This document is mirrored from its source at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia/
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                             Human Rights Watch


       February 2000                              Vol. 12, No. 1 (B)


                                  COLOMBIA

        The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links





    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Summary And Recommendations

    Colombia And Military-Paramilitary Links

    Third Brigade

    Fourth Brigade

    Thirteenth Brigade

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    SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Human Rights Watch here presents detailed, abundant, and compelling
    evidence of continuing close ties between the Colombian Army and
    paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations.

    This information was compiled by Colombian government investigators
    and Human Rights Watch. Several of our sources, including
    eyewitnesses, requested anonymity because their lives have been
    under threat as a result of their testimony.

    Far from moving decisively to sever ties to paramilitaries, Human
    Rights Watch's evidence strongly suggests that Colombia's military
    high command has yet to take the necessary steps to accomplish this
    goal. Human Rights Watch's information implicates Colombian Army
    brigades operating in the country's three largest cities, including
    the capital, Bogotá. If Colombia's leaders cannot or will not halt
    these units' support for paramilitary groups, the government's
    resolve to end human rights abuse in units that receive U.S.
    security assistance must be seriously questioned.

    Previous Human Rights Watch reports and documents have detailed
    credible and compelling evidence contained in government and other
    investigations of continuing ties between the military and
    paramilitary groups in the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Fourteenth, and
    Seventeenth Brigades.

    Together, evidence collected so far by Human Rights Watch links half
    of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units (excluding military
    schools) to paramilitary activity. These units operate in all of
    Colombia's five divisions. In other words, military support for
    paramilitary activity remains national in scope and includes areas
    where units receiving or scheduled to receive U.S. military aid
    operate.

    Human Rights Watch has drawn this information to the attention of
    the appropriate Colombian government ministers and officials, and
    has urged them to take immediate action to address these continuing
    problems in accordance with existing Colombian law.

    Based on the enclosed evidence, Human Rights Watch found that:

       * As recently as 1999, Colombian government investigators
         gathered compelling evidence that Army officers set up a
         "paramilitary" group using active duty, retired, and reserve
         duty military officers along with hired paramilitaries who
         effectively operated alongside Army soldiers and in
         collaboration with them;

       * In 1997, 1998, and 1999, a thorough Colombian government
         investigation collected compelling evidence that Army officers
         worked intimately with paramilitaries under the command of
         Carlos Castaño. They shared intelligence, planned and carried
         out joint operations, provided weapons and munitions, supported
         with helicopters and medical aid, and coordinated on a day to
         day basis. Some of the officers involved remain on active duty
         and in command of troops;

       * There is credible evidence, obtained through Colombian
         government investigations and Human Rights Watch interviews,
         that in 1998 and 1999, Army intelligence agents gathered
         information on Colombians associated with human rights
         protection, government investigative agencies, and peace talks,
         who were then subjected to threats, harassment, and attacks by
         the army, at times with the assistance of paramilitary groups
         and hired killers;

       * There is credible evidence that this alliance between military
         intelligence, paramilitary groups, and hired killers is
         national in scope and is able to threaten key investigators in
         the Attorney General's office and the Procuraduría;

       * The brigades discussed here -- the Third, Fourth, and
         Thirteenth -- operate in Colombia's largest cities, including
         the capital. Their commanders are considered among the most
         capable and intelligent, and are leading candidates for
         promotion to positions of overall command of divisions, the
         Army, and Colombia's joint forces. If Colombia's leaders cannot
         or will not halt support for paramilitary groups in these
         units, it is highly questionable to assume that they will be
         more successful in units that are less scrutinized or operate
         in rural areas, including units that receive U.S. security
         assistance in southern Colombia;

       * As these cases underline, Colombia's civilian investigative
         agencies, in particular the Attorney General's office, are
         capable of sophisticated and hard-hitting investigations.
         However, many investigators assigned to cases that implicate
         the Army and paramilitaries have been forced to resign or to
         flee Colombia;

       * At least seven officers mentioned in the attached report are
         School of the Americas graduates. Training alone, even when it
         includes human rights instruction, does not prevent human
         rights abuses. It must be accompanied by by clear and
         determined action on the part of the Colombian government to
         bring to justice those in the military who have committed human
         rights abuses, to force the military to break longstanding ties
         to paramilitary groups, and to ensure that the Colombian Armed
         Forces are subject to the rule of law, including the August
         1997 Constitutional Court decision that mandates that security
         force personnel accused of committing crimes against humanity
         are tried in civilian courts.

    All international security assistance should be conditioned on
    explicit actions by the Colombian Government to sever links, at all
    levels, between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups.
    Abuses directly attributed to members of the Colombian military have
    decreased in recent years, but over the same period the number and
    scale of abuses attributed to paramilitary groups operating with the
    military's acquiescence or open support have skyrocketed.
    International assistance should not be provided either to those who
    directly commit human rights abuses or to those who effectively
    contract others to carry out abuses on their behalf.

    The actions that the Colombian government should be required to take
    include:

       * devising and implementing a comprehensive and public plan to
         investigate, pursue, capture, and bring to justice paramilitary
         leaders, one that provides sufficient resources and guarantees
         the necessary political support to accomplish these goals;

       * providing a significant increase of funding for the Attorney
         General's Human Rights Unit, including increased support for
         the Witness Protection program, travel, communications
         equipment, increased security, and improved evidence-gathering
         capability. The work of Colombia's Attorney General's office
         has contributed significantly to the protection of human rights
         and accountability for serious crimes, including crimes
         committed by Colombia's guerrillas. Yet prosecutors and
         investigators continue to run deadly risks. Many have been
         forced to leave the country because of threats against their
         lives, leaving the fate of crucial cases in jeopardy;

       * establishing the ability at the regional and local level to
         respond to threats of massacres and targeted violence,
         including the creation of a rapid reaction force to investigate
         threats and killings, and to take steps to pursue and apprehend
         alleged perpetrators in order to bring them to justice;

    With regard to U.S. training of Colombian military and police, Human
    Rights Watch urges the international community to ensure that:

       * all U.S. advice and training includes detailed instruction
         regarding the obligation of all members of the military and
         security forces to uphold Common Article 3 of the Geneva
         Conventions and Protocol II. Training should include
         hypothetical situations that reflect Colombian reality, and
         students should be closely evaluated on their understanding and
         application of international humanitarian law. Specialists from
         the International Committee of the Red Cross should be invited
         to contribute to such training;

       * all existing training materials are reviewed in coordination
         with representatives of the International Committee of the Red
         Cross, the Defensora del Pueblo, the office of the U.N. High
         Commissioner for Human Rights, the Colombian Attorney General,
         and a representative of independent human rights groups, to
         ensure that they reflect the highest standards of protection
         for human rights and international humanitarian law;

       * all trainees, whether of officer rank or below, receive
         appropriate instruction in human rights and international
         humanitarian law.

    The information submitted by Human Rights Watch shows clearly that
    intelligence-sharing remains the most pervasive and common method of
    collaboration between the Colombian military and paramilitary
    groups, with grave consequences for human rights. Intelligence is by
    definition a central function of any army, and is clearly so in the
    case of the Colombian military. Addressing the problems such
    information-sharing poses defies a unit-by-unit approach. Therefore:

       * observing the aim of the Leahy Amendment, the United States
         should apply human rights conditions to all
         intelligence-sharing, to ensure that information is neither
         shared with human rights abusers nor with those who will pass
         it to paramilitary groups that violate human rights;

       * for the purposes of compliance with the Leahy Amendment, the
         United States should make it clear that aiding and abetting any
         paramilitary group would result in a unit being disqualified
         for receipt of further U.S. aid or training effective measures
         are taken to investigate and punish violations;

       * any increase in security assistance should mean a proportionate
         increase in civilian staff assigned to the U.S. Embassy and
         State Department to oversee compliance with human rights
         conditions. Staff should be required to meet frequently with
         not only military and government sources of information, but
         also independent human rights groups, the church, and aid
         organizations. The goal must be to gather as much information
         as possible about reported human rights violations;

       * a report on monitoring activities in countries where the Leahy
         Amendment applies should be a regular part of the State
         Department's annual report on human rights and should be
         available for independent review.

    The "effective measures" set out in the Leahy Amendment should be
    interpreted to include, among other measures, the rigorous
    application of the August 1997 ruling of Colombia's Constitutional
    Court, which requires that crimes against humanity allegedly
    committed by military personnel be investigated and tried in
    civilian courts. Neither the military nor the Superior Judicial
    Council charged with resolving jurisdictional disputes have abided
    by this ruling to date.

       * as a condition of U.S. security assistance, the Government of
         Colombia should first require the military to respect civilian
         jurisdiction in cases involving credible allegations of human
         rights abuse by military personnel, including cases where
         officers are accused of conspiring to commit or facilitate
         murders and massacres by paramilitary groups. In this way,
         President Pastrana can ensure that such cases are sent to
         civilian courts, best equipped to investigate them impartially
         and guarantee due process;

       * the United States should require that the Colombian military
         set up an independent review committee, composed of high level
         representatives from the Attorney General's office and the
         office of the Procuraduría, to assess whether there is credible
         evidence of human rights abuse against individual officers and
         soldiers. If such credible evidence is found, the individual
         should be immediately suspended and the case sent to the
         civilian courts for prosecution. If found guilty, the
         individual should be permanently dismissed from the security
         forces;

       * to reinforce sanctions on abusive security force members, the
         United States should conduct a review of all visas granted to
         military personnel and ensure that individuals against whom
         there is credible evidence of human rights abuse or support for
         paramilitary groups have their visas revoked or are denied
         visas to enter the United States;

       * to strengthen accountability, the United States must urge
         Colombia to reform the rules governing investigations and
         disciplinary proceedings carried out by the Procuraduría. The
         Procuraduría is the government agency that oversees the conduct
         of government employees, including members of the military and
         police, and can order them sanctioned or dismissed. Currently,
         however, delays in investigation mean that many investigations
         into serious human rights crimes must be shelved due to
         excessively short statutes of limitations. Also, the crime of
         murder is not included as a reason for dismissal. Even when the
         Procuraduría finds that a member of the security forces has
         committed murder, it can recommend no more stringent punishment
         than a "severe reprimand," simply a letter in the individual's
         employment file;

       * the United States must require that Colombia void the statute
         of limitations for investigations into crimes against humanity
         and other, related human rights violations.

    Further, the international community should urge Colombia to pass
    and rigorously enforce laws that protect human rights including laws
    penalizing forced disappearance, unlawful detention, and torture.
    Legislation that officially recognizes and supports the work of the
    Attorney General's Human Rights Unit should also be supported by the
    foreign embassies in Bogotá.

    Human rights defenders are among the most at-risk groups in
    Colombia. The international community should support their work by
    increasing funding for non-governmental groups that apply for
    international assistance. Funds should help strengthen their ability
    to investigate and report on human rights violations.

    The international community should provide increased funding for
    Colombia's forcibly displaced, not only those who may be forced to
    abandon their homes because of future coca eradication efforts.
    Currently Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of the number
    of forcibly displaced people. Aid should be channeled through the
    church and independent aid and human rights groups rather than the
    government, in view of the latter's previous failure to follow
    through with promised assistance.


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    COLOMBIA AND MILITARY-PARAMILITARY LINKS

    Half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units (excluding
    military schools) have documented links to paramilitary activity

    THIRD BRIGADE (headquarters in Cali, Valle);

    "The Calima Front and the Third Brigade are the same thing."

    Colombian government investigator

    Colombian government investigators and Human Rights Watch interviews
    include compelling, detailed information that in 1999, the Colombian
    Army's Third Brigade set up a "paramilitary" group in the department
    of Valle del Cauca, in southern Colombia. The investigators identify
    this group by its self-imposed name, the Calima Front (Frente
    Calima), and told Human Rights Watch that they were able to link the
    group to active duty, retired, and reserve military officers
    attached to the Third Brigade along with hired paramilitaries taken
    from the ranks of the Peasant Self-Defense Group of Córdoba and
    Urabá (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá, ACCU), commanded
    by Carlos Castaño. According to these government investigators as
    well as eyewitness testimony obtained by Human Rights Watch, the
    Third Brigade provided the Calima Front with weapons and
    intelligence.

    At the time these events took place, the Third Brigade was under the
    command of Brig. Gen. Jaime Ernesto Canal Albán, where he remains to
    this day.(1)

    Our information is based on interviews with Attorney General
    investigators who prepared documents for an on-going government
    investigation that is currently under seal (bajo reserva); an
    investigator from an independent organization; other investigators;
    and "Elias," a former Army intelligence agent who also served as a
    cartel gunman. "Elias" also testified under oath to Attorney General
    investigators. "Elias" told Human Rights Watch and government
    investigators that he worked for the army's "Coronel Agustín
    Codazzi" Battalion in Palmira, part of the Third Brigade.(2)

    The Third Brigade is part of the Colombian Army's Third Division,
    which includes a region where military units receiving a large
    amount of U.S. security assistance are concentrated.(3)

    According to the government investigator Human Rights Watch
    interviewed who helped prepare the official investigation, the
    Calima Front was formed in response to a mass kidnaping carried out
    by guerrillas belonging to the José María Becerra Front of the
    National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN). On
    May 30, 1999, guerrillas seized about 140 worshipers from Cali's La
    María Church. Among those taken were suspected drug traffickers
    believed to run part of the business established by the jailed Cali
    Cartel leaders.(4) Guerrillas demanded ransoms for some of the
    hostages, a serious violation of the laws of war.(5)

    In response, "Elias" told Human Rights Watch, Third Brigade active
    duty and reserve officers formed the Calima Front, with the
    assistance of Carlos Castaño. Active duty officers provided
    intelligence and logistical support. Former military officers were
    among those called in to assume positions of command. The troops
    were made up primarily of paramilitaries brought in from Colombia's
    north. The men were initially lodged on ranches belonging to
    suspected drug traffickers, who also contributed resources to equip
    and feed the men.(6)

    The connection between drug traffickers and paramilitary groups is
    not new and has been well documented in reporting by the U.S.
    Embassy in Bogotáá since at least 1990.(7)

    "Elias" told Human Rights Watch that during his employment as an
    intelligence agent, he witnessed close links between drug
    traffickers, paramilitaries, and the Army. Among other illegal
    practices, "Elias" said that Codazzi Battalion soldiers routinely
    sold weapons and munitions captured from guerrillas on the black
    market. The money raised, he said, went to soldiers and to fund
    illegal activities. "Elias" said that he was paid according to
    operations generated by his information, in part supplemented by the
    battalion's illegal weapons sales.(8)

    "Elias" said he also worked for local drug traffickers, and served
    as a body guard on the ranch of one drug trafficker who frequently
    hosted Third Brigade troops and paramilitaries. In his interview, he
    described the distinction between drug traffickers, paramilitaries,
    and the Colombian Army as virtually non-existent. His services were
    valuable, he told Human Rights Watch, since he maintained close ties
    to the Army and could serve as a shared intelligence agent for all
    three groups. "The salary was $800 a month if I worked with [the
    paramilitaries] without going on maneuvers and $1,300 if I went into
    the field," "Elias" told Human Rights Watch.(9)

    In July, local officials and the regional ombudsman (Defensora)
    began receiving reports from local residents of the appearance of
    the "Calima Front." Over the August 1 weekend, armed men reportedly
    killed four peasants near Tulu.(10) According to press reports, the
    group, estimated to include at least 150 men wearing army-style
    uniforms, carried AK-47s, M-60s, grenades, and the latest
    communications equipment. Despite abundant reports of their
    presence, their movements went virtually unimpeded for weeks.(11)

    In August, "Elias" testified to Attorney General investigators in
    Bogotá about his contact with the Calima Front. Investigators told
    Human Rights Watch that they corroborated his testimony over the
    following weeks, as the killings and massacres he warned had been
    planned by the Calima Front in conjunction with Third Brigade
    officers progressed.(12)

    Subsequently, allegations of a connection between the Calima Front
    and Third Brigade surfaced publicly, when the ELN charged Army
    complicity in a statement released with a group of La María
    hostages.(13) Human Rights Watch interviewed an independent
    investigator who was able to confirm the Calima Front's existence
    and give additional information in October 1999.(14)

    By August 5, the first of hundreds of displaced people began to
    arrive in towns like Tulu, San Pedro, and Buga. Many told stories
    similar to the one Abelardo Trejos gave to a reporter from the
    Cali-based El País. Armed men had blocked the roads, so Trejos, his
    wife, and two children fled on a foot path. "[The armed men] told me
    that we had to leave, because there was going to be a tremendous war
    and that I should return when it was all over."(15)

    On August 7, armed men seized Noralba Gaviria Piedrahíta, a
    community leader, bound her, then led her to the outskirts of
    Ceylán, near Bugalagrande, and executed her.(16) On September 22,
    authorities discovered the mutilated and dismembered bodies of seven
    men near Tulu, apparently executed by the Calima Front for suspected
    ties to guerrillas.(17)

    Despite abundant evidence of illegal activity, throughout the summer
    the Army claimed that the murders and forced displacement were
    "unconfirmed." Maj. Gen. Jaime Humberto Cortés Parada, commander of
    the Cali-based Third Division, blamed deaths on the Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
    Colombia, FARC), which in his words was seeking to "generate chaos
    and disinformation."(18)

    In Tulu, where a community stadium was providing emergency shelter,
    the number of displaced families fast outgrew available resources.
    The press reported that at night, men on motorbikes fired shots into
    the air and shouted threats at the displaced civilians, whom they
    accused of being guerrilla sympathizers.(19) By September, local
    officials estimated that at least 40 people had been killed and over
    2,000 were forcibly displaced.(20)

    Meanwhile, both "Elias" and the government investigators handling
    the case told Human Rights Watch that they began to receive death
    threats.(21) Although government investigators told Human Rights
    Watch that they put "Elias" under protective custody, the threats
    continued. "Elias" told us there were two attempts on his life.(22)
    The government investigators handling the case and one other
    observer contacted by authorities to assist in the investigation
    told Human Rights Watch that they were also threatened. (23) "Elias"
    and several Attorney General investigators later fled Colombia.(24)

    All agree, in the words of one investigator, that "the Calima Front
    and the Third Brigade are the same thing."(25)

    This pattern of activity differs little from previous cases
    documented in Colombian court proceedings, where the Third Brigade,
    paramilitaries, and drug traffickers allied to attack suspected
    guerrillas and civilians and commit atrocities. Between 1988 and
    1990, for example, traffickers allied with police and Third Brigade
    officers perpetrated the over 100 killings known collectively as the
    Trujillo massacre. President Ernesto Samper subsequently
    acknowledged the government's role in carrying out these killings
    and covering up its responsibility on January 31, 1995.(26)

    Another atrocity linked to the Third Brigade was the 1993 Riofrío
    massacre. On October 5, thirteen members of the Ladino family living
    in Riofrío, Valle del Cauca, were murdered by a combined force of
    Third Brigade soldiers and paramilitaries.(27)

    More recently, the Third Brigade has been implicated in the
    Monteloro massacre of five people on November 8, 1998. According to
    an independent investigation, troops from the "Palacé" Battalion,
    based in Buga, and the "Numancia" Counterguerrilla Battalion killed
    five civilians as they celebrated the fifteenth birthday party of
    the daughter of the owner of the house they were in. Several of the
    witnesses have since been killed in circumstances that suggest an
    attempt to cover up the crime.(28)


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    FOURTH BRIGADE (headquarters in Medellín, Antioquia)

    "When we would deliver a guerrilla to the Girardot Battalion, they
    would give us in exchange grenades and R-15 munitions . . . And
    after the Army received (the corpse), they would dress it in a
    military uniform."

    Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández, a former paramilitary

    The Attorney General's office has collected extensive evidence of
    pervasive ties in 1997, 1998, and 1999 between the Fourth Brigade
    and paramilitaries under the command of Carlos Castaño. These
    documents name the Girardot, Granaderos, Héroes de Barbacoas, Juan
    del Corral Battalions, and Pedro Nel Ospina Battalions as well as
    Fourth Brigade headquarters.

    The investigation describes activities that occurred while the
    Fourth Brigade was under the command of Gen. Alfonso Manosalva
    (since deceased) and subsequently, Gen. Carlos Ospina Ovalle, since
    promoted and now head of Colombia's Fourth Division.(29) In his
    current post, General Ospina is the divisional commander of at least
    one of the units proposed to receive U.S. security assistance, the
    Twelfth Brigade, based in Florencia, Caquetá.(30)

    In 1998, the Attorney General opened an investigation of alleged
    atrocities committed the previous year by paramilitaries around the
    town of Girardota, Tarazá, and Caucasia, in the department of
    Antioquia. Investigators concluded that a group of so-called
    "paramilitaries" included six active-duty soldiers assigned to the
    Batallón de Infantera No. 10 "Girardot" and the Batallón de
    Ingenieros No. 4 "Pedro Nel Ospina." In the official investigation,
    the group was linked to a series of killings and robberies committed
    while they were dressed in Army uniforms and carrying their
    Army-issue weapons, including machine guns and grenades. In
    so-called "social cleansing" operations, the group attacked and
    killed individuals believed to be drug addicts or thieves.(31)

    Among the alleged paramilitaries Attorney General investigators told
    Human Rights Watch enjoyed free access to Fourth Brigade
    headquarters in 1997 and 1998 was Jacinto Alberto Soto, known as
    "Lucas" and believed to act as the ACCU's accountant. In 1998, the
    Attorney General issued an arrest warrant for Soto and seized him in
    possession of ACCU documents and ledgers. Nevertheless, authorities
    told Human Rights Watch that Soto apparently bribed his way out of
    the front door of Medellín's maximum security prison weeks
    later.(32)

    In a separate series of investigations, Attorney General prosecutors
    collected abundant evidence linking the Fourth Brigade to the
    paramilitaries under Castaño's command who carried out the El Aro
    massacre, which took place in October 1997. At the time, General
    Ospina commanded the Fourth Brigade. These documents show that on
    October 25, a joint army-paramilitary force surrounded the village
    of El Aro and the 2,000 people who live in and around it. The
    operation was part of a region-wide offensive launched against the
    FARC and designed to force residents to abandon villages identified
    as providing FARC guerrillas with supplies and "conquer" the region,
    in the words of Castaño.(33)

    Survivors told Human Rights Watch that while soldiers maintained a
    perimeter around El Aro, an estimated twenty-five ACCU members
    entered the village, rounded up residents, and executed four people
    in the plaza. One witness told Human Rights Watch that the ACCU
    leaders were men who called themselves "Cobra" and "Junior."
    Witnesses said that paramilitaries told store owner Aurelio Areiza
    and his family to slaughter a steer and prepare food from their
    shelves to feed the ACCU fighters on October 25 and 26, while the
    rest of Colombia voted in municipal elections. The next day,
    witnesses told Human Rights Watch, paramilitaries took Areiza to a
    nearby house, tied him to a tree, then tortured and killed him. They
    added that the ACCU gouged out Arieza's eyes and cut off his tongue
    and testicles.(34)

    One witness told journalists who visited El Aro soon afterwards that
    families who attempted to flee were turned back by soldiers camped
    on the outskirts of town. Over the five days they remained in El
    Aro, ACCU members were believed to have executed at least eleven
    people, including three children, burned forty-seven of the
    sixty-eight houses, including a pharmacy, a church, and the
    telephone exchange, looted stores, destroyed the pipes that fed the
    homes potable water, and forced most of the residents to flee. When
    they left on October 30, the ACCU took with them over 1,000 head of
    cattle along with goods looted from homes and stores.(35)
    Afterwards, thirty people were reported to be forcibly
    disappeared.(36)

    By year's end, hundreds of displaced families were divided between
    shelters in Ituango, Puerto Valdivia, and Medellín.(37) Jesús Valle,
    an Ituango town councilman, lawyer, and president of the "Héctor
    Abad Gómez" Permanent Human Rights Committee, helped document the
    massacre and represented some families of victims. He was
    assassinated in his Medellín office on February 27, 1998. Carlos
    Castaño, the Army, and local drug traffickers are currently under
    investigation for planning his murder.(38) Government investigators
    have linked the hired killers to La Terraza, a group of professional
    assassins that works on contract for Castaño.(39)

    In sworn testimony to Attorney General investigators taken on April
    30, 1998, Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández, a former
    paramilitary who took part in the El Aro massacre, confirmed the
    testimony by survivors taken by Human Rights Watch that the
    operation had been carefully planned and carried out by a joint
    paramilitary-Army force. Villalba said he belonged to the Toledo
    Group within the ACCU's Metro Front. He told authorities that
    "Junior" and Salvatore Mancuso, known as "El Mono Mancuso" and the
    commander of ACCU fighters present, took him and approximately 100
    other paramilitaries to Puerto Valdivia to prepare to enter El
    Aro.(40)

    There, Villalba told authorities that he witnessed the meeting
    between Mancuso, an Army lieutenant, and two Army subordinates,
    there with troops. This region is covered by both the Girardot and
    Granaderos Battalions. Throughout the encounter, Villalba testified,
    Army soldiers and paramilitaries addressed each other as "cousin"
    (primo), as a sign of shared goals and purpose.(41)Villalba was also
    able to testify about radio exchanges he overheard between Mancuso
    and the colonel in charge of the battalion that was taking part in
    the combined operation. According to Villalba, "They were planning
    the entry into El Aro and how the operation would go lower down (the
    mountain), so that the Army would prevent people or commissions or
    journalists from entering."(42)

    During the operation, Villalba said that the combined
    Army-paramilitary force was attacked by the FARC. "Right when we had
    contact with guerrillas, which lasted three hours, an Army
    helicopter arrived, and gave us medical supplies and munitions."(43)

    Villalba admitted taking direct part in killings and the mutilations
    of victims, including a beheading. Once the paramilitaries had
    rounded up the cattle belonging to El Aro residents, Villalba said,
    paramilitaries left the area protected by the Army, which advised
    them to take a route that would avoid members of the Attorney
    General's office and Procuradura they believed had been sent to
    investigate reports of the massacre. While the paramilitaries
    traveled in several public busses commandeered on the highway,
    another car preceded them, according to Villalba, ensuring that the
    busses would pass army roadblocks unhampered.(44)

    In statements to the press, Carlos Castaño took responsibility for
    the massacre.(45)

    Villalba also testified about numerous other operations carried out
    jointly by paramilitaries and the Granaderos and Girardot
    Battalions. A common practice, he told government investigators, was
    "legalization" (legalización), when paramilitaries would give the
    corpses of suspected guerrillas or murdered civilians to the Army in
    exchange for weapons and munitions. Villalba testified that soldiers
    then clothed the corpses in military uniforms and claimed them
    publicly as guerrillas killed in combat. "When we would deliver a
    guerrilla to the Girardot Battalion, they would give us in exchange
    grenades and R-15 munitions... And after the Army received (the
    corpse), they would dress it in a military uniform."(46)

    Prosecutors told Human Rights Watch that they confirmed this detail
    by reviewing Fourth Brigade records on weapons, which revealed that
    many weapons issued to troops had vanished. Although the prosecutor
    told Human Rights Watch that Fourth Brigade military officers had
    confirmed that Granaderos Battalion stores had gone to
    paramilitaries, he claimed that the Army never followed up on the
    investigation or punished anyone.(47)

    As Human Rights Watch explained in War Without Quarter: Colombia and
    International Humanitarian Law, fueling human rights abuses by
    soldiers is the army's continuing emphasis on body counts as a means
    of measuring performance.(48) Officers who fail to amass lists of
    enemy casualties risk seeing their careers stalled and ended.(49)

    As Villalba's testimony demonstrates, "legalization" is one way
    officers can better their chances of receiving medals and
    promotions. "The commander would give the order, and says that he
    wanted results, casualties (bajas)," one former army officer told
    Human Rights Watch. "So anyone who came near our patrol would be
    killed."(50)

    Less than a month after former Armed Forces Commander General Manuel
    Bonett told Human Rights Watch that the army had revised the way it
    measured success, Gen. Iván Ramírez summarized the work of his First
    Division by releasing to the press long lists of people claimed
    killed in action by his troops.(51)

    This is the same officer whose visa to enter the United States was
    reportedly revoked the grounds of "terrorist activity," in this case
    support for paramilitary groups. According to a Washington Post
    investigation, Ramírez was a key intelligence source for the United
    States and served as a liaison and paid informant for the Central
    Intelligence Agency, supposedly to help the fight against drug
    traffickers and Marxist guerrillas. At the same time, according to
    the report, he maintained close ties to right-wing paramilitary
    groups who finance much of their activities through drug
    trafficking.(52)

    Far from subsiding, Attorney General investigations gathered in
    compelling detail evidence on how illegal activity in the Fourth
    Brigade continued in 1998 and 1999. Perhaps most notorious was the
    March 1999 murder of Alex Lopera, a former peace adviser to the
    Antioquia governor's office. Lopera was assisting a family negotiate
    the release of a family member kidnaped by guerrillas when he was
    stopped at an Army roadblock near Sonsn, Antioquia.(53)

    According to sworn testimony by "Valentín," a former Fourth Brigade
    soldier and radio operator present at the scene, soldiers from the
    Granaderos and Juan del Corral Battalions searched the car and
    discovered the ransom money hidden in a spare tire. At the time,
    "Valentín" told prosecutors, the commander of the Granaderos
    Battalion, Major David Hernández Rojas, was present.(54)

    Since there were no arrest warrants for any of the car's occupants,
    "Valentín" testified, procedure dictated that soldiers had to let
    the car proceed. However, according to "Valentín," Major Hernández
    first sent several soldiers ahead to ambush the car and steal the
    money.(55)

    The soldiers, "Valentín" explained, had little choice. "Hernández
    told all of us there to have a care, that whoever informed on him
    would die, with every person in his family. He said that he had
    people working for him that did that sort of work."(56)

    Under the command of Capt. Diego Fernando Fino, "Valentín" said that
    he and two soldiers set up the ambush.(57) "Valentín" testified to
    prosecutors that private Carlos Mario Escudero fired the fatal
    shots, killing all three passengers at point blank range. The ransom
    was divided up between the soldiers.(58) The case came to light,
    however, when Escudero's wife reported his share of the money stolen
    several weeks later according to Escudero's testimony to government
    investigators.(59)

    An internal investigation initiated by the Fourth Brigade was easily
    deflected, according to "Valentín." "(Hernández) told all of the
    Granaderos soldiers how they should testify, and each one was given
    a set thing to say."(60)

    "Valentín" also testified about Major Hernández's close ties with
    paramilitaries operating in eastern Antioquia.(61) In one
    deposition, "Valentín" told investigators that Major Hernández told
    him and other subordinates that he had begun to organize a death
    squad called "La Muerte" (Death) within the Fourth Brigade in
    coordination with an army officer attached to the rural Gaula, a
    combined military-police unit. The group was to be equipped and
    armed with camouflage uniforms, guns, and munitions seized by
    soldiers from guerrillas.(62)

    "Valentín" also told Attorney General investigators that Major Jesús
    María Clavijo Clavijo, then commander of the "Héroes de Barbacoas"
    Battalion, worked with paramilitary groups.(63) Among the killings
    "Valentín" attributed to Major Clavijo working with paramilitaries
    were ones carried out near El Carmen de Atrato, Choc, in February
    1999. "Normally, everywhere that Major Clavijo went, there were
    disappearances, murders, and wherever he was there was always a
    flood of reports of abuses," he told investigators in a sworn
    statement.(64)

    According to "Valentín," Major Clavijo also "legalized" corpses
    delivered by paramilitaries. However, this system didn't work if a
    reward for a missing person was offered by family members. In one
    case, "Valentín" testified that Major Clavijo ordered soldiers under
    his command to dismember several corpses with chainsaws in order to
    foil identification.(65)

    "Valentín," who was a radio operator, said he often heard
    paramilitaries communicating with the Army in the field. "As I was
    monitoring the communications, I heard people that were not part of
    the Army talking about combat and requesting assistance, using other
    channels than the ones we used, and I realized that these were the
    paramilitaries by the way that they spoke... Major Abondano [of the
    Fourth Brigade] gave orders to the troops using the radio, to
    advance, to follow the flank they were on, because our 'cousins'
    were in combat and needed help."(66)

    This witness also linked other Fourth Brigade officers, including
    Major Clavijo, Col. Rivillas, Major Abondano and others to
    paramilitaries through regular meetings held on military bases, He
    said that officers attached to the "Pedro Nel Ospina" Battalion also
    took part in support for paramilitaries.(67)

    A parallel investigation by the Internal Affairs agency
    (Procuraduría) listed hundreds of cellular telephone and beeper
    communications between known paramilitaries and Fourth Brigade
    officers, among them Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ospina Pardo,
    Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Zapata Gaviria, Major Álvaro Cortés
    Morillo,(68) a "Major Ardila," Major Jesús María Clavijo, Lieutenant
    Felipe Rodríguez, Private Iván Darío Jaramillo, Private Javier Gómez
    Herrán, and Private Carlos Mario Escudero.(69)

    Clavijo's name also surfaced in Attorney General investigations of
    alleged Army coordination with CONVIVIRs, groups of civilians
    authorized by the government to carry out war-related activities. In
    practice, they differed little from illegal paramilitary groups. In
    1997, José Alirio Arcila, the leader of an Antioquia CONVIVIR known
    as "Los Sables" implicated Clavijo and other Fourth Brigade officers
    in a series of murders in Medellín. However, Human Rights Watch is
    not aware of any on-going investigations of the security force
    officers named by Arcila.(70)

    Nevertheless, Major Clavijo, for example, has since been promoted to
    colonel and is now commander of the "Hroes de Majagual" Battalion
    under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Brigade and based in
    Barrancabermeja. Most recently, this battalion has been linked in
    the press to an increase in paramilitary activity and direct attacks
    on the civilian population near Cantagallo, Santander. In November
    1999, for example, local farmers charged that troops under Clavijo's
    direct command had coordinated with paramilitaries to seize two
    noted leaders of displaced people, Gildardo Fuentes and Edgar
    Quiroga.(71) As of this writing, they remain "disappeared."

    The following January, the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra
    River Valley told local authorities that Clavijo's men were carrying
    out so-called "anti-drug operations" by attacking civilians along
    the Cimitarra River. In addition, they claimed that Colombian Navy
    patrol boats fired on civilian dwellings in the villages of La
    Victoria, Coroncoro, and Yanacu starting on January 16.(72) Over 150
    people fled to Barrancabermeja for safety.(73)

    For his part, Major Hernández was arrested, but later, government
    investigators told Human Rights Watch, was allowed to escape by
    soldiers under the command of Fourth Brigade Brig. Gen. Eduardo
    Herrera Verbel.(74) The Colombian press has reported that Hernández
    now works with the ACCU.(75) Indeed, "Valentín" told government
    investigators that the officer told his subordinates that he would
    work for the paramilitaries if he was investigated by the Attorney
    General's office, since the ACCU had already offered him a car, a
    ranch, and a high salary.(76)

    So far, impunity has been the result of official investigations. The
    prosecutors and investigators assigned to the case have either
    recused themselves out of fear or fled Colombia because of threats.
    One prosecutor told Human Rights Watch that he received credible
    information indicating that Major Hernández had paid La Terraza the
    equivalent of  $7,000 for his life.(77)


    ---------------------------------------------------------------------

    THIRTEENTH BRIGADE (headquarters in Bogotá, the capital)

    I signed one case to authorize an indictment of paramilitaries
    before lunch, and by the time I returned to my desk after eating, a
    death threat, hand delivered, was there, with intimate details about
    the decor of my apartment to let me know the killers had already
    been inside.

    Colombian prosecutor

    Attorney General and other investigators said in interviews with
    Human Rights Watch that they believe that the group behind a series
    of assassinations and terror campaigns over the last three years has
    been military intelligence. Although the Twentieth Brigade, which
    centralized military intelligence, was officially dismantled in 1998
    and intelligence units supposedly lost their ability to mount
    operations, evidence strongly suggests that agents were simply
    redistributed to intelligence units in existing brigades and
    battalions. Human Rights Watch has obtained information indicating
    that intelligence units continue to mount operations where human
    rights are violated.

    The United States trains Colombian Army intelligence officers, but
    has not provided information publicly about what units they belong
    to. In FY 1999, for example, the United Sates trained four Air Force
    intelligence officers and two Army intelligence officers. In FY
    1998, the U.S. trained six Army intelligence officers: four were
    stationed in intelligence headquarters in Bogotá, one was stationed
    in San Joséé del Guaviare, and one was stationed in the city of
    Santa Marta.(78)

    In one of at least five similar cases, Attorney General
    investigators linked the 1998 kidnaping and later murder of Benjamin
    Khoudari, an Israeli businessman, to Thirteenth Brigade intelligence
    officers. According to the official indictment, Col. Jorge Plazas
    Acevedo planned and carried out a series of kidnapping for ransom
    and murder, including Khoudari's, as head of the intelligence
    unit.(79) In 1999, Plazas was retired from active duty and his case
    is now before a civilian court.(80)

    Even after Acevedo's arrest, government investigators continue to
    link the Thirteenth Brigade to threats against human rights
    defenders. "The Thirteenth Brigade remains in crisis," a top
    government investigator told Human Rights Watch in October 1999.(81)

    Surveillance believed to be carried out by military intelligence of
    human rights groups is open, aggressive, and threatening. One Bogotá
    group reported being filmed and photographed from a neighboring
    hotel. Many of the telephones used by human rights groups are openly
    tapped. Threats are daily occurrences. One office manager told Human
    Rights Watch that when they are trying to distribute an urgent
    action, the phone line is cut, preventing them from sending it via
    email or fax. Also, when they call out, they are frequently
    connected directly to the Thirteenth Brigade.(82)

    In some killings -- like that of the CINEP workers in 1997 and
    Antioquia human rights defender Valle in 1998 - evidence gathered by
    government investigators strongly suggests that military
    intelligence acted in coordination with Carlos Castaño. Since
    Castaño has no force capable of operating in cities, he will
    contract out murders to La Terraza.(83)

    According to government investigators, Castaño pays La Terraza a
    monthly retainer. Once a target is identified and a "contract" is
    negotiated with La Terraza, investigators believe, the killers are
    given intelligence gathered by the military on the target's
    whereabouts and movements. Killers are able to travel throughout
    Colombia, and typically work in pairs. The pair, mounted on a
    motorcycle, will follow and intended victim until they are ready to
    carry out an attack.(84)

    Government investigators have also tied La Terraza to both the
    Popular Training Institute (Instituto Popular de Capacitación, IPC)
    and Senator Piedad Córdoba kidnapings, which they believe were
    carried out on Castaño's orders. Witnesses have sworn under oath
    that they recognized among the gunmen the La Terraza leader,
    Alexander Londoño, alias "El Zarco."(85) The most recent killing
    being investigated in association with La Terraza and its ties to
    military intelligence is that of Jaime Garzón, the humorist. A
    suspected La Terraza gunmen was arrested in Colombia in January 1999
    in connection with the Garzón murder.(86)

    Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that the
    intelligence system maintained by La Terraza is excellent and
    national in scope. They depend in part on fleets of taxis to collect
    intelligence, and have been linked to death threats against
    government investigators, including members of the Technical
    Investigations Unit (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigaciones, CTI) .(87)

    One prosecutor told Human Rights Watch, "I signed one case to
    authorize an indictment of paramilitaries before lunch, and by the
    time I returned to my desk after eating, a death threat, hand
    delivered, was there, with intimate details about the decor of my
    apartment to let me know the killers had already been inside."(88)

    Some formal investigations into key paramilitary leaders and their
    relationships to the military and La Terraza are made virtually
    impossible by these types of threats and the lack of protection for
    prosecutors, investigators, and key witnesses. In 1998 and 1999, a
    dozen CTI officials were murdered or forced to resign because of
    threats related to their work on human rights cases. Others have
    left the country in fear for their lives.(89)

    Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that among the
    cases most damaged by La Terraza threats is the investigation into
    the murder of human rights defender Valle. One CTI agent
    investigating Valle's murder was killed soon after the murder. The
    prosecutor investigating the case fled Colombia. Another CTI
    investigator was killed in September 1999.(90)

    The Thirteenth Brigade was also linked to the May 1998 seizure by
    authorities of the offices of the Intercongregational Commission on
    Justice and Peace, a respected human rights group. After retired
    general and former defense minister Fernando Landazbal was
    assassinated in Santafé de Bogotá on May 12, 1998, the Twentieth
    Brigade supplied information to the Attorney General's office
    linking the crime to activities that took place within Justice and
    Peace. The following day, Thirteenth Brigade soldiers seized the
    offices.(91)

    Soldiers concentrated their search on the office of "Nunca Más," a
    research project that is collecting information on crimes against
    humanity. Soldiers forced employees to kneel at gun point in order
    to take their pictures, a gesture apparently meant to evoke a
    summary execution. During the search, soldiers addressed employees
    as "guerrillas" and filmed them and documents in the office. At one
    point, soldiers told the employees that they wanted precise details
    of the office in order to later construct a scale model, apparently
    to plan further incursions. After human rights defenders gathered
    outside out of concern, soldiers set up a camera to film them, an
    act of intimidation.(92)

    In a recorded statement to the Colombian radio, Colombia's assistant
    attorney general, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, confirmed that the search
    was prompted by "military intelligence, which gave us a report that
    indicated that there were people associated with the ELN at this
    location . . . but once the prosecutors realized that this was an
    error, they suspended the operation."(93) In later reports, Attorney
    General Alfonso Gómez claimed that the Army had purposefully hidden
    the true nature of the work done at Justice and Peace from
    investigators.(94)


    ---------------------------------------------------------------------

    Human Rights Watch

    Americas Division

    Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of
    people around the world.

    We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice,
    to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom and to
    protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.

    We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers
    accountable.

    We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive
    practices and respect international human rights law.

    We enlist the public and the international community to support the
    cause of human rights for all.

    The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele
    Alexander, development director; Reed Brody, advocacy director;
    Carroll Bogert, communications director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance
    director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office
    director; Patrick Minges, publications director; Susan Osnos,
    associate director; Maria Pignataro Nielsen, human resources
    director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Malcolm Smart, program director;
    Wilder Tayler, general counsel; and Joanna Weschler, United Nations
    representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L.
    Bernstein is the founding chair.

    Its Americas division was established in 1981 to monitor human
    rights in Latin America and the Caribbean. José Miguel Vivanco is
    executive director; Joanne Mariner is deputy director; Joel Solomon
    is research director; Sebastian Brett and Robin Kirk are research
    associates; Monisha Bajaj and Barbara Graves are associates. Stephen
    L. Kass is chair of the advisory committee; Marina Pinto Kaufman and
    David E. Nachman are vice chairs.

    Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org

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      1. Canal is listed as having trained at the School of the Americas
         in cadet orientation C-3 from Nov. 7-Nov. 21, 1980.

      2. The name of "Elias" has been changed for security reasons.
         Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.

      3. The division includes units operating in the department of
         Putumayo, among them the 24th Brigade.

      4. The ELN claimed in a statement that among the hostages were
         individuals wanted for drug trafficking by U.S. law
         enforcement, an affirmation that was never confirmed. Human
         Rights Watch interview with Attorney General investigator,
         January 14, 2000; "Los guerrilleros del Eln se tomaron por
         asalto la iglesia La María; rescatadas 75 personas," El Tiempo,
         May 31, 1999; and "ELN says its hostages include people wanted
         by US for drug trafficking," Agence France Presse, August 23,
         1999.

      5. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, January 14, 2000.

      6. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.

      7. For example, Human Rights Watch obtained much of the cable
         traffic generated by the embassy and related to the activities
         of "Los Tangueros," a paramilitary group led by former Medellín
         Cartel member Fidel Castaño, through a Freedom of Information
         Act request.

      8. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.

      9. Ibid.

     10. "Los habitantes de La Moralia y Monteloro viven en medio de la
         zozobra," El País (Cali), August 3, 1999.

     11. "Unos 150 hombres de las Autodefensas se tomaron la zona rural:
         Combate de 'paras' y guerrilla en Tulu," El País (Cali), August
         3, 1999.

     12. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, January 12, 2000.

     13. "Familiares de los secuestrados rechazaron acusaciones del
         grupo guerrillero: 'Es absurda la afirmación del ELN'," El País
         (Cali), September 7, 1999.

     14. Information about the Calima Front also circulated in press
         reports as early as August. Human Rights Watch interview with
         independent investigator, October 2, 1999; and "Colombia Death
         Squad Said To Plot Against Peace," Karl Penhaul, Reuters,
         August 15, 1999.

     15. "Me dijeron que nos tenamos que ir, porque se iba a formar una
         guerra tremenda, y que regresara cuando todo terminara." "A
         Tulu, San Pedro y Buga llegaron huyendo ayer 460 campesinos:
         Avalancha de desplazados no cesa," El País (Cali), August 5,
         1999.

     16. "Una mujer fue asesinada: Cuatro personas están desaparecidas,"
         El País (Cali), August 10, 1999.

     17. "El terror se apoder la zona montañosa del Centro del Valle:
         Nuevas masacres," El País (Cali), September 25, 1999.

     18. "generar caos y desinformación." "El general Jaime Cortés se
         refiere a la situacin que se vive en el Centro del Valle:
         'Existen muchas contradicciones'," El País (Cali), August 22,
         1999.

     19. "Por las noches realizan disparos en albergues de Tulu: Sigue
         el drama de los desplazados," El País (Cali), October 28, 1999.

     20. "Ya son dos mil los desplazados por la violencia en el
         Departamento Centro del Valle, albergue del temor," Hans Vargas
         Pardo, El País (Cali), September 25, 1999.

     21. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.

     22. Human Rights Watch interview with "Elias," January 15, 2000.

     23. Human Rights Watch interview, September 29, 1999.

     24. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.

     25. Human Rights Watch interviews, January 14 and 19, 2000.

     26. For a summary of this on-going case, see Comisión de
         Investigación de los Sucesos Violentos de Trujillo: Caso 11.007
         de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Santafé de
         Bogotá: Consejera presidencial para los Derechos Humanos de la
         República de Colombia, August 1995).

     27. Gen. Rafael Hernández, reportedly Colombia's military attache
         in Chile, was then commander of the Third Brigade. As the
         primary trial court judge, he acquitted his subordinate, Lt.
         Col. Luis Becerra Bohórquez, despite compelling evidence of the
         officer's guilt. Becerra was eventually dismissed from the
         army. This was not the first atrocity Becerra committed as an
         Army officer. As the Tenth Brigade intelligence chief, he also
         helped arrange the 1988 massacres of banana workers in
         Antioquia's "Honduras" and "La Negra" farms. In October 1998, a
         military tribunal that had convened to review the Riofrío case
         ruled that Becerra and two other soldiers were guilty of the
         crime of "encubrimiento por favorecimiento," in essence
         concluding that the officers had erred only by protecting
         themselves by reporting the incident as combat with a guerrilla
         unit, not the massacre of unarmed civilians. However, the
         sentence meted out was laughable - twelve months in jail, less
         than a month per victim. Indeed, Becerra was never
         incarcerated. Becerra was killed by an unknown gunman in a Cali
         restaurant on February 14, 1999. For a summary of the case, see
         Massacre in Riofro ((Santafé de Bogotá: Commission of
         Non-governmental organizations).

     28. Human Rights Watch communication with independent investigator,
         February 4, 2000.

     29. Ospina is listed as having trained at the School of the
         Americas at least once, in a cadet orientation course held in
         1967.

     30. The division includes units operating in Meta, Guaviare, and
         Caquet.

     31. Report of the Investigative Unit assigned to the Regional
         Attorney General's office in Medellín, Antioquia, February 10,
         1998.

     32. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, October 2, 1999; Attorney General Special Report
         No. 395, "Aseguramientos y capturas de presuntos miembros de
         las ACCU en Antioquia," June 10, 1998; and "Aseguran a fiscal
         por fuga de 'para' ," El Tiempo, October 14, 1998.

     33. This wasn't the first time the ACCU entered this area. In 1996,
         the group murdered three people in the hamlets of El Inglés and
         La Granja. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, Medellín, Antioquia, July 2, 1996.

     34. Human Rights Watch interviews with El Aro survivors, Medellín,
         Antioquia, December 11, 1997; and Human Rights Watch interview
         with Jesús Valle, president, "Héctor Abad Gómez" Permanent
         Human Rights Committee, Medellín, Antioquia, December 11, 1997.

     35. Javier Arboleda, "Cinco días de infierno en El Aro," El
         Colombiano, November 14, 1997.

     36. Amnesty International Urgent Action 01/97, January 3, 1997.

     37. "Los desplazados no se vean en el norte de Antioquia," El
         Tiempo, November 6, 1997.

     38. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with "Héctor Abad Gómez"
         Permanent Human Rights Committee, February 27, 1998; and Human
         Rights Watch interview with Attorney General Alfonso Gómez
         Méndez, May 7, 1998.

     39. Government investigators told Human Rights Watch that La
         Terraza is descended from the groups that worked on contract
         for drug kingpin Pablo Escobar in the 1980s. Testimony of
         Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández to the Attorney General's
         office, April 30, 1998; and Human Rights Watch interview with
         Attorney General investigator, October 2, 1999.

     40. Authorities told Human Rights Watch that Salvatore Mancuso
         Gómez is Carlos Castaño's operational chief within the ACCU.
         The Attorney General has issued at least two warrants for his
         arrest related to paramilitary activity and kidnapping. Report
         on outstanding arrest warrants, Attorney General's office,
         January 1, 1998.

     41. Testimony of Francisco Enrique Villalba Hernández to the
         Attorney General's office, April 30, 1998.

     42. "Estaban planeando la entrada al Aro y como se iba a operar
         abajo, para que el ejrcito no dejara Paísar a personas o no
         fuera a pasar comiciones (sic), ni periodismo." Ibid.

     43. "Al momentico de tener contacto que duramos tres horas llegó un
         helicoptero del ejército, ahí nos bajó lo que fue elementos de
         salud y munición." Ibid.

     44. Ibid.

     45. "Autodefensas de Urabá niegan barbarie en El Aro," El
         Colombiano, November 15, 1997.

     46. "Si le entregamos un guerrillero al Batallón Girardot, por
         cambio de granadas y munición de R 15... Y el ejército cuando
         lo recibió le puso camuflado." This is most likely AR-15
         ammunition. The AR-15 is the Colt company's name for the M-16
         assault rifle. Testimony of Francisco Enrique Villalba
         Hernández to the Attorney General's office, April 30, 1998.

     47. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
         October 2, 1999.

     48. War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian
         Law (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), pp. 48-49.

     49. Human Rights Watch interview with Col. (ret.) Carlos Velásquez,
         Santafé de Bogotá, May 12, 1997.

     50. Human Rights Watch interview with former army officer, Santafé
         de Bogotá, November 12, 1995.

     51. Gen. Ramírez retired from the service in 1999. Tonny Pérez
         Mier, "Balance de I División del Ejército," El Tiempo, December
         23, 1997; Human Rights Watch interview with General Bonett,
         Santafé de Bogotá, December 12, 1997.

     52. "Colombian Army's Third in Command Allegedly Led Two Lives:
         General Reportedly Served as a Key CIA Informant While
         Maintaining Ties to Death Squads Financed by Drug Traffickers,"
         Douglas Farah and Laura Brooks, Washington Post, August 11,
         1998.

     53. "Cuatro militares a juicio por crimen de Alex Lopera," El
         Tiempo, October 13, 1999.

     54. Hernández is listed as having trained twice at the School of
         the Americas. As a cadet, he took the orientation for combat
         weapons from March 7-April 19, 1985. As a lieutenant, he
         trained in "psychological operations" from February 27-May 15,
         1991. For safety reasons, we have changed the name of this
         witness. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's
         office, June 22, 1999.

     55. Ibid.

     56. "Hernández nos dijo a todos los que estábamos ahí, que mucho
         cuidado, que él que se tuerza se muere, con toda la familia;
         dijo que él tenía gente que le hacía ese trabajo." Ibid.

     57. Fino is listed as having taken a course on Cadet Orientation
         C-34 (Mechanized) at the School of the Americas from June
         28-July 26, 1989.

     58. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         22, 1999.

     59. Testimony of Carlos Mario Escudero to the Attorney General's
         office, June 1, 1999.

     60. "(Hernández) le dijo a todos los integrantes del Granaderos
         como debían declarar, a cada uno le dijo que debía decir."
         Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         22, 1999.

     61. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         23, 1999.

     62. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         1, 1999.

     63. Clavijo was listed as having trained at the School of the
         Americas from July 1-July 17 of 1981 in an orientation and
         weapons for cadets (C-3) program.

     64. "Normalmente en el rea donde estaba el Mayor Clavijo, haban
         desaparecidos, muertos, y por donde se Paísaba siempre llegaba
         citatorias de demandas." Testimony by "Valentín" to the
         Attorney General's office, June 23, 1999.

     65. Ibid.

     66. "Por la monitoría escuché gente hablando de combates, pidiendo
         apoyo, por otro tipo de comunicaciones diferentes a las
         nuestras, yo reconocí que eran las autodefensas por la forma de
         hablar... el Mayor Abondano [of the Fourth Brigade] dió la
         orden a la tropa por radio, que avanzaran, que siguieran con el
         eje que llevaban, que los primos estaban en combates y
         necesitaban apoyos." Ibid.

     67. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         1, 1999.

     68. Cortés is listed as having studied in the course on weapons
         orientation for cadets (C-3) at the School of the Americas from
         January 12-26, 1984.

     69. Office of Special Investigations-Antioquia region, Report,
         September 21, 1998.

     70. Arcila directed a CONVIVIR, an association of civilians
         authorized by the government to take part in
         intelligence-gathering and other activities. Sentencia
         Anticipada, 3687- (F 21.336), Juzgado Regional de Medellín,
         August 8, 1997.

     71. An official investigation is on-going. Report by the Comisión
         de Bsqueda de Edgar Quiroga y Gildardo Fuentes, made up of the
         Programa por la Paz y Desarrollo del Magdalena Medio, Servicio
         Jesuita a Refugiados, Ministerio del Interior, Defensora del
         Pueblo, Red de Solidaridad Social, CREDHOS, Organización
         Femenina Popular, Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos
         Políticos, MINGA, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
         Peace Brigades International, and the Catholic Church, December
         3, 1999.

     72. Acción Urgente, "Campesinos del Valle del Ro Cimitarra, en el
         Magdalena Medio colombiano, son bombardeados y ametrallados por
         TroPaís Oficiales," CREDHOS and the Peasant Association of the
         Cimitarra River Valley (Asociación Campesina Del Valle Del Ro
         Cimitarra, ACVC ), January 18, 2000.

     73. "La Casa Campesina, que les sirve de refugio, se quedó
         pequeña," Vanguardia Liberal, January 21, 2000.

     74. Human Rights Watch interview, October 2, 1999; and "Cuatro
         militares a juicio por crimen de Alex Lopera," El Tiempo,
         October 13, 1999.

     75. "El mayor David Hernández est sindicado de la muerte de lex
         Lopera," El Tiempo, July 1, 1999.

     76. Testimony by "Valentín" to the Attorney General's office, June
         1, 1999.

     77. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
         October 2, 1999.

     78. U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, "Foreign
         Military Training & DOD Engagement Activities of Interest: A
         Report to Congress for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999," (Section
         581 Report), CD-ROM, 1999.

     79. Plazas reportedly attended the School of the Americas and took
         a course on Small Unit Infantry Tactics from Jan. 24-March 4,
         1977. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, October 5, 1999.

     80. Col. Bernardo Ruiz, the former Twentieth Brigade commander
         currently charged with masterminding the 1995 murder of
         conservative leader lvaro Gómez, told the newsweekly Semana
         that he had worked closely with Plazas. "Revolción en Brigada
         XIII," El Espectador, July 21, 1999; and "Valgo más muerto que
         vivo," Semana, September 13, 1999.

     81. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigator, October 5, 1999.

     82. Human Rights Watch interview, October 5, 1999.

     83. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
         investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.

     84. Ibid.

     85. Ibid.

     86. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
         investigators, October 5; and "Asegurado presunto asesino de
         Garzón," El Tiempo, January 19, 2000.

     87. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
         investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.

     88. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General prosecutor,
         October 10, 1999.

     89. Human Rights Watch interviews with Attorney General
         investigators, October 5 and 9, 1999.

     90. Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
         investigators, October 5, 1999.

     91. The link between the information supplied by the Twentieth
         Brigade and the use made of it by the Thirteenth Brigade was
         confirmed in government investigations contained in a
         subsequent Procuradura investigation completed on December 18,
         1998. Public Statement, Justice and Peace, May 19, 1998; and
         "Ejercito busca al ELN en una casa de Paz," El Espectador, May
         14, 1998.

     92. Public Statement, Justice and Peace, May 19, 1998.

     93. "Inteligencia militar nos proporcionó un informe que indicaba
         que en este lugar se encontraban personas asociadas al ELN, por
         eso realizamos el allanamiento, pero al darse cuenta los
         fiscales que adelantaban una operación por error, se detuvo la
         diligencia." Allanamiento a ONG, fue error de inteligencia,
         advierte Vicefiscal," RCN broadcast, May 14, 1998.

     94. "A calificar servicios," Semana, May 25, 1998