The following is mirrored from its source at
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l102301j.html.
© 2001, American Civil Liberties Union. Reprinted with permission of the
American Civil Liberties Union (www.aclu.org).
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                    How the USA-Patriot Act Puts the CIA
                Back in the Business of Spying on Americans



     The final version of the anti-terrorism legislation, the Uniting
     and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required
     To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (H.R. 3162, the "USA PATRIOT
     Act") puts the Central Intelligence Agency back in the business of
     spying on Americans. It permits a vast array of information
     gathering on U.S. citizens from school records, financial
     transactions*, Internet activity, telephone conversations,
     information gleaned from grand jury proceedings and criminal
     investigations to be shared with the CIA (and other non-law
     enforcement officials) even if it pertains to Americans. The
     information would be shared without a court order. The bill also
     gives the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, acting in
     his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community, enormous power
     to manage the collection and dissemination of intelligence
     information gathered in the U.S. This new authority supercedes
     existing guidelines issued to protect Americans from unwarranted
     surveillance by U.S. agencies such as the FBI.

     To Appreciate the Dangers of the USA PATRIOT Act, We Should Take a
     Moment to Revisit One of the Shameful Chapters in Recent History
     that Led to Restrictions on the CIA.

     Until the mid-1970's, both the CIA and the National Security
     Agency ("NSA") illegally investigated Americans. Despite the
     statutory provision in its charter prohibiting the CIA from
     engaging in law enforcement or internal security functions (50
     U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)), the CIA spied on as many as seven thousand
     Americans in Operation CHAOS. This operation in the 1960's and
     early 1970's involved spying on people who opposed the war in
     Vietnam, or who were student activists or were so-called black
     nationalists. Operation CHAOS involved an extensive program of
     information sharing from the FBI and other agencies to the CIA.
     The CIA received all of the FBI's reports on the American peace
     movement, which numbered over 1,000/month by June of 1970,
     according to a Senate report issued by the Senate Select Committee
     to Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence
     Activities ("Church Committee Report"). The Church Committee
     Report revealed how simple passive information sharing from other
     agencies to the CIA became authorized spying and data collection
     on lawful American political activity protected by the First
     Amendment. Once CIA officials expressed interest in particular
     types of information on American individuals and groups, other
     federal and local agencies were persuaded to covertly spy on
     citizens at the CIA's behest. The Church Committee reported:

          The mechanics of the CHAOS operation, both in performing the
          mission undertaken by the CIA and in servicing the FBI's
          needs, involved the establishment of files and retention of
          information on thousands of Americans.

          To the extent that [the] information related to domestic
          activity, its maintenance by the CIA, although perhaps not
          itself the performance of an internal security function, is a
          step toward the dangers of a domestic secret police against
          which the prohibition of the charter sought to guard.

     After these abuses were exposed, the CIA's domestic surveillance
     activities and collection of information about Americans were
     greatly curtailed. For example, the Foreign Intelligence
     Surveillance Act made it clear that the Department of Justice
     would have the leading role in gathering foreign intelligence in
     the United States. The USA PATRIOT Act would tear down these
     safeguards and once again permit the CIA to create dossiers on
     constitutionally protected activities of Americans and eliminate
     judicial review of such practices.

     Sharing Information Developed in Criminal Proceedings
     about Americans with the CIA

     The "USA PATRIOT Act" permits the wide sharing of sensitive
     information gathered in criminal investigations by law enforcement
     agencies with intelligence agencies including the CIA and the NSA,
     and other federal agencies including the INS, Secret Service, and
     Department of Defense.

     For example, Section 203(a) of the bill would permit law
     enforcement agents to provide to the CIA foreign intelligence and
     counterintelligence information revealed to a grand jury. No court
     order would be required. In authorizing this flow of sensitive
     information, Section 203(a) would re-define "foreign intelligence
     information" for purposes of this section to permit more liberal
     sharing of information about U.S. persons -- citizens and lawful
     permanent residents of the United States.

     As a result, the foreign intelligence information about Americans
     that could be shared with the CIA need not be information that is
     necessary to protect against attacks, or is necessary to the
     national defense or security of the United States. This
     "necessity" requirement of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
     Act effectively operates to protect Americans from unwarranted
     surveillance for "intelligence" as opposed to criminal purposes.
     This requirement is eviscerated under the information sharing
     provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. In addition, the sharing of
     grand jury information authorized by Section 203(a) is not limited
     to information about the person being investigated. Thus, a
     witness called before the grand jury to provide evidence against
     the person being investigated, or about others, might be less
     forthcoming if it is known that the supposedly secret information
     could be shared with the CIA.

     Section 203(b) would permit law enforcement officers to share with
     the CIA intercepts of telephone and Internet conversations. No
     court order would be necessary to authorize the sharing of this
     sensitive information. This section also broadens the definition
     of foreign intelligence information to include more information
     about Americans. It includes no meaningful restrictions on
     subsequent use of the recorded conversations. For example, there
     is nothing in the bill that prevents this information from being
     used to screen candidates who apply for government jobs. Also,
     Section 203(b) does not prohibit the CIA from sharing with foreign
     governments surveillance information gleaned from a criminal
     investigation, even if sharing that information that could put at
     risk members of a person's family who live abroad.

     Section 203(d) broadly permits the sharing of any foreign
     intelligence or counterintelligence information obtained as part
     of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to the CIA and other
     intelligence, defense and immigration authorities. No court order
     would be required, and for purposes of this information sharing,
     "foreign intelligence information" would be re-defined to permit
     more sharing of information about Americans. Section 905 of the
     bill mandates disclosure to the CIA of foreign intelligence
     information obtained in connection with a criminal investigation,
     but this section does not re-define "foreign intelligence
     information." These proposals represent extraordinary extensions
     of the current authorities of the foreign intelligence agencies,
     including the CIA, to obtain information about Americans.

     While some sharing of information may be appropriate in some
     limited circumstances, it should only be done with strict
     safeguards. These safeguards include protecting information about
     U.S. persons from disclosure to the CIA, requiring court approval
     for disclosure, limiting disclosure to foreign intelligence
     information as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
     Act, limiting disclosure to foreign governments, and requiring
     that disclosed information be marked to indicate how it was
     obtained and how it can and cannot be used or disseminated. The
     bill lacks all of these safeguards. As a result it may lead to the
     very abuses that the Church Committee exposed decades ago.

     Empowering the Director of Central Intelligence
     To Manage Domestic Intelligence Gathering

     Section 901 of the USA PATRIOT Act would empower the Director of
     the Central Intelligence Agency ("DCI"), to establish the
     priorities for the collection and dissemination of intelligence
     information gathered in the U.S. He would exercise this power
     while acting in his capacity as head of the intelligence
     community. The Attorney General currently performs this function.

     Though this provision includes language purporting to prohibit the
     DCI from directing or undertaking electronic surveillance
     operations, it includes no similar prohibition relating to
     physical searches for intelligence purposes. More importantly,
     Section 901 appears to contemplate that the DCI would be empowered
     to identify to the Department of Justice and to the FBI potential
     targets of intelligence surveillance in the United States,
     including particular people and groups to be surveilled. Such a
     power would be inherent to the ability to "establish requirements
     and priorities" for the collection of foreign intelligence
     information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

     It amounts to a rather clear case of giving the CIA an enhanced
     role in domestic intelligence gathering -- including the gathering
     of intelligence about United States citizens -- in the U.S. It
     also runs directly contrary to the statutory prohibition in the
     CIA's charter barring it from engaging in internal security
     functions (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).



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