This document is mirrored from its source at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia/
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Human Rights Watch
February 2000 Vol. 12, No. 1 (B)
COLOMBIA
The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary And Recommendations
Colombia And Military-Paramilitary Links
Third Brigade
Fourth Brigade
Thirteenth Brigade
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Human Rights Watch here presents detailed, abundant, and compelling
evidence of continuing close ties between the Colombian Army and
paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations.
This information was compiled by Colombian government investigators
and Human Rights Watch. Several of our sources, including
eyewitnesses, requested anonymity because their lives have been
under threat as a result of their testimony.
Far from moving decisively to sever ties to paramilitaries, Human
Rights Watch's evidence strongly suggests that Colombia's military
high command has yet to take the necessary steps to accomplish this
goal. Human Rights Watch's information implicates Colombian Army
brigades operating in the country's three largest cities, including
the capital, Bogotá. If Colombia's leaders cannot or will not halt
these units' support for paramilitary groups, the government's
resolve to end human rights abuse in units that receive U.S.
security assistance must be seriously questioned.
Previous Human Rights Watch reports and documents have detailed
credible and compelling evidence contained in government and other
investigations of continuing ties between the military and
paramilitary groups in the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Fourteenth, and
Seventeenth Brigades.
Together, evidence collected so far by Human Rights Watch links half
of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units (excluding military
schools) to paramilitary activity. These units operate in all of
Colombia's five divisions. In other words, military support for
paramilitary activity remains national in scope and includes areas
where units receiving or scheduled to receive U.S. military aid
operate.
Human Rights Watch has drawn this information to the attention of
the appropriate Colombian government ministers and officials, and
has urged them to take immediate action to address these continuing
problems in accordance with existing Colombian law.
Based on the enclosed evidence, Human Rights Watch found that:
* As recently as 1999, Colombian government investigators
gathered compelling evidence that Army officers set up a
"paramilitary" group using active duty, retired, and reserve
duty military officers along with hired paramilitaries who
effectively operated alongside Army soldiers and in
collaboration with them;
* In 1997, 1998, and 1999, a thorough Colombian government
investigation collected compelling evidence that Army officers
worked intimately with paramilitaries under the command of
Carlos Castaño. They shared intelligence, planned and carried
out joint operations, provided weapons and munitions, supported
with helicopters and medical aid, and coordinated on a day to
day basis. Some of the officers involved remain on active duty
and in command of troops;
* There is credible evidence, obtained through Colombian
government investigations and Human Rights Watch interviews,
that in 1998 and 1999, Army intelligence agents gathered
information on Colombians associated with human rights
protection, government investigative agencies, and peace talks,
who were then subjected to threats, harassment, and attacks by
the army, at times with the assistance of paramilitary groups
and hired killers;
* There is credible evidence that this alliance between military
intelligence, paramilitary groups, and hired killers is
national in scope and is able to threaten key investigators in
the Attorney General's office and the Procuraduría;
* The brigades discussed here -- the Third, Fourth, and
Thirteenth -- operate in Colombia's largest cities, including
the capital. Their commanders are considered among the most
capable and intelligent, and are leading candidates for
promotion to positions of overall command of divisions, the
Army, and Colombia's joint forces. If Colombia's leaders cannot
or will not halt support for paramilitary groups in these
units, it is highly questionable to assume that they will be
more successful in units that are less scrutinized or operate
in rural areas, including units that receive U.S. security
assistance in southern Colombia;
* As these cases underline, Colombia's civilian investigative
agencies, in particular the Attorney General's office, are
capable of sophisticated and hard-hitting investigations.
However, many investigators assigned to cases that implicate
the Army and paramilitaries have been forced to resign or to
flee Colombia;
* At least seven officers mentioned in the attached report are
School of the Americas graduates. Training alone, even when it
includes human rights instruction, does not prevent human
rights abuses. It must be accompanied by by clear and
determined action on the part of the Colombian government to
bring to justice those in the military who have committed human
rights abuses, to force the military to break longstanding ties
to paramilitary groups, and to ensure that the Colombian Armed
Forces are subject to the rule of law, including the August
1997 Constitutional Court decision that mandates that security
force personnel accused of committing crimes against humanity
are tried in civilian courts.
All international security assistance should be conditioned on
explicit actions by the Colombian Government to sever links, at all
levels, between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups.
Abuses directly attributed to members of the Colombian military have
decreased in recent years, but over the same period the number and
scale of abuses attributed to paramilitary groups operating with the
military's acquiescence or open support have skyrocketed.
International assistance should not be provided either to those who
directly commit human rights abuses or to those who effectively
contract others to carry out abuses on their behalf.
The actions that the Colombian government should be required to take
include:
* devising and implementing a comprehensive and public plan to
investigate, pursue, capture, and bring to justice paramilitary
leaders, one that provides sufficient resources and guarantees
the necessary political support to accomplish these goals;
* providing a significant increase of funding for the Attorney
General's Human Rights Unit, including increased support for
the Witness Protection program, travel, communications
equipment, increased security, and improved evidence-gathering
capability. The work of Colombia's Attorney General's office
has contributed significantly to the protection of human rights
and accountability for serious crimes, including crimes
committed by Colombia's guerrillas. Yet prosecutors and
investigators continue to run deadly risks. Many have been
forced to leave the country because of threats against their
lives, leaving the fate of crucial cases in jeopardy;
* establishing the ability at the regional and local level to
respond to threats of massacres and targeted violence,
including the creation of a rapid reaction force to investigate
threats and killings, and to take steps to pursue and apprehend
alleged perpetrators in order to bring them to justice;
With regard to U.S. training of Colombian military and police, Human
Rights Watch urges the international community to ensure that:
* all U.S. advice and training includes detailed instruction
regarding the obligation of all members of the military and
security forces to uphold Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II. Training should include
hypothetical situations that reflect Colombian reality, and
students should be closely evaluated on their understanding and
application of international humanitarian law. Specialists from
the International Committee of the Red Cross should be invited
to contribute to such training;
* all existing training materials are reviewed in coordination
with representatives of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the Defensora del Pueblo, the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Colombian Attorney General,
and a representative of independent human rights groups, to
ensure that they reflect the highest standards of protection
for human rights and international humanitarian law;
* all trainees, whether of officer rank or below, receive
appropriate instruction in human rights and international
humanitarian law.
The information submitted by Human Rights Watch shows clearly that
intelligence-sharing remains the most pervasive and common method of
collaboration between the Colombian military and paramilitary
groups, with grave consequences for human rights. Intelligence is by
definition a central function of any army, and is clearly so in the
case of the Colombian military. Addressing the problems such
information-sharing poses defies a unit-by-unit approach. Therefore:
* observing the aim of the Leahy Amendment, the United States
should apply human rights conditions to all
intelligence-sharing, to ensure that information is neither
shared with human rights abusers nor with those who will pass
it to paramilitary groups that violate human rights;
* for the purposes of compliance with the Leahy Amendment, the
United States should make it clear that aiding and abetting any
paramilitary group would result in a unit being disqualified
for receipt of further U.S. aid or training effective measures
are taken to investigate and punish violations;
* any increase in security assistance should mean a proportionate
increase in civilian staff assigned to the U.S. Embassy and
State Department to oversee compliance with human rights
conditions. Staff should be required to meet frequently with
not only military and government sources of information, but
also independent human rights groups, the church, and aid
organizations. The goal must be to gather as much information
as possible about reported human rights violations;
* a report on monitoring activities in countries where the Leahy
Amendment applies should be a regular part of the State
Department's annual report on human rights and should be
available for independent review.
The "effective measures" set out in the Leahy Amendment should be
interpreted to include, among other measures, the rigorous
application of the August 1997 ruling of Colombia's Constitutional
Court, which requires that crimes against humanity allegedly
committed by military personnel be investigated and tried in
civilian courts. Neither the military nor the Superior Judicial
Council charged with resolving jurisdictional disputes have abided
by this ruling to date.
* as a condition of U.S. security assistance, the Government of
Colombia should first require the military to respect civilian
jurisdiction in cases involving credible allegations of human
rights abuse by military personnel, including cases where
officers are accused of conspiring to commit or facilitate
murders and massacres by paramilitary groups. In this way,
President Pastrana can ensure that such cases are sent to
civilian courts, best equipped to investigate them impartially
and guarantee due process;
* the United States should require that the Colombian military
set up an independent review committee, composed of high level
representatives from the Attorney General's office and the
office of the Procuraduría, to assess whether there is credible
evidence of human rights abuse against individual officers and
soldiers. If such credible evidence is found, the individual
should be immediately suspended and the case sent to the
civilian courts for prosecution. If found guilty, the
individual should be permanently dismissed from the security
forces;
* to reinforce sanctions on abusive security force members, the
United States should conduct a review of all visas granted to
military personnel and ensure that individuals against whom
there is credible evidence of human rights abuse or support for
paramilitary groups have their visas revoked or are denied
visas to enter the United States;
* to strengthen accountability, the United States must urge
Colombia to reform the rules governing investigations and
disciplinary proceedings carried out by the Procuraduría. The
Procuraduría is the government agency that oversees the conduct
of government employees, including members of the military and
police, and can order them sanctioned or dismissed. Currently,
however, delays in investigation mean that many investigations
into serious human rights crimes must be shelved due to
excessively short statutes of limitations. Also, the crime of
murder is not included as a reason for dismissal. Even when the
Procuraduría finds that a member of the security forces has
committed murder, it can recommend no more stringent punishment
than a "severe reprimand," simply a letter in the individual's
employment file;
* the United States must require that Colombia void the statute
of limitations for investigations into crimes against humanity
and other, related human rights violations.
Further, the international community should urge Colombia to pass
and rigorously enforce laws that protect human rights including laws
penalizing forced disappearance, unlawful detention, and torture.
Legislation that officially recognizes and supports the work of the
Attorney General's Human Rights Unit should also be supported by the
foreign embassies in Bogotá.
Human rights defenders are among the most at-risk groups in
Colombia. The international community should support their work by
increasing funding for non-governmental groups that apply for
international assistance. Funds should help strengthen their ability
to investigate and report on human rights violations.
The international community should provide increased funding for
Colombia's forcibly displaced, not only those who may be forced to
abandon their homes because of future coca eradication efforts.
Currently Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of the number
of forcibly displaced people. Aid should be channeled through the
church and independent aid and human rights groups rather than the
government, in view of the latter's previous failure to follow
through with promised assistance.
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COLOMBIA AND MILITARY-PARAMILITARY LINKS
Half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units (excluding
military schools) have documented links to paramilitary activity
THIRD BRIGADE (headquarters in Cali, Valle);
"The Calima Front and the Third Brigade are the same thing."
Colombian government investigator
Colombian government investigators and Human Rights Watch interviews
include compelling, detailed information that in 1999, the Colombian
Army's Third Brigade set up a "paramilitary" group in the department
of Valle del Cauca, in southern Colombia. The investigators identify
this group by its self-imposed name, the Calima Front (Frente
Calima), and told Human Rights Watch that they were able to link the
group to active duty, retired, and reserve military officers
attached to the Third Brigade along with hired paramilitaries taken
from the ranks of the Peasant Self-Defense Group of Córdoba and
Urabá (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá, ACCU), commanded
by Carlos Castaño. According to these government investigators as
well as eyewitness testimony obtained by Human Rights Watch, the
Third Brigade provided the Calima Front with weapons and
intelligence.
At the time these events took place, the Third Brigade was under the
command of Brig. Gen. Jaime Ernesto Canal Albán, where he remains to
this day.(1)
Our information is based on interviews with Attorney General
investigators who prepared documents for an on-going government
investigation that is currently under seal (bajo reserva); an
investigator from an independent organization; other investigators;
and "Elias," a former Army intelligence agent who also served as a
cartel gunman. "Elias" also testified under oath to Attorney General
investigators. "Elias" told Human Rights Watch and government
investigators that he worked for the army's "Coronel Agustín
Codazzi" Battalion in Palmira, part of the Third Brigade.(2)
The Third Brigade is part of the Colombian Army's Third Division,
which includes a region where military units receiving a large
amount of U.S. security assistance are concentrated.(3)
According to the government investigator Human Rights Watch
interviewed who helped prepare the official investigation, the
Calima Front was formed in response to a mass kidnaping carried out
by guerrillas belonging to the José María Becerra Front of the
National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN). On
May 30, 1999, guerrillas seized about 140 worshipers from Cali's La
María Church. Among those taken were suspected drug traffickers
believed to run part of the business established by the jailed Cali
Cartel leaders.(4) Guerrillas demanded ransoms for some of the
hostages, a serious violation of the laws of war.(5)
In response, "Elias" told Human Rights Watch, Third Brigade active
duty and reserve officers formed the Calima Front, with the
assistance of Carlos Castaño. Active duty officers provided
intelligence and logistical support. Former military officers were
among those called in to assume positions of command. The troops
were made up primarily of paramilitaries brought in from Colombia's
north. The men were initially lodged on ranches belonging to
suspected drug traffickers, who also contributed resources to equip
and feed the men.(6)
The connection between drug traffickers and paramilitary groups is
not new and has been well documented in reporting by the U.S.
Embassy in Bogotáá since at least 1990.(7)
"Elias" told Human Rights Watch that during his employment as an
intelligence agent, he witnessed close links between drug
traffickers, paramilitaries, and the Army. Among other illegal
practices, "Elias" said that Codazzi Battalion soldiers routinely
sold weapons and munitions captured from guerrillas on the black
market. The money raised, he said, went to soldiers and to fund
illegal activities. "Elias" said that he was paid according to
operations generated by his information, in part supplemented by the
battalion's illegal weapons sales.(8)
"Elias" said he also worked for local drug traffickers, and served
as a body guard on the ranch of one drug trafficker who frequently
hosted Third Brigade troops and paramilitaries. In his interview, he
described the distinction between drug traffickers, paramilitaries,
and the Colombian Army as virtually non-existent. His services were
valuable, he told Human Rights Watch, since he maintained close ties
to the Army and could serve as a shared intelligence agent for all
three groups. "The salary was $800 a month if I worked with [the
paramilitaries] without going on maneuvers and $1,300 if I went into
the field," "Elias" told Human Rights Watch.(9)
In July, local officials and the regional ombudsman (Defensora)
began receiving reports from local residents of the appearance of
the "Calima Front." Over the August 1 weekend, armed men reportedly
killed four peasants near Tulu.(10) According to press reports, the
group, estimated to include at least 150 men wearing army-style
uniforms, carried AK-47s, M-60s, grenades, and the latest
communications equipment. Despite abundant reports of their
presence, their movements went virtually unimpeded for weeks.(11)
In August, "Elias" testified to Attorney General investigators in
Bogotá about his contact with the Calima Front. Investigators told
Human Rights Watch that they corroborated his testimony over the
following weeks, as the killings and massacres he warned had been
planned by the Calima Front in conjunction with Third Brigade
officers progressed.(12)
Subsequently, allegations of a connection between the Calima Front
and Third Brigade surfaced publicly, when the ELN charged Army
complicity in a statement released with a group of La María
hostages.(13) Human Rights Watch interviewed an independent
investigator who was able to confirm the Calima Front's existence
and give additional information in October 1999.(14)
By August 5, the first of hundreds of displaced people began to
arrive in towns like Tulu, San Pedro, and Buga. Many told stories
similar to the one Abelardo Trejos gave to a reporter from the
Cali-based El País. Armed men had blocked the roads, so Trejos, his
wife, and two children fled on a foot path. "[The armed men] told me
that we had to leave, because there was going to be a tremendous war
and that I should return when it was all over."(15)
On August 7, armed men seized Noralba Gaviria Piedrahíta, a
community leader, bound her, then led her to the outskirts of
Ceylán, near Bugalagrande, and executed her.(16) On September 22,
authorities discovered the mutilated and dismembered bodies of seven
men near Tulu, apparently executed by the Calima Front for suspected
ties to guerrillas.(17)
Despite abundant evidence of illegal activity, throughout the summer
the Army claimed that the murders and forced displacement were
"unconfirmed." Maj. Gen. Jaime Humberto Cortés Parada, commander of
the Cali-based Third Division, blamed deaths on the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia, FARC), which in his words was seeking to "generate chaos
and disinformation."(18)
In Tulu, where a community stadium was providing emergency shelter,
the number of displaced families fast outgrew available resources.
The press reported that at night, men on motorbikes fired shots into
the air and shouted threats at the displaced civilians, whom they
accused of being guerrilla sympathizers.(19) By September, local
officials estimated that at least 40 people had been killed and over
2,000 were forcibly displaced.(20)
Meanwhile, both "Elias" and the government investigators handling
the case told Human Rights Watch that they began to receive death
threats.(21) Although government investigators told Human Rights
Watch that they put "Elias" under protective custody, the threats
continued. "Elias" told us there were two attempts on his life.(22)
The government investigators handling the case and one other
observer contacted by authorities to assist in the investigation
told Human Rights Watch that they were also threatened. (23) "Elias"
and several Attorney General investigators later fled Colombia.(24)
All agree, in the words of one investigator, that "the Calima Front
and the Third Brigade are the same thing."(25)
This pattern of activity differs little from previous cases
documented in Colombian court proceedings, where the Third Brigade,
paramilitaries, and drug traffickers allied to attack suspected
guerrillas and civilians and commit atrocities. Between 1988 and
1990, for example, traffickers allied with police and Third Brigade
officers perpetrated the over 100 killings known collectively as the
Trujillo massacre. President Ernesto Samper subsequently
acknowledged the government's role in carrying out these killings
and covering up its responsibility on January 31, 1995.(26)
Another atrocity linked to the Third Brigade was the 1993 Riofrío
massacre. On October 5, thirteen members of the Ladino family living
in Riofrío, Valle del Cauca, were murdered by a combined force of
Third Brigade soldiers and paramilitaries.(27)
More recently, the Third Brigade has been implicated in the
Monteloro massacre of five people on November 8, 1998. According to
an independent investigation, troops from the "Palacé" Battalion,
based in Buga, and the "Numancia" Counterguerrilla Battalion killed
five civilians as they celebrated the fifteenth birthday party of
the daughter of the owner of the house they were in. Several of the
witnesses have since been killed in circumstances that suggest an
attempt to cover up the crime.(28)
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FOURTH BRIGADE (headquarters in Medellín, Antioquia)
"When we would deliver a guerrilla to the Girardot Battalion, they
would give us in exchange grenades and R-15 munitions . . . And
after the Army received (the corpse), they would dress it in a
military uniform."
Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández, a former paramilitary
The Attorney General's office has collected extensive evidence of
pervasive ties in 1997, 1998, and 1999 between the Fourth Brigade
and paramilitaries under the command of Carlos Castaño. These
documents name the Girardot, Granaderos, Héroes de Barbacoas, Juan
del Corral Battalions, and Pedro Nel Ospina Battalions as well as
Fourth Brigade headquarters.
The investigation describes activities that occurred while the
Fourth Brigade was under the command of Gen. Alfonso Manosalva
(since deceased) and subsequently, Gen. Carlos Ospina Ovalle, since
promoted and now head of Colombia's Fourth Division.(29) In his
current post, General Ospina is the divisional commander of at least
one of the units proposed to receive U.S. security assistance, the
Twelfth Brigade, based in Florencia, Caquetá.(30)
In 1998, the Attorney General opened an investigation of alleged
atrocities committed the previous year by paramilitaries around the
town of Girardota, Tarazá, and Caucasia, in the department of
Antioquia. Investigators concluded that a group of so-called
"paramilitaries" included six active-duty soldiers assigned to the
Batallón de Infantera No. 10 "Girardot" and the Batallón de
Ingenieros No. 4 "Pedro Nel Ospina." In the official investigation,
the group was linked to a series of killings and robberies committed
while they were dressed in Army uniforms and carrying their
Army-issue weapons, including machine guns and grenades. In
so-called "social cleansing" operations, the group attacked and
killed individuals believed to be drug addicts or thieves.(31)
Among the alleged paramilitaries Attorney General investigators told
Human Rights Watch enjoyed free access to Fourth Brigade
headquarters in 1997 and 1998 was Jacinto Alberto Soto, known as
"Lucas" and believed to act as the ACCU's accountant. In 1998, the
Attorney General issued an arrest warrant for Soto and seized him in
possession of ACCU documents and ledgers. Nevertheless, authorities
told Human Rights Watch that Soto apparently bribed his way out of
the front door of Medellín's maximum security prison weeks
later.(32)
In a separate series of investigations, Attorney General prosecutors
collected abundant evidence linking the Fourth Brigade to the
paramilitaries under Castaño's command who carried out the El Aro
massacre, which took place in October 1997. At the time, General
Ospina commanded the Fourth Brigade. These documents show that on
October 25, a joint army-paramilitary force surrounded the village
of El Aro and the 2,000 people who live in and around it. The
operation was part of a region-wide offensive launched against the
FARC and designed to force residents to abandon villages identified
as providing FARC guerrillas with supplies and "conquer" the region,
in the words of Castaño.(33)
Survivors told Human Rights Watch that while soldiers maintained a
perimeter around El Aro, an estimated twenty-five ACCU members
entered the village, rounded up residents, and executed four people
in the plaza. One witness told Human Rights Watch that the ACCU
leaders were men who called themselves "Cobra" and "Junior."
Witnesses said that paramilitaries told store owner Aurelio Areiza
and his family to slaughter a steer and prepare food from their
shelves to feed the ACCU fighters on October 25 and 26, while the
rest of Colombia voted in municipal elections. The next day,
witnesses told Human Rights Watch, paramilitaries took Areiza to a
nearby house, tied him to a tree, then tortured and killed him. They
added that the ACCU gouged out Arieza's eyes and cut off his tongue
and testicles.(34)
One witness told journalists who visited El Aro soon afterwards that
families who attempted to flee were turned back by soldiers camped
on the outskirts of town. Over the five days they remained in El
Aro, ACCU members were believed to have executed at least eleven
people, including three children, burned forty-seven of the
sixty-eight houses, including a pharmacy, a church, and the
telephone exchange, looted stores, destroyed the pipes that fed the
homes potable water, and forced most of the residents to flee. When
they left on October 30, the ACCU took with them over 1,000 head of
cattle along with goods looted from homes and stores.(35)
Afterwards, thirty people were reported to be forcibly
disappeared.(36)
By year's end, hundreds of displaced families were divided between
shelters in Ituango, Puerto Valdivia, and Medellín.(37) Jesús Valle,
an Ituango town councilman, lawyer, and president of the "Héctor
Abad Gómez" Permanent Human Rights Committee, helped document the
massacre and represented some families of victims. He was
assassinated in his Medellín office on February 27, 1998. Carlos
Castaño, the Army, and local drug traffickers are currently under
investigation for planning his murder.(38) Government investigators
have linked the hired killers to La Terraza, a group of professional
assassins that works on contract for Castaño.(39)
In sworn testimony to Attorney General investigators taken on April
30, 1998, Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández, a former
paramilitary who took part in the El Aro massacre, confirmed the
testimony by survivors taken by Human Rights Watch that the
operation had been carefully planned and carried out by a joint
paramilitary-Army force. Villalba said he belonged to the Toledo
Group within the ACCU's Metro Front. He told authorities that
"Junior" and Salvatore Mancuso, known as "El Mono Mancuso" and the
commander of ACCU fighters present, took him and approximately 100
other paramilitaries to Puerto Valdivia to prepare to enter El
Aro.(40)
There, Villalba told authorities that he witnessed the meeting
between Mancuso, an Army lieutenant, and two Army subordinates,
there with troops. This region is covered by both the Girardot and
Granaderos Battalions. Throughout the encounter, Villalba testified,
Army soldiers and paramilitaries addressed each other as "cousin"
(primo), as a sign of shared goals and purpose.(41)Villalba was also
able to testify about radio exchanges he overheard between Mancuso
and the colonel in charge of the battalion that was taking part in
the combined operation. According to Villalba, "They were planning
the entry into El Aro and how the operation would go lower down (the
mountain), so that the Army would prevent people or commissions or
journalists from entering."(42)
During the operation, Villalba said that the combined
Army-paramilitary force was attacked by the FARC. "Right when we had
contact with guerrillas, which lasted three hours, an Army
helicopter arrived, and gave us medical supplies and munitions."(43)
Villalba admitted taking direct part in killings and the mutilations
of victims, including a beheading. Once the paramilitaries had
rounded up the cattle belonging to El Aro residents, Villalba said,
paramilitaries left the area protected by the Army, which advised
them to take a route that would avoid members of the Attorney
General's office and Procuradura they believed had been sent to
investigate reports of the massacre. While the paramilitaries
traveled in several public busses commandeered on the highway,
another car preceded them, according to Villalba, ensuring that the
busses would pass army roadblocks unhampered.(44)
In statements to the press, Carlos Castaño took responsibility for
the massacre.(45)
Villalba also testified about numerous other operations carried out
jointly by paramilitaries and the Granaderos and Girardot
Battalions. A common practice, he told government investigators, was
"legalization" (legalización), when paramilitaries would give the
corpses of suspected guerrillas or murdered civilians to the Army in
exchange for weapons and munitions. Villalba testified that soldiers
then clothed the corpses in military uniforms and claimed them
publicly as guerrillas killed in combat. "When we would deliver a
guerrilla to the Girardot Battalion, they would give us in exchange
grenades and R-15 munitions... And after the Army received (the
corpse), they would dress it in a military uniform."(46)
Prosecutors told Human Rights Watch that they confirmed this detail
by reviewing Fourth Brigade records on weapons, which revealed that
many weapons issued to troops had vanished. Although the prosecutor
told Human Rights Watch that Fourth Brigade military officers had
confirmed that Granaderos Battalion stores had gone to
paramilitaries, he claimed that the Army never followed up on the
investigation or punished anyone.(47)
As Human Rights Watch explained in War Without Quarter: Colombia and
International Humanitarian Law, fueling human rights abuses by
soldiers is the army's continuing emphasis on body counts as a means
of measuring performance.(48) Officers who fail to amass lists of
enemy casualties risk seeing their careers stalled and ended.(49)
As Villalba's testimony demonstrates, "legalization" is one way
officers can better their chances of receiving medals and
promotions. "The commander would give the order, and says that he
wanted results, casualties (bajas)," one former army officer told
Human Rights Watch. "So anyone who came near our patrol would be
killed."(50)
Less than a month after former Armed Forces Commander General Manuel
Bonett told Human Rights Watch that the army had revised the way it
measured success, Gen. Iván Ramírez summarized the work of his First
Division by releasing to the press long lists of people claimed
killed in action by his troops.(51)
This is the same officer whose visa to enter the United States was
reportedly revoked the grounds of "terrorist activity," in this case
support for paramilitary groups. According to a Washington Post
investigation, Ramírez was a key intelligence source for the United
States and served as a liaison and paid informant for the Central
Intelligence Agency, supposedly to help the fight against drug
traffickers and Marxist guerrillas. At the same time, according to
the report, he maintained close ties to right-wing paramilitary
groups who finance much of their activities through drug
trafficking.(52)
Far from subsiding, Attorney General investigations gathered in
compelling detail evidence on how illegal activity in the Fourth
Brigade continued in 1998 and 1999. Perhaps most notorious was the
March 1999 murder of Alex Lopera, a former peace adviser to the
Antioquia governor's office. Lopera was assisting a family negotiate
the release of a family member kidnaped by guerrillas when he was
stopped at an Army roadblock near Sonsn, Antioquia.(53)
According to sworn testimony by "Valentín," a former Fourth Brigade
soldier and radio operator present at the scene, soldiers from the
Granaderos and Juan del Corral Battalions searched the car and
discovered the ransom money hidden in a spare tire. At the time,
"Valentín" told prosecutors, the commander of the Granaderos
Battalion, Major David Hernández Rojas, was present.(54)
Since there were no arrest warrants for any of the car's occupants,
"Valentín" testified, procedure dictated that soldiers had to let
the car proceed. However, according to "Valentín," Major Hernández
first sent several soldiers ahead to ambush the car and steal the
money.(55)
The soldiers, "Valentín" explained, had little choice. "Hernández
told all of us there to have a care, that whoever informed on him
would die, with every person in his family. He said that he had
people working for him that did that sort of work."(56)
Under the command of Capt. Diego Fernando Fino, "Valentín" said that
he and two soldiers set up the ambush.(57) "Valentín" testified to
prosecutors that private Carlos Mario Escudero fired the fatal
shots, killing all three passengers at point blank range. The ransom
was divided up between the soldiers.(58) The case came to light,
however, when Escudero's wife reported his share of the money stolen
several weeks later according to Escudero's testimony to government
investigators.(59)
An internal investigation initiated by the Fourth Brigade was easily
deflected, according to "Valentín." "(Hernández) told all of the
Granaderos soldiers how they should testify, and each one was given
a set thing to say."(60)
"Valentín" also testified about Major Hernández's close ties with
paramilitaries operating in eastern Antioquia.(61) In one
deposition, "Valentín" told investigators that Major Hernández told
him and other subordinates that he had begun to organize a death
squad called "La Muerte" (Death) within the Fourth Brigade in
coordination with an army officer attached to the rural Gaula, a
combined military-police unit. The group was to be equipped and
armed with camouflage uniforms, guns, and munitions seized by
soldiers from guerrillas.(62)
"Valentín" also told Attorney General investigators that Major Jesús
María Clavijo Clavijo, then commander of the "Héroes de Barbacoas"
Battalion, worked with paramilitary groups.(63) Among the killings
"Valentín" attributed to Major Clavijo working with paramilitaries
were ones carried out near El Carmen de Atrato, Choc, in February
1999. "Normally, everywhere that Major Clavijo went, there were
disappearances, murders, and wherever he was there was always a
flood of reports of abuses," he told investigators in a sworn
statement.(64)
According to "Valentín," Major Clavijo also "legalized" corpses
delivered by paramilitaries. However, this system didn't work if a
reward for a missing person was offered by family members. In one
case, "Valentín" testified that Major Clavijo ordered soldiers under
his command to dismember several corpses with chainsaws in order to
foil identification.(65)
"Valentín," who was a radio operator, said he often heard
paramilitaries communicating with the Army in the field. "As I was
monitoring the communications, I heard people that were not part of
the Army talking about combat and requesting assistance, using other
channels than the ones we used, and I realized that these were the
paramilitaries by the way that they spoke... Major Abondano [of the
Fourth Brigade] gave orders to the troops using the radio, to
advance, to follow the flank they were on, because our 'cousins'
were in combat and needed help."(66)
This witness also linked other Fourth Brigade officers, including
Major Clavijo, Col. Rivillas, Major Abondano and others to
paramilitaries through regular meetings held on military bases, He
said that officers attached to the "Pedro Nel Ospina" Battalion also
took part in support for paramilitaries.(67)
A parallel investigation by the Internal Affairs agency
(Procuraduría) listed hundreds of cellular telephone and beeper
communications between known paramilitaries and Fourth Brigade
officers, among them Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ospina Pardo,
Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Zapata Gaviria, Major Álvaro Cortés
Morillo,(68) a "Major Ardila," Major Jesús María Clavijo, Lieutenant
Felipe Rodríguez, Private Iván Darío Jaramillo, Private Javier Gómez
Herrán, and Private Carlos Mario Escudero.(69)
Clavijo's name also surfaced in Attorney General investigations of
alleged Army coordination with CONVIVIRs, groups of civilians
authorized by the government to carry out war-related activities. In
practice, they differed little from illegal paramilitary groups. In
1997, José Alirio Arcila, the leader of an Antioquia CONVIVIR known
as "Los Sables" implicated Clavijo and other Fourth Brigade officers
in a series of murders in Medellín. However, Human Rights Watch is
not aware of any on-going investigations of the security force
officers named by Arcila.(70)
Nevertheless, Major Clavijo, for example, has since been promoted to
colonel and is now commander of the "Hroes de Majagual" Battalion
under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Brigade and based in
Barrancabermeja. Most recently, this battalion has been linked in
the press to an increase in paramilitary activity and direct attacks
on the civilian population near Cantagallo, Santander. In November
1999, for example, local farmers charged that troops under Clavijo's
direct command had coordinated with paramilitaries to seize two
noted leaders of displaced people, Gildardo Fuentes and Edgar
Quiroga.(71) As of this writing, they remain "disappeared."
The following January, the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra
River Valley told local authorities that Clavijo's men were carrying
out so-called "anti-drug operations" by attacking civilians along
the Cimitarra River. In addition, they claimed that Colombian Navy
patrol boats fired on civilian dwellings in the villages of La
Victoria, Coroncoro, and Yanacu starting on January 16.(72) Over 150
people fled to Barrancabermeja for safety.(73)
For his part, Major Hernández was arrested, but later, government
investigators told Human Rights Watch, was allowed to escape by
soldiers under the command of Fourth Brigade Brig. Gen. Eduardo
Herrera Verbel.(74) The Colombian press has reported that Hernández
now works with the ACCU.(75) Indeed, "Valentín" told government
investigators that the officer told his subordinates that he would
work for the paramilitaries if he was investigated by the Attorney
General's office, since the ACCU had already offered him a car, a
ranch, and a high salary.(76)
So far, impunity has been the result of official investigations. The
prosecutors and investigators assigned to the case have either
recused themselves out of fear or fled Colombia because of threats.
One prosecutor told Human Rights Watch that he received credible
information indicating that Major Hernández had paid La Terraza the
equivalent of $7,000 for his life.(77)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
THIRTEENTH BRIGADE (headquarters in Bogotá, the capital)
I signed one case to authorize an indictment of paramilitaries
before lunch, and by the time I returned to my desk after eating, a
death threat, hand delivered, was there, with intimate details about
the decor of my apartment to let me know the killers had already
been inside.
Colombian prosecutor
Attorney General and other investigators said in interviews with
Human Rights Watch that they believe that the group behind a series
of assassinations and terror campaigns over the last three years has
been military intelligence. Although the Twentieth Brigade, which
centralized military intelligence, was officially dismantled in 1998
and intelligence units supposedly lost their ability to mount
operations, evidence strongly suggests that agents were simply
redistributed to intelligence units in existing brigades and
battalions. Human Rights Watch has obtained information indicating
that intelligence units continue to mount operations where human
rights are violated.
The United States trains Colombian Army intelligence officers, but
has not provided information publicly about what units they belong
to. In FY 1999, for example, the United Sates trained four Air Force
intelligence officers and two Army intelligence officers. In FY
1998, the U.S. trained six Army intelligence officers: four were
stationed in intelligence headquarters in Bogotá, one was stationed
in San Joséé del Guaviare, and one was stationed in the city of
Santa Marta.(78)
In one of at least five similar cases, Attorney General
investigators linked the 1998 kidnaping and later murder of Benjamin
Khoudari, an Israeli businessman, to Thirteenth Brigade intelligence
officers. According to the official indictment, Col. Jorge Plazas
Acevedo planned and carried out a series of kidnapping for ransom
and murder, including Khoudari's, as head of the intelligence
unit.(79) In 1999, Plazas was retired from active duty and his case
is now before a civilian court.(80)
Even after Acevedo's arrest, government investigators continue to
link the Thirteenth Brigade to threats against human rights
defenders. "The Thirteenth Brigade remains in crisis," a top
government investigator told Human Rights Watch in October 1999.(81)
Surveillance believed to be carried out by military intelligence of
human rights groups is open, aggressive, and threatening. One Bogotá
group reported being filmed and photographed from a neighboring
hotel. Many of the telephones used by human rights groups are openly
tapped. Threats are daily occurrences. One office manager told Human
Rights Watch that when they are trying to distribute an urgent
action, the phone line is cut, preventing them from sending it via
email or fax. Also, when they call out, they are frequently
connected directly to the Thirteenth Brigade.(82)
In some killings -- like that of the CINEP workers in 1997 and
Antioquia human rights defender Valle in 1998 - evidence gathered by
government investigators strongly suggests that military
intelligence acted in coordination with Carlos Castaño. Since
Castaño has no force capable of operating in cities, he will
contract out murders to La Terraza.(83)
According to government investigators, Castaño pays La Terraza a
monthly retainer. Once a target is identified and a "contract" is
negotiated with La Terraza, investigators believe, the killers are
given intelligence gathered by the military on the target's
whereabouts and movements. Killers are able to travel throughout
Colombia, and typically work in pairs. The pair, mounted on a
motorcycle, will follow and intended victim until they are ready to
carry out an attack.(84)
Government investigators have also tied La Terraza to both the
Popular Training Institute (Instituto Popular de Capacitación, IPC)
and Senator Piedad Córdoba kidnapings, which they believe were
carried out on Castaño's orders. Witnesses have sworn under oath
that they recognized among the gunmen the La Terraza leader,
Alexander Londoño, alias "El Zarco."(85) The most recent killing
being investigated in association with La Terraza and its ties to
military intelligence is that of Jaime Garzón, the humorist. A
suspected La Terraza gunmen was arrested in Colombia in January 1999
in connection with the Garzón murder.(86)
Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that the
intelligence system maintained by La Terraza is excellent and
national in scope. They depend in part on fleets of taxis to collect
intelligence, and have been linked to death threats against
government investigators, including members of the Technical
Investigations Unit (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigaciones, CTI) .(87)
One prosecutor told Human Rights Watch, "I signed one case to
authorize an indictment of paramilitaries before lunch, and by the
time I returned to my desk after eating, a death threat, hand
delivered, was there, with intimate details about the decor of my
apartment to let me know the killers had already been inside."(88)
Some formal investigations into key paramilitary leaders and their
relationships to the military and La Terraza are made virtually
impossible by these types of threats and the lack of protection for
prosecutors, investigators, and key witnesses. In 1998 and 1999, a
dozen CTI officials were murdered or forced to resign because of
threats related to their work on human rights cases. Others have
left the country in fear for their lives.(89)
Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that among the
cases most damaged by La Terraza threats is the investigation into
the murder of human rights defender Valle. One CTI agent
investigating Valle's murder was killed soon after the murder. The
prosecutor investigating the case fled Colombia. Another CTI
investigator was killed in September 1999.(90)
The Thirteenth Brigade was also linked to the May 1998 seizure by
authorities of the offices of the Intercongregational Commission on
Justice and Peace, a respected human rights group. After retired
general and former defense minister Fernando Landazbal was
assassinated in Santafé de Bogotá on May 12, 1998, the Twentieth
Brigade supplied information to the Attorney General's office
linking the crime to activities that took place within Justice and
Peace. The following day, Thirteenth Brigade soldiers seized the
offices.(91)
Soldiers concentrated their search on the office of "Nunca Más," a
research project that is collecting information on crimes against
humanity. Soldiers forced employees to kneel at gun point in order
to take their pictures, a gesture apparently meant to evoke a
summary execution. During the search, soldiers addressed employees
as "guerrillas" and filmed them and documents in the office. At one
point, soldiers told the employees that they wanted precise details
of the office in order to later construct a scale model, apparently
to plan further incursions. After human rights defenders gathered
outside out of concern, soldiers set up a camera to film them, an
act of intimidation.(92)
In a recorded statement to the Colombian radio, Colombia's assistant
attorney general, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, confirmed that the search
was prompted by "military intelligence, which gave us a report that
indicated that there were people associated with the ELN at this
location . . . but once the prosecutors realized that this was an
error, they suspended the operation."(93) In later reports, Attorney
General Alfonso Gómez claimed that the Army had purposefully hidden
the true nature of the work done at Justice and Peace from
investigators.(94)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Rights Watch
Americas Division
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of
people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice,
to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom and to
protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers
accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive
practices and respect international human rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the
cause of human rights for all.
The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele
Alexander, development director; Reed Brody, advocacy director;
Carroll Bogert, communications director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance
director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office
director; Patrick Minges, publications director; Susan Osnos,
associate director; Maria Pignataro Nielsen, human resources
director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Malcolm Smart, program director;
Wilder Tayler, general counsel; and Joanna Weschler, United Nations
representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L.
Bernstein is the founding chair.
Its Americas division was established in 1981 to monitor human
rights in Latin America and the Caribbean. José Miguel Vivanco is
executive director; Joanne Mariner is deputy director; Joel Solomon
is research director; Sebastian Brett and Robin Kirk are research
associates; Monisha Bajaj and Barbara Graves are associates. Stephen
L. Kass is chair of the advisory committee; Marina Pinto Kaufman and
David E. Nachman are vice chairs.
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1. Canal is listed as having trained at the School of the Americas
in cadet orientation C-3 from Nov. 7-Nov. 21, 1980.
2. The name of "Elias" has been changed for security reasons.
Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.
3. The division includes units operating in the department of
Putumayo, among them the 24th Brigade.
4. The ELN claimed in a statement that among the hostages were
individuals wanted for drug trafficking by U.S. law
enforcement, an affirmation that was never confirmed. Human
Rights Watch interview with Attorney General investigator,
January 14, 2000; "Los guerrilleros del Eln se tomaron por
asalto la iglesia La María; rescatadas 75 personas," El Tiempo,
May 31, 1999; and "ELN says its hostages include people wanted
by US for drug trafficking," Agence France Presse, August 23,
1999.
5. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, January 14, 2000.
6. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.
7. For example, Human Rights Watch obtained much of the cable
traffic generated by the embassy and related to the activities
of "Los Tangueros," a paramilitary group led by former Medellín
Cartel member Fidel Castaño, through a Freedom of Information
Act request.
8. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.
9. Ibid.
10. "Los habitantes de La Moralia y Monteloro viven en medio de la
zozobra," El País (Cali), August 3, 1999.
11. "Unos 150 hombres de las Autodefensas se tomaron la zona rural:
Combate de 'paras' y guerrilla en Tulu," El País (Cali), August
3, 1999.
12. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, January 12, 2000.
13. "Familiares de los secuestrados rechazaron acusaciones del
grupo guerrillero: 'Es absurda la afirmación del ELN'," El País
(Cali), September 7, 1999.
14. Information about the Calima Front also circulated in press
reports as early as August. Human Rights Watch interview with
independent investigator, October 2, 1999; and "Colombia Death
Squad Said To Plot Against Peace," Karl Penhaul, Reuters,
August 15, 1999.
15. "Me dijeron que nos tenamos que ir, porque se iba a formar una
guerra tremenda, y que regresara cuando todo terminara." "A
Tulu, San Pedro y Buga llegaron huyendo ayer 460 campesinos:
Avalancha de desplazados no cesa," El País (Cali), August 5,
1999.
16. "Una mujer fue asesinada: Cuatro personas están desaparecidas,"
El País (Cali), August 10, 1999.
17. "El terror se apoder la zona montañosa del Centro del Valle:
Nuevas masacres," El País (Cali), September 25, 1999.
18. "generar caos y desinformación." "El general Jaime Cortés se
refiere a la situacin que se vive en el Centro del Valle:
'Existen muchas contradicciones'," El País (Cali), August 22,
1999.
19. "Por las noches realizan disparos en albergues de Tulu: Sigue
el drama de los desplazados," El País (Cali), October 28, 1999.
20. "Ya son dos mil los desplazados por la violencia en el
Departamento Centro del Valle, albergue del temor," Hans Vargas
Pardo, El País (Cali), September 25, 1999.
21. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.
22. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.
23. Human Rights Watch interview, September 29, 1999.
24. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.
25. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.
26. For a summary of this on-going case, see Comisión de
Investigación de los Sucesos Violentos de Trujillo: Caso 11.007
de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Santafé de
Bogotá: Consejera presidencial para los Derechos Humanos de la
República de Colombia, August 1995).
27. Gen. Rafael Hernández, reportedly Colombia's military attache
in Chile, was then commander of the Third Brigade. As the
primary trial court judge, he acquitted his subordinate, Lt.
Col. Luis Becerra Bohórquez, despite compelling evidence of the
officer's guilt. Becerra was eventually dismissed from the
army. This was not the first atrocity Becerra committed as an
Army officer. As the Tenth Brigade intelligence chief, he also
helped arrange the 1988 massacres of banana workers in
Antioquia's "Honduras" and "La Negra" farms. In October 1998, a
military tribunal that had convened to review the Riofrío case
ruled that Becerra and two other soldiers were guilty of the
crime of "encubrimiento por favorecimiento," in essence
concluding that the officers had erred only by protecting
themselves by reporting the incident as combat with a guerrilla
unit, not the massacre of unarmed civilians. However, the
sentence meted out was laughable - twelve months in jail, less
than a month per victim. Indeed, Becerra was never
incarcerated. Becerra was killed by an unknown gunman in a Cali
restaurant on February 14, 1999. For a summary of the case, see
Massacre in Riofro ((Santafé de Bogotá: Commission of
Non-governmental organizations).
28. Human Rights Watch communication with independent investigator,
February 4, 2000.
29. Ospina is listed as having trained at the School of the
Americas at least once, in a cadet orientation course held in
1967.
30. The division includes units operating in Meta, Guaviare, and
Caquet.
31. Report of the Investigative Unit assigned to the Regional
Attorney General's office in Medellín, Antioquia, February 10,
1998.
32. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, October 2, 1999; Attorney General Special Report
No. 395, "Aseguramientos y capturas de presuntos miembros de
las ACCU en Antioquia," June 10, 1998; and "Aseguran a fiscal
por fuga de 'para' ," El Tiempo, October 14, 1998.
33. This wasn't the first time the ACCU entered this area. In 1996,
the group murdered three people in the hamlets of El Inglés and
La Granja. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, Medellín, Antioquia, July 2, 1996.
34. Human Rights Watch interviews with El Aro survivors, Medellín,
Antioquia, December 11, 1997; and Human Rights Watch interview
with Jesús Valle, president, "Héctor Abad Gómez" Permanent
Human Rights Committee, Medellín, Antioquia, December 11, 1997.
35. Javier Arboleda, "Cinco días de infierno en El Aro," El
Colombiano, November 14, 1997.
36. Amnesty International Urgent Action 01/97, January 3, 1997.
37. "Los desplazados no se vean en el norte de Antioquia," El
Tiempo, November 6, 1997.
38. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with "Héctor Abad Gómez"
Permanent Human Rights Committee, February 27, 1998; and Human
Rights Watch interview with Attorney General Alfonso Gómez
Méndez, May 7, 1998.
39. Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that La
Terraza is descended from the groups that worked on contract
for drug kingpin Pablo Escobar in the 1980s. Testimony of
Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández to the Attorney General's
office, April 30, 1998; and Human Rights Watch interview with
Attorney General investigator, October 2, 1999.
40. Authorities told Human Rights Watch that Salvatore Mancuso
Gómez is Carlos Castaño's operational chief within the ACCU.
The Attorney General has issued at least two warrants for his
arrest related to paramilitary activity and kidnapping. Report
on outstanding arrest warrants, Attorney General's office,
January 1, 1998.
41. Testimony of Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández to the
Attorney General's office, April 30, 1998.
42. "Estaban planeando la entrada al Aro y como se iba a operar
abajo, para que el ejrcito no dejara Paísar a personas o no
fuera a pasar comiciones (sic), ni periodismo." Ibid.
43. "Al momentico de tener contacto que duramos tres horas llegó un
helicoptero del ejército, ahí nos bajó lo que fue elementos de
salud y munición." Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. "Autodefensas de Urabá niegan barbarie en El Aro," El
Colombiano, November 15, 1997.
46. "Si le entregamos un guerrillero al Batallón Girardot, por
cambio de granadas y munición de R 15... Y el ejército cuando
lo recibió le puso camuflado." This is most likely AR-15
ammunition. The AR-15 is the Colt company's name for the M-16
assault rifle. Testimony of Francisco Enrique Villalba
Hernández to the Attorney General's office, April 30, 1998.
47. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
October 2, 1999.
48. War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian
Law (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), pp. 48-49.
49. Human Rights Watch interview with Col. (ret.) Carlos Velásquez,
Santafé de Bogotá, May 12, 1997.
50. Human Rights Watch interview with former army officer, Santafé
de Bogotá, November 12, 1995.
51. Gen. Ramírez retired from the service in 1999. Tonny Pérez
Mier, "Balance de I División del Ejército," El Tiempo, December
23, 1997; Human Rights Watch interview with General Bonett,
Santafé de Bogotá, December 12, 1997.
52. "Colombian Army's Third in Command Allegedly Led Two Lives:
General Reportedly Served as a Key CIA Informant While
Maintaining Ties to Death Squads Financed by Drug Traffickers,"
Douglas Farah and Laura Brooks, Washington Post, August 11,
1998.
53. "Cuatro militares a juicio por crimen de Alex Lopera," El
Tiempo, October 13, 1999.
54. Hernández is listed as having trained twice at the School of
the Americas. As a cadet, he took the orientation for combat
weapons from March 7-April 19, 1985. As a lieutenant, he
trained in "psychological operations" from February 27-May 15,
1991. For safety reasons, we have changed the name of this
witness. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's
office, June 22, 1999.
55. Ibid.
56. "Hernández nos dijo a todos los que estábamos ahí, que mucho
cuidado, que él que se tuerza se muere, con toda la familia;
dijo que él tenía gente que le hacía ese trabajo." Ibid.
57. Fino is listed as having taken a course on Cadet Orientation
C-34 (Mechanized) at the School of the Americas from June
28-July 26, 1989.
58. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
22, 1999.
59. Testimony of Carlos Mario Escudero to the Attorney General's
office, June 1, 1999.
60. "(Hernández) le dijo a todos los integrantes del Granaderos
como debían declarar, a cada uno le dijo que debía decir."
Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
22, 1999.
61. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
23, 1999.
62. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
1, 1999.
63. Clavijo was listed as having trained at the School of the
Americas from July 1-July 17 of 1981 in an orientation and
weapons for cadets (C-3) program.
64. "Normalmente en el rea donde estaba el Mayor Clavijo, haban
desaparecidos, muertos, y por donde se Paísaba siempre llegaba
citatorias de demandas." Testimony by "Valentín" to the
Attorney General's office, June 23, 1999.
65. Ibid.
66. "Por la monitoría escuché gente hablando de combates, pidiendo
apoyo, por otro tipo de comunicaciones diferentes a las
nuestras, yo reconocí que eran las autodefensas por la forma de
hablar... el Mayor Abondano [of the Fourth Brigade] dió la
orden a la tropa por radio, que avanzaran, que siguieran con el
eje que llevaban, que los primos estaban en combates y
necesitaban apoyos." Ibid.
67. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
1, 1999.
68. Cortés is listed as having studied in the course on weapons
orientation for cadets (C-3) at the School of the Americas from
January 12-26, 1984.
69. Office of Special Investigations-Antioquia region, Report,
September 21, 1998.
70. Arcila directed a CONVIVIR, an association of civilians
authorized by the government to take part in
intelligence-gathering and other activities. Sentencia
Anticipada, 3687- (F 21.336), Juzgado Regional de Medellín,
August 8, 1997.
71. An official investigation is on-going. Report by the Comisión
de Bsqueda de Edgar Quiroga y Gildardo Fuentes, made up of the
Programa por la Paz y Desarrollo del Magdalena Medio, Servicio
Jesuita a Refugiados, Ministerio del Interior, Defensora del
Pueblo, Red de Solidaridad Social, CREDHOS, Organización
Femenina Popular, Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos
Políticos, MINGA, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Peace Brigades International, and the Catholic Church, December
3, 1999.
72. Acción Urgente, "Campesinos del Valle del Ro Cimitarra, en el
Magdalena Medio colombiano, son bombardeados y ametrallados por
TroPaís Oficiales," CREDHOS and the Peasant Association of the
Cimitarra River Valley (Asociación Campesina Del Valle Del Ro
Cimitarra, ACVC ), January 18, 2000.
73. "La Casa Campesina, que les sirve de refugio, se quedó
pequeña," Vanguardia Liberal, January 21, 2000.
74. Human Rights Watch interview, October 2, 1999; and "Cuatro
militares a juicio por crimen de Alex Lopera," El Tiempo,
October 13, 1999.
75. "El mayor David Hernández est sindicado de la muerte de lex
Lopera," El Tiempo, July 1, 1999.
76. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
1, 1999.
77. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
October 2, 1999.
78. U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign
Military Training & DOD Engagement Activities of Interest: A
Report to Congress for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999," (Section
581 Report), CD-ROM, 1999.
79. Plazas reportedly attended the School of the Americas and took
a course on Small Unit Infantry Tactics from Jan. 24-March 4,
1977. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, October 5, 1999.
80. Col. Bernardo Ruiz, the former Twentieth Brigade commander
currently charged with masterminding the 1995 murder of
conservative leader lvaro Gómez, told the newsweekly Semana
that he had worked closely with Plazas. "Revolción en Brigada
XIII," El Espectador, July 21, 1999; and "Valgo más muerto que
vivo," Semana, September 13, 1999.
81. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigator, October 5, 1999.
82. Human Rights Watch interview, October 5, 1999.
83. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
investigators, October 5; and "Asegurado presunto asesino de
Garzón," El Tiempo, January 19, 2000.
87. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.
88. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
October 10, 1999.
89. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.
90. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
investigators, October 5, 1999.
91. The link between the information supplied by the Twentieth
Brigade and the use made of it by the Thirteenth Brigade was
confirmed in government investigations contained in a
subsequent Procuradura investigation completed on December 18,
1998. Public Statement, Justice and Peace, May 19, 1998; and
"Ejercito busca al ELN en una casa de Paz," El Espectador, May
14, 1998.
92. Public Statement, Justice and Peace, May 19, 1998.
93. "Inteligencia militar nos proporcionó un informe que indicaba
que en este lugar se encontraban personas asociadas al ELN, por
eso realizamos el allanamiento, pero al darse cuenta los
fiscales que adelantaban una operación por error, se detuvo la
diligencia." Allanamiento a ONG, fue error de inteligencia,
advierte Vicefiscal," RCN broadcast, May 14, 1998.
94. "A calificar servicios," Semana, May 25, 1998