalized forms
of propaganda. With regard to the democracies, we know from
the experience of group dynamics how false is the assertion that
propaganda is ineffective (see Whyte, Sorokin, etc.). To put it
differently, all that matters is what one means by propaganda.
Besides, even if it were impossible for propaganda to get people
to believe in Marxism, propaganda was very successful in China
in making the people act in accord with the government's wishes.
The “great leaps forward” and the communes are admirable ex-
amples of propaganda's efficiency.
To support the thesis of propaganda's ineffectiveness, many
refer to great historic examples. For example, American sociolo-
gists were forced to acknowledge that American propaganda
failed when it tried to make the Germans resist their government
in 1943-5. In particular, the German civilian population con-
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
284)
tinued to resist despite bombings and food shortages. Industrial
production remained at a surprisingly high level despite far-
reaching destruction; morale did not disintegrate in any way (see
Warburg). Propaganda specialists thought that morale would
break down after the Normandy invasion, but the will to fight
persisted. And all this despite strong psychological action. Ergo—
propaganda was not effective.
.But one should perhaps look at the other side of the problem
and examine what caused the high German morale, what produced
the resistance that led a people to fight until the very end of its
material means for at least a year, without hope, when twenty-
eight years earlier the same people gave in while its army was in
less danger than in 1944. There can be no doubt that it was the
result of Nazi education—in other words, propaganda, propa-
ganda that exalted sacrifice, war, military values, faith in the
Fiihrer, the common weal, the superiority and invincibility of the
German race. Such propaganda had begun fifteen years earlier,
i.e.y had had time to take effect. American propaganda that began
to penetrate only in 1943 could not stem the tide; it had no time.
The general morale, resting on propaganda—and not the survival
of cadres and groups, as Shils’s microscopic analysis would have
it—led to the German resistance;4 for at least four months before
the end of the war, communications were cut off, the police
and the party exercised pressures only very sporadically, the ad-
4 This is the conclusion of Gurfein and Janowitz, who showed, for example, that
from June 1944 to April 1945 more than 60 percent of German soldiers still re-
tained their faith in Hitler, and that in February 1945, 40 percent believed that
Germany could still win the war. These authors concluded that it was useless to
attack the German soldier on ideological grounds because he was protected by
virtue of being a propagandee. But, in contrast, there is the explosive study by
Shils, which attempts to show that German propaganda had little effect, and that
he found such values as honor, fatherland, and so on existed where small groups,
and particularly military groups, had succeeded in surviving. To the extent that an
individual is satisfied with his small group, he cannot be attacked, and his resist-
ance to outside force will not spring from propaganda. This interpretation (Shils's)
conflicts in my view with basic considerations. With regard to small groups, why
were there such great differences, some groups dissolving without apparent reason,
and so on? There is a basic problem here: the morale of the group. And that
morale, precisely, is the result of propaganda. If a newly turned anti-Nazi is judged
by his fellows, a transposition of the importance of slogans takes place on the
personal level: ideological unity and “morale” then constitute the unifying force of
the primary group. If, conversely, we see an individual's morale collapse quickly
when he is separated from his group, that is (except for other obvious reasons)
because propaganda is a mass phenomenon, so that the isolated individual ipso
facto ceases to be a propagandee. Thus Shils is right, but stops halfway. Propaganda
is present in a combat group.
Appendix (285
ministration no longer functioned. If the people, and not just the
combat groups studied by Shils, resisted, it was not because they
were surrounded by official pressure, but because they had been
propagandized in depth. And that also rendered them immune
to American propaganda.
A second and classic example: Hungary. From the moment of
the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, it was said that Communist
propaganda had failed: even though this propaganda had been
going on for ten years, the people had retained their critical
sense and had not been convinced. That was the standard argu-
ment. The Western bourgeoisie was delighted to welcome those
anti-Communists, valiant fighters for the Free World. How great
was the astonishment and the general covering up when it was
discovered that these revolutionaries were almost all Communists,
or at least Socialists. And the Hungarian refugees of 1945, almost
all adherents of Horthy’s regime, refused to have anything to do
with the new arrivals, on the ground that they represented the
extreme left. This is another propaganda success. Within ten
years a population with a large majority of moderate rightists,
an important moderate leftist group, and a small Communist
minority (8 percent) was tinned into an almost entirely Com-
munist nation. I say “almost entirely,1" because the opponents of
the regime who fled were also Communists who, even when
beyond the reach of the police State, continued to say so though
they knew that Communists were not popular in the countries
to which they had gone. They had not revolted against a form of
government or against Communism, but against a man, against
excessive restrictions, against the presence of the Russians. This
means that not just anything can be attained through propaganda
and that only surface propaganda, tactical propaganda, had failed,
whereas fundamental propaganda had succeeded. But it obviously
is much more important to show that propaganda succeeded in
transforming a nation into Communists than to show that it could
not make them accept certain food restrictions.
Another example of the ineffectiveness of propaganda is
Algeria.5 It is true that psychological action directed at the Arabs
generally fails. Very few fellaghas were persuaded by propaganda
to lay down their arms and come over to the French side. The few
cases in which this occurred do not seem to have been the result
5 This was written in 1959, and is included unchanged.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
286)
of propaganda. Among “neutral” Arab populations, no great suc-
cesses can be registered either, nor does pro-French sentiment
seem to have increased. On the contrary. Therefore, it is said,
propaganda was ineffective. But here one must make distinctions.
Let us say first that propaganda was quite effective with regard
to the French groups. Young soldiers, often hostile to the war in
Algeria in the beginning, changed their attitude after a few
months there. This was not the exclusive result of psychological
action, but it played its part and was related to other things,
such as man's inclusion in groups, his participation in a state
of mind—all things that I have shown to be closely related to
propaganda. With respect to French civilians, propaganda was
equally effective, and the events of May 13 cannot be explained
without the careful psychological preparations that took place for
the events of that day. The failure of propaganda toward the
Arabs—aside from the fact that propaganda toward such groups
is most difficult—must be attributed mainly to its extreme medi-
ocrity and the shortcomings of its methods. Some meetings, usu-
ally conducted by young people without experience, a few
pamphlets (some of which were well done), some phonograph
records—who can expect to convince anybody of anything by
such means? The failure of propaganda must also be attributed
to the complete absence of both a usable ideology and subjects
that could cause excitement or enthusiasm: nothing had been
marshaled against the nationalist passion. There was no effective
stimulus on any level. How can one claim to judge propaganda
under such conditions? What happened in the camps can hardly
be mentioned.6 All that can be concluded from this failure is that
propaganda cannot be improvised or made in just any fashion.7
8 See “brainwashing,” Appendix II.
7 Here are some other well-known examples of failure of propaganda: Goebbels’s
propaganda of 1929 against the Young Plan; the 1945 mayorality elections in
Boston; the 1948 Presidential elections in the United States; the psychological
preparation for the Suez campaign (1956); the European Defense Community in
France. But these failures were almost all the result of faulty judgment concerning
the territory where propaganda was to be applied, or of the overwhelming power of
an opponent
Appendix
(287
3. Effectiveness of Propaganda
It is impossible, in my view, to establish precise measurements
of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of propaganda. In honesty,
one can judge it only in conjunction with very broad facts and
very general ideas. I shall give here some criteria of judgment,
often very banal and simplistic, which permit the conclusion
that propaganda is indeed effective.
First, some very general reasons deserve to be considered. The
first is that today all politicians and all big businessmen agree that
psychological action, propaganda, advertising, human relations,
and public relations are indispensable and definitely produce re-
sults. Could one say that these men obey a new fashion, are
victims of an illusion, or have not really thought about it? In
view of the deliberate attempt on the part of some socio-psy-
chologists to demonstrate that political men err when they
“believe” in the effectiveness of propaganda, one might ask who is
the real victim of illusions here. If we think of men motivated
entirely by the desire for efficacy, like Lenin, or of businessmen
entirely motivated by the desire for higher profits, it would be
hard to admit that such people, who are very realistic, allow
themselves to be taken in by illusions in this domain.
A second argument on the same order is the following: All those
who have lived in a strongly propagandized environment and
have been subjected to the effects of propaganda (while trying
to remain unaffected), all those who have seen propaganda in
massive action, are agreed that propaganda is effective. Those
who deny it live in countries that are still liberal and not sub-
jected to intense propaganda. Today hardly any Germans, Rus-
sians, or Algerians question the effectiveness of propaganda. Only
those who see it from afar, who are not directly subjected to it,
who do not witness opinion-changes caused by propaganda, who
confound the brushfire of a McCarthy with the propaganda of a
Goebbels, express doubts. Moreover—and this is characteristic
—they do it to the same degree that they fail to see the true
propaganda practiced on them. This explains why many American
socio-psychologists deny the effectiveness of propaganda, but
admit that of Public Relations and Human Relations: for these
are precisely the form propaganda takes in the United States.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
288)
There, it is the only truly developed, systematized, and long-
lasting form of propaganda.
We must now turn to some very general and broad facts that
are open to various interpretations. First: How can the following
developments be explained without an admission that opinion
and behavior changes took place as a result of the use of mass
media?
1. The attainment of consciousness on the part of the labor
class between 1848 and 1917. Marx is perfecdy right when he
says that the actual condition of the proletariat is nothing unless
the proletariat is aware of that condition; that such awareness is
simultaneously the creator of the labor class and the revolutionary
will, and that it cannot occur spontaneously or individually. It is
the fruit of what the workers are told by certain intellectuals, the
result of an “education”—in reality, of a propaganda. Propaganda,
sometimes uncertain and searching for a way but effective in the
long run, has led the working class to where it is now, and has
done so by closely mixing action, education, mass meetings, and
“propaganda” in the strict sense of the term, according to the
formula that I have indicated as typical for propaganda in the
broad sense.
2. The spread of the Socialist mentality in France between 1900
and 1950: How did this famous shift to the left come about? Why
did the number of Socialist and, later, Communist votes increase
constantly? Why were the Socialist reforms of the State and the
economy effected without revolution? Who would question today
the nationalization of certain enterprises, social security, paid vaca-
tions, and so on? A distinction must be made between those who
vote Socialist and those—whose number is far greater—who are
so imbued with Socialism that they no longer even recognize as
Socialist what were considered to be purely Socialist demands fifty
years ago. Here again we see a slow penetration by propaganda.
3. The revolutions of 1917 and 1933 are the results of propa-
ganda, in the very words of those who made them. Lenin and
Trotsky, Hitler and Goebbels said time and again that the success
of their revolutions was the result of propaganda, which made
the masses become adherents of a minority.
4. The spread of Communism and the Communization of the
populations in the people's democracies and China are also the
result of propaganda. Those populations are progressively trans-
Appendix (*& 9
formed into Communists by enlisting them in a psychological
mass movement, by systematic education, and by involving them
in certain actions designed for psychological ends. The problem
of truth or of doctrinal persuasion is of no importance in the
process.
5. The explosions of nationalism in the Cameroons, Algeria, In-
dochina, and so on cannot be explained except as results of propa-
ganda. Their people were without historical or racial coherence,
a common State, or a national existence. On the other hand, na-
tionalism was a specific phenomenon of the Europe of the nine-
teenth century, contrary to the thesis that nationalism is a
necessary historic “stage” between feudalism and socialism, a
purely Marxist assertion not borne out by history. In reality, the
colonial peoples saw in nationalism the image, the grandeur, the
effectiveness of their victors, and adopted its form and passion to
become victors in their turn—which is completely normal. But
this reasoning on the part of some intellectuals had no reality, no
force, no efficacy until that nationalist passion inflamed hearts,
until there was the systematic creation of a national exaltation
with regard to a nation that did not exist. This was done through
propaganda.
I could cite other instances. In all, these facts are of infinitely
greater importance in judging the effectiveness of propaganda
than any analyses of a voting pattern or of the effects of a
pamphlet. To be sure, for all these examples documentation is
needed. For some of them, such documentation exists; in con-
nection with others, research is being done. I cannot trace every
element here. But I will say that my assertions are not gratuitous
or lightly made. One qualification is essential to prevent misunder-
standing: I do not mean to say that these developments were the
result of one propaganda only, and even less of propaganda in
the narrow sense of psychological manipulation of symbols. Of
course, the Revolution of 1917 or the emergence of Algerian
nationalism was a confluence of many factors. There were pre-
existing conditions, an evolution of events, a spontaneous evolution
of opinions, the growth of some organizations and the decline
of others, economic phenomena, and so on.
But these facts by themselves are incapable of producing such
massive human movements as the labor movement of the Nazi
revolution. What is decisive is the propaganda factor, which sets
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
290)
these developments into motion, coordinates them, makes people
conscious of them. Obviously, propaganda does not exist by itself.
But without it, nothing would happen. It really starts the engine.
And once the movement is underway, propaganda keeps it going,
directs it, and ensures its success. From a different point of view
one can also see the importance of this fact if one realizes that
no enterprise now is possible anywhere without psychological
preparation, conditioning, persuasion, and so on. Every event in
our society supposes the allegiance or approval of all, and such
participation in mind or action can be obtained only by propa-
ganda. The fact that it is utilized in so many different fields shows
that our society is in the process of becoming a total society, e.g.,
a society in which no single act can be a matter of indifference;
every act and feeling assumes a political character; no act is purely
personal. Not to participate in Hitler's Winterhilfe (winter col-
lection for the poor), not to participate in the national enthusiasm
in some new African State, not to take an interest in the problem
of school systems in France in 1959, is no longer an individual
act but a breaking of ties with community; and the community
cannot function today unless its citizens are sufficiently integrated
so that every reform, no matter what kind, is carried out by all,
and assumes a political character. From there on, propaganda is
necessary. At the same time, one must assert that the mechanism
works this way and generally achieves its aim because propa-
ganda is effective.
Is it necessary to remind the reader here of the phenomenon
of advertising? I have said that one cannot draw general con-
clusions from its workings, but it seems impossible nowadays to
deny that it is effective in its own sphere; I need not reiterate
the examples found in all the books—about cigars smoked by
gangsters in films or about cigarette-manufacturers who thought
they had conquered the market, stopped advertising, and soon lost
their sales. But I must give at least three indications. Even the
careful reader, alert to exaggerations, must take seriously facts
and examples given by Vance Packard, which testify to the pub-
lic s enormous sensitivity to advertising. Second, every month
new products appear for which there is no prior need, but which
take their place in the market without much resistance. That is
exclusively the result of propaganda. New needs are created
from the day a new product appears. After a few months of
Appendix (291
getting used to a product, its absence will be felt because an
effective need will have been created. But the need was created
exclusively by advertising. If the product were presented without
advertising, nobody would buy it. Third, the reappearance and
rapid spread of advertising in the U.S.S.R. After the Communists
had considered advertising to be a capitalist phenomenon, a
non-productive expenditure, and so on, and after having abolished
it as useless in a Socialist country, they have brought it back
during the past ten years. It goes hand in hand with belief in
production. We may be certain that when production will have
increased further and produced new and more refined products,
advertising will show an upsurge similar to that in the United
States. Does this not show that advertising is really effective?
Let us now examine another field in which propaganda is
effective: in private life, and in matters that seem entirely outside
its field, but, nevertheless, show the individual’s extraordinary
sensitivity to propaganda.
Can it be said that propaganda affects an individual taken
separately? If we accept Stoetzels division between the rather
superficial public opinions of an individual and the profound atti-
tudes that remain with him, we might conclude that propa-
ganda works on the former and not on the latter. This is the
generally prevailing—and reassuring—view. The individual would
be reached by propaganda only to the extent that he participates
in public opinion (or to the extent that he is “massified”), and
then only in the upper levels of his individual psychology, and
only collectively at that. In this way, psychological effects would
not transcend the effects of public opinion and would have no
effect on the core of personality. Seeking mass effects, propa-
ganda would determine only collective behavior, and that would
show why propaganda has so little effect on private conduct.
Typical examples are propaganda against alcoholism or for
a higher birth rate. Such propaganda, it is said, does not work
because it deals with private matters. The stereotypes of health
or national power, publicly accepted by everybody, should lead
inevitably to respect for temperance and for large families, but
they have not reduced alcoholism or increased the size of families.
Ergo: propaganda, even if it succeeds in sparking specific collec-
tive actions, is incapable of affecting personality.
This is a facile analysis, but it does not seem to correspond to
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
292)
facts. First of all, it is not correct to say that in France the
respect for temperance and large families is general; among the
working class and the bourgeoisie, the general judgment that
a large family is madness and gentle intoxication agreeable is at
least as strong as that respect. What might be called the mentality
of the Canard EnchainS is surely that of the majority in this
connection. And the stereotype of the bon vivant who enjoys his
wine, plays around, and is not concerned with having children is
certainly more powerful than the stereotype of the water-drinking
family man.
But the anti-alcoholic propaganda posters in the Paris sub-
ways are slowly beginning to reach the individual. There are no
actual figures as yet, but the protests by producers of wine and
alcohol, addressed to the French Parliament, are a significant
indication. To cause such excitement, effects on liquor consump-
tion must have been felt. The same is true for propaganda in
favor of a higher birth rate. One can no longer doubt that propa-
ganda has had a profound effect on births. What really is curious
is that there has been a considerable increase in births without
a similar change in surface public opinion in favor of large families.
It seems hardly debatable today that in Nazi Germany, in Fascist
Italy, and in France since 1941, the increase in births resulted
from propaganda.
In the same way that propaganda can work for a higher birth
rate it can (contrary to what I myself believed until recently)
also work for a lower one. The surprising experience in Japan
is significant. It is well known that a country begins, spontaneously,
to produce more children after a defeat. Japan, already very
prolific before, was no exception to this rule: beginning in 1945
its birth rate increased rapidly. But it was quickly realized that
this would lead to disaster. As a result, propaganda for a lower
birth rate was launched in 1945. To be sure, in accord with wha.
I have said many times, the campaign did not have an immediate
effect. But propaganda conducted solidly for four years managed
to show results in 1950. From 34.3 per thousand in 1947, the rate
dropped to 29 in 1950, to 20 in 1954, and to 17.2 in 1957, a decline
of 50 percent in ten years, which had never been seen before.
Japan now has one of the worlds lowest birth rates.8 A striking
8 "Outlook of Studies,” in Population Problems in Japan, IV, 1959. It is true that
since 1959 the birth rate has been increasing again.
Appendix (293
aspect of this development is that birth control spreads faster in
rural areas than in the cities.
A final example: since 1950 at least, there has been concern
in France that there were too many students in the Arts and in
Law, too few in Science and in Technology. But there was no
change until it was decided that "a propaganda action should
be undertaken with the parents, to direct their children toward
the deficient areas” (November 1951). From that moment on,
a change took place, even though the propaganda was not par-
ticularly coherent, insistent, or continuous. The propaganda
launched in 1952 began to take hold in 1956: from 1956 until
1959 a shift of 25 percent of students in the desired direction
took place.
It follows that even in his personal conduct the individual
is very sensitive to propaganda in some domains. I think this
leads to the conclusion that the same is true of political behavior.
In fact, where the purchase of a product is concerned, the indi-
vidual can rely on personal experience as to his needs, the value
of the product, and so on. He can make comparisons before
shopping; all this is on the level of his direct experience, a simple
process.9 Now, if he can be influenced in this domain (though only
up to a point—he will not again buy products that turn out to be
inferior), he can be influenced all the more on the level of eco-
nomics or politics outside his range of personal experience, never
simple, and always hard to compare. Similarly, where his private
conduct is concerned—to have children or not, or what to make
them study—the individual generally knows what he wants and
obeys motivations that are truly personal and concern him closely.
So, if he can be influenced even there, will he not be susceptible
to being influenced on much more remote and exciting questions
that concern him less directly?
Finally, to demonstrate further the extreme susceptibility of the
individual, we must look at rumors and fashion—two closely
linked phenomena. Every rumor that circulates has a certain
effect. It is an amazing fact that rumors whose origins are not
known have a small audience in the beginning, a large audience
after some time. The farther away the source and the greater the •
• But behavior has been effectively changed on this level. For example, a 32 percent
increase in the consumption of slaughtered beef after a well-conducted campaign
has been recorded. Similar success has been achieved in connection with fruit juices
and cod-liver off.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
294)
number of individuals who have passed it on, the more the objec-
tive fact loses importance and the more the rumor is believed by
the multitudes who adhere to it. An individual does not remain
unaffected by a rumor that is spontaneously circulated in his
milieu by a growing number of persons. Obviously, he pays no
attention to it unless he is already personally interested. In fact,
no rumor can circulate if the individual is not concerned. He may
be concerned, or feel he is, simply on the basis of the judgment
—or what he thinks is the judgment—of his milieu. This is where
we find fashion. But it may be objected that the decisive element
is a commercial mechanism: a fashion is launched by the pro-
ducers, and advertising plays the biggest role (in the form of an
organized rumor launched by propagandists). This is true in the
majority of cases, even in the case of such absurd fashions as
the Yo-Yo, the Hula Hoop, or Davy Crockett. But it is not always
that way: sometimes an absurd fashion spreads without advertis-
ing, from only one point of departure, such as in the astonishing
case of the Scoubidou. Beginning with an article in a childrens
magazine, and without any commercial interest being involved,
France was submerged within a month by Scoubidous made by
children and adults. Evidently, we are face to face with the phe-
nomenon of imitation, pure and simple, but to the extent that
this imitation is caused by an article that reaches only a limited
number of children, it is an example of the individual's extreme
susceptibility, his capacity to be influenced and propagandized.
Even if he defies it, even if he stiffens in the presence of true
propaganda, he still is extremely vulnerable. These reflections and
statements, selected arbitrarily from various fields and based on
different methods, lead us to conclude that the effectiveness of
propaganda is indeed great and decisive.
4. The Limits of Propaganda
Propaganda, though effective, obviously does not have unlimited
powers. It would be erroneous to conclude that anything at all
can be obtained from people by propaganda. I have already
pointed out some limitations. Certain psychological or sociological
conditions must pre-exist for the mechanism to work. For example,
the needs to be satisfied by propaganda must be kept in mind.
Appendix (295
Obviously, no psychic changes or reversals of opinion can be pro-
duced suddenly. I have also said that well-established opinion
should not be attacked head on. However, propaganda consists
first of all of a stocktaking of existing limitations. Outside those
limits it is obviously ineffective. But it would be absurd to deny
the efficiency of automobiles as a means of transportation merely
because they cannot travel on open fields or on the beach. At the
same time, the limits of propaganda's field of action are very
large.1
In an attempt to trace these limits, we might first remember four
elements already examined:
1. Pre-existing attitudes. In the beginning, propaganda cannot
move except within the framework of these attitudes, which it
can modify only very slowly.
2. The general trends and sociological factors of the society
in which it acts. The first limitation is relative and can be over-
come, but this second is an absolute limit. Propaganda cannot
reverse fundamental trends in a society. For example, in the
United States no propaganda that would be against a democracy
(formally) and in favor of a monarchy would be able to “take.”
Nor could any propaganda against Socialism be successful in the
U.S.S.R., nor any propaganda, anywhere in the world, against
technology, progress, happiness, and so on.
3. A third limitation is the necessity for consonance with the
facts. A basic fact is always necessary. Propaganda can never
be a propaganda of ideas, but must pronounce judgment on cer-
tain facts (whether these judgments are accurate or not). Propa-
ganda cannot prevail against facts that are too massive and defi-
nite: Goebbels changed his propaganda after Stalingrad because
it was impossible to transform that debacle into a victory. His
propaganda of success was followed by his propaganda of
heroism.1 2
4. A last limit that abridges the capabilities of all propaganda
is time, from two points of view. To have any effect, the psycho-
1 It is not a question of propaganda in a panicky group in the grip of excessive
terror or in a milieu that flees into fiction to protect and justify itself. Similarly, it
makes no sense to insist that propaganda is limited by the structure of the mass
media. Finally, in a totally adverse sociological situation, propaganda can do noth-
ing. All this constitutes evidence.
2 After Hess's escape, Goebbels said: “There are situations against which the best
propagandist in the world cannot fight”
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
296)
logical action must be lasting and continuous. But time imposes
a limitation because of the weak durability of the direct effects.
In German public opinion, the Nazi doctrine is now disappearing.
All propaganda evaporates progressively when it ceases. One
therefore cannot hope to create a final current of opinion or a
type of man. But here again this limit is growing less restricting:
the longer a propaganda has been made, the more durable its
effects. The more profound, total, and technically superior it has
been, the more it will have changed man. The propagandist's work
is never done. After forty years of remakable propaganda in the
U.S.S.B., much remains to be done to capture man completely.
Points that were believed to be won and no longer in need of
propaganda treatment, must be taken up again and given a differ-
ent treatment.8 I shall now turn to two new elements.
One limitation upon the effectiveness of propaganda has not
yet become clear: foreign countries. The conditions for the de-
velopment and effectiveness of propaganda analyzed here were
mainly concerned with internal propaganda, inside a large group,
society, or nation. Propaganda is most effective, most dangerous,
and least noticed inside a group. Propaganda addressed to the
outside is inevitably ineffective to a large extent:* * * 4 there is the
propagandist's psychological ignorance of the attitudes, centers
of interest, and presuppositions of his target, and the spontaneous
suspicion on the part of the target of all that comes from the
outside. There is the difficulty of establishing continuity, the
impossibility of being in real “communication," the inevitable
delay with regard to immediate events, the impossibility of all the
mass media, of making “pre-propaganda," of using obsessive
propaganda, and so on. Even when a country is occupied by a
foreign power, the latter cannot really make effective propa-
ganda (for example, German propaganda toward the occupied
countries during World War II). A poster or an article that evokes
a response in one country may fail to do so in a neighboring one.5
Only very elementary operations are possible, very much prey to
* Let us remember the violent attacks of 1960-1 against poorly made propaganda.
Much of the propaganda was considered boring and dogmatic; it had to change to
an action method to stimulate higher productivity; it must cease being abstract and
relate to facts.
4 This is how most of the failures of German propaganda were regarded in neutral
and occupied countries.
* From which it follows that one cannot export propaganda.
Appendix (2 97
unforeseeable circumstances—and that really is not modem
propaganda. What is remarkable is that such propaganda is actu-
ally evoking the greatest interest, and that it should represent
the form by which the effectiveness of propaganda as such is
being judged. Psychological warfare is of passionate interest to
people, though it is the least convincing type of propaganda. I
have already discussed this.
Too often propaganda has been judged by its effects on a
stranger or an enemy. From its effects on die German army,
Americans have concluded that propaganda is not effective (more-
over, with variations of evaluations). I, in turn, am astonished
that even one soldier should have surrendered as the result of a
leaflet. Similarly, propaganda toward the Socialist countries has
only very limited value or effect (even if it is heard, which is not
certain, so many receiving sets being official). It is giving such
propaganda undeserved honor to attribute to it the revolts in East
Berlin and Hungary. It is more likely that, once the revolts had
broken out, the rebels remembered and took seriously the
formulas of that propaganda, and that when those were not fol-
lowed by action, the rebels felt they had been deceived and
rejected the West doubly: this is the famous boomerang effect,
which undeniably occurs. At the most, such propaganda can create
a certain ambiguity in the thoughts and feelings of the foreigner;
it can disturb certain ideas and judgments, show up certain
claims of domestic propaganda as false, and create a certain
amount of bad conscience. All that is not negligible, but must
not be exaggerated or considered as typical with regard to the
effects of propaganda. Spear6 has analyzed perfectly the weak-
ness of propaganda addressed to the outside. He even considered
such questions as: who, in an opposed nation, is really the enemy?
Should one aim at the military elite as much as at the political
elite? Who, in such a nation, is a potential or actual ally? Who
exercises the real power? What can and should be modified by
propaganda—the ideological bases, political structures, social
institutions?
None of these questions can be given a precise answer, for
to answer them we would need psychological investigations that
cannot be carried out in a foreign country, even less in an enemy
•In Daniel Lemer (e&): Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: George W.
Stewart; 1951)*
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
298)
country. One can be guided only by general ideas and estimates.
And one must not think that it is easier to operate with propa-
ganda in a democratic country than in a dictatorship. Obviously,
in the former case, the injection of propaganda from the outside
is easy, but on the one hand, it may be more readily felt as
propaganda (because the domestic governmental propaganda is
less evident, less well recognized) and is therefore mistrusted;
on the other hand, it responds much less to a need. In a totalitarian
country, most people, before they are fully integrated, want to
hear what is forbidden, the other line, which, incidentally, is the
only support foreign propaganda has. But in a democracy, this
need is much less felt, so that even though the reasons are less
obvious, it is as difficult to conduct external propaganda against
a democracy as against a dictatorship. These limitations on the
effectiveness of "foreign” propaganda also apply when foreigners
live in a territory controlled by the propagandist. This held true
for the Arabs and the Kabyles in Algeria. There, French propa-
ganda was addressed to a people who remained foreigners.
We are really facing here the greatest obstacle to psychological
action: it can be fully effective only in the hands of nationals ad-
dressing themselves to their fellow citizens. This is undoubtedly
the secret of the great force and effectiveness of Communist
propaganda. The homeland of socialism does not make its propa-
ganda directly to other peoples. That propaganda is made by the
Communist parties, which are national parties, and which, conse-
quently, are within easy elbow-rubbing distance of those to be
seduced. Subjects and methods may then vary greatly from
country to country. This does not mean contradiction between
various Communist parties, but only a certain freedom of action
on the level of propaganda, which must be adapted to every
nation. Every time a unification of propaganda dogmas was at-
tempted (for example in 1949-50), effectiveness was reduced.
Thus, even though coming from the outside and doing the work
of the U.S.S.R., Communist propaganda nevertheless is a national
propaganda playing on inclinations and using facts known directly
and understood.
A last limitation must be considered. Despite all technique, in
the final analysis, a certain inability to foresee the response that the
individual is called upon to give remains. As the result of a
stimulus, a personality may react with various responses, opinions.
Appendix, (2 99
or actions. The number of possible responses differs from person to
person. Obviously, an esthete’s reaction to a poster will differ
from a worker’s. The response really depends on the entire social
context of an individual, on his milieu, his education, his family,
his profession. In this domain of immediate and localized re-
sponse, the theory of pre-existing attitudes applies most clearly.
It has been proved, for example, that in the case of a film, those
who approached it with the most favorable attitude were most
influenced by it. (U.S. Army Information Service, 1944.) Also,
people will be more influenced by the propaganda of their own
group, more prone to give it the expected response.
To know exactly what response to expect from a given indi-
vidual, a complete psychological analysis would be necessary. One
factor that profoundly modifies responses is culture. A high culture
is favorable to propaganda because it makes man more able to
understand facts, become interested in problems, form judgments,
and learn new attitudes. But this capability is decisive only if the
propaganda is really serious. Conversely, culture makes the propa-
gandist’s work harder, for it will lead to a wider variety of
responses to a stimulus, responses that will often be contradictory:
the propagandist is then not certain of his effect. Culture makes
men see several solutions, discuss them, feel uncertain of their
own convictions, and for those reasons, either not act at all, or
make an unexpected response. Conversely, the man without
culture learns responses more slowly and is less easily incited
or provoked into giving a response; but when the incitation is
felt, such a man will not have a great variety of responses,
least of all contradictory ones. The propagandist’s work will be
different in this case: a weak incitation to begin with, reinforced
by a second argument, and excluding a plurality of responses
when he speaks to a cultured milieu; but a violent incitation,
without secondary argumentation, in the face of an uncultured
public.
It must be remembered, however, that culture is only one of
the elements that determine the response. The problem for the
propagandist is to obtain, from among all the responses of which
a person is capable, the one directly related to the political objec-
tive of his propaganda. This will be the “related response,” i.e.,
the specific, expected response, in harmony with both the pro-
posed aim and the instrumental process that was put into mo-
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
300)
tion. This “related” response can never be obtained automatically
if one works on a free public opinion: too many factors are put
into motion to make it possible to predict the results. The situa-
tion is different if there has been pre-propaganda. But aside
from that case, propaganda can fail when the power of the stimu-
lus is too weak, if the stimulus runs counter to existing opinions,
or if the power of other responses is stronger than that of the
desired one. The choice of the stimulus, its reach, its power,
with relation to the propagandees sociological and psychological
milieu, are the propagandists work that will make certain re-
sponses more or less likely.
On the other hand, the propagandist can facilitate the response,
either by auxiliary responses, or by developing prior responses,
called “pre-active responses” by Doob. An auxiliary response is
one evoked with certainty by viewing or hearing something; it
may not relate directly to the pursued aim, but will facilitate the
hoped-for response. All advertising is based on such auxiliary
responses. A well-done ad evokes a favorable over-all response,
makes one stop in his tracks to examine it; there is an esthetic
response that may be followed by the desired response. Those are
auxiliary responses to the one hoped for: the purchase of the
advertised product.
Similarly, the presentation of certain merchandise by a pretty
young girl provokes an esthetic or erotic response, or one of
sublimation or identification—auxiliary responses to the main
decision expected from the viewer. There is no direct connection
between the auxiliary response and the “related” response. The
latter does not necessarily follow the former, which merely
facilitates it. The auxiliary response may arouse attention, create
a favorable climate, erase some other unfavorable feeling, in-
crease the force of a subsequent stimulus, but it will not lead
directly to acceptance or to action. It may, however, make the
individual more receptive to an unexpected response from the
propagandist.
The propagandist must look for other means to induce action.
In a certain sense, one can say that “propaganda is a form of
communication demanding the learning of new responses. These
responses cannot be ‘learned’ except after the perception of a
propaganda stimulus, and after the evocation of individualized
responses related to the objective of propaganda” (Doob). In
Appendix (301
fact, the desired response can take place only after a spontaneous
response. Learned responses are attitudes and predispose people
to certain actions. Learned responses that become integrated in
the sum total of an individual's responses must be taken into
account. If these responses were learned through propaganda,
they may be called, as by Doob, “pre-action responses”; this
indicates their proximity to, and their distance from, action.
Propaganda can, in fact, modify opinions and obtain responses
that will remain without external manifestation for a certain
period of time. That is the passive participation discussed earlier.
A man may be in agreement with the propagandist and yet not
act as the propagandist would have him. In certain cases, the
propagandist will be satisfied with such agreement without
external manifestation: the paralysis provoked by a propaganda
of terror completely achieves the aims of the propagandist. But
most often—for example, in connection with election propaganda
—the individual must be led from this “pre-action” response to
action.
The propagandist will, therefore, try to give to this pre-action
response the greatest possible power of involvement. The indi-
vidual who learns a certain response and becomes capable of it,
feels, as a result of this response, the need to go past it, to pass
over to action, which then appears as a consequence of the “pre-
action” response established by propaganda. Such a response will
have power if it represents a central drive in the personality.
It will be stronger if it is more recent and if reinforced by auxiliary
responses.
All this allows us to understand the response sought by the
propagandist. But this response is never certain whether a vote
or allegiance to a party is concerned. To the extent that such
response, even if learned, even if supported by all auxiliary re-
sponses, even if based on every possible calculation, must be the
result of a determined, specific propaganda campaign, it remains
unforeseeable. It is all the more so if the propagandist addresses
himself to specific persons (trying to anticipate how a particular
person will react to a particular propaganda), and if a definite
act is to be obtained. Only after a campaign can it be seen whether
the response was favorable or not. But such a situation is un-
acceptable to the propagandist. Because he is a technician, he
cannot simply accept this uncertainty, which a sociologist would
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA
302)
be satisfied to Have emphasized. The propagandist seeks more
certain and automatic responses.
To begin with, he will give up anticipating how the individual
will react. He will think of the group and be satisfied with a gen-
erally favorable result—for example, with 80 percent of the re-
sponses obtained. On the other hand, he will also make less of
an effort to elicit a specific response toward a localized action
than to obtain a general attitude that, in turn, will create local
responses.
Therefore, the propagandist’s effort will aim at the elimination
of individualizing factors. The expected response must be less
and less conditioned by natural elements (milieu, education, and
so on) and more and more by the “pre-education’* provided in
depth by propaganda. At the moment when the attitudes learned
by propaganda begin to prevail over the “natural” attitudes that
are man’s second nature, they become collective, and the propa-
gandist who has taught them can then calculate more easily
what a given stimulus will elicit from them.
APPENDIX
DO
MAO TSE-TUNG’S
PROPAGANDA1
Mao rigorously applied the principles of Leninist propaganda,
adapting them to his own circumstances. He did no more
than that, but he did it with remarkable precision and perfect
comprehension of the given facts. From the point of view of
propaganda, the situation had three essential aspects: the com-
plete absence of mass media (no newspapers and practically no
posters), the vast number of people to be reached, and the revolu-
tionary character of the war he led. Because of that situation,
the two principles of his propaganda had to be education and
organization.
By “education” is not meant here merely intellectual instruc-
tion or the promulgation of information. Information—directed
and manipulated, moreover, on the Leninist pattern—was, to-
1On Mao's propaganda, see Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works (New York: Interna-
tional Publishers; 1954-6), Vols. I, III; Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.): The Hun-
dred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger; i960); and Tibor Mende: China and Her Shadow (New York: Coward-
McCann; 196a).
304) mao tse-tung’s propaganda
gether with instruction, incorporated into an education whose aim
was to modify the whole human being by giving him a totally new
view of the world and awakening in him a range of feelings, reac-
tions, thoughts, and attitudes entirely different from those to
which he was accustomed.2
By “organization” is meant that every individual must be put
into a network comprising many organizations that surround him
on all sides and control him on all levels. But the aim is not to
stifle the individual through organization; it is to make him an
active member of that organization.
These principles underwent modifications according to chang-
ing circumstances. Obviously, the period of war must be dis-
tinguished from the period of consolidation.
I. The War: From 1926 to 1949
Education
In conquered and more or less controlled territories, the task
was to spread the principal revolutionary theses of Marxism
via slogans, through explanations of the “Three Principles of the
People,” and by meetings at which the wealthy and the exploiters
were to be denounced. Political education was aimed less at
agitation and rebellion and more at slow and deep infusion of
certain economic notions based on the widespread desire for land
distribution. Meetings, marches, banners, and posters were used
for the dissemination of these slogans. Explanations always took
place in naturally structured groups, such as the Peasant Union.
Political education clearly was pushed much harder in the principal
propaganda organization: the army. With the help of a permanent
Marxist education, an attempt was made to raise the political
level of party and army members. This was accompanied by the
struggle against putschism, individualism, egalitarianism, and so
on.
The object was, therefore, not so much immediate rebellion as
“political mobilization,” in the course of which propaganda had *
* Although Mao always gave first place to education, propaganda in the first period
received equally intense attention. The aim was to elicit hatreds, to spur national
and patriotic feelings, to play on the prestige of the soldier and on the fear of
reprisals. Here we see the traditional traits of propaganda.
Appendix (305
to set into motion the masses, who would themselves realize the
catchwords and promises of propaganda. This may well be an
original idea conceived by Mao: he who formulates a slogan not
being the one to fulfill the promise it contains. The slogan will
mobilize the people, who will then have to do the work to attain
the objective contained in the formula that excited them in the
first place. In non-controlled territories, this type of work was
much less intense. On the one hand, attempts were made to reach
enemy troops through prisoners. Captured enemy soldiers were
subjected to intensive propaganda, new political formation, com-
plete transformation of their view of the world (this process
later became brainwashing); then they were released. This libera-
tion was in itself a propaganda act designed to show the Com-
munist’s generosity toward their opponents, but beyond that, the
released soldiers were meant to exhibit their new attitudes in the
midst of the old army.
On the other hand, the revolutionary struggle led Mao tempo-
rarily to occupy zones that were later abandoned—and frequently
—with much infiltration and a great flow of people back and
forth. Here the purpose was to leave an ideologically formed popu-
lation behind when the revolutionary army had to withdraw.
In the face of an enemy without any ideological weapon, this
permitted Mao little by little to contaminate the enemy army
when it occupied these territories. To be sure, these zones could
not be left too long without propaganda; infiltration and partial
occupation had to take place to renew and strengthen *political
education.” At that stage, political education consisted in taking
the prevailing misery, the widespread oppression, and the spon-
taneous reactions against it as points of departure for providing
coherent explanations, for designating enemies who could serve
to catalyze existing hatreds, for sketching out the myth of libera-
tion, and for showing the means of that liberation (cooperation
of the people and adherence to Communism), with all these
elements united into a solid whole.
Organization
The propagandized people had to be inserted into a system.
During the period of battle, Mao's organization contained three
elements. First, “Peasant Unions” designed to organize the
peasants of a region, to disseminate slogans, and to explain them
306) mao tse-tungs propaganda
in discussion groups. These unions, with their very large member-
ship and their—at first glance—very liberal orientation, were
under the official direction of the Party. Mao could say with
justification: ‘Would it have been possible, even if we had set
up tens of thousands of schools for political education, to educate
all the men and women even in the remotest villages in so short
a time?” These Peasant Unions were neither combat nor action
organizations, but large groupings to serve the purposes of psycho-
logical organization and polarization.
The second element was the famous parallel hierarchy. Side by
side with the official administration (still the administration of
the enemy government in the battle areas), a clandestine, revolu-
tionary, and complete administration was being built. This ad-
minstration had its own finances, its own police—and very precise
propaganda functions. The point was, Mao said, “to mobilize the
masses by resorting to organization work.”
Actually, this administration transformed general ideas and
new views, acquired as a result of political education, into action:
rations, supplies, wages, and so on. Social and economic trans-
formation had to take place on the inside and secretly until it
could be superimposed on prior organization, and the participa-
tion of the individuals on all levels was needed to strengthen the
conviction that this transformation was not imposed from outside
and above. “The methods of mobilizing the masses must not be
bureaucratic,” Mao said. The parallel hierarchy was called upon
to “make propaganda in every instance” in order to create a sense
of participation in the common work, with Mao knowing full
well that as soon as this feeling of participation was acquired, all
action would provide its own justification and would involve the
individuals more deeply. Mao often insisted that the creation of
the parallel hierarchy could serve no purpose without this propa-
ganda designed to lead people to act “spontaneously.”
Finally, die third propaganda organization was the army: “The
Chinese Red Army is an armed organization fulfilling the political
tasks of the revolution ... it has important tasks to fulfill:
propaganda among the masses, organization of the masses, and so
on. . . . The Red Army does not make war for wars sake: this
war is a war for propaganda in the midst of the masses.” The
first task was to shape the soldiers of that Red Army, to teach
them why they had to fight, and then to turn them into propa-
Appendix (307
gandists and carriers of these ideas. They had to live symbioti-
cally with the civilians in order to conquer the people ideologi-
cally and progressively assimilate them.
Such propaganda methods are subtle and numerous. They
cover the whole gamut from terror to indoctrination, from parades
to involvement in action. But it can take place only in the case
of a strictly popular army. This emerges from, the famous and
oft-repeated formula: “The army must function among the people
like a fish in water.” This implies, of course, that such an army
must be recruited from the population, express it, find support
in it, share its interests, never act as it would in a conquered
country, serve the public—and that its struggle have positive
meaning for the people. If these prior conditions are not fulfilled,
no propaganda instrument can be made out of the army (this ac-
counts for the failure of the attempt to adopt Mao's methods in
Algeria). The Red Army is a propaganda apparatus because it is
formed on the basis of ideology and because its presence mobilizes
the people: they have no choice but to participate and to become
involved.
2. Since 1949
After victory, the propaganda principles remained unchanged,
but were applied differently. On February 27,1957, in his report to
the Supreme Conference of the State, Mao said: “One cannot
force a people to renounce idealism or force a people to believe
in Marxism. To settle ideological problems, one must act through
the democratic methods of discussion, criticism, persuasion, and
appropriate education.” But we must remember the—incident-
ally quite remarkable—method of the “Hundred Flowers.” As
in Nazi Germany in 1943,8 there was a period of apparent
liberalism when expressions of all sort of criticism, deviationism,
idealistic and religious inclinations, and so on, were tolerated,
authorized, even encouraged. Then, after all opponents had
spoken, the wave of repression hit them: arrests, jail sentences,
and, above all, political re-education took place. The purpose of
the “Hundred Flowers Campaign” was to make opponents come *
* A liberalization of the regime’s press at the end of 1934 was designed to make
opponents reveal themselves.
30 8) mao tse-tung's propaganda
out in the open so they could be arrested and eliminated. The
subsequent “rectification” campaign could not, in Mao's words, be
“gentle as a breeze or a summer rain for the enemies of the
people.”
Even a propaganda centered on education cannot do without
terror. In order to arrive at full compliance with propaganda, the
7 percent “incorrigible” individualists must be eliminated. The
objective of Mao's propaganda is a double one: to integrate
individuals into the new body politic as deeply as possible, and,
at the same time, to detach them from the old groups, such as the
family or traditional village organizations. These groups must be
disintegrated, always through action from within. For this there
must be maximum conformity on the part of the individual.4
According to men like R. Guillain and Tibor Mende, this enter-
prise was successful. Mende has written: “Rendered perfectly
malleable by ten years of pounding, the prototypes, mass-pro-
duced by the party, are now replacing the categories imposed
earlier by Confucian scholars.” On the other hand, the task
is to make the individual work beyond his strength for eco-
nomic development. All these ‘leaps forward” rest exclusively
on propaganda. Propaganda may take the form of excitation, mass
demonstrations (China must overtake the United States, and
hatred for capitalists is aroused), or emulation & la Piatiletka, but
it is mainly in the form of education and persuasion in the
economic domain. When orientations change, methods change
as well.
Education
There have been three innovations.
1. The traditional processes of propaganda are on the increase:
everybody is being taught to read, newspapers and brochures are
placed at everyone's disposal, and so on. At the same time, child
education is completely integrated into propaganda: from the
nursery on, little children are conditioned so as to make their
subconscious receptive to the verities of Socialism. This takes
place on all levels of instruction.
2. The expansion of the discussion system. In his 1957 report,
Mao said: “We have developed in 1942 the slogan TJnity-
4 This conformity is ideological and total. Mao could well say that “not to have the
correct ideological point of view is like having no souL”
Appendix (309
Criticism-Unity,* to define this democratic method of resolving
conflicts through criticism and subsequent efforts to arrive at a new
unity on a new basis.’’ Mao reminded his listeners that the first
successes of this method go back to 1927. He stated that the
method of persuasion could be used only on workers. Others must
be forced: “Benevolence for the people, dictatorship for the ene-
mies of the people.” There is a genuine propaganda effort for
those who can be integrated; the others are eliminated. It follows
that “discussion-criticism-unity” is a method that operates only
within a limited circle, on the basis of common presuppositions
and without questioning the common interests. On this subject,
Tibor Mende reported the answer of a director of a steel foundry
in Anshan, concerning organization of work and establishment of
norms: “We arrive at decisions after long discussions. Opposition?
We rely only on persuasion. There is no chance that someone
might resist the decision that is taken after the discussion, when
everybody has been persuaded that the road taken is the right
one.” And how can one tell that this road is really the right one?
“White is not black. We know where the truth lies. There is only
one truth, and with patience it can be explained.” This comple-
ments Mao’s method perfectly.
But let us remember the democratic method: a man knows the
absolute truth. He poses problems for which there are solutions.
He encourages objections (in a limited circle). The discussion
that follows does not have as its aim the common search for
truth or a plan based on the opinions of all, which will take
shape gradually. The aim of the discussion is to use the opposi-
tion and to drain the opponents of their energy and their convic-
tions. Its aim is to “work over” every member of the group until,
fully and of his own free will, he adheres to a proposition declared
to be the absolute truth by the leader.
3. The other new aspect in education is the theory of the mold,
also described in the 1957 report. The point is to press man in a
mold, placing him there periodically, to “re-mold” him systemati-
cally. Whatever his convictions or inclinations may be, even if
he is a convinced Communist. Mao said: ‘When one builds a
Socialist society, every person must be placed in the mold, the
exploiters as well as the workers. Who says that the working class
does not need this? Naturally, molding the exploiter and the
worker are two different operations. . . . We ourselves are being
3 I O ) MAO TSE-TUNGS PROPAGANDA
placed in the mold every year.... I have gone through a remold-
ing of my own thoughts . . . and I must continue.”
There is, on the one hand, a mold of the perfect Socialist
man which appears as the absolute ideal. There is, on the other
hand, a method to press people again and again into this mold,
to give them this shape conforming to the ideal. This is no longer
the spontaneous formation of the new man as a result of changes
in the social structure, as with Karl Marx. Nor is it the voluntary
formation of a new man who must be built, but whose eventual
entity is not known, as under Lenin. For Mao, the idea of the
mold implies the idea of a recognizable ideal prototype to which
every man must be tailored. This interpretation by Mao is con-
firmed by his concern for laying down criteria of action, dogma-
tic definitions as to what a man should be, and, among others,
his six criteria of Good. “Acts can be judged good by these six
criteria: if they serve to unite the people rather than divide them,
if they are favorable to the building of Socialism, if they con-
solidate the people s democratic dictatorship, if they consolidate
democratic centralism, if they reinforce the direction of the
Communist party, if they are favorable to international Socialist
solidarity.” These criteria of Good reflect Mao’s concern with
furnishing simple means of judgment for Socialists and clearly
defining what kind of man is to be shaped by the mold. Party
members must also go through the mold. But this assumes that
there is a man or a group making the diagnosis, and placing
people in the mold. In any event, it is above all a psychological
and ideological operation. But the aim is perfect conformity of the
individual to the Marxist doctrine and the new structure of so-
ciety. And the adaptation will be slow, progressive, and sys-
tematic as a result of successive remoldings.
Encirclement
I have already covered this important point in my discussion of
horizontal propaganda. Let us only remember that the army no
longer has a favored role as a propaganda instrument.
Appendix
3. Brainwashingf
f 311
This term has become famous, though it is only a secondary
aspect of Chinese propaganda. To be sure, brainwashing has
nothing to do with the type of magic described in UExpress, in
1957, under that title. The aim of brainwashing is to retrieve
enemies and transform rather than eliminate them—either to
make them exponents of Marxism and then send them back
home, or to turn them into edifying examples. The process, to
the extent that it can be recognized, has three principal aspects:
1. The individual is cut off from everything, from his former
social milieu, from news and information. This can be done
only if he is placed in a prison cell or a camp. The individual is
totally uprooted. The absence of news places this man, who has
been used to receiving information, in a vacuum, which is hard
to endure after a certain time. Complementary methods are
added to this: a certain privation of food and sleep to weaken
his psychological resistance, to make him more susceptible to
influences (though there is no intention of exhausting him),
frequent isolation and solitude, which cause a certain anxiety,
increased by the uncertainty of his fate and the lack of a definite
sentence or punishment; also frequently incarceration in win-
dowless cells with only electric light, with irregular hours for
meals, sleep, interrogations, and so on, in order to destroy even
his sense of time. The principal aim of these psychological
methods is to destroy a man's habitual patterns, space, hours,
milieu, and so on. A man must be deprived of his accustomed
supports. Finally, this man lives in a situation of inferiority and
humiliation, aimed not at destroying him but at reconstructing
him.
2. A man placed in the above circumstances is subjected to a
bombardment of slogans by radio or by fellow-prisoners, who,
though prisoners themselves, shower him with reproaches and
slogans because they already are on the road to their own re- 5
5 See A. M. Meerloo: The Rape of the Mind: The Psychology of Thought Control,
Menticide, and Brainwashing (New York: World Publishing Company; 1956);
Eleutherius Winance: The Communist Persuasion: A Personal Experience of Brain-
washing, trans. Emeric A. Lawrence, O.S.B. (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons;
1959); and Robert Jay Lifton: Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism:
A Study of Brainwashing in China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company; 1961).
3 MAO TSE-TUNGS PROPAGANDA
construction. There is an endless repetition of formulas, explana-
tions, and simple stimuli. Of course, in the beginning all this
merely evokes the subject's scorn and disbelief. After some time,
however, erosion takes place; whether the subject likes it or not,
he ends up knowing by heart certain formulas of the catechism
repeated to him a thousand times; he ends up inhabited by
these slogans, which still carry no conviction; he does not yield
to some advertising slogan, for example, just because he knows
it. But it must not be forgotten that the prisoner hears nothing
else, and that the incessant repetition of these slogans also
prevents any personal reflection or meditation. The noise of the
slogan is present all the time. The result is an involuntary pene-
tration and a certain intellectual weakening, added to the im-
possibility of leading a private intellectual life.
3. The third element of brainwashing, closely tied to the two
others, is group discussion according to the “democratic method."
Obviously, the leader must be an agile man, intellectually supe-
rior, able to answer all questions and objections. But clearly
the aim of such discussions is not that of free groups. The first
objective will be to create an ambiguity in the mind of the
prisoner with regard to his ideas and convictions, an uncertainty,
a doubt (after all, could this be true?) on questions of fact—
for example, on information that the leader (the only source of
information) will provide, and at the same time a feeling of guilt
based on ideas of morality in the individual himself. (I belonged
to a group, a class, a people that has done much harm, great
wrongs to humanity. This kind of thinking will attach itself
quite easily to a Christian conscience, for example.) The creation
of a guilt feeling obviously leads to the desire to get rid of it,
to cleanse, purify, and redeem oneself.
When it appears that ambiguity of conviction and guilt feelings
are well established in the group, a new stage can be reached:
explanations. These explanations are furnished on two levels. One
set deals with the personal situation of the prisoner, his guilt,
his humiliation, his imprisonment: he is shown the legitimacy
of all that, its logic, its validity, so as to eliminate his resentment
toward his jailer. The jailer, on the other hand, reveals his good-
will and his good intentions toward the prisoner. The other set
of explanations concerns the general problems of the world and the
political situation. History and the universe are depicted with
Appendix (313
the help of very clever dialectics. An entire Weltanschauung is
unfolded progressively, not dogmatically and with great speeches,
but adjusted bit by bit to the personal experience of the prisoner,
and with individual explanations given him. Gradually, his tradi-
tional—Christian, bourgeois, liberal, or feudal—view of the
universe is removed and replaced by a different view. At the same
time, the slogans previously learned by heart now fall into
place. From then on, elementary formulas, repeated a thousand
times, are alternated with explanatory discussions in depth un-
ceasingly. Then there is a final stage: “The Road to Redemption.”
Once entered into the new Weltanschauung, and even more con-
vinced of his guilt, “the individual is eager to deliver himself, to
purify himself.” He then accepts the rules of belonging, and the
actions proposed to him. He thus justifies himself both in his own
eyes and in the eyes of others.
This is approximately the technique of brainwashing. It must
be noted that because it is slow and uses complex methods and
highly qualified personnel, it can be practiced only on a very
small number of individuals, who are hand-picked and special
persons. Moreover, its effects are not very durable except when
the prisoner, once liberated, enters a society with the same
Weltanschauung as the one imposed on him. If he does not, what
was built up will eventually wear off. In any case, this technique
is only of incidental importance in Mao's system.6
6 This type of brainwashing was practiced In the Algerian Internment camps after
1957. In January 1958 an official notice dealing with the French Psychological
Action was published in the camps, simply confirming what we have said earlier.
Some details deserve to be remembered:
(a) The classification of individuals into “incorrigible,1” “soft,” “retrievable.”
(b) The notion that, according to the Chinese, brainwashing took between six
months and two years, depending on the level of the prisoner. But in Algeria less
time was needed (which undoubtedly accounted for the French failures).
(c) The division into three stages: (1) disintegration of the individual, (a)
creation of a collective conscience, plus reindoctrination, (3) self-criticism and full
engagement in the new line.
(d) The creation of collective self-discipline, with sanctions applied by the
inmates themselves.
(e) The system of semi-weekly “waves”: waves of discipline, waves of gaiety,
waves of work, study, and so on. This created a collective current.
(f) The mechanism of liberation: “The people have the right to pardon crimi-
nals”; the collectivity of the camp in a general meeting, with discussion, criticism,
and self-criticism on the part of those to be liberated who had become members of
the New French Algeria.
All this failed almost entirely because there was no really usable ideology, and
particularly because there were no sufficiently well organized cadres.
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Index
action-reflex, obtained by propaganda,
28-9, 30
advertising, 40, 63, 68, 69, 84, 119,160,
174, 176, 209, 274, 290-1; and mo-
tivational research, 27 n.; veracity in,
53-4; ineffectiveness of, in political
propaganda, 262; based on auxiliary
responses, 300
Africa, propaganda in, 42, 54, 74, 134,
150
agitation propaganda, 20, 32 n., 70-4,
76, 77» 78, 79> 105, 112, 188
Albig, John, xi n., 3 n., 94 n., 197, 253 n.
Albord, T., 135 n.
Algeria, 13 n„ 23 n., 29 n., 43 n., 57,
61, 76, 79, 86, 89, 99, 127 n., 143 *»•>
189, 201, 246, 264, 265, 285, 286,
298; and failure of French attempts
at brainwashing, 313 n.
Alg&rie franQaise (film), 85, 86
alienation, through propaganda, 169-78
aligned consciousness, in Soviet Union,
179 n.
American Legion, 244
anti-Semitism, 195, 27211.
anxiety, in modem society, 153, i54»
155, 188
army, civic education of, in Western
democracies, 135-6
Aron, Raymond, 116
Asia, propaganda in, 42, 110, 134
Athenian democracy, 14, 89
Austria, 134
auxiliary response, 300
Azerbaijan, 98
Bartlett, F. C., xn.
behaviorism, 36, 39
Belgium, 218
Bemavs, Edward L., 71, 119 n.
Bidault, Georges, 213
birth rate, increased by propaganda, 292
black (covert) propaganda, 15, 16 and
n., 59 n., 262 n.
Blumenstock, Dorothy, 262 n.
boomerang effect, 34 n., 38 n., 281, 297
Bourricaud, Frangois, 268
brainwashing, 305, 311-13
Bruner, Jerome S., 12 n.
Buddhism, 198
Bulganin, Nikolai, 12
Byzantium, 49
cadres, executive, within political party,
216-17
“campaign,” propaganda, 12
Campbell, Angus, 253 n.
Camus, Albert, 146
Canada, 172
capitalism, 222, 223, 224
Cartwright, Dorwin, 279 n.
Castro, Fidel, 58, 72, 78, 131,132
Catholicism, failure of, in France, 15a
Caucasus, 98
censorship, 16 n., 123, 220
centralized state, 41
Chambre, P., 202
China, Communist,. 61, 63, 71-2, 78,
89, 98, 99, no. 141, 265, 283, 288;
see also Mao Tse-tung
Chinese Red Army, 306-7
Christianity, 63, 201, 228-32
class consciousness, 37, 115, 177, 205
Cold War, 89, 135. 233, 235, 238, 239
Common Market, 119
Communes, medieval, 14
communication, mass media of, 102-5,
162
Communism, 163 n., 169 n., 176, 197,
198, 205, 225, 243, 262, 288; as
ideology and myth, 117, 194; see also
China, Communist; Khrushchev,
Nikita; Lenin, Nikolai; Mao Tse-
tung; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef
Communist parties, propaganda by, as
national parties, 298
Communists, 29, 30, 3411., 35, 45* 82,
133, i54> 157, 188, 213, 273, 280, 282
conditioned reflex, 5, 36, 80, 112;
created by propaganda, 31, 3*
INDEX
H)
confessions, in great show trials, 14
Congo, 74, 77, 85
Conseil Frangais des Mouvements de
Jeunesse, 182
Constant, Benjamin, 63
Coolidge, Calvin, 173
covert (black) propaganda, 15, 16 and
n., 59 n., 262 ft.
Crutchfield, Richard S., 63 n., 65, 277,
278
crystallization, psychological, 162-8
cultural transformation, Lenin’s call for,
106 n.
culture; individual psychology shaped
by, 34 n.; average, as prerequisite for
propaganda, 108-12; responses to
propaganda modified by, 299
Czechoslovakia, 131, 132, 134
Dean, James, 152
de Gaulle, Charles, 246, 248
demand, symbols of, 163 n.
democracy: propaganda by, 16, 235-42,
253, 254> 255, 256; as fundamental
ideology, 117; and public opinion,
123 and n., 124, 126, 127, 128 n.,
129, 131, 139-40; subjected to
psychological warfare, 133, 134, 235;
propaganda weapon forced upon,
133.134.135,137, 138, 232-5 passim,
350; opposing propagandas in, 181;
obligation to become religious, 251
depth psychology, 36, 89
Dewey, John, 5
Dicks, Henry V., 270
diplomacy, and oropaganda, 13
direct propaganda, 15
dissociation effect of propaganda, 178-
182
Doob, Leonard W., xii, 12 n., 63 n., 203,
209, 263, 264, 279; quoted 209, 279,
300, 301
Driencourt, Jacques, x-xi, 242
East Berlin, revolt in, 297
Egypt: and United Arab Republic, 23
and n.; weakness of propaganda in,
106
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 217, 253, 273
election campaign, ineffectiveness of
propaganda during, 19, 261
elite, formation of organic groups of, 91
escape, as need of modem man, 151 n.,
181 n.
European Defense Community, 127,
286 n.
existentialism, 148
expectation, symbols of, 163 n.
Express, L\ 11, 311
factuality, problem of, 53-7
falsehood, as instrument of propaganda,
53, 60 and n., 61
family, as obstacle to horizontal propa-
ganda, 82
Fascism, 172, 205, 245, 265
fashion, susceptibility to, 293, 294
fear, in modem society, 153,154
federalism, 41
Felice, Philippe de, 178, 179
Figaro, Le, 213
Forces de Liberation Nationale (F.L.N.),
21, 58, 61, 72, 79, 99 n., 143 n., 189,
201
France, 51, 63, 89, 109, 111, 126 n.,
127 and n., 137, 141, 189, 192, 218,
246, 247, 290; Jeanson network in,
13 n.; trend toward socialization
in, 42, 288; American propaganda
ineffective in, 70; agricultural “re-
construction’' in, 119; failure of Ca-
tholicism in, 152; Communist party
in, 218, 269, 282; regrouping of
Right in, 219; Communist propaganda
in, 262, 264; anti-alcohol propaganda
in, 292; increased birth rate in, 292;
Eropaganda in, for increase in num-
er of science and technology stu-
dents, 293; Sooubidous in, 294
French Psychological Action, 31311,
French Revolution, 117
Freud, Sigmund, 5
Friedmann, M. G., 224
Fundamentals of Social Psychology,
12 n.
Gallup, George, 268
Germany, 136, 245, 273; at time of
Weimar Republic, 51; Nazi, 51, 186,
192, 218, 279, 292, 307 (see also
Goebbels, Josef; Hitler, Adolf; Nazis);
new army in, 120
Goebbels, Josef, 13 n., i6n., 18 n., 20 n.,
25 n., 32 n., 36 n., 4m., 43 n., 53
and n., 54 n., 55 n., 56, 57 n., 60 n.,
93, 128 n., 174 n., 188, 241, 246, 276,
279, 286 n., 288, 295; quoted, xn„
25 n., 26 n., 36 n., 43 n., 131 n., 206,
295 n.
government, propaganda by, 127, 128,
130, 131, 132; see also State
group dynamics, 80, 81
grouping, and propaganda, 212-32
groups, partitioning of, 2i2r-i6
Guatemala, Friday of Sorrows in, 153
Guillain, R., 308
guilt feelings, stimulated by propa-
ganda, 189
Gurfein, Murray I., 270, 271 n., 284 n.
(Hi
Index
Haltung, distinguished from Stimmung,
25 n.
Hamon, L60, 127 n., 128
Hartley, Eugene L., 12 n.
hatred, role in propaganda, 73, 74, 76,
77, 152, 163, 200
hedonism, 39 n.
Herald Tribune, New York, 70
hero, cult of, 172 and n., 173
history, as fundamental myth, 40
Hitler, Adolf, 5, 1 an., 170., 18n., 52
and n., 53, 57, 60 and n., 61, 62, 71,
78, 85, 89, 128 n., 133, 195, 196, 239,
284 n., 288, 290
Hitler Youth, 171, 254
Ho Chi Minh, 72
horizontal propaganda, 80-4, 209 n.,
310
Homey, Karen, 154, 155, 167; quoted,
168
Hovland, Carl I., 44 n.
Human Engineering, 160
Human Relations, 143, 148, 160, 283;
in United States, 141-2, 153 n., 287
humanism, 201
HumanitS, V, 213
“Hundred Flowers” campaign, Mao's,
307-«
Hungarian Revolution (1956), 22, 182,
285, 297
identification, symbols of, 163 n.
ideology, 116-17; and propaganda, 36,
193-202; definition or, 116
Ilyichev, Leonid, 224 n.
incitement, direct and indirect, 16-17,
240
India, 54, 56, 106
individual: propaganda addressed to, as
part of mass, 6-9, 105-6, 150; need
of, for propaganda, 37 and n., 121,
138-53, 158-60; and collective center
of interest, 49, 50, 51; diminished by
participation in mass society, 149,
151; need of, for repression, 151
individualist society, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97
Indochina, 56, 89, 98 and n., 99 and n.,
143 n., 144, 289
information: distinguished from propa-
ganda, 84; personal judgment elim-
inated by surfeit of, 87; propaganda
related to, 112-16, 144-7, 250
Inkeles, Alex, 60 n., 270
innuendo, technique of, 56-7
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, xi,
12 n.
integration propaganda, 29, 70, 74-9,
81, 84, 105, 112, 188, 210
Iraq, 23
Irion, Frederick C., 53
Islam, 198
Italy: Fascist, 51, 292; Communist party
in, 218
Jacobinism, 244
Janowitz, Morris, 9 n., 270, 284 n.
Japan, 245; propaganda for lower birth
rate in, 292
Jeanson network, in France, 13 n.
Johnson, Lyndon B., 125
Khrushchev, Nikita, 12, 4m., 45 and
n., 46, 48, 55, 56, 59, 62, 132, 133,
153 n., 176, 248; and Theses on
Economic Reorganization, 130
Kinsey Report, 275
Komsomols, 120, 130, 171, 254
Korean War, 34 n., 108, 252
Krech, David, 63 n., 65, 277, 278
Kris, Ernst, 85 n., 90 n., 239 n.
Krokodil, 153
Kronstadt Rebellion, 78
Krueger, quoted, 278
Ku Kiux Klan, 244
labor: ideology of, 194; propaganda
effects on, 222-8 passim
language, as “pure sound” in propa-
ganda, 180
Lasswell, Harold D., zn., xi, 16, 80,
163 n., 197, 240, 241, 262 and n.
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 212, 281, 282
leadership, and group opinion, 100
Leites, Nathan, 85 n., 90 n., 239 n.
Lenin, Nikolai, 12 n., 13, 290., 32 n.,
53 and n., 60 n., 62,71, 78, 93,106 «•>
109 n., 195, 196, 204 n., 287, 288,
310; and Doctrine of the State, 13
Lemer, Daniel, xii n., 262 n., 297 n.
liberal democracy, suppressed by propa-
ganda, 26
lie, as instrument of propaganda, 53, 60
and n., 61
Lien-Viet, 99 n.
Lifton, Robert Jay, 311 n.
Lipset, S. M., 112
literacy, as prerequisite for propaganda,
110
literature, and propaganda, 14
“lonely crowd, 8-9, 147, *48
Louis XIV, 122
Lumumba, Patrice, 74, 77, 85
McCarthyism, 68, 107
MacDougall, C., 65, 205, 277, *79
Macht Propaganda, 21
Malenkov, Georgi, 55
Mao Dun, quoted, 14
INDEX
iv)
Mao Tse-tung, 13 and n., 21, 25 n.,
26 n., 29 n., 32 n., 3311., 53 n., 72,
78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 110, 169 n.,
209, 283; and theory of “mold” 72n..
79, 107, 209-10; propaganda of, 303-
313; “political education0 by, 304-5;
and brainwashing, 305, 311-13; Peas-
ant Unions organized by, 305-6;
Chinese^ Red Army organized by,
306-7; “Hundred Flowers” campaign
by, 307-8; “discussion-criticism-
unity” method of, 306-9; and “cri-
teria of Good," 310; see also China,
Communist
Marshall Plan, 69-70
Marx, Karl, 37, 157, 195, 198 n., 288,
310
Marxism, 110, 283, 289, 304, 307, 311
mass media of communication, 102-5,
162
mass society, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 and n.,
95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 210; individual
diminished by, 149, 151; cult of hero
in, 172, 173
masses: propaganda addressed to, 6-9;
participation of, in political affairs,
121-7, 130, 132, 139
materialism, 39 and n.
Meerloo, A. M., 311 n.
M6gret, Maurice, xiiin., xivn., 29 n.,
59 n., 128 n., 232 n.
Mende, Tibor, 303 n., 308, 309
Mend&s-France, Pierre, 56, 127 n.
micro-sociology, 75 n.
middle class, propagandists recruited
from, 106
Ministry of Propaganda, in modem
state, 20, 118
Miotto, Antonio, xii, 18, 279
mithridatization, 183-4
mobilization of individuals, as objective
of propaganda, 25 n., 30 and n.
“mold,” Mao's theory of, 72 n., 79, 107,
309-10
Monde, Le, 23 n., 43 n., 127 n., 130 n.,
135 n., 136 n.; quoted, 48
Monnerot, Jules, 170
Morin, E., 97
Moscow trials (1936), 14
Motion Picture Association, 67
motion pictures, utilized by propaganda,
10, 64, 103, 105, 254
motivational research, 27 n.
Munich, success of propaganda opera-
tion at, 58
Mussolini, Benito, 44, 129
myth, 36, 40, 116, 117, 243, 244, 245.
246, 247, 249; utilized and created
by propaganda, 11, 31-2, 38, 40, 41,
42, 199-200
Napoleon, 13, 52 n., 122, 123
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 23, 58
National Association of Manufacturers,
66
nationalism: aroused by propaganda,
38, 41, 289; as fundamental ideology,
117
NATO, 119
Nazis, 16, 29, 30, 57 n., 71, 157, 188,
196, 197. 221, 241, 245, 265 and n.,
270, 271, 272, 276, 280, 282, 284;
in pact with Soviet Union, 278
needs, met and utilized by propaganda,
37 and n., 121, 138-53, 158-60
Negro problem, in United States, 42
neurosis, 167-8, 178
New Economic Policy, in Soviet Union,
109 n.
newspapers, 10, 102, 103, 104, 109 n.
North Korea, 110
North Vietnam, 78
Nuremberg trials, 14
O.A.S., 191 n., 208 n.
Observateur, V, 11
Ogle, Marbuiy B., 65-6; quoted, xi
Ohne Mich ideology, 182, 191
operational terms, 46
opinion, public, see public opinion
Organization Man, Trie, 84
Ortega y Gasset, Jos6, 93 n.
orthopraxy, 25-32
overt (white) propaganda, 15, 16 and
n.
Packard, Vance, 225 n., 290
paranoia, 185
participation, obtained by propaganda,
26 n., 26-7, 30
parties, political, see political parties
partitioning of groups, 212-16
Pavlov, Ivan, 5
peace, propaganda for, 45-6
Pearlin, Leonard I., 75
Pericles, 122
Pleven, Ren6, 127
political education, in Communist sense,
32 n., 33 n., 78, 83, 192, 304-5
political parties, 126, 128, 232, 273;
propaganda made by, 216-22
political propaganda, 62, 80, 262
politics, as present-day focus of interest,
49, 50
population density, 122; required for
effective propaganda, 95
poster, utilized by propaganda, 10
Pravda, 14, 130
pre-active response, to propaganda, 300,
301
Index
prejudice, and propaganda, 33, 35, 38,
162, 164, 166, 206
premeditated consciousness, in Soviet
Union, 179 n.
pre-propaganda, 15, 22, 30-1, 32 and
n., 296, 300
press, utilized by propaganda, 10, 102,
103, 104, 109 n.
privatization, 180 n., 190, 191, 192, 272
progress, belief in, 39, 40, 41, 43* 186*
200
proletariat, 222, 288
propaganda: based on psychology, 4,
5, 6, 33-8 passim; scientific basis
of, 4-6, 241; American, 5, 32, 60,
61, 63-5, 69-70, 85 (see also United
States); Stalinist, 5, 60, 61, 62,
164 n., 202, 281 (see also Soviet
Union; Stalin, Josef); Hitlerian, 5,
60 and n., 61, 62, 245 (see also Hitler,
Adolf; Nazis); addressed to individ-
ual as part of mass, 6-9, 105-6, 150;
external characteristics of, 6-32;
total, 9-17, 97, 105-17, 242; myths
utilized and created by, 11, 31-2,
38, 40, 41, 42, 199-200; of self-
criticism, 11-12, 153 n.; Soviet, 11-
12, 13 and n., 14, 16 n., 22 and n.,
26 n., 290., 32 and n., 43 n., 52-3,
60, 61, 75 and n., 78, 84, 98, 111,
113 n., 120, 139 n., 214-15, 277, 278;
and diplomacy, 13; and literature,
14; direct, 15; overt, 15, 16 and n.;
covert, 15, 16 and n., 5911., 262 n.;
sociological, 15, 62-72, 81; dem-
ocratic, 16, 235-42, 253, 254, 255,
256; continuity and duration of, 17-
20; changeability of, 18 and n.; of
agitation, 20, 32 n., 71-4, 76, 77, 78,
79, 105, 112, 188; psychological and
physical action as inseparable ele-
ments of, 20-1; organization of, 20-4,
28-9, 29 n.; human-relations tech-
nique of, 24; and orthopraxy, 25-32;
nature of relationship to public
opinion, 26, 171, 202-12; participa-
tion obtained by, 26 n., 26-7, 30;
action-reflex obtained by, 28-9, 30;
of integration, 29, 70, 74-9, 81, 84,
105, 112, 188, 210; internal charac-
teristics of, 33-61; and boomerang
effect, 34 n., 38 n., 281, 297; stereo-
types, prejudices, and established
opinions utilized by, 35-6, 37, 38,
162, 163 and n., 164, 166, 206, 277,
278; and ideology, 36, 193-202;
human needs met and utilized by, 37
and n., 121, 138-53, 158-60; socio-
logical presuppositions utilized by,
38, 39, 40, 41; related to technology.
40, 49, 64; of timeliness, 43-8; for
peace, 45-6; related to superficial
aspects of events, 47; and the Un-
decided, 48-52, 54, 280; based on
collective center of interest, 49, 50,
51, 52; religious, 49, 279; and truth,
52-61; falsehood as instrument of,
53, 60 and n., 61; silence as tech-
nique in, 56; innuendo as technique
in* 58-7; intentions and interpreta-
tions in, 57-61; Leninist, 60 and n.,
62, 89, 111, 200, 202, 232, 277 n.,
303 (see also Lenin, Nikolai; Soviet
Union); definition of, 61; present-day
Chinese, 61, 63, 71-2, 80, 81, 111
(see also China, Communist; Mao
Tse-tung); categories of, 61-87;
Khrushchev’s, 62 (see also Khrush-
chev, Nikita; Soviet Union); political,
62, 80, 262; vertical, 79-60, 82;
horizontal, 80-4, 209 n., 310; dis-
tinguished from information, 84;
rational and irrational, 84^7; socio-
logical conditions for existence of,
90-105; combination of demographic
phenomena required for, 95; as means
of reinforcing opinions, 104; and
need of average standard of living,
105-8; average culture required for,
108-12; related to information, 112-
116, 144-7, 250; necessity for, 118-60,
182-7 passim; by government, 127,
128, 130, 131, 132; as necessary
weapon for democracy, 133, 134, 135,
137* 138, 232-5 passim, 250; per-
sonality and freedom destroyed by,
137, 171, 178; required to provide
motivations for sacrifices, 142-3, 174,
177; as remedy for loneliness, 148;
psychological effects of, 161-92; com-
plementary character of, 162; religi-
ous personality conferred by, 166-7;
critical judgment suppressed by, 169-
171, 173; alienation through, 169-78;
artificial needs created by, 176, 177;
psychic dissociation effect of, 178-
182; thought devalued by, 179, 180;
overexcitement provoked by, 179 n.;
transformation of words in, 180;
shock effect of, 181 and n., 204, 237;
mithridatization against, 183-4; sensi-
bilization to, 184-7; ambiguity of
psychological effects of, 187-92;
guilt feelings stimulated by, 189;
war, 190, 274 n., 275; privatization
utilized by, 191, 192; socio-political
effects of, 193-257 passim; “skeleton**
role in, 204 and n.; translated into
“verbal action,** 207; and grouping,
212-32; made by political parties.
Vi)
propaganda (continued)
216-22; effects on labor, 222-8 pas-
sim} effects on churches, 228-32;
effects of international, 042-50; ef-
fects of internal, 230-7; need for
serious attitude toward, to defend
against, 257; difficulties of measuring
effectiveness of, 250-77, 287; elas-
ticity of, 268; inadequacy of mathe-
matical methods for measurement
of, 275-7; problems connected with
ineffectiveness of, 277-86; violent
turns in, 280; effectiveness of, 287-
294; limits of, 294-302; internal, as
most effective, 296-8; by Communist
parties, reason for effectiveness of,
298; “related response’* to, 299-300;
“pre-active response” to, 300, 301;
Mao Tse-tung s, 303-13 (see also
China, Communist)
psychoanalysis, 152, 154
psychological action, by Western
democracies, 135-7
psychological crystallization, 162-8
psychology, 89; propaganda based on,
4> 5, 6, 33-8 passim; behavioristic,
36, 89; depth, 36, 89; of instincts,
36; and effects of propaganda, 161-
192; see also individual
public opinion, 36 n., 68, 89, 95, 99-
102, 114, 165, 198, 199; nature of
relationship to propaganda, 26, 171,
202-12; in modern state, 123-8, 130,
!32, 139-40, 221; attempts at analy-
sis of, in United States, 267; limited
usefulness of surveys of, 267-70
Public Relations, 283; in United States,
225, 287
racial prejudice, propaganda ineffective
against, 33
radio, 212-13; utilized by propaganda,
7, 8, 10, 11, 103, 104, 105, 162
Rank, J. Arthur, quoted, 67
rationalization, 155-6, 157, 158
Rauschning, Hermann, 60
Reader's Digest, 64, 70
reflex, conditioned, see conditioned
reflex
Reformation, 14
Reichstag fire, 14
“related response,” to propaganda, 299-
300
religious propaganda, 49, 279
Renaissance, 14
repetition, principle of, 17 n., 18
response: related, 299-300; auxiliary,
300; pre-active, 300, 301
INDEX
Review of the German Democratic Re-
public, 85
Revolt of the Masses, The, 93 n.
Revue a Action Populaire, 26511.
Reisman, David, 186
Riess, Curt, 12 n., 59 n.
Rivero, quoted, 237-8
Rivet, Paul, 110
Roman Empire, 51
Roman Republic, 14
Rommel, Erwin, 57 n.
Roosevelt, Franldin D., 125, 248
Roper, Elmo, 93 n., 268
Rosenberg, Morris, 75
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 128
Rubel, M., 157
rumor, susceptibility to, 293-4
Russian Revolution, 89
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 278
Sauvy, Alfred, 530., 56 n., 59 n., 77,
164 n., 166 n.
schizophrenia, 185
science, as fundamental myth, 40
secret consciousness, in Soviet Union,
179 n.
selection, technique of, 56 and n.
self-criticism, propaganda of, 11-12,
153 n.
sensibilization, 184-7
Shils, Edward A., gn., 270, 276, 284
and n., 285
shock effect, of propaganda, 181 and n.,
204, 237
Simon, P. H., 201
“skeleton” role, in propaganda, 204
and n.
slogans: as evocative symbols, 16411.;
Mao’s, 304, 305, 306, 308-9, 311, 312
Socialism, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 288;
as fundamental ideology, 117; see also
Communism
society: individualist, 90, 91, 92, 93,
97; mass, see mass society
sociological propaganda, 15, 62-71, 81
sociology, 89; propaganda based on, 4,
5, 6; and collective presuppositions
in modem world, 38, 39, 40, 41
Sophocles, 235
Soviet Union, 132, 134, 221, 265, 295,
296; propaganda of, 11-12, 13 and
n., 14, 16 n., 22 and n., 26 n., 29 n.,
32 and n., 43 n., 52-3, 60, 61, 75 and
n., 78,84,98,111,113 n., 120,139 n.,
214-15, 277, 278; orthodox Church
in, 13 n.; reflex utilized by, 32;
Khrushchev’s claims for agricultural
production of (i957)» 59-60; pose
(vii
Index
Soviet Union (continued)
of, as defender of democracy, 60;
PiatUetka campaign in, 72; Kronstadt
Rebellion in, 78; culture of, inte-
grated into universe of propaganda,
109; public opinion in, 124 n., 125,
130-1; Five Year Plans of, 141,
224 n.; agitators and shock workers
in, 141 n.; self-criticism in, 153 n.;
compartments of consciousness in,
179 n.i cost of propaganda in, 263 n.;
in pact with Nazis, 278; reappearance
of advertising in, 291; see also Com-
munism; Khrushchev, Nikita; Lenin,
Nikolai; Stalin, Josef
Speier, Hans, 59 n.
Stakhanovism, 141 n.
Stalin, Josef, 5, 46, 62, 129, 172, 179 n.
State: centralized, 41; propaganda
necessary for, 121; and public
opinion, 123-8, 130, 132, 139-40,
221; function of, 133-8; and pri-
vatization, 191, 192; and political
parties, 220, 221; propaganda costs
not always counted by, 274-5; see
also government
statistics, 54, 275
stereotypes, utilized by propaganda,
34, 35, 36, 37, 163 and n., 164, 166,
206, 277, 278
Stevenson, Adlai E., 253
Stimmung, distinguished from Haltung,
25 n.
Stoetzel, Jean, 173, 203 and n., 204,
280, 291; quoted, 96, 163 n., 165,
206, 210
structure of expectation, of propaganda,
37 n.
Suez propaganda operation, 58
surveys, limited usefulness of, 267-70
Sweden, 152
symbols, related to stereotypes, 16371.,
164 n.
Syria, 22, 23 n.
Taft-Hartley law, 66
taxation, 123, 142
Tchakhotin, Serge, xivn., 273
Technological Society, The, 241, 252
technology: propaganda related to, 40,
49,64; moaem man obsessed by, 49,50
television, 8, 175-6, 238; utilized by
propaganda, 103, 104, 105, 253, 254
Tiberius, 122
timeliness, propaganda of, 43-8
Tito, Marshal, 129
torture, of political enemies, 201
total propaganda, 9-17, 97, 105-17,
242; objective conditions of, 105-17
Trotsky, Leon, 288
truth, and propaganda, 52r-6i
unconscious, the, reached by propa-
ganda,, 27
Undecided, the, and propaganda, 48-
52, 54, 280
unionism, 223, 226-8
United Arab Republic, 23
United Nations, 23 n.
United States, 89, 120, 186, 219, 236,
244, 247, *55, *73, *79 n-, *86 n.,
295; myth utilized by, 32; tests in, of
experimental propaganda, 36, 37;
Negro problem in, 42; factuality in
propaganda manuals of, 53; pose of,
as defender of liberty, 60; con-
formity in, 68, 249; “agitators” in,
69; propaganda of integration in,
75-6; mass media of communication
in, 95; underdeveloped nations aided
by, 134; Human Relations in, 141-2,
153 n., 287; cult of hero in, 172;
transformation in political parties of,
216; Public Relations in, 225, 287;
unions in, 226, 227 and n., 228;
attempts at analysis of public opinion
in, 267
United States Army Information Service,
*99
“verbal action,” 207
vertical propaganda, 79-80, 82
Viet-Minh, 98 n.
Villiers de Lisle Adam, Colonel,
quoted, 135-6
Voice of America, 22, 103
war propaganda, 190, 274 n.t 275
Weiss, Walter, 44 n.
Westerfield, Bradford, 128 and n.
white (overt) propaganda, 15,16 and n.
Whyte, William H., 84, 283
Winance, Eleutherius, 311 n.
WinterMfe, Hitler’s, 290
work: role in modern life, 140-2;
mechanization of, 180
World War I, 89, 232
World War H, 89; and inquiries into
“war aims” of American soldiers,
270, 272; studies of German soldiers
in wake of, 270-2, 276, 284 and n.;
and failure of German propaganda in
occupied countries, 296 and n.
Wright, Q., 116
Young, Kimball, 173, 211, 277, 278
Yugoslavia, 254
Jacques Ellul was bom in Bordeaux in 1912. A Graduate
in Jurisprudence in 1936, he thereafter taught in French
universities until he was discharged by the Vichy regime.
He then joined and fought in the Resistance. After
France's liberation, while attached to the city govern-
ment of Bordeaux, he was named Professor at the law
school there. In 1947, he was appointed to a chair in
law and social history at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques.
His increasing reputation as a significant social and
political philosopher was first established in the United
States by the publication here of The Technological
Society (1964), Propaganda (1965), and The Political
Illusion (1967).