Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Issues: An Encyclopedia
Nigeria: The Ogoni:
Oil, Blood, and the Death of a Homeland
Bruce E. Johansen
Professor of Communication and Native American Studies
University of Nebraska at Omaha
The 500,000 tribal Ogoni of the Niger delta in southern Nigeria
have watched as their traditional fishing and farming livelihood
has been laid waste by Shell Oil's extraction of oil, with full
complicity of the national government, which has allowed large
parts of the Ogonis' homeland to be ruined. The Ogonis' land has
been contaminated not only by oil wells and pipelines, but also by
gas flares that burn 24 hours a day, producing intense heat and
chemical gas fogs that pollute nearby homes as they render farm
fields barren and unproductive. The constant flaring of natural
gas also contributes measurably to global warming. Several Ogoni
who protested the ruination of their homeland and the
impoverishment of their people have been convicted of false
charges and executed.
Shell has extracted oil from the Niger Delta since 1958. Shell
operates a joint-venture consisting of Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, Elf and Agip. Shell is by far the largest foreign oil
company in Nigeria, accounting for 50 per cent of Nigeria's oil
production. Nigeria generated roughly 12 per cent of Shell's oil
production world-wide in the late 1990s. (Shell: 100 Years, 1997)
High-pressure pipelines have been laid above ground through
villages and farmlands, a major reason why the area suffered an
average of 190 spills per year between 1989 and 1996, involving on
average 319,200 gallons of oil. (Shell: 100 Years, 1997)
According to one observer on the scene, "Rivers, lakes and ponds
are polluted with oil, and much of the land is now impossible to
farm. Canals, or `slots', have permanently damaged fragile
ecosystems and led to polluted drinking water and deaths from
cholera. Gas flaring and the construction of flow stations near
communities have led to severe respiratory and other health
problems..." (Shell: 100 Years, 1997)
By 2000, oil accounted for more than 90 per cent Nigeria's export
earnings and roughly 80 per cent of government revenue. More than
90 per cent of Nigeria's oil is extracted from the Niger Delta.
During the last 40 years, oil worth $30 billion has been extracted
from the Ogonis' homeland. (Wiwa, 2000) By 2000, the Ogonis'
homeland was home to 100 oil wells, two refineries, a
petrochemical complex and a fertilizer complex, while most of the
Ogoni people do not have electricity or running water. It is a
land where five physicians serve 500,000 people. (Wiwa, 2000)
According to a local observer, "Chevron-Texaco extracts hundreds
of thousands of barrels of oil from the Niger Delta in Nigeria
every year despite decades of resistance by the people of the
Delta. In Opia, one community of the Delta, Chevron-Texaco has
destroyed the traditional local economy, run pipelines through
gardens and villages and leased helicopters to the military to
attack local demonstrators." (Environmental Injustice, 2001)
While local opponents of its activities assert that Chevron-Texaco
profits heavily from its operations in the Niger Delta and has
provided both dollars and infrastructure to the Nigerian military,
(which uses those resources to suppress resistance and kill
activists), Chevron-Texaco accepts no responsibility for
environmental problems or human-rights abuses. While all
meaningful quality-of-life measures continue to indicate that the
lives of indigenous people in the Niger Delta continues to
decline, the corporation continues to claim that its operations
"promote democracy and development." (Environmental Injustice,
2001)
Obsolete, leaking, rusty oil pipelines have become a major source
of contaminating oil spills for the Ogoni. In 1992, a major oil
blow-out in the village of Botem lasted a week before it was
stopped, creating a biological dead zone in the water courses that
supplied drinking water for local residents. Oil spills caused by
obsolete pipelines are routinely blamed on sabotage, which allows
companies to ignore repairs under Nigerian law. During October,
1998, an explosion and leak flooded a large part of the village of
Jesse, killing more than 700 people; two years later, two pipeline
explosions in southern Nigeria killed 300 people. (Gedicks, 2001,
45)
Repression by the "Kill and Go"
The Ogonis' protests of such conditions have been met with brutal
repression by Nigerian police. During 1990, people in the village
of Umuechem protested oil pollution of their homeland, to be set
upon by the notorious Mobile Police (known locally as the "Kill
and Go") who bombarded the village, killing more than 100 people,
as they looted many homes. Survivors were forced to leave their
homes. (Gedicks, 2001, 46) The Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People (MOSOP), organized during 1990, adopted an Ogoni Bill
of Rights demanding local control of political and environmental
affairs, blaming Shell Oil for "full responsibility for the
genocide of the Ogoni." (Gedicks, 2001, 46) Following this
declaration, the rights of the Ogoni were discussed before the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland, during 1992. In 1993, roughly 300,000 people gathered
in protest in the Ogoni village of Bori, to declare Shell Oil
persona non grata on their land. Shell was forced to suspend oil
production for a time due to the protests at its nearby
facilities.
Response to these protests by Nigerian police and military was
quick and forceful. Within the next eight years, according to an
account by Al Gedicks (in Resource Rebels, 2001), more than 2,000
people were killed and 37 villages substantially destroyed. About
30,000 other Ogoni were displaced from their homes as troops took
up long-term residence in the area to protect Shell's assets.
(Gedicks, 2001, 47)
On May 21, 1994, four Ogoni leaders were murdered in Gokana
Kingdom, reportedly by angry youths. Ken Saro-Wiwa, the most
notable leader of MOSOP and eight other MOSOP leaders were
arrested and accused of involvement in the murders. The day after
the crimes, military police (the Internal Security Task Force)
stormed into Ogoniland, raiding, burning and looting villages.
While thousands of Ogoni villagers took refuge in the bush,
hundreds who did not escape were detained and tortured. On October
31, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis were sentenced to
death by the Special Tribunal. They were executed on November 10.
Oil Spills and Wastelands
Large oil spills have turned large areas of the Ogonis' homeland
into wastelands. In mid-2001, for example, a United Nations
Internet page described Yaata, a Ogoni village, where "dying
vegetation in various shades of ochre stretch as far as the eye
can see, poisoned by soil turned soggy and a dark, greasy hue
since crude oil began seeping through over a month ago." On April
29, at the Royal/Dutch Shell Yorla oil field, a "quake-like tremor
sent shockwaves onto Yaata and surrounding villages." (Nigeria:
Focus, 2001) Within minutes, before people could guess the cause,
jets of crude oil were already shooting up 100 meters, raining on
the surroundings. The oil plume was quickly followed by strong
fumes of natural gas, as the people of the village ran for their
lives.
John Nwikine, a student from Yaata, told the U.N.'s Integrated
Regional Information Network that the villagers "knew from
experience that any accidental fire was going to light up the area
and spread as fast and as far as the fumes were going." (Nigeria:
Focus, 2001) For nine days, according to an I.R.I.N. account, "The
shower of crude oil and gas poured on Yaata unabated. The rapidly
resulting streams of crude oil swamped neighboring farmlands,
forests, streams and rivers." (Nigeria: Focus, 2001)
Although Shell Oil was quickly alerted to the disaster, its
employees were described by indigenous people on the scene as
appearing helpless, as teams of Shell workers circled the area in
helicopters, without landing. In the meantime, local people
organized to alert inhabitants to the danger of lighting fires,
limiting the damage as best they could. "Nevertheless," according
to the I.R.I.N. account, "People in the areas pervaded by the
fumes complained of breathing difficulties, in a number of cases
combined with cough and runny noses" until experts from Boots and
Coots International Well Control of Houston, Texas, capped the
broken well-head on the ninth day. (Nigeria: Focus, 2001)
When Yaata's residents returned after the spill was stopped,
They found their village was uninhabitable. Their maize,
cassava and yam crops were stained with crude oil,
wilted and dying. Much of their livestock had either
died or were dying from eating polluted vegetation and
drinking contaminated water. Dead fish rose to the
surface of creeks and ponds. (Nigeria: Focus, 2001)
Two months later, no attempt had been made to clean up the spill's
damage, aside from the digging of a few trenches to divert some of
the oil spill. Residents of Yaata had been forced to move into
other villages, giving up their lives' work.
In the meantime, the spilled oil seeped further into the earth,
contaminating underground water for miles around, as Shell blamed
"sabotage" and refused to pay compensation. Shell complained that
protests by local people had inhibited its ability to properly
shut down the well that blew, in effect blaming the Ogoni for the
explosive spill in the Yorla field. (Shell Says, 2001) Ledum
Mitee, president of MOSOP in 2001, accused Shell of seeking
"scapegoats" for the spill instead of taking prompt steps to
contain and clean it. "We are shocked that Shell is already
leveling accusations against local people who have risked their
lives and health to prevent a fire for the last three days," Mitee
said. (Shell Says, 2001)
The Death of Friday Nwiido
The tensions between the oil companies and people in the Niger
Delta are a regular feature of daily life that often result in
deaths, illustrated by the death of one young man, Friday Nwiido.
On Sunday April 29, 2001, at about 9:30 a.m., a huge explosion
took place at the Well 10 facility (Yorla Oil Field) and the
affected facility rained crude oil sporadically for days into
adjacent farmlands, settlements, streams, swamps, lakes and
rivers. Jollyboy Olole, an eyewitness, who was inspecting his
cassava crops when the explosion occurred, said that the crude
"rained into his eyes." (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
On the same afternoon, Shell organized a press conference in its
staff club in nearby Port Harcourt. At the conference, Shell staff
insisted that the blow-out had been caused by sabotage. Three
Texan oil engineers who helped to deal with the problem later were
quoted as saying that the blow-out was caused by "mechanical
failure due to gas pressure coupled with corrosion of the
facility." (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
In the meantime, Friday Nwiido celebrated his 30th birthday in
June, was working as a welder in Port Harcourt to where he
commuted every day on his motorbike. He also was a farmer and
fisherman; "a true Ogoni Man," he said. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
Seventeen people were dependant on his earnings, including his
mother, his wife and three children.
Following the blow-out at Yorla, a group of local youths,
including Friday, who seems to have been accepted him as a leader,
went to see Shell in Port Harcourt about clearing up the mess. It
was agreed that Shell staff would meet the youths at the site to
discuss the situation. However, Shell arrived on the scene,
contrary to the perceived agreement, with all their equipment,
plus their Wilbros contractors. Nonetheless, it was agreed with
Friday that the youths would do the cleanup labor. The operation
was not completed that day and it was further agreed that Shell
would employ the same youths when they returned to complete the
work. No payment was made.
However, contrary to the agreement Shell did not send a prior
message of their return so that the group of youths were not on
site when the clearance contractors returned. As a result, another
group was employed. By the time Friday and his cohort learned what
had happened, the work had been completed and, by coincidence,
Nwiido met the Shell team returning to Port Harcourt as he was
coming home on his motorcycle. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
Nwiido stopped the Shell vehicles and asked what was going on. He
was told to see the Shell Community Director in Port Harcourt but
he replied that he could not do that because he was afraid for his
safety and because he knew from experience that he would not be
allowed inside the gate. Instead, Nwiido said he wanted to keep
one of the vehicles and, apparently, he was allowed to keep the
fire truck at his house. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
On June 10 or 11, the police came to Nwiido's house, saying they
wanted to remove the truck to Bori, the district center. Friday
refused and the police returned with the local government chairman
who said he was willing to pay N.500 to each of Nwiido's men
because his possession of the truck was affecting his job as
chairman. They pleaded with Friday but he refused, saying he would
only talk to Shell and not to middlemen. On June 15, the police
came to the village with tear-gas and guns. The villagers ran to
Nwiido, according to an observer on the scene, "immediately
surrendered himself to the police. With his hands up and outside
his own house, he was shot in the legs and put into the boot
[trunk] of the police car by the Divisional Police Officer and the
Area Commander. That was the last time that Friday was seen."
(Ashton-Jones, 2001)
For five days, Nwiido's mother searched for her son. She was not
allowed into the Shell compound in Port Harcourt, but told to go
to the nearby Rumuibekwe police station from where she was sent to
the Shell clinic; there an Ogoni nurse told her that her son had
died. His body apparently had been deposited in the teaching
hospital where she was told that she could only inspect the name
in the mortuary register; the body could only be seen with police
permission. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
Another version of the story, that quotes Nwiido's mother is
consistent:
I don't know who called my son. He suddenly reappeared
from his workplace and walked into the invading force
with his hands raised in surrender. As he came he was
shouting, "I am the one, I didn't hijack any vehicle,
Shell is owing me and I want my money." He cried as the
police fired live bullets at him at close range. He was
hit on his thighs several times. He fell down, bleeding
profusely. He was carried from the ground by one of the
police offices and dumped in the boot. I hired a car
immediately and followed the police who were retreating
after killing my child. When they noticed that we were
following them, they stopped us. We diverted and
monitored them up to the police station at Bori, Ogoni.
I saw when Shell vehicles stopped and entered the police
station. The police held brief talks with Shell and
Khana local government officials. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
From there, we moved to Port Harcourt. My son was crying
in pains as they drove on. Some of the police vans had
left the convey remaining in some unmarked cars. It was
when they stopped over in Shell clinic at Rumukrushi,
Port Harcourt that I missed my way. I went to the
military hospital where they told me that there was no
body like that. I visited all the government and Shell
hospitals in Port Harcourt but I could not find my son.
It was at the Shell hospital somebody I will not mention
his name, told me that really the boy was brought there
alive and after several secret talks with the medical
personnel, they transferred him to the Mini-Okoro police
station. At Mini-Okoro, another reliable source told me
that the boy was executed on Saturday and that the
people who were present during the shooting were the
Divisional Crime Officer (DCO), Divisional Police
Officer (DPO), Area Commander, one man nicknamed Ahoada
and two others. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
To confirm the source, I was told that the corpse was
deposited at the mortuary of the University of Port
Harcourt Teaching Hospital (UPTH). I went there and saw
the corpse of my son. I then went back to report all my
ordeals to Hon. Emmanuel Deeyah, Commissioner for
special duties in Rivers State. I told the commissioner
that I want to see the Governor, Dr. Odili, since I
voted for him. On 29 June 2001, Deeyah held a meeting
with us in his office. Present at the meeting were our
village head, elders, youth and the chairman Khana local
government council, Hon. Letam Korsi. The Ogoni
commissioner blamed those who attended for allowing the
poor to die. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
Up till now I am still waiting for the corpse of my son.
I want to bury him -- the police, Shell council
officials, and the village council are all responsible
for my child's death. I will say these things anywhere,
any day. Please quote me anywhere, I have read what
Shell and the police are saying in the Nigerian media,
they are all liars. (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
The Travail of Ogoniland Continues
As the third millennium dawned, an old story continued in
Ogoniland: poorly maintained oil-drilling infrastructure continued
to leak and blow up, as anyone who spoke out against the
devastation risked death. The August 31, 2001 issue of Drillbits &
Tailings was dedicated
to the memory of Mr. Vincent Ifelodun Bolarin Oyinbo
(also known as Bola), his family and friends, the Ilaje
people, all people of the Niger Delta, and the staff and
volunteers of Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the
Earth, Nigeria. Environmental Rights Action/Friends of
the Earth (ERA/FoEN), Nigeria notified friends and
allies that Bola passed on to the great beyond on July
19, 2001 in Lagos, Nigeria at the age of 36 while
preparing for a trip to the United States. ERA/FoEN said
a death certificate issued by a private medical clinic
in Lagos put the cause of his death as cardiac arrest.
But relatives and friends say he never had a history of
heart problems. Bola was one of the 100 peaceful
protesters on the Parabe offshore platform who were
attacked by the Nigerian military in helicopters
operated by Chevron personnel. He was held for 12 days
and tortured by the Nigerian military personnel. Bola
witnessed bribes given by Chevron employees to the
military personnel who attacked and arrested him. His
trip to the United States was to receive medical
treatment from injuries he sustained during this attack
and to work on a court case filed against Chevron by
communities in the Niger Delta. (Drillbits, 2001)
Within a week of Bola's death, the Niger Delta was afflicted with
yet another massive oil spill. People living in the community of
Ogbodo, on the banks of the Miniamu River, "were engulfed with
irritating odor and itching every morning." Isiri Alison, an
observer, related that "We no longer drink from the rivers. As an
emergency measure, Shell supplied few liters of water to the 15
families that make us Ogbodo. Apart from the one I saw with my
eyes, everyone here complained that the water Shell supplied is
dirty and smells. Many people simply threw theirs away."
(Drillbits, 2001)
As of August 21, 2001, community leaders from Gokana, Ogoniland
reported that fires caused by ruptured pipelines owned and
operated by Shell Oil had been burning for two months with no
response from authorities. "Agency reports yesterday [August 20,
2001] that the community faced being ravaged by `devastation of
unimaginable proportion' unless urgent steps were taken to put off
the `scores of fires ignited by pipeline excavators,'" said The
Guardian news agency in Lagos. (Shell Oil, 2001) Other news
correspondents reported that farmland has been lost to the fires.
In June 1997, when Shell refused to pay compensation for a 1982
oil spill (defying a local court order), members of four affected
Ijaw communities gave Shell an ultimatum to leave the oil
producing area by July 8, or be forced out. Hours before the
deadline expired, the leader of the community protest was arrested
by the State Security Service (SSS). A local observer wrote that:
"Worried that the said payments will encourage other legitimate
compensation demands, Shell has alerted the security forces and
this morning Mr. Matthew Eregbene has been whisked away," said a
spokesman for the Niger Delta Oil-Producing Communities
Development Organization. (Shell: 100 Years, 1997)
In Bayelsa State, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) has called on Shell
Petroleum Development Company, the Nigerian subsidiary of Shell
Oil, to cease all operations at the Nun River flow station in
response to the murder of a 22-year old Ijaw man by the mobile
police, the infamous "Kill and Go." At about the same time, the
Lagos newspaper This Day reported that by August, 2001, 4,835 oil
spills totaling almost 2.4 million barrels of crude oil had
afflicted the Niger delta. (Lowri, 2001)
Drillbits & Tailings November, 2001 reported that another
oil-related accident had claimed several more lives: "An oil
pipeline owned by the Royal Dutch Shell exploded, killing as many
as 15 people and injuring 14 others. The explosion occurred at
Umidike in Imo State on November 5, 2001. Ironically, Drillbits &
Tailings noted that Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) the
previous October had called for the introduction of a national
environmental and safety standard in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry that meets international standards. (Hotspots: Nigeria,
2001)
Meanwhile, to quell any popular expression of notions that
something might be dreadfully wrong in the oil fields, the
Nigerian government set up a special committee to ensure total
security for oil-producing areas. The authorities demanded that "a
recent siege" in the oil producing areas by "restive youths,
communal agitators and economic saboteurs" must end. The new
committee signaled increasing vigilence on the part of the
military against any sign of unhappiness among the Ogoni. Chief
Ekaette explained that the recent "terrorism" had made the assured
security of oil installations an urgent imperative. Felix Ekure,
Delta State chairman of the National Youth Council of Nigeria
(NYCN), warned that unless the youths of the Niger Delta are
included in the development of the region, "The country may know
no peace." (Hotspots: Nigeria, 2001)
Oil-related disasters in Ogoniland have assumed a daily
regularity. The Lagos Vanguard, on July 18, 2001, for example,
carried, on page 7, a report describing how three children had
died in Akwa Ibom by drowning in uncapped oil wells belonging to
Shell Producing Nigeria Ltd. Addressing the World Conference of
Mayors in Eket, Gov. Victor Attah said that "Shell callously left
uncapped wells in whichthree young children have so far drowned."
Narrating the "evil side" of oil exploitation in the area by
Exxon-Mobil, Addax and Elf oil companies, he said that pollution,
environmental degradation, terminal diseases and birth defects had
affected many people in oil producing areas." (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
The same newspaper, on the same day and the same page carried the
headline: "Oil Spill: Strange Illness Hits Rivers Community." In
the Ogbodo Isioko community in Ikwere area of the Rivers region,
where (the) June 25 oil spill of Shell Petroleum Development
Company (SPDC) occurred, [residents] have reported strange
ailments among its people which they said, had claimed four lives.
The community said the spill, "which spread quite extensively on
the only stream that provided (the) source of drinking water for
the area." (Ashton-Jones, 2001)
In the midst of all this, Royal Dutch-Shell told a reporter for
the Wall Street Journal that its "more urgent concern is to
protect Ogoni lives and avert disaster." (Moore, 2002, A-10) The
company also said it plans to spend $7.5 billion to extract 300
million barrels of remaining oil reserves in the region. This
particular account portrays the oil company as a victim of "local
hostility," as well as enterprising theives who can sell a
purloined 25-foot section of oil pipeline for $87, or more than an
average Nigerian construction worker earns in a month. (Moore,
2002, A-10) Children are said in this account to "flock to the
theft sites, collecting leftover oil with plastic bottles to sell
to those who use it as medicine or to frightn away evil spirits."
(Moore, 2002, A-10) Shell executives are portrayed here as
lamenting local hostility that keeps them from helping clean up
the mess. "We have pleaded with the Ogoni people to to let us come
and make those wells safe," says Hubert Nwokolo, Shell's general
manager of community development in Nigeria. "What worries me is
one day we'll have a blowout and then they'll say, `Shell, they
planned it, they want to kill us all.'" (Moore, 2002, A-10)
FURTHER READING
* Ashton-Jones, Nick. "Causes of Terrorism? Shell Oil in
Nigeria, 1993 to 2001." October, 2001.
[http://www.shell-terror.net/]
* Drillbits & Tailings 6:7 (August 31, 2001)
[http://groups.yahoo.com/group/protecting_knowledge/message/1770]
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/motherlode/chevron/chevinfo.html]
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/6_07/3.html]
* "Environmental Injustice" in Catherine Baldi, ed. Drillbits &
Tailings 6:9 (November 30, 2001)
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/motherlode/chevron/wto2001_nov.html]
* Gedicks, Al. Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and
Oil Corporations. Boston: South End Press, 2001.
* "Hotspots: Nigeria," in Catherine Baldi, ed. Drillbits &
Tailings 6:9 (November 30, 2001)
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/6_09/hotspots.html]
* Lwori, John. "Niger Delta Records 4,835 Oil Spills in 20
Years," This Day (Lagos, Nigeria), August 3, 2001, in
Drillbits & Tailings, 6:7(August 31, 2001).
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/6_07/]
* Moore, Sarah. "For Shell, Nigerian Debacle Isn't the End of
the Line: Danger Lurks in Ogoniland for People and Firm, but
the Place Beckons." Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2002,
A-10.
* "Nigeria: Focus on Ogoni Oil Spill." Intergrated Regional
Information Networks. United Nations Office for the
Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, June 12, 2001.
[http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200106130090.html]
[http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,3283.jsp]
[www.irinnews.org]
* Project Underground. "More Blood is Spilled for Oil in the
Niger Delta." Drillbits & Tailings 4:20(December 11, 1999),
N.p.
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/4_20/1.html]
* Robinson, Deborah. Ogoni: The Struggle Continues. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Council of Churches, 1996 (2nd Ed.)
* Saro-Wiwa, Ken. Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy. Port
Harcourt, Nigeria: Saros International Publishers, 1992.
* "Shell: 100 years is enough!" October, 1997.
[http://www.kemptown.org/shell/rest.html]
* "Shell Oil Spills Continue to Ravage Communities and the
Environment in Nigeria." Drillbits & Tailings 6:7(August 31,
2001)
[http://groups.yahoo.com/group/protecting_knowledge/message/1770]
[http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/6_07/3.html]
* "Shell says Ogoni Oil Blow-out Now under Control." May 7,
2001.
Integrated Regional Information Networks. United Nations
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, June
12, 2001.
[www.irinnews.org]
[http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200105070222.html]
* Wiwa, Owens. Like Oil and Water: The Ogoni in Nigeria.
August, 2000.
[http://www.dghonline.org/nl7/owens.html]
Bruce E. Johansen, Professor of Communication and Native American
Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, is working on a
worldwide survey of indigenous peoples and environmental issues
for Greenwood Press. Last updated: 2/8/2002. Publication of this
work is expected to be in late 2003.
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/IPEIE/Ogoni.html (hypertext)
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/IPEIE/Ogoni.txt (text only)
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/IPEIE/Ogoni.pdf (print ready)