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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE                                                                                                                                          | DATE | RESTRICTION  |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--------------|
| 1.../.../...     | State C(...) 8pp<br>E.A. Gullion memo for "The Kennedy Administration" :<br>"A United States Arms Control Administration"                                        |      | A            |
| 1a               | TAB: A<br>10/12/60 State U 2pp 370<br>Department Circular: "Organization of the United States Disarmament Administration"                                        |      | *            |
| 1b               | TAB: B<br>10/25/60 WH U 3pp<br>D.D. Eisenhower letter to Secretary of State re creation of U.S. Disarmament Administration                                       |      | *            |
| 1c               | TAB: C<br>12/12/60 State U 1p <i>Declassified, NLK-02-69A-3-1-1, 4/10</i><br>Chart: "Organization and Staffing Chart - United States Disarmament Administration" |      | *            |
| 1d               | TAB: D<br>12/15/60 State C(...) 4pp <i>Sanitized, NLK-03-14B, 7/03</i><br>Outline                                                                                |      | A            |
| 16               | 01/17/63 WH (TS(...)) 2pp <i>Declassified NLK-63-12c 6/12</i><br>McG Bundy memo to JFK: "Your meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy"                 |      | A            |
| 16a              | 02/.../61 JAEC U 2pp<br>Two-page excerpt of Joint Committee                                                                                                      |      | *            |
| 17               | 04/09/63 <del>State C(...) 2pp</del><br><del>W.C. Foster (ACDA) memo to JFK: "Meeting with General Advisory Committee, ACDA, 4:00 P.M., April 9, 1963"</del>     |      | <del>A</del> |

FILE LOCATION

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES::DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES::ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

ACDF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Kennedy Administration

FROM: Edmund A. Gullion,  
Acting Deputy Director.

SUBJECT: A United States Arms Control Administration  
(Part I of Two Parts. Part II, in preparation,  
treats substantive issues of arms control.)

1. President-elect John F. Kennedy has pledged his Administration to a renewed effort to negotiate controlled disarmament compatible with national security. This will require revised and expanded governmental machinery. In the past, administrative responsibility for the development of arms control policies and for conduct of international negotiations has undergone a number of shifts. Recently efforts have been made to provide more continuity and depth in the review, development, and negotiation of policy.

2. Various proposals have been developed within the Executive Branch, in Congress and outside Government. They include the Senate Bills, S-3173, introduced by Senator Kennedy on March 10, and S-2989, introduced by Senator Humphrey on February 4. On the basis of studies initiated by President Eisenhower in the fall of 1959, the outgoing Administration established, on September 9, 1960, a "United States Disarmament Administration" reporting to the Secretary of State but designed to be semi-autonomous in character and including personnel from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. This organization was directed by President Eisenhower to undertake or coordinate an intensive program of research, as well as to back-stop international negotiations. (There is attached: a statement of functions of the new organization, negotiated with the agencies concerned (Tab A); a copy of President Eisenhower's letter of October 25 on this subject to the Secretary of State; (Tab B), an organization chart (Tab C); and a preliminary list of projects in which the unit is engaged (Tab D).

3. President

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

Department of State Guidelines

By mmk NARA, Date 4/25/97



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3. President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Dillon have considered the pursuit of a reliable agreement as a major goal of foreign policy. To head the new Disarmament Administration, Secretary Herter has for some months been seeking some American of national stature who would serve with the rank of Under Secretary (on the White House payroll at \$21,000) and would provide direction and continuity suitable to the seriousness of the subject. A distinguished list of possible names has been compiled but the post has not yet been accepted. The nearness of the election probably had something to do with this even many months ago.

4. The Kennedy Administration may re-examine the question of whether such a body should be a separate agency reporting directly to the President or whether it should continue to report to the Secretary of State. The existing United States Disarmament Administration, under an Acting Deputy Director, is purposely being developed to fit either solution: i.e., (a) to serve as a nucleus of a new and separate organization; or (b) while continuing to report to the Secretary, to develop the necessary attributes and functions of the coordinating center for disarmament activities in the U.S. Government.

5. The respective arguments for the different arrangements cited above can be briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) An agency placed directly under the President presumably would:
  - (i) demonstrate the importance the new national administration attaches to arms control as a means of enhancing national security;
  - (ii) attract highly qualified personnel;
  - (iii) provide a more effective means at a high level for the resolution of differences of opinion among Departments;
  - (iv) be

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- (iv) be better equipped for creative work, involving a grasp of scientific and strategic factors, than would the Department of State which has a different tradition and outlook.

(b) On the other hand, in favor of maintaining and developing the organization as a semi-autonomous body reporting to the Secretary it can be argued that:

- (i) development of policy and responsibility for international negotiation should not be separated but should be centered in one organization;
- (ii) valid arms control is one of our most vital foreign policy objectives, closely bound up with many others, and cannot be removed from the Secretary of State who is charged with the conduct of foreign relations;
- (iii) the position of the Secretary is senior in the Executive Branch after the President. Under a forceful Secretary, interested in disarmament, the position of the arms control unit would be strongest. If the unit were independent or even in the Executive Office of the President, its actions and recommendations would not necessarily carry more weight than that of Defense or State. It is probably true that Defense views would prevail more strongly under this arrangement than under another;
- (iv) past experience of the establishment of special or ad hoc administrations in the Executive Office indicates that such organizations divorced from old-line Departments have a precarious influence and tenure. They might be made more potent by underpinning them with a bureaucracy of their own; but the proliferation of offices of this type in the Executive Office makes the Presidency more unwieldy and less responsive;

(v) continuation

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- (v) continuation of the organization under the Secretary of State would occasion less delay. It can be built up quickly to whatever scope is desired taking advantage of as many of State's supporting services (such as intelligence, communications, etc.) as appropriate.

6. On balance, the arguments for a semi-autonomous organization reporting to the Secretary appear to me more compelling. The overriding argument in favor of this solution is the advantage of uniting development of policy and international negotiation in one group under one head. For example, such matters as: United States tactics and strategy in Soviet relations; NATO military and political considerations; bilateral relationships between the United States and the United Kingdom, Germany and France; negotiations within the United Nations; the way in which the United States position is presented to the public; and the handling of summit preparations and meetings of foreign ministers are involved both with policy formulation and negotiations, and must be kept under the direction of the Secretary.

7. Most of the advantages which do appear to lie with closer Presidential affiliation and which relate to prestige could be conveyed in practically the same degree to the other form of organization if the President designates it as a chosen instrument. This last condition is, of course, essential and transcends questions of organizational detail or lines of command.

8. The reservation expressed above with respect to the Department's ability to pilot research, especially of a technical nature, may be better founded. However, much of the cerebration required in the arms control field consists of bringing together and weighing results of scientific research and development of foreign policy consideration and of strategic studies. This the services directed by the Secretary are already able to do. The establishment under the Secretary is not devoid of creative gifts. With its own facilities or with the aid of consultants, it has planned such things as the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposals of 1946, the Organization of American States, etc. The scope and autonomy granted the new Administration should encourage original thinking.

9. It

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9. It is true that such an organization under the Secretary may seem a new departure to Congressional Committees and will have to establish its claim to adequate financing. We believe, however, that this is more likely to be forthcoming if it has a separate budget (cf. ICA) and favored, as it will be, in the precedent-setting years of its existence by the circumstance that House and White House leadership is of the same party.

10. The proper balancing of national security considerations with others is a major problem in developing arms control proposals. The system here preferred should, it is believed, produce better balance than an arrangement in which an independent agency lies between State and Defense. Defense views would be asserted with respect to recommendations made by the agency at the level of the NSC (or such bodies as the Committee of Principals), or to the President.

11. Despite its very recent creation and in spite of election-eve uncertainties, the existing organization has been able to develop assets which can be incorporated into whatever type of successor unit may be chosen. It has done the spade-work for a new type of cooperative inter-departmental undertaking; a research program leading to a documented and forehanded negotiating effort has been laid out and begun; a program for continuous public information support at home and abroad has been projected; plans for creating strong Advisory Panels and a Board of Consultants have been drawn up; and competent personnel, including most of those able to provide essential continuity in negotiations, have been assembled.

In these activities, it has had close and informal support and unstinting personal attention from Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon. Mr. Merchant and Mr. Loy Henderson have aided significantly in the fields of their respective responsibilities.

12. If, however, this organization or another is to become the focus for disarmament efforts it was intended to be, the following recommendations should be approved and executed:

(a) The

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-6-

- (a) The new President should in the course of a major speech on disarmament objectives also set forth his choices with respect to organization.
- (b) An American of national stature should be designated to head the arms control and disarmament administration as soon as possible. In view of the important substantive decisions to be made in the very near future, it would be desirable for this official to be named on a bipartisan basis and to take over immediately, or if this is not possible, at least to join the Department as a consultant now.
- (c) The autonomous character of the organization must be established in fact as soon as possible. During its formative period, the existing organization, has had to rely in a substantial way on Department of State supporting or parallel services. There is no reason, however, why the requisite degree of autonomy cannot be achieved together with optimum arrangements for guidance by the Secretary as soon as the permanent head of the organization is designated.
- (d) The organization should have its own legislation. (A preliminary draft of legislation, based in part on Senator Kennedy's Bill S-3173, is being prepared.)
- (e) The organization should have its own budget, beginning in FY 1962. At present, it has authorized fifty-two positions including fourteen funded by other agencies. In FY 1961, twenty-one would be added for a total of seventy-three. The budget for studies and research projects is \$400,000 for FY 1961, and \$1,000,000 for FY 1962.
- (f) The organization is presently bound by the budget of the outgoing Administration but increases on

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the order of fifty percent for personnel should be contemplated. As much as a ten-fold increase in FY 1962 and beyond, accompanied perhaps by some reductions in the research budgets of other agencies. The outer limit of the figure for research depends upon whether the organization actually assumes responsibility for "big ticket" items in the technological and scientific fields, (e.g., measurement of background radiation in outer space as a means of determining the feasibility of detecting nuclear tests conducted in that region.)

- (g) It would seem reasonable for the organization to design and commission projects, assume full responsibility for conducting scientific and technological research. The latter would be conducted in cooperation with the President's Science Adviser, or the equivalent, either under contract or through such agencies as the Department of Defense, NASA, AEC, etc. It should not now be excluded, however, that the arms control agency would actually conduct this type of research itself as contemplated in the Kennedy bill. This subject is under study and recommendations can be provided.
- (h) The responsibility for conducting negotiations on nuclear test talks as well as general disarmament should now be situated in the new organization. In the present transitional situation this function is shared with another office in the Department.
- (i) The organization of the United States delegation at the UN should reflect the need for continuous high level advice on disarmament, not only during the General Assembly but all times.

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A



# Department Circular

No. 370

October 12, 1960

SUBJECT: Organization of the United States Disarmament Administration (D)

## 1. Establishment and Designation

There has been established a United States Disarmament Administration (D) responsible to the Secretary of State. The disarmament functions in the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy have been transferred to the United States Disarmament Administration. Mr. Edmund A. Gullion has been designated as Acting Deputy Director of the Administration. He is located in Room 4222, on extension 3965 and 4385.

## 2. Functions

The mission of the Administration is to assist the Secretary of State in formulating disarmament and arms control policies and basic positions consistent with national security for consideration within the United States Government, and in negotiating international agreements in this field. This mission, which will be carried out in cooperation with the other interested parts of the Government, and with the assistance, where necessary, of experts and consultants under contract, includes assisting the Secretary of State in the following functions:

- a. Development, review, analysis, evaluation and coordination of plans, studies, policies and programs, and research in connection therewith;
- b. Maintenance of up-to-date information on all studies and research and development activities which are being carried on, both inside and outside the government, in support of the United States governmental effort in the disarmament and arms control field; development of a long-term cooperative program for such studies and activities; and undertaking or commissioning such studies or activities as may be appropriate in the light of the long-term program;



- c. Formulation and coordination of policies for the guidance of United States delegations to international negotiations;
- d. Maintenance of contact on disarmament, arms control and related matters with the representatives of foreign governments;
- e. Planning for, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public opinion accurately informed of United States policies;
- f. Development in cooperation with the other interested United States agencies of plans for United States participation in such arrangements for control and inspection as may be required under international disarmament and arms control agreements.

### 3. Personnel Arrangements

The Administration is being staffed by Foreign Service and Departmental officers, and persons on detail from other departments and agencies. Personnel from other agencies will be an integrated part of the staff of the Administration for the period of their assignment and will be responsible to the Director of the Administration rather than to their parent agency.

(A/MS)

B



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October 25, 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have read and approved your memorandum concerning the steps you are taking, pursuant to plans I approved last fall, to create a United States Disarmament Administration to strengthen leadership and coordination of the manifold activities of the United States Government in the field of safeguarded disarmament and arms control.

I agree that this Administration should be staffed with personnel from the interested U. S. Government departments and agencies, together with personnel recruited from outside government where appropriate, thus assuring the blending of skills essential to the highly complex work in which it will be engaged.

In addition to coordinating or conducting an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating recommendations for policies and basic positions for consideration within the U. S. Government with respect to effective disarmament and arms control, and for direction and support of international negotiations on these subjects. I expect that, as in the past, you will continue to coordinate these policies with the heads of other agencies and departments concerned, as appropriate to their responsibilities.

The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available skills applicable to the field in a continuing campaign to develop practical means for attaining effective disarmament and arms control agreements, for easing the burden of armaments, for lessening the dangers of surprise attack or war by accident or miscalculation, and for promoting a just and durable peace.

I am requesting the heads of all other interested agencies to give you full and continued support in developing an effective organization and in building a sound and imaginative disarmament and arms control policy.



DETERIORATING ORIGINAL REPLACED


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My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well-being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by its efforts. I shall support it in every way I can.

I am sending letters related to this one to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and to my Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dwight D. Eisenhower", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Christian Herter

The Secretary of State



FUNCTIONS OF THE U.S. DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

The mission of the Administration will be to assist the Secretary of State in formulating disarmament and arms control policies and basic positions consistent with national security for consideration within the U. S. Government, and in negotiating international agreements in this field. This mission, which will be carried out in cooperation with the other interested parts of the government, and with the assistance, where necessary, of experts and consultants under contract, will include assisting the Secretary of State in the following functions:

- A. Development, review, analysis, evaluation and coordination of plans, studies, policies and programs, and research in connection therewith;
- B. Maintenance of up-to-date information on all studies and research and development activities which are being carried on, both inside and outside the government, in support of the United States governmental effort in the disarmament and arms control field; development of a long-term cooperative program for such studies and activities; and undertaking or commissioning such studies or activities as may be appropriate in the light of the long-term program;
- C. Formulation and coordination of policies for the guidance of U.S. delegations to international negotiations;
- D. Maintenance of contact on disarmament, arms control and related matters with the representatives of foreign governments;
- E. Planning for, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public opinion accurately informed of U.S. policies;
- F. Development in cooperation with the other interested U.S. agencies of plans for U.S. participation in such arrangements for control and inspection as may be required under international disarmament and arms control agreements.

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The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available skills applicable to the field in a continuing campaign to develop practical means for attaining effective disarmament and arms control agreements, for easing the burden of armaments, for lessening the dangers of surprise attack or war by accident or miscalculation, and for promoting a just and durable peace.

I am requesting the heads of all other interested agencies to give you full and continued support in developing an effective organization and in building a sound and imaginative disarmament and arms control policy.



My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well-being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by its efforts. I shall support it in every way I can.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Christian Herter

The Secretary of State

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- B. Maintenance of up-to-date information on all studies and research and development activities which are being carried on, both inside and outside the government, in support of the United States governmental effort in the disarmament and arms control field; development of a long-term cooperative program for such studies and activities; and undertaking or commissioning such studies or activities as may be appropriate in the light of the long-term program;
- C. Formulation and coordination of policies for the guidance of U.S. delegations to international negotiations;
- D. Maintenance of contact on disarmament, arms control and related matters with the representatives of foreign governments;
- E. Planning for, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public informed of U.S. policies;
- F. Development in cooperation with the other interested U.S. agencies of plans for U.S. participation in such arrangements for control and inspection as may be required under international disarmament



C

ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING CHART  
UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

December 12, 1960

KEY: \*Vacant  
\*\*Presently in Geneva

| <u>OFFICE OF DIRECTOR</u>        |    |
|----------------------------------|----|
| *Director                        | 1  |
| Deputy Director                  | 1  |
| Special Assistant                | 1  |
| **Dep.U.S.Rep.Nuclear Test Nego. | -  |
| **Spec.Ass't Nuclear Test Nego.  | -  |
| Policy Reports Officer           | 1  |
| *Military Officer (DOD)          | 1  |
| Public Affairs Advisor           | 1  |
| *Public Affairs Assistant (USIA) | 1  |
| Staff Assistant                  | 1  |
| *Secy to the Director            | 1  |
| Secretary                        | 3  |
|                                  | 12 |

| <u>EXECUTIVE STAFF</u>   |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Executive Director       | 1 |
| Administrative Assistant | 1 |
| Accounting Clerk         | 1 |
| Secretary                | 1 |
| Mail & File Supervisor   | 1 |
| File Clerk               | 1 |
| Messenger                | 1 |
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| <u>POLITICAL OFFICE</u> |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| Office Chief            | 1  |
| **Political Officer     | 1  |
| Political Officer       | 5  |
| Staff Aide              | 1  |
| Military Officer (DOD)  | 1  |
| **Secretary             | 2  |
| Secretary               | 2  |
|                         | 13 |

| <u>OFFICE OF POLICY AND STUDIES</u> |    |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| Chief Policy and Studies (CIA)      | 1  |
| Foreign Affairs Officer             | 4  |
| **Foreign Affairs Officer           | 1  |
| Scientist (AEC)                     | 1  |
| *Scientist                          | 1  |
| *Scientist (CIA)                    | 1  |
| Military Officer (DOD)              | 2  |
| *Military Officer (DOD)             | 2  |
| *Policy Officer (USIA)              | 1  |
| Policy Officer (AEC)                | 1  |
| Research Director                   | 1  |
| *Research Analyst (CIA)             | 1  |
| Secretary                           | 3  |
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Progress Report on Studies  
and Related Projects

PAGES: 5

CLASSIFICATION: C

STATUS:

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December 15, 1960

PROGRESS REPORT ON STUDIES AND RELATED PROJECTS

I. In Progress

1. Disarmament Bibliography, Inventory, and Library Project
2. Study of Effect of U. S. Disarmament Measures on a Stable Military Environment
3. National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet, Chinese, and French Attitudes toward Disarmament
4. Cut-off Study
5. Outer Space Study
6. Reduction of Force Levels Study
7. African Regional Arms Control Paper
8. Surveillance in Time of Crisis Study
9. Study of the Economic Adjustments to Disarmament
10. Paper on Draft Proposal for Comprehensive Disarmament
11. Paper on Soviet General and Complete Disarmament Proposal
12. Paper on Soviet Separate Measures

II. Check List under Consideration (without Reference to Priority)

13. Pros and Cons of "Overwhelming Superiority" as U. S. Disarmament Objective
14. Pros and Cons of "General and Complete Disarmament" as U. S. Disarmament Objective
15. Step-by-Step Nuclear Disarmament by Example
16. Unilateral Measures and Tacit Agreements to Achieve Stable Military Environment
17. Regional Arms Control Studies, Including Europe, Latin America, Middle East, South Asia, Far East, and South East Asia
18. Revision of U. S. June 27 Paper

|                        |
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| NLK-03-14B             |
| By MAD NARA, Date 7/03 |

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19. Control System Communications Study
20. Study on Legal and Security Aspects of on-Site Nuclear Test Inspection
21. 
22. Study on a Public Affairs Program for Disarmament
23. Study on the Definition of Armed Forces and on the Techniques for Relating Armed Force Levels to Arms Limitations
24. International Control Organ Study
25. Study on Budget Verification Measures
26. Study on the Phasing of Arms Control Agreements with Political Agreements
27. Study on Means to Ascertain Elimination of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
28. Study on Nth Country Problem Including Effect of Development of Centrifuge System
29. Study of Technical Measures Necessary to Verify Control, Reduction, and Elimination of Nuclear Delivery Systems (or of Missiles Alone)
30. Study of Measures to Provide Greater Protection Against Surprise Attack--Including Prior Notification of Proposed Space and Missile Landings, Zones of Aerial and Ground Inspection, Exchange of Observers, Purple Telephone, Invited International Surveillance, UN Ban Satellites, and Including the Use of Gaming Techniques
31. Study of Acceptability of Present U. S. Disarmament Policy to (a) Allies; (b) USSR; (c) Red China; (d) Neutral Nations; (e) U. S. Congress; (f) U. S. Public
32. Study of Techniques for Evading Agreements and on Techniques for Countering Such Evasions
33. Study of Measures to Reduce Danger of War by Accident or Miscalculation

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34. Study of the Feasibility or Lack of Feasibility of a Program for Complete and General Disarmament
35. Study of Soviet and Red China Secrecy as a Power Asset and of Methods to Overcome or Neutralize It
36. Study of the Acceptability or Non-Acceptability of Partial Measures (Including Those of 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1960)
37. Study of Regional and Global Peace Keeping Machinery with Particular Reference to Regional and Global Military Forces
38. Study of the Possible Reduction of Foreign Bases
39. Study of the Use of Public Opinion, Public Forums, and the Press to Move Government Decision-Making on Arms Control
40. Study of Soviet Negotiating Techniques as Evidenced Particularly in Previous Disarmament Conferences and at the UN
41. Study of the Pros and Cons of Various Negotiating Forums Including Various Compositions of the Negotiating Body and Including Private U. S.-Soviet Negotiations and Methods of Accomplishing U. S.-Soviet Bilateral Negotiations
42. Study of the Pros and Cons of Reducing the Military Aspects of Present Regional Pacts
43. Study of the Effect on the European Defense Posture of Both East and West of (a) Reduction of U. S. and Soviet Forces in non-Soviet Europe to a Token or Trip-wire Force; (b) Reduction of U. S. and Soviet Force Levels to 2.1 and 1.7 million; (c) Withdrawal of All U. S. and Soviet Forces from non-Soviet Europe
44. Study of Methods to Reduce the Necessity for 100 Per Cent Inspection and 100 Per Cent Certainty of Inspection Measures Including the Study of A Threshold of National Safety and the Study of Possible Uses of Statistical Sampling Techniques in Inspection Arrangements
45. Study of the Economic Impact on the U. S. of Total National Military Disarmament
46. Study of the Effects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons--Tactical and Strategic
47. Study of the Effect of the U. S. and USSR Total Security Positions on the Acquisition by Red China of (1) a Nuclear Capability and (2) a Nuclear-Missile Capability

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48. Study of the Effect on Stability in the Middle East of an Israeli Nuclear Capability
49. Study of Projection of U. S., USSR, and Red China's Military Power Position over Next Five Years and Ten Years Including the Impact of Anticipated New Technological Developments on These Positions
50. Study of Feasibility of and Prospective Threat from: (1) Artificial Satellite Weapon Platforms and (2) Planetary Weapon Platforms

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Rec'd 1/30/62

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Report to Congress on the activities  
of the U.S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency

Enclosed for the President's signature is a letter transmitting the report on the activities of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Congress. Also attached is the report itself, together with Mr. Foster's letter transmitting the report to the President. Draft copies of the report were sent to your office, Dr. Wiesner's office, to the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and to appropriate bureaus of the Department of State. Their views were taken into account in the preparation of the final draft, which is forwarded herewith.

I am also attaching a draft press release to be issued by the White House at the time that the President transmits the report to the Congress.

Would you please bring the transmittal letter for the President's signature and the report itself to the attention of the President. Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides that the report is to be submitted to the Congress "no later than January 31 of each year."

*Adrian S. Fisher*  
Adrian S. Fisher  
Acting Director *694B*

Enclosures:

1. Letter for President's signature.
2. Activities report of ACDA, together with Mr. Foster's transmittal letter.
3. Draft press release.

FOR RELEASE AT 12:00 NOON, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1962

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I have the honor to transmit the first annual report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Agency was established by the Act of September 26, 1961, and has thus been in existence for only four months. This report, submitted pursuant to law, describes not only its own initial activities, but also the work of predecessor agencies which it is continuing.

The existence of this new Agency is a source of strength to me, in the performance of my responsibility to pursue a new type of world security which will increase our own prospects of living in peace and freedom. I know that this goal is the desire of the Congress and the American people to leave no stone unturned in their search for a peaceful world.

This report of activities indicates that the new Agency is moving surely toward the achievement of greater effectiveness and flexibility in disarmament negotiations. The development of this kind of skill and responsibility is essential to the serious pursuit of security through disarmament.

On March 14, our representatives will meet with the representatives of 17 other nations in a forum established by resolution of the United Nations General Assembly to seek to negotiate a comprehensive disarmament treaty program. When I appeared before the United Nations last September, I submitted a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. It is my hope and expectation that the forthcoming conference will make significant progress toward the achievement of the goal of disarmament with effective methods of insuring compliance.

Never before in the history of man has the importance of arms control and disarmament been so great. For this reason, I urge your support of this Agency in the great and difficult tasks which it will face in the future.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 1, 1962.

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ACOA  
June 29 9:50

Mr. Bundy,

Adrian Fisher called with the following  
urgent message:

Senator Fulbright indicated that he is not  
prepared to sponsor the bill for the U.S.  
Disarmament Agency for World Peace and  
Security. It is urgent that the President call  
Senator Fulbright this morning.

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Manda



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

ACDA 5

December 15, 1960

Dear Jack:

I have submitted to your representatives a summary memorandum of my ideas concerning the organization of the Government for disarmament. I recommended that responsibility be centered in a strong, interdepartmentally staffed, semi-autonomous unit, reporting to the Secretary of State. I can also see some merit in other proposals such as the creation of an independent agency. I have tried to design the existing "Disarmament Administration" to fit either solution.

My principal reasons for preferring an organization under the Secretary of State are these:

(a) Research and responsibility for negotiations should not be separated. Recent experience (e.g., the Stassen effort) shows this does not work too well.

(b) Beyond a certain point progress on disarmament depends on resolution of international political differences. At every point disarmament is bound up with foreign policy issues--e.g., Soviet relations; European security; bilateral relations with France, the UK, Germany; the China question; summitry; the UN, etc. So central and involved a foreign policy question as disarmament should not be removed from the Secretary's responsibilities.

(c) The multiplication of ad hoc administrations reporting to the President or attached to the Executive Office tends to make the Presidency unwieldy and less responsive.

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The Honorable  
John F. Kennedy,  
President-elect.



I should like to present here some further considerations not developed in the memorandum submitted through the Department of State.

President Eisenhower, in October of last year, asked Secretary of State Herter to study with other Departments and agencies the organization and location of a unit which might be a center for disarmament activities in Government. The Coolidge study recommended an intensified program of research, more continuity, and more forehanded preparation of U.S. disarmament positions for negotiation. As you know the need for such improvements was also widely recognized and urged outside the Executive Branch and outside Government. There is no need to rehearse here the considerations you and Senator Humphrey probably had in mind when you introduced your bills in the Senate.

Since 1958, possibly as a result of the impetus generated earlier by Governor Stassen's efforts and by the work of the U.S. experts assembled for the Surprise Attack and Nuclear Test conferences, there has been a striking increase in the research and study going on in private institutions, laboratories and foundations. The results of all this cerebration needs to be tapped for Government systematically.

Even though President Eisenhower's initiative occurred in October of 1959, it was not until September 1960 that the creation of the new organization, "The United States Disarmament Administration" was announced to the press. One reason for the long gestation was the issue which emerged with respect to whether the organization should be attached to the Executive Offices or placed in the State Department.

The solution finally adopted was to make the organization responsible to the Secretary but not bury it in the bowels of the Department's organization. It was to be semi-autonomous on the ICA pattern. It was not at all clear at this time whether this unit was to be merely one more study group, whether it was to have responsibility for negotiations, or what was to be its relation to other agencies or other offices in the Department of State.

I came into the picture in a curious way, and too late to do much good except on organization. Senator Humphrey

had

had shown continuing interest in what the Department was doing to set up a new disarmament organization. He did not fail to point out that despite the Department's prospectus the organization did not in fact exist.

At this time, August, 1960, while serving as the Department of State staff member on the President's Committee on Informational Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), I was asked to fill this gap and to try to bring the Department's planning to some fruition. I, thereupon, submitted to the Secretary recommendations with respect to the organization which has now come into being. The new elements which I added included the concept of an office which combined negotiation and research and the idea of bringing into it members borrowed from other agencies, including the Department of Defense. The latter are to be responsible to the new Administration rather than the parent agency. Since September 1960 we have been engaged in back-stopping negotiations at the UN, in preparing a fundamental review of U.S. policies, developing a research program, arranging for an inventory of arms control studies all around the country both governmental and private and projecting a public information program. We have made some progress despite the uncertainties of the campaign months which, toward election time and since, have produced some "foot dragging" on the part of some persons pending a re-opening of the question of the form and the location of the disarmament organization.

Even though this organization was begun in good faith and has been developed to serve as a nucleus for any organization which may be set up, it did, I fear, at the outset have some aspects of a political lightning rod. Nevertheless, while it does not yet have all the attributes necessary to serve as a focus of disarmament activity, it does represent a considerable step forward. However, as my memorandum shows, the leading strings with respect to budget and personnel are still short indeed. For example, there is a tacit understanding that the Department will not ask for more than \$1 million for disarmament studies until after the Presidential budget message in January, thus permitting it to be said that the budget line theoretically had been held.

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These matters, however, could easily be cleared up once it is evident that the new organization has Presidential support. We also believe it would be desirable to establish the disarmament unit on the base of its own legislation which would include a number of features of the Kennedy Bill.

I can understand that some may question the ability or appropriateness of the Department of State as an agency to coordinate various fields of research, including scientific research. There are also some reservations as to the creative capabilities of the Department. While it is true that the Department of State has seldom had responsibilities in the scientific field, it has shown that it can devise new solutions and new form, e.g., the Acheson-Lilienthal report, prepared by Consultants commissioned by the Department, leading to the Baruch proposals of 1946; and the general planning which went into such projects as the Marshall plan, the UN, the Bank and Fund, the Organization of American States, etc.

There are some who believe that disarmament is a matter so bound up with national security that responsibility for it should be given the Department of Defense or that that Department should have the main responsibility. I do not hold with these views. However objective the Department of Defense may be, positions on disarmament developed primarily by military men lack some credibility in international negotiations. I certainly believe that national security is at all times a prime consideration in developing positions, and especially so if we should decide to design arms control policies primarily to procure and maintain a "stabilized military environment". I also recognize that the Department of Defense and its agents carry out objectively tests and studies assigned to it in the disarmament field. I do believe, however, that the selection of the studies to be made, the assignment of priorities, and the application of results to negotiations should be a civilian matter. One of the reasons why I prefer an organization reporting to the Secretary of State rather than an organization attached to the White House or somewhere between State and Defense is that I think the former solution makes for a sounder balancing of military considerations with the goals of disarmament. Under the organization I propose, both State Department and military

opinion

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
opinion would be built into the organization from the beginning. The recommendations of the organization would, however, be submitted for consideration in the Government, to the Committee of Principals, or the NSC, and to the President. At These levels, the Department of Defense would have ample opportunity to assert its views.

There would also be strengthened arms control offices in Defense and AEC. I would hope that the Office of the Scientific Adviser to the President would be a nexus with the White House and would help on the scientific side. This seems to me to be more practical and much more economical than trying to duplicate under a new organization the vast scientific and technical facilities which already exist.

Finally, even though I have dwelt upon organization both in this letter and in the memorandum, I repeat that the matter of organization is in itself not so important as long as the indications of the national Administration are clear and its interest in the disarmament agency is maintained.

A word as to my own situation. As a Foreign Service Officer I am relatively mobile and perfectly ready to serve in my present deputy position or anywhere you assign me. I do not believe I should be considered for the top disarmament post which requires a man of national reputation. (I have been pondering some names.) The second spot should eventually be filled by a man with continuity of experience equal to mine of which there are ~~two or~~ three. Thereafter, I should like to help here in Washington in whatever capacity seems appropriate--or eventually take a field post to which my twenty-five years in the Foreign Service inclines me.

Sincerely,



Edmund A. Gullion



September 26, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Newport, Rhode Island)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced he will nominate Mr. William C. Foster as Director of the United States Arms Control Agency. Following is biographic information on Mr. Foster.

Born: April 18, 1897 in Westfield, New Jersey. Married with one son; three grandchildren. His education at MIT was interrupted by World War I where he served as a pilot in the United States Air Corps. Following the war he worked as an engineer for the Packard Motor Company in New York City and for Public Service (a New Jersey utility company).

After several years with both of these firms, he entered business for himself as owner of the Pressed and Welded Steel Production Company of Long Island City, New York where he is still Chairman of the Board.

Mr. Foster first entered government service in 1941 as a consultant for the War Production Board. In 1942 he was named Director of the Purchases Division, Army Service Forces and was promoted to Special Representative to the Secretary of War on aircraft procurement (1943-1946). He returned to his private business briefly following the war and was recalled to Washington to become Under Secretary of Commerce from 1946 to 1948. Mr. Foster was then named Deputy Special Representative in Europe for the Marshall Plan responsible for setting up all special missions in Europe.

From 1948 to 1951 he worked with the Economic Cooperation Administration as Deputy Administrator, appointed later as Administrator. He was appointed Deputy Secretary of Commerce by President Truman in 1951 and served until his voluntary resignation in 1953.

Mr. Foster makes his home at 3304 R Street, NW, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Foster is Chairman of the Board of Aerospace of Los Angeles; Chairman of the Board and President of the United Nuclear Corporation, New Haven, Connecticut; Chairman of the Board, Porter International Company of New York; Vice-Chairman of the International Committee for Economic Development; Commissioner of the National Capitol Planning Commission, 1959 to present.

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October 6, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
ACDA

FOLLOWING IS AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE HONORABLE JOHN J. McCLOY, ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT ON DISARMAMENT

October 6, 1961

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I would like to extend my hearty thanks to you for the work you have done as my Adviser on disarmament and arms control. You have made a notable contribution to the country and to the world in this most important area.

Through your service the Government has been able to table at Geneva a workable, effective and understandable draft treaty for the banning of nuclear weapons tests.

In the field of general disarmament, your discussions with Mr. Zorin concerning the principles which should guide future disarmament negotiations have cleared away many of the misunderstandings and misconceptions which have clouded this difficult subject.

At the same time, your development of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World has set forth clearly the proposals of the United States for an effective disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries.

You have also performed a valuable service in connection with the establishment of a permanent agency of the Government to deal with the problems of disarmament and arms control. After giving this matter the most thorough consideration, you arrived at a recommendation with respect to the organization of the Government in the field of arms control and disarmament which I transmitted to the Congress. The substantial majority by which the Congress has recently enacted the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is a tribute to the soundness of your recommendations and the diligence and persuasiveness with which you presented them to the Congress.

In all of these steps you have assisted in clarifying the position of the United States as a country which is seeking realistic, mutually balanced and beneficial steps to reduce the dangers of war and to obtain the kind of disarmed world we all prefer. These tasks have been carried out at a time when the intransigence of others, especially on the issue of control over nuclear testing, has brought disappointment to the world. But we must not be discouraged, and I am confident that in the longer view what you have done will be recorded as a major contribution to the great task of achieving disarmament.

In expressing my thanks, I know I am expressing the thanks of our country also. I am very glad that we shall continue to have the benefit of your advice in this most important field.

Sincerely,

(s)

John F. Kennedy

The Honorable John J. McCloy  
Adviser to the President on Disarmament  
Washington, D.C.

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MORE



October 6, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

At the commencement of your Administration, you requested me to undertake a special mission, later confirmed to me in writing by your letter of January 27, 1961, the essence of which was to act as your Adviser on problems of disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test ban. In addition to the request to make recommendations regarding the formulation of the United States policy in these areas, you also requested me to make recommendations to you as to the type and nature of the organization within the Government which would be best designed to deal with the very important problems in this field.

In carrying out this mission, I have worked in very close association with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, as well as with other Agencies of the Government having an interest in these matters.

The first problem which demanded attention was the then impending resumption of the test ban negotiations at Geneva. Intensive efforts were made to present to that Conference a constructive position which could promptly serve as a basis for an agreement. This work was completed prior to the resumption of the negotiations and a comprehensive draft treaty was, in due course, presented to the Conference, which, if adopted, could have effected the banning of all nuclear testing, with reasonable assurance that the obligations undertaken were being fulfilled. Mr. Arthur H. Dean conducted these negotiations on behalf of the United States, ably assisted by Mr. Charles Stelle, and an experienced staff. The proposals put forth by the United States were designed to afford a reasonable basis for negotiation, if the Soviets wanted a workable agreement, or, if the Soviets did not want a workable agreement, to make that fact clear. We hoped for the former, but our hopes for the conclusion of an agreement were rudely shaken from the first day of the resumed negotiations by the new position taken by the Soviet Union in regard to the matter of controls and inspection. Subsequent events, particularly the breaking of the voluntary moratorium through the resumption of extensive and rapid nuclear testing indicated that there had been no serious intent on the part of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement in the course of these negotiations. The Soviet testing is of such a character that preparations for it must have been actively undertaken from the outset of the resumed negotiations, if not before. In spite of the disappointing attitude of the Soviet Union, the United States continued to search for a basis for an agreement covering all tests and finally proposed an agreement without controls and inspection on Soviet territory which would ban testing in the atmosphere where fall out was a continuing threat to health.

In the light of the high potential that these negotiations possessed for constructive action on the one hand, and the apparent pre-determination on the part of the Soviet Union to avoid reaching any agreement on the other, I regret to say that this Geneva Conference constitutes the most discouraging exercise in disarmament negotiations since the close of the war. I enclose with this letter a brief resume of the Geneva negotiations (Tab A). More comprehensive reports are, of course, on file with the Secretary of State; and Mr. Dean has himself reported from time to time to you at considerable length on the negotiations.

Other negotiations in the form of a follow-up of the conversations begun during the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Stevenson on the subject of comprehensive disarmament, were likewise impending. These negotiations were resumed during the months of June, July, August, and September, in Washington, Moscow and New York, between Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin and myself. The purpose of these negotiations was to develop a statement of principles which would serve as the framework for resumed negotiations on comprehensive disarmament as well as to agree upon the forum in which such negotiations could take place. A

MORE



statement of agreed principles was reached containing, what I believe to be, some highly significant principles on which future negotiations might proceed. Though we were unable to agree on the composition of the forum, prior to the reconvening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and we likewise disagreed on the desirability of including a certain sentence in the statement of principles which would have emphasized the necessity of verifying remaining force levels, the extent of our agreement was, as I say, impressive. As for the failure to agree on the composition of the forum, though we proffered four different proposals, I do not despair of our being able to reach a settlement of this issue in due course, assuming a real desire on the part of the Soviet Union to reach a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

I also enclose in (Tab B) a summary of my discussions with Mr. Zorin, as well as the joint statement of agreed principles dated September 20, 1961 filed with the United Nations on the same day, a letter from me to Mr. Zorin dated September 20, the reply of Mr. Zorin dated September 21, the United States memorandum dated September 14 setting forth the United States position with respect to general disarmament, also as filed with the United Nations on September 20, and the memorandum of July 29, 1961, setting forth the position of the United States in respect to the composition of the forum for the resumption of negotiations likewise filed in the United Nations on September 20, 1961.

Likewise, during the course of the spring and summer extensive work was undertaken leading to the preparation of a plan for general and complete disarmament. Panels of distinguished experts were convened and they worked industriously to make recommendations in the various aspects of disarmament and arms control. Numerous consultations with our Allies and the representatives of appropriate agencies of the Government took place and the result was the plan submitted to the United Nations on September 25th of this year. A report covering the development of this plan, including a copy of the plan itself, is enclosed herewith (Tab C).

As for the second aspect of my mission, namely, the matter of the character and position of the Agency to deal with the problem of disarmament and arms control within the United States Government, I believe the passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by both houses of Congress with such substantial majorities speaks for itself. I have, however, enclosed herewith a short summary of the adoption of the legislation (Tab D). I feel that you can take deep satisfaction in the seriousness with which the Congress dealt with this important problem in a very busy session and I know it must be particularly gratifying to you that the Bill had such wide bipartisan support. The authoritative position which the new Agency now holds by Statute in the Government is another earnest of the serious intent of the United States to seek a sound and constructive resolution of the tremendous hazards involved in a modern arms race.

With the passage of the legislation, the conclusion of my negotiations with Mr. Zorin, and the introduction of the United States plan for disarmament at the General Assembly, my mission, I believe, is concluded. I am happy to learn that you have already designated a man of such experience and capacity as William C. Foster to direct the Agency and to become your principal adviser on Disarmament as the Statute provides. He will be most effectively assisted by one of the finest and ablest public servants I have ever known -- Mr. Adrian S. Fisher.

I remain deeply convinced that constructive steps must be taken in this field of disarmament and arms control if the World is to avoid disaster of a cataclysmic nature. I also believe that with the position which the United States maintained at the Geneva Conference on nuclear testing, with the acceptance of an agreed statement of principles under which negotiations for general and complete disarmament could be resumed, and, finally, with the impressive votes on the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, that the United States has shown what



- 4 -

must appear to all a thoroughly convincing display of its sincerity and willingness to bring to an end the hazards of an indiscriminate arms race. If others will demonstrate a similar will and intent, real assurance could be felt that constructive progress in this all important field could now take place.

I have been greatly honored to have been selected by you for this mission and I am particularly appreciative of the unfailing support I have received from you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense during the course of my work.

Respectfully yours,

(s)

John J. McCloy

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ACDA 8

October 6, 1961

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I would like to extend my hearty thanks to you for the work you have done as my Adviser on disarmament and arms control. You have made a notable contribution to the country and to the world in this most important area.

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- 2 -

In all of these steps you have assisted in clarifying the position of the United States as a country which is seeking realistic, mutually balanced and beneficial steps to reduce the dangers of war and to obtain the kind of disarmed world we all prefer. These tasks have been carried out at a time when the intransigence of others, especially on the issue of control over nuclear testing, has brought disappointment to the world. But we must not be discouraged, and I am confident that in the longer view what you have done will be recorded as a major contribution to the great task of achieving disarmament.

In expressing my thanks, I know I am expressing the thanks of our country also. I am very glad that we shall continue to have the benefit of your advice in this most important field.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

The Honorable John J. McCloy  
Adviser to the President on Disarmament  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9  
ACDA

August 2, 1961


Dear Mr. President:

Today I saw Senator Fulbright about the Bill for the Disarmament Agency and urged him to see what he could do toward getting the Bill referred to his Committee and early hearings started. He seemed to be somewhat reluctant but I argued with him at some length about what I considered to be the real importance of getting a Bill this session of Congress if we were to be equipped to deal with this subject of disarmament and if we were to be convincing in regard to our seriousness about the subject.

He finally said that if I wrote him a letter indicating the importance of the Bill he would use that letter as the justification for his calling up Senator McClellan to see if he could get the Bill referred to the Senate Relations Committee.

I am sending you a copy of the letter which I sent to Senator Fulbright and it may be that if you are talking to him you might again indicate your interest in the subject to him. I believe it is extremely important to get hearings started.

Sincerely,

  
John J. McCloy

Enclosure:

Letter to Sen. Fulbright

The President,  
The White House.



August 2, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

Today I saw Senator Fulbright about the Bill for the Disarmament Agency and urged him to see what he could do toward getting the Bill referred to his Committee and early hearings started. He seemed to be somewhat reluctant but I argued with him at some length about what I considered to be the real importance of getting a Bill this session of Congress if we were to be equipped to deal with this subject of disarmament and if we were to be convincing in regard to our seriousness about the subject.

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Sincerely,

John J. McGloy

Enclosure:  
Letter to Sen. Fulbright

The President,  
The White House.



9a

August 2, 1961

Dear Senator Fulbright:

As you know, the President some time ago asked me to act as his Adviser on Disarmament policy for the nation; and in that connection, he asked me to give him my recommendations as to what type of organization should be set up in the Government to deal with this important subject.

I have endeavored to fulfill this mission and have generally advised the President in respect of our test ban negotiations which are being currently conducted in Geneva and also our policy in connection with more comprehensive disarmament measures. As for the second part of my mission -- that is, to advise him as to the type of organization which should deal with this problem, I have, after much thought and consultation with people knowledgeable in this area, recommended to him the setting up of an Agency reporting to the Secretary of State but with separate statutory authority to deal with problems of disarmament.

Prior to making this recommendation, I naturally consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as with a number of other Government and private officials. I also consulted with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and with the President himself. The result is embodied in Senate Bill No. 2180 sent to the Congress by the President on June 29, 1961 with an accompanying message.

Although

The Honorable

J. W. Fulbright,  
Chairman,

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,  
United States Senate.

Although there were many who pressed the advisability of an entirely separate agency reporting directly to the President, I came to the conclusion that there were so many aspects of foreign relations involved in the formulation of the negotiation of our disarmament policy that it was much more advisable to have the Director of the Agency, although given statutory authority, report to the Secretary of State with right of access to the President upon notification to the Secretary of State. On the other hand, there were so many other aspects of disarmament which affected other departments of the Government it was felt that an agency should not be merely another bureau or division of the State Department. This, together with the consideration that the agency would be engaged in rather extensive operations dealing with control and inspection systems, led to the semi-autonomous character of the agency which the bill provides. It should have a separate budget and should transmit annual reports to Congress.

My experience over the last six months has made me feel that the interests of the country in this field cannot be properly served without an agency fully equipped to formulate, carry out and give the necessary continuity to the Government's policy toward disarmament. The questions relating to disarmament policy and its implementation are bound to demand the attention of the top officials of the Government. The means by which we can avoid both a debilitating and dangerous arms race and the occurrence of war itself has become one of the greatest challenges to mankind. With the horrendous character of modern weapons, the subject has become so pressing that it is necessary that we muster the best talents under the best conditions possible within the Government to cope with the problem. Every session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is called upon to debate this problem; we are engaged in negotiations bearing on some phase of disarmament almost continually, and I feel that the country has heretofore lacked the type of organization which could be considered as fully equipped to deal with the intricacies of the problem and at the same time protect the security of the nation. You are already familiar with the general provisions of the bill so I shall not describe it in detail here. I do want to emphasize the importance of giving statutory authority to that governmental organization which is responsible for our disarmament efforts.

I am



I am writing to you because you have been in the position of having to evaluate constantly the effect of the composite of our foreign policy actions and policies. Since disarmament policy is one of the integral parts of our foreign policy it is imperative that the United States be able to formulate and be prepared to implement effective programs on disarmament. During this very sensitive period into which we are entering in our international relations, it is all the more important that we create such an organization which not only will be convincing to the World as to our seriousness of purpose in this field, but will provide the country with the necessary equipment and facilities to deal with the highly technical and very important aspects of the problem. I feel that failure to pass a bill of this general character during this session of the Congress might have very unfortunate results. Whereas, if one were passed, I believe that we would be better equipped than we ever have been thus far to prepare ourselves for a feasible disarmament policy -- one by which the security of the country would be furthered.

Of course, the President's interest in this bill is well known. I may add that I talked with former President Eisenhower about it and he volunteered a letter of endorsement -- a copy of which I have. Other prominent citizens have indicated their support for such a bill. Among them are former Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, former Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, former Defense Director of Research and Engineering, Herbert York. There are many other organizations and individuals deeply interested in this subject.

As time is running out in this session, I hope that the Senate can give consideration to the bill as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John J. McCloy  
Adviser to the President  
on Disarmament

D:JJMcCloy:imf

ADVANCE FOR NOON  
DISARMAMENT

(ADVANCE) WASHINGTON. (AP)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY TODAY PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT U.S. DISARMAMENT AGENCY. IT WOULD HAVE SUGGESTING POWERS TO DRAW UP DISARMAMENT PLANS, NEGOTIATE AND HANDLE ENFORCEMENT IF ANY INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

ADMINISTRATION AIDES CONTEND THE NEW U.S. AGENCY--FIRST OF ITS KIND IN THE WORLD--WOULD UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM.

KENNEDY SENT HIS PROPOSAL TO CONGRESS IN THE FORM OF A BILL TO SET UP A "UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT AGENCY FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY."

THE NEW, AUTONOMOUS FEDERAL BUREAU WOULD REPLACE THE "U.S. DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION," WHICH NOW OPERATES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDER JOHN J. MCCLOY, KENNEDY'S SPECIAL ADVISER ON DISARMAMENT.

THE BASIC IDEA IS TO CREATE A LONG-TERM AGENCY TO DEAL WITH A LONG-TERM COLD WAR PROBLEM--HOW TO CHECK THE SPIRALING ARMS RACE.

A WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT SAID KENNEDY'S PLAN WOULD CARRY OUT A 1960 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM PROMISE. THE STATEMENT SAID THE BILL ALSO INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF AN "ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH INSTITUTE" BILL KENNEDY PROPOSED AS A SENATOR AND "PEACE AGENCIES" PROPOSALS MADE BY OTHER DEMOCRATS.

THE NEW AGENCY WOULD EXPAND ON THE DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION WHICH FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER SET UP LAST OCTOBER.

KENNEDY WANTS THE NEW AGENCY TO BE HEADED BY A \$22,500-A-YEAR, SUBCABINET LEVEL DIRECTOR, WHO WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT'S DISARMAMENT ADVISER AND WOULD REPORT BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WILLIAM C. FOSTER, WHO HAS HELD IMPORTANT DISARMAMENT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE JOBS UNDER THE PAST TWO ADMINISTRATIONS AND IS ASSISTING MCCLOY NOW, HAS BEEN MENTIONED FOR THE TOP POST. SOURCES SAID KENNEDY HAS NOT YET MADE A DECISION. MCCLOY, NOW ENGAGED IN PRELIMINARY DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA, INTENDS TO RETIRE TO A PURELY ADVISORY ROLE.

JA1053A 6/29

ADVANCE FOR NOON

(ADVANCE) WASHINGTON--ADD DISARMAMENT (27)

PRELIMINARY PLANS CALL FOR STEPPING UP THE 80-MAN DISARMAMENT STAFF TO SOME 200 THE FIRST YEAR, RAISING ITS BUDGET FROM \$800,000 TO \$6-7 MILLION, AND RETAINING OFFICES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUILDING IN RECOGNITION OF THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY.

THE EVENTUAL BUDGET COULD CONCEIVABLY RUN INTO BILLIONS--IF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS AGREEMENT IS REACHED THAT REQUIRES MUCH POLICING. KENNEDY ADVISERS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE RUSSIA IS BACKING AWAY FROM ANY DISARMAMENT ACCORD.

AS A STARTER, THE DISARMAMENT AGENCY WOULD TAKE ON MORE EXPERTS FROM THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

IT WOULD HIRE SKILLED RESEARCH SCIENTISTS AND WOULD EXPAND CONTRACTS TO RESEARCH FIRMS FOR STUDIES ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS.

THE WIDER-RANGING AUTHORITY IN KENNEDY'S BILL PROVIDES FOR STUDIES SUCH ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS, SUCH AS HOW TO READJUST U.S. INDUSTRY IF DISARMAMENT COMES ABOUT.

THE DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR, UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DIRECTION, WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO CONDUCT DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES.

THE TICKLISH QUESTION OF CONFLICTS WITH REGULAR FEDERAL AGENCIES IN SETTING DISARMAMENT POLICY, WHICH ENTER AGENCIES HAVE LONG DISCUSSED.

MCCLOY, WHO DREW UP THE PLAN, REPORTED SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. MACNAMARA AND OTHER AGENCY HEADS "ALL CONCUR" IN THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE AGENCY.

THE DISARMAMENT CHIEF IS SUPPOSED TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH OTHER AGENCIES, ESPECIALLY THE STATE DEPARTMENT. BUT IF HE DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HE CAN GO STRAIGHT TO THE PRESIDENT.

LT1115AED 6/29



REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  
held at Geneva, Switzerland  
March-September, 1961

In January and February, 1961, all of the U. S. positions on the outstanding issues of the nuclear test ban conference were carefully reviewed. In this connection, a very distinguished panel of scientists and experts were convened under the Chairmanship of Dr. James B. Fisk, and the resulting report served as the basis for a reconsideration of the entire problem. Consultations with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, and others, were conducted and frequent reports and discussions were held with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress. Soviet statements on the issues on which they considered it necessary to reach agreement were also carefully examined. This review of U. S. positions resulted in the drafting of new proposals. Each proposal was designed to meet, as far as possible, the views of the Soviet Union on major outstanding issues. Each of the new U. S. positions was also thoroughly discussed with the United Kingdom and a joint position was reached.

On March 21, 1961, Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, who was asked to lead the U. S. Delegation at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, presented these new compromise proposals to the Soviet Union. The Western proposals included provisions:

- (1) to reduce the number of control posts on Soviet territory from 21 to 19 and in the United States from 17 to 16;
- (2) to extend from 27 months to 3 years the proposed moratorium on small underground tests and the associated seismic research program;
- (3) to institute the means to ban all nuclear weapons tests in space;
- (4) to ask the Congress for legislative authority to permit Soviet internal inspection of the nuclear devices used in the seismic research and peaceful engineering programs;
- (5) to accept a veto over the total annual budget;
- (6) to organize the policy-making Control Commission so as to give the Soviet Union a voice in guiding the control system equal to that of the United States and the United Kingdom combined.

On May 29th, the UK and the US, in a further effort to induce agreement, also proposed to reduce the number of on-site inspections in the territory of each of the negotiating states from 20 to a possible 12, depending on the number of suspicious seismic events.

The Soviet Union did not accept these attempts to resolve the outstanding differences. Instead, on March 21, 1961, it withdrew its previous agreement on a single Administrator to oversee the daily executive and administrative tasks of the control organization. In place of the single Administrator, the Soviet Union proposed to substitute a three-man directorate -- the "troika" -- with each member, Soviet, Western, and neutral, possessing a veto over every action of that body. The "troika" arrangement would, of course, have made a mockery of effective control by providing a possibility of completely paralyzing the executive arm of the control organization.

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Subsequently, and throughout the remainder of the negotiations, the Soviet Union maintained a stance of unyielding obduracy. The Soviet Union also made clear in its aide memoire given to the President at Vienna on June 4 that the only way agreement could be reached on the test ban was to merge consideration of it with the broader problem of general and complete disarmament. Finally, on July 15, the United States and the United Kingdom asked for urgent consideration of the problem at the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly.

On August 28, in a last attempt to make progress before General Assembly consideration of the test ban issue, and as an indication of our willingness to go even further in order to induce agreement, Ambassador Dean returned to Geneva with additional new proposals. These proposals provided for:

(1) Removal of the single administrator by a decision of seven members of the Commission;

(2) Staffing of on-site inspection teams in the USSR, UK, and US so that up to one-half of the personnel could come from neutral nations;

(3) Methods to lower the threshold of the treaty by extending the control system so that all or practically all underground tests would be included in the treaty ban either immediately or at the end of the three-year moratorium on small underground weapon tests.

On August 31, 1961, the Soviet Union suddenly announced the resumption of nuclear weapon tests and on September 1, exploded its first device in the atmosphere. In the days immediately following, the President and Prime Minister Macmillan offered to ban all tests in the atmosphere without any additional controls. Subsequently, the Soviet Union stepped up the momentum of its rapid test program and on September 5, the intention of the United States to resume nuclear weapon tests underground was announced.

The rapid progress of the Soviet Union's test program -- fifteen shots of from small to intermediate yield over a period of twenty-two days -- suggests that extensive secret preparations for test resumption were undertaken by the Soviet Union during a major portion of this year's session of the Geneva Conference. The first Soviet shot came within hours of the announcement of resumption and on at least one occasion two weapons were exploded within the period of a single day.

On September 9, Chairman Khrushchev delivered his rejection of the atmospheric test ban proposal to our Ambassador at Moscow. The same day, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon tests recessed.

It was proposed by the UK and the US that the recess last until after the completion of General Assembly debate on the nuclear test ban item. The Soviet representative agreed, but was unwilling to commit himself specifically to any resumption of the talks.

The United States and the United Kingdom have submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution urging that an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests under effective control be concluded at the earliest possible time. This proposal remains the cornerstone of our policy. The test ban, as pointed out in the President's speech to the General Assembly on September 25, 1961, is the logical



place to begin on a program of general and complete disarmament. It is a step which can be taken now to reverse the dangerous and burdensome arms race, to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons and the capability to manufacture them, to contribute to the reduction of international tensions and to eliminate any health hazard associated with nuclear testing. It is to be hoped that effective and forthright action by the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution proposed jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States will ensure that this first step is taken as soon as possible. However, it is clear that this objective can be achieved only if the Soviet Union reverses its present policy and agrees to participate in further negotiations at Geneva in good faith and with an intention to reach an accord with a willingness to accept whatever reasonable controls and inspection measures the situation demands to insure fulfillment of the objective.

October 2, 1961.

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REPORT ON THE US/USSR EXCHANGE  
OF VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

A. BACKGROUND

As a result of an understanding reached between Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko during the second half of the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, there took place an exchange of views between the US and the USSR on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations in an agreed body. At the Secretary of State's request, Mr. John J. McCloy served as United States spokesman during that exchange.

The exchange of views took place in Washington, D. C. from June 19 to June 30; in Moscow, from July 17 to July 29; and in New York, from September 6 to September 19, 1961. In the course of the talks, both sides introduced documents setting forth their respective views.

During the entire exchange, an effort was made on the part of the U. S. representative to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on a basis which would permit a speedy resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations. The United States took the position that the objective of the exchange was to reach agreement between the US and the USSR on the framework for disarmament negotiations and on the composition of the negotiating body, such agreement to be submitted as recommendation to the other States concerned.

The United States set forth its views on what it regarded as the basic principles by which any comprehensive disarmament negotiations should be guided. In the first instance, it endeavored to impress upon the Soviet Union its conviction that:

(1) The disarmament process should go hand-in-hand with a gradual development of institutions designed to settle international disputes by peaceful means and effectively to maintain peace;

(2) Implementation of all obligations undertaken by States should be subject to effective verification so as to give assurance to all parties that all obligations are being fulfilled; and

(3) The implementation of any agreement that can be reached on a specific disarmament measure or group of measures should not await agreement on a full program of general and complete disarmament which might well involve a lengthy period of negotiations. At the same time, the US emphasized its readiness to negotiate without interruption until a total program of general and complete disarmament has been developed and agreed.

The United States also proposed four alternative formulae for the composition of the negotiating body, including a forum comprised of the members of the Ten-Nation Committee and additional ten States, including non-committed States, selected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

At the outset of the talks, the Soviet Union took the position that no disarmament negotiations could take place unless and until a US/USSR understanding was reached on the basic provisions of a specific disarmament



plan. In spite of the position taken by the United States that no specific disarmament plans, which of necessity affect the interests of many other States, should be discussed in the absence of such States, the Soviet Union sought to prove, on the basis of its plan, the merits of its own approach. The Soviet Union also refused to discuss the question of the composition of the negotiating body until a US-USSR understanding on the basic provisions of a disarmament plan was reached.

The USSR pursued this approach almost until the end of the Moscow phase of the talks. Two days before the end of that phase, the USSR altered its position and agreed to discuss a statement of principles. It also expressed its views on the question of the negotiating forum, reiterating its past position which provides for addition to the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee of a component of neutral States, thus reflecting the Soviet concept of a World divided into three distinct blocs.

The final phase of the talks, which took place in New York, was devoted to efforts to arrive at an agreed statement of principles for future disarmament negotiations. As a result, on September 19, agreement was reached on a document that was acceptable to both sides and a report to that effect was submitted to the United Nations. The text of the US/USSR report and of the joint US/USSR statement of agreed principles is attached here as part of Tab B. The United States also submitted to the United Nations a memorandum on the principles which should govern negotiations for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world and a US memorandum on the composition of the negotiating forum which had been presented earlier in the course of the discussion. A text of these documents is also attached hereto as part of Tab B.

The question of the composition of the negotiating body remained unresolved.

## B. EVALUATION

The exchange of views was useful in the sense that both sides had an opportunity to expound their respective positions and thus gain a greater insight into each others thinking. Although the main US objective -- that of making possible the resumption of disarmament negotiations at an early date -- could not be achieved, it is believed that the joint statement of agreed principles is an important step in that direction.

It should be recognized that while the joint statement is not a disarmament plan in itself, or an agreement as to specific measures, it does constitute recognition by both sides of certain fundamental concepts which the US believes to be essential if any progress in comprehensive disarmament is to be made.

Thus, both sides have recorded their readiness to negotiate a total program for general and complete disarmament without prejudice to such areas of agreement as could be reached and implemented, perhaps as part of the total program, even before such program has been developed and agreed.

Among the important principles which the Soviet Union has agreed to include in the statement are those of the need for a gradual development of international peacekeeping institutions and for a control system assuring all parties that the obligations undertaken are being faithfully fulfilled. The Soviet Union, however, still refuses to accept what the US believes to be inherent in this latter concept; namely, that there should be verified not only obligations with respect to reductions of forces or armaments, but also those relating to the maintenance of agreed levels of forces or armaments. The US understanding of this problem was expressed in the letter which Mr. McCloy sent to Mr. Zorin on September 20. This letter, together with Mr. Zorin's reply, is attached hereto as part of Tab B.

## UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISARMAMENT DOCUMENT SERIES

REF #198

September 21, 1961

Report of the US and USSR to the Sixteenth  
Session of the United Nations General Assembly  
Concerning Their Talks on Disarmament

The Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the United Nations Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly a report covering the results of their exchange of views relating to disarmament, together with a copy of their joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.

A copy of the report and agreed statement of principles are circulated herewith for your information.

Beatrice R. Puckett  
Staff Assistant for Communications  
Room 5672-B NS  
Ext. 6783

Attachment:

Report and Agreed Statement.

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REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
TO THE 16th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS  
ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT AND TO THE  
RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN AN APPROPRIATE BODY,  
WHOSE COMPOSITION IS TO BE AGREED UPON

In accordance with their statements of March 30, 1961, at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Governments of the United States and the USSR wish to inform the members of the General Assembly of their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is to be agreed upon.

1. The exchange of views took place in Washington, D. C. from June 19 to June 30; in Moscow from July 17 to July 29; and in New York from September 6 to September 19, 1961.

2. As a result of the exchange of views, the two Governments submit a joint statement of agreed principles which they recommend as guidance for disarmament negotiations when such negotiations are resumed. The text of these agreed principles is attached hereto in the form of a joint statement of the two Governments.

3. The two Governments were not able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the 16th General Assembly.

Attachment:

Joint Statement of Agreed Principles  
for Disarmament Negotiations.

September 20, 1961

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JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES FOR  
DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on March 30, 1961,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959,

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a UN peace force.

3. To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.



4. The disarmament program should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total program has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

September 20, 1961

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September 20, 1961

Dear Mr. Zorin:

At the September 18, 1961 session of our bilateral discussions on disarmament you indicated that the draft of a joint statement of agreed principles which I submitted to you on behalf of the United States Government on September 14, 1961 would be acceptable to the Government of the Soviet Union provided the following clause were omitted from paragraph 6:

"Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage."

This sentence expresses a key element in the United States position which we believe is implicit in the entire joint statement of agreed principles that whenever an agreement stipulates that at a certain point certain levels of forces and armaments may be retained, the verification machinery must have all the rights and powers necessary to ensure that those levels are not exceeded.

It appears from your statements that the Soviet Union will be unwilling to agree to a joint statement of agreed principles unless the above-mentioned clause is omitted therefrom. My Government has authorized me to inform you that, in the interests of progress toward resuming disarmament negotiations, it is willing to remove the above-mentioned sentence from paragraph 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles since it is an item to which the Soviet Union has not agreed.

This is done upon the express understanding that the substantive position of the United States Government as outlined in the above-quoted sentence and in our memorandum of September 14, 1961 remains unchanged, and is in no sense prejudiced by the exclusion of this sentence from the joint statement of agreed principles.

The United States continues to adhere to and will continue to advance the principle contained in the omitted sentence as a necessary element in any comprehensive disarmament negotiations or agreement.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John J. McCloy

His Excellency  
V. A. Zorin,  
Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR,  
Permanent Mission of the USSR to  
The United Nations,  
680 Park Avenue,  
New York 21, New York.

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## UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISARMAMENT DOCUMENT SERIES

REF #199

September 22, 1961

Ambassador Zorin's Letter to Mr. McCloy re  
U. S. Reservation to Joint Statement  
of Agreed Principles

There is attached a copy of Mr. Zorin's letter of September 21, 1961  
in response to Mr. McCloy's letter of September 20, 1961 (see REF #196)  
concerning the United States reservation to the Joint Statement of Agreed  
Principles (see REF #198).

Beatrice R. Puckett  
Staff Assistant for Communications  
Room 5672-B NS  
Ext. 5783

Attachment:

Mr. Zorin's Letter of 9/21/61.

State-RD.

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Text of Mr. Zorin's Letter to  
Mr. McCloy re Agreed Principles

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I have received your letter of September 20th in which you make a reservation with regard to the position which the United States intends to take in further negotiations on disarmament.

In accordance with the agreement reached between us during the bilateral exchange of views, the U. S. agreed not to include in the Joint Statement by the Government of the USSR and the USA on the principles for disarmament negotiations the clause which is known to you and the acceptance of which would represent agreement to the concept of establishing control over armament instead of control over disarmament. In your letter you indicate that the clause expresses "a key element in the U. S. position."

In this connection, I must state that, as you well know, the position of the USSR on the question of control over general and complete disarmament has been set forth sufficiently, fully and clearly in statements by the Soviet Government and its head, N. S. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union advocates the most thorough, the most strict international control over measures of general and complete disarmament. While being for effective control over disarmament and desiring to facilitate as much as possible the reaching of agreement on such control, the Soviet Union at the same time resolutely opposes establishment of control over armaments.

It follows from your letter that the U. S. seeks to establish control over armed forces and armaments which will be retained by states at the various stages of disarmament. However, such control, which in fact means control over armaments, would become an international system of legalized espionage, which of course, cannot be accepted by any state which is interested in its security and in the maintenance of world peace. The U. S. position in this matter, if the U. S. continues to insist on the above mentioned clause, cannot but make more difficult agreement on a program of general and complete disarmament, the general principles of which have been agreed between us.

As to the Soviet Union, it will continue to exert every effort to develop as promptly as possible a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ V. A. Zorin  
Permanent Representative  
of the USSR to the UN

9/21/61

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MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES THAT  
SHOULD GOVERN NEGOTIATIONS FOR GENERAL  
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Government and the people of the United States have traditionally worked for the achievement of a peaceful world in which nations will no longer resort to war as an instrument for settling international problems. They remain dedicated to this goal.

In taking the initiative last March and suggesting a bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Government on disarmament, the United States acted in the belief that a frank and informal discussion of issues of principle could make an important contribution to the appreciation by each side of the views and positions of the other and to effective progress along the road to a lasting peace. It also sought to meet repeated Soviet insistence that no multilateral negotiations could take place without an agreed framework for them. The United States hoped that this exchange of views would lead to a joint understanding of the guidelines for resumed multilateral negotiations -- negotiations which the Soviet Union arbitrarily abandoned in 1960. Last March there appeared to be a common understanding with the Soviet Government that once these guidelines and an appropriate and representative forum were agreed upon and accepted by the other participants, multilateral negotiations would reopen on July 31. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government took the view that such an understanding regarding both the nature of the bilateral talks and the resumption of multilateral negotiations on July 31 did not exist.

The Soviet Government stated that the bilateral talks should turn instead directly to a consideration of specific plans and that without a large measure of agreement on such specific plans there could be no multilateral negotiations. The United States believes on the other hand that negotiation of detailed disarmament plans is the concern of many states. Therefore, the United States cannot accept a procedure whereby these interested states would be excluded from participation in working out an agreement.

Consequently, the United States sought to achieve a meeting of minds on a set of principles to be submitted for approval to the other participants in multilateral negotiations. This, the United States believed, would prepare the ground for detailed and fruitful negotiations of specific measures and programs. Such a procedure, if followed from the outset, as was the understanding reached by Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko last March, would have provided for the presentation and discussion of a specific program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in the appropriate multilateral forum at any time after July 31. The United States regretfully saw July 31 pass without such negotiations having been commenced.

To facilitate accomplishment of the task of the bilateral exchange of views the United States representative at the bilateral talks gave the Soviet representative on June 19 a draft statement of principles setting forth the purpose of the multilateral negotiations and the principles that should guide them. This statement closely conformed to the type of statements that had previously been the subject of an exchange of views between Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The United States several times made revisions of its draft statement of principles in order to meet points that had been raised in the course of the bilateral talks.

The United States representative did not, however, confine himself to the presentation of these documents. In accordance with our understanding of the purpose of the bilateral exchange of views, he sought to engage the Soviet representative in a productive discussion of the principles and considerations underlying the written documents.



As is clear from the United States documents submitted during the bilateral discussions, the United States objective is to implement a program which ensures total disarmament with states retaining at their disposal only those minimal forces and non-nuclear armaments required for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens. Apart from these internal security forces, only an international peace force would exist. All other military force would be eliminated. The program desired by the United States would include the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace, including the International Peace Force, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The United States also set forth its views on several important specific aspects of the search for agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

First, the United States stresses the importance of working out a total over-all program providing for complete disarmament. The United States is prepared to work out the whole program. At the same time, the United States cannot accept a situation where nothing concrete can be done until the very last word has been agreed for the total program. Consequently, it urges acceptance of the proposition that without prejudice to eventual development of the total program an attempt must be made to find the widest possible area of agreement--including any individual measures or groups of measures--and to implement such measures just as soon as they are agreed. The United States believes that while the complete program with its admittedly complex provisions is being worked out, no opportunity should be missed to make a start. Any beginning, even the most limited, will represent progress. Moreover, it would facilitate the work on, and indeed form part of, the total program which is the stated goal. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will accept this practical approach. In disarmament, as elsewhere, the way to begin is to begin. This is why the United States particularly deplores the retreat of the Soviet Government from an effective agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests, which would have been a significant first step on the road to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Secondly, the United States stresses the inseparable relationship between the drastic scaling down of national armaments and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions. Any program, even if it carries the title "General and Complete Disarmament," which does not embody this relationship is a program for disorder and the perpetuation of disputes among nations. Nations which are expected to give up their means of self-protection must have available other effective means of safeguarding their legitimate interests. They must be protected against possible violators of a disarmament agreement by effective international enforcement measures. They must have available judicial and non-judicial procedures for the equitable settlement of disputes and for harmonizing conflicting interests and aspirations as they arise. They must be assured that change in the world will be orderly and progressive. And if necessary they must be assured of the protection of an international force capable of operating effectively for the common benefit of all nations and not in the special interest of any one nation or group of nations.

The procedures and institutions envisaged by the United States would be within the framework of the United Nations as part of the program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. These procedures and institutions would not permit nations to invoke doctrines of sacred or just wars in behalf of unilateral military action since they would ensure that no one really seeking justice or the fulfillment of legitimate aspirations



will need to have recourse to their own force. They would not permit arbitrary revisions of established international agreements and infringements of other nations' rights. The United States believes firmly that nations must be prepared to moderate gradually the exercise of unrestricted sovereignty and to abide by the decisions and judgments of tribunals and other bodies, even if such decisions at times may not meet with a particular nation's approval.

The Soviet Government, judging from the statements of its representative during the bilateral talks, does not appear as yet to recognize the essential requirement of the progressive development of effective peace-keeping machinery parallel to the implementation of measures leading to total disarmament.

Thirdly, the United States insists upon effective verification of all disarmament measures from beginning to end. The fundamental precept guiding the United States is that the implementation of every obligation entered into must be subject to effective verification in order to provide each participating state with confidence that every other state is fulfilling its commitments.

Verification only of the process of reducing or destroying particular elements of military strength, as proposed by the Soviet Union, does not meet the criterion of effective verification of all obligations entered into. What must be certain is not only that nations are removing certain numbers of forces and armaments from their military establishments, but also that they are not maintaining forces and armaments or engaging in activities in excess of those permitted at a given step or stage in the disarmament program.

Any disarmament program which professes to meet the criterion of effective verification must provide unambiguously for means of detecting clandestine or other activities not authorized in the agreement. The absence of such provision would make any disarmament plan a sham.

It follows, further, that the verification system must be fully capable of exercising the functions necessary to ensure compliance with the agreement throughout the entire disarmament process and not just at the end of it. The phrase frequently used in Soviet statements that "under conditions of general and complete disarmament the most thorough control must be implemented" is ambiguous and does not adequately reflect the necessity for effective verification at every step and stage of the disarmament process. Indeed, it must be pointed out that if, as the Soviet Union suggests, control can be "most thorough" only "under conditions" of general and complete disarmament, but not during the process of implementing the measures leading to general and complete disarmament, it may never be possible to determine whether the "conditions" of general and complete disarmament have in fact arrived or to protect a complying party against the consequences of violation or evasion of a disarmament agreement by others.

The United States believes that effective verification requires smooth day-to-day functioning of the inspection machinery. The rights and functions of the verification system would be spelled out in detail in any agreement and in its annexes. There would of course be a political body composed as agreed by the parties, which would exercise policy supervision over the administrative arm of the control organ. But this administrative arm itself must be able to work as fast and efficiently as possible and without hindrance if it is to have the confidence of all parties. Sound administrative practice the world over and the requirement of effective



verification demand efficient administration of the disarmament verification machinery. For this reason the United States rejects firmly the concept of some sort of multi-headed administrative machinery. The United States, moreover, does not agree with the effort of the Soviet Government to divide the world into three or any other number of blocs or "camps". As the United States representative indicated during the bilateral discussions, the agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world should include a mechanism providing states with recourse in the event they believe that personnel of the administrative machinery are not properly discharging their functions.

The United States believes that the nature and extent of controls should depend strictly on the objective requirements for verification of each disarmament measure. The agreement and its annexes, based as they must be on adequate scientific and technical findings, should set forth in detail the verification requirements for each measure. No other consideration than assurances that each measure will be fully and punctually implemented should enter into the specification of verification requirements. This will ensure that no legitimate security interests of any state will be adversely affected by the application of disarmament controls.

The United States believes that the elaboration of the means of verification is the joint responsibility of all states interested in the achievement of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Soviet Union has for the past year suggested that, on the contrary, the West must carry the burden of elaborating a verification system. The United States urges the Soviet Government to join the United States in multilateral negotiations and in the conscientious and businesslike development of a verification system which would enable all parties to repose trust in a disarmament agreement.

The United States representative also dealt with numerous other aspects of principle in order to amplify the written documents tabled by the United States. He said the United States believes that time limits must be worked out for the completion of all disarmament measures as well as for the completion of each stage. However, the problem of establishing these time limits is complicated by the numerous technical problems involved in working out effective and reliable means of implementing disarmament measures. Moreover, an over-all time limit would, of course, have to take into account the procedure for transition between stages. The United States will devote every effort toward solving these problems and hopes the Soviet Union is prepared to do likewise. Once the time limits for the measures in each stage and for the stages themselves have been worked out, it will be possible to estimate the time limit for the implementation of the total program. The United States believes, however, that it would be unrealistic and dangerously misleading to pretend that a specific over-all time limit can be established in advance.

With regard to transition from one stage to the next, the United States believes that the underlying principle must be that states will at each stage be assured that all parties have fulfilled their obligations and that the next steps in the disarmament program can then safely be taken. Without such assurance, there would be cause for suspicion and dispute, which might disrupt the entire disarmament process. Accordingly, the United States believes that transition from stage to stage should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have in fact been implemented as provided in the agreement. As soon as this decision has been taken, implementation of the next stage would commence forthwith. The Soviet position on this question remains obscure despite repeated United States attempts to obtain clarification.



The United States also attempted to resolve the issue of the composition of a multilateral negotiating forum. Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko had agreed previously that this would be one of the purposes of the bilateral discussions. Accordingly, the United States presented the Soviet Union with several alternative possibilities for a forum including: (1) the reconvening of the Ten-Nation Committee, which the USSR abandoned in 1960; (2) the addition to that Committee of three officers selected from other countries; (3) an expansion of the Committee by 10 members selected on an equitable geographical basis, and (4) the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Unfortunately, neither the oral statements of the Soviet representative nor a Soviet aide-memoire tabled on July 28 indicated a constructive Soviet response to these United States suggestions. Disarmament negotiations cannot, of course, take place without the Soviet Government. Since that Government still appears unwilling to accept a forum of workable size and equitable composition, the United States proposes that negotiations be resumed in the first instance in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. However, if the Soviet Government agrees, the United States remains willing to resume negotiations in a Committee composed of the original members of the Ten-Nation Committee, with the addition of the following countries: from Asia -- Pakistan, India and Japan; from Latin America -- Mexico, Brazil and Argentina; from Africa and the Middle East -- the UAR, Nigeria and Tunisia; and from Europe -- Sweden. Such a committee would ensure equitable and fair representation to all geographical regions of the world. The Soviet Government is already in possession of the United States memorandum of July 29, 1961, in which the United States position on the forum issue was set forth in detail.

The views and considerations presented in this memorandum, in conjunction with the draft Statements of Principles which have been given to the Soviet Government, provide a clear statement of the position of the United States on the principles which should govern the working out of an agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The United States Government has studied the Statement of the Soviet Government of June 27, 1961, the Soviet Government's aide-memoire of July 19 and July 21, and the draft statement of principles which the Soviet representative submitted on July 27. It has carefully taken into account the positions of the Soviet Government expressed in these documents as well as in the statements of the Soviet representative during the bilateral talks. The successive drafts of statements of principles submitted by the United States testify to its consistent effort to meet any constructive suggestion put forward by the Soviet Union. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will similarly make a sincere effort to work out a mutually acceptable statement of principles which will permit the early resumption of multilateral negotiations.

New York City, New York

September 14, 1961

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UNITED STATES  
MEMORANDUM ON COMPOSITION OF THE DISARMAMENT FORUM

The objective of the United States is the resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations. It has made, and now reaffirms, four alternative proposals for the composition of a disarmament forum:

1) Ten-Nation Committee: The United States remains prepared to resume negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee, which was established by agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom in September 1959. The work of this committee, which is composed of five NATO Powers (the US, UK, France, Canada and Italy) and five Warsaw Pact Powers (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania), was left unfinished by virtue of the Soviet Union's break-off of negotiations in Geneva on June 27, 1960. It was conceived that the deliberations of this Committee would provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations. In this way, a stage would be achieved, after a basis for agreement was reached by the members of this Committee, in which all members of the United Nations would participate in an effective way in the disarmament negotiations, which are of concern to all the nations of the world. The United States continues to believe that this represents a sound and orderly approach, which has been approved by the United Nations and which should not be abandoned.

2) Ten-Nation Committee with Invited presiding Officials: The United States is fully prepared to join with the other three powers which established the Ten-Nation Committee in extending an invitation to three other nations, not members of the NATO or Warsaw Treaty organizations, to designate a chairman and two vice-chairmen of the Ten-Nation Committee. These officers would preside over meetings of the Committee, using their good offices as appropriate to facilitate the achievement of agreement, without bearing the additional responsibility of serving as official spokesmen of their governments in the negotiations or attempting to act as formal "representatives" of a non-existent "neutral" bloc.

3) Twenty-Nation Committee: The United States is fully prepared, considering its objective of reaching agreement on disarmament, to propose changing the original concept of the Ten-Nation Committee by an expansion of its membership so that countries not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact can participate at the initial negotiating level, as well as through the U.N. Such an expansion should be consistent with normal principles of equitable representation of the different regions of the world and with the desirability of selecting countries on the basis of such relevant factors as population and military capabilities. Accordingly, the United States proposes that three countries be added to the Ten-Nation Committee from Asia, three from Latin America, three from the Middle East and Africa, and one from non-NATO, non-Soviet Bloc Europe. The United States has suggested that the following states might appropriately be added: Pakistan, India and Japan from Asia; Mexico, Brazil and Argentina from Latin America; the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Tunisia from Africa and the Middle East; and Sweden from Europe.

4) The UN Disarmament Commission: If none of these alternatives is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States proposes that substantive negotiations be resumed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which all UN members are represented. The UN Disarmament Commission would be free to establish, if it so wished, smaller subcommittees in which detailed negotiations could be conducted.

July 29, 1961

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DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT PLAN

With the completion in March of the review of the nuclear test policy, attention was directed next to the development of a comprehensive United States disarmament plan. The statements of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Stevenson concerning the bilateral discussions on the forum and framework of a resumed disarmament negotiation made it necessary for the United States to be prepared for the resumption of these negotiations by July 31, 1961. Given the shortness of time to prepare and then to coordinate within the U. S. Government and with the Allies a new, far-reaching disarmament plan, two decisions were made: first, to have the U. S. Disarmament Administration prepare a draft plan drawing on new ideas that had emerged from extensive work on arms control going on in the Universities and Research Foundations, on new ideas recently submitted by our Allies, and on a variety of proposals in previous negotiations; and, second, to assemble a number of panels composed of distinguished individuals considered experts in the various areas of arms control and disarmament to address themselves to the draft plan.

The following were the panels and their chairmen:

- Conventional Arms and Armed Forces -  
Major Gen. John E. Hull
- Nuclear Armaments                      Professor Harvey Brooks  
Dean of Engineering,  
Harvard University
- Delivery Vehicles                      Dr. Donald Ling,  
Bell Telephone Laboratories
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological Warfare -  
Dr. Robert Cairns,  
Hercules Powder Company
- War by Accident, Miscalculation, Surprise Attack -  
Professor Thomas C. Schelling,  
Harvard University
- International Legal and Security Arrangements -  
Professor Louis Henkin,  
University of Pennsylvania Law School
- Regional Disarmament                      Mr. Girard Smith, formerly Assistant  
Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Outer Space                              Dr. Chalmers Sherwin  
Aerospace Corporation
- New Approaches                              Mr. Richard Leghorn, President  
ITEK Corporation
- Economic Aspects of Disarmament -  
Dr. Emile Benoit,  
Columbia University

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The work of these panels was completed by May 13 and the Policy Staff then prepared a revised draft of the U. S. disarmament plan, taking into account the reports of these panels. This draft was circulated on May 31 for comment within the Government and as a staff draft given on June 1 to our Western partners for their comment. Agreement had been reached between the US and USSR to have bilateral disarmament discussions beginning June 19 in Washington with the hope -- as the US understood it -- of agreeing on the framework for future multilateral negotiations. Because the preambular part of the new draft plan dealing with the goal, the task, and the principles governing negotiations constituted the US recommendation for the framework of new negotiations, clearance on the substance of this part of the draft was sought and obtained from the Government and the Allies in time for the beginning of the US-USSR bilaterals on June 19.

Taking into account Departmental and Allied comment, another revision of the plan was produced and circulated on June 24 in preparation for a meeting of the heads of Departments and Agencies concerned on July 5. The principal issue remaining within the U. S. Government after this "Meeting of Principals" was the question of the relationship of the various measures to each other. After a week of extensive discussion in Washington beginning July 10 with representatives of Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (the other Western members of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee), a final meeting of the Principals was held on August 3. The final decision on the substance of the plan was made by you on August 18 and consultation with NATO was completed on August 31. Finally, on September 25, the product of these efforts -- entitled "Declaration on Disarmament: A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" -- was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations and publicly released in connection with your address to the General Assembly.

The proposals contained in this plan represent an imaginative yet realistic program to bring the present arms race to an end. The plan advances in many respects well beyond what has heretofore been put forward by the United States in the field of disarmament. The new features include a recognition of the fact that progress in disarmament must be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and for settlement of international disputes by peaceful means by including provisions for the establishment of a permanent United Nations Peace Force and peacekeeping machinery strong enough to cope with the threats or use of force by any nation or group of nations. These new features also include an increased emphasis on the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems at an early stage in the disarmament process, including measures designed to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons to nations not now owning them. The plan also includes a commitment to seek and implement immediately as wide an area of agreement as possible and to continue this effort without interruption until general and complete disarmament has been achieved.

The last word, of course, has not been spoken on disarmament, and reasonable flexibility is essential if disarmament is to be achieved. However, if the Soviet Union and other Communist states are seriously interested in disarmament, the US proposals can afford a realistic basis for negotiation of a detailed disarmament plan.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

UNCLASSIFIED

DISARMAMENT DOCUMENT SERIES  
REF #195  
September 25, 1961

Declaration on Disarmament:  
A Program for General and Complete Disarmament  
In a Peaceful World

The above-captioned comprehensive disarmament  
proposal was submitted by the United States of America  
in the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly of  
the United Nations on September 25, 1961.

Beatrice R. Puckett  
Staff Assistant for Communications  
Room 5672-B NS

Attachment:

U. S. Disarmament Plan.

State-RD.

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The following is submitted by the United States of America as a proposed Declaration on Disarmament for consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a guide for the negotiation of a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

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DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT:  
A PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT  
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

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Call on the negotiating states:

- (a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;
- (b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;
- (c) Also to seek -- without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program -- agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

- (a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.
- (b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.
- (c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.
- (d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
- (e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

- (a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required  
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for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and USSR and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

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(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation the information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force -- including nuclear, conventional, or CBR -- contrary to the principles of the UN Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a UN peace force.

(e) A UN peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the US, USSR, and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.



C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peacekeeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The UN peace force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

### STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the UN should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened UN Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a UN Peace Force.

(b) The UN Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the UN Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.



REPORT ON THE ADOPTION OF THE LEGISLATION  
known as the  
"ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT"

In the President's letter to Mr. John J. McCloy of January 27, 1961, the latter was given the task of making recommendations to the President regarding the organization of the U.S. Disarmament Administration and related activities. The U. S. Disarmament Administration, which was then in existence as a part of the Department of State, had been established by Departmental order by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on September 9, 1960. No Director had been appointed for the organization. It was headed by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, an able career Foreign Service Officer, who had been designated as Acting Deputy Director on October 12, 1960.

Because of the pressing and immediate problems in connection with preparation of the U. S. position of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, it was not possible to devote a great deal of personal attention to this problem until the formulation of the U.S. position for the Geneva discussions and Ambassador Dean had left for the Geneva Conference on March 15, 1961. In the spring of this year, as part of the study of this problem, consultations were conducted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as well as a number of other Government officials, including the President of the United States. Consultations also took place with a number of private persons whose experience and knowledge in the field of Government organization was impressive, including Professor Richard E. Neustadt of Columbia University, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Mr. James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation, and Mr. Don K. Price of the Ford Foundation.

As a result of these studies, the conclusion was reached that an Agency should be established by statute at an authoritative level in the Government with the exceptionally broad competence, functions, and resources required to work on the problems of arms control and disarmament, including the conduct of the research so essential to progress in this field. Though there was considerable support for an entirely independent Agency reporting only to the President, the conclusion was reached that those conducting this research should be in the same organization as those charged with conducting negotiations in the field, and that the organization should be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, although distinct from the Department of State. Since the Director of the new Agency would have to deal with and coordinate the activities of many other agencies of Government which have direct access to the President, it was felt that the Director should serve as the principal adviser to the President as well as to the Secretary of State in the disarmament field, with direct access to the President upon notification to the Secretary of State.

A draft bill was prepared, which put these conclusions in the form of a statute. This bill was transmitted to the President of the United States for formal clearance throughout the Government on May 9, 1961, together with an explanatory letter of transmittal and an accompanying memorandum. As a result of the clearance process, the draft bill was slightly revised and was transmitted to the President by letter of June 23, 1961. The President, in turn, transmitted the draft bill to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House by letter of June 29, 1961.

In the Senate, it was introduced as S. 2180 by Senator Humphrey and eight other Senators. In the House, it was initially introduced as H.R. 7936 by Congressman Morgan, and 70 other similar or identical bills were subsequently introduced in the House.

Hearings on these bills were held in the latter part of August and early September before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. At these hearings, the support for the bill was completely bipartisan in nature. Witnesses testifying in support of it included officials impressive in quality and number of both your Administration and the Administrations of Presidents Eisenhower and Truman. A letter, which President Eisenhower had written in support of the principles on which the bill was drafted, was introduced into the record of both Committees. Both Committees reported the bill favorably by unanimous vote.

The bill passed the Senate on September 8, 1961 by a vote of 73 to 14. A crucial amendment offered by Senator Goldwater which would have crippled the research program was defeated by a vote of 46 to 43. The bill passed the House of Representatives on September 19, 1961 by a vote of 290 to 54. A Conference Committee report was adopted by the House of Representatives on September 23, 1961, by a vote of 250 to 50 and in the Senate by unanimous consent. The President was able to report the passage of the bill to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1961.

As finally passed by the Congress, the Act incorporated the general principles of the bill originally transmitted to you on June 29, 1961; although, in the process of legislative deliberation, the language was clarified in several important respects to express more accurately the concepts which underlay the original bill.

October 2, 1961.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

March 30, 1962

Dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In connection with the visit to the President of the General Advisory Committee to this Agency on Monday, April 2 at noon, I am supplying you herewith the following which may be of use to the President:

1. Brief biographic outlines on all members of the General Advisory Committee. We expect full attendance, but you will be advised, of course, of any last minute absences and can make appropriate notations on the sheet.
2. Statement of functions and purpose of the General Advisory Committee.
3. Suggested remarks for the President for public statement purposes. Brief and informal, these are submitted on the assumption that he might desire guides for extemporaneous remarks. If something longer and more formal is desired, please advise me. A carbon copy of these remarks has been sent to Ted Sorenson.

Sincerely,

  
Adrian S. Fisher

Attachments

Mr. P. Kenneth O'Donnell  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

15a

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES

JOHN J. MCCLOY (CHAIRMAN)

Born: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 31, 1895  
Legal Residence: New York  
Present Position: Counsel, Law Firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley  
Office Address: Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York 5, New York  
Background Notes: 1960-61 - Adviser to the President on Disarmament  
1949-52 - U.S. High Commissioner for Germany  
1947-49 - President, World Bank  
1941-45 - Assistant Sec. War  
1955 - Chairman, Board Chase National Bank

ROGER M. BLOUGH

Born: Riverside, Pennsylvania, January 19, 1904  
Legal Residence: Pennsylvania  
Present Position: Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Steel Co.  
Office Address: United States Steel Co., New York City, New York  
Background Notes: 1952 - Vice Chairman, Director, Member Finance Commission  
Member, Metropolitan Music and Art Council on Foreign Relations  
1952 - Yale Law School Assn. (Executive Committee)

REV. EDWARD A. CONWAY, S.J.

Born: Milwaukee, Wisconsin, February 6, 1902  
Legal Residence: Nebraska  
Present Position: Professor of Political Science, Creighton University  
Office Address: Center for Peace, Creighton University, 2410 California Street, Omaha 31, Nebraska  
Background Notes: Director, Center for Peace Research, Creighton University  
Author, "Quest for Peace in Outerspace" Commonweal Magazine



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JOHN COWLES

Born: Algona, Iowa, December 14, 1898  
Legal Residence: Minnesota  
Present Position: President, The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.  
Office Address: Star and Tribune, Minneapolis, Minnesota  
Background Notes: 1948 - Member, Hoover Commn. Committee on National Defense  
1954-55 - Member, Committee for White House Conference on Education

TREVOR GARDNER

Born: Cardiff, Wales, August 24, 1915; Naturalized, 1937  
Legal Residence: California  
Present Position: Chairman and President of Hycon Manufacturing Company, 1956 -- Present  
Office Address: 1030 S. Arreye Parkway, Pasadena, California  
Background Notes: 1945-49 - General Manager and Executive Vice President of the General Tire and Rubber Company of California  
1953-55 - Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development  
1955-56 - Assistant Secretary of Air Force

GEORGE BOGDAN KISTIACOWSKY

Born: Kiev, Russia, November 18, 1900, came to U.S. 1926  
Naturalized, 1933  
Legal Residence: Massachusetts  
Present Position: Professor, Harvard University  
Office Address: Harvard University  
Background Notes: 1937-61 - Professor, Chemistry, Harvard University  
1959-61 - Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Born: Huntsville, Texas, September 14, 1895  
Legal Residence: New York  
Present Position: Partner, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.  
Office Address: 59 Wall Street, New York, New York  
Background Notes: 1947-49 - Under Secretary of State  
1950-51 - Deputy Secretary of Defense  
1951-53 - Secretary of Defense

DEAN ANDERSON MCGEE

Born: Humbolt, Kansas, March 20, 1904  
Legal Residence: Oklahoma  
Present Position: President of Kerr-McGee Industries  
Office Address: Kerr-McGee Building, 306 N. Robinson Street,  
Oklahoma City 2  
Background Notes: 1935-37 - Chief Geologist for Phillips Petroleum Co.  
1937 - Kerr-McGee Oil Industries  
Member of Board, Atomic Industrial Forum  
Member, American Association for the Advancement  
of Science

RALPH B. MCGILL

Born: Soddy, Tennessee, February 5, 1898  
Legal Residence: Georgia  
Present Position: Editor, "The Constitution"  
Office Address: Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., Atlanta  
Background Notes: 1942-to present - Editor, "The Constitution"  
1937-38 - Rosewald fellowship, for travel in Europe  
1958 - Pulitzer prize for editorial writing  
Member, Georgia Acad. Social Sciences



GEORGE MEANY

Born: New York, New York, August 16, 1894  
Legal Residence: Maryland  
Present Position: President, American Federation of Labor & Congress  
of Industrial Organizations  
Office Address: 815 16th St., NW, Washington, D.C.  
Background Notes: 1959 - Rep. of the USA to the Fourteenth Session  
of the General Assembly of the UN  
1961 - Member of the President's Advisory Com.  
on Labor-Management Policy

JAMES A. PERKINS

Born: Philadelphia, Penna., October 11, 1911  
Legal Residence: New Jersey  
Present Position: Vice President, Carnegie Corporation  
Office Address: 589 Fifth Ave., New York 17, New York  
Background Notes: 1958 - to present - Inst. for Def. Analyses, Trustee;  
Cons. Rand Corp.  
1955 - to present - Cons., Dept. of Defense  
Member, Council Foreign Relations, Am. Political  
Science Association

HERMAN PHLEGER

Born: Sacramento, California, September 5, 1890  
Legal Residence: California  
Present Position: Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco,  
California  
Office Address: 111 Sutter St., San Francisco  
Background Notes: 1953-57 - Legal adviser Dept. of State  
1958 - Representative of the USA to the Thirteenth  
Session of the General Assembly of the UN  
1959 - Chairman of the US Delegation to the  
Conference on Antarctica with the personal rank  
of Ambassador

ISIDOR ISAAC RABI

Born: Austria, July 29, 1898; brought to US in infancy  
Legal Residence: New York  
Present Position: Professor of Physics at Columbia University  
Office Address: 31 Library Place, Princeton, New Jersey  
Background Notes: 1955-58 - Vice President, International Conference  
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva  
1958-60 - Member, NATO Science Commission  
1950 - Member, U.S. Delegation to UNESCO  
Conference, Florence, Italy

THOMAS DRESSER WHITE

Born: Walker, Minnesota, August 6, 1901  
Legal Residence: Washington, D.C.  
Present Position: General, United States Air Force, retired  
Office Address: Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C.  
Background Notes: 1945 - Deputy Commander, Thirteenth Air Force  
Commanding General, Seventh Air Force  
1951-53 - Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, USAF  
1953-57 - Vice Chief of Staff  
1957-61 - Chief of Staff

HERBERT FRANK YORK

Born: Rochester, New York, November 24, 1921  
Legal Residence: California  
Present Position: Chancellor of the University of California,  
San Diego, La Jolla, California  
Office Address: University of California, San Diego, La Jolla,  
California  
Background Notes: 1957-58 - President's Science Advisory Committee  
1958 - Chief Scientist of Advanced Research  
Project Agency of the Office of the Secretary of  
Defense  
1958-61 - Director, Department of Defense, Research  
and Engineering  
Member, American Physicists Society



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

15b

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Statement of Functions and Purpose

Public Law 87-297 establishing the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was signed into law by the President on September 26, 1961. Included in its provisions is the authority to appoint a General Advisory Committee to assist the Agency in the discharge of its responsibilities. This authority is defined in Section 26 of the Law which reads as follows:

"The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint a General Advisory Committee of not to exceed fifteen members to advise the Director on arms control and disarmament policy and activities. The President shall designate one of the members as Chairman. The members of the Committee may receive the compensation and reimbursement for expenses specified for consultants by section 41 (d) of this Act. The Committee shall meet at least twice each year. It shall from time to time advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace."

The members of the Committee have assembled in Washington for their swearing-in ceremony at the White House April 2 and to meet with Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Agency, and other officers of the Agency's staff. The occasion marks the first meeting of the whole Committee. It is anticipated that the members will remain in Washington for two days, April 2 and 3. During this time, they will have an opportunity to review and consider the broad range of problems relating to the Agency's responsibilities.

APRIL 2, 1962

SUGGESTED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT

As we intensify our effort to find practical solutions to the arms problem, it is important that our experts working in government have access to the wisdom of respected and leading citizens from all sections and many walks of life in our country.

Congress has created the General Advisory Committee to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to perform this important function, and I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. McCloy, and to each of your colleagues for your willingness to serve on this Committee. Secretary Rusk, Mr. Foster and I expect to profit greatly by your advice and counsel.

We share a profound sense of urgency about the need for arms control and disarmament. Your mature judgment will be useful to me, to the Secretary of State, and to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in our efforts to devise practical plans and proposals for arms control and disarmament with effective methods of assuring that all countries respect their agreements.

I thank you for being here, and I wish you Godspeed in your work.



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MEMORANDUM

March 31, 1962

TO: Ken O'Donnell ✓  
Larry O'Brien

FROM: Claude Desautels

The following Members of Congress have been invited for the Swearing-in Ceremony for the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on Monday, April 2, at 12:00 noon:

Senator J. W. Fulbright  
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey  
Senator Alexander Wiley  
Congressman Robert B. Chipfield  
Congressman Chet Holifield  
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper  
Congressman Leslie C. Arends  
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier  
Congressman Clement J. Zablocki

(Invited, but not coming):

Congressman Thomas E. Morgan  
Senator Richard B. Russell  
Senator Leverett Saltonstall  
Congressman Carl Vinson



THE FOLLOWING WILL ALSO BE PRESENT AT MEETING AT 12:00 NOON  
ON MONDAY, APRIL 2:

Hon. Robert McNamara  
Hon. John McCone  
Hon. Edward R. Murrow  
Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg  
Hon. McGeorge Bundy  
Hon. Jerome Wiesner

Hon. William Foster, Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency  
Hon. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director  
Hon. Henry Byroads, Coordinator of the General Advisory Committee  
Mr. Clem Conger



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

1. SKIPJACK


While it is our current belief that there is no need for haste on this matter -- and particularly no need for early hearings in Executive Session -- we have decided that in the right political context a SKIPJACK deal with the French would be useful and safe. John McCone has informed you, as he has informed the Committee, that in his judgment as a past Chairman of the AEC, and as Director of Central Intelligence, a transfer of reactor information to the French in 1966 or 1967 would give twice the time that he has considered necessary as assurance against helping the Russians (McCone originally thought we should wait four years in 1958). McCone's comments are not available in the transcript because they were made informally at the end of the meeting to a group of its members.

The argument for the SKIPJACK, of course, is that it is something we can do for the French, and for that matter for the Italians and Belgians when they are ready, without danger to our security and with both diplomatic and financial advantage. But, again, it is the strong feeling of Rusk and McNamara that we do not want hearings now.

2. NASSAU, POLARIS, JUPITER, ETC.

You will want to outline the politics of Nassau and its sequence from SKYBOLT to POLARIS to multilateral force for Germany. There is no legal problem in the POLARIS understandings with Britain, which are limited to missile systems and do not involve reactors or warheads. There is a legal problem about any truly multilateral force, but we are not prepared to say yet whether we would proceed by amendment of the statute or by effective agreement or by a maintenance of U. S. custody,

TOP SECRET



which would need no legal change. There has been legal doubt about custody at sea, but permissive links and mixed manning may remove that doubt.

On the JUPITERS, I attach again the pages from the Joint Committee's report of February 1961. This is a step toward modernization and a safe and more defensive position. It is still in the process of discussion with Italy, Turkey, and the North Atlantic Council, and for this reason is sensitive information. The reasons for doing it now are Nassau, the period of low tension, and the lesson of political and military vulnerability taught by the Cuban crisis.

### 3. FOSTER-TSARAPKIN DISCUSSIONS

We have told them that you would have nothing much to say on this, but you may get a question. Our position within the Government is that these are purely exploratory talks, but if and when there is need for a review of our position, we will do it in the normal way with the Committee of Principals (Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Taylor, *Wessing*, Seaborg, and myself). In analogy with Berlin, you have said that you would not review the U. S. bidding unless there is some evident reason to do so.

### 4. NUCLEAR TESTING

We are still evaluating information and have reached no final position, but currently there is no indication of a need for atmospheric testing from either Defense or AEC, at least in the first half of 1963. Underground testing is proceeding on a routine basis.

5. I add one paragraph of the opinion of the Staff Director of what the Committee wants:

"Conway said that he thought the Committee would be extremely pleased by a broad presentation and would greatly appreciate hearing the President on these matters. He recognizes the limitation imposed by the availability of time and understands that obviously the President can't cover everything, even if he wanted to. Conway also understands that the President wishes the discussion to be focused on the international aspects of our nuclear problems, and that the Committee members will not take this opportunity to ride their pet hobbyhorses."

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.



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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with the General Advisory  
Committee, ACDA, 4:00 pm, April 9,  
1963.

1. The primary concern of the Committee relates to (a) the nature of their responsibilities and (b) your request to them concerning nuclear test ban.

2. The initial concern of the Committee is that they may be being asked to review an offer which has already been made. They feel it would be embarrassing internationally to give a negative response. Moreover, some of them may have some doubts as to whether they can give a completely affirmative response.

3. The Committee is also concerned about how broad the question is that they are supposed to answer. The spectrum of views on this ranges from a concentration on the adequacy of the particular verification system involved as compared with prior verification systems, through a concern about the overall balance of risks involved in a treaty as compared with the risks of unlimited testing. Some members wish to advise on particular negotiating tactics.

It is recommended that in discussions with the Committee you may wish, as a matter of background, to state the issue the way it was put before you on February 18, 1963, namely, that the basic U.S. interest concerning a test ban agreement had been before the U.S. Government many times and that each time, after a long and careful consideration of the relevant military and

political

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLH-93-61

3x JMDP, NARA, Date 4/30/94



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

political considerations, it had been concluded that an effective treaty was in the overall security interests of the United States. The most recent time -- prior to February 18 -- that this consideration was made was in June, 1962 at which time Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett had aided you in the deliberations. In February of this year you reassessed the U.S. interests on the basis of the most recent information, including an analysis of the Soviet tests series and it confirmed your previous conclusion. Having concluded that an effective test ban treaty was in the national interests, the specific questions which had to be resolved related to the nature of a verification system to monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty and other essential points in such a treaty, such as procedures for on-site inspections and the withdrawal clause.

4. In view of the difficulty of getting the Committee together prior to April 8, 1963, Mr. McCloy's absence from the country and the fact that no suitable subcommittee could be arranged in his absence, the Committee was not generally advised of your exchange with the Senators until yesterday and has had only yesterday and today to discuss this matter. It has only discussed it with Arms Control and Disarmament Agency personnel as a Committee although individual members have undoubtedly discussed it with others. For that reason they may be somewhat reluctant to give anything other than the most tentative report this afternoon.

It is recommended that you ask the Committee to give you orally, through their Chairman, the present state of their thinking on this matter and ask them whether or not they wish to go into the matter in further detail at a later period. It is not recommended that you ask for a formal report, at this time, since it tends to precipitate the issue of whether an advisory committee should take votes at a time when this question is one of some concern and disagreement among members of the Committee. We do not wish to precipitate that issue because of a feeling that the Committee should be an advisory committee not a board of directors. If you can find the time you may wish to talk to the Chairman, Mr. McCloy, for a few moments after the meeting.

*William C. Foster*

William C. Foster

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~