

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1961–1963
VOLUME VII

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume VII

Arms Control and Disarmament

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In creating the *FRUS* ebook edition, we endeavored to maintain fidelity with the original printed edition. One challenge in this respect is representing original page numbers from printed editions in ebooks. For readers who need to cite material in this ebook, we recommend citing document numbers instead of page numbers, since document numbers are persistent, media-neutral identifiers. In older *FRUS* volumes (before the subseries covering the Johnson administration), where cross references use page numbers rather than document numbers, we append to each page number a bracketed list of the document numbers that correspond to it.

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**Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
May 2018**

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of

historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The editors of this volume are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Although this volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, the Foreign Relations statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations series for the years 1961-1963. The subseries presents in 25 print volumes and 6 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the administration of President John F. Kennedy. This volume presents the documentary record of major U.S. arms control and disarmament policies. A separate microfiche supplement includes additional documentation on arms control matters regarded by the editors as significant but not warranting inclusion in the printed volume.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of the statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below.

The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. Certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became available to the Department historians only after this volume was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future volumes.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Kennedy and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense (particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. This access arrangement began with the research of volumes for the 1961-1963 triennium. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of this access, and the variety of documentation made available and selected

for publication in the volumes has expanded. This volume includes 25 documents from the CIA records and 6 CIA documents from other repositories.

The List of Sources (pages XIII [Pg. XIII is part of [List of Sources](#)]-XVIII [Pg. XVIII is part of [List of Sources](#)]) lists the files consulted and cited in this volume.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in bibliographical notes.

The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors gave priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).

Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):

1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States;
2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted;
3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;

4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members;
5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies;
6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues;
7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State;
8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State;
9. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions;
10. Economic aspects of foreign policy;
11. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance;
12. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies;
13. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies;
14. Documentation that illuminates special decisionmaking processes that accomplished the policies recorded in particular volumes;
15. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.

Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for [Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume VII](#) 

The editors of this volume, the research and editing of which was completed in 1991 and 1992, have defined a “major issue” as an arms control policy or problem that received high-level attention within the U.S. Government; from the President, key White House aides, or Cabinet-level officials; and/or had long-range repercussions for U.S. foreign policy and interests. While it was impossible to include the details of U.S. policy on every disarmament issue, documentation has been included, either in the print volume or the microfiche supplement, that delineates basic U.S. policies toward the subjects in question.

The primary focus of the documents in this volume is on the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, including documentation illuminating policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Emphasis is placed on official memoranda that reveal policy positions, show differences within the U.S. Government over policy formulation, summarize developments and positions regarding an issue, contain intelligence or military assessments, and describe decisions or actions taken in the National Security Council. Some key instructions sent to diplomatic posts are included when they demonstrate the details of the execution of a policy. Memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington were selected to provide additional information on the origins and impact of foreign policy decisions.

The editors selected only the most important reports from diplomatic posts, particularly those containing the records of significant conversations held with foreign leaders and their diplomatic representatives on arms control issues. Details of the arms control negotiations and their incremental movement are not included.

Documentation selected by the editors for inclusion in the microfiche supplement provides additional details on the major issues covered in this volume. The annotation to printed documents contains references to related documents included in the microfiche supplement. The supplement also includes several lengthy attachments to printed documents. In these cases, the printed document contains editorial references to the appropriate microfiche document. The volume may be used without the supplement, but the microfiche should be used in conjunction with the printed volume.

The major topics and issues the editors sought to cover in [volume VII](#) are as follows:

- 1) Debate within the administration over whether to resume nuclear testing.
- 2) Arms control bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and multilateral negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva.
- 3) Relations with U.S. allies, especially the United Kingdom, on the issue of nuclear testing.
- 4) Internal administration discussions on the relative merits and feasibility of negotiating a comprehensive test ban agreement versus a more limited treaty.
- 5) Initiation of talks on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons (nuclear non-proliferation) with U.S. allies, especially the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, as well as with the Soviet Union.
- 6) Negotiations by the President's special emissary W. Averell Harriman leading to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
- 7) The Kennedy administration's efforts to gain the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Senate for the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

A few documents are also included on the ongoing negotiations concerning a possible agreement banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and more documentation on the subject is scheduled for publication in [volume XXV](#). Documentation on the talks leading to the establishment of a Direct Communications Link ("hot line") between Washington and Moscow in 1963, which is often considered an arms control agreement, is included in [volume V](#).

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this print volume and from the microfiche supplement because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The unnumbered first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all volumes in the series.

This volume has not been reviewed by the Advisory Committee.

Declassification Review

The declassification review of this volume in 1993 and 1994 resulted in the decision to withhold approximately 2 percent of the documents originally selected; 5 documents were denied in full. The remaining documentation provides an accurate account of the major arms control issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by, the U.S. Government during this period.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of archivists at the John F. Kennedy Library, in particular Suzanne Forbes, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume. Officials at the Department of Defense, especially Sandra Meagher, and officials at the National Defense University also deserve special thanks.

David S. Patterson and David W. Mabon compiled and edited the material presented in this volume, under the supervision of General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie. Dr. Mabon also provided initial planning. Rita M. Baker, Deb Godfrey, and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw the production of the volume. Thomas J. Hoffman compiled the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

January 1995

List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. An important source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many documents were selected from the following files:

110.11: Secretary of State

396.12: Conferences on international political relations

397.5611: Conferences on atomic weapons

600.0012: U.S. limitation of arms

611.0012: U.S. arms control agreements

611.3722: U.S. blockade of Cuba

611.61: Political relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

611.6112: Arms limitation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

700.5611: Atomic weapons in the world

711.5: U.S. national defense

711.5611: Atomic weapons in the U.S.

762.00: Political affairs and conditions in Germany

DEF 18: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament

DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE): Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations, and conferences relating to Geneva, Switzerland

DEF 18-3 USSR (MO): Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences relating to Moscow

DEF 18-4: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, agreements and treaties

DEF 18-6: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, control measures

DEF 18-9: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, demilitarized and nuclear-free zones

ORG 7 S: Organization and administration, visits

POL UK-US: Political affairs and relations between the U.K. and the U.S.

POL UK-USSR: Political affairs and relations between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.

POL US-USSR: Political affairs and relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

POL 7 US/Harriman: Visits and meetings of W. Averell Harriman

POL 7 US/Kennedy: Visits and meetings of John F. Kennedy

POL 15-1 USSR: Political affairs and relations between the heads of state of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by documents from the lot files of the Department of State, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366

Documentation on official visits to the United States by heads of government and foreign ministers and on international conferences attended by the President, Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of State for 1961.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533

Documentation on official visits to the United States by heads of state and foreign ministers and on international conferences attended by the President, Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of State for 1962.

Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110

Documentation on international conferences attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961-December 1964.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Presidential exchanges of correspondence with heads of government for 1953-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan for 1960-1962.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 76 D 435

Exchanges of correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev for 1961-1963.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163

Correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the Chairman of the Soviet Union, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and President of France, 1961-1964.

Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

Complete chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversation with foreign visitors for 1956-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including his memoranda of telephone conversations.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330

Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State, 1961-1964.

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Files of the Policy Planning Staff for 1961-1964.

S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121

Files of the Policy Planning Staff for 1961-1964.

S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199

Files of the Policy Planning Council for 1963-1964.

Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451

Minutes and memoranda of the Special Group, Counterinsurgency, January 1962-December 1963.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316

Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961-1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, 1947-1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171

Restricted data file maintained by the Executive Secretariat for 1957-1967.

National Archives and Records Administration

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS Records

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382

Decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501

Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1962.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926

Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1963-1964.

OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464

Subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1961.

OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542

Subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470

Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for 1961-1968.

OSD/AE Files: FRC 68 A 6453

Subject files of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for 1950-1966.

OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243

Subject files of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for 1961-1969.

Record Group 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACDA/CSRC Files: FRC 77 A 59

Miscellaneous policy and position papers for 1953-1968.

ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23

Files of Director William C. Foster for 1959-1966.

ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80

Files of Director William C. Foster for 1958-1969.

ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17

Files of Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher for 1961-1969.

ACDA/EX/C&R Files: FRC 77 A 8

Subject files for 1962-1963.

ACDA/EX/RIC/R Files: FRC 77 A 10

Subject files for 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

DCI, ER Subject Files

DCI Memoranda

DCI Memos for Record

EA/DCI Chron

McCone Files

Meetings with President

Special Group 5412(1963)

National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army,
1955-1959; the President's Military Representative, 1961-1962; and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964.

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

Ball Papers

National Security Files

Bethe Report

Brubeck Series

Countries Series

Departments and Agencies Series

Kaysen Series

Meetings and Memoranda Series

Subjects Series

President's Appointment Books

President's Office Files

Sorensen Papers

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File

National Intelligence Estimates

Subject File

Vice President's National Security File

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Harriman Papers

Special files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy and
Johnson administrations

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- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, 1962, 1963* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office)
- . *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964)
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List of Abbreviations

A, airgram

ABM, anti-ballistic missile

ABC, American Broadcasting Company

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACDA/D, Office of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACDA/DD, Office of the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACDA/IR, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACDA/ST, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AEDS, Atomic Energy Detection System

AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center

AICBM, air-launched intercontinental ballistic missile

AP, Associated Press

ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ASW, anti-submarine warfare

BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

CA, circular airgram

CAP, series indicator for telegrams from the White House

ChiCom, Chinese Communist

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CPR, Chinese People's Republic

D, Democrat; Office of the Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development

DASA, Defense Atomic Support Agency

DC, Disarmament Commission (United Nations)

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

Disto, series indicator for telegrams from the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to the Department of State

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Office of East Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State
ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
FRC, Federal Records Center (Washington National Records Center)
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
GCD, general and comprehensive disarmament
GDR, German Democratic Republic
G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-
Military Affairs
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IR, intermediate-range
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
JCAE, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
KT, kiloton
M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
MC, memorandum of conversation
MLF, multilateral force
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MT, megaton
NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Problems
NAP, non-aggression pact
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum

NSC, National Security Council

Nusup, telegram indicator from the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P.L., Public Law

Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

PRC, People's Republic of China

RD, Restricted Data

RG, Record Group

ROW, risk of war

RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

S, Office of the Secretary of State

SAM, surface-to-air missile

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

SovDel, Soviet delegation

S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Supnu, series indicator for telegrams from the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State

TB, Test Ban

Todis, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva

Topol, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; unclassified; uranium
UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation
UN, United Nations
UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
UPI, United Press International
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDA, United States Disarmament Administration
USDel, United States Delegation
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

List of Persons

Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State; adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 17, 1963

Akalovsky, Alexander, Department of State interpreter

Alphand, Hervé, French Ambassador to the United States

Anderson, Clinton P., Democratic Senator from New Mexico

Barber, Arthur W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Arms and Trade Control)

Bell, David E., Director, Bureau of the Budget, January 1961-December 1962; Administrator, Agency for International Development, from December 21, 1962

Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until September 4, 1962; Ambassador to France from October 27, 1962

Bowles, Chester B., Under Secretary of State, January 25-December 3, 1961; President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, December 4, 1961-June 9, 1963; Ambassador to India from July 19, 1963

Brown, Harold, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961

Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Ambassador to the United States until September 1961; British Permanent Under Secretary of State from 1962

Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 23, 1961

de Gaulle, Charles, President of France

de Murville, Couve, French Foreign Minister

Dean, Arthur, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva until December 27, 1962

Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States from March 13, 1963

Dillon, C. Douglas, Under Secretary of State until January 4, 1961;
Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1961

Dirksen, Everett M., Republican Senator from Illinois

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 29, 1961

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 20, 1961

Farley, Philip J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space

Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1961

Foster, William C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from October 6, 1961

Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1961

Godber, Joseph B., British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Goodby, James E., Officer in Charge, Nuclear Test Negotiations

Gore, Albert, Democratic Senator from Tennessee

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister

Gullion, Edmund A., Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration until 1961; Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo from August 3, 1961

Hailsham, Viscount Quinton M.H., British Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science and Technology; also British representative at the test ban treaty negotiations at Moscow, July 1963

Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February 13-December 3, 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, December 4, 1961-April 3, 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Haworth, Leland J., Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission

Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Republican Senator from Iowa

Holifield, Chet, Democratic Representative from California and Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Home, Lord Alexander Frederick Douglas, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 20, 1963; thereafter Prime Minister

Hood, Viscount Samuel, British Minister to the United States until December 1962; thereafter British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Hosmer, Craig, Republican Representative from California

Humphrey, Hubert H., Democratic Senator from Minnesota

Jackson, Henry M., Democratic Senator from Washington

Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas until January 20, 1961; Vice President of the United States, January 20, 1961-November 22, 1963; thereafter President

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 2, 1961

Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 1961

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., National Security Council Staff member from January 1961

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States, January 20, 1961, until his assassination on November 22, 1963

Kent, Sherman, Assistant Director and Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeivich, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 19, 1962; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from September 27, 1962

Komer, Robert W., National Security Council Staff member from January 1961

Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilievich, First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister

LeMay, General Curtis E., Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until September 30, 1962

Long, Dr. Franklin, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Science and Technology, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Macmillan, Harold, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until October 20, 1963

Mansfield, Michael J., Democratic Senator from Montana and Senate Majority Leader

McCloy, John J., President's Adviser on Disarmament

McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 29, 1961

McCormack, John W., Democratic Representative from Massachusetts and Speaker of the House

McDermott, Edward A., Deputy Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, until September 22, 1961; Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Planning, September 22, 1961-February 2, 1962; thereafter Director

McGhee, George C., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, February 16-December 3, 1961; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, December 4, 1961-March 27, 1963; Ambassador to Germany from May 18, 1963

McGovern, George, Director, Office of Food for Peace, January 1961-April 1962

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961

McNaughton, John T., General Counsel, Department of Defense, from July 5, 1962

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from March 15, 1961

Myrdal, Alva, head of the Swedish Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, January 29, 1961-November 29, 1963; thereafter Secretary of the Navy

Ormsby Gore, David (Lord Harlech), British Ambassador to the United States from October 26, 1961

Pastore, John O., Democratic Senator from Rhode Island and Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Penney, Sir William, Chairman, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

Price, Benjamin, Chief Science Officer, British Ministry of Defense

Price, Charles M., Democratic Representative from Illinois

Rostow, Walt Whitman, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, January-November 1961; Counselor and Chairman,

Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from November 29, 1961

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961

Russell, Richard B., Democratic Senator from Georgia

Saltonstall, Leverett, Republican Senator from Massachusetts

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., President's Special Assistant from January 1961

Schroeder, Gerhard, West German Foreign Minister from November 14, 1961

Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Assistant Director, Bureau of Science and Technology, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from March 1, 1961

Smith, Bromley, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, until February 1961; Acting Executive Secretary, National Security Council, June-August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary

Spaak, Paul-Henri, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until March 5, 1961; Belgian Foreign Minister from April 25, 1961

Stelle, Charles C., U.S. Deputy Representative at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests until 1962; Deputy Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, 1962-1963

Stevenson, Adlai E., III, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 23, 1961

Symington, Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri

Taylor, General Maxwell D., President's Military Representative, July 1, 1961-October 1, 1962; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Thant, U, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, November 3, 1961-November 30, 1962; thereafter Secretary-General

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until July 27, 1962; Ambassador at Large from October 3, 1962

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia

Tsarapkin, Semen Konstantinovich, Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Tyler, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 24, 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from September 2, 1962

Van Zandt, James E., Republican Representative from Pennsylvania until January 1963

Wiesner, Jerome B., President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology

Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1962; Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 1962

Arms Control and Disarmament

1. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, January 17, 1961.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

2. Letter From President Kennedy to His Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

Washington, January 27, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/1-2761. No classification marking.

3. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 9, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, February-April 1961. Top Secret.

4. Editorial Note

5. Memorandum From the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 8, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Fisk Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a March 9 note from Bundy, which reads: "This is a paper from McCloy—you are not the real target—Joint Committee is. It is part of the effort to present the whole story without asking for approval yet."

6. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Geneva

Washington, March 8, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-861. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodby and cleared by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Political Office of USDA. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Allen Dulles, Seaborg, and Wiesner.

7. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, March 14, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 1-3/61. Secret.

8. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration (Gullion) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, March 15, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers.

9. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, March 23, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen."

10. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 25, 1961, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

11. Report of the Panel on the Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons

Washington, April 1, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. This Panel, appointed by the USDA, was known as the Perkins Panel after Chairman Dr. James Perkins. Other members were Manson Benedict, Marion Boyer, Spurgeon Keeny, General Herbert Loper, Donald Musser, George Quinn, Isidor Rabi, Louis Roddis, Herbert Scoville, Walter Singlevich, and William Webster.

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Washington, April 4, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Shepard Stone, Special Assistant to McCloy; cleared by McCloy, Fisher, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USUN and Moscow.

13. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, April 6, 1961.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 6. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

14. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, April 8, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

15. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State

Geneva, April 21, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2161. Confidential.

16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Washington, April 22, 1961, 8:10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution.

17. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, April 25, 1961.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,

The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 25. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

18. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, April 27, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1960-1961. Top Secret.

19. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President’s Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

Washington, April 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. The first attachment to this letter, a forwarding memorandum from Burke to McNamara dated April 26, is not printed.

20. Editorial Note

21. Record of Meeting

Washington, May 4, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA Disarmament General, 4-5/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the National Security Council

Washington, May 15, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to McCloy.

23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, May 17, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962). Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Philip J. Farley.

24. Editorial Note

25. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, May 19, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations 4-6/61. Secret.

26. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 23, 1961, 11 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Goodby and approved by Rusk on May 25.

27. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 24, 1961, 4:57–6:32 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2461. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Manfull (S/S) on May 25. A typed note reads: “Not cleared by the President or the Secretary.” The meeting was held at the White House. The times are taken from the President’s Appointment Books. (Kennedy Library)

28. Editorial Note

29. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, May 26, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/5-2661. Secret; Priority.

30. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-461. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva.

31. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks, Vol. I (President). Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The full text of this memorandum of conversation is printed in vol. V, Document 62.

32. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France, Vol. I. No classification marking. The memorandum is dated June 7, but no drafter is indicated.

33. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, June 8, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-861. Secret.
Sent through Kohler who initialed, and a copy was sent to McCloy.
Thompson was in Washington for consultations.

34. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State

Geneva, June 12, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-1261. Secret;
Limit Distribution.

35. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy

Washington, June 12, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.

36. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 13, 1961, noon.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General 7/2/61-7/10/61.
Confidential. Drafted by Fisher. The meeting was held at the White House.

37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, June 26, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.

38. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 30, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-3061. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House.

39. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Dean Acheson

Washington, July 1, 1961, 10:46 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau, Rusk's Personal Assistant.

40. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

Washington, July 13, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Secret.

41. Editorial Note

42. Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing

Washington, July 21, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 28 letter from Wiesner to McNamara, which states that the Panel made a preliminary report on its findings to the President on July 21, and requested comments by August 4. The panel was known as the Panofsky Panel after its Chairman, Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky. Other members were William A. Baker, Hans A. Bethe, Norris E. Bradbury, James B. Fisk, John S. Foster, Jr., George B. Kistiakowsky, Frank Press, Louis H. Roddis, John W. Tukey, and Walter H. Zinn. Keeny served as Technical Assistant.

43. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

Washington, July 27, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Bundy.

44. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

45. Editorial Note

46. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, July 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: "DR saw Sat" (July 29). A covering note from Lucius Battle to Secretary Rusk reads in part: "Mac Bundy called me today and stated that he was sending to me the attached memorandum of decision which grew out of conversations between the President and Mr. Arthur Dean. He said that you probably should have been present but that if you had any objection to the attached understanding it was not too late to make changes and that you should speak to the President." Another copy of this memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 4/61-8/61.

47. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

Washington, July 28, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top

Secret; Restricted Data.

48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, August 2, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.

49. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner)

Washington, August 3, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

50. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, August 3, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. Top Secret. Transmitted to London in telegram 585, August 3, for delivery to Macmillan. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962)

51. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy

Washington, August 4, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-461. Secret.

52. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 7, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Panofsky Panel Report. Top Secret.

53. Memorandum of Minutes of the 490th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 8, 1961, 10–11:45 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on September 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book, which indicates 30 people attended. (Ibid.) Attendees included all statutory members except Rusk, who was represented by Ball. For another account of the meeting, see Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pp. 75-76.

54. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, August 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1961. Top Secret.

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 16, 1961, 11:03 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dean, cleared by McCloy in substance, and approved by the President through Bundy and by Rusk.

56. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, August 17, 1961, 4–5:30 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

57. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 29, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: Lot 77 A 17, McGeorge Bundy. Secret.

58. Editorial Note

59. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency_(Murrow) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 31, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. Confidential.

60. Memorandum by the Ambassador to the United Nations (Stevenson)

New York, August 31, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. No classification marking. There is no addressee, but the memorandum was apparently routed to Bundy.

61. Editorial Note

62. Memorandum From the President's Special Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, September 1, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. Confidential.

63. Editorial Note

64. Editorial Note

65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 87

Washington, September 5, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Sec Def has seen."

66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, September 5, 1961, 12:55 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 5, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-561. Confidential; Niact. Approved by the President and Secretary Rusk. The time of transmission is not legible.

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 7, 1961, 9:22 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-761. Top Secret; Priority.

69. Brief of Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, September 8, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 350.09. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Richard Collins, Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, to McNamara. The full text of SNIE 11-11-61 is in the Supplement.

70. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 8, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 9/8-9/26/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] weekend of 9/9/61." Copies were sent to Wiesner, Lemnitzer, Dulles, and Bundy.

71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, September 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/9-1461. No classification marking.

72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger)

Washington, September 15, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert W. Komer 9/61. Confidential. Copies were sent to Sorensen, Rostow, and Bundy.

73. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 18, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1861. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House.

74. Paper Prepared for President Kennedy

Washington, undated.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, June-Sept 61. Secret; Restricted Data. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to President Kennedy on September 20 under cover of a brief letter signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg. Another

copy of the paper is in the Kennedy Library, National Security File, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/8-26/61.

75. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 21, 1961, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Towers.

76. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Putsunda?, September 29, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 76 D 435, Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence, 1961-1963. No classification marking. For the full text of this letter, see vol. VI, Document 21.

77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, September 29, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/27-10/11/61. Secret.

78. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, [date not declassified].

79. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy.

Washington, October 7, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/27-10/11/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

80. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle)

Washington, October 7, 1961.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Top Secret. Drafted by Rusk.

81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, October 9, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 Oct 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation reads: "SecDef has seen."

82. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by P.J. Halla of ACDA on October 12 and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room.

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, October 10, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 10/11-15/61. Confidential. A typed note on another copy indicates that Rusk signed the memorandum on October 10 and gave it to Cleveland to deliver to the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1061)

84. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 76 D 435, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1961-1963. Top Secret. For the full text of this letter, see vol. VI, Document 22.

85. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

New York, October 19, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61. Secret.

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, October 27, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/10-2761. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Also sent to USUN.

87. Editorial Note

88. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 30, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/30-31/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

89. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, October 31, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jan-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.

90. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 2, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File Aug-Dec 61. Top Secret. Drafted by Major William Y. Smith of Taylor's staff.

91. Record of National Security Council Action No. 2440

Washington, November 2, 1961.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, Meetings of the National Security Council 1961. Secret. Taken at the 492d meeting (see Document 90).

92. Note Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jan-Nov 61). Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, which bears the stamped notation: "SecDef has seen." Gerald Johnson prepared a lengthier but similar memorandum on the same subject on November 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61)

93. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, November 3, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Volume II. Top Secret; Atomic. Attached to a covering note from Ormsby Gore to the President.

94. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 9, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61. Secret.

95. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, November 16, 1961.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret. Another copy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961.

96. Draft Report of the Meeting of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group (Bethe Panel), November 16-17, 1961

Washington, November 20, 1961.

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, November 21, 1961, 9:41 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-1661. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Copenhagen, London, Oslo, Ottawa, Stockholm, and USUN.

98. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, August-December 1961. Secret.

99. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/11-2261. Confidential. Also addressed to Foster.

100. Editorial Note

101. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Goodby and approved in S on December 4.

102. Letter From the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy_(Seaborg) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 29, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 11/29-12/6/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 30, 1961, 8:47 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-2861.
Confidential. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Office of Political Affairs in ACDA, and William G. Jones, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; cleared by Foster and by EUR, AF, ARA, and NEA; and approved by Cleveland.

104. Editorial Note

105. National Security Action Memorandum No. 116

Washington, December 1, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 116. Secret; Restricted Data.

106. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 4, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-461.
Confidential. This memorandum was sent to the President. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations 4/28/61-3/62. Other copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, Stelle in Geneva, Foster, Ambassador Stevenson at USUN, McNamara, Allen Dulles, and Seaborg.

107. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts

Washington, December 5, 1961, 6:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-561. Official Use Only. Drafted in the Public Affairs area of ACDA and approved by James E. Goodby.

108. Editorial Note

109. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to President Kennedy

Washington, December 12, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/7-18/61. Secret; Restricted Data. Another copy is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 (8 Apr 61).

110. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy

Washington, December 19, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/19-20/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

111. Memorandum of Conversation

Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 5–6:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)

112. Memorandum of Conversation

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)

113. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, December 29, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "President saw."

114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, December 30, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A handwritten note reads: "President saw." In a covering note to Clifton, not found attached, Bundy stated that this memorandum and Schlesinger's memorandum (Document 113) needed to be "called to the President's attention for careful consideration." The President had "several times indicated to me his desire to have the other side of the atmospheric case sharply stated," as Schlesinger's memorandum did. "Since it will be very important, if the President should ever take this course, not to have the author of this memo blamed for it, I am emphasizing the quality of the argument and not the name of the creator." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/12/61-1/8/62)

115. Editorial Note

116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 4, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Put in folder of things to talk to Pres. about."

117. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 8, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. The records of White House staff meetings were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.

118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, January 12, 1962.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 400.112 12 Jan 62. Secret.

119. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, January 13, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from Bundy

to Rusk, stating that Kennedy wanted Rusk to deliver it to Ormsby Gore. A draft by Foster, dated January 11, is *ibid*.

120. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 15, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/13-15/62. Top Secret.

121. Editorial Note

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, January 18, 1962, 1:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-1862. Top Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text.

123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 17, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62. Top Secret.

124. Editorial Note

125. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, January 31, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-3162. Top Secret.

126. Editorial Note

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, February 2, 1962, 7:48 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-262. Secret.
Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, London, and Moscow.

128. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy

Washington, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. Secret; Restricted Data.

129. Editorial Note

130. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 21, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Confidential.

131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Secret. Attached to a February 21 memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy stating that the memorandum had been approved at a meeting in the Secretary's office on February 20.

132. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, February 22, 1962, 10:35 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.

133. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 22, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in U on February 23.

134. Letter From the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 26, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.

135. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 26, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Legere. These memoranda for the record were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.

136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 27, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret.

137. Memorandum of the 497th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. A complete list of the 22 attendees is *ibid.*, President's Appointment Book. Other accounts of the meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 225-227, and in a memorandum for the files by McCone in Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/61.

138. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, February 27, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk, stating that the original had been delivered to Ormsby Gore.

139. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 27, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Eighteen Nation 1/62-2/62. Secret.

140. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 1, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. Bundy presided at the meeting.

141. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 1, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-162. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on March 3. Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, and in a memorandum for the record by Kaysen, March 1, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda 2/62-4/62.

142. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Hood) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, March 2, 1962.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62. Secret. Attached to the source text is a March 2 note from Battle (S/S) to Halla (ACDA) asking Halla to take “appropriate action” on the letter.

143. Editorial Note

144. Editorial Note

145. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 6, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-662. Confidential.
Drafted by Goodby.

146. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 6, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, 3-62. No classification marking. The source text, dated March 7, bears no drafting information.

147. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 8, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-862. Secret. Drafted by Spiers.

148. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, March 9, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Secret. The source text, which is dated March 12, bears no drafting information. An attached list of participants is not printed.

149. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva

Washington, March 10, 1962, 4:24 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1062. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Andre J. Navez (S/S). Secretary Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 to head the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

150. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State

Geneva, March 12, 1962, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1262. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.

151. Editorial Note

152. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva

Washington, March 13, 1962, 8:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Fisher (ACDA) and cleared by Kaysen (White House), Nitze (Defense) (by Fisher), and Navez (S/S).

153. Editorial Note

154. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, March 14, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1462. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on June 14. The meeting was held at the British Mission, Villa la Fenetre.

155. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)

Washington, March 14, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Confidential. The source text does not indicate to whom this memorandum was sent. An earlier March 13 draft, identical in most points to the text printed here, was sent to Kaysen. (Ibid., Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62) See the Supplement.

156. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, March 14, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962. Top Secret.

157. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 15, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, March 62. Confidential.

158. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State

Geneva, March 15, 1962, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and Moscow.

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Washington, March 18, 1962, 4:17 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1862. Secret. Drafted by Goodby (ACDA) and cleared by Long (ACDA). Repeated to London.

160. Memorandum From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Haworth) to the Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Long)

Washington, March 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Haworth to McGeorge Bundy, March 20, which reads: “It occurred to me that you might be interested in the enclosed memorandum I have written to Dr. Long in connection with the UK-US technical meeting last weekend.”

161. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball

Washington, March 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball’s office.

162. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

New York, March 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a March 20 cover note from Stevenson to McGeorge Bundy, in which Stevenson wrote: “I hesitate to prolong this discussion, but I wonder if you would be good enough to consider the enclosed letter and pass it along to the President.”

163. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball

Washington, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.

164. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, March 22, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62. Confidential.

165. Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 28, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 498, 3/27/62. Top Secret. The source text, which is dated March 29, bears no drafting information. A summary of this NSC meeting from Gerry Studds (S/S-S) to various Department of State and ACDA principals, March 29, and the NSC record of actions of this meeting, March 28, are both in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. A memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, March 28, was prepared by McCone. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President 12/1/61-6/30/62) See the Supplement.

166. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, April 3, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4-362. Top Secret. The source text bears a typed notation: "Send thru Department, night action, Eyes Only for Bruce for earliest delivery Wednesday a.m. (April 4) to the Prime Minister—from the President." The text was transmitted in telegram 5292 to London, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4-362)

167. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy.

London, April 5, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing 4/10/62, 3/62-4/62. Top Secret.

168. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 5, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/4-562. Secret. Drafted by William E. Gathright (ACDA/IR) and approved by Foster for ACDA on April 9 and by the Secretary on April 10.

169. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, April 6, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva,

4/1/62-4/11/62. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of 14 participants on the last page of the memorandum is not printed.

170. Editorial Note

171. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, April 10, 1962.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting. Confidential.

172. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 11, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1162. Secret.
Drafted by Gathright and approved in ACDA by Foster on April 16 and in S by Emory C. Swank on April 20.

173. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, April 12, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, Memorandum to the President 4/12/62.

Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

174. Editorial Note

175. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, April 17, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to the source text is a note from Ormsby Gore to the President, April 17, explaining that the Prime Minister asked him “to pass to you the enclosed message on the neutrals' proposals at Geneva on nuclear tests.”

176. Editorial Note

177. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, April 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2362. Secret. Drafted by Secretary Rusk.

178. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 27, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2762. Secret.
Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 11.

179. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret.
Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Reference to “the afternoon meeting” in the penultimate paragraph indicates that the discussion of nuclear testing resumed in the afternoon. Macmillan visited Washington April 27-29 to discuss questions of common concern with President Kennedy.

180. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret.
Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House.

181. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

Washington, May 10, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1062. Secret.
Attached to the source text is a May 11 note from Stevenson to Secretary

Rusk, indicating that the enclosed is “a copy of a letter I delivered to the President today.”

182. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, May 14, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. In a May 14 note to Bundy, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Kaysen wrote: “As you can see from the attached, Dean did nearly all the talking. I don't know whether the record makes clear the only impression I got from the thing: Dean's confidence that he is doing a great job is unlimited. The President was not very much interested and had relatively little to say. He expressed no opinion on any of the specific questions that Dean raised. (p. 2) Foster's purpose, I think, was to get Presidential support to deny all these requests. At the moment none of them is pressing although I think we will require some give in our position on the first three in order to continue the discussions.” (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62)

183. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, [date not declassified].

184. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State

Geneva, May 16, 1962, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1662. Confidential.

185. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, May 19, 1962.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Gen. 388.3, Jan-July 62. Top Secret.

186. Letter From President Kennedy to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)

Washington, May 23, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see Document 182. A draft of this letter was prepared in ACDA, concurred in by Harlan Cleveland and Ambassador Dean, and transmitted under cover of a May 15 memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk for the Secretary's approval. The Secretary's initials indicating his approval appear on the memorandum. Also attached to this draft is a May 21 memorandum from William H. Brubeck (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, indicating that the draft response, "which has the approval of the Secretary, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Cleveland, may be of use to the President in responding to the Ambassador." (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2462) The first, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of the text printed here are identical to the draft, but some minor differences appear in the second and third paragraphs. In a letter to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., May 15, in which he enclosed a copy of Stevenson's May 10 letter, Kaysen wrote that he would probably answer the letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62) No further documentation on the White House role in preparing this reply has been found.

187. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/5-3062. Secret.
Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 31. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 31, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-3162. Secret.
Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on June 8.

189. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 20, 1962.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on June 26.

190. Memorandum of Conversation

London, June 24, 1962, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held at Carleton Gardens. The Secretary was in London during a visit to several European capitals June 18-28.

191. Memorandum of Conversation

London, June 25, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held after lunch in the British Foreign Ministry.

192. Editorial Note

193. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 5-6, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662. Confidential. Drafted by Marie deGunzburg (ACDA/IR). The meetings were held at the British Embassy.

194. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 12, 1962, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

195. Editorial Note

196. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5-7/30/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

197. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 21, 1962, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held during luncheon at the British Mission. Secretary Rusk was in Geneva July 19 for sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which reconvened on July 16, and for the signing of the Laos Accords on July 23.

198. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 24, 1962, 1:25 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2462. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Akalovsky on July 26. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

199. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 25, 1962, 10:30–10:50 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2562. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

200. Editorial Note

201. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on August 16. McCone also wrote a memorandum for the record of this meeting, July 26. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.

202. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_(Foster) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 26, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a note from McGeorge Bundy to the President that reads: "Here is a basic paper for tomorrow's testing-disarmament meeting—set for 10:15 AM. It puts the main issues clearly. The positions relating to the general disarmament treaty are easy—and unanimously agreed. The testing scenario is the hard one. My belief is that you will want to listen hard, and not decide, tomorrow morning."

203. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, July 27, 1962, 10:20 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of the 19 participants at the meeting is in the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) McCone also prepared a summary memorandum of this NSC meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, NSC, 7/1/62-7/31/62) See the Supplement.

204. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, July 28, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. In a July 28 note to McNamara, attached to a carbon copy of this memorandum, Harold Brown wrote that Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Jack Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Research and Engineering, had drafted the memorandum on the previous day and, regarding the final paragraph, Solis Horwitz, DOD's Director of Office of Organizational and Management Planning, "concurs in the proposed assignment of responsibility. So do I, though somewhat reluctantly." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 000.01-400.112, 1962)

205. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 30, 1962.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy—Armaments 62. Confidential. Copies were distributed to the Principals under cover of a July 30 memorandum from Foster, which is attached to the source text.

206. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, July 30, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. McCone summarized this meeting in a memorandum for the files, August 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62) See the Supplement. A July 30 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, which sets forth the agenda for this meeting, indicates that Foster's memorandum (Document 205) and two memoranda each from McNamara and Haworth, submitted in response to "certain questions on which you asked for reports over the week end," were attached to his memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62) None, however, is attached. An "index" identifies the subjects of these memoranda as follows: The US-USSR Military Balance With and Without a Test Ban, The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement, Maintaining Readiness to Test During a Test Ban, and Relative Technical and Military Advantages of Testing or Non-testing Under Various Testing Constraints. (Ibid.) Undated drafts of the former two are *ibid*. Haworth's two memoranda have not been found.

207. Report of the Inspection Study Group

Washington, July 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Inspection Study Group. Secret. The typescript report is 12 pages, plus 4

pages of front matter and 7 appendices, totaling 98 pages. Regarding the interagency Inspection Study Group (also known as the Foster Panel), see footnote 3, Document 140. In an August 31 letter to McGeorge Bundy, Foster enclosed copies of the report “for yourself and for the President if you find, as I hope you will, that it is worthy of his attention.” He called the report “the most thorough investigation of inspection and verification, and of the relations of intelligence to arms control inspection, that has so far been made,” though he emphasized that it was “but a beginning, and that its preliminary estimate of the scope of inspection that might be required for comprehensive arms control on a zonal basis, for example, is only illustrative.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/62-6/63)

208. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, August 1, 1962, 4:45 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/1/62-8/23/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

209. Memorandum for the File

Washington, August 2, 1962.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

210. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State

Geneva, August 3, 1962, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-362. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

Washington, August 3, 1962, 12:24 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-362. Top Secret. Drafted by Foster and Fisher; cleared by Edward S. Little (S/S), Bundy for the President (White House), Haworth/Seaborg (AEC), Nitze/McNaughton (DOD), and McCone (CIA); and approved by Secretary Rusk.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Disarmament Committee

Washington, August 3, 1962, 5:58 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, K-M, 1961-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beam and approved by Brubeck (S/S) and Bromley Smith (White House). Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador.

213. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk

London, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. An attached note from Lord Hood to Secretary Rusk, August 5, notes that Foreign Secretary Home had asked him to transmit the enclosed message. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Brubeck (S/S) through McGeorge Bundy to Kaysen, August 6, saying that the message was received from the

British Embassy on August 5. “A proposed reply,” the memorandum concluded, “is now in preparation and will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.” This reply has not been found.

214. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 6, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.

215. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State

Geneva, August 7, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.

216. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 8, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/8-862. Secret. Drafted by Valdes and approved in S on August 15. A memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Dobrynin on a comprehensive test ban agreement on this occasion is not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

217. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, August 10, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Jul-Sep 62. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

218. Editorial Note

**219. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee to the Department of State**

Geneva, August 14, 1962, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-1462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

**220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science
and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy**

Washington, August 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.

**221. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee to the Department of State**

Geneva, August 23, 1962, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-2362. Secret.

222. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 23, 1962, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8-2362. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on August 28.

223. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/24-31/62. Confidential.

224. Editorial Note

225. Informal Communication From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, September 4, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1961-1962, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy,

Adrian Fisher (ACDA), Secretary Rusk, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 52.

226. Editorial Note

227. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, September 6, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Prime Minister Macmillan Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1962-1963, Vol. III. Secret; Eyes Only.

228. Editorial Note

229. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, September 15, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. No classification marking. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 54.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, September 21, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. An undated memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to the source text, states, "The attached documents while not actually seen by Secretary Rusk, have been discussed with him by me and he has expressed his present intention to discuss this matter with Lord Home in New York, probably on Sunday." A copy of the source text identifies ACDA officers Adrian Fisher, James Goodby, and Betty Goetz as the drafters. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Chron File, July-Sep 1962)

231. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 25, 1962, 1:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on September 26. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled "Part II." A memorandum of conversation on Laos, the first subject of their talk, is not printed. (Ibid.)

232. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The portions on Berlin and Cuba are printed in vols. XV, pp. 337-338, and volume X, respectively. The full text is printed in vol. VI, Document 55.

233. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology_(Wiesner) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 1, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.

234. Letter From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency_(Cline) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_(Foster)

Washington, October 1, 1962.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files. Secret.

235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology_(Wiesner) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 6, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Safe, Drawer 1, Bethe Report 10/4/62. Top Secret.

236. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, October 8, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with USSR Officials, 1961-1964, Vol. I. Top Secret. Also printed in Vol. VI, Document 58.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The telegram is one of seven that Kohler transmitted to the Department of State that reported on his 3-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev on the morning of October 16. This was Kohler's first formal meeting as Ambassador. Their lengthy conversation was a tour d'horizon of U.S.-Soviet relations. Telegrams 970, 973, 974, and 982, as well as the full text of telegram 979 are printed in vol. V, Documents 146-150. Telegram 978 on Cuba is printed in volume XI; telegram 981 on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 359-362.

238. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 23. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is labeled "Part III." Part I on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 370-376; Part II on Cuba is printed in volume XI; Part IV on U.S.-Soviet relations is printed in vol. V, Document 151. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

239. Editorial Note

240. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 30, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10-3062.
Confidential. Drafted by Beam and initialed by Foster.

241. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 3, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.

242. Editorial Note

243. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 8, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Secret.

244. Editorial Note

245. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 10, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Baker.

246. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_(Foster) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 20, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 20 memorandum by Foster, presumably sent to the Committee of Principals, which states that the paper was a final revision and reflected the discussion by the Committee of Principals on November 10 and comments received by the interested agencies in response to ACDA's November 13 and November 15 memoranda. A copy of the November 13 memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals. The November 15 memorandum and the agencies' responses have not been found.

247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, November 27, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Agencies and Departments Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear

Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. For an earlier memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy on this subject, see Document 230.

248. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 10, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on December 10.

249. Editorial Note

250. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)

Washington, December 20, 1962.

251. Editorial Note

252. Editorial Note

253. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy.

London, January 5, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1963. Top Secret. The time of transmission is illegible.

254. Editorial Note

255. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 9, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-963. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by John C. Guthrie (EUR/SOV) on January 10 and approved in draft by Thompson and by the White House on January 14. A memorandum of their conversation on Cuba is printed in volume XI. A telegraphic summary of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations is printed in vol. V, Document 170.

256. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 10, 1963, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1063. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie on January 11 and approved in S on January 16. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Memoranda of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations are printed in vol. V, Documents 171 and 172, and one on Germany and Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 474-475. Foster also met with Kuznetsov and Dobrynin; a memorandum of their conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Secretary of State.

257. Editorial Note

258. Editorial Note

259. Editorial Note

260. Memorandum for the File

Washington, February 6, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 1/1/63-2/9/63. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on February 8. A note on the source text indicates the memorandum was handcarried to Gilpatric.

261. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 7, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 10.

262. Editorial Note

263. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

264. Editorial Note

265. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on March 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. A memorandum of their discussion on U.S.-French relations is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 760-761.

266. Memorandum for the File

Washington, March 5, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers —Nuclear Test Ban, 3/1/63-1/21/64. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

267. Editorial Note

268. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, March 21, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Top Secret. Also addressed to Under Secretary Ball.

269. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, March 28, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan Correspondence, Vol. II. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the message was sent by the White House channel. A draft of this message, identical to the source text, is attached to a March 27 memorandum from Foster to McGeorge Bundy, which indicates that the draft was approved by Secretary Rusk after review by Thompson and Tyler. (Ibid.)

270. Editorial Note

271. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy

London, April 3, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1963. Top Secret. Attached to a note from Ormsby Gore to the President.

272. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 8, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy.

273. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, April 11, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1962-1963. Secret. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Copies sent Secret Eyes Only to Amb. Thompson & ACDA/Foster."

274. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, April 11, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963. Top Secret. Attached to an April 11 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, in which Thompson wrote that he had delivered the note to Dobrynin that afternoon and had told Dobrynin that no decision had been made as to who the "senior personal representative" mentioned in the message might be. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets would therefore probably make no comment other than on the timing of the visit until they learned more. For the full text of this letter, see vol. VI, Document 92.

275. Telegram From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, April 15, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 3/63-6/63. Secret. The time of transmission is 5:19 Zulu time. Although the message was sent from Washington, Kennedy was consulted about final wording while in Palm Beach. (Telegram CAP 63177, April 14, from the White House to Palm Beach, repeated to the Department of State; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1962-1963)

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, April 15, 1963, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE). Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. Drafted and approved by Goodby and cleared by Bundy, Foster, and Davis (EUR). Repeated to London for the Ambassador and to Geneva for Ambassador Stelle. The letter is also printed in Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp. 466-468.

277. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 17, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/15-6/4/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 18.

278. Editorial Note

279. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, April 20, 1963.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Comp Nuc Test Ban I, T-368-69. Secret; Restricted Data.

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 24, 1963, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only.

281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, April 24, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 USSR. Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by Thompson. Copies were sent to Ball and McGeorge Bundy.

282. Editorial Note

283. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, April 29, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Harriman Trip, Briefing Book I, Tab H. Top Secret.

284. National Security Action Memorandum No. 239

Washington, May 6, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Policy Review. Secret. This NSAM was apparently occasioned by a request made by Nitze to McGeorge Bundy in a May 2 memorandum. Nitze pointed out that the U.S.-Soviet dialog had been almost exclusively on the test ban and on general and complete disarmament and that the United States had not responded to Soviet initiatives regarding potential agreed force levels. The “present possibility of changes in the Soviet leadership” made it essential to make the U.S. position clear to the Soviets, but before that, “we must make our measures clear to ourselves.” (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 4/15-5/31/63)

285. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, May 8, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Khrushchev. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. Another English text is in telegram 2839 from Moscow, May 8. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-4) Also printed in vol. VI, Document 96.

286. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology_(Wiesner) to President Kennedy

Washington, May 16, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Energy, Test Ban Negotiations 7/62-7/63. Secret.

287. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, May 18, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. The conversation was held on board the Patrick J. This memorandum of conversation is printed in full in vol. V, Document 195.

288. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 21, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, May 30, 1963, 5:56 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Khrushchev. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and cleared by McGeorge Bundy. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 102.

290. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 8, 1963.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda. Confidential. Drafted on June 27 by Chief Warrant Officer Proctor of Taylor's personal staff.

291. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)

Washington, undated.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda. Secret.

292. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)

Washington, June 8, 1963, 2:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau.

293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, June 8, 1963, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Received at 4:48 a.m. on June 9. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 103.

294. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 14, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Secret. Drafted by George Bunn, General Counsel of ACDA.

295. Editorial Note

296. Paper by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_(Fisher)

Washington, June 20, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions. Top Secret. In a June 20 memorandum to the President, Kaysen stated that the paper was “Fisher’s report on the line of thought that has evolved from several discussions among Harriman, Foster, Fisher, Nitze, Haworth, Bundy and myself.” (Ibid.)

297. Editorial Note

298. National Security Action Memorandum No. 250

Washington, June 22, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 250. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

299. Proposed Interagency Briefing Paper

Washington, June 22, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, Status of US/USSR Nuclear Technology 6/63. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text. The paper printed here contains material modified or inserted after June 22. A June 25 White House telegram from Kaysen to Bundy (who was traveling with the President in Germany), which was drafted by Harold Brown, Wiesner, and AEC Commissioner Leland Haworth, proposed a change which is incorporated in the text printed here. The telegram concludes: "At present, McNamara proposes that after we have gone through the formal process of getting an agreed memorandum on this subject, he would be glad to have a Brown-Haworth-Wiesner comment and interpretation of it as a document bearing his endorsement for the President's advice." (Telegram Sitto No. 12; *ibid.*, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions) No further information has been found on the use made of this paper.

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL/7 US/Harriman. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

301. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, June 28, 1963.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the title page states: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board." A note on the following page indicates that the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.

302. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)

Washington, June 28, 1963, 2:40 p.m.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July 1963 Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed note: "No Distribution Except to Sullivan." Sullivan was Harriman's Special Assistant.

303. Telegram From the White House to the President's Party in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 28, 1963.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 5TS, Test Ban 2, Background. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The communications channel and delivery point are not indicated. By Saturday morning, the President was at Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence, Birch Grove.

304. Memorandum of Conversation

Birch Grove, England, June 29, 1963, 10:15–11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Top Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on July 12. Birch Grove was Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence.

305. Paper Prepared for the Kennedy-Macmillan Talks

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. No classification marking. Prepared by a U.S.-U.K. team consisting of McNaughton, Sir Solly Zuckerman, Frank Long, and Archibald Duncan Wilson, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

306. Memorandum of Conversation

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963, 11:45 a.m.–1:15 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. Secret. Drafted by John McNaughton, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, on July 1. Copies were sent to William R. Tyler and Franklin Long.

307. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, July 2, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers: Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/21/64. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate whether a final version of this memorandum was sent.

308. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, July 2, 1963.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63, USSR. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the cover sheet reads: "This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, NSA, and FBI." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdictions.

309. Editorial Note

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, July 3, 1963, 9:46 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, July 3, 1963, 7:10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Ball; cleared by Rusk (in substance), Richard Davis (EUR), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.

312. Telegram From Prime Minister Macmillan's Personal Secretary (de Zulueta) to President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

London, July 4, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Telegrams 7/1/63-7/6/63. Secret; Personal. The time of transmission is 1904 Zulu.

313. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, July 5, 1963.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. Attached to a July 5 letter from Kaysen to Harriman.

314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, July 8, 1963.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret.

315. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 8, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412) (1963). Top Secret. Drafted by Louis Marengo on July 9. An attached list of the 24 participants is not printed. Among those attending but not reported as speaking were Harriman, Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Another, lengthier memorandum of this meeting prepared by George Rathjens of ACDA is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.

316. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 8, 1963, 6 p.m.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Background. Secret; Personal; No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Secretary McNamara's office.

317. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy

Washington, July 9, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Chancellor Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy & Johnson, 1963-1964, Vol. II. Secret. The source text is an unofficial translation apparently provided by the German Embassy.

318. Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 9, 1963, 6:25–6:55 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book (Kennedy Library); the source text indicates it began at 6 p.m. Taylor and McCone also prepared memoranda of this meeting, and Seaborg wrote a journal entry. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memos for Record, T-236-69; Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President; and Seaborg, Journal, vol. 6, pp. 33-34, respectively)

319. Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, July 10, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Secret. Another copy is attached to NSC Action No. 2468, July 9, which states that the President approved the revised text after the 9:30 a.m. meeting; see Document 320. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding earlier drafts of the instructions, see footnote 1, Document 318.

320. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 10, 1963, 9:30 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Harriman Trip to Moscow. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaysen. A copy was sent to Bundy and Harriman.

321. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 10, 1963, 3:45–4:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR(MO).
Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on August 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.

322. Position Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Washington, July 12, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 245. Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 12 note from Foster to Bundy.

323. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, July 12, 1963, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret.

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 12, 1963, 8:11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted in the White House by McGeorge Bundy. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 108.

325. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 15, 1963, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 5:45 p.m. Another set of the telegrams documenting the Moscow test ban negotiations is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2284-2286.

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 15, 1963, 9:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret. Drafted by President Kennedy and cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State.

327. Editorial Note

328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 16, 1963, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. No time of receipt is indicated.

329. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 17, 1963, midnight.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Eyes Only; Ban, Received at 10:29 p.m.

330. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 18, 1963, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 10:55 a.m.

331. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 18, 1963, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. Received at 12:43 p.m.

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 18, 1963, 9:29 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only—Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared in draft and substance with the President, Thompson, Ball, Bundy, and Read; and approved by Rusk. All those officials participated in a meeting on the test

ban negotiations held at the White House from 6:30 to 7 p.m. that day. At the outset, “the comment was made that the Moscow delegation had ‘pact fever’ and needed to be slowed down.” In the course of the meeting, agreement was reached on several of the instructions contained in telegram 237. (Memorandum by Bromley Smith; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations, Harriman Trip) See the Supplement.

333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 19, 1963, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Ban. Received at 4 p.m.

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:13 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Foster, cleared by Rusk and Ball, and approved by Read.

335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 20, 1963, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Eyes Only; Ban. Received at 11:19 a.m.

336. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 20, 1963, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 2:30 p.m.

337. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 22, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 6/5-7/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

338. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 22, 1963, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. A longer account of this conversation is in telegram 280 from Moscow, July 23. (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)

339. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 22, 1963, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash. Received at 4:22 p.m.

340. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, July 22, 1963, 6–6:45 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 22, 1963, 10:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, S, and Foster in substance and by Bromley Smith in draft; and approved by Read.

342. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 23, 1963, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 8:50 a.m.

343. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 23, 1963, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret.
Received at 3:57 p.m.

344. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, July 23, 1963, 5:15–5:50 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

345. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 23, 1963, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 7:15 p.m.

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 23, 1963, 9:05 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, Rusk, Foster, and Thompson; and approved by Read.

347. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 24, 1963, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Flash. Received at 4 p.m.

348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 25, 1963, 1 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 9 p.m.

349. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, July 24, 1963, 6–6:50 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:44 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.

352. Letter From President Kennedy to President de Gaulle

Washington, July 25, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with de Gaulle 1961-1964. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text reads: "Original delivered to Elysee on 25 Jul 63." Concerning the delivery of this letter, see Document 349.

353. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 25, 1963, 10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 6:28 p.m.

354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 27, 1963, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 8:30 a.m. and passed to the White House. The

portions of this telegram concerning Germany are printed in vol. XV, pp. 539-544.

355. Editorial Note

356. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, July 30, 1963.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65. Secret. A typewritten note after the drafting line reads: "Noted by Dr. Chamberlain, whose changes are incorporated." This memorandum was possibly prepared in anticipation of the briefing described in Document 357.

357. Editorial Note

358. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in France

Washington, August 4, 1963, 8:48 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President de Gaulle's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-1964 Vol. I. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. The

source text does not indicate whether the telegram went directly from the White House to the Embassy or whether it was relayed to the Department for transmission to Paris. The Department received the telegram at 12:11 a.m. on August 5.

359. Editorial Note

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, August 6, 1963, 9:58 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964 Vol. II. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted in the White House.

361. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

Bonn, August 10, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. The source text does not indicate a transmission time; the telegram was received at 10:56 p.m. and relayed to White House at 11:30 p.m.

362. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 13, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Eyes Only.
Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson on August 15.

363. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 13, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 8/63. Secret.
Drafted by Bundy.

**364. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Russell)**

Washington, August 23, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban and the U.S. Military. Top
Secret.

365. Editorial Note

366. Editorial Note

367. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the White House

Washington, October 4, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates Ball saw this memorandum.

368. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, October 8, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament. Secret.

369. Editorial Note

370. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1963, 4–6:10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by S on October 16 and by the White House on October 21. The ending time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is from the President's Appointment Book.

(Kennedy Library) Separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on the subjects of Cuba, Berlin, steps to be taken after the Test Ban Treaty, U.S.-USSR relations, U.S.-USSR trade relations, nuclear non-dissemination, observation posts, the proposed non-aggression pact, military budgets, and bombs in orbit. Regarding the last, the President and Gromyko agreed that it should be handled in the form of an agreed U.S.-Soviet draft U.N. resolution, perhaps to be cosponsored by other members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The memoranda of conversation on U.S.-USSR relations and U.S.-USSR trade relations are printed in vol. V, Documents 222 and 223. The memorandum of conversation on Cuba is printed in Volume XI; that on Berlin in vol. XV, pp. 591-594.

371. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions

Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:57 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cathright and cleared in the Department by G/PM, ACDA, UNP, EUR, RPM, and P and by DOD/ISA, AEC, and the White House. Approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to the capitals of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Geneva, and USUN.

372. National Security Action Memorandum No. 269

Washington, October 31, 1963.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 269. Secret.

373. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_(Foster) to the Committee of Principals

Washington, December 12, 1963.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2. Secret. Lyndon B. Johnson became President following the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22 in Dallas, Texas.

374. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Senator John Stennis

Washington, December 17, 1963.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 388.3, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965). Secret; Restricted Data. John Stennis of Mississippi chaired the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

375. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 19, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret.

1. National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, January 17, 1961.

NIE 4-61

PROBABLE SHORT-TERM REACTIONS TO U.S. RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The Problem

To estimate the major probable short-term reactions to US resumption of a program of nuclear explosions for purposes of weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications.^{[1](#)}

Assumptions

We assume in this estimate that the US unilaterally resumes nuclear tests, but not until some time after the reconvening of the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban.^{[2](#)} We further assume that the US announces that its explosions will be limited to underground or extra-atmospheric detonations and states their purpose to be weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications.^{[3](#)}

The Estimate^{[4](#)}

Introduction

1. World opinion tends to recoil from nuclear weapons, submerging logical consideration of the subject in an emotional reaction of dismay. This attitude, cultivated although not created by Communist propaganda, regarded the test explosions conducted by the US, the UK, and the USSR up to the fall of 1958 as an important part of the East-West arms race which in turn was likely to culminate in a general nuclear holocaust. Lively fears of health hazards resulting from fallout associated with these tests aggravated this reaction. Thus the unilateral undertakings of the

three powers in the fall of 1958 to suspend testing were greeted with universal relief. Similarly, the Geneva negotiations aimed at making this suspension permanent have been viewed as inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and as a hopeful portent of disarmament, relaxation of tensions, and peace.⁵

2. Between the present time and the date of any US announcement of resumption of a program of nuclear explosions, several factors might act to alter these attitudes. The stage reached in the Geneva negotiations, and the opinions formed concerning the merits of each side's position, is one such factor. Another is any program which the US might develop to inform world opinion about the various purposes and characteristics of different kinds of test programs. A third is the general world picture of Soviet behavior in international affairs during this period.

*Reactions in the Non-Communist World*⁶

3. Given present attitudes, a new US program of nuclear explosions would be regarded by most peoples and many governments as likely to lead the USSR to resume testing; they would fear that the East-West arms race had begun to accelerate and was once more heading towards war. No matter how conducted, renewed US testing would also stimulate fears concerning health dangers from fallout. The US would be severely criticized in many quarters; there would be a tendency on the part of some to regard US policy as insufficiently dedicated to peace. A resolution calling for cessation of nuclear explosions would win widespread support in the UN, and its adoption would be almost certain if the tests were announced as being for weapons development.
4. Adverse reactions could be mitigated in several ways. Insofar as international opinion could be persuaded that the US had earnestly sought agreement in the Geneva talks but had been rebuffed by Soviet unreasonableness, renewed testing would be met with greater understanding. Also, to the extent that the program could be convincingly presented as designed to improve the prospects for test detection and, ultimately, an agreed ban, or to serve other nonmilitary purposes, it would draw less criticism. A very short test series, for example, with Soviet and other observers invited, would dilute some of the negative reaction.

5. It must be recognized, however, that because of the complex technical issues involved, a clear-cut and credible justification on these or other grounds would be very difficult to convey to world opinion. Such attempts at justification would have a greater influence on opinion already aligned with the US than on neutralists, less educated populations, and newer states. In general, however, these explanations would not go far toward neutralizing the critical popular reaction, which would spring in large part from emotional attitudes not readily accessible to rational argumentation. In the minds of many, for example, fallout is so closely associated with any kind of nuclear explosion that large segments of opinion would be impervious to the fact that underground detonations carry no dangers of this sort.⁷
6. Reactions would vary among different countries and areas, as well as in accordance with what were believed to be the purposes of the US program. Some NATO governments would approve, particularly those which would welcome an improved American nuclear capability. France would also be glad to have criticism deflected from its own nuclear weapons program. Most West European governments would probably take a public position which, while deploring further explosions, sought to quiet adverse reaction by sympathetically noting the considerations which had prompted the US to take this step. In taking this stand, some of these governments would find it hard to allay the anxieties of their public. The task of justification would be especially difficult in Great Britain, where the issue would be seized upon by the popular press and large segments of the Labor Party. The Canadian Government would oppose any tests which it believed had military purposes.
7. In Japan, opposition would probably be so intense as to produce anti-American demonstrations and a formal protest by the government as well. Some other Asian nations, particularly India and Indonesia, would be highly critical. However, Asian governments closely aligned with the US would be inclined to accept the US action and might be induced to approve it publicly.⁸ Renewed testing would be very unfavorably received in Africa and the Arab states, and it would be particularly exploited by governments already critical in varying degrees toward the US. The Latin American governments would not regard the issue as of primary importance to themselves; their positions would vary in

accordance with what they judged to be expedient in terms of other interests; most could probably be induced to support the US position.

8. US resumption of nuclear testing, particularly for weapons purposes, would tend to weaken one of the inhibitions upon other Free World countries considering independent development of a nuclear weapons capability. This inhibition would not be completely removed, however, and other military, political, and economic considerations affecting this decision would continue to exist. Thus, while renewed US tests would tend to revive this question in Sweden and elsewhere, they are not likely, in and of themselves, to be decisive factors. However, if these countries were confronted by a situation in which both the US and the USSR had launched extensive test series, the chances that they would embark on independent nuclear weapons programs would rise.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Reactions

9. No matter what purposes the US announced or what safeguards it offered in embarking on a unilateral program, Bloc spokesmen would charge, as part of a major propaganda campaign, that the explosions were in fact for military purposes. Almost certainly the USSR would reject any invitation to observe the explosions and would withdraw its negotiators from Geneva. It would almost certainly call for a special session of the General Assembly to condemn the US, demand abandonment of the planned tests, and insist on speedy conclusion of an agreed ban.
10. The USSR would reaffirm its public position that US nuclear explosions of any type freed the USSR to resume testing. However, Moscow probably would refrain from overt testing for an initial period, lest it compromise its diplomatic and propaganda efforts to indict the US. We estimate that the USSR has technical incentives to conduct nuclear tests, chiefly in order to increase the yield-to-mass ratio of its weapons, to make them more efficient in the use of fissionable material, to develop improved low-yield weapons for tactical and air defense purposes, and to obtain very-high-altitude effects data for antimissile applications. These incentives probably would continue to exist whether or not the USSR had conducted clandestine tests since 1958. The Soviets might consider that they could improve their relative military position if both sides resumed overt testing, and in any event the incentives would grow stronger as the

US conducted additional tests. Thus we believe that, if the US resumed, the USSR would in time follow suit.

11. Soviet representatives have on several occasions expressed the view that the USSR would be quick to undertake testing in the atmosphere if the US should resume testing of any sort. We believe that the Soviets would delay a decision on atmospheric testing pending an assessment of reactions to US testing, the success of their anti-American charges, and other developing factors. It is possible that, on the basis of this assessment, they would limit themselves to tests underground or in space in order to avoid the charge of contaminating the atmosphere. Indeed, they might even conduct tests underground or in space without public acknowledgment, calculating that this would enable them to maximize their political gains and that, in the event of exposure, the excuse of prior US testing would neutralize most of the opprobrium.
12. We believe that Communist China has for some time been pressing the USSR for considerably greater assistance in the attainment of a nuclear capability than the USSR has been willing to grant. In justifying its position, the USSR may have been arguing the net advantages to the Bloc of an agreed test ban. If so, resumed US testing would undermine this argument. In any event, the Chinese Communists would probably exploit such a US resumption and any subsequent Soviet testing to renew and step up their pressures for aid, and it would be more difficult for the USSR to maintain its position. Since the Soviet leaders have other strong reasons for resisting Chinese demands, we believe that renewed US tests probably would not substantially alter the Soviet attitude.
13. The Soviet leaders, and particularly Khrushchev, are eager to assess the attitudes and policies of the incoming US Administration on such matters as defense, disarmament, and East-West negotiations. They will look upon the US attitude toward testing as one of the major indicators in such an assessment.⁹ Their general conclusions concerning the new Administration, however, will be based not only upon this matter, but upon the stance which the US adopts on general disarmament issues and the entire range of foreign policy issues.

STATEMENTS OF NONCONCURRENCE

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur with the estimate as written even with the assumptions as stated in the text. He believes the estimate overplays the negative reactions to the US resumption of nuclear testing and fails to reflect the following:

That the US resumption of nuclear weapons testing is inseparably related to the conditions under which testing is to be resumed.

That the unfavorable reaction by most people and many governments at the outset of nuclear testing would lessen with time following a comprehensive diplomatic and information program.

That most pro-US governments would approve or at least remain aligned with the US should we resume testing.

That the Soviets are likely to conclude from US unilateral testing that the US could no longer be ensnared in inconclusive negotiations and Soviet stalling techniques.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcur in this entire estimate. He considers the estimate to be erroneous in the following major aspects:

- a. It imputes an exaggerated importance to a nebulously defined “world opinion” as a factor in reaching a major US policy decision vis-à-vis nuclear testing.
- b. It credits too little effectiveness to possible US programs to acquaint “world opinion” with non-fallout facts associated with the types of nuclear testing assumed.
- c. It denigrates the capability of pro-Western governments to recognize the nuclear testing facts as well as their courage and ability to guide public opinion in their nations.
- d. It fails to examine the full scale of pressures on the USSR which would come about if the US resumed testing. While one result might be renewed USSR testing—as this estimate states—another possibility would be that the Soviets would feel compelled to accept the US position on controls for verification of test suspensions. A good case can be made for this as an outcome—but it is completely neglected in this document.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, considers that the suggestions summed up in a through c above are unsupported by the evidence available; that they mistakenly credit the USSR with invulnerability, in the world

political arena, to the very factors to which the US is exaggeratedly viewed as hyper-vulnerable; and that omission of point d is a major gap in the appraisal. He concludes that the estimate should be rejected for policy use because it is one-sided, misleading, and in large measure irrelevant.

* Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

¹ We have not attempted to estimate in this paper the long-term impact of these reactions on US foreign relations, or the exact value to the USSR's military establishment of resumed Soviet testing in response to the US program. A judgment on the military or scientific value to the US of such a program is beyond the purview of an Intelligence Estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

² The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, note that the results of these future Geneva negotiations, the conditions under which the US would make such a decision, and the effect of possible actions which the US could take prior to such resumption of nuclear explosions, cannot now be fully assessed. They consider, for example, that the consequences of a period of intensive probing at the negotiations by the US in an attempt to reach reasonable agreement, and of explanation at the highest level as to the reasons for the contemplated US action, would have an important effect on any reactions and therefore on this estimate. However, appropriate assumptions with respect to these factors cannot now be developed. [Footnote in the source text. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, comprising delegations from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reconvened on March 21.]

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the present Assumption is so stated that it presents to its users an incomplete perspective within which to judge the effects of the probable reactions to resumption of US nuclear testing. He believes that a number of other considerations such as the following are necessary prerequisites to a US resumption of testing:

- (a) That the US resumes nuclear tests only after further negotiations at Geneva have demonstrated the failure of US efforts to obtain an adequate inspection system to safeguard Western security;
- (b) That such resumption of tests is accompanied by a comprehensive information program to acquaint other governments and peoples with US requirements for these tests;
- (c) That the information program also includes a full explanation that such US underground or space detonations would not create fallout hazards;
- (d) That the US program of testing for peaceful application and improvement of detection techniques is fully publicized and that an announced standing offer is made to cease testing upon Soviet acceptance of an effective inspection system. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcur in the entire estimate. The reasons for their nonconcurrences are set forth on page 5. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that these reactions have been generated as a result of past detonations. They point out, however, that past detonations have been solely for weapons development purposes, many have been of very large yield, and most have been conducted above ground. They therefore, do not believe that future detonations, under different conditions, will necessarily produce such reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, consider the evaluations of reactions presented in this section to be primarily directed toward reactions to resumption of weapons development tests only, and to underestimate the results which would be achieved by a vigorous and intensive program of public information initiated by the President. They

consider that this would be particularly true if the US action is the undertaking of detonations for detection improvement and that public reaction would be considerably influenced by world scientific opinion which will understand the basic reasons for such action. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that the factors mentioned in this paragraph must be regarded as serious problems to be faced, but note that world opinion on the need for a seismic detection improvement program and on the fact that underground testing does not involve fallout hazards depends heavily on the manner in which the US initiates any program of nuclear explosions. They therefore consider that the general evaluation contained in this paragraph could be mitigated, as mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4, by certain courses of action open to the US. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁸ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this sentence should read: "Government leaders in Asian countries closely aligned with the US would be more inclined to accept the validity of US motivations but, with one or two possible exceptions, they would find it difficult to rally public support." [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the following sentence should be inserted at this point: "If the Soviet leaders concluded from US unilateral testing that the US was abandoning its interest in a negotiated ban, they would be inclined to infer that, with respect to other East-West issues, negotiations had become a less promising course of action." [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Letter From President Kennedy to His Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)[Source](#)

Washington, January 27, 1961.

DEAR MR. MCCLOY: In accordance with our previous discussions, I am hereby designating you as my adviser on the problems of disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test bans. I will expect you to make recommendations regarding the formulation of U.S. policy in these areas, and the organization of the United States Disarmament Administration and related activities. In carrying out your work, the staff of the United States Disarmament Administration will be available to you, as well as such other personnel from other agencies as may be needed.^{[1](#)}

The task which you are undertaking I consider to be of the highest priority. It is firmly linked to our foreign policies, to our national security and to our desire for peace. As such, it will have the constant attention and full support of my Administration. I am asking all departments of the government to cooperate fully with you and to advise you of their views.

I will expect you to work in particularly close association with the Secretary of State, who will be responsible for the conduct of negotiations with foreign countries and for whom you shall also serve as adviser, and with the Secretary of Defense. I want the most diligent possible effort made on this somber problem in the period ahead.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

^{[1](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/1-2761. No classification marking.

¹ McCloy worked closely with the USDA staff but had offices in the White House and the Department of State.

3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, February 9, 1961.

Seaborg, Wiesner, and I have asked for a short meeting on Friday.¹

The problem is this: in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, AEC conducted a series of ingenious and illuminating experiments involving explosions of a few hundred pounds of chemicals, with very small—but rapid—nuclear reactions as one element of them. These nuclear reactions were miniature versions of a real atomic explosion, but with a force not to exceed ten pounds of chemical explosives—and in fact the actual levels involved have been of less than one-pound force. Still, because it was felt that these experiments might be denounced by the Soviets—or others—as clandestine “atomic tests,” their existence was kept very secret. And to give you a free hand in the matter, they were suspended on January 18th.

Seaborg and Wiesner think they should be renewed. Rusk and McCloy concur, and so do I. These experiments may lead to real improvements in nuclear weapons—in particular they may help to improve the range or power of such a weapon as Polaris by showing the safe way to a more efficient warhead. It has always been the U.S. position that weapons development must continue actively even while atomic tests were suspended, and we do not believe that these small explosions, overwhelmingly chemical in character, can properly be called atomic tests in the common meaning of the phrase—there is no mushroom cloud here, by a long sight.

There does exist the possibility that news of this activity will leak out, and we believe it will be important, in this event, to explain the matter promptly, accurately, and with no sense of guilt. The attached statement² aims to produce this result, and we think it should be held for use by Seaborg as needed.

At the same time, we think the very hush-hush atmosphere around these experiments should gradually be lifted; it is not sound to act as if this were a guilty secret when our conviction is that it is an innocent one. We also believe it should become a part of our Geneva position to urge that “atomic explosions” be clearly defined as involving a lot more power than such experiments as these. This matter is under discussion with McCloy.

The only real alternative is to stop these experiments for many months, because if we do not start them before Geneva, it will probably be politically unwise to make a new decision to approve them while Geneva talks are going on. But if we put them off—till fall—we not only slow up possible improvements in needed weapons, we also discourage the talented group of research men at Livermore, perhaps to the point of breakup, and we increase the chance that some disgruntled weaponeer will leak the story in a damaging way.

We do not pretend that our recommendation is without risk. These experiments will be attacked by some ardent disarmers in our own country if they become known, and the Soviet Union will be able to join in if it chooses. But on balance we think the course we suggest is right—the alternative looks worse.³

McG. B.⁴

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, February-April 1961. Top Secret.

¹ February 10.

² Not printed.

³ According to a journal kept by Seaborg, he, Bundy, and Wiesner discussed the matter with the President at a meeting in the White House on February 10, and “obtained the President’s approval for continuation of the experiments that we were interested in.” (Glenn T. Seaborg, *Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971*, vol. 1, pp. 11-12. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a

typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal.)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

4. Editorial Note

On March 4, 1961, the President met a number of officials to discuss resumption of the test ban talks at Geneva, scheduled to begin March 21. Seaborg's journal entry for this meeting reads as follows:

"From 10:35 a.m. to about 11:45 a.m. I attended a meeting with the President to discuss the U.S. position on the forthcoming test ban negotiations to be held in Geneva. It was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House and present were: President Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Arthur Dean, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Paul Nitze, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Mr. Rusk and myself.

"Mr. McCloy made the opening statement by saying that there had been general agreement on the instructions to be given to the U.S. Delegation, as brought out in a meeting of the Principals, and others (total people present, according to Mr. Bundy, were 32), held on Thursday, March 2nd; however, a difference of opinion had developed on the point of the number of on-site inspections, with the AEC holding a different point of view from the others, and we thought this was important enough for the President to resolve.

"Mr. McCloy proceeded to explain the present U.S. position, with its formula of a minimum of ten on-site inspections and the possibility of ten more with a proportionality factor of one per five suspected events to a maximum of 20. In the course of this he mentioned the AEC position, although I had the impression that he referred to it more in the way of opposition to an upper limit, rather than to AEC preference for strict proportionality with no ceiling.

"Mr. Bundy and Dr. Wiesner, and others, supported the point of view of 10 minimum, plus 10 additional on a proportional basis; Mr. Bundy made the point, supported by statistical arguments, that if you inspected some 10 or 20 events, even though each had a probability of only one in three or four of uncovering a clandestine operation, after you had done 10 or 20 of them, the chance that you had missed a true event is very small.

“The President asked General Lemnitzer for his point of view, and he said, but not very forcefully, I thought, that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer the concept of strict proportionality with no ceiling.

“Mr. Nitze made some comments, but they were not of the nature that threw much light on the subject of on-site inspections. He said that the Department of Defense didn't regard the matter of on-site inspections of paramount importance, but they were more concerned with the composition of the Control Commission and the methods by which certification of an event for inspection was made. DOD sees loopholes there that might negate the purposes of the treaty.

“I then said that I wanted to be sure that the difference of point of view of the AEC and the rest of the group was completely understood: that we felt that the position of settling on some arbitrarily negotiated number like 20, 3, 10, or 17 was a political solution; that we thought a more logical and scientific basis existed for adopting the principle of proportionality throughout, and that this would lead to more support by the American public, by Congress, and by scientists. I said that the average number of detectable seismic events per year appeared to be about 100. On the basis of an inspection ratio of one to five, this would result in 20 inspections. But this varies from year to year by something like a factor of 2; that is, you might have as few as 50, or as many as 200 detectable seismic events. Therefore, according to our formula, in some years, there would be less than 20 inspections.

“As the discussion began to move into other channels, Mr. McCloy brought it back to the issue of the differences on the number of on-site inspections, and the President then said that he thought that we should stay with the position of 20, as defined.

“At this point, and also at various times earlier, there was discussion of the importance of approaches to the Members of Congress. In this connection I mentioned specifically the great importance of correct approaches and approaches at the right time to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I mentioned specifically the difficulty last summer when a discussion with them revealed their stand that they would require reciprocity, whereas the

present U.S. position is unilateral disclosure in connection with seismic experimentation.

“Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a luncheon set up for next Tuesday on this matter to discuss it with a number of Democratic Members of Congress. The President asked whether it wouldn't be better to include Republican members. In answer to Mr. Bundy's observation that this would make the group unmanageably large, the President suggested that it could be divided into two luncheons.

“In the discussion of who might attend—and I am not particularly sure who will attend which of the two luncheons—the names of Holifield, Pastore, James Van Zandt, Anderson, Jackson and Hickenlooper of the JCAE were mentioned, as well as other key members of Congress, such as Mansfield, John McCormack, Charles Halleck, etc.

“This was followed by a discussion of the question of the duration of the negotiations. The President, and many of us, had noticed the article in this morning's *Washington Post* by Murray Marder, pointing out that President Kennedy was departing from his campaign promise that he would set a definite time limit on the negotiations. The President observed that the article was rather vague on this point. It seemed to be agreed that there wouldn't be any hard and fast time limit; but, on the other hand, the negotiations would, in effect, come close after a reasonable time.

“There was also discussion here, as well as at other times during the meeting of the John Finney article (*New York Times*, March 3, 1961, 'U.S. Easing Stand on Atom Test Ban') and of the Marder article, in which discussions of the U.S. position, including the statement that we had decided to fall back to 17 inspections, were disclosed. There was much speculation as to the origin of these leaks. These articles indicated that a high official in the State Department had made these statements.

“Mr. McCloy then went on to describe very briefly the Fisk Report, and raised the question of whether it should be made available to the JCAE, pointing out the need for keeping them informed if their subsequent support is to be forthcoming. President Kennedy said he would like to study the Fisk Report over the weekend before deciding on this matter.

“The President then remarked on the time remaining before Mr. Dean’s departure for Geneva, and therefore, on the need for rapid progress. He asked Mr. Dean who was going with him to Geneva, and Mr. Dean mentioned, among others, Messrs. Stell, Popper, Doyle Northrup, etc.

“The President asked whether Mr. Dean had passed on to Dr. Fisk his request that he (Fisk) be with the delegation. Mr. Dean replied that Dr. Fisk has requested that he come after the start of negotiations, on invitation, as needed, so that if he couldn't remain for the entire time, it wouldn't appear that he had lost interest in the negotiations.

“After the meeting I took Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dean aside and said there were three broad areas of possible pitfalls, or at least potential points of public attack upon the treaty that I think they should call to the President’s attention even before he met with the Members of Congress. These are areas which I would have identified at the meeting had the opportunity presented itself.

“I pointed out that the upper limit of 4.75 (on the seismic detection scale) in the treaty, below which there would be a moratorium on testing, left the possibility of cheating in the development of small weapons, and even of rather large ones in the event decoupling was resorted to. I told him I thought this would be a matter of much public comment.

“I pointed out what was basically a point of illogicality in the treaty in the area of high altitude explosions. I said that here we have in the treaty itself a prohibition for which there are in certain cases no enforceable safeguards, and hence we have deviated from a principle which might come back to plague us. I pointed out that a way out of this might have been to have a moratorium for explosions above a certain altitude, below which we could definitely police the treaty provisions.

“I pointed out that some people, and I cited Teller as an example, would disagree with the statements made earlier in the meeting that a treaty of this sort couldn't place the U.S. in a very vulnerable position with respect to its future existence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because only certain small changes, factors of 2 or 3, could be made in relation to yields, weight ratios, etc. I said that there are those who would disagree with this, that there is the

possibility of the next large step—or possibly you might call it the third stage of weapons development—namely, that in the course of a few years such weapons systems as the Polaris-carrying nuclear submarine might be negated (for example, by the Soviets having a sufficient number of submarines to put them on the tail of each of ours, in cooperation with surface ships, and effectively rendering them inoperative). Concomitant with such steps to negate our striking power, the Soviets would continue to develop new concepts which could, in fact, take the next step as breakthrough in a decisive way in their ability to wage war on us.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 1, pages 58, 60-62)

Seaborg’s published *Journal* is an edited typescript prepared in the mid-1980s, based on handwritten notes recorded daily during Seaborg’s chairmanship. An account of the methodology of this transcription appears in the preface to volume 1. A briefer account of this meeting appears in Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, pages 44-45.

The Committee of Principals had been established by President Eisenhower in 1958 to coordinate review of U.S. arms control and disarmament policy. It originally comprised five members: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Science Adviser to the President. Kennedy added the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and, later in 1961, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

A memorandum by James Goodby of the U.S. Disarmament Administration of the Principals’ meeting held March 2 and the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Technical Capabilities and Implications of the Geneva System (the Fisk Report), comprising 62 pages plus amendments and charts are in the Supplement. Kennedy did release the Fisk Report to the JCAE. Other accounts of the Principals’ March 2 meeting and a description of the March 7 meeting with the congressional leaders are in Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 1, pages 65 and 70-72, respectively, and Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, pages 38–43 and 46–48, respectively.

5. Memorandum From the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, March 8, 1961.

SUBJECT
Fisk Report

I am transmitting herewith the report of the Fisk Panel on Technical Capabilities of the Geneva System.^{[1](#)} This Panel was established to study, review and bring up to date the technical considerations bearing upon the conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This report, in my judgment, from a technical standpoint buttresses the conclusion that it is in the overall interest of the national security of the United States to make a renewed and vigorous attempt to negotiate a test ban agreement along the lines now contemplated.

The consensus of scientific thinking and analysis contained in this report indicates that a test ban agreement along the lines of the Geneva system involves certain risks from the point of view of potential nuclear weapons development. General Loper, one of the members of the Panel, has expressed his separate views^{[2](#)} as to these risks. Some of these risks are due to the inhibiting effect which the agreement might have on some areas of weapons development which may be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R. This is not true in all cases; the reverse situation exists in some. Some of these risks are due to the possibility of undetected testing by the U.S.S.R. either by underground tests which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75 or by tests at high altitude. It is proposed to undertake further research in these fields which may increase the ability to detect such tests. In the present state of knowledge, however, it must be recognized that the effect of the agreement is to make undetected testing more difficult and expensive but that a determined evader could probably evade the technical detection system if it were to put enough of its national effort into the attempt. The increased effort would make detection more likely, however, by conventional intelligence methods.

These risks should not be disregarded; neither should they be overstated. They must be evaluated in light of our total military effort and plans. They must be appraised in the light of all the courses and risks facing the United States in its endeavor to reduce the likelihood of war and to promote strong conditions of peace. When so evaluated and appraised, they are, in my judgment and on balance, worth taking in order to achieve this first step towards a workable agreement on arms control.

Taking a first step in the field of arms control in the present world situation involves some risks but there are also real risks in not taking the first step. Moreover, the first step may well have such significance as to lead to the adoption of further advances toward the relief of tensions and the avoidance of war and its concomitant, a devastating nuclear catastrophe.

A test ban agreement, along the lines now contemplated, would be a significant step in the field of arms control. It would establish a control organization which will give experience in the problems of control and inspection which can be expanded and adapted to handle other measures of arms control. Installation of the high altitude control system will provide an opportunity for joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. cooperation in the exploration of outer space of the type suggested by you in your State of the Union message. The system contains the possibility of difficulties and irritations but, on balance, provides a useful mechanism for getting past a stage in the international control of arms which has proved impassable until this time.

A test ban agreement along the lines now being considered might well contribute to better and more stable relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and thus help ease general international tensions. Moreover, by stationing Americans and other foreigners at control posts and on inspection teams it could contribute to the development of a more open Soviet society. It would involve the acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the principle that inspection and control is a necessary and integral part of any agreement in the field of disarmament.

A second reason for supporting a test ban agreement is that it could be helpful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among other countries. By establishing an international legal order, to which nations would be asked and expected to join, it will tend to restrain the

present non-nuclear powers from obtaining nuclear capabilities. The test ban agreement is certainly not sufficient in itself to prevent this spreading of nuclear capabilities. It will have to be followed by the negotiation of other measures. If the present nuclear powers are engaged in nuclear weapons testing, the possibility of effective agreements restricting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will have been severely limited.

The final reason for supporting a test ban agreement results from a comparison of the political gains which would accrue from a successful test ban negotiation, on the one hand, with the political disadvantages which would be presented by a resumption of testing, on the other. A workable test ban agreement, honestly sought by the United States, would gain credit for the United States in responsible world opinion which could conceivably firm up its alliances and produce a better atmosphere, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, for conducting further negotiations with the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, the United States were to break off the test ban talks and resume testing, without a new and serious attempt to negotiate an agreement, it would, in my judgment, alienate world opinion, not only in the underdeveloped countries but among our major allies as well.

Discussions during the past summer with officials from the United Kingdom illustrate how seriously even a staunch ally as the British would regard such an action. The damage to the stature of the U.S. in world affairs and the effect on U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations which might result if the U.S. were to fail to take reasonable steps necessary to reach a satisfactory test ban agreement, and then resume testing, would be serious. This consideration, and the other considerations which I have referred to, affect the security of the United States and make me feel that they outweigh the risks which are involved in the test ban agreement and which the Fisk Panel has identified.

This does not mean that the U.S. must continue to refrain from testing indefinitely and acquiesce in what is, in effect, a test ban with no safeguards during a period of unduly protracted negotiations. If reasonable and timely progress is not made in the test ban talks, the national interests of the U.S. may well require the resumption of testing. This should be done, however, only after the U.S. has exhausted reasonable steps to obtain a satisfactory agreement.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Fisk Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a March 9 note from Bundy, which reads: “This is a paper from McCloy—you are not the real target—Joint Committee is. It is part of the effort to present the whole story *without* asking for approval yet.”

¹ See [Document 4](#). The Fisk Report is in the Supplement.

² Attached to the Fisk Report. Loper’s views were endorsed by the JCS in a March 4 memorandum to McNamara. The Chiefs stated that Section VII of the Report did not give sufficient emphasis to the consequences of a major breakthrough by either side in the nuclear field, to the need for testing to ensure weapons safety and reliability, or to the “urgent military requirement for obtaining of weapons effect data in various environments.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 388.5 1961)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

6. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Geneva [Source](#)

Washington, March 8, 1961.

A-161. Subject: Presidential Letter to Ambassador Dean. Following is the text of a letter dated March 4, 1961, from the President to Ambassador Dean:

“Dear Arthur:

I am delighted that you have accepted the heavy responsibility of representing the United States in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. You are outstandingly qualified to conduct these negotiations with the wisdom, energy and seriousness of purpose which they demand.

The deliberations which you are about to undertake could lead to the first international arms control agreement of the nuclear age. Such an agreement might not only help to contain the danger of a nuclear arms race, but might also be the prototype of other far-reaching agreements. At the very least, it would furnish practical experience for cooperative effort in arms control. The United States is prepared to make a vigorous effort to reach an agreement which would be to the advantage of both sides and which would promote disarmament and strengthen world security.

The main obstacle heretofore has been the lack of agreement on the establishment of an effective control system. You should, therefore, seek to discover whether a reasonable basis for accord can be found which provides adequate controls and is consistent with the security of the United States. On this could depend the answer to the larger question of whether progress towards more comprehensive disarmament will be advanced or retarded.

Undue delay in these negotiations would tend to decrease the possibility of reaching agreement, for the present uncontrolled suspension of nuclear tests is a condition which must inevitably give rise to increasing concern.

Accordingly, the negotiations should be conducted in such a way as to make it clear within a reasonable period whether it is possible to proceed to the consummation of a treaty. While it is not in our hands alone to determine the outcome of the conference, whatever we can do to ensure success by negotiating openly and in good faith should be done. To this end, you have my wholehearted confidence and support.

With best wishes,

/Sgd./ John F. Kennedy

The Honorable Arthur H. Dean

Department of State

Washington 25, D.C.”

The above letter will not be released or otherwise made public. You are, however, authorized to show the text to the Soviet Delegation on a confidential basis.^{[1](#)}

Rusk

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-861. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodby and cleared by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Political Office of USDA. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Allen Dulles, Seaborg, and Wiesner.

^{[1](#)} In Supnu 1426 from Geneva, March 23, Dean reported that he had that day given the President’s letter to Tsarapkin, who stated that he did “not intend to make any comment until our position had been completely developed.” (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/3-2361)

7. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, March 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

Instructions for Governor Stevenson for his Talks with Gromyko on the Question of Timing of Future Substantive Negotiations on Disarmament and the Forum in which such Negotiations Would Take Place

During this past weekend we have developed, in concert with Governor Stevenson, the attached cable for your approval on the above subject.¹ If you approve the instructions, Governor Stevenson would see Gromyko and propose: (a) that disarmament negotiations be resumed on or before August 1, 1961, in Geneva; and (b) that the forum for such talks be the 10-Nation group, augmented by either two or three officers from the smaller powers. If agreement is reached on the foregoing with the USSR, this would be incorporated in a resolution to be submitted to the resumed session of the General Assembly. In his discussions with Gromyko, Governor Stevenson would also indicate our willingness to have bilateral substantive talks with the Soviets in early summer prior to the opening of negotiations in the more formal 10-Nation group, as augmented.

Mr. McCloy has approved the attached instructions. We have discussed the general lines of this cable with Mr. Bundy, who has seen a preliminary draft. We have also consulted with Mr. Nitze, who has made several suggestions which have been incorporated in the draft instruction, but in light of the need for urgent instructions, it has not been possible for him to discuss the attached cable either with the Secretary of Defense or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Nitze regrets, as I do, that we are having to deal with this essentially tactical matter before knowing more concretely where we wish to go on the substantive aspects of the U.S. position on disarmament. This underscores the need for early decisions on our substantive position in light of studies which are now in process.

Dean Rusk

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 1-3/61. Secret.

¹ Not printed. The draft cable was sent unchanged as telegram 1703 to USUN, March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1461)
See the Supplement.

8. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration (Gullion) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, March 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

Instructions for Nuclear Test Delegation

Discussion:

Attached for your approval are the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.¹ These instructions have been drafted to reflect the decisions of the Committee of Principals and of the President. Information copies of this draft have been sent to all members of the Committee of Principals and to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The draft has been approved by Mr. Dean and Mr. McCloy. The Department of Defense has advised us of their concurrence. There are, however, three points in which the AEC has not concurred, as follows:

- 1) The AEC staff continues to feel that no upper limit of 20 should be placed on the escalator formula for on-site inspections (para. 3(d), pages 4-5);
- 2) The AEC staff believes that we should explicitly state that the seismic research program should begin before signature of the treaty (para. 3(b), page 3);
- 3) The AEC staff feels that the Control Commission should not be given authority to alter Phase I components of the system (para. 5(f), page 9).

We have reviewed the specific issues with Mr. McCloy, who feels as we do, that we should proceed with the instructions as drafted in view of their acceptability to the other agencies involved and in view of the primary responsibility of the State Department on the matters to which the AEC staff has taken exception.

With respect to the AEC's first point, which is the only major one, we feel that the nature of the escalation proposal has been thoroughly considered by the Committee of Principals and that the proposed position has been approved by the President. Furthermore, we have advised the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the proposed position.

With respect to the AEC's second point, we have pointed out that our proposed position does not preclude the starting of the seismic research program prior to the signature of the treaty, if this can be agreed. However, we object to making it mandatory that the research program be launched before the treaty is signed.

With respect to the AEC's third point, we are simply applying to Phase I a principle which has been proposed by the U.S. and accepted by the USSR for Phase II and III. We regard this as entirely a political matter.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached instruction for the U.S. Delegation to the nuclear test talks.^{[2](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers.

^{[1](#)} Not printed.

^{[2](#)} Rusk's stamped signature and date indicate that he approved the draft instructions that day. They were sent, apparently unchanged, to Geneva as Nusup 1083, March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561) Dean outlined the joint U.S.-U.K. position at the reconvened Geneva Conference on March 21, and the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty was tabled on April 18. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 55-65 and 82-126, respectively. Extensive documentation on the coordination of the U.S.-U.K. position on the draft test ban treaty is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 and 397.5611-GE for January-April 1961.

9. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, March 23, 1961.

JCSM-182-61

SUBJECT

Nuclear Arms Control Measures (U)

1. Current international and domestic interest in arms control matters indicates a probable need for early policy decisions on issues which confront the United States in this field. US arms control policy decisions probably will require coordination with at least major NATO Allies in order to gain Western support for policies which are compatible with US national security requirements. Anticipating these needs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the issues which, in their view, warrant priority consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that certain extremely important arms control issues arise in connection with those proposals which would affect the nuclear capabilities of the United States. This memorandum sets forth the policy decisions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be made concerning these issues.
2. In their re-examination of pressing arms control issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the following factors into consideration:
 - a. “The *basic threat* to US security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.
 - b. “The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime’s ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free

societies; to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and, particularly in the neutralist and less developed societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.”

- c. The United States is in fact engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Leaders of the Bloc recognize this by repeatedly stressing their objective of securing domination of the world and emphasizing that their ultimate task is the subjugation of the US. Sino-Soviet techniques for attaining their objective include subversion; the creation and exploitation of chaos; economic warfare; blackmail through threats to employ their military power; the outright use of their military power when risks to their own security are not great; the development, maintenance and improvement of their military strength and capabilities far in excess of any apparent requirements for internal security; a constant campaign to degrade the US position as leader of the Free World; and a constant campaign to reduce and eliminate US nuclear warfare capabilities which constitute the primary Free World obstacle to the Bloc use of major aggression to achieve world domination. Employment of the foregoing techniques has proven successful in many cases: Since World War II, the USSR base of the world Communist movement has been expanded to encompass Eastern Europe, mainland China, Tibet and parts of Korea and Indo-China; significant political and economic influence by the Bloc has been achieved in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; there is a broad base of support for the Soviet campaign to stigmatize and inhibit possible US use of its nuclear weapons capabilities even for self-defense; many Free World spokesmen have joined the chorus in support of Soviet efforts to disarm all nations, especially the United States, and thus to eliminate the obstacle to Sino-Soviet ambitions which is posed by US military capabilities.
- d. The US military posture is determined by the need to protect the security of the United States and to carry out our collective security responsibilities; it is not designed for aggression. However, the Soviet leaders probably realize that there is a serious risk of self-destruction if

they attempt to destroy US military capabilities. They probably recognize also that they would risk the initiation of general nuclear war, and their own destruction, if they were to expand significantly the area under their domination. They would consider the risks to be very great if areas considered vital by the United States to its own security arrangements were involved. Thus, programs to attain their objective of world domination without incurring the risk of self-destruction are supported by their efforts to disarm the West through their campaign for “general and complete disarmament”.

- e. Basic to the security of the United States and to its collective security arrangements is a capability to deter a nuclear attack on the United States. This requires sufficient numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means for their delivery which are sufficiently invulnerable to be able at least to absorb an initial nuclear attack and still retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. The active defense of the North American continent against manned aircraft and missile attack requires the use of nuclear weapons. A similar defense requirement exists for US forces on the seas and overseas. Also, US forces overseas must possess at least sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery to operate effectively if Sino-Soviet forces initiate nuclear attack or in case the use of nuclear weapons is authorized by the President for other reasons.
- f. To meet US requirements for nuclear weapons, and those required in support of US collective security arrangements, it is anticipated that allocation of the bulk of planned US special nuclear materials production will be needed at least through the 1960's.
- g. In accordance with national policy, the US military posture over a period of years has been based on progressive modernization of all military forces, with emphasis on nuclear capability, and on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used “when required to meet the nation's war objectives” and when authorized by the President. If directed, the time between a decision to change the US military posture and the availability in operational units of the weapons systems required both qualitatively and quantitatively to support the new posture may in many cases be as long as eight to ten years. Such a change would necessarily have to consider many factors

not the least of which would be substantial increases in US defense expenditures in making the change-over.

3. In light of the situation which confronts the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that US national policy be established as follows relative to nuclear arms control measures currently under consideration for possible negotiation independently of each other and independently of other disarmament measures:

a. *Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Testing:*^{[1](#)}

- (1) The United States should seek to conclude the Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests not later than 1 June 1961 with an agreement which will prohibit those tests which the agreed control system is capable of detecting and identifying.
- (2) Following 1 June 1961, and pending an enforceable international agreement to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, the United States should resume the testing as soon as possible of nuclear weapons in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere can be controlled, i.e., outer space, underground and underwater.
- (3) The United States should agree to cease only those nuclear weapons tests for which an effective international detection and identification system is feasible. In this case, the United States should reserve the right to resume such tests in the event of violation of any part of the agreement, including that part which prescribes the installation and continued effective operation of the detection and identification system on a world-wide basis.

b. *Cessation of Production of Fissionable Materials for Use in Weapons:*^{[2](#)}

- (1) The United States should not implement an agreement to halt its production of fissionable materials for use in weapons until:
 - (a) Its requirements for nuclear weapons indicated in paragraph 2 e above have been met;
 - (b) All States within the Sino-Soviet bloc have implemented an agreement to limit numerically their armed forces personnel and armaments to levels which would not reduce, and preferably would improve, the relative military capabilities of the US and its Allies vis-à-vis the USSR, Red China and the remainder of the Sino-Soviet bloc;

- (c) The implementation of these limitations on armed forces personnel and armaments by the Sino-Soviet bloc has been and continues to be verified and inspected to the satisfaction of the United States and its Allies throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc;
 - (d) A system by which the US and its Allies can verify and inspect compliance by the Sino-Soviet bloc with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is installed and operating effectively throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc; and
 - (e) The Sino-Soviet bloc simultaneously ceases production of fissionable materials for use in weapons.
- (2) The United States should not agree to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons on a reciprocal plant-by-plant basis with the Sino-Soviet bloc unless the conditions listed in paragraphs 3 b (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, have been met.
- (3) The United States should not agree to halt the production of non-fissionable materials, such as tritium, which are essential to the effectiveness of US stocks of nuclear weapons, nor to halt the production of fissionable materials for non-weapons uses, including nuclear propulsion.
- (4) The United States should not agree to halt the fabrication of nuclear weapons from stocks of nuclear materials available when a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons becomes effective, nor to halt the refabrication and maintenance of its nuclear weapons.
- c. *Transfer of Fissionable Materials from Past Production to Non-Weapons Uses:*³ The United States should not agree to transfer fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses unless:
 - (1) The quantity to be transferred by the United States is matched by the USSR, there is effective international control of the quantities transferred, and the quantity transferred by the United States does not reduce US stocks of nuclear weapons; or until
 - (2) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has been halted under the conditions specified in paragraph 3 b above and its subparagraphs, the quantities transferred by the United States are matched by the USSR, and there is effective international control of the quantities transferred.
- d. *Declaratory Prohibition of Nuclear Sharing:*⁴

- (1) The United States should continue to abstain from commitment to the provisions of UN Resolution 1576 (XV), 20 December 1960. This resolution calls upon nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear powers, and calls upon non-nuclear powers to refrain from manufacturing or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the United States abstained when this resolution (commonly called “the Irish Resolution”) was voted upon, it was approved by the General Assembly.
 - (2) The resolution, if now subscribed to by the United States, would constitute a moral commitment which could impose limitations on the Free World in efforts by its members to provide for their individual and collective self-defense; moreover, because it is not enforceable, it would not bar nuclear sharing by the USSR with other Communist countries. Furthermore, the declaratory approach of the resolution would establish a precedent which could undermine the position of the United States and its Allies that arms control agreements must be accompanied by effective verification and inspection.
- e. *Application of IAEA Inspection Machinery to Restrictions of Fissionable Materials to Peaceful Uses:*⁵
- (1) Implementation of the arms control measures in paragraph 3 b and c could result in relatively large quantities of fissionable material becoming available for non-weapons purposes. The United States could agree that use be made of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure that fissionable material made available to the IAEA for peaceful uses is not diverted to military uses providing the following are met:
 - (a) The Statute of the IAEA is revised and strengthened to ensure against inspection veto by possible evaders.
 - (b) An effective inspection system is developed.
 - (c) The IAEA’s inspection and safeguards staff is appropriately expanded and includes adequate US representation.
 - (d) All fissionable material becoming available for peaceful purposes as the result of arms control measures is placed under the IAEA’s control.

- (2) Inspection and verification systems for monitoring arms control measures, such as the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, should be separate and distinct from the IAEA. Experience gained by the IAEA with respect to inspection and safeguards, however, could be useful in the development of arms control verification and inspection systems.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that they are concerned about and recommend strongly against any reduction of our nuclear warfare capabilities, unless the conditions specified in paragraph 3 above have been met. They consider that it would be premature in the foreseeable future to initiate any negotiations or undertake a commitment to adhere to any of the measures listed in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of an effectively safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons tests, in isolation or related only to other nuclear measures.
 5. In making the foregoing recommendations concerning nuclear arms control measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the requirement to balance nuclear and non-nuclear measures and reaffirm their previously stated views that:
 - a. "The US negotiations effort must ensure that in the post-arms control agreement era, the United States will be able to maintain at any stage an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the remaining Sino-Soviet bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident, flexible capability for military operations short of general nuclear war.
 - b. "The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight with or without nuclear weapons, credible both to our Allies and our enemies."
 6. There are other important issues in the arms control field which may require national policy decisions on which the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished as the need arises. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the policies set forth in paragraph 3 above involve arms control issues of immediate importance to the security of the United States. Decisions on these policies will have major effects on the national strategy of the United States and on US military capabilities and long-range programs. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be transmitted to the Adviser to the President on

Disarmament Affairs and that decisions at the national level be reached on these policies.⁶

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen."

¹ See Appendix A hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

² See Appendix B hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 15-page appendix is not printed.]

³ See Appendix C hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

⁴ See Appendix D hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 3-page appendix is not printed.]

⁵ See Appendix E hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

⁶ In a memorandum to Bundy dated April 10, Komer described this paper "as an example of how the Chiefs still sign off on such disarmament comments as made the last general in the White House almost come to ignore their views." Komer believed that the paper failed to take into account the effect on the Soviet Union of U.S. actions regarding atomic weapons, and pointed out that the Soviets were currently in the process of reducing conventional forces to 2.5 million, "where we are," by 1962. "True, this still somehow gives them a lot more divisions than we have, but the disparity will no longer be so great as to be an absolute bar." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA Disarmament General, April 1961)

10. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State [Source](#)

New York, March 25, 1961, 3 p.m.

2626. Lunch with Gromyko. I had lunch with Gromyko alone on Friday, March 24, at his request. He asked for a meeting with the President, explaining that he had planned to return to the Soviet Union on Saturday, March 25, but would stay over a few days. He reminded me that he had suggested such a meeting during his talk with Secretary Rusk on March 18^{[1](#)} and had received no reply. I promised to arrange a meeting if possible and asked him when he wanted it. His response was as soon as possible.^{[2](#)}

I asked about his reaction to the President's TV program and proposals on Laos,^{[3](#)} and he replied that the Soviet Government wanted a neutral and independent Laos and that he was hopeful that a solution was possible.

I submitted our last draft resolution on disarmament.^{[4](#)} He said he wanted me to tell the President that they had taken our views very seriously and appreciated our difficulties and were studying the situation. But the resolution was unsatisfactory; they could not accept the proposal for an additional 3 neutrals (India, Mexico and one unnamed) to be added to the committee as chairman and vice chairmen respectively. They would have to insist that the neutrals be added with equal rights to participation in all respects. In view of the fact that we could make no other suggestions besides the Disarmament Commission itself, perhaps any further discussion of the paragraph on principles was unnecessary.

After further discussion we agreed that in these circumstances the best thing to do would be to have no resolution, announce that we had agreed to resume negotiations by the end of July and meanwhile would have some bilateral talks in June and July on disarmament, including the composition of the forum, and recommend that all pending resolutions be deferred until the next GA. He agreed to my suggestion that perhaps any reference to bilateral talks on the subject of the composition of the forum might be

omitted, and he preferred to make a statement before Committee I instead of issuing a joint communiqué. I asked him to draft what he had in mind saying. This draft was transmitted to the Department by telegram today.⁵ He said that any statement I cared to make would be satisfactory with him. He thought a reference to deferring pending resolutions might be desirable to avoid possibility of committee consideration of any other items proposed by other countries.

In the course of our conversation he said he had a message from Mr. K. to deliver to the President orally. We discussed Soviet-US difficulties, and he complained that the Soviet Union had been misunderstood following the war and charged improperly with designs on the independence of Europe. On disarmament, he said in the USSR there has been a feeling that “some influential circles” in the US continued to be suspicious of the USSR. Until that dissipated, mutual trust was impossible. He wished that the US would believe in their sincere anxiety for general and complete disarmament under international control, and a disarmed world. He repeated that in Moscow they felt that influential circles in the US did not want disarmament, and implied that this suspicion about our sincerity was extensive.

As to Berlin, again he emphasized its importance and expressed the fear that there was some under-estimation of its importance in the US.

On the Congo, he said he regretted that we were so far apart. He said the Soviet Union wanted nothing—no investments, no land—and felt the Congo should be independent. The Soviet Union was indignant about Lumumba’s murder. He said he had known Lumumba personally and he was a clever man.

Stevenson

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

¹ A memorandum of this conversation drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, Officer in Charge of General Disarmament Negotiations at ACDA, is *ibid.*, 611.61/3-1861. It is printed in [vol. V, Document 33](#)². Nusup 1095 to

Geneva, March 20, contains an extract of this conversation pertaining to disarmament. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2061) See the Supplement.

² Kennedy met with Gromyko and other officials on March 27; see [vol. V, Document 36](#).

³ For text of the President's remarks on Laos at a news conference held March 23, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1961, p. 543.

⁴ Text not found. According to telegram 2615 from USUN, March 24, the text was similar to that transmitted in telegram 2588 from USUN, March 22, except that the United States was willing to accept the addition of three rather than two "neutral" powers to the former 10-nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-2461 and 600.0012/3-2261, respectively) Documentation on U.S. efforts to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on its proposal made in September 1960, one of a series of "troika" initiatives, to expand the 10-nation Committee to 15 by adding 5 neutral nations is *ibid.*, 600.0012 for February and March 1961.

⁵ Telegram 2622 from USUN, March 25. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/3-2561)

11. Report of the Panel on the Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons[Source](#)

Washington, April 1, 1961.

INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS

The “Panel on Cutoff” submits this report on the problems involved in an international agreement for the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons. The cutoff was studied as a single isolated disarmament measure. If it were to be linked with other measures (e.g., stockpile reduction) it should be re-examined in the new context.

Before presenting our findings, we must emphasize that we were not asked and we make no recommendation as to the advisability of negotiating a cutoff agreement. Such a decision would, of course, require the consideration of matters not included in this study.

We present the following conclusions:

1. A cutoff would have a profound effect on both US and USSR plans for the use of nuclear weapons. Presently planned uses will quickly exceed the prospective stockpile existing as of the cutoff date studied (July 1, 1963).
2. A cutoff of future tritium production would have a particularly serious effect on the weapons stockpiles since, if unreplenished, fifty percent of the tritium in the stockpile would decay in twelve years time. This would result either in the progressive reduction of important weapon systems or in the redesign of the systems with degraded performance. A reduction in tritium would probably be more serious to the US than to the USSR in view of existing US and USSR weapon systems. For the purpose of this report, it has been assumed that a cutoff agreement would allow production of tritium to the extent necessary to maintain the tritium stockpile existing at the time of the cutoff. The proposed inspection system includes provisions for monitoring such production.

3. The larger US stockpile of weapons materials (possibly several times that of the USSR) suggests a US advantage in a stockpile freeze. However, it is impossible to draw any final conclusions as to the net effect of cutoff until the appropriate net military evaluations are completed. We note with deep concern that an appropriate study of the net military effect of such a proposal is not available, and urge that this deficiency be rectified as a matter of high priority.
4. Without attempting to judge the net military significance of a cutoff, it does appear that the US can maintain a very substantial second-strike retaliatory capability by allocating 25 to 50 percent of the 1963 stockpile to strategic systems. We do not know what levels of Soviet fatalities are required to deter the USSR from initiating an attack nor are we suggesting, by the use of certain examples, that a deterrent strategy based on population kill is a proper strategy for the United States. We note, however, that estimates, based on the assumption, among others, that the USSR will not develop an effective AICBM, indicate that these US systems will cause from 20 percent to 40 percent fatalities in the Soviet Union even after a large surprise Soviet attack with no warning. We note also that whereas cutoff of fissionable material production in 1963 would limit the ability of the USSR to expand its strategic forces, the population kill capability of the US systems is relatively insensitive to a Soviet missile expansion beyond the credited 1963 level. The cutoff would also limit the ability of the US and the USSR to undertake massive AICBM or ASW programs. The amounts of material that the USSR could divert by evasion of the proposed control system would have very little effect on the US-USSR strategic balance.
- 5.

An inspection system to cover the USSR would cost about \$10 million a year and would involve about 450 technical personnel, 350 of whom would have to be in the USSR. In addition to monitoring declared production facilities, this system would require a limited number of peremptory inspections. A high degree of access, not only to declared plants, but also to sites suspected of clandestine activity, is indispensable if the system is to be effective.

This recommended inspection system, when supported by a strong US intelligence effort, should provide a high level of confidence that Soviet evasion could not exceed about 2 percent per year of their 1963 stockpile, which is considered to constitute a relatively small military risk. Adding inspection system requirements for the US and UK would about triple the above cost and personnel figures.

6. Production by other countries, including the Chinese Peoples Republic, is estimated to be relatively small during the next decade and would not constitute a direct danger to either the US or the USSR if their remaining stockpiles are not reduced.
7. The economic consequences of a cutoff of fissionable materials production in itself, while significant, would not be so damaging as to be a serious negative factor in the overall determination of the advisability of a cutoff agreement.

[Here follows the body of the 19-page Report.]

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. This Panel, appointed by the USDA, was known as the Perkins Panel after Chairman Dr. James Perkins. Other members were Manson Benedict, Marion Boyer, Spurgeon Keeny, General Herbert Loper, Donald Musser, George Quinn, Isidor Rabi, Louis Roddis, Herbert Scoville, Walter Singlevich, and William Webster.

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests [Source](#)

Washington, April 4, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

Nusup 1123. Upon invitation of Winiewicz, Head of the Polish UN Delegation and presumably at request of Gromyko, McCloy had two hour conversation night March 30 at Polish Mission New York with Soviet Foreign Minister. Others present were Zorin-USSR, Ambassador Lwandowski and Professor Lachs of Poland and Shepard Stone.

Prior to discussion more specific problems, McCloy described role as Adviser on Disarmament. McCloy stated he had not come to Washington to maneuver or to engage in tactical exercise but to help bring about agreement with Soviet Union on disarmament. President had made it crystal clear to McCloy that such was his objective. McCloy stated agreement with Soviet Union was imperative and it now remained to find items of common interest and to begin.

Gromyko asked many questions about economic aspects of disarmament. McCloy pointed out based on experience with U.S. industry and banking that though disarmament would mean readjustments and in a very few cases some dislocation, overwhelming emphasis U.S. industry and business was non-military and eager to expand non-military production. Economic problems were not a barrier to U.S. disarmament and Soviets should abandon myth that U.S. could not afford to disarm. Gromyko appeared to show interest in views outlined and said he accepted and gave credit to statement.

In answer to Gromyko question as to barriers in way of GCD, McCloy outlined his views on negative aspects of Soviet secrecy and need for inspection and controls so that both sides would gain mutual experience and overcome suspicions and fears. McCloy emphasized need for first steps which leading to growth of mutual trust would later accelerate to larger program. Throughout evening Gromyko emphasized what seemed to him

American misunderstanding of Soviet proposals. He insisted Soviets agree on necessity inspection and controls and that at end of each stage of disarmament Soviet proposals contemplated a review of situation before going on to next stage. GCD objective necessary because partial steps taken independently without overall program would create disequilibrium. He implied that partial steps proposed by U.S. were aimed at weakening Soviet Union. McCloy argued against practicability of Soviet proposal and re-emphasized need to take first steps and build on them. Gromyko asked what first steps were contemplated. Without trying outline appropriate sequence, McCloy mentioned: (a) necessity to reach test ban agreement in Geneva, (b) cut-off of production fissionable materials to be followed later by decreases in stockpiles, (c) ban on bombs in orbit, (d) common efforts to work out measures to prevent accidental warfare and surprise attack, (e) common efforts in peaceful uses atomic energy. Gromyko asked for repetition this list two or three times and seemed to be interested. He was told we would welcome Soviet proposal as to first step but important matter was to get started.

Gromyko said Soviet at Geneva was waiting to hear full U.S. proposals and hoped there would be new things to come out of our "bag." Soviet would make serious study proposals but was not impressed so far. Soviet Foreign Minister did not consider, for example 19 inspection stations in U.S.S.R. as against 21 as an important gesture but he did not labor the point. Gromyko insisted that three man administration was sticking point for Soviets admitting that Soviets wanted veto. He said he hoped we would not believe Soviet proposal was based on Soviet expectation that they would always get majority in control commission and he said that Soviets would be "reasonable" in the operation of the veto. McCloy emphasized that Soviet three-man suggestion had had serious negative effect in Washington and he hoped Soviets would reconsider. Gromyko admitted relationship of all this to the attack on UN.

Gromyko asked McCloy's views on where June-July talks should take place. McCloy emphasized this a matter for discussion with Stevenson and Rusk, not McCloy and that any views he expressed were personal and without official significance. McCloy said he personally not in favor of Swiss resort town or similar place because other nations would become

suspicious of a separate conference and, therefore, McCloy preferred Washington and Moscow. Gromyko said his views paralleled those expressed and he mentioned Washington in June and Moscow in July.

On French testing, Gromyko stated without emphasizing point that U.S. could be using France, its NATO ally, to do its testing. McCloy emphasized U.S. had not given weapons or information to France and had no intention of doing so. Essential for US-USSR to sign Geneva agreement and at that time world opinion would make it difficult for France and we hoped China not to accede to agreement. Gromyko's only mention of China was to state that China like Russia favored GCD and wanted to bury all arms in a hole in ground.

The conversation was frank and friendly ranging from World War II memories of common effort to need for stopping and turning back arms race.

At his request Winiewicz met Shepard Stone at Century, New York on April 3 as follow-up Gromyko-McCloy conversation held at Polish Mission, New York March 30.

According Winiewicz, Gromyko, after McCloy and Stone departed, had stated conversation useful, productive and promising. Gromyko had gained impression of sincerity, frankness, and was returning to Moscow with belief U.S. launching serious disarmament effort. On other hand, Zorin, who had been present at conversation, had stated that first steps mentioned by McCloy were not new. Gromyko replied that steps were not new but that did not make them less important.

Apropos Geneva Test Ban talks, Winiewicz said that Gromyko had not been fully briefed on details and therefore had been somewhat reluctant to carry on discussions about Geneva. Winiewicz stated that he had impression from Gromyko, Geneva Test Ban negotiations would be "locked" with no real progress until after talks on comprehensive disarmament had started and showed some signs of advance.

Stone pointed out that failure of Russia to come to agreement at Geneva talks would have serious negative effect in U.S. in respect later

comprehensive talks. Winiewicz said he thought U.S. had not made this point adequately clear to USSR and suggested that Ambassador Thompson ought to do so in Moscow.

Winiewicz put in a plea for previous Polish proposals, freezing of present arms situation in Central Europe and also for Rapacki Plan. He said that this would not mean Germany would have to withdraw from NATO, but that Germany and East European countries would not possess atom weapons.

In conclusion Winiewicz said major divisive point between US-USSR was position of Secretary General UN. As for Laos, he said “that is not a problem or conflict between U.S. and USSR, but it is a Moscow-Peking problem.”

Dean Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Shepard Stone, Special Assistant to McCloy; cleared by McCloy, Fisher, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USUN and Moscow.

13. National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, April 6, 1961.

NIE 4-2-61

ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

The Problem To assess the underlying motivations and objectives of key world powers—the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada—in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Scope

Disarmament, as used in this estimate, refers generally to all forms and degrees of arms limitation, controls, regulation or reduction, and is not restricted to the idea of abolition of armaments. Where useful or necessary, the terms “general and complete disarmament” or “arms control” will be specified in the discussion according to the context.

This estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of the various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of different technical proposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states.

Conclusions

1. It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament. In approaching this latter question, they are influenced in contrary directions by a variety of considerations.
2. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same

time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting “wars of liberation,” teaches that the fundamental political, economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual world-wide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military force through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage. (Para. 14)

3. The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. We believe that they continue to think that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to their advantage. They also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measures directed against the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measures as a possible means of achieving a military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and of promoting a climate of relaxation favorable to Communist exploitation. (Paras. 16-19)
4. On the other hand, the Soviets perceive dangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China. (Paras. 21, 25)
5. From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reaching disarmament agreements favorable to their ultimate world objectives is presented by Western requirements for inspection. A primary reason for the strong Soviet aversion to inspection is military: having developed secrecy into a major military asset, the Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through

inspection. Another is political: while the regime's anxieties concerning contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are diminishing, the implications of an international inspectorate—cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in the control organization—remain inimical to the political outlook fostered by the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effective inspection because it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement. (Paras. 22-24)

6. Apart from these considerations, the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal yearning for peace and, at the same time, to label the West as “against” disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare. (Para. 31)
7. The Soviet leaders may conclude, however, that some more modest proposals offer sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justify entering upon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament to create a strong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures, including the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. (Paras. 32-44)
8. The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament question in a different spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Peiping's primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the political gains—diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to the UN—which it hopes to extract when its participation in disarmament negotiations is sought. (Paras. 45-46, 48)
9. The Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They are anxious to forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such as the combination of a nuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons and

technology to other countries. We believe that, as China's weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Soviet freedom of action. (Paras. 26, 47, 49)

10. The strongest support for disarmament comes from Canada, which is especially concerned with being caught up in a nuclear war and has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the "middle powers," urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK, which sees in arms control measures a chance to close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West détente. In spite of a strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and popular level, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring a national nuclear capability. French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status, even though his determination to acquire nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreement for the special security problems of the Federal Republic. As West Germany's national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in disarmament matters. Both France and West Germany oppose regional schemes confined to Central Europe, fearing that these would discriminate against them and jeopardize collective security with the West. (Paras. 50-63)

[Here follows the 11-page "Discussion" section of the estimate.]

* Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,

The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 6. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

14. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, April 8, 1961.

JCSM-221-61

SUBJECT

Further Considerations Bearing on a Voluntary US Moratorium on All Underground Testing of Nuclear Weapons (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted a cable from the Acting Secretary of State to the US Delegation to the Conference on a Nuclear Test Treaty in Geneva (State to Geneva—Nusup 1110, 29 March 1961).¹ This cable indicated that the United States is prepared to continue the voluntary moratorium on all underground nuclear testing, including tests of small yields, for three years from the date of signing of a treaty on control of nuclear testing, if the United Kingdom and the USSR will do likewise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain of the belief that the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on tests which cannot be detected by any inspection system would be unwise at this time and could be seriously inimical to the continued security of the United States.
2. There are several considerations bearing on this problem which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe should be reviewed by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense before irrevocable steps are taken in negotiations to commit the United States to the voluntary moratorium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consequence, recommend that you request the President to hear a briefing in the near future at which scientific and military experts in the various fields mentioned below can set forth certain factual and potential factors affecting the problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest such a briefing be attended, in addition to the President and such members of his staff as he desires, by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the AEC, the Director of the CIA, the Advisor to the President for Science and Technology, and the Honorable John J. McCloy.²

3. The several fields which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend be covered in the proposed briefing of the President are as follows:
 - a. The possible development of pure fusion weapons—[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] or so-called “neutron bomb.”
 - b. The lack of practical and authoritative data regarding the phenomenon of neutron-flux and x-rays outside the atmosphere.
4. It is only by considering the above subjects in their interrelationships that the possible serious impact on our national security of the continuation of an unpoliced moratorium on testing can be properly evaluated. In brief, these interrelationships, as seen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are as follows:
 - a. The principle upon which a “neutron bomb” may be developed has been known to the Soviet Union, by their own admission, since 1952. [*3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Inherent in the neutron bomb concept—a pure fusion weapon emitting very high intensities of neutrons—is that the only scarce nuclear component required is tritium [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].
 - b. The major characteristic of the neutron bomb is the extent and range of its lethal instant radiation effect and relatively small other effects as compared to the much larger blast, thermal and residual radiation effects of the fission weapons. This characteristic may make the neutron bomb highly efficient as an anti-personnel weapon without the other destructive characteristics, including radioactive contamination, which are associated with fission weapons. Thus, the new weapon might be classed somewhere between conventional and current nuclear weapons. Possibly more important, however, could be the potentially greatly higher efficiency of the pure fusion weapon in generating at very long distances a neutron-flux in adjacent nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, particularly in space or the higher atmosphere.
 - c. The Nike-Zeus, and presumably the anti-ICBM weapons which intelligence sources indicate are being developed by the USSR, depend among other effects on neutron-flux to “kill,” i.e., render impotent, the warhead of the incoming ballistic missile against which the anti-missile is directed. If the Soviets have developed, or could develop by surreptitious and undetectable testing, an efficient pure fusion weapon which could “kill” enemy missile warheads at a considerable range,

there could result a very high degradation to the credible nuclear deterrent posture of the United States. If the Soviets achieve this capability while the United States remains without it because of inability to test the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] devices, the result could be catastrophic.

- d. Allied with the problem just alluded to is the fact that the United States has very little practical data on the intensities of instant radiation produced by fission or fusion explosions in rarefied atmosphere or space. The Orange and Teak shots in the US nuclear testing program just prior to the current moratorium on nuclear testing provided inadequate data for a full evaluation of this effect at very high altitudes. Additional technical information concerning intensities of radiation at very high altitudes might show that x-rays have a much greater lethal radius for "killing" missile warheads than neutrons. If this were to be the case, we would want to take measures to protect our own warheads and, at the same time, exploit this effect in our own anti-ICBM capability.
5. In sum, the United States plans to deter deliberate initiation of thermonuclear war by the USSR, over the next decade, by the maintenance of an adequately invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability. If the USSR were able to develop and make practical tests of the effects of the pure fusion weapon, and if the USSR as a result or by other means could develop a highly effective and relatively cheap AICBM, the USSR could conceivably plan a nuclear attack upon the United States without fear of receiving retaliatory destruction to a degree which would be unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. Because the Soviet stockpile may well contain today [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] and because of US lack of tested experience in the several fields mentioned above, the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on testing the potential development of a US pure fusion weapon could seriously prejudice the national security.
6. In consequence of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
 - a. The briefing referred to in paragraph 2 above be given the President and his senior officials at the earliest feasible date. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be prepared to coordinate the preparation of this briefing if it is desired.

- b. The United States not commit itself to a voluntary moratorium of underground testing below the level of test explosions which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75.
- c. Further research and development on the pure fusion weapon, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] or otherwise, be given urgent attention by the AEC.
- d. The need for further testing on the pure fusion weapon and the phenomenon of radiation-flux in space be considered of such national importance that no further concessions be made towards extreme Soviet positions in future negotiations on a nuclear test treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer³

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2961) ² Gilpatric forwarded this suggestion to Bundy in a letter dated April 20. In a reply to Gilpatric of April 25, Bundy stated that the President had been briefed previously on both fusion weapons and the neutron flux problem. (Ibid.) ³ Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

15. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, April 21, 1961, 7 p.m.

Supnu 1549. From Dean for McCloy. We are trying to bring out what basically lies behind the tactics Sov Delegation has adopted since our resumption March 21. Sovs have not only stood still on positions they have been maintaining since the summit meeting last spring, but have appeared to go to great pains to cross the T's and dot the I's of their stand-still position in great detail and to make it clear that they are not budging in even the most minute particular from previous positions.

At the same time, Sov Delegation appears completely relaxed, is in no hurry to get anything done, and provides no indication that any Sov initiative is forthcoming in the near future to break up the conference. Indeed, they go to some length to demonstrate ostensible concern that the West might take some such action which they apparently don't want to see happen.

We have tended to assume that the Sov Delegation's instructions were to make no significant move away from the general framework of their present position but to keep the conference going inconclusively for an indefinite period and in effect they have made all of their concessions and the next move is up to us. One might think that if these were their instructions, they might, in order to keep things going, make some very minor moves on their positions, pointing to these as great concessions and use them as a basis to refute the association which, as of now, is so clearly justified, that they have made no move at all.

We are wondering if the Department has any ideas as to what explanation might be given for the Sov tactics. Several possibilities have occurred to us:

(A) The Sovs may merely be waiting us out in the expectation that the West has not yet laid all its cards on the table in the field of concessions and

hope to move us to further concessions by standing pat. This possibility seems somewhat unlikely since the Sovs must realize it would be improbable that we would move further without any motion on their part.

- (B) The Sovs may be in a general stall in the expectation of carrying negotiations on until general disarmament discussions begin with the idea of merging these talks into those discussions this summer. They may not feel under any compulsion to move beyond their present positions at this time to achieve this purpose.
- (C) The Sovs may be hoarding any minor moves which they are prepared to make until there are much stronger indications that the West is getting impatient and considering a break-off of negotiations or a resumption of testing. In that case they might be expected to make such minor moves at the eleventh hour in order to frustrate any indicated move of the West towards a break-off or resumption of testing.
- (D) They may be waiting until the French test gives them a pretext for a walk-out or until they can see what the French really accomplish.
- (E) The Sov absolute stand on their present position may be designed to provoke us into taking the initiative to break-off the negotiations or to resume testing, thus giving them a good pretext for ending the negotiations and to put the blame on us. As we have said above, the ostensible attitude is that they do not want the negotiations broken off but this, of course, does not remove the possibility that they do want them ended so long as the onus is placed on us.
- (F) The Sov Delegation may have been instructed just to sit tight while Moscow took a look, not so much as to what the West has to offer in this particular negotiation as to the general political situation between the US and USSR and Moscow's basic decision on the conference here may not yet have been made.

We would appreciate any views the Department may have on what Sovs are up to.¹

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2161.
Confidential.

¹ In Nusup 1192 to Geneva, April 26, drafted in EUR/SOV and D/P, the Department replied that evidence did not "warrant firm conclusion" that the

Soviets were no longer interested in a test ban agreement, but that perhaps for them the degree of inspection demanded by the West was only acceptable in the context of an agreement on general disarmament. (Ibid.)

16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests [Source](#)

Washington, April 22, 1961, 8:10 p.m.

G-14. Nusup. Following is text memorandum from McCloy to be used as basis White House discussion next steps in nuclear test negotiations:[1](#)

“MEMORANDUM ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

I. The Situation:

It now appears clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators at Geneva is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a Test Ban agreement. Mr. Arthur H. Dean, our negotiator, will return sometime after the first of May to report. The indications are that the Soviet Union will not take the responsibility of breaking off negotiations, but will drag them along to a time when it would seem appropriate to suggest that they be merged into the comprehensive disarmament negotiations now set for July 31.

The best estimate is that the Soviets are trying to put the US in a position in which it goes into the July 31 talks with the present unenforceable moratorium still in effect, a position which would make it increasingly difficult for the US to exercise its freedom of action with respect to the resumption of testing.

At the outset of the negotiations on March 21, 1961, the Soviet negotiator proposed that there should be substituted for the concept of a single, impartial Administrator, to which it has previously agreed, a three-man Council with one representative each, for the Soviet Union, the Western powers, and the uncommitted countries. No action could be taken without the concurrence of all three. Moreover, the Soviet Delegation continues to insist on other provisions, tantamount to self-inspection, which could not be

accepted. The Soviet position on the three-headed Council has now been re-affirmed and emphasized in several Soviet declarations, including Mr. Khrushchev's interview with Walter Lippmann.² The Soviet position is linked to its campaign in the UN against the single Secretary-General. As it is, in effect, a nullification of the concept of an independent inspection or verification system, it would have very far-reaching consequences. Not only does it critically affect the control system proposed for the nuclear Test Ban but it would also, if applied to controls for general disarmament, render these unreliable and unnegotiable. We could not accept such a concept without abandoning the fundamental Western positions on disarmament and permitting the foundation to be laid for a serious attack on the United Nations.

The attitude of the Soviet Union developed at Geneva presents a problem which has to be faced in the very near future. This Government has consistently taken the position that, though a serious effort was to be made to reach a Test Ban agreement as promptly as possible, it would have to review this position if it became clear that the Soviet Union was not disposed to enter into an agreement on terms reasonable and fair to all. The President of the United States (letter to Thomas E. Murray of October 10, 1960)³ has indicated that he would favor another serious attempt to conclude such a treaty, but that if it became clear that one could not be reached within a reasonable period of time, he would consider the resumption of underground tests in the field of peaceful uses, seismic research, and weapons improvement under such controls as may appear appropriate in the light of the situation then existing. Similar declarations and projections were made by Government officials before committees of Congress prior to the resumption of negotiations on March 21, 1961. The time has now come to consider what steps should be taken to give effect to these declarations.

II. Two questions must be decided:

- A. Should the US decide now to resume nuclear weapons tests if the deadlock in Geneva continues for more than a few weeks in spite of further approaches direct to Khrushchev?

B. If not, should the US decide now to conduct nuclear detonations for seismic research programs, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken?

III. Arguments Pro and Con Resumption of Tests:

A.

Pro-Resumption

If we continue to negotiate on the present basis without bringing matters to a head, we shall be in the position of extending our moratorium on nuclear testing for a further indeterminate period without any control or inspection of Soviet tests. This not only creates a condition in which the Soviets may be conducting undetected tests while we are not, but it also weakens the whole emphasis on the vital importance of appropriate inspections and controls.

If we assume that the Soviet Union is engaging in clandestine tests and we do not test, we are not only excluded from testing for peaceful purposes and for perfecting the means of detecting clandestine tests, but also our failure to test weapons would eventually put us at a serious military disadvantage. Scientists differ as to the full significance of the continuance of this condition, but it must be recognized that continued testing on the part of the Soviet Union and a failure to test on our part would in time produce real weapon advantages for the Soviet Union. Moreover, there is a possibility, if not the probability, of achieving some major break-through which would never be disclosed to the non-tester.

A plan to resume testing, moreover, may be the only way to get an agreement since, otherwise, the USSR will be convinced that there is no need to accept controls. Finally, permitting an unenforceable moratorium to continue indefinitely (something we have said we would not permit) cannot fail to have an adverse effect on US credibility.

B.

Arguments against resumption of Weapons Tests

We can be quite certain that any resumption of testing, particularly in the weapons field, would be attended by a heavy propaganda barrage on the part of the Soviet Union, as well as by unfavorable criticism on the part of many important sectors of world opinion on the grounds that the US was taking the first step in renewing the arms race. Although the American case as presented at Geneva has now received favorable support in world opinion, we should have to expect a substantial reversal of that opinion if we resumed tests, even if limited to underground tests. If the US did resume testing, the Soviet Union might either resume testing itself which presumably would be to its advantage, or prefer the psychological advantage it would gain by announcing that it would not engage in testing even if the US did.

A general and continued resumption of testing will make it almost impossible to prevent a proliferation of nuclear capability to other powers who do not now possess such a capability. If the great powers are themselves engaged in testing, their ability to dissuade other countries which have the means and incentive to test from doing so is seriously impaired.

Resumption of testing would result in a further deterioration in the relations between the USSR for which the US will be held responsible. It would relieve the USSR from the pressure to which their adherence to their position with respect to the tripartite administrator might otherwise expose them.

If both sides resume testing, moreover, the Soviets would at least have a renewed opportunity to overtake us in the fields in which we lead, a possibility which must be seriously regarded in view of the forward leaps in their technology. This opportunity would be given them without their having to take the trouble and risk of clandestine tests and without any political liability on their part from testing openly.

C.

Possible Alternative Course of Action

A possible alternative is to decide, at this time, only on the detonation of nuclear devices in a seismic research program for the purpose of

improving the ability to detect clandestine explosions, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken. This might well tend to diminish the unfavorable results from a resumption of testing which have been mentioned above, especially if the detonations for seismic research were accompanied by appropriate safeguards. It would also be more consistent with our purpose of continuing to seek a treaty. If, however, the prospect of the US resuming testing in the weapons field is expected to exert any substantial pressure on the USSR to come to an agreement, this pressure would be diminished if the tests were limited to a seismic research program.

According to informal estimates of the AEC, the first of a series of seismic research tests could be conducted in about ten weeks after a decision to prepare for it was made. Weapons proof tests could be conducted in about the same time. It would be approximately a year before tests could be conducted which would look toward major improvements or radical changes in weapons design.

IV. Communication with Mr. Khrushchev

In accordance with the decisions taken with respect to the foregoing courses of action, and, in any case, in advance of any public announcement of a decision to resume tests, the President and Prime Minister should address a communication to Mr. Khrushchev, framed with a view to eventual publication. This exchange should, at the least, declare US and UK concern at the highest level with the implications of the tripartite control concept and its possible implications. In degree, depending upon the decisions reached with respect to resuming tests and to the kind of tests, it should foreshadow announcement of the decision which has been made.

The communication should give Khrushchev opportunity to alter his position or, if not, it should serve to marshall world opinion in support of Western attitudes toward inspection and control and the whole matter of international organization and peace-keeping machinery.

An exchange of this character between the Heads of State should probably precede any effort to proceed to detailed exchanges between Governments in regard to the constitution of the negotiating body and the site of the

negotiations, or upon any statement of general principles upon which they might proceed after July 31, 1961.

Recommendation:

This paper is solely for the purpose of discussion. No recommendation is made at this time.”

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution.

¹ NSC Action No. 2408, taken at the 478th NSC meeting held April 22, reads: “The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations: [The NSC] noted and discussed an interim report by Mr. McCloy on the current state of negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban. It was agreed that Mr. Dean will soon be recalled for discussion, and that a strong preliminary US-UK effort should be made to create an effective international environment for a possible show-down on these negotiations.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

² Reference is to Lippmann’s interview with Khrushchev at Khrushchev’s dacha at Sochi on the shores of the Black Sea on April 10. Lippmann’s published account of this interview is in *The Coming Test With Russia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).

³ For text of Kennedy’s letter to Murray, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 287-289.

17. Special National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, April 25, 1961.

SNIE 11-9-61

THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING DURING THE MORATORIUM

The Problem

To estimate whether the Soviets have conducted clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium which began in November 1958.

The Estimate

1. The USSR conducted a nuclear test series ending on 3 November 1958, and since that time has indicated that it, along with the US and the UK, was observing a moratorium on testing. In considering whether or not to conduct clandestine nuclear tests during this moratorium, the Soviet leaders would have had to weigh the importance of obtaining additional data for their nuclear weapons program, the possibility of being caught, and the costs of exposure.

Considerations Affecting the Soviet Position

2. *Technical Motivations.* Soviet nuclear weapon development activity has continued at a high level during the moratorium. Nevertheless, we believe that only limited improvements in Soviet weapons capabilities would have been possible without further tests. An analysis of Soviet weapons development indicates the following principal areas in which the USSR might have desired to conduct further tests since November 1958: (a) tests related to antiballistic missile effects; (b) tests of low yield, light weight devices; (c) tests directed toward increasing economy of fissile materials; (d) tests to improve the yield-to-weight ratio of all classes of nuclear weapons; (e) new areas of development, [2 lines of source text not

declassified]. Of these, the Soviet requirement with regard to antiballistic missile effects probably is the most urgent.

3. The necessity for additional Soviet tests to optimize or improve existing weapons, or to develop new designs, depends heavily on Soviet strategy and on the character of future weapon systems. We believe that nuclear weapons are available for all the delivery systems which we know to be in the Soviet arsenal or which we estimate to have been under development. However, many of these weapons probably are not of optimum design, and serious gaps in the Soviet knowledge on weapons effects for certain military applications may exist. Almost certainly there have been pressures within the USSR for continued nuclear testing, on all the various grounds cited above.

4. *Political Considerations.* The Soviet leaders must have recognized that it would be a major blow to their public position if it were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the bulk of the Free World nations that they had been testing nuclear weapons covertly. They have set great store by their campaign to capture the “peace” theme in world opinion and to present themselves as the proponents, and the West as the opponents, of a halt to the arms race. In balancing the possible political costs against the considerations arguing for covert testing, we believe that the Soviet leaders would have required very high assurances that such testing could not be proved, or even plausibly charged, against them before entering on such a program. At a minimum, this consideration would have narrowed the choice of tests they might make; at a maximum, it would have inhibited them from testing at all.^{[1](#)}

5. During the past year or so, some US statements have raised in the Soviet mind the possibility that the American side might soon openly resume testing. This factor probably gave increased weight to arguments within the USSR that it should not run the risk of being caught testing during this period.

Techniques Minimizing the Risk of Detection

6. If the Soviets attempted to conduct clandestine nuclear tests, they would have sought to minimize the risk of detection by doing so under conditions

which did not put nuclear debris into the atmosphere.² Any such tests would have had to be conducted either underground or in space. The possibility that tests in space can be detected decreases as the distance from the earth is increased. Tests in either of these environments—underground or outer space—are within Soviet capabilities.

7. At present, the US detection system has no capability to detect nuclear explosions occurring in outer space. However, intelligence does have a capability to direct attention to those missile/space activities which could be employed in such testing. Intelligence probably cannot establish whether nuclear tests in space have in fact taken place, although it might provide some basis for judgment.

8. Fully contained underground tests, like space tests, provide no airborne radioactive debris which would provide positive identification of a nuclear event. However, there are limits to the yields of devices (up to about 100 KT) which can feasibly be tested in this manner, although many of the principal areas of development in which the USSR might have desired to conduct tests since November 1958 (as indicated in paragraph 2, above) could have been accomplished by underground tests of a few kilotons. Moreover, the signals produced by such tests may be detectable by seismic means, although such detected signals cannot be distinguished from natural seismic events. The capability of the seismic component of the US detection system can be significantly degraded by conducting the test in a hard medium, such as granite or salt, or by decoupling. An even greater reduction could be achieved by a combination of these techniques—decoupling in a hard medium. However, the scale of operations required for carrying out decoupling tests is such that other intelligence techniques would have an increased opportunity for detecting them.

Evidence of Possible Testing

9. Proof that nuclear weapons tests have occurred is difficult to obtain without collection of debris, since the other indicators of testing activity are susceptible to alternative explanations. Conversely, proof that tests have not occurred has not been possible. Since 3 November 1958, the US has collected no nuclear debris or other conclusive evidence that the Soviets

have conducted nuclear tests. Each year a large number of seismic events are detected in the USSR; some of those occurring during the moratorium could have been the result of nuclear explosions, but none could be identified as such. There are indications from other intelligence sources which have raised the possibility of Soviet evasion of the moratorium by means of contained underground testing, but these also are susceptible to alternative explanations. Each suspected event, or plausible indication, must be examined separately and exhaustively.

10. Accordingly, we have made an intensive survey of all the evidence, from all sources and all regions of the USSR, bearing upon possible Soviet nuclear testing during the moratorium. The most suspicious evidence relates to Southern Turkestan, in particular around Osh, and to Semipalatinsk. The data are most consistent with the thesis that the Soviets had conducted one or more large HE explosions near Osh in the winter of 1959-1960 as a part of their seismic improvement program or to study methods of clandestine nuclear testing, but the conduct of an actual nuclear test cannot be ruled out. Nuclear testing in other areas of Southern Turkestan appears less likely than in the case of the Osh area. The Semipalatinsk proving ground area has remained active since the moratorium, and photography in April 1960 shows evidence of additional but not recent low-yield, venting tests since the previous coverage in August 1957. Evaluation of all evidence indicates it is more likely that these tests occurred between 1957 and the commencement of the moratorium in November 1958 rather than during the moratorium period. An apparent ground zero area outside the fenced shot area was under construction in 1960, but it is probable that this ground zero has not yet been used. There is even less evidence relating to possible testing in areas outside of Southern Turkestan and Semipalatinsk.^{[3](#)}

11. On technical grounds, we cannot exclude the possibility that tests in contained underground environments or, less likely, very low-yield, vented explosions have occurred. However, the political costs of exposure have probably been regarded by the Soviets as high enough to deter them from any kind of nuclear testing which had an appreciable chance of being detected, and we doubt that the technical advantages to be gained from very low-yield tests would have been sufficiently great in the Soviets' mind to justify their conducting them. The conclusion that the Soviets have

conducted nuclear tests since 3 November 1958 cannot be drawn from the available evidence.⁴ -⁵

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 25. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

¹ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph overemphasizes the Soviet concern for a favorable international image. Further, there is little likelihood of the exposure problem arising since the Soviets can use, indeed probably have used, testing techniques that deny confirmation of violations. [Footnote in the source text.]

² [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We have no knowledge of Soviet development in this field, and the feasibility of such advanced concepts has not yet been conclusively demonstrated. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers that available evidence indicates [2 lines of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the evidence relating to Southern Turkestan and the Semipalatinsk area closely follows a pattern of activity indicative of nuclear testing and that this testing probably took place since November 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, although concurring that a conclusion as to whether or not the Soviets have been conducting clandestine tests cannot be drawn from the available evidence, considers that the technical advantages to be gained from very low-yield tests could have been sufficiently great in the Soviets' mind to justify their conducting them. He also believes that very low-yield tests conducted underground would almost certainly not be detected. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, do not support the conclusions reached in this paragraph. They would substitute the following: The evidence is such that we cannot conclusively establish that the Soviets have or have not tested. The USSR has considerable knowledge of our nuclear detection capabilities. Because of this knowledge and because a high degree of conventional security could be maintained, the Soviets are no doubt aware that but negligible risk of detection is associated with low-yield contained underground, or very low-yield atmospheric tests. Many of the principal development objectives for which the USSR might have desired to conduct tests since November 1958 could have been accomplished by underground tests of a few kilotons. In particular, we believe that the need by the USSR for data on antiballistic missile warhead effects has been critical in the period since November 1958. This need could have been at least partially satisfied by low-yield contained underground testing. *[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* In the light of the evidence, their technical need to have tested during the period since November 1958, coupled with the negligible risks involved, we conclude that a strong possibility exists that the Soviets have tested since 3 November 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]

18. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, April 27, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: David Ormsby-Gore is back here after consultations and I believe that Dean is returning to Washington and will no doubt be telling you the same things. It looks as though the Russians have quite lost interest in the Geneva talks and that it is pointless to try to press Tsarapkin further there. The question is what to do.

In the ordinary way I think that you and I might address simultaneous letters to Khrushchev expressing the great importance that we attach to these negotiations and the serious consequences that would flow from their failure. The object would be to engage Khrushchev personally and publicly in the success or failure of the Conference and make it a test of his good faith in the whole disarmament field. If we adopted this course the messages might go in about two weeks' time and meanwhile we would have to consider carefully their exact content and our future action should they meet with a dusty answer. My own feeling is that the Russians will only be induced to reconsider their present negative policy when they have been made to understand that this attitude if maintained will lead to a resumption of testing, the consequent spread of nuclear weapons, and will make renewed negotiations on general disarmament valueless. Just how we should get this across to Khrushchev and how we should play the hand thereafter could no doubt be worked out between our people.

However, I am writing to you personally on this because of your message about your possible visit to Khrushchev. I do not know what your present intentions are, and of course I have kept this news to the smallest possible circle here and the staffs in the Foreign Office know nothing of your intentions. It has occurred to me that, as an alternative to our sending these open letters, you could perhaps put emphasis in any message to Khrushchev on the importance of the Tests Negotiation. You might say that you are very disappointed by the lack of progress and express the hope that, if sufficient progress can be made in Geneva meanwhile, your meeting might be made

the occasion if not for signature of the agreement at least for final discussions about it. I do not know what your estimate of the position is, but I suppose that such a course might involve you in publishing the fact of your meeting fairly soon in order to explain why you were prepared to continue negotiating patiently at Geneva and why you were not authorising an early resumption of United States testing. I imagine that it might be unwise to put Khrushchev publicly on notice that the subject of tests was the one important matter which you would particularly wish to discuss with him, because then he would no doubt say that Berlin was something that he would regard as of particular importance.

I should be very interested to hear what you think about this.^{[1](#)}

Yours very sincerely

Harold Macmillan

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1960-1961. Top Secret.

^{[1](#)} In a draft reply dated May 16, Kennedy stated that he might be meeting with Khrushchev. Since he did not wish to single out the test talks as the primary object of his discussions with Khrushchev, he also did not believe “we” should write letters to him on that subject before the meeting. Kennedy stated as a “preliminary thought” that if the United States did not “conduct a test prior to the resumption of disarmament negotiations in August of this year, the difficulties of our doing so thereafter would be much increased.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 4-5/61) See the Supplement. No final version of this reply has been found.

19. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) [Source](#)

Washington, April 28, 1961.

DEAR JACK: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commented on your "Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations,"¹ which you presented to the National Security Council meeting on 22 April. Their views are set forth in the attached memorandum which they have recommended that I forward to you.

I agree in general with the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for their suggestion that weapons tests be conducted on a classified and unannounced basis and if detected, these tests, regardless of type, be related directly to the seismological research program. In our open society, I doubt the practicality and wisdom of attempting weapons tests under the cover of the research program. Rather, I would favor announcing that preparations were under way, with the actual announcement of the weapons test to be made shortly before it happens. Also, it is my understanding that it may not always be technically practicable to use nuclear weapons tests for the rather exacting detonation requirements of the seismic research program in which the yield must be accurately forecast.

It is my view that the President should announce that the seismic research explosion program, including nuclear detonations, will begin at an early date, and that preparations will be made to conduct nuclear weapon tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects. At such future time as the nuclear weapon test program has been formulated and preparations for the first detonation have been completed, the President could then announce the actual resumption of nuclear weapon tests a few days before the first shot.

The course recommended above would permit prompt implementation of Project Vela Uniform, for which preparations are well advanced. It would

also allow the necessary lead-time to prepare for a carefully considered and profitable nuclear weapon test program.

Sincerely,

Roswell L. Gilpatric²

Appendix³

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

SUBJECT

Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations (U)

1. In accordance with our agreement, following the special NSC meeting on 22 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum on special courses of action relating to negotiations with the Soviets on test ban negotiations. They feel that you have made an excellent analysis of the present situation and have come directly to the heart of the problem. They are generally in accord with the questions you pose, and the various courses of action as you depict them.
2. Your evaluation of the Soviet intentions with reference to dragging out the test ban negotiations in order to combine them with the comprehensive disarmament negotiations are believed to be well founded. Perpetuating current tactics appears to be directed toward inhibiting further development of US technological and military capability and causing harassment and embarrassment to the United States through propaganda media.
3. On numerous occasions in the past and as recently as 18 March 1961,⁴ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that valid and pressing military requirements exist to resume nuclear weapons testing. They have also reiterated their concern as to the current self-imposed moratorium which in no way insures that the military power relations between the United States and the USSR have not deteriorated to the advantage of the USSR.
4. While it appears to be prudent that announcement of future tests in the sensible atmosphere not be made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with you

that it is now timely to decide upon underground tests, which offer the advantage of both weapon improvement and increased seismic research knowledge. In this light, it appears it would be prudent to announce the resumption of testing to begin at an early date, with particular emphasis on the scientific research program. Weapons tests could be conducted initially under 4.75 seismic equivalent and on a classified and unannounced basis. If detected, these tests, regardless of the type, may be related directly to the seismological research program.

5. The opportunity for the USSR to propagandize this action by the United States is recognized in your memorandum. However, it appears that a carefully conceived and implemented program by the United States could well result in derogatory effect on the Soviets. For example, the fact that the Soviets have repeatedly refused to agree with participation in an over-all seismic research program should offer room for exploitation. Resumption of testing itself may either induce the Soviets to negotiate a treaty, or expose them as merely interested in propaganda objectives.
6. In the absence of any real progress towards agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the requirement that nuclear testing be resumed without further delay in the interest of national security.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. The first attachment to this letter, a forwarding memorandum from Burke to McNamara dated April 26, is not printed.

¹ See [Document 16](#).

² Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

³ Secret. The source text is marked "Draft" and has no date.

⁴ Apparent reference to [Document 9](#).

20. Editorial Note

At its 482d Meeting on May 2, 1961, the National Security Council discussed the Geneva test ban negotiations. NSC Action No. 2419, approved by the President on May 16, reads:

- “a. Noted and discussed a report by the Adviser to the President on Disarmament and the U.S. Representative, Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Test, on the progress of the negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban.
- “b. Agreed that the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, with the assistance of an interdepartmental group, should prepare recommendations on future U.S. policy with respect to nuclear testing.
- “c. Noted that the Department of Defense would make a presentation to the President on the military factors involved in the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961) Concerning followup to paragraph c., see [Document 24](#).

The account of the NSC meeting in Seaborg’s journal reads as follows:

“At 5:15 p.m. I met with the National Security Council at the White House. The President, Vice President, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bell, Rusk, Edward Murrow, Bundy, Wiesner, Dean, McCloy, Dulles, Admiral Burke, Zuckert, Nitze, Fisher and others were also in attendance.

“McCloy gave a brief summary of the present situation and ended by suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might want to brief the President on the possible accomplishments of testing with the Secretary of State and me present.

“Arthur Dean then gave a status report. He said that he had presented the complete U.S. test ban proposal and expanded upon it from day to day and finally tabled the complete text of the treaty on April 18th. He told them that President Kennedy would recommend to Congress necessary legislation to allow inspection of the devices in connection with the seismic and peaceful uses aspects of the program. He said that for the first time

many newspapers in Europe were commending our stand and our action in tabling the complete text. Tsarapkin continues to say that they would be reasonable if they had the tripartite method of administration and he says we want to conduct the decoupling shots in order to learn how to cheat. We have agreed to the possibility of veto of the overall budget, but not on individual items. We are still demanding 20 inspections and they are only offering three.

“In answer to the President’s question as to what Dean recommends, Dean said that he wouldn’t break off negotiations now, but that he should go back and continue and perhaps the President and Prime Minister Macmillan should send a letter to Khrushchev pinpointing some of the difficulties and suggesting they get down to brass tacks. We probably can’t give in on the tripartite demand because this would be giving in on their attack on Dag Hammarskjold. Perhaps the Kennedy-Macmillan letter should be sent about May 22nd, allowing ten days to two weeks for a reply. During that time we could work out a policy as to what the contingencies are. Maybe the President should then announce that we intend to start nuclear weapons testing. This would bring us to about June 15th.

“The interested agencies should prepare for the President a comparison of the relative United States-Soviet gain from testing. The President said that we might state publicly that we have evidence that the Soviets are testing. Dulles, when asked, said that we can’t exclude the possibility on technical grounds that they are conducting underground tests, but he doubts they are, due to the risk; the Air Force dissents from this point of view. Bundy suggested that McCloy and an interdepartmental group should work up a statement of the pros and cons of our resuming nuclear weapons testing. The President wondered whether he should make any statement before Dean returns to Geneva and Dean thought that he should highlight the problem. It was concluded that the President might express a hope for progress, etc., at his Friday press conference.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 1, pp. 238, 241. Page references are not continuous owing to interpolated materials in the journals as published.)

For the President’s statement on the Geneva Conference at his news conference on May 5, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pages 142-

143.

21. Record of Meeting [Source](#)

Washington, May 4, 1961.

RECORD OF MEETING ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN ISSUE 4 MAY 1961

PRESENT

The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCloy, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Dean, Mr. Komer

The first subject taken up was Mr. McCloy's draft press conference statement for this Friday.¹ The President wanted the significance of the new Soviet demand for a triumvirate spelled out a bit more, perhaps with an example. Certain other minor amendments were made.

Mr. McCloy cited his talks with Walter Lippmann² to buttress his view that the "triad" was a fundamental Soviet concept. The Soviets realized that the Secretary General had now acquired a major role and begun to operate; he just wasn't an administrative officer as was contemplated in 1945. McCloy could understand the Soviet position and felt that we too would have objected in 1945 if the Senate had thought the Secretary General would become such an important figure. The question of the triad runs across the whole spectrum of international issues—it is absolutely central to an effectively functioning UN as well as all sorts of disarmament measures.

Mr. McCloy felt that this and other political issues were more important than the military arguments with respect to test resumption. The Soviets think that we don't have the nerve to test. Mr. McCloy felt that Moscow still wanted a test ban but on an essentially uninspected basis.

The President indicated that Mr. Dean must go back and see. We must also get the UK to say something. They consistently try to put us out in front. Mr. Rusk thought they would be reluctant to say anything positive.

Mr. Dean described how he had raised with Dr. Scoville of CIA the idea of his suggesting to Tsarapkin that the Soviets let us come in and see that they are not testing, say at Osh. Dr. Scoville was opposed on two grounds. First because the Soviets might ask to see our Nevada test site in return and

second because if we went in and saw nothing the Soviets would get a big propaganda gain. The President opined that the Soviets wouldn't let us in anyway if they were testing. He regarded the resumption issue as a really tough one. The Soviets had us right on the propaganda hook. Our only hope for an agreement was if they feared proliferation enough. He felt that we have got to begin building our psychological case, and saying that we hope all those who favor disarmament will join us in putting pressure on the Soviets. Secretary Rusk felt that we should attempt to generate such pressure only in diplomatic channels for if we got public opinion stirred up it might turn on us if we resumed testing.

Mr. Bundy, replying to the President's query, urged that the President submit to the JCS briefing so that no one could say, especially on the Hill, that the military had not been fully consulted. The President agreed that the JCS should have their day in court.³

Mr. Bundy outlined the need for an immediate and systematic analysis of test resumption options, bringing everybody into the act, and ending up with recommendations. He saw no harm if various departments took different positions. The President mentioned that if we must start testing, we might wait until some international event occurred, e.g. a Berlin crisis, which would appear to justify it. Alternatively, we could start with seismic tests only, contending that these tests were in fact devoted to the purpose of achieving an adequate verifiable test ban.

Mr. Dean brought up the need to decide this issue before the test ban talks got merged with the comprehensive negotiations scheduled to begin on 31 July. The President felt we might even say to the Soviets that we did not see much point in comprehensives unless the fundamental issue of the triad were settled. Mr. McCloy felt that we should vigorously probe the Soviets along these lines in the forthcoming bilaterals.

RWK⁴

³ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA Disarmament General, 4-5/61. Top Secret. Drafted

by Komer.

¹ McCloy's draft is *ibid.* For Kennedy's statement at the May 5 news conference, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 142-143.

² The talk is not further identified.

³ See [Document 24](#).

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the National Security Council [Source](#)

Washington, May 15, 1961.

The Defense Department is scheduled to review with the National Security Council on Friday, May 19, certain data relating to the resumption of atomic weapons testing.

Attached for your information is a copy of the material to be presented to the Council. The document reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Research & Engineering,¹ Mr. Gilpatric, and myself.

Robert S. McNamara

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown)

QUESTIONS BEARING UPON THE RESUMPTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTING

Answers to the following questions are pertinent to the position which should be taken by the United States with respect to the resumption of atomic weapons testing.

(1)

What evidence do we have that the Soviets are continuing to test?

Answer: We have no proof that the Soviets are testing, nor do we have any proof to the contrary. Since the beginning of the moratorium in 1958, there has been a continuing and vigorous association between development laboratories and individuals known to have been associated

with testing programs prior to the moratorium and activities at sites which are particularly suitable for underground testing. It is questionable whether this evidence can support a firm belief that the Soviets are doing nuclear testing. The proper conclusion to reach from this situation, however, is that under present circumstances intelligence indications cannot in fact produce any conclusion about whether or not the Soviets are testing which is firm enough so that national policy can be based upon it.

The Soviets evidenced great interest in pure fusion devices as early as 1952, and in 1958 produced scientific papers on experimental work dating back to the earlier days, which had been done in a related area. The work done at that time involved very low levels of fusion reaction and was far from constituting an explosion, although the Soviets mentioned possible explosive uses as a conceivable future development. *[12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

(2)

What does the Department of Defense consider to be the military objectives (or information) to be attained through the resumption of testing?

Answer: The objectives of resuming testing are important, numerous, and varied. The following are indicated as the ones of most importance and interest to the Department of Defense:

(a)

To pursue the development of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* pure fusion weapons. These are particularly applicable to limited warfare, but if successfully developed, also for general application to the whole spectrum of defensive and offensive weapons systems. Such weapons provide anti-personnel effects over a well defined radius without wholesale physical destruction or radioactive fallout. *[5 lines of source text not declassified]*

[12 lines of source text not declassified] Its effects on limited war could be very great.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the U.S. has some tactical nuclear weapon capability [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. If no cutoff of fissile material production takes place, tens of thousands of such weapons using [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] could be made available without unacceptable diversion from other uses. By exploding them at a height above the ground of several fireball radii, the military problem of fallout is avoided although there may still be a substantial psychological problem. These fission weapons would, however, be considerably less effective (covering perhaps 1/20 of the area) for a given yield, and the yield would tend to be the limiting factor with regard to acceptable blast or thermal effects.

(b)

To develop a spectrum of reduced size and weight weapons, without undue sacrifice of yield, for particular application to strategic missile systems for the purpose of improving survivability and penetrability. This development affords the prospect of strategic missile warheads in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] (i) for use singly in lightweight missile systems capable of high mobility and a high degree of invulnerability at relatively low cost or (ii) for cluster warheads in present or future systems to improve penetrability against an anti-missile defense. The development of these weapons would proceed through straightforward extension of the present state of the art.

The effect of the availability of such weapons of lower weight on our deterrent capability depends on how marginal that capability is otherwise considered to be. It is clear that going from [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. Advances in the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pound range are likely to have a smaller influence, since the U.S. already has a considerable degree of mobility in its retaliatory force, and could get greater and more diversified mobility even without nuclear tests.

Developments of small strategic weapons certainly will enable us to create new systems which plug soft spots in our arsenal of second-strike weapons, by allowing us to use smaller missiles which are

thereby made easier to deliver from mobile (land, sea, or air) launchers, or by increasing the multiplicity of warheads and thus saturating possible defenses, or by any combination thereof. It is also possible to reduce such weaknesses by developments in other areas of weaponry. But cutting off nuclear tests clearly inhibits the U.S. from developments toward reduced vulnerability in what has been one of the most rapidly changing areas (reduction of warhead weight).

(c)

To determine the lethal ranges for various kill mechanisms against ballistic missile re-entry vehicles for warheads. The range of some of these mechanisms is fairly well known against specific warhead designs. There are others whose existence is known but whose range is not. In view of the frequency with which such mechanisms have been found, it is likely that there are still others, whose nature is still unknown, with perhaps still larger lethal radii. Knowledge of this kind is important both in examining U.S. possibilities for defense against ballistic missile attack, and in deciding how our ballistic missile attacks (including the nature of the re-entry vehicle, degree of saturation, and the necessary separation between warheads) must be planned if the Soviets should begin to deploy an AICBM system of their own.

On the other hand, considerable work can be done without nuclear explosions to reduce the uncertainties in the lethal radius for those effects whose nature is known. The uncomfortably large factor between the large value we must assume for possible lethal radii against our own warheads and the small lethal radius which we must assume our own AICBM's would have against Soviet warheads is a result of four factors. One of them is the lack of nuclear tests which could provide more precise lethal radii produced by a given warhead against a re-entry vehicle. Another is our uncertainty about the nature of the Soviet re-entry vehicle which is probably not matched by a corresponding uncertainty on their part about ours. A third is that we do not know the yield of possible AICBM's which the Soviets might deploy, and the lethal radius goes up with the square root of the yield. The fourth is that we must deal with a Soviet first strike against us, and

consider a second strike by us against the Soviets; under these circumstances we are talking about our small warheads, which tend to be more vulnerable, and Soviet larger ones which can be made very much less so.

Only one of these factors of uncertainty can be reduced by nuclear testing. However, nuclear testing might conceivably disclose other effects which could create very large lethal radii, which are now unknown and therefore not subject to examination in terms of past nuclear experiments. Furthermore, it is possible that very cheap and very light warheads might allow a barrage approach to AICBM at acceptable cost. *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

Much of the nuclear testing of use in this connection would be underground. Some of the more complex phenomena might have to be examined in outer space.

It should be added that some nuclear tests could disclose smaller lethal radii than had been expected. Such nuclear tests by either side would tend to increase stability, since it is hard to think of anything more dangerous than an AICBM system which was believed to work but actually did not.

(d)

To provide adequate assurance that new weapons entering stockpile to meet our most critical needs will function properly. A number of important weapons under development or in production have not been tested as finally designed (e.g., warheads for Polaris, Minuteman, and Skybolt). Functional tests can be performed underground at yields which are small fractions of the design yields.

Though these weapons have not been tested in their operational configuration, it should be understood that they have been certified by the AEC as having the same assurance of functioning as those which have been tested. By testing them in this way, however, more precise predictions of their full yield may be made.

(3)

What would be the relative advantages to the United States and the USSR of testing by both sides?

Answer: Assuming both sides test and disregarding the effect, if any, of a treaty or a continued uncontrolled moratorium on nth power acquisition of strategic weapons, it appears that the strategic situation would be stabilized by the development by either or both sides of smaller thermonuclear warheads. Our development of such weapons would enhance our deterrent capability much more than Soviet development of large or small thermonuclear weapons would improve their first-strike capability. Correspondingly, their development of small thermonuclear weapons would degrade our counterforce capability.

This last point is relevant only if counterforce is otherwise a feasible U.S. strategy. What has made counterforce unattractive to the U.S. even from the purely military point of view has been Soviet secrecy which has been able to keep the location of even quite large missiles hidden from the U.S. So long as this continues the Soviets have no particular need for smaller warheads.

How important this increase in stability is likely to be will depend on whether our deterrent strategy now or at a later time has severe soft spots, in terms of such things as vulnerability of our missiles either before launch or to Soviet AICBM, etc.

It is generally assumed that the U.S. knows more about the effects of nuclear explosions in space and the upper atmosphere than the Soviet Union. If one believes that the Nike-Zeus warhead is the right AICBM warhead, then it is probably true that the corresponding Soviet warhead would either weigh more or give less yield. This argues that resumed testing by both sides would enable the Soviets to “catch up”. On the other hand, despite our “lead” in these areas, we have not been able to develop a satisfactory AICBM system. This argues strongly that to “catch up” in nuclear warheads will not produce such a system for the Soviets either. If in fact they do deploy an AICBM system of the terminal interception Nike-Zeus type, it indicates either they know *more* about suitable nuclear (or non-nuclear) AICBM warheads than we do or that they are making a

mistake. Both of these results would be cause for great concern, which a continued moratorium would in no way remove.

It may be that some of the new warhead developments [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] or effects which are unknown or about which we know little could have a large influence on AICBM. Any such possibility depends on knowledge about nuclear weapons and their effects which we do not possess, and therefore resumed testing by *both* sides is unlikely to make our relative position any worse.

One may also want to consider the situation in which residual military forces have an important effect on the nature and condition of the nation, and on the termination of the war. Then quantitative improvement by a factor of three to ten in weight of strategic offensive weapons could be an important influence on both sides. In very light strategic weapons (below 2000 pounds) the Soviets appear to be somewhat behind the U.S., and might therefore gain more than we if both sides resume testing and eventually become equal. Of course, their relative gain would be still greater if they test clandestinely and the U.S. does not test.

When it comes to the matter of nuclear weapons for limited war, we know much less about the Soviet program than about their strategic weapons. In particular, in the case of the pure fusion bombs, there is no way of telling whether the Soviets are ahead of us or behind us, and if *both* sides test in this area there is no particular reason to expect alteration in relative capability. It may be argued that the U.S. has a greater need of these than the Soviet Union in order to overcome a disparity in conventional armament. This asymmetry might well instead be overcome by a free-world build up in conventional armament (and anti-guerrilla capability), but it is a fact that the asymmetry now exists and will persist for some time. Even if the pure fusion bombs are developed, it may not be possible to use them in many areas of the world without fear of escalation. Whether threats of such escalation would deter a side which had sole possession of such weapons cannot be foreseen.

All the above has been on the basis that both sides resume testing. In view of the answer to question (1) above, which indicated that U.S. intelligence can in fact not provide convincing evidence either that the

Soviets are or are not testing in the low-yield range, the situation in which only one side tests must be offered for comparison. Recognizing these limitations of intelligence under a continuing moratorium or under a treaty of the kind the Soviet Union now insists on, the Soviet Union could if it so desired carry out low yield underground tests without fear of U.S. acquisition of information on which we could act. There would thus be no deterrence to Soviet clandestine testing.

[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The precise military effects of such a situation are difficult to evaluate, but the Soviets would clearly be able to gain in the strategic areas, and might produce a very dangerous unbalance in AICBM. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In any event, under such circumstances they could do far more than “catch up”.
(4)

What specific devices would be tested in the near future?

Answer: This question is best answered by the Atomic Energy Commission since the Commission would design the test program to meet the objectives outlined above and other important goals. The attached list, however, indicates a number of the devices which we understand would be readied for testing within the next year.

(5)

How do the above conclusions compare with those of the Fisk Panel?

Answer: Although this document weighs the various factors differently than does the Fisk Panel Report, the technical evaluations are consistent with those in that report. Several new factors have appeared which change the situation somewhat, although not drastically.

The first is the further development of the pure fusion work in the AEC laboratories. This makes the achievement of such weapons appear quite likely, although the Fisk Panel Report already assumed that they were possible.

The second is that further study indicates the likelihood of larger lethal radii against U.S. ICBM's than previously has been believed to be the case. Although nuclear tests would resolve some of the most important questions about these lethal radii, much can be done by non-nuclear experiments and calculations. The relative importance of nuclear tests and non-nuclear tests and calculations is subject to the usual debate. Whatever the merits of this argument, the existence of larger lethal radii against existing warheads narrows the margin of strategic deterrence. It thus tends to make possible advances in strategic nuclear warheads a more critical item in the deterrent balance.

A third and perhaps more important factor is that the Fisk Report assumed that even small-scale violations would be subject to some risk of detection in case of acceptance of the U.S. draft Treaty. Therefore, although it considered a variety of cases, it predicated its approach on the basis that the Soviets would have to weigh their possible gains against the consequences of being caught and a real risk of detection. The Fisk Panel Report therefore evaluated the military situation by comparing the case in which both sides test and that in which we do not and the Soviets do some cheating, with the situation in which neither side tests. As the political situation is now evaluated, there will be either no treaty, or if there is a treaty the control system will be virtually powerless. The deterrence of violation would appear to be either very much weakened or non-existent. The case in which both sides refrain from testing probably can no longer be the standard to which one refers the other cases for comparison.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Tentative and Partial List of Weapons Tests To Be Undertaken Within the Next Year

1. [1 line of source text not declassified]
2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
3. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*
5. *[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
6. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*
7. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to McCloy.

¹ Harold Brown.

23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, May 17, 1961.

SUBJECT

Future U.S. Policy Regarding Negotiations with the Soviets on the Test Ban

Mr. McCloy is contemplating a meeting of the Committee of Principals on Monday, 22 May,¹ to discuss a memorandum which he has prepared on the above subject.² The memorandum has not yet been transmitted formally to the Principals.

A briefing paper and an advance copy of Mr. McCloy's memorandum are attached for your use at the proposed meeting.

William P. Bundy³

Enclosure

BRIEFING PAPER

FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE TEST BAN

Mr. McCloy has forwarded a memorandum on this subject (copy at Tab A) for discussion at an early meeting of the Committee of Principals, which he has proposed for Monday, 22 May. This memorandum, with more emphasis on the political aspects, covers the same ground as Dr. Harold Brown's memorandum to you of 13 May 1961, Subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

Mr. McCloy's memorandum sets forth accurately the current situation at Geneva, and states it is clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators is to

avoid a prompt conclusion of a test ban agreement. He poses two questions to be decided:

- A. Should the U.S. sometime in June or July of 1961 indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear tests?
- B. Should the U.S. actually detonate a nuclear device prior to July 31, 1961, and, if so, what sort of a nuclear device should be detonated?

The memorandum then covers objectively the arguments for and against the resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. McCloy concludes that if, after a final approach to Mr. Khrushchev by the President and Mr. Macmillan, there is no significant change in the Soviet approach, the United States, acting in concert with the United Kingdom, should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests, at the same time indicating the U.S. does not propose to test on the surface of the earth, in the ocean or in the sensible atmosphere. (This answers Question A.)

The memorandum then explores arguments for and against the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other device before July 31, 1961, and implies that a test of a nuclear *weapon* before that date would not be in our best interests. A nuclear detonation in the seismic research program (Vela Uniform) is indicated to be preferable. (This states an implied answer to Question B.)

Mr. McCloy then makes seven detailed recommendations (Section V, pages 22-24). These appear generally consistent with the recommended Defense position on resumption of nuclear weapon testing which was submitted by DDR&E on 13 May 1961 for the Secretary's approval, and can be supported by Defense subject to the following comments:

- a. Recommendations 1 and 2 state in substance that if, after a high level approach to Mr. Khrushchev, no significant change ensues in the Soviet attitude, the U.S. should decide to resume nuclear weapons testing. Although not stated in the recommendations, the text of the memorandum (top of Page 11) states that "the U.S., acting in concert with the U.K., should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests." In view of the past reluctance of the U.K. in this matter, the U.S. should be prepared to proceed unilaterally if necessary.

- b. Recommendation 4 states that the announcement would indicate that the U.S. “considers itself free to resume weapons testing and that it plans to do so as soon as this will afford it an advance in weapons development of major military significance.” Perhaps the U.S. in a public announcement should not be this specific, but should state the testing is essential to U.S. national security.
- c. The last sentence of Recommendation 4 states that it should be indicated the U.S. has no plans to test on the surface of the earth or in the sensible atmosphere, while the text of the memorandum (second paragraph, Page 11) also includes “in the ocean.” Defense would prefer the less restrictive language in the recommendation, and preferably some more general language regarding “tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects.”

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962). Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Philip J. Farley.

¹ The meeting was held on May 23; see [Document 26](#).

² This 24-page memorandum was attached but is not printed.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

24. Editorial Note

At its 484th meeting on May 19, 1961, the National Security Council discussed military considerations involved in the resumption of nuclear testing. NSC Action No. 2426, approved by the President on May 19, reads:

“Noted and discussed a presentation by Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, based on a paper circulated to the members of the National Security Council on May 15 which reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961)

The account of the meeting in Seaborg’s journal reads as follows:

“From 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. I attended a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. Present at the main table were: President Kennedy, Messrs. Dulles, Wiesner, Bell, Dillon, Bundy, Harold Brown, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McNamara, Chester Bowles, McCloy, me. At the side tables were: Fisher, Gullion, Curtis LeMay and a large number of military people. The purpose of the meeting was to hear a briefing by Harold Brown on questions bearing upon the resumption of atomic weapons testing. McNamara introduced Brown who then gave his presentation. After this briefing, there was general discussion. The President asked what the Russians needed most from testing, and the answer was that they did not need bigger strategic warheads, but most likely needed lighter, more maneuverable ones. The President asked LeMay, that if we made a strike, would we have enough to prevent retaliation; LeMay said we probably would not. LeMay suggested that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. probably should go the route of the development of smaller missiles. The President asked further questions, such as the degree of reliability of the Atlas and Polaris, etc., and LeMay gave some estimates.

“The President said that the reactions from our embassies around the world all gave the estimate that the reaction to our resumption of testing would be

very adverse. The President said that all factors must be weighed and, if the decision appears to be a close one, perhaps we should wait for a time before resuming testing; but if the answer seems clear, we should begin immediately to think of the public steps that should be taken.

“Bundy made the point that better evidence on the question of whether the U.S.S.R. is testing is very important. Dulles said that the evidence simply is not and cannot be good in the range of low yields, and whether we get the answer through Intelligence is just a matter of luck.

“The President then raised the question of our immediate course of action in view of the impending meeting between himself and Khrushchev on June 3rd. One possibility seemed to be that an announcement might be made Monday that the President was asking Arthur Dean to come back from Geneva, and thus the President could see him before he leaves for Paris at the end of the week. Another possibility might be to issue a statement over the weekend and have Dean come back in time for the Meeting of the Principals on Monday (May 22nd). He asked Mr. McCloy and Mr. Murrow to think about a course of action here. This course of action should also contemplate building up public attention to the problem posed by the Russian position. The President raised the question of where we should do the testing and on what time scale it should be announced if he does decide to resume.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 1, pages 275, 282. Page references are not continuous because of interpolated materials in the journal as published.) Documentation on the inquiries to Embassies abroad and their replies is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 and 397.5611-GE for March-May 1961.

Seaborg states that at the President’s birthday dinner held May 27, Kennedy gave him the impression that he doubted there was any need for testing nuclear weapons at that time. (Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, page 66)

25. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, May 19, 1961.

SUBJECT

Comments on McNamara Briefing Paper on Nuclear Test Resumption^{[1](#)}

Neither this paper nor the Fisk Report^{[2](#)} alters my conviction that there is no great military gain to us from resumption of nuclear tests *if the Soviets also resume*. While nuclear technology is one area where we are probably well ahead, and we have many interesting new weapons possibilities, these presumably would also become available to the Soviets in time. Indeed, much of the DOD case is that if we don't resume the Soviets may pull ahead.

Thus to me the guts of the military case is not that we gain so much from testing, but that if we do *not* do so we run a growing risk of Soviet clandestine testing, which could result in a growing security disadvantage. While intelligence cannot demonstrate that the Soviets are or are not testing, the important thing is that their technical motivations for doing so are growing over time (just like ours). Presumably their ability to test clandestinely also increases with the time available for study and preparation. Thus our worries will grow with time.

DOD's strong argument that advanced versions of present weapons [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will permit us to produce cheaply thousands of nuclear weapons is highly inconsistent with our new strategic thinking. Even though the new models were smaller, cheaper, more economical, and less dangerous in fallout terms, they just wouldn't give us a whole new capability beyond what we already have. The same argument seems to apply to smaller ICBMs. Sure they would be swell, but is there an imperative need for them?

The AICBM argument has more to it, but this is an unknown area where we have no assurance that testing will produce anything new.

In sum, I still feel that *political arguments, rather than military, make the real case for test resumption*. Given the history of US/USSR competition in military technology, we are kidding ourselves if we think that we can gain a real jump on the other guy (or he on us) if both test. However, I grant the military argument that if we continue to observe a voluntary, unpoliced moratorium at a time when clandestine testing by the enemy (if not already underway) becomes increasingly likely, we may find ourselves in a real box.

Bob K

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations 4-6/61. Secret.

¹ [Document 22](#).

² See [Document 4](#).

26. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, May 23, 1961, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

(See Tab A)¹

Meeting of Committee of Principals, May 23, 11 A.M.

Secretary Rusk put four questions to the Committee of Principals for a discussion of the nuclear weapons test negotiations. The four questions were:

1. Is there any real prospect that a treaty to ban tests will result from the present negotiations in Geneva?
2. Is there a real and serious national defense interest in testing nuclear weapons?
3. On political grounds, can we accept the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests?
4. If we must resume nuclear weapons tests, what are the political considerations involved in doing so?

For an answer to the first question, Secretary Rusk turned to Ambassador Dean, who said that in his view the prospects for agreement were pretty dim at the present time. Ambassador Dean did not, however, wish to exclude entirely the possibility of agreement. He went on to say that the Soviet Union had been dissatisfied with the organization of the United Nations and that the Soviet Union clearly did not intend to let any organization have the independent power to influence matters in which the Soviet Union had a strong interest. For this reason, Ambassador Dean was inclined to think that the Soviet's proposal for a tripartite Administrative Council was rather fundamental as a part of the Soviet over-all position. There nevertheless was a possibility—and this had been mentioned to Ambassador Dean by Mr. Krishna Menon—that the Soviet Union might be impressed by the lack

of support for the tripartite proposal in the United Nations. But to sum up, Ambassador Dean could only report that the prospects for agreement in Geneva appeared “pretty dim”.

Secretary Rusk remarked that he could confirm the fundamental nature of the tripartite or “troika” proposal in Soviet thinking. Gromyko had told him that the security interests of the Soviet State must not be affected by decisions made by other people. The Secretary continued that the desire for general disarmament might also be fundamental in Soviet thinking. If the Soviet Union discovered that the “troika” was a bar to reaching agreements on disarmament, it was possible that the Soviets might conclude that it was more important to achieve disarmament than to retain the “troika” concept. At present, however, it was clear that the Soviets were promoting both disarmament and the “troika” idea with equal vigor.

Secretary Rusk then asked Ambassador Dean whether there was any doubt that the “troika” would paralyze the inspection machinery for the test ban treaty. Ambassador Dean replied that there was no doubt about it and he pointed as an example to the procedures for getting inspection teams quickly to the sites of suspicious events. If a single administrator were to be replaced by a debating society, the procedures for rapid implementation of the treaty would break down. Ambassador Dean thought some face-saving gesture to the Soviet Union might be made, such as offering to set up a three-man seismological advisory group to advise the Administrator on the eligibility of seismic events for inspection; the U.S., however, should not give in on the substance of this question.

Summing up discussion on the first question he had posed, the Secretary stated that all seemed in agreement that there was little present prospect for achieving a treaty in the test ban negotiations. There was no dissent from this.

The Secretary then turned to his second question, i.e., what was the national defense interest in testing?

Secretary McNamara said that he felt the gross advantage to the U.S. from a resumption of testing was substantial. In the first place, there would be a reduction in the costs of warheads which would be reflected even more

importantly in the reduction of costs of delivery vehicles. This saving might amount to tens of billions of dollars over a period of years. Dr. Wiesner said he thought the savings would not begin to be realized until four or five years from now. To this, Secretary McNamara replied that in obligational terms this was not so far ahead.

In the second place, Secretary McNamara continued, there was a potential for the development of pure fusion weapons. *[12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* The end result would be that within a well defined circle it would be possible to knock out enemy troops while just outside this area, friendly troops would not be harmed. He noted that with ordinary nuclear weapons it was difficult to know just what the total effects would be, because of variations in meteorological conditions at the time of their use. *[7 lines of source text not declassified]*

Secretary McNamara concluded that it was possible, although it could not be guaranteed, that an effective anti-ICBM weapon could be developed if testing were resumed. He felt there was much to learn and much to gain in this field.

In response to a question by Secretary Rusk, Dr. Brown said that testing in the atmosphere probably would not be necessary to determine the kill radius of anti-ICBM weapons.

As to the net results to be expected from testing by the U.S., plus testing by the Soviet Union, Secretary McNamara stated that he could not give a very satisfactory answer. It was his personal opinion that the differential in weapons capability between ourselves and the Soviet Union would be at least as great in the future as it was today if both sides resumed testing. He concluded by stating that he strongly urged the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.

A discussion ensued as to the Soviet interest in nuclear weapons in relation to its objectives in the nuclear test ban conference. Secretary McNamara remarked that it was possible, of course, that the Soviet Union did not want a test ban. Dr. Wiesner said that the Soviet Union might have a different assessment from ours of whether nuclear weapons would be used in the future. Dr. Scoville noted that there was evidence that the Soviet Union had

tested tactical weapons and Secretary McNamara said there was strong evidence that the Soviets were working vigorously on anti-ICBM weapons.

Dr. Wiesner noted that an asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the United States had developed in the ICBM field because the U.S. had developed small warheads which were more vulnerable to anti-ICBM efforts than were the larger warheads used by the Soviet Union. On the ground, the U.S.'s ICBMs were less vulnerable than the Soviets', but on re-entry, they were more vulnerable. Secretary McNamara said that the Polaris and Minuteman missiles could be improved by further testing and that decoys could then be used more extensively. Dr. Wiesner said he believed the anti-ICBM problem was one of our most difficult technical questions and one which was least likely of being successfully solved. Dr. Brown agreed that it was extremely difficult to meet a strong, sophisticated and decoyed attack.

General LeMay added that one of the things wrong with missiles was their unreliability. If we could make warheads, and hence, missiles smaller we could afford to test more of them and thus increase their reliability. Secretary McNamara agreed that again a question of cost was involved.

Mr. McCloy asked Dr. Brown for his view of the results of resumed testing by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Dr. Brown replied that in the long run, since both sides have approximately the same capability, testing by both sides would result in the Soviet Union and the United States achieving approximate parity. However, which side needed nuclear weapons most was another question. For example, if both the Soviet Union and the United States were to develop smaller missiles, this would help the United States more than it would help the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union to begin with had an easier job of hiding its missiles. Dr. Scoville added that the Soviet Union might be behind the United States in the area of nuclear testing related to defense against ballistic missiles.

Returning to the question of the economic impact, Dr. Wiesner said he wished to make clear his belief that the savings which had been referred to would be realized several years ahead and not in the 1964-65 period. He finally wished to note that if the Soviet Union tested clandestinely, which it probably could, and the United States did not test, it would be bad for the

United States both in terms of economics and in terms of the military situation.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the Department of Defense was worried about the Nth country problem. Secretary McNamara replied that he was concerned about the Nth country problem, but he could not see a clear relation between the test ban and this problem. What did concern Secretary McNamara was the possibility that some other country could develop [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Ambassador Dean inquired whether testing limited to underground was acceptable or whether it might not be necessary to test in outer space. Dr. Brown said he felt that tests generally could be limited to underground although some of the more esoteric types of experiments might best be conducted in space. Dr. Wiesner said he felt the important consideration was that any United States' testing should not produce fallout. Mr. McCloy asked whether underground tests involved the possibility of venting and whether the radioactivity had to be washed out from the site of the underground explosion. Dr. Brown said the possibility of venting was negligible if the site was properly chosen and the test occurred sufficiently far underground. As regards washing out the radioactivity, it was not necessary to do that. He noted that over the years since the Rainier tests, the radioactivity from that test had migrated distances measured only in tens of feet.

Turning to the third question which he had posed, namely the political acceptability of the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was a disadvantage in continuing a moratorium without control. Our position on the need for controls would be eroded if an uncontrolled moratorium were permitted to continue and we would be under increasing pressure to accept agreements without control. Mr. McCloy agreed with this assessment. With respect to the world reaction from a resumption of testing, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was an important difference between testing which would produce fallout and testing which would not produce fallout. The latter, Secretary Rusk stated, was a manageable political problem.

The Secretary then inquired how much could be done underground in the way of weapons development. Secretary McNamara said he thought a great deal could be done underground. Ambassador Dean asked about outer space tests, and Chairman Seaborg said we would not be ready for such tests within two years.

Dr. Wiesner said it was his opinion that the military considerations involved were so long range in nature that the political considerations should be the determining factors in timing the resumption of testing. Secretary McNamara said he would agree only if it were understood that a delay in resumption of testing would not mean an indefinite and perhaps permanent postponement of testing.

Secretary Rusk thought that tests should not be conducted for purely political reasons. If a test were conducted, it should be because of its military significance. Furthermore, he did not see much difference in the public reaction that could be expected as between seismic research detonations and a weapons test. He did not see much sense in “easing” into the testing of weapons. Secretary Rusk then inquired what the time lag was between instructions to prepare for testing and the actual test.

Chairman Seaborg replied that there was a continuous gradation in importance of individual weapons tests; there was no discontinuity between the more and the less important. Proof testing could begin ten weeks from the time the laboratories were asked to start preparations.

Ambassador Dean said he felt the United States should decide on which were the most fruitful tests and that these should be conducted first. It should be recognized that political repercussions could be expected from testing and if it were decided that the military importance of resuming tests was overriding, then the United States should resume tests in the most meaningful way possible. Chairman Seaborg noted that there was a weapons test [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] which could be conducted in about ten weeks. He felt that perhaps all the possible tests might not be carried out at the end of the ten-week period because, to a certain extent, they interfered with each other. The test holes would be used up if all three shots were fired at about the same time.

Secretary Rusk then referred to his fourth question for discussion; the problem of working out the political considerations involved in resumption of tests. Mr. Murrow stated that nothing which had been said in the meeting would be very persuasive in convincing public opinion around the world of the need for U.S. resumption of tests. The public would not find convincing the argument that testing should be resumed because it will cut costs or because the kill radius could be increased or because there were some possible, but perhaps unlikely, improvements which might be made in anti-ICBM defenses. The only possibility of convincing the public in other countries of our need for testing would be if the President could say that the national security and indeed the national survival of the United States was at stake. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might even say that it would not test nuclear weapons and then proceed to test clandestinely. Mr. Murrow said he felt Ambassador Dean and Mr. McCloy had made great progress in selling the world on our proposals and on our appetite for the treaty. Secretary Rusk said our position should be built on the idea that the United States would stop testing if the Soviet Union modified its impossible positions in the test negotiations. Secretary McNamara agreed to the importance of this point.

(At this point Secretary Rusk left the meeting.)

Mr. McCloy said that we could not blink the fact that the reaction of the public around the world would be bad. There would be a worsening of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This might make the world more unstable and result in less security for the United States. There was a dilemma in this because while there were many political reasons for not testing, it was also true that an uncontrolled moratorium on testing might pull the whole rug out from under us on other disarmament matters. One thing was clear and that was that we could not let the conference drift.

Mr. McCloy said he had thought we might tell the Soviets that we would not discuss disarmament with them on July 31 nor would we table any disarmament plan until the question of the troika was settled. If the Soviet Union wished to take the question to the UN, this would be fine with the United States. We could say that the Soviet general and complete

disarmament proposal is phony because what the Soviets are proposing is this tripartite Administrative Council which makes control futile.

Ambassador Dean remarked that the United Kingdom has been trying to persuade the United States to announce tests as a bluff. Ambassador Dean felt it was important, however, that the United States not announce tests until it is actually ready to conduct a nuclear test. Otherwise he felt UK support would vanish during the interim between announcement and actual test due to internal pressures in Britain.

Mr. McCloy asked how long a time would be required to prepare for weapons tests to improve the weight yield ratio or for tests like [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Chairman Seaborg said it would take longer than ten weeks to prepare for such tests. Ambassador Dean wondered whether tests in November or December might be an appropriate target date. This would be after the General Assembly discussions. Secretary McNamara said if a delay in tests meant that no test would occur for a long time and possibly not at all, he would have to oppose such a delay.

Dr. Wiesner stated that in his opinion the United States had begun to enjoy a good position in the nuclear test talks only recently and that we should capitalize on this. Before the present administration took over, few people were convinced that the U.S. really wanted a treaty. He saw no reason why the United States should not wait until November or December to conduct weapons tests if a public affairs buildup over that time were desirable. Secretary McNamara said that if it were decided to resume tests and if this were a definite intention, then whether the tests were held in July or December would make no difference. Mr. McCloy said he thought the Soviets needed a stimulus to show them they could not have the best of all worlds with things as they are. For this reason he would not mind having it known that the United States is preparing to resume tests even though we did not announce it. Mr. Kohler asked what would happen if a decision to test were made and then the Soviet Union said they would sign the Western treaty. Mr. McCloy and Ambassador Dean replied that the United States would be prepared to sign the treaty under those circumstances and to stop testing.

Secretary McNamara asked what would happen if a UN debate on nuclear testing took place and world opinion were mobilized against a resumption of tests. The United States might then decide to postpone resumption. It was this kind of possibility which worried him about delaying the resumption of tests. Dr. Wiesner said he assumed the United States would be able to use time to swing opinion to our side. Mr. Nitze said he felt we would not gain ground from the public opinion standpoint on resuming tests, but that we might gain ground on the troika question. Mr. Bundy said that a resumption of tests would probably mean the troika issue would be lost, also.

Mr. McCloy said he did not suppose a decision could be made today. The forthcoming meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev would, of course, be important in this connection.

Mr. McCloy then asked for opinions on his idea of not resuming disarmament negotiations until the Soviets dropped the troika proposal. Dr. Wiesner replied that we must distinguish between general and complete disarmament and reciprocal arms control measures. In some arms control measures only bilateral observation would be involved. In the general disarmament area, however, the troika proposal would become very important.

Ambassador Dean then referred to his original instructions of March 1961 and said that he had then been authorized to submit the “escalator” proposal on numbers of on-site inspections. He had not submitted the “escalator” proposal but recently the Soviets had been saying more seismic events occurred annually in the United States than in the Soviet Union, yet the United States asked for the same number of inspections for both the Soviet Union and the United States. Ambassador Dean said he felt it would be good negotiating tactics to emphasize to the Soviets at this point that we are willing to relate the number of on-site inspections to the number of events which actually occur, so that if twice as many events occur in the United States as in the Soviet Union, twice as many inspections would take place in the United States. We would then introduce our escalator proposal which would combine the fixed figure for inspections with the feature of adjusting the number of inspections to the number of events which actually occurred. It was generally agreed that this would be a helpful move.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 p.m.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Goodby and approved by Rusk on May 25.

¹ The list of 28 participants from 6 agencies is not printed.

27. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, May 24, 1961, 4:57–6:32 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson

Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland

The following is a summary of consensus and action and not a detailed record of a meeting which lasted about an hour and a half, covering several subjects.

In a review of next steps on the disarmament negotiations, the following points were highlighted:

- a. The agreed date is June 19th. The Secretary said that the Russians had originally proposed June 5, but when the date of the 19th was mentioned the Soviet instructions evidently were made in agreement on the latter date, since the Soviet negotiator accepted June 19th on the spot. The chief Soviet delegate for these talks will evidently be Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the UN. The U.S. Delegate has not yet been selected.
- b. Ambassador Stevenson expressed the view that the bilateral stage of negotiations was at least as important as the later broader negotiations in whatever forum was agreed. The agenda for the bilaterals will be an attempt to agree on the composition of the forum for the later talks beginning in August, and the general “principles” that should guide the disarmament discussions.

Ambassador Stevenson said it should be possible to develop a general objective that met the Soviets' proposals for “general and complete disarmament” on their own terms and at their own level of generality. The President asked whether we could go for general and complete disarmament

with adequate inspection controls; Governor Stevenson thought that agreement about general principles would make it possible then to get on with questions of phasing, first steps, and details. In this connection Governor Stevenson said that the U.S. line at Vienna¹ could well be very simple indeed, saying to Khrushchev in effect: We want disarmament as much as you do, quite possibly more than you do; you should not delude yourself that we would have any trouble reallocating to peaceful purposes the resources released in our economy by a real disarmament program; let us get on with it, but with controlled devices that are international and effective, which means of course they cannot have a built-in veto on executive action.

On the question of forum, the President asked whether we could not accept five neutrals. After some discussion, the President reconfirmed the present negotiating position, involving two or three neutrals added to the ten present members of the disarmament negotiating body.

Ambassador Stevenson handed the President a memorandum on the forthcoming discussions with Chairman Khrushchev and President de Gaulle,² and expressed the opinion that the Soviets may mean business on disarmament. There was some discussion of past history of disarmament negotiations and U.S. positions in that field, some of which Ambassador Stevenson described as mistaken. The President said he felt the need for more information on the history of disarmament negotiations with the Russians, before he meets with Khrushchev in Vienna. There was general agreement that the matter of nuclear test bans, and particularly the administrative control arrangement for a nuclear test ban, should be a major item on the Vienna agenda.

Ambassador Stevenson reported that Zorin had recently called him expressing his readiness to talk about arrangements for discussing outer space.

¹ * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2461. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Manfull (S/S) on May 25. A typed note reads: "Not cleared by the President or the Secretary." The meeting

was held at the White House. The times are taken from the President's Appointment Books. (Kennedy Library)

¹ The President met with Chairman Khrushchev for talks in Vienna June 3-4.

² Kennedy was in Paris for a State visit to France and a meeting of the North Atlantic Council May 31-June 3.

28. Editorial Note

On May 25, 1961, Secretary Rusk signed a memorandum to President Kennedy suggesting that he inform Chairman Khrushchev, during their Vienna meeting, that the United States proposed to install a direct telephone connection between the Department of State and the Embassy in Moscow. An attached memorandum from John McCloy to Secretary Rusk indicated that the proposal resulted from the work of a panel that “recently studied measures to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.” A memorandum from McGhee to Kohler identified the panel as one convened by McCloy and headed by Thomas Schelling of Harvard University. McGhee noted that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev did not discuss the telephone link. These memoranda are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, USSR. Secretary Rusk’s May 25 memorandum is printed in [volume V, Document 53](#) .

29. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State [Source](#)

New York, May 26, 1961, 9 p.m.

3200. Nuclear testing. Department telegram 2306.^{[1](#)}

1. We believe that political groundwork has not yet been established which would permit us to resume nuclear tests without suffering severely damaging political reaction throughout world. We are not in position to judge defense requirements which may favor early resumption of testing but we question whether these requirements are sufficiently compelling and immediate to warrant resumption testing without further political preparation and clear demonstration in and to UN that US has exhausted every reasonable possibility of negotiation.
2. We believe one key to estimating public reaction lies in demonstrated ability Soviets to stimulate public condemnation on such issue through leftist groups and public media over which they have influence; if Soviets choose exercise this influence, which we confident they will, reaction will be severe. For past decade Soviets have attempted with considerable success to mold public opinion against nuclear explosions whatever their purpose. While UN resolutions have always been carefully restricted to nuclear "weapons" tests, resumption of any kind of testing would be viewed with alarm by many UN members because of fear it only first step to resumption weapons tests, either by US or by USSR. In our view resumption US underground tests now, whether for weapons or for seismic research or peaceful purposes, could provide pretext to Soviets both for effective worldwide anti-US campaign and for resumption of weapons [tests] on their part if they wish, while leaving blame on US. If we resumed peaceful explosions only (seismic tests to improve inspection capabilities would perhaps be distinguishable), and if we included appropriate international supervision of devices and tests we could probably prevent resolution but would nevertheless anticipate great difficulties in debate and that US would be in defensive position, especially if Soviets used this as pretext free selves from their restraint on

weapons testing. As replies from field have shown, public opinion reaction in most countries would not distinguish between weapons and non-weapons tests and we think this public reaction would be heavily reflected here. Should atmosphere testing be resumed, fear of radiation, whether rational or not, would further magnify reaction. In short we do not see any advantages from resumption any type nuclear testing at this time which would offset undoubted adverse political reactions.

3. We assume that greater lead time would be required for weapons test than for other types of underground shots. If this is case, and if decision is taken that we must resume weapons testing in absence change Soviet position, we believe intervening time should be used to prepare political groundwork in hope of minimizing damaging reaction when testing actually takes place.
4. Chief requirement in preparation for resumption of tests is public belief that US has made and continues to make sincere reasonable efforts to reach agreement with Soviets at Geneva test talks with parallel appreciation of obstacles which Soviets have placed before such an agreement. This requires far greater dissemination and understanding of key issues at Geneva than is case to date. Pressure "neutral" opinion might, for example, be used in our interests in this case; Presidential letters to chief neutrals such as Nehru, Nkrumah and Tito might warn them in advance that we feel testing talks about to break down because of failure Soviets to agree on reasonable inspection. And, since so many governments are properly fearful of leftist-organized public demonstrations and since public opinion so widely opposed to nuclear tests, this understanding must reach level of man on street. It follows that a major propaganda effort would have to be launched well in advance of any testing. Even break in negotiations without immediate resumption testing would require much more public opinion preparation both through Washington and elsewhere than has yet been made if we are not to suffer political reactions.
5. Presumably nuclear test talks in Geneva would be broken off sometime after decision reached to resume tests, yet well ahead of actual tests. To bolster our posture of reasonableness and of desiring make every conceivable effort to reach satisfactory agreement with Soviets, we should, simultaneously with breakoff at Geneva, bring matter on our initiative to UN. (It would be highly important to beat Russians to the

punch.) Forum would depend somewhat on time of year; if break comes during fall we could introduce item in GA, if it comes in summer we could put it either in DC or SC, or we could put it on GA agenda for fall while pursuing other means in summer, e.g., in disarmament talks or bilaterally. Our purpose in referring matter to UN would be to build support for our contention that Soviet negotiating position has prevented an agreement by which weapons tests could be stopped with any real assurance of compliance by all parties. We believe it is only by taking political offensive in this manner that we could prevent Soviets from getting resolution passed against resumption of tests which would further extend present uncontrolled moratorium or increase political cost for us if it then went ahead with tests. And it is only in this manner—i.e., after having exhausted world's top political forum in effort to produce agreement—that we can build maximum political atmosphere which would put blame for failure negotiations and resumption of tests on USSR.

6. Although we recognize that initiative along these lines is not without risk, we believe Soviet positions, such as tripartite administrative council, limited number of on-site inspections, staffing and criteria proposals, could not successfully be defended under spotlight of world attention.
7. With these views in mind, and believing that we must make every effort to gain world public support on an issue of this magnitude and gravity, we believe decision to resume tests before political groundwork had been laid would critically isolate us with serious repercussions to our foreign policy objectives.

Stevenson

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/5-2661. Secret; Priority.

¹ Dated May 24. (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/5-2461)

30. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State [Source](#)

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10 a.m.

Secto 15. In conversations at Ambassador's residence in Vienna following President's luncheon for Khrushchev Secretary and Gromyko turned to discussion of disarmament.¹ Secretary referred to so-called bilateral disarmament talks beginning in Washington June 19 and said perhaps agreement could be reached particularly on proposals regarding forum for broader disarmament discussions. Gromyko said he had made to Ambassador Stevenson number of reasonable proposals as to composition. Secretary pointed out Ambassador Stevenson had made some reasonable proposals on our side as well.

Gromyko said US was always talking about control. Khrushchev had spoken at length of Soviet willingness accept control in UNGA last fall but no other delegation made any mention this proposal. Secretary stated this question could be discussed endlessly on purely theoretical basis. In this connection wanted say frankly US very much taken aback by Soviet position in resumed nuclear test negotiations in Geneva. Without replying directly to Secretary Gromyko entered into history disarmament negotiations over past 15 years saying endless discussion of partial measures had led to absolutely no results. All Soviet proposals in this field had been rejected on ground they would change balance of power in favor Soviet Union. It was now time tackle GCD instead of starting up new round of discussions of partial measures which could go on for another 10 years.

Secretary stated Soviet Union could not both maintain its policies of military secrecy and achieve disarmament. These two policies, and he was willing grant Soviets really wanted disarmament, were incompatible. Secretary said there were only as he saw it two roads to disarmament. First would be prior settlement of political problems which might make possibilities of broader disarmament agreement. Second would be step-by-step basis with full inspection and control of each step. Gromyko said US

ally Adenauer had said repeatedly no solution of political problems possible unless there was first progress on disarmament.

Secretary said for nearly 30 years one disarmament conference after another had taken place and proceeded in merely ceremonial fashion. He felt it time be realistic about this problem. The immediate action required was in conference in Geneva. In broad field of disarmament this was simple matter but it was vital test.

Gromyko referred to US adoption word "troika" to describe new Soviet proposals. Gromyko said troika was good word and good idea. It was to protect Soviet Union's natural rights. They were only asking for one-third, not two-thirds. They had a right to one-third. Any decision against Soviet, or indeed against US interests, would be excluded. He did not want to use word "demand" which was too strong, but Soviets were very firm on this. If troika adopted US would be even better off than USSR because other one-third would side more often with US than USSR. Secretary commented real question that of veto. Gromyko replied if there were no veto Soviet proposal would not make sense.

Secretary stated if adequate number investigations seismic events could not be agreed test ban would become improbable. Gromyko replied, after some uncertainty as to whether he had said two or three, that three investigations would be acceptable.

Secretary said troika proposals were block to any progress in disarmament field. If they were maintained would be waste of time even to discuss disarmament since no disarmament would be possible if any one country could block inspection. Gromyko referred to Roosevelt proposal for veto in UN Security Council as precedent. Gromyko said under present circumstances GCD only way out. Secretary asked when Soviets had adopted troika proposal. Gromyko said UN operation in Congo had made them realize importance this proposal. Referred at length to US long years' domination UN by mechanical voting majority. President Roosevelt's veto proposals for UN Charter adopted realistic approach. US since that time had invalidated many provisions of Charter and emasculated Security Council. It was deviations from UN principles that had caused trouble. Secretary said troika proposal would run against every principle of arbitration and

conciliation. Gromyko said always, even in ICJ, voting reflected state of affairs in world, therefore arbitration and conciliation were not solution. Gromyko said there were two sides to troika proposal: three-sided arrangement plus unanimity of most powerful countries. US wants order by which it could impose its decisions on USSR. Gromyko asked how he could convince us this not possible. If two sides were not able reconcile their interests it was better not to have decision.

Ambassador Thompson stated this might be true in important political decisions but not in disarmament. If two men have revolvers and decide to give them up they must be able to check whether another revolver is hidden under vest of second party. Gromyko said if general and complete disarmament treaty concluded all pockets could be examined. Even trousers could be taken off.

Nitze asked how you get through intermediate stages. Gromyko said they did not propose GCD like rocket shot. They had done their best to fit out stages with controls. Until complete disarmament was reached there naturally would not be complete control. Degree of control would be in accordance with degree of disarmament.

After discussion how troika would prevent inspection by veto in specific cases, Gromyko asked why build in such an abundance of doubts. He asked Secretary directly, do you think we are exploding atomic bombs now? Secretary replied we have no evidence Soviets are testing but it very difficult prove negative proposition. Gromyko stated vigorously that Soviets think US is sure Soviets not testing.

Gromyko said Soviets would resume testing if US did and other countries would also. He emphasized Soviets would not lose more than we by resumption. Everybody would lose but Soviets not more interested in testing agreement than was US.

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-461. Confidential.
Repeated to Geneva.

¹ A memorandum of this June 3 conversation is *ibid.*, 397.5611/GE/6-361. It is printed in [vol. V, Document 61](#); see also the Supplement. Complete documentation on the Vienna summit meeting is in [volume V](#).

31. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between The President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR—Mr. Kohler
D—Mr. Akalovsky, (interpreting)

USSR

Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Here follows discussion of Laos.]

Mr. Khrushchev then addressed himself to the question of nuclear weapon tests. He said he would not go into any details because the positions of the two sides were well known. Furthermore, he was not familiar with all the details of this intricate problem. However, there were two basic questions: (1) the number of suspicious events to be inspected and (2) organization of control. The Soviet Union cannot accept such controls as have been suggested so far. The events in the Congo taught the Soviet Union a lesson. Before those events the Soviet Union might have signed a treaty like the one suggested. However, the events in the Congo indicated that the UN appears to be able to act against the interests of individual states. The Congo had invited UN troops and those troops acted against the interests of the Congolese Government. So if there is a single chairman of the control commission (Mr. Khrushchev was obviously referring to the administrator) he will be able to set the policy. The US would not agree to having a Communist chairman and that is understandable. If it did then the Soviet

Union could accept a single chairman (administrator). But the Soviet Union cannot accept a neutral chairman; after all, Hammarskjöld is also a neutral and an intelligent one at that. He is not the worst neutral possible. One should try to imagine a situation, Mr. Khrushchev said, where he, as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, would have to subject his actions to such a commission (administrator). The people of the Soviet Union would never accept such a situation and if the United States wants him to be fired then it should pursue this line. The Soviet Union does not seek control over the control organization but it does not wish the United States to have such control either. This is why the USSR has proposed a three-man body. Such an arrangement would not be prejudicial to any of the sides. Mr. Khrushchev said that he believed that the work of other international organizations should be organized along the same lines. He said that the United States was now in the majority in the UN, but times may change—one cannot say when—and the US may find itself in a minority. The UN is not a parliament, it is an international organization and the majority rule has no place there. Each group of countries should be equally represented, so that a balance of forces be established and that no one be able to pursue a policy prejudicial to any other side. Referring to the number of inspections, Mr. Khrushchev said that three inspections a year would be sufficient. A larger number would be tantamount to intelligence, something the Soviet Union cannot accept. Mr. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to link the question of nuclear tests with disarmament. If agreement could be reached on disarmament, then the USSR could agree to any controls and it would then drop the troika arrangement and the requirement for unanimity. The Soviet position on disarmament is well known; it was stated at the UN and the USSR still proceeds on that basis. Under the conditions of general and complete disarmament control must be most extensive so that no country could arm itself clandestinely. If there were general and complete disarmament there would be no question of espionage because there would be no armaments. Then there would be no secrets and all doors must be open so that complete verification could be ensured. This would include nuclear plants. In view of the fact that apparently no agreement can be reached on the question of nuclear tests, this question should be linked to disarmament. The disarmament group should combine the two questions and work out a general plan. Given good will, two years should be sufficient to develop an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he could give the President an aide-mémoire setting forth the Soviet position on this question. (The aide-mémoire was received from the Soviets after the meeting.)¹

The President said that he wanted to ask Mr. Khrushchev whether he believed it to be impossible to find any person that would be neutral both to the US and the USSR.

Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative.

The President then said that the result of the Soviet proposal could be compared to a situation where if he were living in this room and Mr. Khrushchev in the adjacent room, they could not go to each other's rooms without the consent of the occupant. Under such conditions, how could any of the two be certain that nothing suspicious is going on in his neighbor's room. The President then said that a treaty along such lines could not be confirmed by the Senate. In sending any treaty to the Senate the President would have to give assurance that the treaty provides if not for a fool-proof control system, at least for a reasonable deterrent against violations. However, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, no such assurance could be given. Likewise, how could Mr. Khrushchev give such assurance to those people in his country who may think that the United States is testing clandestinely. True, Mr. Khrushchev is in an advantageous position because of the open way in which the United States acts.

Mr. Khrushchev smiled and said: "But what about Allen Dulles? Isn't that secret?" The President replied he wished it were. Furthermore, the President continued, how can we inspect events in the Soviet Union if any such inspection would be subject to Soviet approval? Under such an arrangement any party that might have tested clandestinely would simply refuse to accept inspection in the area where the test had occurred.

Mr. Khrushchev referred to his statement about three inspections a year to verify suspicious events and also noted that the President had failed to address himself to his statement regarding the dropping of the troika proposal if nuclear tests were linked with disarmament. If this arrangement were adopted, then full control could be exercised any time and at any place. Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that a nuclear test ban alone would

not be very important to the national security of the people. The danger of war would remain, because the production of nuclear energy, rockets, and bombs would continue full blast. What people want is peace. Therefore, agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament. Then the troika would be dropped and the USSR would subscribe to any controls developed by the US, even without looking at the document.

The President said that he agreed that a nuclear test ban would not of itself lessen the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US. Nor would it reduce the production of such weapons. However, a test ban would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely, although, of course, no one can guess what will happen in the future. At this time, the United States and the USSR possess great stocks of nuclear weapons; Great Britain possesses certain quantities of such weapons and France is also getting some capability. If we fail to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban then other countries will undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program. While a nuclear test ban would be no certain guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would certainly impede such proliferation. If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers. So in considering this question of what Mr. Khrushchev calls espionage one should balance its risks against the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we are successful in reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban then it will certainly at least put a brake on the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed that there was some logic in the President's position and said that this was why the Soviet Union had entered the negotiations. However, practice has demonstrated that this logic is not quite correct because while the three powers are negotiating in Geneva, France simply spits at them and goes on testing. Thus if there is no link between a nuclear test ban and disarmament other countries may say that they are in an unequal position and might act like France. Other countries may say that if the great powers possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons they should also acquire such stockpiles. On the other hand, if there were disarmament, then nuclear weapons would be eliminated and other countries would be in an equal position and would not have to spend money on the development of nuclear weapons. General and complete disarmament is the most radical

means of preventing war. The Soviet Union has always regarded the question of a nuclear test ban merely as a small step toward general and complete disarmament. But let us now begin with the main issue and include the test ban in it.

The President said he agreed that a test ban would not be a basic part, but it would be a most important part. He said that the treaty as drafted now provides for abrogation of the treaty if any country associated with any party to the treaty should conduct tests. The United States does not support French testing. We hope that once a treaty has been concluded most other countries will join in it. The question of a nuclear test ban is a relatively easy problem to resolve because the controls required are based on scientific instrumentation, such as seismographs, etc. So why not start with this relatively easy question. The President then inquired whether the Soviet conception was that if we used the term general and complete disarmament—or general and comprehensive disarmament as used by us last year—the process would be carried out step by step with the necessary parallel inspection. Or is it the Soviet view that we would simply announce that goal as an objective of national policy and countries would carry out inspection on their own.

Mr. Khrushchev replied he wanted to make a complaint: The President apparently had not read the Soviet proposals with sufficient attention. Otherwise, he would know that the Soviet proposals provide for disarmament in stages and for control in stages.

The President then inquired whether this was to be understood that, if both sides accepted general and complete disarmament and agreed to reduce their armed forces, the number of their aircraft or submarines, or to disarm outer space, the Soviet Union would accept inspection any place in the USSR.

Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative, using the word “absolutely”.

In other words, the President inquired further, if general and complete disarmament were accepted as a commitment of national policy and a nuclear test ban were included in the first stage, would that mean that the test ban would be subject to inspection without a veto?

Mr. Khrushchev replied that in that event he would try to persuade the President not to start with this measure because it is not the most important one.

In response to the President's question what should come first, Mr. Khrushchev replied that any other measure would be acceptable, such as, for instance prohibition of nuclear weapons, prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons, or elimination of military and missile bases. (At this point Mr. Gromyko corrected the interpreter saying that Mr. Khrushchev had not mentioned prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Khrushchev confirmed that he had mentioned this item.) The Soviet proposals on disarmament contain all the details and there is logic in those proposals. The proposals also provide for complete control. In any event, both sides should try to reach agreement on the priority of individual measures so that neither side would have its interests prejudiced by the other.

The President said that Mr. Khrushchev appeared to feel that a link should be established between a nuclear test ban and disarmament and that these two questions are inter-related and should be discussed together. We, on the other hand, believe that a nuclear test ban would be if not the most important step, at least a very significant step and would facilitate a disarmament agreement. There is a Chinese proverb saying that a thousand-mile journey begins with one step. So let us make that step.

Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that the President apparently knew the Chinese very well but that he too knew them quite well. To this the President replied that Mr. Khrushchev might get to know them even better. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that he already knew them very well.

Referring to the President's statement about the significance of a nuclear test ban, Mr. Khrushchev said that the USSR could agree to a nuclear test ban provided it was subject to the troika arrangement.

The President then said that it appeared to him that the conversation was back where it had started. Therefore, he wanted to conclude this discussion by saying that the United States is greatly concerned by the uninspected moratorium that has been going on for three years in connection with the

negotiations. This indicates how long it takes to reach agreements. The prospect of an indefinite continuance of a moratorium without controls is a matter of great concern to the United States. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how the question of nuclear tests could be included in disarmament negotiations, which we hope will be successful but which will probably require a long time. Perhaps it would be best to go back to Geneva to make another effort and to see what each of us should do in this matter. Perhaps then the conference might be recessed or some other action taken. Whether or not there is agreement on nuclear tests we would start our discussions on disarmament on June 19.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he was agreeable to conducting negotiations in Geneva and said that there was a Soviet representative there. However, the Soviet Union could not accept such controls as would be tantamount to espionage if weapons themselves were not eliminated. This, in effect, is what the Pentagon has wanted all along. Eisenhower's open skies proposal in 1955 was a part of that scheme. Now ground posts are envisaged and this is also reconnaissance. The Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate on a nuclear test ban in the hope of reaching agreement and proceeding to general and complete disarmament. If the US refuses to accept general and complete disarmament then the Soviet Union cannot agree to accept such an arrangement. The Soviet Union cannot accept a situation where controls would prejudice its national security and where the Soviet Government would be subject to the will of a third party and would not be free to act on its own.

The President said that it was obvious that if controls should turn out to be prejudicial to the national interest of any of the parties to an unreasonable degree, the treaty could be abrogated. The President reiterated that we would begin our discussions on disarmament on June 19, which will be in effect a continuation of the discussions Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Stevenson had had in New York.

Mr. Khrushchev inquired whether the President would agree to tie together the question of the test ban and disarmament.

The President replied that he would not unless there was assurance that agreement on disarmament could be reached speedily. He referred to the

fact that negotiations on a nuclear test ban had been in process for three years. The President emphasized that the problem of espionage mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev paled if compared with the problems which would result from the development of nuclear capabilities by other countries. This is bound to affect the national security of our two countries, and increase the danger of major conflicts.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if we agreed on general and complete disarmament that problem would not only pale but would completely disappear.

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin.]²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks, Vol. I (President). Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The full text of this memorandum of conversation is printed in [vol. V, Document 62](#) .

¹ Dated June 4; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1961, pp. 22-24, and *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, pp. 162-166.

² Following this meeting, Khrushchev gave a lunch for the President at the Embassy. During the lunch, Khrushchev “said he had heard pressure was being brought to bear on the President to resume nuclear weapon tests. He said that he was under a similar pressure; however, the USSR will wait for the US to resume testing and if the US does resume the USSR will follow suit.” (Memorandum of conversation by Akalovsky; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks, Vol. I (President))

32. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, June 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

PRESENT

The Vice President, Senators Mansfield, Humphrey, Russell, Fulbright, Dirksen, Saltonstall,
Hickenlooper, Wiley

The Speaker, Congressmen McCormack, Albert, Vinson, Morgan, Arends, Chipfield, Hoeven,
Byrnes (Wisconsin)^{[1](#)}

[Here follows discussion of the President's visit to France and his talks with
Chairman Khrushchev on Laos and the Middle East.]

On Sunday the discussion began with nuclear testing and Mr. Khrushchev had insisted on the Troika, stating that there was no such thing as a neutral person. Control in such circumstances was a form of espionage. There could be no serious control or inspection until after the decision for complete and general disarmament had been accepted. Mr. Khrushchev had urged that the President should agree to a merger of the test talks with disarmament, and the President's conclusion was that either from Chinese pressure or for other reasons the Soviets have lost interest in a test ban agreement. The President replied that in his view it would be wrong to merge the test ban with general disarmament since for fifteen years discussion of the latter subject had gotten nowhere. Khrushchev said that when we start to test, he will start to test. The main question now was how to disengage from these negotiations. Macmillan and the President had talked about this matter, which was a hot issue in England. Gaitskell had also expressed his hope that we could wait until the autumn, until after his own contest for control in his own party, which he expected to win. This was a problem in Canada, too, and in general a major question of propaganda values. The question was how to break it off so that the Soviets would seem to be responsible.

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin.]

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France, Vol. I. No classification marking. The memorandum is dated June 7, but no drafter is indicated.

¹ Michael J. Mansfield of Montana, Senate Majority Leader; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, Senate Majority Whip; Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, Senate Minority Leader; Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, a minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Sam Rayburn of Texas, Speaker of the House; John McCormack of Massachusetts, House Majority Leader; Carl Albert of Oklahoma, House Majority Whip; Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, House Minority Whip; Robert B. Chipperfield of Illinois, ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Charles B. Hoeven, ranking minority member of the House Agriculture Committee; and John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee.

33. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, June 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

Handling of Nuclear Test Problems

I believe we should immediately initiate consultations with the British, and possibly the French, with a view to renewing formally in the Geneva Test Ban Conference our proposal for a ban on atmospheric and under-sea tests.^{[1](#)} I suggest our original proposal be modified to provide for the absolute minimum of control posts we consider necessary. I should think one on the Chinese border and one other would suffice. The Soviets would doubtless again raise the question of under-ground tests and we should state that we have no present plans for testing but will be guided by what we consider to be the security interests of the United States and that we no longer feel obliged to give notification of test resumption. This would put the Soviets in a position of turning down a reasonable proposal to prevent pollution of the atmosphere and if they did resume testing in the atmosphere the onus would fall on them and they could have the pleasure of dealing with organized demonstrations in Britain and elsewhere. If we do resume testing ourselves, I suggest that even if the tests are generally known we do not either deny or admit them but stick completely to the “no comment” position.

As a prelude to taking this position, we should state in the Geneva Conference that we can neither accept “Troika” nor an indefinite prolongation of the moratorium which we cannot control. There is the slight possibility that the Soviets would actually accept a ban on atmospheric and under-sea tests.

^{[1](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-861. Secret. Sent through Kohler who initialed, and a copy was sent to McCloy. Thompson was in Washington for consultations.

¹ The first in this series of proposals is contained in President Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev, April 13, 1959; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1392-1393.

34. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State[Source](#)

Geneva, June 12, 1961, 6 p.m.

Supnu 1652. Reference: Nusup 1257,^{[1](#)} Supnu 1639.^{[2](#)} We believe there might be disadvantages in actual tabling of treaty language in renewal of proposal re banning atmospheric tests. Our suggestion in Supnu 1639 was that there might be no harm and possibly some advantage in event we resume testing in repeating U.S. willingness to negotiate on basis proposed in 1959 for banning tests in readily policed environments such as atmosphere and ocean. But actual tabling or publication of treaty language for such a limited proposal might compete with and actually confuse picture of U.S. standing ready to sign treaty draft tabled on April 18th and detract from effectiveness of our tabling of comprehensive proposals which are being widely circulated. Actually, we would recommend that we do no more than say that the 1959 limited ban offer still stands as an alternative basis of negotiation and that we not put forward treaty language on this basis.

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution.

^{[1](#)} This telegram, June 8, transmitted to the delegation the text of a draft memorandum from McCloy to the President recommending that the United States recall Dean from Geneva and commence preparations for a resumption of testing. The memorandum also recommended that the United States propose, together with the United Kingdom, an accord on atmospheric and underwater testing. Concurrently, the United States would announce that it considered itself free to resume testing until a comprehensive test ban treaty was agreed on. (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/6-761) See the Supplement.

^{[2](#)} Dated June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-661)

35. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy[Source](#)

Washington, June 12, 1961.

Mr. McCloy wishes to meet with you and the Secretary of State—if not with a wider circle—on Tuesday or Thursday¹ of this week. He has a New York engagement on Wednesday² which he would cancel if Wednesday is your only possible opening.

His items of business are these:

1. He must meet next Monday with the Russians on a bilateral basis. Before that time, he wishes you to clear his position, including especially the position that general and complete disarmament can only be achieved in a world of law. This is the fundamental proposition which he would set against the Soviet proposition that general and complete disarmament is, in itself, the objective, and that until general and complete disarmament is achieved, inspection and control must be on the basis of veto by the USSR.
2. He wishes to go over with you and Mr. Rusk his reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire on the test ban treaty.³ He states that he will have a better draft tomorrow morning than the one that was sent to you at Palm Beach.
3. He wishes a decision on what to do with Dean in Geneva. After Vienna, there is evidently little for him to do. The newspapers are beginning to mock the whole exercise. If we leave him there, we are also in the danger of falling into the Soviet trap of merging the test ban talks with the disarmament talks which begin on July 31.
4. He wishes to begin consideration of the effect of the Vienna meetings on what proposals we make for disarmament at the meetings which begin on July 31.

I called Mr. McCloy's attention to the attached cable of June 9 from New York.⁴ Yost believed the USSR has overplayed its hand and is vulnerable to

attack because it had bluntly stated that international controls are impossible without veto prior to “general and complete disarmament.”

I suggested that McCloy consider two fundamental principles in the design of his disarmament proposals: first, that we are prepared to proceed by steps towards general and complete disarmament in which the degree of effective international control would be proportioned to the degree of disarmament actually achieved; second, that we emphasize, as he proposes, that general and complete disarmament does demand effective international rules of law. I emphasized that we might wish to avoid the trap of being like the Russians in merely debating what the end of the road would look like and not proposing principles for moving along that road.

I also suggested that he consider using the problem of guerrilla war and its effective international control as an illustration of why general and complete disarmament requires not merely the destruction of arms, but the substitution for sovereignty of effective and enforceable rules of international behavior.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.

¹ June 13 or 15.

² June 14.

³ See [footnote 2, Document 31](#).

⁴ Telegram 3290 from USUN, not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-961)

36. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, June 13, 1961, noon.

SUBJECT

U.S. Reply to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Acting Secretary Chester Bowles
Mr. John J. McCloy
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher

Mr. McCloy showed the President the June 12 draft of our aide-mémoire dealing with the nuclear test ban negotiations.¹ The President read it, made some specific suggestions as to its content, and said that it was a good paper and should be cleared with the British.

Mr. McCloy then stated his opinion that continuing to keep Mr. Dean at Geneva might result in an erosion of the U.S. position there. He pointed out that continuing a high level delegation, saying the same thing day after day, might result in some ridicule, and expressed his view that Mr. Dean ought to return promptly after the aide-mémoire had been delivered and read by him into the record. The President expressed his general approval of this course of action and indicated that Mr. Dean ought to stay at least a few days after the aide-mémoire had been read into the record before returning.

Mr. McCloy then showed the President the proposed memorandum of June 8, 1961.² The President read it and indicated that he was in general agreement with its contents but stated that he did not think we should now make a statement that we are actually preparing to test, and should be careful that no such statement should get around.

The problem of a ban on atmospheric testing was briefly discussed and the consensus was that Mr. Dean should not remain in Geneva to lay the foundation for this type of action but that it should be done by declarations made from Washington.

Mr. McCloy then advised the President that prompt action within the Administration on the proposed bill was essential. The President indicated his agreement, but after attempting to get in touch with David Bell and Elmer Staats on the telephone, and failing to reach them, said he would take the matter up at another time.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General 7/2/61-7/10/61. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher. The meeting was held at the White House.

¹ Draft not found. For text of the aide-mémoire as delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow on June 17, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 189-195.

² See [footnote 1](#), [Document 34](#).

37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, June 26, 1961.

I talked at length to McCloy on Saturday, and I feel a little less gloomy about the disarmament negotiations.¹ We have never planned to have any detailed proposals for June, and the Soviets acknowledge that. But their propaganda play is that we are stalling in our resistance to detailed discussions now, and they are unwilling to discuss the shape of the forum before they discuss "general views." Stevenson and McCloy believe that this attitude proves that they no longer feel—if they ever did—that anything serious can be accomplished.

McCloy is continuing to make the general arguments which you have heard from him, about the control problem and the Troika and disarmament in supervised stages. He does resist my repeated proposal that he go after the Soviet plan in detail. His argument is that any discussion in detail will bring a demand for counter-proposals and involve us in real trouble with our allies and the Pentagon and everybody else who is awaiting a new agreed position on our side. It is certainly true that we do not have such a position to discuss now, though I myself find the argument unpersuasive.

In the circumstances, McCloy is beginning to feel that we should not go on with the bilaterals very much longer. Obviously, the two sides have quite different views as to what they should be discussing, and we do have a strong position in saying that we never intended to discuss detailed plans in June. We could therefore say that since there is disagreement, we suggest that both sides go back to their governments. We could add that we, for our part, will go on working on a basic plan which will be ready, as we always said, by the end of July. We could add our regret that the Soviet UN seems unwilling to settle with us the forum of resumed discussion, express our readiness to face this question whenever they are ready, and wind up by stating that if no agreement can be reached on this point (which arises because the Soviets walked out of the last agreed forum), we will gladly meet them at the UN in the autumn.

One great advantage of closing out these talks quickly is that they are pre-occupying McCloy at a time when we really should be pressing for serious headway on an agreed disarmament plan. Another reason, I fear, is that the gossip at the second level is that we are not doing a very good job in this particular debate (this kind of gossip should be taken with some reservation, because it often means simply that our spokesman is not saying exactly what the gossip wishes he would). McCloy is our man, and we can't substitute someone else at this point. So the best way may be to let the talks end after a few more days.

One further thought—Foster is a serious administrator, and perhaps his first crash job could be to take the disarmament position and wrestle it into shape. I can press this with McCloy if you want.

McG. B.²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.

¹ These negotiations between McCloy and Zorin Began in Washington on June 19. Eleven sessions were held, the last on the afternoon of June 30. In the course of the talks, which did not result in agreement on an appropriate forum for multinational general disarmament negotiations, the two sides agreed to reconvene in Moscow in mid-July. Documentation on these talks is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 for June 1961. Telegrams Circular 2042, June 17 (ibid., 600.0012/6-1761); Nusup 1275, June 19 (ibid., 600.0012/6-1961); and Nusup 1304, June 30 (ibid., 600.0012/6-3061), all dealing with various aspects of the talks, are in the Supplement.

² Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

38. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, June 30, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

US-USSR Exchange of Views on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Mr. McCloy
D/P—Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R.

Mr. V.A. Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. I.G. Usachev, USSR Foreign Ministry
Mr. R.M. Timerbaev, Soviet Mission to the U.N.
General A.A. Gryzlov, USSR Ministry of Defense

The President opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at meeting Mr. Zorin and his group and said that he understood that Mr. McCloy was going to the USSR.

Mr. Zorin replied that he was very happy to have this opportunity of meeting the President and that he considered this as evidence of the President's interest in disarmament. He said he hoped this meeting would contribute to a fruitful outcome of the talks he had been having with Mr. McCloy.

The President observed that he had sent to Congress draft legislation providing for the establishment of a new disarmament agency so that a more detailed research in this area could be done than we had been able to do heretofore.

Mr. Zorin said that he had had a rather extensive exchange of views with Mr. McCloy. However, frankly speaking, greater progress could have been achieved if a more definite discussion of specific programs had been conducted. He said that sooner or later we would have to deal with such programs.

The President replied that this was correct but said that our primary concern now was to arrange in this exchange of views a practical procedure for further negotiations. He said he was hopeful that a satisfactory conclusion on this matter could be reached so that we could then move to substance. This matter required coordination between many nations, including, on the Soviet side, the Chinese, who would have to be involved in any broad disarmament plan. Of course, our allies were also vitally interested in this problem. The President then expressed the hope that as a result of the talks between Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy, a conclusion could be reached with regard to the next step in negotiations; he also hoped that agreement could be reached on a forum that would be broad enough so that a structure could be established for a useful discussion. The President then said that although so far there had been no total conclusion as to how this could be done, he felt that the present talks had been extremely important.

Mr. Zorin responded by saying that the two sides had not wasted their time and had clarified many points in their respective positions, which, of course, would facilitate negotiations. However, the Soviet Union believed that progress in this matter of disarmament depended primarily on an understanding between the US and USSR on the basic questions of disarmament. In the absence of such agreement it would be hardly possible to have fruitful negotiations in the future. He said that experience had shown that it was difficult to make any progress in disarmament unless there was a rapprochement between the positions of the two principal parties. He expressed the hope that the United States would consider the Soviet position as set forth in the statement of the Soviet Government of June 27,¹ so that agreement could be reached in Moscow and negotiations in a broader forum could take place.

The President said that this matter of disarmament was of great interest to us but that it was a very difficult and complex problem. He recalled the efforts made in the League of Nations before World War II and said that in spite of the fact that conditions in those days had been perhaps easier than those prevailing today, those efforts had had only a limited success. He then said that it was a very complicated matter to find ways of increasing mutual confidence which was so necessary if we wanted to create a situation permitting reductions in armed forces of states. He observed that both the

USSR and the United States were bearing a heavy burden of armaments and expressed the hope that perhaps a way could be found of using all that money for better purposes to the benefit of humanity. The President emphasized that we were very anxious to develop a system with the USSR and with other countries which would permit a lessening of the arms burden and noted that success in this endeavor would depend on further discussions. He stressed his personal interest in this matter and said that the legislation he had referred to earlier reflected the interest of many members of Congress and of our country at large. He expressed the hope that if no progress could be achieved in this matter immediately, perhaps it could be made in future negotiations.

Mr. Zorin replied that he believed that we must avoid the mistakes made in the League of Nations. The League of Nations had attempted to resolve major technical problems without first having resolved the major political problems involved. The major question was whether those participating in disarmament negotiations really wanted disarmament. If our two countries really wanted disarmament, then the Soviet program and any proposals the United States might have could be examined and could serve as a practical basis for future negotiations. The Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin said, was anxious to engage in practical discussions.

The President then expressed his disappointment over the lack of progress in the nuclear test negotiations. He said he had hoped that agreement in that area could set the stage for progress in the general field of disarmament. He felt that the nuclear test issue was rather easy to resolve and that agreement on that problem would have a very favorable effect not only on US-USSR relations but also on the world at large. The President said he believed that the respective positions of the two sides at Geneva were not very far apart and that agreement on a nuclear test ban could also make these discussions more profitable. Furthermore, it would show the world the usefulness of the US and the USSR's discussing these difficult matters. The President reiterated his disappointment but said that he was still hopeful that agreement could be reached at Geneva.

Mr. McCloy noted the difference of views between the two sides on the purpose of the present talks. He said that our interpretation of our mission

differed from Mr. Zorin's interpretation but that in spite of that he felt that this exchange of views had been useful. He expressed the hope that both sides could agree on a proper forum and framework for negotiations and then engage in serious negotiations.

The President again expressed his pleasure at meeting Mr. Zorin and his group and said that he wanted to see all matters standing between the US and the USSR settled; therefore, he felt that any progress in these talks would be useful.

Mr. Zorin said he appreciated very much the President's willingness to devote his time to this meeting and said that he would, of course, inform his government of the wishes expressed by the President. However, he said, success could be achieved only as a result of efforts by both sides and not just one. Therefore, he hoped that Mr. McCloy would receive appropriate instructions so that in Moscow progress could be made on the basis of the views of both sides. As to the question of nuclear test talks, Mr. Zorin said that the only thing he could do was to refer the President to his conversation with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna, where Mr. Khrushchev had clarified the Soviet position on that issue. Mr. Zorin said that the USSR had not lost hope that agreement could be reached in Geneva; however, if this should prove impossible then the only thing we could do would be to merge the test issue with the general disarmament problem. Mr. Zorin then again thanked the President for this meeting and wished the President every success.

The President replied that he felt it would be a mistake to merge the test talks with general disarmament negotiations. While we were on the verge of an agreement in the nuclear test area, disarmament was an extremely complicated problem requiring great efforts on both sides to build such confidence as would permit reduction in armed forces. The President reiterated his hope that failure at Geneva could be prevented. He then said that Mr. McCloy would have appropriate instructions when he went to Moscow. The main question now was to develop a method for future negotiations and this question would be discussed between himself and Mr. McCloy. The President recalled his statement of about three months ago to the effect that the United States would complete its analysis of the various

aspects of the disarmament problem by July and expressed his hope that future talks between Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin would make it possible for us to start serious negotiations in an agreed forum.

After an exchange of amenities the meeting ended at 12:15.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-3061. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House.

¹ For text of this statement submitted during the bilateral talks, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 199-213. Text of a U.S. statement submitted at the outset of the talks is *ibid.*, p. 196.

39. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Dean Acheson [Source](#)

Washington, July 1, 1961, 10:46 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ACHESON

The Sec returned the call and A said he had a visit from McCloy and Dean who were disturbed. They wondered whether there is a master-mind running affairs of the US and whether it is thought out re their mission to Moscow if it is the right thing to be doing when the other program is in mind which they discussed the day before yesterday.¹ How does it appear to people with whom we are talking there? Our friends? Our country? Are we going up and down at the same time. The Sec asked when they talked. A said till 6:30 or later. The Sec said he came in and made a flat statement he could not run out on this deal. The Sec called the Pres and told him that rather than have the Soviets in a position to say we ran out on this Jack and he felt he should go over and come back after 3-4 days. A said he² is concerned about what he should be doing. The Sec said he wants to go down a track we don't want him to—he has been thinking he has to debate on some substantive issues on disarmament. The Sec will get hold of him because if he has misgivings he did not express them. A said he³ spent the afternoon with Zorin and talked with A until 7—then they went off and asked A to call the Sec which he thought they might have done. The Sec said if they have thoughts like these they should have expressed them before announcing they had to go to Moscow. The Sec will get Jack. A said Jack is salmon-fishing for two days with McNamara and Lemnitzer. The Sec said we talked about these problems but he was so flat on making good on this deal we went ahead. A thinks it can wait until they get back. The Sec said maybe we want to shift the Moscow date to a brief quadripartite mtg on the Forum—it was a quadripartite meeting which set up the Comm of 10. A thinks if the Sec turns it over in his mind until the 5th of July that will be plenty of time. They don't go until the 14th. A said they asked if it were discussed with him by the Sec or others and A said no—no reason that it should be. They wondered if it had been thought about fully. The Sec said it

was thought about in connection with Berlin. They asked M to talk with Zorin—this is foolish when Berlin is as it is. But the Sec is not sure M did. The Sec is surprised he did not mention to A that he did talk about it with the Sec.

* Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau, Rusk's Personal Assistant.

¹ Not further identified.

² Acheson is referring to Jack McCloy.

³ i.e., McCloy.

40. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) [Source](#)

Washington, July 13, 1961.

I enclose a copy of a CIA analysis of the increase in the Soviet military budget. It shows that there may be more sound than fury in Khrushchev's announcement, but the figure of a 35% increase to be used over the next six months nevertheless makes a strong talking point on our side.^{[1](#)}

The Department of Defense currently estimates that additional military expenditures attributable to this Administration will total about 700 million dollars in FY '61, and about 700 million dollars in FY '62. This makes an increase of about 1-3/4% in a total expenditure of about \$43-44 billion dollars in each year. Even if we should now respond to Khrushchev's challenge by a substantial additional request for funds, the figures would not be comparable in percentage to what he himself has indicated.

The bald language of Khrushchev's reference to military budgeting is as follows:

"In these conditions is it right for us to continue the unilateral reduction of our Armed Forces? Taking into account the existing situation, the Soviet Government has been compelled to issue a temporary directive to the Ministry of Defense, pending a special order, instructing it to suspend the reduction in the Armed Forces planned for 1961. In connection with the increase in NATO member states' military budgets the Soviet Government has decided to increase defense allocations for the current year 3,144,000,000 rubles, which raises total military expenditure in 1961 to 12,399,000,000 rubles."

McGeorge Bundy^{[2](#)}

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Secret.

¹ The attachment has not been found. In a brief memorandum to Bundy dated July 10, Kennedy wrote in part: “What about the disarmament talks of McCloy, should we break them off using the recent Soviet increases as our argument and ask that the matter be taken to the UN? Stevenson thinks that the UN emphasis on disarmament is most important.” (Ibid., ACDA, Disarmament General, 7/2/61-7/10/61)

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

41. Editorial Note

On July 17, 1961, the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament reconvened at the Spiridovka House in Moscow with McCloy and Zorin continuing to represent their countries. Documentation on these talks, including memoranda of seven sessions held through July 29, is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 for July 1961.

In telegram 205 from Moscow, July 20, McCloy reported that on the basis of meetings held so far he saw “little prospect” of reaching agreement on a set of principles to guide general disarmament negotiations or on a suitable forum for such negotiations. While he believed the United States had built a “reasonable record” on a number of contended points, he considered that there was “little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles,” and wanted to suggest to Zorin winding up the meetings on July 26 or 27 and convening a meeting of the full Disarmament Commission in September. (Ibid., 600.0012/7-2061)

In telegram 231 to Moscow, July 22, the Department gave tentative assent to the tactic of convening a meeting of the full U.N. Disarmament Commission but cautioned McCloy against any abrupt breakoff of the current talks and suggested July 28 as a better date for concluding them. (Ibid.) On July 29, the United States submitted a memorandum that proposed four alternatives for the composition of a disarmament forum, one of which was the U.N. Disarmament Commission. For text, see *Documents on Disarmaments, 1961*, pages 271-273.

42. Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing [Source](#)

Washington, July 21, 1961.

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the President, the Panel has considered the technical questions involved in a decision by the U.S. on the resumption of testing. The Panel's report is divided into two sections: (1) Present and future unilateral U.S. test detection capabilities and (2) Present and future U.S. and Soviet nuclear warhead capabilities. The status of intelligence of Soviet testing during the moratorium is considered in a separate supplement.

The Panel's task was facilitated by the recent report of the Fisk Panel to Mr. McCloy (2 March 1961),¹ which covered these problems in the context of a possible test ban treaty. After reviewing such new information as had become available since the publication of the Fisk Report, the Panel found that it was able to endorse the relevant portions of the Fisk Report essentially without exception.

In submitting this report, the Panel hopes that it will clarify the technical issues involved in a decision on the resumption of testing. The Panel wishes to emphasize, however, that while these technical issues have an important bearing on this decision, the final decision on whether or not to resume testing also involves very important non-technical or military issues which have not been included in the Panel's considerations.

The Panel also wishes to express its concern over certain statements which have appeared in the press on the subject of resumption of testing. While some of these statements have been technically highly misleading, they have still given a great deal of information on U.S. programs to the USSR. At the same time, the Panel believes that these statements have seriously detracted from the political gains which have resulted from our constructive position in the Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.

SUMMARY

We do not know whether or not the USSR has conducted any clandestine tests since November 1958. While some suspicious activity which might be connected with testing has been noted, this activity is equally compatible with other technical activities not involving nuclear tests. The USSR could have conducted underground nuclear tests without providing any intelligence information.

Despite future improvements in our unilateral detection capability, the USSR could still carry out a limited number of clandestine underground tests in the kiloton range which would very likely escape detection. The USSR could also carry out larger explosions, even up to yields in the megaton class, at an increasing penalty in time, cost and test effectiveness, and at increasing risk of detection. The greater the level of Soviet clandestine activity, the greater the possibility would be that it would be discovered through conventional intelligence, including [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Improvements in the yield to weight ratios of strategic warheads that may be achieved through weapons tests would give added flexibility to the designs of U.S. strategic systems, in particular with regard to reduced vulnerability and increased mobility. Proof tests would also remove possible doubts concerning the reliability of certain warheads. The significance of these developments is in part dependent on whether future U.S. strategy will emphasize deterrence or counterforce capability. At the same time, the status of Soviet weapons technology is probably such as to create a strong incentive for Soviet weapons tests, especially if the USSR desires smaller, more mobile strategic weapon systems to compensate for the anticipated loss of security of their present missile force when [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] becomes operational.

The principal areas of weapon improvements in the tactical weapons field involve: a) economy in the use of fissionable materials; b) reduction in diameter to permit interchangeability with conventional ammunition; and c) enhancement of neutron radiation effects. However, it is difficult to evaluate the potential value of nuclear warhead improvements to either the U.S. or the USSR since there is no established doctrine on the use of tactical weapons.

Enhanced neutron radiation weapons which would be relatively more effective against personnel under certain circumstances may have significance in tactical warfare. A prototype [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] which would produce some enhancement in neutron radiation at a cost comparable to a conventional fission weapon, is available for test. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] If such devices can be developed in a militarily useful configuration, the most optimistic estimate for earliest availability of a first device for stockpile is 1965. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] The date for operational availability would, therefore, not be appreciably affected by deferment of test resumption by a year or two. The significance of these developments is strongly dependent on the extent to which future U.S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare.

The present U.S. Nike-Zeus AICBM system is not limited by nuclear warhead performance or lack of knowledge on nuclear kill mechanisms but rather by the highly unfavorable exchange ratio of the cost of Nike-Zeus vs. increased number of enemy ICBM's, especially if the enemy employs decoys. The known vulnerabilities of U.S. ICBM warheads to potential Soviet AICBM defense can be reduced without additional effects tests; however, nuclear tests to search for overlooked sources of vulnerability may become advisable in the future. Increasing the yield to weight ratios of missile warheads is one method of improving the ability of our ICBM's to penetrate potential Soviet AICBM defenses by providing additional payload to incorporate measures to reduce warhead vulnerability or to carry penetration aids such as decoys.

One of the most important considerations in further technical developments is the possibility of surprises. In general, as far as yield to weight improvements is concerned, surprises are very unlikely in the strategic warheads beyond predicted developments. There could, however, be overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons, where the room for invention is large, the possibility of important surprises is correspondingly great.

The range of weapon development tests which can be undertaken would not be seriously impaired if only underground tests were permitted.

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the restriction to underground tests would make some tests more difficult and costly. In addition, some weapons effects tests at high altitude of interest to (but on the basis of present knowledge not critical to) the AICBM problem could not be carried out if testing is only permitted underground.

In the absence of tests by either the U.S. or USSR, the U.S. would retain a degree of technological superiority in nuclear weapons for some time. If the U.S. continues to refrain from testing and the USSR engages in clandestine underground testing, the USSR could gain technological superiority in nuclear weapons to the extent discussed in the body of this report in as little as three to four years of extensive testing. If both the U.S. and USSR resume testing, the two countries will probably both approach the same general level of warhead technology in areas of interest in the relatively near future.

Although the limitations on our weapons progress imposed by lack of nuclear tests can to a considerable extent be compensated by efforts in other fields, such a self-imposed limitation would, in the long run, impair the rate of U.S. military progress. However, none of the specific weapons tests now discussed appear to be of such urgency from the technical and military point of view that a reasonable delay in reaching a formal decision on the resumption of nuclear testing would be critical. Therefore, any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.

[Here follows the remainder of the 34-page Report.]

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 28 letter from Wiesner to McNamara, which states that the Panel made a preliminary report on its findings to the President on July 21, and requested comments by August 4. The panel was known as the Panofsky Panel after its Chairman, Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky. Other members were William A. Baker, Hans A. Bethe, Norris E. Bradbury, James B. Fisk, John S. Foster, Jr., George B. Kistiakowsky, Frank Press, Louis H.

Roddis, John W. Tukey, and Walter H. Zinn. Keeny served as Technical Assistant.

¹ See [Document 4](#).

43. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) [Source](#)

Washington, July 27, 1961.

DEAR JACK: Reference is made to your letter of June 2, 1961¹ which requested that the Department of Defense make a study of the relative military consequences to the U. S. and the USSR of cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and to our reply of June 10 which indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were undertaking this study.

Enclosed for your consideration and that of the Committee of Principals is a memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: "Net Military Consequences of a Cessation of Production of Fissionable Material (U)", to which is appended the evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² I am in general agreement with the views of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed therein.

As emphasized in General Lemnitzer's memorandum, there are certain principles which must be adhered to in negotiations on this subject in order to protect the security interests of the United States. These include a concurrent nuclear test ban, adequately enforced.

Of particular importance is the close relationship between the cessation of production measure and other arms control measures. I agree with the Chairman's recommendation that, because of this relationship, the enclosed study should be considered in conjunction with a report being prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which addresses the military impact on the United States of reducing its military forces to 1.8 million men. This report should be completed in a few days, and I expect to be able to forward it to you in the very near future.

It is noted from the enclosure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that "nuclear weapons and force levels are so closely related that they cannot be considered in isolation under any condition short of total and universal disarmament." In view of their firm opinion on this relationship, I believe

that the Committee of Principals should await completion of the study on force reductions, before considering the resolution of whether or not the nuclear measures in the first stage of the U.S. draft negotiating paper should be linked to prior accomplishment of force reductions to 2.1 million men for the U.S. and the USSR.

Sincerely,

Bob³

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Bundy.

¹ In this letter, McCloy asked that an evaluation of the net military consequence of a nuclear production cutoff be undertaken, as suggested by the Perkins Panel (see [Document 11](#)). (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61)

² Both dated July 21. (Ibid.)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

44. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

323. McCloy met with Khrushchev at latter's dacha in Putsunda, south of Sochi, July 26 and morning 27th. Most of conversation centered on Berlin although McCloy repeatedly emphasized he not in position discuss officially any subject except disarmament and could express views on Berlin only as private citizen. Khrushchev generally in good humor, displaying fits of temper only when he referred to what he called US threat of war over German peace treaty and to President's speech.¹ Fol highlights discussion both days. Memcon will follow as soon as available.²

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Germany, and Laos; for text, see [volume XIV, pages 231-234](#).]

4. Disarmament (July 26 and 27). McCloy stressed strongly his personal and United States desire get to practical disarmament. Described background his appointment as President's Adviser on Disarmament and recalled his efforts develop such US position on test ban as would be acceptable to Soviets and his deep disappointment when negotiations assumed negative form primarily as result introduction troika proposal. Stated as result Geneva deadlock possibility resumption tests being discussed in US. No widespread enthusiasm for resumption discernible although present situation unverified moratorium and possible courses of action being seriously studied. Stressed if one side testing clandestinely and the other is not, point would be reached where national security involved; therefore wondered what could be done this area so that efforts made in Geneva would not be completely lost. Mentioned possibility ban atmospheric and under-water tests with extension ban when means of detecting tests underground and outer space improved. Emphasized significance reaching test ban agreement as first step toward agreement in broader disarmament areas. Said he searching for way to assure both sides no clandestine testing going on now. Referred to pressure exerted by some

quarters on President to resume testing and said he assumed Khrushchev under similar pressure. Rejected Sov contention French testing for US and we assisting them. Wondered whether present Sov reluctance have test ban perhaps due Chinese pressure. Re general disarmament expressed concern how reality could be introduced in disarmament in light present Berlin situation. Congress asking questions why money should be appropriated for proposed new disarmament agency when President asking money for armaments. (Khrushchev interjected this logical question.) However, perhaps we should continue our efforts until sun shines again and attempt work out program for relieving ourselves of armaments and for bringing better life to world. Noted value contacts between two sides in spite fact some of our friends nervous about them and expressed belief contacts on this most important question should be left open. Re controls, emphasized strongly unacceptability troika and explained requirement verification levels remaining after reduction. Pointed out necessity arrangements impartial arbitrament disputes and some restriction sovereignty if horrors of war to be avoided and total disarmament achieved. Recalled US/USSR differences re purpose bilateral talks but stated discussions nevertheless useful.

Re tests, Khrushchev asserted Sovs not testing clandestinely and assured McCloy would not do it in future either. Said strong pressure on him to resume tests because many inventions and discoveries had accumulated and designers want test them This pressure now stronger in view Berlin situation and threat of war if peace treaty signed. Said he had been successful in resisting pressure so far but if US intensified its threats of war over peace treaty it would assist those in Soviet Union who want resumption. Stated Sov scientists believed 100 megaton bomb would be most economical cost-wise. Sovs have rocket capable of lifting such bomb. However, such bomb would require testing. Asserted he had told his scientists perhaps US would resume testing and thus help them test their bomb. Conceded no agreement in Geneva in sight since US would not agree to troika and Sovs could not abandon it. Reiterated Sov arguments re espionage and lessons of Congo events, as well as Sov position test ban would not resolve disarmament problem. Likewise, recited standard Sov line on French testing. Contended present Sov position test ban not due Chinese pressure and claimed no pressure on part anybody possible in

socialist camp. Stated Chinese would of course eventually develop nuclear bomb but claimed ignorance when that would be.

Stated under general and complete disarmament troika would be dropped and would not be acceptable even if US should propose it. No troika would exist even in course process of GCD and control and inspection would not be subject to veto or any restriction. Comprehensive control must correspond to staged disarmament program because establishment control prior actual disarmament would mean control without disarmament; i.e., intelligence. After completion GCD process unrestricted and vetoless control established earlier would be permanently institutionalized. Sovs completely flexible as to what measures disarmament program should be started with; US should take its choice and Sovs would agree. Referred to elimination of means of delivery as possible first stage measure, although said perhaps it would be well start with conventional armaments so that both sides could retain rockets as deterrent. Also listed as possible first stage measures elimination foreign bases and complete withdrawal of foreign troops; gradual withdrawal of troops by stages with inspection to reduce danger of surprise attack; atom free zone along lines Rapacki Plan; establishment of observers at strategic points (major railroad stations, highway junctions, airfields and ports, but not launching sites because this would be possible only if rockets destroyed); non-aggression pact; and dissolution all military pacts. Stressed Sovs regard rockets and nuclear weapons their main weapon and expressed belief air force receding in history. Recent Sov air show may have been swan song of air force. Said President's intention increase orders military aircraft would result merely in good business for aircraft manufacturers. Asserted military bases have lost value with advent missiles.³

Thompson

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ Reference is to the President's speech on Berlin delivered the evening of July 25. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 535-540.

² This 25-page memorandum, dated July 31, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/11/61-7/31/61.

³ In telegram 304 from Moscow, July 27, the Embassy reported that at the end of his conversation with McCloy, Khrushchev stated that he had seen the text of a Soviet draft of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on “Basic Principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament” and that it reflected his views. Telegram 304 transmitted a translation of this draft, which Zorin handed to McCloy on his return flight to Moscow.

(Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2761) A slightly different translation, dated July 28, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 267-269.

45. Editorial Note

In telegram 305 from Moscow, July 28, 1961, the Embassy reported that the new Soviet draft statement of principles (see [footnote 3, Document 44](#)) “substantially improves Sov position and undercuts our argument that Sovs have blocked way to multilateral negotiations by refusal to discuss principles.” The Embassy suggested three alternatives: submit a minimum number of amendments, which, if accepted, would make the draft a basis on which the United States would be prepared to resume multilateral negotiations; propose a recess, with resumption of negotiations in New York in a week to 10 days; or recapitulate major differences without offering amendments and propose moving directly to multilateral negotiations. The Embassy recommended the first alternative: “Consider it unlikely this would lead to agreement but likely to lead to alternative [three] on most favorable basis.” Telegram 308 from Moscow, July 28, reported McCloy’s agreement with this tactic. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861)

Telegram 295 to Moscow, July 28, marked “For McCloy from the Secretary,” replied that Rusk had personally considered the three alternatives and chosen the first on several grounds: there was urgent need for McCloy to report to the President on his talks with Khrushchev; since further efforts to reach an agreement on principles were likely to be unsuccessful, it would be unfortunate to terminate them in McCloy’s absence; a break in the negotiations would make possible full allied consultations on the matter; and discussions in New York, “looking toward followup action in the United Nations,” would be preferable to further open-ended talks in Moscow. Rusk’s “present thinking was that in the absence of agreement on forum and principles we should move to substantive discussion of our specific plan in the UNDC around August 29.” (Ibid.) In telegram 333 from Moscow, July 29, the Embassy reported that McCloy had informed Zorin of the U.S. request for a recess. (Ibid., 600.0012/7-2961) All these documents are in the Supplement.

46. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, July 28, 1961.

Memorandum of decision, July 27, 1961, test ban scenario

1. The Panofsky Panel Report¹ will receive comment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before August 4.² This Report, with JCS comment, will be presented to the National Security Council on August 8.³ The President will review the advice of these bodies and if he does not change his present intention, he will then consult with Ambassador Dean and announce that in view of the Panel Report he is sending Mr. Dean back to Geneva for one last try. Before the President's announcement,⁴ but late enough to prevent leakage, selected members of the Panel (Panofsky, Bradbury, and Foster, preferably) will brief the JCAE.
2. Mr. Dean will return to Geneva about August 20; his main task will be to make one last effort to obtain Soviet agreement to the draft treaty as tabled. He will remain about a week, and if no progress is made he will return about August 28. The President will then announce that in the light of Soviet folly he now has concluded that no workable treaty is possible, and he may add that in view of the seriousness of the situation he proposes to put the matter, himself, before the United Nations. He will reserve further comment until that time.
3. Early in the General Assembly Session, the President will make a major speech largely or wholly devoted to disarmament. He hopes to have a strong and imaginative general proposal to make, but he will also want to refer to the test ban (unless it still seems essential at this later date to keep the two subjects separate). At this stage, he may put forward the Thompson proposal.
4. The President may, at some appropriate point, reach a decision to authorize stand-by preparations for tests of nuclear weapons, such tests to begin not earlier than 1962. Such authorization will be as quiet as possible, and in the event of leaks it will promptly be made clear in backgrounding that these are stand-by preparations only.

5. Appropriate parts of this plan will be communicated by Mr. Dean to the JCAE, by Mr. Schlesinger to Ormsby-Gore, and by the President to Macmillan (Bundy to draft a letter).⁵
6. Meanwhile, Mr. Dean will produce an imaginative disarmament plan, Mr. Schlesinger an eloquent white paper, and Senator Humphrey a statute for the new disarmament agency.

McG. B.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: "DR saw Sat" (July 29). A covering note from Lucius Battle to Secretary Rusk reads in part: "Mac Bundy called me today and stated that he was sending to me the attached memorandum of decision which grew out of conversations between the President and Mr. Arthur Dean. He said that you probably should have been present but that if you had any objection to the attached understanding it was not too late to make changes and that you should speak to the President." Another copy of this memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 4/61-8/61.

¹ [Document 42](#).

² [Document 48](#).

³ See [Document 53](#).

⁴ For text of the President's announcement of August 10, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 274-276. The President stated that Dean would return to Geneva on August 24.

⁵ [Document 50](#).

47. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) [Source](#)

Washington, July 28, 1961.

DEAR MR. MCCLOY: I recommend the Committee of Principals propose to the President that the United States initiate preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing.

The Department of Defense supports the recent series of U.S. actions to explore all reasonable means of reaching an acceptable agreement in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and is in accord with continuing the negotiations. It now seems evident, however, that the Soviet Union is not interested in a treaty to discontinue nuclear weapons tests except on terms unacceptable to the U.S. This was made clear in the Soviet aide-mémoire of 4 June¹ and subsequently by the Delegate in the Conference. It therefore is timely to consider making a judgment on the resumption of testing, as the President indicated in his public statement of June 8.

In developing a recommendation, three sets of considerations must be examined:

- A. The payoffs which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may expect from testing.
- B. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. comparative positions before and after U.S. resumption of tests.
- C. *The political implications of resumption of testing.*

A. The payoffs which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may expect from testing.

The following objectives of nuclear weapons testing are considered to be most critical for the U.S.:

1.

Pure fusion weapons.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pure fusion weapons, which would be particularly applicable to limited warfare, but which with further development would have general application to the whole spectrum of offensive and defensive warfare. [*13 lines of source text not declassified*]

2.

Weight-yield ratio.

Testing would result in a spectrum of reduced size and weight weapons, without undue sacrifice of yield, for particular application to strategic missile systems with improved survivability. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] They offer the prospect of low cost lightweight strategic missile warheads for delivery by mobile systems (land, sea, and air) and for cluster warheads to improve penetrability, thereby plugging possible soft spots in second strike systems and improving our deterrent posture. In turn this could improve the capability to limit and control nuclear conflict. This field of development has been one of the most rapidly changing areas of weaponry.

3.

Weapons effects.

Tests would result in gaining more information on weapons effects, especially to determine the lethal ranges and characteristics of kill mechanisms to be used against ballistic missiles. Knowledge of this kind can be of critical importance both for examining possibilities for defense against ballistic missile attack and for developing penetration capabilities for use should the Soviets deploy an AICBM system. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] important to determine the kill mechanism for AICBM's and in deciding how our ballistic missile attacks must be planned including the nature of the re-entry vehicle, degree of saturation and the necessary separation between warheads. Other important objectives of effects tests are: The vulnerability of our own warheads and carriers to nuclear bursts; the effects of nuclear bursts on electronic equipment and radio and radar propagation; the acquisition of design data

for hardening underground and other structures; and the kill radii and safe delivery ranges of our weapons.

4.

Proof testing.

To assure that new weapons entering stockpiles to meet critical needs will function properly. Testing by functional tests underground at fractional yields will provide assurance that weapons not tested as finally designed will function properly, e.g., warheads for Polaris, Minuteman and Skybolt. Presently planned warheads have all been certified by the Atomic Energy Commission as having the same assurance of functioning as those which have been tested; further developments in the absence of testing could result in loss of confidence in the stockpile.

B. The comparative U.S.-U.S.S.R. positions before and after U.S. resumption of tests.

The situations before and after U.S. resumption of tests are difficult to compare because the U.S. does not know whether the U.S.S.R. is or is not now testing. Three situations, therefore, must be examined:

1.

The proposed situation.

It is assumed that if the U.S. resumes tests the U.S.S.R. will also test. With both sides testing, there is no reason to expect U.S. weapons development to proceed on terms which are worse than even. Because of the asymmetry of the strategic positions of the two countries, it is likely that the advances made will be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R.

2.

One view of the present situation: Neither side tests.

If neither side tests, weapons development in both countries will be hampered. The Soviets would be denied some developments useful to them (e.g., smaller high-yield warheads which could make a more mobile deterrent force, to the extent that they are interested in deterrence). The U.S. would be denied the developments listed in A above, which the DOD considers to be of great importance to U.S. strategic and tactical capabilities. Moreover, because of the differences in conditions of secrecy prevailing in the two nations, the Soviets would over time have an advantage in acquiring U.S. secrets. And, since the line between "laboratory experiments" and "testing" is not a clear one, the Soviets are less likely to refrain from significant "experiments" which the U.S. might call "tests". These factors could lead to weapons advantages for the Soviets.

3.

A second view of the present situation: The Soviets test clandestinely while the U.S. abstains.

If the U.S. refrains from testing while the Soviets conduct clandestine tests underground and in space, the U.S.S.R. will make significant advances not available to the U.S. in the critical areas of weapons development mentioned in Part A above. The results of Soviet tests could be important and varied. If the U.S.S.R. achieved a major breakthrough, especially on the area of AICBM (where there have been indications of Soviet interest and activity), the U.S. might have its deterrent missile force emasculated with little warning. Similarly, a composite of developments of the kind which the Soviets might be reasonably expected to achieve through a program of clandestine testing could, in the absence of parallel development by the U.S., degrade or possibly even negate U.S. strategic capability based on present weapons technology. Further, a major even though not decisive advance by the U.S.S.R. could be a strong political asset and could give them a formidable advantage at the conference table. It may be argued that advances which the Soviets could make clandestinely in a few months or a year cannot unbalance the strategic situation. However, this question should be considered in the light of the almost three years during which the Soviets have been able to test clandestinely if they wished. In three years, one or even two new

generations of weapons development have occurred in the past. In any event, this situation—in which the U.S.S.R. tests while the U.S. abstains—has grave implications for U.S. national security and for the security of our allies.

C. The political implications of resumption of testing.

The political issues involved in a decision to resume testing, while not the province of Defense, are clearly serious. The following political considerations deserve special mention:

1. The adverse reaction of some nations may be expected and must be evaluated and taken into account.
2. The resumption of tests will probably not have a significant effect on the Nth-country problem. At this time it appears that even the unlikely situation of the successful conclusion by the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. of a test ban agreement will not lead to the adherence of France and Communist China, unless these countries have previously achieved a nuclear weapons capability satisfactory to them. How many other countries would adhere that are otherwise likely to develop nuclear weapons is uncertain, but the number is probably small. On the other hand, in the absence of a treaty, it is doubtful that resumption of testing by the U.S. would cause proliferation of testing, especially if the U.S. maintains a consistent policy of discouraging diffusion.
3. Continuation of a voluntary and uncontrolled moratorium on tests puts the U.S. in a weak position to press for adequate controls in the disarmament negotiations and in connection with other arms control measures; it sets a bad precedent.
4. If there is any remaining chance of obtaining a satisfactory test ban agreement, resuming tests is more likely to help than hinder the chance. A continuing uncontrolled moratorium removes any incentive for the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty or to negotiate seriously on an acceptable control system.
5. Most important—especially in view of the impending Berlin crisis—is the role played by resumption of tests as a demonstration of U.S. resoluteness. The U.S. has stated that it would not continue indefinitely

under an uncontrolled moratorium. This is an appropriate time to demonstrate that the U.S. means what it says.

D. Conclusions.

If the U.S. could be sure that the U.S.S.R. were not testing (and if all political considerations were set aside), the justification for resumption of testing would be weaker. However, the crucial fact is that the U.S. does not know whether or not the U.S.S.R. is testing. The U.S. does know:

- that the motive to test exists (it may be assumed that the possibilities for advancements along some or all of the lines mentioned in Part A above are open to and known to the U.S.S.R.);
- that there have been unexplained activities which could be indicative of testing at Soviet sites suitable for underground testing, and that there has been a continuing association between weapons development laboratories and Soviet organizations known to have been associated with testing programs prior to the moratorium;
- that underground tests could have been performed in the U.S.S.R. with next to no risk of detection; and
- that the Soviets have consistently rejected proposals for arrangements which would give reasonable assurance that they are not testing.

The first judgment therefore is that the U.S.S.R. may now be testing or may be planning to test clandestinely. The second is that the chances are substantial that such one-sided testing will lead to grave consequences for the security of the U.S. and her allies. And the third is that the risks involved in the resumption of tests are less than the risks involved in continuation of the unpoliced moratorium.

After consideration of all aspects of the problem, including the political factors, I recommend that the U.S. complete preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing, and collaterally prepare for a Vela program of underground shots for seismic research. The latter are essential if we ever are to achieve an improved underground detection and identification system, either national or international.

Assuming that the decision is made to resume testing, the timing of announcements, and of the actual shot schedule, will be significant. The AEC and Defense have developed a proposed program of tests, based on priority of need for the data and taking into account practical readiness dates for various shots. This is attached² and discussed in more detail in Par. E-4.

E. Recommended sequence of events.

This proposed sequence consists briefly of the following steps:

1. An early announcement that preparations for nuclear tests will start at once, but that the decision to conduct tests will depend on the results of test ban negotiations over the next five or six months.
2. Physical preparations for underground tests at the Nevada Test Site and continuation of test ban negotiations.
3. If treaty negotiations are unsuccessful, announcement that tests are being resumed.
4. Early resumption of underground tests.

Each of these steps is discussed more fully below.

1.

Announcement that preparations for tests have been ordered.

There should be an announcement, on, or shortly after, August 1, that the President has instructed the AEC and Defense to get nuclear test sites in readiness, as a decision to conduct underground tests may be required for reasons of national security.

The ground work for this announcement was laid in the U.S. reply (released June 17) to the Soviet aide-mémoire.

It is recognized that any announcement of preparations for resumption of testing should be accompanied by a continued intensive program by State and USIA to gain U.S. and world support. The announcement explaining

U.S. preparations may well be short and to the point, along the following lines:

“The U.S. has done everything in its power to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear testing with adequate safeguards. The U.S.S.R. does not want a test-ban treaty and has not negotiated in good faith. They consistently reject proposals for arrangements which would give reasonable assurance they are not testing, and they may be testing. If the U.S. resumes testing, it will be because the irreducible minimum security needs of the free world require it. The AEC and the DOD have been instructed to make preparations for nuclear weapons tests as soon as possible. The first important tests cannot be conducted for five or six months, and the U.S. does not want to test except as national and free world security dictates. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to negotiate in Geneva towards reaching agreement on a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. Should a satisfactory agreement be reached, preparations for testing will be discontinued. The U.S. is preparing sites for underground tests involving no fall-out hazard. The decision whether testing will actually be conducted will depend on events in the next few months.”

The preparations to test should be announced publicly rather than kept secret for two reasons:

- a. It is consistent with past policy of disclosure (and the news could probably not be suppressed anyway).
- b. Such an announcement may be consistent with other steps being taken in connection with the impending Berlin crisis.

The separation of the decision to make preparations to test and the decision to test correctly implies that the latter decision is genuinely left open. The decision to test will depend on conditions at the later time.

2.

Preparation for tests.

Detailed preparations for a schedule of tests along the lines of the attached program would of course immediately follow the announcement. The

program by State and USIA to gain world-wide public support should be continued and intensified during the interval between announcement of preparations and resumption of testing.

The six months preparation period will cost the AEC about \$25 to \$30 million and the Defense Atomic Support Agency about \$6 million, while the whole two-year series of tests, including preparation, would cost the AEC about \$315 million and the DOD about \$150 million, not including the cost of nuclear material in the various devices. More than half of the DOD's \$150 million estimate represents the cost of high altitude and space tests, including the necessary boosters and instrumentation.

The first two weapons effects tests (Nos. 4 and 15 in the attached table) which are the responsibility of the DOD, have been studied in considerable detail. The Hard Hat shot (No. 4) will give engineering data on the design of hardened underground structures, on which we are now spending hundreds of millions of dollars without sufficient knowledge to insure that the engineering designs are adequate, and provide seismic data to replace one of the scheduled Vela shots. About \$2 million has already been spent on Hard Hat in constructing a series of tunnels in hard rock, lined with different types of materials to be subjected to very high blast forces. Instrument and cable placement can begin about August 1st and will require several months' time and an additional \$1 million. The data could be obtained by exploding 1,250,000 pounds of NE, but this would cost an additional \$1 million and would not satisfy the Vela requirements.

The second effects shot (No. 15) must be nuclear, as it will give simulated data on X-ray and other nuclear kill mechanisms against ICBM warheads above the atmosphere, provide data on the kill radius of Nike Zeus, and test the response of nose cone and other materials to nuclear bursts. Many of the questions about ICBM effectiveness and vulnerability should be answered or greatly simplified by this and the preceding effects test. The tunnel and shaft are already constructed. An 800 ft. steel vacuum pipe should be ordered immediately, followed by design, construction and placement of the pipe, targets and instruments. An additional \$5 million will be required.

No detailed estimates of the necessary preparations have been made by the AEC for their development shots, pending a decision to prepare for nuclear testing, but a total of about \$25 to \$30 million will be required during a six months preparation period. This would cover the digging of additional shafts and tunnels, the installation of cable, diagnostic firing and timing equipment and other preparations of a detailed nature that are now under study.

3.

Announcement that tests are being resumed.

Assuming that conditions have not materially changed, there should be an announcement shortly before the first test is to be made, of the resumption of tests. It should be explained that the tests contemplated in the first series are underground and involve no fall-out hazard.

The announcement would be similar to the one made when preparations were begun. This time, however, it should conclude in the following vein: "... Time has run out. We said we could not abide an uncontrolled moratorium. And we will not. Underground tests will be resumed_____."

4.

Resumption of tests.

The first of the series of tests should be made very soon after the announcement, and a demonstrably significant series of tests should be carried out. The attached tables show such a proposed series of 44 development, effects and proof tests prepared by DASA in cooperation with the Division of Military Application of the AEC, and representing the best current judgment of what could and should be done over a period of about two years following a six month period of preparation. Certain changes may have to be made as the results of preceding tests become available. In addition, 10 underground safety, or "one point detonation" tests, are proposed which would produce little or no nuclear yield, and could therefore be carried out concurrently with the others, as convenient.

The first six months of actual testing would be carried out underground, with essentially no contamination of the surface or the atmosphere. Beyond that period, 10 tests (marked with an asterisk in the table) might be made in and above the atmosphere, on the surface of land or water and underwater, but designed to produce a minimum of radioactive contamination. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] These 10 shots are considered of lower priority than the others, and would be omitted if political considerations so dictate, but have been inserted in the list in logical time sequence. The last 6 shots would be either at very high altitude or in outer space. They are most important [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] and also to obtain information on radar and radio black-out caused by nuclear bursts at very high altitudes. The only two high yield shots of this nature, fired in the last test series, demonstrated the need for much additional information about these important and potentially serious phenomena. They have been scheduled last only because of the extensive preparations required for testing at very high altitudes or in outer space.

There is also attached the present schedule of Vela underground shots. The proposed weapons tests would delay the conclusion of the Vela Uniform program by 6 months to a year, and increase its cost by possibly \$4 million. However, a considerable amount of seismic data could be obtained from the weapons shots. The DASA Hard Hat shot could eliminate the need for the Vela Lollipop event. In fact it is possible that during such a series of tests electromagnetic or other phenomena may be found that would prove superior to seismic effects as a means of detecting underground nuclear explosions. Alternative schedules involving a mixture of the two programs can also be carried out.

[*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] No specific test [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is listed because it could not be built until more data are available, but it would be tested as soon as possible.

Three other tests in this first six months series of 15 shots would be devoted to securing a higher yield-to-weight ratio in weapons producing [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] KT. The remaining seven shots would verify performance and prove the yield of new weapons going into

stockpile where there is some doubt about the final design or where the yield is particularly important for small tactical weapons such as Davy Crockett and the air delivered missiles, Falcon, Terrier and Bullpup, where safe firing distances must be determined.

The remaining tests in the list would continue with advanced development and proof tests in about the same ratio as during the first six months, to answer questions that have arisen so far. Obviously other questions will become critical as the tests proceed.

While it is not contemplated that any tests in the first six months period would be in the atmosphere or underwater, the U.S. should not commit itself in any public statements to refrain indefinitely from testing in any environment. We should retain freedom of action, should the Soviet Union test in those environments, or should the military value of such tests later be determined to outweigh the possible adverse political effects of producing a small amount of local radioactive contamination.

The United States should continue to reaffirm the U.S. desire for an effective test ban treaty and should endeavor to keep negotiations going in Geneva.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of State, Chairman, AEC, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Director, CIA, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director, USIA, and Chairman, JCS.

Sincerely,

Robert S. McNamara³

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See [footnote 1, Document 31](#).

² The enclosure, entitled "Proposed Test Program" is not printed.

³
 Printed from a copy that indicates Secretary McNamara signed the original.

48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, August 2, 1961.

JCSM-517-61

SUBJECT

Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (U)

1. Reference is made to:
 - a. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President, dated 28 July 1961, subject as above.^{[1](#)}
 - b. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 4 March 1961, subject: Fisk Panel Report.^{[2](#)}
 - c. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 May 1961, subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U).^{[3](#)}
 - d. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 June 1961, subject: Proposed Letter to the President on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Testing.^{[4](#)}
 - e. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1961, subject: review of Nuclear Test Plans (U).^{[5](#)}
2. By reference a, the Special Assistant to the President forwarded the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel) with the request that comments of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be available for the President not later than 4 August 1961.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Panofsky Report and agree with the panel that the report is essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report. In this connection, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b remain valid in relation to the Fisk Report. Of particular significance is the nonconcurrence of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy^{[6](#)} on the Fisk Report which contained views which were generally agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following comments on the subject report:
 - a. There are many points in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or which express opinions and military judgments with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree.
 - b. The report is based on unconfirmed intelligence estimates and therefore its conclusions with respect to Soviet capabilities are conjectural and subject to gross error. In this connection, the following are pertinent:
 - (1) United States intelligence sources cannot identify nor can they give specific information on a single stockpiled Soviet nuclear weapon.
 - (2) United States estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile are based entirely on analysis of Soviet nuclear tests with no confirmation from defectors or from other sources.
 - (3) Estimates of the Soviet nuclear material availability are better than estimates of the weapons stockpile; however, a margin of error of plus or minus 50% is assigned the 1963 materials estimate. No margins of error can be assigned subsequent estimates because of their dependence upon actual production which, in turn, is dependent upon Soviet plans, policies, and intentions.
 - c. From b, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations as to the validity of the conclusions concerning Soviet capabilities in development and production of nuclear weapons relative to capabilities of the United States. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile is essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively.
 - d. The final conclusion loses a considerable amount of its validity when the report states that the possibility of new surprises in developments exists in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. The conclusion also overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds, and failed to evaluate the potential value of such break-throughs based on the erroneous conclusion that there is no established doctrine for the use of tactical weapons.
 - e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur with the Panel's conclusion that from the military viewpoint there is little urgency connected with the US resumption of nuclear testing, and that decisions in the near future on resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by

non-technical considerations. Earlier Panel statements that the possibility exists of important surprises in overlooked weapons effects and tactical weapon developments invalidates this conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that discoveries in these areas are potentially of sufficient importance that their unilateral achievement by the Soviets could result in a decisive Soviet military advantage. The fact that the US has refrained from pursuing these important discoveries by not testing since October 1958, while we have no assurance that the Soviets have likewise refrained from testing, makes the US resumption of testing a matter of great urgency. In the interest of national security the US cannot afford the risk of unilateral Soviet discovery of these important new achievements in nuclear technology.

5.

An important element in the decision to resume nuclear testing is the psychological aspect associated with world-wide fallout. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to emphasize the conclusions of the Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency,⁷ which are contained in reference e:

“The Chief of DASA desires to emphasize that world-wide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard. While contrary to some widely publicized statements, the above conclusion is based on a careful study of the problem. For many years DASA has conducted an extensive stratospheric sampling program. Data from this program coupled with extensive surveys of levels of radiation in soil, foods and directly in people have shown conclusively that the levels of radiation exposure to important areas of the body which have been created from past tests (including the radiation effects of ingested Sr 90, Cs 137 and C 14) are only a few percent (2 to 3%) of the natural radiation background. These are even smaller than the fluctuations in the background exposure as one moves from place to place on the earth. In light of these facts, it is believed that the testing philosophy of the United States should allow tests to be conducted in any environment for which information is required, including if necessary, all environments that have been employed in the past. As far as fallout is concerned, care should be taken, as can easily be done, to insure that local fallout does not descend into

inhabited areas. The conduct of the above-ground tests, which are proposed, would increase the background radiation by less than 1/10 of 1%; consequently, any biological effects from world-wide fallout would be insignificant.”

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the necessity for the resumption of nuclear testing which are summarized in reference c. It is requested that the views contained herein and those in reference c be brought to the attention of the President. It is further recommended that reference d be updated and forwarded to the President.⁸

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See [Document 42](#) and the source note thereto.

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 5](#), and [Document 4](#).

³ In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their approval of the position set forth in the enclosure to [Document 22](#). (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Apr-May 61))

⁴ In this draft letter, McNamara set forth a position similar to that in [Document 47](#). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61)) McNamara's letter may have gone to the President on June 27 but was returned at Kennedy's request. See Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, p. 69.

⁵ Not found but see numbered paragraph 5.

⁶ Major General Herbert B. Loper (Ret.).

⁷ Major General Robert H. Booth.

⁸ A memorandum from the President to General Taylor, August 7, reads: "The Joint Chiefs took a very strong position against the Panofsky report on

testing. I wonder who prepared their analysis. Was it done by one, two, or three men? Was it done outside of the Defense Department by a group of scientists, or what? This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Chairman of the AEC seems to find himself 'in general agreement [with] the findings and conclusions of the report.'" (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Panofsky Panel Report 7/21/61) Kennedy's quote is from Seaborg's August 4 letter to Wiesner, in which Seaborg emphasized maintaining a readiness to test "quite apart from the political decision whether or not to resume testing" and recommended increasing the limit on laboratory explosions to 1 ton. (Ibid., Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Nuclear Test Ban, 7/2/61-8/7/61)

49. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) [Source](#)

Washington, August 3, 1961.

DEAR JERRY: In response to your letter of July 28, 1961,¹ the Secretary of Defense has asked me, in view of the short time available for response, to reply for him. I am also enclosing comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff² on the report of your Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing.

I agree with the Panel that we do not have sufficient evidence from any source to determine whether or not the USSR has been conducting clandestine nuclear testing since November 1958.³ For this reason, it seems prudent to assume that they may have been doing so. Accordingly, I would add to the Summary, at the end of the second sentence in the second full paragraph on page 5 the phrase, "from whenever they start(ed)," and to the end of the Summary, page 6, the sentence, "It should be noted that the time scale should take into account possible clandestine activities by the USSR since November 1958." The assessments of relative positions throughout the report, as on pages 15, 17, 24, 26, 27 and 32, seem to be accurate on the basis of 1958 data but do not indicate that the situation may be different now, as is clearly brought out in only one case on page 29.

The danger of closing off for a long period our own advances in nuclear weapons development, while the other side may continue, represents a greater risk if the arms race continues in other areas than it would if we could expect general arms limitation agreements. The Fisk Panel answered the questions about the technical and military effects of a test ban or a resumption of tests in the context that one possibility was a partially controlled agreement on nuclear testing, presumably to be followed by other agreements. Since the immediate prospects of arms limitation agreements seem more remote, the motivation for a Soviet violation of an unmonitored ban and consequent dangers to the U.S. appear greater.

Page 4 of the Summary points out that the significance of small pure fusion weapons depends on the extent to which future U.S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare. It also depends on future USSR tactics. If they emphasized such weapons and we did not have them, we could be at a distinct disadvantage, both militarily and politically.

On Page 4, also, the unfavorable cost ratio of Nike-Zeus to enemy ICBM's is stated to be more significant than warhead performance or lack of knowledge of kill mechanisms. This is true. However, Nike-Zeus was designed to rely on known and conservative kill mechanisms and expensive warheads. If we knew more about the probable longer range lethal effects, the system might be quite different, and possibly much less costly. Furthermore, effects tests might show us how to reduce the vulnerability of our own ICBM warheads to a greater degree than we now believe possible. Thus, though my outlook for ballistic missile defense, at least of cities, is pessimistic, I believe that nuclear testing (and consequent warhead development) and better understanding of effects would have an important influence on both our ICBM penetration program and our AICBM efforts.

In summary, I find a stronger technical case for the resumption of nuclear testing than appears in the Ad Hoc Panel's report. I would agree that delay of a few more months is unlikely to have a substantial military effect, but over the long run (including the nearly three years since October 31, 1958) possible Soviet gains from testing must certainly be considered an important military disadvantage to the U.S. Therefore, the position of the Department of Defense, as previously stated by Secretary McNamara, is that nuclear weapons testing underground should be resumed as soon as it is politically expedient. Secretary McNamara's views were set forth more fully in the letter to Mr. McCloy dated July 28, 1961.^{[4](#)}

Sincerely,

Harold Brown^{[5](#)}

^{[4](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See the source note, [Document 42](#).

² [Document 48](#).

³ In a memorandum to Wiesner dated August 3, Allen Dulles stated that the Panofsky Report's conclusion that available intelligence permitted no conclusion with regard to Soviet clandestine testing was consistent with SNIE 11-9-61 ([Document 17](#)) and that "for the present we have no new important information to add to that presented in the Panel's report." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing)

⁴ [Document 47](#).

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Brown signed the original.

50. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister

Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, August 3, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: We have been thinking some more about the test ban, and I have reached some conclusions I would like to share with you. We have come so far together that we want to be sure to keep as close as we can in the last stages of this effort.

I have had a study made of the possibility of clandestine tests by the Russians—and of the military importance such tests might have.¹ The preliminary findings indicate that what we have all feared is the fact: we simply cannot be sure, without a control system, that the Soviets are not testing, and if they are testing, they can be learning important things. The final judgment of probabilities depends on a political assessment of the way the Soviets would estimate their own gains and losses from such a program, and I know of no one who has a right to a wholly certain judgment. We don't know—but for the long run it is just this simple fact that is disturbing—in this field what we don't know can hurt us.

Yet I remain most reluctant to take a firm decision to resume testing—the stakes are high and the consequences not easily predicted. So I propose to send Dean back to Geneva, about August 24, with instructions to make one more strenuous effort to move the Soviets. I do not see any need for a shift in our present negotiating position—it is clearer than ever that what is holding us up is the Soviet loss of interest in a treaty, as you pointed out back in April. But I think we ought to make one more try in Geneva just to bring home as well as we can the seriousness of the position the Soviets have created. I hope you may agree and that Ormsby-Gore may go back with Dean.

If Dean and Ormsby-Gore make no progress, we shall face the problem of further steps. We have already inscribed this question for discussion at the UN Assembly session, and I think we should use this and all other opportunities to press home the fact that the responsibility for failure rests

with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, we shall shortly be publishing a paper on the test ban which has the same purpose.² And perhaps, if the Berlin environment allows it, you and I should write a last letter to Khrushchev.

Meanwhile, I shall be forced to consider a decision to resume testing. I am still reviewing the evidence, and in any event I do not expect that there need be any U.S. tests in 1961. But I am not very hopeful that it will be possible to wait much beyond the first of the year. If we do resume, it will be underground, unless and until the Soviets resume atmospheric tests.

We are considering one further possibility, which is that at the UN and in a general campaign for some time thereafter—and before we resume testing—we should offer to join in an unpoliced agreement to give up all tests which can cause fallout. We believe that it may be possible to get wide public understanding of “fall-out testing” as bad, and underground testing as reasonable—and this would give us the assurance of parity with the Soviet Union which cannot exist at present. May I hear how all this strikes you?

Let me repeat my warm congratulations on your common market decision, and let me thank you too for your support of my Berlin speech—I tried to frame the language on civil defense so as to awaken our people without frightening yours.

With warm personal wishes,

Sincerely,³

* Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. Top Secret. Transmitted to London in telegram 585, August 3, for delivery to Macmillan. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962)

¹ Apparent reference to the Panofsky Panel report, [Document 42](#).

² Not further identified.

³ Printed from an unsigned copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

51. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, August 4, 1961.

SUBJECT

Report of Panel on Nuclear Testing

In response to Dr. Wiesner's request I have reviewed the report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing and have given consideration to the course of action which the United States should now pursue in the light of the conclusion of the Panel that any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.

On the basis of this assessment it would appear that the dominant factors to be considered in determining US policy on this question in the immediate future are those relating to the over-all posture of the United States as regards our allies, world opinion, and the USSR, particularly in the light of our general approach to the problem of Berlin. Our policy on the resumption of nuclear testing should likewise take into account the effects of any present moves both on prospects of realistic negotiation on disarmament, and on the longer-range military security considerations to which the Panel has referred.

On the basis of these factors it would appear to me that the most advantageous course would be to defer any announcement of test resumption until at least the end of the year, to reaffirm, in response to questions, US freedom to test upon prior announcement, and to proceed with such preparations as are necessary to achieve technical readiness for weapons tests of highest priority early in 1962. The announcement in each case would be only a few days before the actual test.

If on the basis of the Panel's assessment it is concluded that an early test resumption would not contribute significantly to our immediate preparations for a potential crisis in Berlin, I believe that a deferral of this step would serve to increase support and cooperation in those measures of preparedness we deem most essential. I believe, too, that deferral of such an

announcement would enhance our position in the forthcoming General Assembly, increase support for our position in the Geneva test ban negotiations, and afford the most favorable circumstances for the US initiatives contemplated in the field of disarmament.

In the longer range, it seems to me, considering the possible risks to the security of the country, testing for military weapons purposes should be resumed if a safeguarded treaty ban cannot be agreed, although the final determination should be made in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Accordingly, I would urge that while deferring an announcement of test resumption pending at least the achievement of a state of technical readiness which would permit the conduct of a significant test series, preparations toward that end should proceed forthwith. The achievement of such a state of readiness would, I believe, contribute to the flexibility we will need in timing any announcement of test resumption, since I am convinced we should be prepared to follow any such announcement quite promptly with an actual test.

Mr. McCloy concurs in these recommendations.

George W. Ball¹

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-461. Secret.

¹ Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.

52. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, August 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing

1. The subject report limits itself to the technical questions involved in a decision by the United States on the resumption of testing. However, the paper needs to be read with an eye to the military strategy which the United States intends to pursue in order to determine the attitude on testing which is most favorable to that strategy.
2. The USSR enjoys important military advantages which we need to offset. In the field of strategic weapons, they have the option of a first strike against a known target system and have a better defense against our retaliatory reaction which will eventually include an anti-missile missile probably deployed some years before we can have one of our own. To offset these advantages we need light, high yield warheads adapted to a mobile delivery missile system as well as to the requirements of small multiple warheads and decoys.
3. In the tactical field, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has a very considerable superiority in trained military manpower with which to oppose the United States and its Allies on the ground. The primary requirement for effective tactical weapons in our hands is to offset this manpower. Even though the USSR also had tactical nuclear weapons as good as our own, the net effect would be to reduce the amount of manpower that could be employed safely in the combat zone. Then, it becomes like a football game in which, regardless of a disparity of size of the squads, only eleven men can be played at a time by either side. Effective tactical weapons in our hands which are cheap, adaptable to delivery systems that can also use conventional weapons, and which are discriminatory in their destructive effect can provide the United States for the first time with an answer to Soviet manpower without our living in a condition of permanent mobilization.

4. In summary, the pros and cons of testing look differently if we consider the requirements for testing derived from U.S. military strategy.
- a. If we are to absorb the first strike, we need a secure retaliatory force, which is mobile and uses lightweight warheads. Further testing is essential to develop such warheads without sacrifice of required yield.
 - b. If we must conclude that the USSR will beat us to an anti-missile missile, again it is important to test to develop lighter warheads. These will be necessary to permit decoys and multiple warheads to defeat the Soviet AICBM.
 - c. If we are to have the best of tactical weapons with the characteristics described in paragraph 3 above, we need to resume testing. Although we are not without tactical weapons now, they are generally too large and their aggregate effect too destructive for generalized use in friendly territory. For the safety of our own forces and for the protection of the friendly populations among which we expect to operate, it is more important to us than to the Soviets to perfect very small atomic weapons.
 - d. Thus, a failure to resume testing seriously retards progress in developing both light strategic warheads and very small atomic weapons. Because of our military strategy, progress in both these fields is worth more to us than to the USSR. This fact argues for a resumption of testing at once unless the most compelling of political arguments can be adduced against it.

Maxwell D. Taylor

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Panofsky Panel Report. Top Secret.

53. Memorandum of Minutes of the 490th Meeting of the National Security Council [Source](#)

Washington, August 8, 1961, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Panofsky Report^{[1](#)}

The meeting opened with an extensive summary of his panel's report by Dr. Panofsky. One point to which he gave particular emphasis was that the party which is engaged in concealment can always succeed if a sufficient effort is made. In summary, Dr. Panofsky made four points:

1. A ban on testing does impose limitations on our development;
2. Such limitations can in large measure be compensated for by improvements elsewhere in our technology.
3. In the long run, nevertheless, such limitations will impair our strength.
4. In the short run, the matter is not critical.

The President asked Dr. Panofsky to comment on the remarks of the JCS about his report.^{[2](#)} Dr. Panofsky replied that he could not make any intelligent comment because the criticisms of the Joint Chiefs were not spelled out.

Dr. Seaborg remarked that the Soviet Union may well be testing in the laboratory, with a much higher limit on what would be classed as a laboratory explosion. Dr. Seaborg wanted a higher limit on U.S. laboratory tests, and the President appeared to agree.

(After the meeting, the President authorized Dr. Seaborg to conduct laboratory tests up to a limit of one-ton TNT equivalent.)^{[3](#)}

Mr. McCloy reported Khrushchev's remark that, in a discussion of chemical explosions, "it all depends on what you mean by testing." He also reported that Khrushchev had told him that he was receiving pressure from the

military not in technical but in strategic areas. Khrushchev had mentioned 100-megaton bombs as the economical way of using his large rockets.

General Lemnitzer said that the main concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was with the lack of intelligence on what the Soviets are doing and on the character and strength of Soviet weapons and the Soviet stockpile. The Joint Chiefs were further concerned about what the Soviet Union *might have done* since 1958. The Joint Chiefs were not currently advocating atmospheric testing. They objected strongly to the notion that there was no tactical doctrine for the use of atomic weapons. General Lemnitzer asserted that the Chiefs definitely do have such a doctrine. They did not object to a “reasonable delay” but the meaning of this phrase turned on definition. There would be a great disadvantage if we were confronted by the Soviets with their possession of a serious new weapon.

The President asked if under the doctrine of the JCS we could have a tactical nuclear war. General Lemnitzer’s answer was in the affirmative but he recognized that many people would disagree.

There followed a careful discussion of the need for testing in connection with the development of the so-called neutron bomb. In this discussion it became clear that while tests would not be needed in the near future for the neutron bomb itself, they would be helpful in the area of “staging experiments” which might turn out to be a limiting factor upon the development of a neutron bomb as an effective weapon, if in fact such a device proves practicable. General Taylor strongly supported the need for the neutron bomb.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there were not yet any good studies of the precise effects of such a weapon, but Mr. Foster replied that certain of its qualities were very clear, notably that the radius of effectiveness was very sharply defined.

The President asked what we could learn by testing in 1962 and Dr. Panofsky replied that we could pre-test the staging principle, move toward cleaner strategic warheads, and save time in the development of the neutron bomb, if the staging principle proved to be the most difficult problem. We could also test the weapon arrow, which would be useful on the assumption

that we were using tactical weapons in great quantity, and we could substantially reduce the weight of a 100 kiloton weapon.

We could test for improved safety, and for unknown forms of vulnerability in our own weapons systems.

The President then asked what would happen if we should test underground while the Soviet Union tested in the atmosphere. This question received no decisive answer, although there was much sentiment to the effect that our own initial tests could be underground as well as not in any case.

Speaking in general support of testing, General Taylor argued that testing means progress and that progress means more to us than to the Soviet Union. At this point Director Dulles entered a strong defense of our intelligence on atomic matters, asserting that we know much more than General Lemnitzer supposed about the quality and content of the Soviet stockpile. The President stated that there ought to be a clarification of the differences between the JCS and others on this point, and he asked General Taylor to consult with General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles and Dr. Panofsky in order to define the disagreements and narrow them if possible.⁴

Mr. McCloy believed that as a practical political matter we ought to wait until 1962 to test because of the UN General Assembly. As he read the Panofsky report, such a postponement was acceptable in technical terms. The President remarked that we have here a major political problem. We should clearly resume testing fairly soon, but the UN problem is a serious one. We would now have to emphasize the finding of our blue ribbon panel if we cannot prove that the Soviet Union is not testing. He would make a statement on this on Wednesday or Thursday.⁵

McGeorge Bundy⁶

⁴ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on September 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book, which indicates 30 people attended. (Ibid.) Attendees

included all statutory members except Rusk, who was represented by Ball. For another account of the meeting, see Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, pp. 75-76.

¹ [Document 42](#).

² [Document 48](#).

³ See [footnote 8](#), [Document 48](#). Kennedy had written Bundy a note favorable to Seaborg's request on August 7. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 7/16-8/10/61) See the Supplement. After the NSC meeting, Kennedy also explored with Seaborg and others the problem of ensuring test readiness in advance of a decision to resume testing. See Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, pp. 71-73, and memoranda from Bundy to Seaborg, August 8, and Seaborg to Bundy, August 10, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 7/16-8/10/61 and 8/10-8/30/61, respectively. Both memoranda are in the Supplement.

⁴ In NSAM No. 69, dated August 15, addressed to Taylor, Bundy repeated the "President's request that you prepare a report" on disagreements on the intelligence aspects of the Panofsky Report revealed at the NSC meeting. If disagreements among the Panel, CIA, and JCS were "basic," the President wanted a statement of each position within 2 weeks. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.12, 5 May-3 Nov 61)

⁵ He made the statement on August 10; see [footnote 4](#), [Document 46](#). NSC Action No. 2437, August 8, records that the Council: "Received the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

54. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, August 14, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am very glad to have had your personal letter of August 3¹ and to have this opportunity for an exchange of views about the Nuclear Tests problem. While considering my reply I have also seen reports of your Press Conference of August 10² and I have taken account of these. I am assuming however that these do not affect the substance of your letter to me.

I agree that without a control system we cannot be sure that the Russians are not testing and I recognise that if all our efforts to secure a treaty fail, a decision on the resumption of testing may have to be taken. But I hope that there will be no question of resuming tests for purely negative reasons, for example because the Russians may be doing so. If of course there was some specific knowledge which would only be gained by another test, the situation might be different.

Meanwhile I anticipate that the problem will fall into two or three distinct phases. There are six weeks left before the General Assembly and I shall be glad to agree that during that time Dean and Ormsby Gore should make a new effort at Geneva. In view of the present state of the international climate I do not expect this to succeed. Our object should be to focus attention again on Soviet intractability and to secure as much understanding and support as we can for the Western position.

The timing of this move seems to me important for if it emerges too soon that our efforts are not succeeding you and I may be under pressure to admit that the conference has failed and to consider radically new approaches. If we can avoid reaching this point until shortly before the General Assembly, pressures of this kind should be easier to avert. For this reason my inclination has been to suggest that we should begin a new move at Geneva a little later than you suggest, perhaps in the first few days of September. However I see that you have mentioned August 24 at your Press

Conference, and if you feel after further consideration that this would be better, we can arrange for Ormsby Gore to join Dean on or just after that date. In that case, for the reasons I have explained, I would be in favour of playing the hand slowly with the idea that failure of this effort would still not be apparent before, say, the end of the first week of September. My preference would still be to start a week later than you suggest, if this does not present too great difficulties for you.

When the Assembly meets I am sure you will agree that our objective should be to secure a resolution calling for the resumption of serious negotiations at Geneva with a view to the early conclusion of a treaty. This seems to me both the best we can hope for and the least that will protect the Western position and give us a final chance to get the Russians to sign a treaty. The Assembly may of course go further. The Indians have now tabled an item, together with an explanatory memo, which calls upon all States, pending the conclusion of a treaty, to refrain from testing.³ This is awkward, for on past form it is likely to command a wide measure of support.

Assuming that we can arrange for the item to be dealt with reasonably quickly, we should then have a short period in perhaps November and December for a further and probably final effort to move the Russians. If, as you point out, the Berlin situation allows it, this would be the time for a final appeal to Khrushchev. We should also consider what final concessions, if any, we might be able to offer in order to secure a treaty. On the moratorium our position is sound and logical, but I believe that publicly it is not seen in that light and that Russian propaganda to the effect that it is a device to prepare for resumed Western testing after three years is having some effect. Indeed the Indian explanatory memorandum to the United Nations picks out the moratorium as a “cause for serious anxiety”.⁴ One idea that our officials might look at again is whether we could offer a comprehensive treaty covering all environments. This would mean eliminating the moratorium and threshold in exchange for tightening up the language committing the Russians to an extensive research programme and the introduction of some kind of “escape hatch” relating to underground tests, such as is in our high altitude proposals, which would enable us to withdraw from that part of the treaty if detection cannot be made effective.

I am attracted by your idea of offering an unpoliced agreement on tests that cause fallout. We should not, however, delude ourselves that if thereafter the United States resumes testing underground and the Russians then test in the atmosphere, there will not be a widespread tendency to denounce the country that first broke the present voluntary suspension of tests irrespective of the environment. But with that qualification I believe that some such move will be necessary to show that we are fully conscious of world-wide anxiety about fallout and ready to do our best to avoid it.

I am glad to see that we seem to be very close together, both as to what it may be possible to do and as to how we should set about it. I am confident that we should be able to move closely in step during the undeniably difficult stages ahead.

[Here follows discussion of the Common Market and Berlin.]

Harold Macmillan⁵

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1961. Top Secret.

¹ [Document 50](#).

² See [footnote 4](#), [Document 46](#).

³ For texts of these documents, dated July 28, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 270-271.

⁴ The full sentence reads: "Statements on behalf of the different parties concerned about the possible renewal of tests in case agreement is not reached, as well as the contemplated limitation of the period of moratorium give cause for serious anxiety."

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, August 16, 1961, 11:03 p.m.

790. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Following is President's reply to Prime Minister's letter of August 14¹ text of which repeated you FYI by immediately preceding eyes only telegram. Deliver following reporting time and date delivered:

"Dear Prime Minister: I appreciate having your views on the test negotiations. It is good to know that David Ormsby-Gore will be in Geneva.

It seems to me that we are quite close on the timing of the intensified effort in Geneva. Although Ambassador Dean will return there on the 24th of August, in order to confer with the United Kingdom and United States Delegations, he had not planned to participate in a formal conference session until August 28. I hope you agree it would be useful to have one or two meetings take place before the Belgrade 'non-aligned' conference convenes on September 1. There would then be sessions every other day for the next two weeks, and Dean and Ormsby-Gore could plan to depart around September 8. Their departure a week or so before the opening of the General Assembly would, I should think, be understood as a natural consequence of the need to prepare our case for the General Assembly debate.

On the matter of a comprehensive treaty, I agree that the moratorium issue is the most vulnerable position we have. Dean has acquainted us with Ormsby-Gore's views on it. It is important that this issue not be allowed to overshadow our very strong case on all the other questions. We are now studying this problem and we will be in touch with you again on it in a few days.² With warm regard, John F. Kennedy."

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dean, cleared by McCloy in substance, and approved by the President through Bundy and by Rusk.

¹ [Document 54](#).

² A draft of this letter, which indicates Goodby as preparer, includes the following final paragraph: “As for a resumption of testing, I agree with you that we should not, and indeed we have no intention to, resume testing for wholly negative reasons. I question, however, whether you and I could long tolerate a situation where, for example, the USSR tests and we do not or where the resumption of testing should otherwise prove really necessary.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Disarmament General, 8/61) Concerning the removal of this paragraph, see [Document 56](#).

56. Minutes of Meeting Source

Washington, August 17, 1961, 4–5:30 p.m.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS WITH THE PRESIDENT AUGUST 17, 1961

PRESENT

Dean Rusk—Secretary of State
Robert S. McNamara—Secretary of Defense
Roswell L. Gilpatric—Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Lyman Lemnitzer—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allen W. Dulles—Director of Central Intelligence
Glenn T. Seaborg—Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
John J. McCloy—Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Arthur Dean—Chairman, US Delegation Nuclear Test Ban Talks
William Foster—Consultant to Mr. McCloy
McGeorge Bundy—Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Adrian Fisher—Deputy to Mr. McCloy
Don Wilson—Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency
Robert W. Komer—National Security Council
Spurgeon Keeny—Science and Technology

The test ban talks were taken up first. Ambassador Dean noted we have word from the UK, etc. that Soviets will probably attack us on grounds our desire to sign treaty a fraud, because we would just learn to cheat below 4.75 threshold, and then end moratorium. We were also worried about appeal of Indian Resolution¹ to uncommitted states. So Dean would like to go back to Geneva, explain we didn't invent moratorium but recognized couldn't monitor below this threshold with presently proposed controls. Hence we would express willingness to explore with Soviets any number of variants during moratorium period to reduce threshold, also to cluster inspection stations in earthquake zone. The UK has always favored a comprehensive treaty. Ambassador Dean didn't think we ought to go that far, but should go far enough to take wind out of Soviet sails at GA, and reduce appeal of Indian Resolution. We should surface this at Geneva before 1 September Neutrals' Conference.

The President queried why not propose also to stop fallout tests even if no treaty? Dean feared Khrushchev would buy and then say let's go on and ban

all tests, claiming Soviets were prepared to do so right now. Secretary Rusk asked why we couldn't respond that atmospheric tests can be monitored unilaterally and thus detected without treaty apparatus? Dean felt that the problem was not that easy.² He would prefer not to raise fallout issue till we need it in GA to counter Indian Resolution.

The President expressed the thought that after Dean came back we'd announce AEC undertaking contingent preparations but President would say no final decision taken yet; we were still trying to get a treaty. Would this be O.K? Would it create new support for Indian Resolution? Ambassador Dean felt that it would.

Dr. Seaborg thought the proposal good. Secretary Rusk felt we could bring in the fallout problem at this point. Mr. Bundy concluded that we would save the announcement till the appropriate time.

He then raised five specific points proposed by Dean.³ They amount really to moving from "no, unless" re threshold to "yes, if." Dr. Seaborg was concerned about how far down we should go on the threshold. One could never fully eliminate threshold without violating principle of a policed treaty. Mr. McCloy raised decoupling. Dr. Seaborg agreed this was always a possibility. Ambassador Dean commented that Dr. Press⁴ feels we can reduce threshold with further research. However, Dr. Seaborg noted that we can't remove it entirely without violating principle of no disarmament without inspection.

Mr. McCloy said there was not a prayer that Soviets will turn around and accept our new proposals. In Secretary Rusk's opinion, if we proposed to go down to zero without linking to possibility of detection, this would be bad, but if we agreed to go down as far as research will permit, this was better. Mr. Keeny pointed out that unmanned stations would permit going way down if you had enough of them. The President observed that tying to scientific possibilities protects us.

Ambassador Dean pointed out that Indians say they think Soviets not testing and two sides merely need to agree not to test. We must do

everything we can to lower threshold so as to give credibility to our position with Indians.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the Soviets might tamper with unmanned stations. Ambassador Dean mentioned Raytheon proposal which would make them difficult to tamper with.

The President noted Macmillan's letter⁵ saying we'll have hard time stopping the Indian Resolution. Ambassador Dean thought we could block any majority for it.

The President queried if there would be any problem on the Hill? Ambassador Dean was going to explain to Holifield tomorrow. He thought he'd have no problem. The President asked Dean to bring Indian Resolution to the JCAE's attention and explain our UN problem to them.

The President raised Macmillan proposal for a last step. Ambassador Dean explained that UK wanted a comprehensive treaty article covering underground tests like that on outer space, saying there would be no tests but calling for a review of the detection machinery after three years. At that point we could get out if the scientists said such tests couldn't be monitored.

Dr. Seaborg reiterated his comment about the difficulty of saying threshold could be removed entirely. The President might be subjected to criticism if the US proposed going into an area that couldn't be policed. Ambassador Dean and Dr. Seaborg exchanged views on whether we should propose eliminating threshold. Dean agreed he would change the language of his proposal to make clear we were "only going so far as scientists tell us" we can. This might in effect be down to laboratory level, but we would not say we'd remove threshold entirely.

Mr. Keeny noted that this change would rob the proposal of much of its popular appeal. Ambassador Dean granted this, but it would still have some merit as step forward.

Mr. Keeny noted the Berkner Panel⁶ view that around 400-600 unmanned stations would identify 98% of events over 1 kt, and would have a detection threshold of tens of tons.

Secretary Rusk observed that the very people who would like to have an unpoliced moratorium now, e.g. Indians, would condemn us if Soviets got real jump on us through clandestine testing. We can't defer too much to transitory world opinion. The President decided that we would go ahead with Dean's proposals,⁷ and at the appropriate point make a statement on contingent preparations for testing.⁸ Mr. Bundy asked if the President would make this statement himself? The President said when DOD has finished its review of what it needs and Dean is back, the AEC can announce contingency preparations; then he would say this didn't mean we were resuming tests.

Mr. Bundy asked why, when we actually resume, should we announce the tests? If we could get to the stage where we could conduct tests without announcing them, we'd be in a good position. However, the President felt they'd either become public or Congress would start complaining that there was no testing. Let's defer these questions and let State/Defense/AEC consider them with Mr. Bundy.

Then, said the President, we should attempt to convince Macmillan we need to test positively, in view of his expressed hope (in his letter) that we wouldn't resume for "negative" reasons alone. Mr. McCloy agreed we should challenge Macmillan on this. Mr. Bundy said that he took such argumentation out of initial reply⁹ because there was plenty of time to debate this with the UK at a later date. The President thought we might have to send someone qualified over to see Macmillan from DOD or AEC. No one was optimistic over the chances of convincing the UK. In Mr. Bundy's opinion the best we'd get from Macmillan was agreement not to be publicly critical.

The USDA comprehensive disarmament proposals (11 August draft)¹⁰ were then presented by Mr. McCloy. He said the allies approved of them, except for the French, who think this is the wrong time to present anything at all. It is an outline plan, with a good deal of emphasis on peace-keeping machinery. He wanted the President's approval before sending the final version to the others of the Western Five, as well as the NAC. The last remaining issue to be resolved was "linkage" of nuclear delivery vehicle reductions to concurrent reductions in conventional armaments in Stage I.

The DOD wanted a specific link. But this would lessen the public opinion impact by diluting the idea that we are willing promptly to deal with nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets emphasize this latter need in their proposals.

Secretary McNamara said the only issue was the sentence proposed in footnote on page 8. DOD believed this sentence protected us and doesn't reduce propaganda value. Mr. Gilpatric added that originally DOD had wanted a materials cut-off linked too.¹¹ The DOD regarded the issue as fundamental. Our nuclear deterrent deters conventional attack as well as nuclear. Until we've raised conventional capabilities much higher it must continue to do so. Since nuclear disarmament measures would take a long time to carry out in any case, he didn't see why linking should reduce propaganda appeal. General Lemnitzer pointed out the strong feelings of the JCS on this issue. If the Soviets didn't agree to conventional limitations at the time when we both cut nuclear capabilities, we'd be at a military disadvantage. The JCS fear a materials cut-off would force us to remodel our whole nuclear weapons posture. The DOD disagrees with JCS on linking a materials cut-off too, Mr. Gilpatric said; DOD wants only delivery vehicles linkage. Mr. McCloy noted that absence of an explicit link doesn't mean we wouldn't take all these factors into account. We're well protected by the caveats in the USDA proposals. We just don't want too much restrictive language. Secretary McNamara said that DOD just doesn't think we should give up our nuclear advantage before the other guy gives up his conventional advantage. He was not so much worried by the USDA language itself as about the intent behind the language. Did USDA really favor nuclear controls first? Mr. Bundy felt that this was the real issue. He could see advantages in leaving out linkage language, but Mr. McNamara's point is that before we enter into any serious negotiations we ought to take a real look at the linkage problem. The solution might be to have the President rule that in any serious negotiations, the DOD position would be safeguarded. Mr. McNamara thought that would be fine from DOD viewpoint. At Mr. Bundy's request, Mr. Wilson pointed out USIA feeling that there would be real propaganda disadvantages if linkage language were left in. The President asked why? Mr. Bundy responded that it was because conventional disarmament was an old tired issue, whereas nuclear disarmament was what world worried about. It had more mileage.

Secretary Rusk added that the Soviets will take care of linkage if we don't. The USDA position was right at this point, but if we get into real negotiations we should stick with the DOD principle. The President asked why can't we put in "concurrently balanced steps" or similar language? This was fine for DOD, but Mr. Bundy pointed out that as long as we understand what we mean within the government, the USDA paper's language doesn't create a real problem. At Mr. Rusk's suggestion all agreed to a minute to this effect.

Mr. Foster mentioned the work of his panel, which had focused on the strategic weapons problem. The panel felt that the way to begin disarmament is to commence. It started with cuts in medium bombers, then reduced strategic vehicles, with zonal inspections, then moved to some tricky conventional disarmament measures. But the panel was not ready to report yet. He hoped we could keep the door open to the panel's ideas, since they were more dramatic than the USDA proposals.

The President didn't see why all the fuss about the word "linkage", at which point Mr. Bundy read his draft minute, which called for reopening the issue whenever serious negotiations seemed in prospect. The President asked whether it should be put positively (i.e. we would link such measures at that point) but Mr. Bundy pointed out that this might create the problem Mr. Foster was worried about. As Mr. McCloy put it, we really wanted to assure DOD its day in court.

The President turned to page 7 of the USDA proposals and asked how we get the French to buy para. (d) on no transfers of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Dean rejoined they haven't raised this, but object violently to Section F on page 9, especially (c) and (d), as looking like acceptance of the Rapacki Plan.

Mr. McCloy's view was that we should get NATO comments before deciding to eliminate Section F. We might get the French to buy it without (c) and (d). He went on to mention that Ambassador Stevenson liked the 11 August paper, but favored reducing to 1.9 million in the First Stage.^{[12](#)} McCloy admitted he didn't know what this would imply, hence he would prefer not to take on DOD on this issue. He also raised Ambassador

Stevenson's proposal to delete from para. (b) on page 14 covering the UN peace force the reference to "weapons of mass destruction", etc.¹³ No objections were raised.

Mr. McCloy then proposed including in the USDA proposals a reference to the test ban. There would be a void in the program if it were not in. Of course the Soviets were trying to merge these issues, but if DOD had no objection he would like to put in a reference on page 6. USIA favored putting it in the "initial declaration" instead but there was no discussion of Mr. Wilson's point. The President asked "Don't we get in danger if we put the test ban and GCD together?" Mr. McCloy felt we could keep them separate as negotiating matters; he simply wanted to show it was part of GCD.

The President asked "Have the Soviets or anyone ever proposed simply 'ban the bomb'?" Several present pointed out they had, so it was agreed to amend the proposed language to include the idea of "an effective" test ban treaty.

The President suggested that after the Foster Panel does its work, we would consider whether we can add it in. Mr. Foster pointed out that it might mean some substantial changes in the USDA proposals. However, Mr. Bundy was not sure this would be the case.

Finally, the President asked whether there were any problems which still concerned the JCS? General Lemnitzer asked whether the agreed minute would link a materials cut-off or just delivery vehicles to conventional reductions. Mr. Bundy agreed that it would cover both. General Lemnitzer then questioned the reference to AICBMs in para. (b) on page 8. The JCS could not see any limitation on defensive capabilities as realistic. Ambassador Dean explained the rationale as being to protect us in the event that the Soviets achieved an AICBM capability first and destabilized any agreed limitations on delivery vehicles. In General Lemnitzer's view, if all that was being done was to indicate the relationship between the offensive and defensive aspects, then this was all right.

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

¹ See [footnote 3, Document 54](#).

² Dean set forth his views on the difficulties in eliminating atmospheric tests only in an August 4 memorandum to the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General, 4/61-8/61) See the Supplement.

³ Detailed information regarding these proposals is in Nusup 1387 to Geneva, August 16. The delegation's reply, which argued against fresh proposals on the threshold issue at that time, is in Supnu 1741, August 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/8-1661 and 397.5611-GE/8-1761, respectively) Both are in the Supplement.

⁴ Frank Press, a geophysicist at the California Institute of Technology, was a member of the Panofsky Panel and the President's Science Advisory Committee.

⁵ [Document 54](#).

⁶ Lloyd V. Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, headed a panel of U.S. earthquake experts appointed by the Eisenhower administration to study the problem of detection of underground nuclear tests. The Panel completed its report on March 7, 1959.

⁷ For text of the proposals as presented by Dean at Geneva on August 28, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 292-302.

⁸ Dean, in an August 18 memorandum to McCloy, and Seaborg, in an August 23 memorandum to the files, submitted recommendations on this topic. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 8/10-8/30/61) Both memoranda are in the Supplement.

⁹ See [footnote 2, Document 55](#).

¹⁰ Not found. In a covering memorandum to the President, also dated August 11, McCloy stated that "with the exception of France, which prefers not to be associated with any disarmament proposal at this time, the paper has the strong support of the other members of the Western Five and is regarded by them as a major advance over past U.S. proposals." (Kennedy

Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General) See the Supplement. Documentation concerning meetings of representatives of the “Western Five” in Washington regarding the general disarmament proposals is in Department of State, Central File 397.5611-GE for June through August 1961.

¹¹ McNamara agreed to abandonment of this linkage in an August 10 letter to McCloy, provided both a Soviet production cutoff and a total test ban could be adequately verified, but he added: “Our stockpile depends on a continuous supply of tritium. The production of tritium must not be cut off.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General)

¹² Stevenson suggested this reduction in a letter to Bundy dated August 11. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations, 4/28/61-3/62) Rusk, in an August 17 memorandum to Bundy, stated that the proposal “would improve the salability of our proposal in the General Assembly context,” but questioned changing the figure “without further study of its military implications.” (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-1761) Both documents are in the Supplement.

¹³ The proposal to ban all weapons of mass destruction was from the Stage III, or final, list of proposed measures. Stevenson in his letter of August 11 pointed out that nuclear weapons might be retained for the U.N. peace force, also envisaged in Stage III. Rusk agreed with the point in his August 17 memorandum to Bundy.

57. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, August 29, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Adviser to the President on Disarmament
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

At his meeting on August 17, 1961 with the Committee of Principals on disarmament matters,¹ the President:

1. Noted that the omission of any language linking Stage 1 measures on strategic delivery vehicles or fissionable materials with measures on conventional arms and force reductions in the proposed US disarmament program was without prejudice to the merits of this issue. If the US actually became engaged in serious negotiations about such measures, the question of linking them would be examined at that time.
2. Approved the new proposals for Ambassador Dean to present in the Test Ban Conference at Geneva, with the amendment that instead of proposing total elimination of any threshold, the US would propose putting this threshold as low as scientifically possible. However, the US delegation could point out that the US would in practice be willing to reduce the threshold as far as Soviet acceptance of controls would permit. Thus, if there were sufficient controls the treaty threshold could in effect be removed for all practical purposes.
- 3.

Directed that the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC, recommend the appropriate time for the AEC to make an announcement about the resumption of contingent preparations for nuclear testing and for the President to issue a statement that this did not mean we were resuming tests at any given time. The above group should also consider

whether there should be any announcement at the time of actual resumption of tests.

The President later indicated his belief that it would probably not be appropriate to have public announcement on these matters before the UN General Assembly.

McGeorge Bundy²

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: Lot 77 A 17, McGeorge Bundy. Secret.

¹ See [Document 56](#).

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

58. Editorial Note

During a TASS broadcast at 7 p.m. EDT on August 30, 1961, the Soviet Union announced that it was resuming atomic testing. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pages 347-348. Through intelligence channels, the U.S. Government had prior knowledge of the announcement and began drafting a statement that was released by the White House at approximately 9 p.m. (Memoranda of telephone conversations: Rusk-Stevenson, Rusk-Bohlen, Rusk-Bundy, and Rusk-Wiesner, all the evening of August 30; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) For text of the announcement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pages 348-350. The memorandum of Rusk's telephone conversation with Wiesner indicates that Dean's recall, announced in the statement, was initiated by the President.

59. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Morrow) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, August 31, 1961.

SUBJECT

Considerations Regarding Nuclear Testing

1. What is now to be tested is not so much nuclear devices as the will of free men to remain free.
2. Those who today urge you to resume testing immediately will tomorrow contend that the decision to do so was merely another belated reaction to Soviet action.
3. What is required is *time*. We can within weeks achieve the position of the last best hope of freedom, sanity and survival. This can be done not only by the exposure of Soviet duplicity, but also by playing heavily upon the fears of hazards to health and future generations.
4. No further public statements should be made during the Belgrade Conference.¹ Our people there should be instructed to say quietly that our arsenal is adequate to any demands that may be made upon it and that the President is considering the advisability of giving Khrushchev one final chance to draw back.
5. There should be no indication of consultation with our allies lest this be interpreted as a sign of vacillation or indecision.
6. Steps should be taken to bring the question before the U.N. General Assembly, where in the course of a roaring debate the Russians can be hoist on a troika of their own making, Berlin, colonialism and nuclear testing.
7. I have heard no arguments from the military or scientific community to indicate a delay of a few weeks in the resumption of testing would endanger the national security. This time, if properly employed, can be used to isolate the Communist Bloc, frighten the satellites and the uncommitted, pretty well destroy the *Ban the Bomb* movement in Britain, and might even induce sanity into the SANE nuclear policy group in this country.

8. During this interval, special effort should be made to arrange for an Administration spokesman to appear on television and radio, not to make statements of policy but rather to explain why precipitate action is unnecessary and unwise and why this country should not, by the immediate imitation of Soviet tactics, throw away this opportunity to consolidate its leadership of the non-communist world.

Edward R. Murrow²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. Confidential.

¹ The Conference of Non-Aligned States was held at Belgrade September 1-6.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

60. Memorandum by the Ambassador to the United Nations (Stevenson) [Source](#)

New York, August 31, 1961.

RE

Nuclear testing

1. Allow a day or two for neutralist sentiment to express itself. In this connection see to it that Nehru is asked by the President whether India still subscribes to the statement in its memorandum of July 28th that “any state which resumes these tests would become primarily responsible for the deterioration of the entire position.”
2. Call on Saturday¹ for a prompt meeting of the Security Council to deal with the threat of peace and security posed by the Soviet decision anticipating that the meeting take place some time next week—possibly Thursday September 7th.
3. Introduce in the Security Council jointly with the United Kingdom a resolution calling on the USSR to change its position, and on all others to refrain from testing in connection with this appeal, and for early completion of a testing agreement with adequate inspection not subject to the veto or to any form of “self inspection”. Be prepared to proceed along these lines even if the French protest.
4. When the USSR vetoes this resolution promptly introduce a procedural resolution to Article 12 of the Charter taking note of the serious situation created by the Soviet Union’s position and the Soviet’s veto and asking the General Assembly to make urgent recommendation (this should come about September 12-13).
5. Cover the subject extensively in the President’s speech to the General Assembly.
6. Speak at an early period in the general debate and conclude with a resolution along the lines of the Security Council’s resolution, with “a view to a final vote by the middle of October.”
7. Immediately following the vote in the General Assembly the United States and the United Kingdom dispatch a final appeal to the Soviet Union calling for compliance by the USSR.

8. When the USSR rejects this appeal, or gives a dusty answer, President Kennedy announces that he has decided that the United States must resume testing in self protection, including appropriate statements about safeguards.
9. If it is necessary to make an immediate announcement on our intention in regard to testing (it would be preferable not to) the President should say that he has ordered preparation for the resumption of underground testing *only* in the interest of national security, but has not taken a final decision to resume testing pending a final effort by the nations of the world to get the Soviet Union to change its mind.
10. It must be understood that if the USSR agrees to a UN resolution to postpone testing we must be prepared to do so as well.²

Adlai E. Stevenson³

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. No classification marking. There is no addressee, but the memorandum was apparently routed to Bundy.

¹ September 2.

² In a telephone conversation with Rusk that evening, Stevenson stated that he just heard that McCloy's office was trying to persuade the President to "make a statement re the resumption of testing. He wanted personally to say this is a big mistake. This is not a blow; it is a bonanza." Rusk replied that at the day's meetings (see [Document 61](#)) "it was decided no" and added that "we don't expect to say anything for a week or so in any event."

(Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

61. Editorial Note

On August 31, 1961, the President held several meetings to discuss Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. According to the account in Seaborg's journal:

“At 10 a.m. I attended a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room. Others present were: Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Harold Brown, Murrow, Rusk, Bohlen, Bundy, Schlesinger, Taylor, Wiesner, Scoville, Dulles and Sorensen. The meeting opened with the President's calling on Dulles to begin with any pertinent comments that he might have. After a brief description of the receipt of the information that the Russians were going to resume testing prior to the actual announcement at 7 p.m. yesterday, Dulles described the method that had been used in announcing Soviet tests in the past.

“He said that the Soviets had not announced them themselves, but the United States had announced them either via the White House (and this was limited to the first few tests, or the most important tests) or, more generally, via the AEC. Dulles thinks, however, that the Soviets may now start to announce the tests as they occur. In the past we often made two announcements—a rather immediate one based on the acoustic and seismic data and then a later one based on the data obtained from atmosphere sampling. He estimated that the United States had announced some 50 to 60 Soviet tests.

“The President suggested that perhaps a method of procedure would be to have the AEC make an announcement that they are preparing for testing in order to be ready in case the decision is made to resume testing. This would have the advantage of avoiding a direct commitment so soon after the Russian announcement, which would negate some of our propaganda advantage, but at the same time it would reassure people in the United States and our Allies that we are not standing still.

“Murrow argued strongly for waiting a while—perhaps a few weeks—before making any statement that we had decided to resume testing in order

to let the Soviet announcement take the maximum effect around the world.

“Rusk favored a statement now in order that the impression not be created that the President is indecisive on this matter.

“The Vice President tended to agree that there shouldn't be any immediate announcement that we have decided to resume testing but also pointed out that it wouldn't hold very long since Gore, Symington and Mansfield had made speeches this morning.

“In connection with the proposed discussion with Congressional leaders, McNamara recommended that he say we have a bomb in the stockpile which can be delivered by our current aircraft and that we see no requirement for bombs of 60-80-100 megatons. He wanted to report that we believe we could build a 50-megaton bomb within the delivery capability of currently available aircraft and based on currently known technology so that further testing would not be required. We could also build a 100-megaton bomb deliverable by the B-52, but it would have to be based on a new design which would require testing. A question was then raised as to whether or not we could say we are primarily interested in a new test series to be concentrated on tactical weapons; but Dr. Brown pointed out that some of the devices now proposed for early test have to do with Minuteman and Polaris warheads, which would certainly be for strategic purposes.

“McNamara then proposed a somewhat different response. He stated that our response should now stress the fact that we are strengthening our military preparations in connection with Berlin such as calling up an Army Division and other similar actions. He also stated that he had just reviewed the Nike-Zeus development program; he would be prepared at this time to recommend that a decision be made to produce the Nike-Zeus weapon system on a somewhat limited production base to provide for protection for some 9 to 10 cities at roughly \$2.5 billion cost. He stated that he could meet the FY 1962 commitment to such a program out of his current budget and that the remaining funds would be spread over the next few years. The production program would not begin to provide actual protection until about four years from this time.

“The primary conclusion of the meeting was to hold back on any decision or announcement until the President had been able to discuss the subject with Congressional leaders, making an effort to assess, in the course of that discussion, how realistic it would be to expect those most vocal in urging the resumption of tests not to stir things up too badly over the next few days. It was proposed at one point that we announce that the decision is to be made at the next NSC meeting, presumably on Tuesday of next week; but his suggestion was rejected on the basis that it would focus too much attention on that meeting and result in a build-up of interest that would be detrimental to the position we would like to pre-sent to the world public.

“As the time was drawing near for the Congressional leaders to come in for the meeting which was immediately to follow, the President summarized by saying that he would present to the Congressional group the idea that the AEC was being directed to prepare to resume testing, but that no announcement would be made along these lines until at least after Labor Day weekend in order that we might have maximum propaganda value accruing to the United States as a result of the USSR action.

“The next meeting was held from 10:45 to 11:40 a.m. and was attended by the President, the Vice President, McNamara, Rusk, Lemnitzer, Bundy, Senators Mansfield, Jackson, Fulbright, Gore, Kuchel, Symington, Dirksen, Russell, Saltonstall, Pastore, Humphrey, Congressmen Holifield and Halleck and other Congressional leaders. McCloy came in about the middle of the meeting.

“The President opened the meeting by saying that he was directing the AEC to make preparations for the resumption of testing so that they could conduct tests, certainly before the end of September, but that he also wanted to explore with them the possibility of deriving the maximum propaganda benefit by the U.S. from the recent Russian announcement to resume testing, refraining from making an announcement so soon after the Russian announcement.

“Russell made the opening statement by saying that this was a God-given opportunity to exploit the maximum propaganda value, and he suggested that we should delay any announcements as to the resumption of testing in order to have maximum benefit.

“Gore inquired as to the reaction in Western Europe, and Murrow said that it generally had been one of revulsion to the Russian action and was favorable toward the U.S. He mentioned the possibility of bringing the question to the United Nations, particularly with respect to arguing against testing in the atmosphere. He seemed generally to be favoring waiting before the U.S. makes any announcement on the resumption of testing.

“Jackson asked whether the Soviet announcement at this time might not reflect some weakness in the Soviet Union, such as, Khrushchev’s having internal difficulties or difficulties with China. He also mentioned the possibility that the reason for their step was that they have a new spectacular device which they want to test and which has been developed as far as it can be by testing clandestinely.

“Dulles replied by saying he saw no sign of any rift in the government of the Soviet Union. Humphrey suggested that perhaps Khrushchev just gave in to the pleas and pressures of people in the Soviet Union who would be pressuring him to resume testing, pointing out this has been the situation in the United States also and that it has taken tremendous forbearance on the part of the President to resist these pressures.

“Dirksen said he thought the Soviet Union had taken this step in order to impress the maximum amount of fear on the world and, hence, to gain respect on this basis.

“Symington said that he wanted to reiterate what he had been saying all along and that was he believed they had been testing clandestinely.

“Gore said he thought their goal was world intimidation, that they wanted to break the will of the world to resist and, in particular, the will of the Western European Allies. He thought that the President should state that the U.S. has a superior stockpile of weapons and that there is no need for alarm because of the Soviet announcement.

“The President suggested that McNamara might hold a press conference in which he would state bluntly that the U.S. has a stockpile of nuclear weapons from three to seven times greater than that of the Soviet Union, and, in general allay the fears of our own people and Allies. He again raised

the possibility of the AEC's making an announcement that the President has directed the AEC to get ready for testing.

"Jackson reiterated that he thought we should go about this quietly for the next few days and that the AEC shouldn't make any announcement now. Russell said it would be better to make an announcement denouncing the Soviet action, speaking of it as a crime against humanity, etc. Holifield then spoke on several points: that we had the capability of building a 50- or 100-megaton bomb; that we hadn't seen fit to do so; that he was concerned about the effect on Great Britain of any long period of silence in which we wouldn't indicate our intentions; that we should be careful to leave open the possibility of atmospheric testing, and that any public announcement concerning resumption of testing should be made within a few days.

"McCloy indicated that he was puzzled by the Russian action. Khrushchev had told him the Soviet Union wouldn't test until after the U.S. had started to test. Something had changed his mind. Perhaps this was the desire to build up fear throughout the world with reference to the 100-megaton bomb. He thought the U.S. should defer announcement of the resumption of testing, but that in the announcement we should leave open the possibility of atmospheric testing eventually. He said that he thought we should give some time to trying to figure out just what was motivating the Russians in the direction they are taking. The Vice President indicated he thought the Soviet action might be a reaction to their failure to intimidate the U.S. in the Berlin situation. Symington indicated that he was in favor of McNamara's having a press conference to indicate the greater nuclear capability of the U.S. as compared with the Soviet Union.

"I raised the question of whether the 100-megaton bomb might not have terrible consequences if exploded in the ocean near some of our populous centers by creating a tidal wave, etc. McNamara and Lemnitzer felt that this was not a serious matter, that this already could be done with some of the smaller weapons.

"The President thanked the Congressional leaders. The meeting broke up with the general consensus that the AEC would make preparations for the resumption of testing (and the President reiterated this) but that there wouldn't be any announcement until after Labor Day weekend in order that

we might have maximum propaganda benefit. There seemed to be agreement that everyone concerned would defer comment in response to questioning from newspapers as best he could.

“Another meeting took place from 11:45 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. Present were McCloy, Dulles, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Murrow, Bundy, Bohlen, Harold Brown, Scoville, Fisher, John Foster and I. The President came in at the end of this meeting. The time was spent in preparing a draft of a statement that the President might make at the end of this meeting. I made the point that the agreed upon program, wherein the AEC does undertake preparations for testing, has in it the inherent possibility of a leak; hence, it would become known that we are doing so, and, in any case, commits us to such a program; although we might get past the Labor Day weekend without a leak, serious preparations couldn't go on very long before becoming known.

“I also made a plea for following the carefully prepared program which the DOD and the AEC had outlined rather than a crash program. However, it was decided not to make this decision today, and it was decided that we would direct our laboratories to prepare for the three types of tests that McNamara and I had discussed yesterday, namely, the proof testing of the Davy Crockett in about two weeks; the testing of the second device in about four weeks; and, the testing of the third device in about six weeks.”
(Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 2, pages 120, 126-128)

Everett Dirksen of Illinois was Senate Minority Leader. Representative Chet Holifield of California was Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee was a member of that Committee, as was Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Richard B. Russell of Georgia was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senator Jackson and Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri were members.

For text of the White House statement issued following these meetings, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, page 350.

62. Memorandum From the President's Special Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, September 1, 1961.

SUBJECT

Governor Stevenson's memorandum of August 31 re nuclear testing

I have been giving some thought to the possibility of immediate UN action along lines Governor Stevenson has proposed on the nuclear test issue. While I fully share the view that we should exploit to the utmost the propaganda advantage the Soviets have given us, I do not believe a US initiative for UN action at this time would on balance be advantageous.

I assume that the US will, in the light of the latest Soviet action, resume nuclear tests. The question is merely one of when. It seems to me inevitable that whatever the tactical skills employed in execution of a UN exercise at this stage, the outpouring of sentiment against all tests with or without a treaty, and with or without controls, would make a prompt US test resumption far more difficult and deprive us of the brief opportunity we now have to minimize the unfavorable consequences of our action by moving promptly in the wake of the Soviet resumption.

I believe, too, that any UN action is likely to eventuate in resolutions which in fact or in principle call for an uncontrolled test cessation or an uncontrolled moratorium. The US cannot propose or accept any resolution calling for an uncontrolled test cessation by either the Soviets or by both sides without departing from the most fundamental principle upon which any disarmament measure must be based—the principle of control. Since we cannot propose or accept a resolution calling for an uncontrolled moratorium, I doubt that we should choose as our field for propaganda exploitation an arena in which the overwhelming sentiment is likely to favor this course.

I think we should bear in mind, also, that action in the UN at this time could point up to a serious degree the differences between the French and ourselves on the testing issue. The French would be almost certain to veto a Security Council resolution against testing. I consider that this is a dangerous time to undertake unnecessary moves which would further split or reveal splits in allied solidarity.

On the purely tactical side I also question the wisdom of appearing to press too eagerly our propaganda advantage, by sponsoring condemnations of the Russians. The Soviet action has not gone unnoticed. Its effect might be diminished if we seek too obviously to capitalize upon it. In this situation perhaps we can let the neutrals take the initiative rather than turning this too obviously into a cold war issue where they will feel compelled to seek a middle ground.¹

John J. McCloy

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. Confidential.

¹ In a handwritten postscript, McCloy added: "Arthur Dean strongly concurs." A memorandum of a call from Rusk to Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, made the afternoon of September 1, indicates that IO wanted the testing issue to go to the United Nations, that Schlesinger had told Cleveland the President was also interested in this possibility, and that Schlesinger had asked Stevenson to draft a possible resolution. Rusk stated that "we may need the SC for Berlin." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

63. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum of a telephone call from Rusk to John J. McCloy in the late morning of September 2, 1961, "Sec. said he just had a talk with the Pres. and he, on his own initiative, started raising question of a proposal on the limitation of atmospheric tests." (Department of state, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No Memorandum of Rusk' telephone conversation with Kennedy has been found.

Rusk called a meeting to discuss this proposal. The account in Seaborg's private journal, as subsequently edited by him, reads as follows:

"From 12:45 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. I attended a meeting with the Secretary of State in his Conference Room at the State Department. Also present were McCloy, Dean, Mac Bundy, Scoville, Gilpatric, Murrow, Cleveland, Harold Brown and General Wheeler.

"Rusk said that the President (who is in Hyannisport) had called him to suggest that the United States, together with Great Britain, probably should propose to the USSR an agreement that there might be no testing in the atmosphere.

"Gilpatric mentioned the need for testing in the atmosphere in connection with anti-ICBM tests, and Brown said this was our most important reason. Brown also mentioned the testing of the hardness of our missile launching sites and the effect of electromagnetic radiation on these sites.

"The effect of such a treaty on Plowshare was also mentioned, but it was agreed that the stakes were so high this might be relatively unimportant. It was agreed that the effect of such an agreement on weapons development would be quantitative rather than qualitative, at least up to some 10-megatons, and that the Russians would be impeded more than the U.S. if they must stay underground. On an effects test, it would be difficult to determine who would be impeded most. It was thought desirable to place a five-day limitation on the USSR answer to the proposal.

“McCloy was somewhat skeptical of the possible gain to this proposal from the standpoint of the neutrals; but he thought maybe from the standpoint of increasing our security, it was worthwhile. It was the general agreement that we should proceed to make such a proposal (copy attached).

“From 1:30 p.m. to 2 p.m. Secretary Rusk, Gilpatric, Bundy, McCloy and I discussed the procedure on the release pertaining to the above matter. It was decided that Rusk would clear it with the President later today; the members of the Joint Committee would be informed and the release probably would be made tomorrow.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 2, page 129) The “copy attached” refers to the proposed statement as issued, cited below.

In a telephone call to Foy Kohler at 5:05 p.m. on September 2, Rusk “said he was considering having President and Prime Minister Macmillan publicly propose to Mr. Khrushchev immediate cessation of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Does Mr. K. see any significant dangers involved? Mr. K. said no—he doesn't think it would have a decisive effect one way or the other.” In a telephone conversation Rusk had with Bundy a few minutes later, Bundy stated that he had just discussed the proposed statement by phone with the President, who wanted the British to join in it and had suggested “we give them immediate notice.” A memorandum of a Rusk telephone conversation with Kohler later that evening indicates that consultations with the British were underway. (All three memoranda in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

On the morning of September 3, Rusk called McCloy: “Sec. said on proposal we talked about yesterday re time duration of offer if we have difficulty with the British or perhaps anyhow wouldn't it be wise to say this offer remains open pending further atmospheric shots so long as there are not additional atmospheric shots—it's the logic of the proposal. McC. thinks that is all right.” In a telephone conversation with Murrow later that morning, Rusk reported learning that the British “wanted to shift from 'atmospheric pollution' to 'further aggravation of international tension'. Mr. M. said the reaction in this country and abroad would be one of yielding. Sec. said there is a possibility of combining the two. Mr. M. said that would do it—atmospheric pollution is essential. Sec. thanked him.” (Memorandum

of telephone conversation; *ibid.*) The draft on which the British were commenting is apparently that in circular telegram 386, September 2, the opening sentence of which reads: “In order to protect mankind from the increasing dangers of atmospheric pollution, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom propose to Chairman Khrushchev that their three Governments agree, effective immediately, not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce atmospheric fallout.” (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 700.5611/9-261)

In the early afternoon of September 3, Rusk received the following telegraphic message from Lord Home: “I am not happy about the last phrase of the new draft from 'and regret', which I think detracts from the positive tone of the rest. I do hope that the U.S. government can agree to omit it.” According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation with Lord Hood at 2:19 p.m., Rusk said he “doesn't think we can turn around now. Pres. did not want to leave impression we were going into fruitless negotiations. LH understands and will pass this along.” (All three memoranda (Lord Home's message is attached to the last of these) are *ibid.*) The draft on which Lord Home commented has not been found, nor has a record of Rusk's telephone conversations with the President on this subject.

For text of the proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan for a ban on atmospheric nuclear tests, issued jointly in Washington and London on September 3 at 3 p.m. EDT, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, page 351.

64. Editorial Note

On September 5, 1961, President Kennedy met with several advisers to discuss nuclear testing. The account in Seaborg's private journal, as subsequently edited by him, reads as follows:

"I met with President Kennedy in his White House office from 11 a.m. to 11:50 a.m. Others present were: Mac Bundy, General Taylor, Harold Brown, Ros Gilpatric and General Betts. The discussion centered on the question of the yield of the first test. The President did not want to accept any delay beyond September 15th, but he was concerned that the disparity between the planned test and the first Soviet test at over 100 KT would invite such adverse comment as to be unacceptable. He wanted a much larger test, if possible. I informed him that although we have the device capability to conduct tests, such a large yield test done in the very short time frame of less than two weeks would jeopardize the availability of the rest of the tunnel complex in which such a shot might be carried out. The President accepted my recommendation that such a large yield test not be conducted in the very early time frame indicated.

"The President then asked what possibility existed to do a test at a larger yield. General Betts recommended that a warhead be considered for the first experiment. The President was informed that this experiment could be conducted within two weeks, i.e., by Friday, the 15th, if approval was given immediately to go ahead with preparations. He was informed that this would be in the nature of a proof-test of a warhead which would apply to the Terrier fleet air defense guided missile, as well as to other tactical weapons. The President accepted this recommendation and instructed us to take the necessary steps to carry out this test on the 15th of September. The President was informed that this action would result in a general increase of activities at the test site and that, since these steps could not be hidden from the public view, it would become obvious that deliberate steps were being taken at the site to prepare for testing. The President said he was aware of this but that he was prepared to accept whatever press reaction might follow.

“It was pointed out to the President that John McCone had been on a television program yesterday, at which he was asked questions about the U.S. position with respect to nuclear weapons testing. McCone’s answers coincided with the general position being taken by the present administration. The President then expressed a desire to have McCone discuss this problem with him and a meeting was arranged for tomorrow morning, September 6th.

“The President then raised the question as to the relative merits of in-atmosphere as opposed to underground testing. A discussion followed during which Harold Brown and I assured him that most of the development tests now proposed for a test program could be conducted underground. The President was informed that underground tests would prove to be much more expensive than testing in the atmosphere.”
(Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 2, page 131)

Kennedy met with McCone from 10:12 to 10:55 a.m. on September 6. No memorandum of this conversation has been found.

65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 87 [Source](#)

Washington, September 5, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Decision

At a meeting in his office on Tuesday, September 5,^{[1](#)} the President ordered the resumption of underground weapons testing, and the following schedule was agreed:

On Friday, September 15, there will be tested a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] weapon. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]^{[2](#)}

The President also requested the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to consider the problem of atmospheric testing, as opposed to underground testing, and to produce a report with appropriate recommendations within two weeks.

McGeorge Bundy

^{*} [Source](#): Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Sec Def has seen."

^{[1](#)} See [Document 64](#).

^{[2](#)} A September 12 memorandum from Bundy to McNamara and Seaborg states [*text not declassified*] by Kennedy, at Seaborg's recommendation, for October 10. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61))

66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, September 5, 1961, 12:55 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. BUNDY

B said there appears to be another bang¹ and the Pres' patience is at an end and he proposes to announce he is resuming underground testing. B read the proposed statement.² The Sec said on the timing wait until morning to get the Belgrade people out of town.³ If that is possible he would like to take a look at it. B asked something about are we dealing with a slight difference between what he said and what he actually said???⁴ B said the 9th and he said immediately. The Sec said that is not what is bothering him—he is concerned about announcing testing and this order that preparations be made for laboratory and underground testing. Let that announcement stand and as far as the bang is concerned do it only when it makes sense from a testing point of view. B said it is clear in his mind this is the thing to do. He feels his flank needs to be guarded by this. The Sec said to say preparations are being taken immediately for an early resumption of underground testing not involving fall out. B asked what is the argument. The Sec said they can come back and will say we have been preparing for months. The argument is if they should come back in a day or so saying so—then they can say what they are doing now is playing the line that this is a pretext for resuming underground testing. The Sec said it could be done for the morning papers. B dictated the statement.⁵

^{*} [Source](#): Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

¹ Seaborg indicates that this third Soviet nuclear test was not detected until after the meeting described in [Document 64](#). (*Journal*, vol. 2, p. 132) ² Not found.

³ The Belgrade Conference adjourned on September 6. For the communiqué, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 374-384.

⁴ As on the source text.

⁵ Not found. For text of the statement by President Kennedy on the resumption of underground nuclear tests, released by the White House at 5 p.m. on September 5, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 355.

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, September 5, 1961.

1178. Eyes only for Ambassador. Deliver urgently to Prime Minister Macmillan the following letter from President Kennedy dated September 5.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to be sure that you understand fully my decision to resume underground testing.^{[1](#)} This decision became inevitable as soon as the Soviets resumed testing, and as their tests continued one after another—the only answer to our proposal of Sunday^{[2](#)}—it became clear to me that announcement of the decision could no longer be delayed. The world is being subjected to threats and terror. We have to show both our friends and our own people that we are ready to meet our own needs in the face of these new Soviet acts. And while of course we must keep our offer of Sunday open until September 9, I must say that the response in the first two days is not encouraging. As you know, we do not have in mind any early resumption of atmospheric testing unless unforeseen circumstances should require it. In my judgment, at this hour the gravest of our dangers is that we may seem less determined than Khrushchev.^{[3](#)}

With warm personal regards. John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

^{*} [Source](#): Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-561. Confidential; Niact. Approved by the President and Secretary Rusk. The time of transmission is not legible.

^{[1](#)} In a call to Bundy at 2:20 p.m. on September 5, Secretary Rusk asked if he should talk to the President about informing the British about the release of the testing statement. “Bundy said the thing had moved fast. Salinger was

contacted by the President and the whole thing was on the way before he got control.” Rusk indicated he would call the President. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No record of Rusk’s call to the President has been found. At an unspecified time prior to release of the testing statement, Rusk gave Caccia a copy. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 711.5611/9-561) ² September 3; see [Document 63](#). Khrushchev gave a preliminary response to the U.S.-U.K. proposal during an interview on September 5 with Cyrus Sulzberger, published in *The New York Times* on September 8. Khrushchev replied to the President and the Prime Minister in a statement of September 9. Extracts from the interview and Khrushchev’s statement are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, pp. 355-360 and 384-391.

³ In Macmillan’s reply, received at the White House on September 7, he stated that he understood the reasons that led to the decision, thought press reaction “fairly good” at least in the United Kingdom, and was very glad “to have your assurance that you do not contemplate any early resumption of tests in the atmosphere. This is a much larger question on which we must surely go very carefully.” While only a small minority opposed testing because of opposition to nuclear weapons, many more felt a “legitimate anxiety” about testing’s dangers to health. “We must not gratuitously cause them alarm and I would trust that you will take no decision to resume tests in the atmosphere without full prior consultation with us.” (Text in telegram 1240 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-761)

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, September 7, 1961, 9:22 p.m.

1241. Following message replies to Prime Minister's letter delivered September 7 which being sent you in immediate following eyes only telegram.^{[1](#)} Please deliver following, reporting time date delivery:

"September 7, 1961.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just received your message of today about atmospheric tests, and I am happy to assure you that we will consult carefully with you before any decision to resume atmospheric testing. I doubt if there will be any urgent need for such tests in the next few months. Over the long run, if the current Soviet position does not change, the situation may be quite different, and it may happen that we shall face again the same overriding need to test atmospherically that both our countries have experienced before. But the matter will be carefully weighed, and your opinion sought, before any such decision is made.

May I thank you also for your message of September fifth about nuclear tests. Obviously, it crossed our exchange about my decision to resume underground testing, but I am glad to have it as an expression of your thoughts.^{[2](#)}

We have given a lot of thought to the possibility of taking the testing problem into the Security Council promptly, and we are still looking it over, but on balance it does not seem promising to us. In the Security Council we could probably get a fairly good resolution, but we would also get a Soviet veto and, as you say, they would certainly try to confuse the matter with an amendment on underground tests. The result would be indecisive, and it would involve a lot of unrelated and uncontrolled noise. So, on balance, we are inclined to think that it is better not to press the case in that forum. We

have of course put down the whole problem of atomic testing for discussion in the General Assembly, and our two governments should keep in close touch on that as planning goes forward.

I agree with you that we should make a prompt statement in reply to any Soviet answer to our proposal of Sunday.³ It seems to me that whatever they say about underground tests or general and complete disarmament, our answer can be a straightforward one. We have now offered to make a treaty of control and inspection for the kinds of testing which require that assurance; we have offered an agreement to give up the kind of testing that can be detected without a special system. The Soviets have rejected both proposals and resumed fallout testing by unilateral decision; the responsibility for the consequences falls squarely on them.

Finally, let me also acknowledge your thoughtful letter of August 28th.⁴ Your statement of August 27th⁵ certainly hit exactly the right line, and I think we see eye to eye on the need for making it entirely clear that we are ready to enter into serious negotiations as soon as they can be useful. I am considering a more explicit statement on this point by the end of the week in view of the Belgrade efforts to show us the path of light and truth. I do not want Sukarno to come here with any illusion that he understands the need for negotiation better than I do. I expect to take up most of his time, in any event, by explaining the improvement in the world atmosphere that would result if he would promptly undertake fruitful negotiation with the Dutch on West New Guinea.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-761. Top Secret; Priority.

¹ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 67](#).

² In a covering note to the letter, Caccia indicated to Kennedy that the letter was drafted before Macmillan learned of Kennedy's decision to announce resumption of testing. In the letter, Macmillan suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom, following the Soviet Union's expected rejection of the September 3 atmospheric testing proposal, propose a U.N. resolution for an end to atmospheric testing by all nations, despite the risk of a Soviet amendment to include underground tests. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1960-1961) See the Supplement.

³ For text of a joint statement issued on September 9, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 403-404.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Reference is presumably to a statement Macmillan made on August 26 regarding Berlin.

69. Brief of Special National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, September 8, 1961.

SNIE 11-11-61: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 7 September 1961. Significant judgments of the Estimate are as follows:

Motivations for Testing

The Soviets have had increasing technical motivations for further nuclear weapons tests related to development of antimissile defenses; tests of high-yield and of low-yield devices; tests directed toward economy of fissionable materials and improving yield-to-weight ratio; and perhaps tests in new areas of development. Of these, the one relating to antimissile defenses has probably been the most urgent.

Technical and military requirements, which Khrushchev has said were factors being pressed by the Soviet military leaders were thus a major factor of increasing weight on the side of resumption. In July or August it appeared that the US had not decided upon early resumption of tests, and the Soviets had to decide whether to proceed themselves without the benefit of prior US resumption.

At the same time, developments in the world political situation, and particularly manifestations of firmness in the Western stand on Berlin, almost certainly played a major role in this decision at this time. When pressing military incentives to test came to be supplemented by important political ones, the decision was reached—probably in late July—to proceed with the tests for which contingent test site preparations had been underway for many months.

General Implications of the Soviet Announcement

The resumption of nuclear testing at this time was clearly intended to raise the level of fear and anxiety in the world in general, and to create a powerful impression of the strength and ruthlessness with which the Soviets intend to pursue their objectives. We believe the timing of the move reflects and dramatizes the turn by the Soviets to an openly militant and increasingly risky phase of tactics in relations with the West. Renewed testing accords with other recent demonstrations of Soviet military strength and of the Soviet determination to increase it.

By announcing resumption of tests two days prior to the convening of the Belgrade Conference, the Soviets probably believed that the desired effect on neutralist opinion—anxiety and clamor for East-West negotiations—would be enhanced by the use of shock tactics on an assembly of major neutralist leaders, and that much of the negative effect could be counteracted by lobbying at the conference.

The Chinese Communists, who almost certainly pressed the Soviets not to conclude a test ban will welcome the Soviet test resumption as a manifestation of aggressiveness in the struggle with capitalism. Although this should increase their demands for Soviet nuclear assistance, we do not believe that the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing indicates any increase in Moscow's willingness to assist the Chinese nuclear program.

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 350.09. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Richard Collins, Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, to McNamara. The full text of SNIE 11-11-61 is in the Supplement.

70. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, September 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Aspects of Nuclear Testing

1. In the course of consideration of the report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (the Panofsky Panel) at the August 8, 1961 National Security Council meeting,¹ you directed me to prepare a report on the disagreements on the intelligence aspects which were revealed in the discussion of the report.
2. I have met with General Lemnitzer, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, and Dr. Jerome Wiesner, representing the Panel because of the unavailability of Dr. Panofsky. We have agreed that the differences of view on the intelligence bearing upon nuclear testing fall into two areas: (a) evaluation of the evidence as to whether the Soviets have tested since 1958 and (b) the adequacy of our intelligence to make a judgment on the qualitative aspects of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile.
- 3.

With regard to the first point, whether the USSR has tested since 1958, all parties are in agreement that we cannot conclusively establish that the Soviets have or have not tested. Beyond this basic agreement, there are gradations of view somewhat as follows:

- a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, impressed by the negligible risks involved in testing, the technical needs of the USSR, and the consequent strong motivation to test, feel that there is a strong possibility that the Soviets have tested since 1958.
- b. The CIA takes into account the same factors as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but tends to attach greater weight to the possible political cost of exposure as a deterrent to the Soviets from any kind of testing with an appreciable chance of detection. For these reasons, CIA believes the

- conclusion that the Soviets have been conducting nuclear tests since the moratorium cannot be drawn from the available evidence.
- c. The Panel assumed an unqualified position of uncertainty with regard to whether or not there has been clandestine testing, basing its view on technical information without attempting to evaluate Soviet motivation.

It may be added that the divergent views of the JCS and the CIA are not new, but have been reflected in the National Intelligence Estimate drawn up last April² on the possibility of Soviet nuclear testing.

4. With respect to the qualitative aspects of the Soviet nuclear stockpile, the Panel and CIA believe that reasonable estimates on yield, weight, efficiency, and material composition of specific weapons can be made on the basis of Soviet tests and extrapolations therefrom, while the JCS believe that these estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty. However, the discussion on this point brought out that the authors of the JCS paper submitted to the National Security Council³ may not have had access to some recently received covert information available to the CIA and other elements of the JCS. General Lemnitzer agreed to review this information with the CIA and then decide whether any significant difference of opinion remained.
5. Although not directly relevant to the Panel's technical findings, the uncertainty concerning the Soviet stockpile was emphasized by the JCS to stress the absence of substantial hard information on the Soviet nuclear weapons program. On this point, there is agreement that, except for estimates derived from information on Soviet technical capabilities, the amount of fissionable material available, the probable size of the Soviet bomber and missile forces, and the existence and size of certain nuclear storage sites, the United States has no detailed knowledge of the numbers of various types of nuclear weapons within the Soviet stockpile.
6. In spite of some divergence of view with regard to the intelligence, our discussion brought out clearly that all parties agreed to the need for the United States to resume nuclear testing within a reasonable time.

Maxwell D. Taylor

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 9/8-9/26/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] weekend of 9/9/61." Copies were sent to Wiesner, Lemnitzer, Dulles, and Bundy.

¹ See [Document 53](#).

² [Document 17](#).

³ [Document 48](#).

71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, September 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

The Problem of a U.S. Initiative on “Fallout Testing” in a UN Forum Prior to the General Assembly

You have asked that we consider whether to do anything in the UN about “fallout testing” prior to the General Assembly.^{[1](#)}

We already have requested inscription of a nuclear test ban item on the agenda of the General Assembly,^{[2](#)} and I believe it would not be advisable now to take another initiative on this subject in any UN forum prior to the opening of the session on September 19.

While there might have been some advantage to such an initiative during the period of September 1 to 2, the announcement of our intention to resume testing has dissipated this advantage. Furthermore, another factor militating against taking such an initiative is the need to retain maximum flexibility—and credibility—for ourselves should atmospheric tests prove necessary in our national security interest.

There also is the added consideration that we can expect the testing question to be considered early in the proceedings of the General Assembly. We already have had indications of a possible move to bring it up for substantive discussion within a week or two after the opening of the General Assembly.

I recommend that the United States not take an initiative in the UN for consideration of the problem of “fallout testing” prior to the beginning of the General Assembly session on September 19.

Dean Rusk^{[3](#)}

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/9-1461. No classification marking.

¹ President Kennedy made the request at a meeting on September 5. (Memorandum by Cleveland, September 5, attached to a memorandum from Battle to Bundy, September 6; *ibid.*, 301/9-661) Additional information on this meeting is in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, pp. 482-484.

² See [footnote 3](#), [Document 83](#).

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger)[Source](#)

Washington, September 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Angles in UN Speech^{[1](#)}

Your draft strikes me as better than either Tom Wilson's or Vince Baker's.^{[2](#)} I like it for the very reason which may make others dislike it, i.e. it is hortatory and argumentative. We are locked in a crucial test of wills. Everybody knows it. Everybody is worried. This is not a time to avoid the real issues and talk only glittering generalities, without ever jousting with the USSR.

Now for some nit-picks.

1. You do not emphasize strongly enough one key forthcoming aspect of our new GCD proposals.^{[3](#)} For years Khrushchev has been beating us over the head that we are really not for GCD (i.e. we are against virtue). Now for the first time we heartily embrace GCD. We should make this crystal clear in order to rob Sovs of their biggest propaganda argument. It might suffice simply to insert the following after "disarmament" on bottom line of page 9: "Let no one cast doubt on our dedication to this goal."
2. Your crack at USSR on page 10 might gain strength by elaboration as follows:

"At one end of the spectrum the Soviet Union insists upon agreeing in advance on every step to be taken toward total disarmament—and embodying this agreement in a treaty acceptable to all UN members—before any disarmament whatsoever can take place. Their stand in effect stymies any concrete progress. Could this be their real intent?"

3. Another major feature of the new USDA proposals, which deserves highlighting in your draft, is that GCD alone is not enough. As we reduce armaments we must build up world peace-keeping machinery. Here our proposals are far superior to those of the Soviets, an advantage which should be exploited. Here too is an opportunity to take another whack at the troika. Even though Soviets say they will not use troika to prevent *inspection* if total disarmament takes place, they still insist upon it in the peace-keeping machinery. You could meet above points by beefing up first para. of VII on page 12.
4. Be wary of undue emphasis on starting disarmament process via “determination to eliminate reliance on weapons of mass destruction” (middle of page 11). To mention nuclears alone, without touting conventional arms reductions at the same time runs afoul of the so-called “linkage” issue which greatly concerns Defense. The President ruled on August 17⁴ that, while linkage would not be explicitly called for in USDA proposals, this was without prejudice to the merits of the case. If we now make policy through speeches which omit linkage, DOD may have a legitimate squawk. It should be consulted in any case. Moreover, our plan does not really call in early stages for “*elimination*” of such weapons, but rather for proportionate reduction by stages. True, the goal is eventual elimination but this should be clarified. One solution would be to mention that we favor conventional cuts (initially to 2.1 million) too.
5. Now we come to the two so-called Foster proposals⁵ —the reduction of jet medium bombers (bottom of page 11) and similar reductions in fissionable materials.⁶ Both are very sensible noises. First they lend concreteness, and thus credibility, to a set of proposals that are otherwise glittering generalities. Second, I don't see a prayer that Soviets would accept either of them. You may be aware that DOD (Nitze and perhaps Gilpatric) think such noises wholly inappropriate at a time of high tension over Berlin.⁷ Like de Gaulle, they regard it as nonsense to talk about disarmament when we are in fact building up. I emphatically disagree. To my mind, this is the very time when we should be most forthcoming in offering an alternative to the arms race. It is the obverse of the coin, the alternative road we would much prefer, the road which the Soviets are denying to us and to the entire world by their stance.

We've never had the Soviets more on the defensive about disarmament. Let's push our luck hard, and destroy their pose.

6. Moreover, a fissionable materials exchange at least would make real military sense in view of our vastly greater stockpile. As for the jet bombers, *both sides were phasing these out up until the recent crisis*; ergo, neither should find it so painful to resume doing so.
7. Beating the drum on *self-determination* is also highly desirable at this stage in history. On page 15 why not counterpoint our decolonization process against the "recolonization" process under the Bloc. For example, you might add to last full paragraph on page 15 the following: "Indeed, it is regrettable that at a time when the Western powers are granting the right of self-determination to their dependent territories, formerly independent nations have been denied this right in Eastern Europe by Soviet-dominated regimes." I don't think this smacks too much of "liberation."

R. W. Komer⁸

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert W. Komer 9/61. Confidential. Copies were sent to Sorensen, Rostow, and Bundy.

¹ Reference is to the President's forthcoming speech on disarmament before the U.N. General Assembly. For information on the final stages of the drafting of this speech, see Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy*, pp. 519-521. For text as delivered on September 25, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 465-475.

² Drafts not found. Thomas W. Wilson was Special Assistant for Public Affairs in IO, and Vincent Baker was Deputy Director of the Political Office in the U.S. Disarmament Administration.

³ The proposals as presented to the General Assembly on September 25 are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 475-482.

⁴ See [Document 56](#).

⁵ Two drafts of the "Foster Plan," No. 6 dated August 30 and No. 9 dated October 12, are attached to a summary of No. 9 dated November 2 by Major William Y. Smith of General Taylor's staff. (National Defense

University, Taylor Papers, #1 Disarmament 1961) The summary is in the Supplement.

⁶ In a September 20 memorandum to McNamara, the JCS opposed the Foster Plan's proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union deposit 30 medium-range jet bombers apiece with the United Nations for destruction. The JCS also opposed any plan for transfer of fissionable materials to international control prior to verified cessation of the production of fissionable materials by all producing states. A draft undated memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, not sent, states that at a meeting among Nitze and White House staff on September 19 it was agreed to omit a draft paragraph in the U.N. address on transfer of medium jet bombers, but to retain another on transfer of fissionable material. (Attachments to memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, September 20; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61)

⁷ More information on the intragovernmental debate on the desirability of presenting U.S. general disarmament proposals during the Berlin crisis is in Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, pp. 484-485. An unnumbered telegram from the Department to Hyannis Port, September 16, contains a message from Dean to the President supporting delivery of the disarmament address. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1661)

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

73. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State [Source](#)

New York, September 18, 1961, 9 p.m.

797. US-USSR bilaterals.¹ Deliver President by 8:00 a.m. From McCloy and Dean. Further to our telephone conversation on the subject of the Soviet acceptance of our Statement of Principles² with the exception of one sentence, Dean and I are inclined on balance to recommend we delete the sentence and record agreement on the statement as it stands.³

While we sense the possible political disadvantages of reaching an agreement on principles which could be portrayed to be more meaningful than it actually is at this time, we believe this must be weighed against the political difficulties of refusing to agree after we have gone so far in pursuing these bilateral talks with the avowed purpose of reaching agreement. Such a refusal, after Soviet acceptance of our proposal in total with the exception of one sentence, could be used to our political disadvantage as indicating we are seeking a pretext to avoid agreement. If the Soviets were asking us to change our fundamental position in deleting the sentence in question or if there was anything in the remaining text which was inconsistent with our position, it would be one thing; however, this is not the case. They agree that the substantive question could be reserved for future discussion, without prejudice to the US position or theirs.

Our position in refusing to accept this would seem artificial since it would represent a reversal of our previous position, which was that the US was prepared to go into substantive negotiations without any agreement on principles. It may be regarded as strange if now, after the Soviets have accepted so much of our language on principles including much that is helpful to us, we in effect refuse to agree on a framework for future negotiations because one point is disagreed. Furthermore, agreement would break Soviet monopoly on general and complete disarmament, and give it a

distinctly American twist. It would also be consistent with our general posture of willingness to explore possibilities for negotiations with Soviets.

We are not minimizing the importance of the sentence at issue. But we believe we can make it quite clear that in omitting the sentence we are not at this time requiring the explicit settlement of this particular issue as a precondition to resumption of the negotiations which we have gone on record as seeking even without a Statement of Principles ever since they were broken off in June 1960 by the Soviets.

If this clause is removed from para 6, or if it is replaced with language not explicitly affirming US position re clandestine activities, which we will try to obtain, we believe our position would still be fully safeguarded in future negotiations for following reasons:

First, we have already handed Soviets memorandum officially stating our position in strongest terms; we would file this memorandum with UN and make it part of public record.

Second, we would make any omission or modification of last clause of para 6 subject of a letter from me to Zorin in which we formally restate our substantive position, and affirm that we have in no way modified it and will continue strongly to demand it.

Third, our disarmament plan contains explicit statement of our position in subpara (b) of "affirm" section of Preamble.⁴ Introduction of our plan in the UN will thus once more reaffirm our position.

Fourth, we can make certain that in any public statement we make during the UN debate on disarmament we will forcefully and explicitly affirm the US position.

We know this presents a problem but we repeat on balance we think that the disadvantages of refusing the offer outweigh the advantages. We thought it would be useful for you to have these points spelled out before you when we talk Tuesday morning.

If you do agree to proceeding as recommended, we believe it will be important to background the press in order to put the Statement of Principles in perspective as a fairly limited step which should not be taken as indicating disarmament is just around the corner; it only means that an

obstacle to resuming disarmament negotiations is cleared away. It does not mean that we can in any way relax our efforts to safeguard our rights in Berlin so long as these continue to be threatened.⁵

Stevenson

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1861. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House.

¹ The U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament resumed in New York at USUN on September 6. Seven sessions were held (Nos. 19-25), the final one on September 19. Documentation on these talks is *ibid.*, 600.0012 for September 1961. The Department's instruction prior to these talks specified that U.S. "willingness to resume bilateral disarmament talks in New York will help maintain our posture of reasonableness. However, since the Soviets are now in a highly vulnerable propaganda position we should not make any undue or unnecessary concessions in order to achieve agreement on principles." (Telegram 428 to USUN, September 2; *ibid.*, 600.0012/9-261) See the Supplement.

² The text as presented on September 14 has not been found, but it is apparently identical to the agreed text of September 20, with the exception noted in [footnote 3](#) below. For the final text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 439-442. The memorandum of the McCloy-Zorin meeting held September 14, at which the U.S. draft was tabled, and telegram 794 from USUN, September 18, reporting Zorin's acceptance of all but one sentence of the U.S. draft, are in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-2851 and 600.0012/9-1861, respectively. Both are in the Supplement.

³ The text of the sentence and an explanation of its significance to the United States is in a letter from McCloy to Zorin, September 20, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 442. Zorin's reply, also dated September 20, and a statement by the Soviet Government on the bilateral talks are *ibid.*, pp. 443-444 and 444-458, respectively.

⁴ The language on this point in the U.S. general and complete disarmament plan as released on September 25 is *ibid.*, p. 476.

⁵ At 5:38 p.m. on September 19, Rusk called Bundy to discuss approval of this McCloy-Dean proposal. “B asked if the Sec were satisfied. The Sec said he is sure himself they can live with it but thinks it will take careful backgrounding—it is not a disarmament agreement or plan. It is a statement of principles upon which we are agreed, which will be taken fully into account in future negotiations.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

74. Paper Prepared for President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

NUCLEAR TEST PROGRAM

In order to compare the effectiveness of testing nuclear explosives in various media, as requested in NSC Action Memo No. 87,¹ the various requirements for such tests must first be analyzed. Although these requirements have been presented previously, they are reviewed here in a relevant framework as a convenience to understanding. The United States principal aims may be categorized as follows:

1. To improve weapons.
2. To measure the effects of weapons.
3. To explore peaceful applications of explosions.

In all of these areas some progress can be and is made without nuclear tests through theoretical analysis and laboratory experiments. However, in every case after such work, full scale nuclear tests are required for confirmation and extension of the information. By careful design of tests, while a particular test may have one primary objective, measurements can be carried out which support all of the national aims. Thus, while a test may be required to study a new weapons design concept, the explosion can be used also to obtain weapons effects data and to contribute to peaceful applications.

Let us now discuss more fully each of the national aims and indicate the kinds of testing required to obtain the measurements of interest.

The objective of nuclear weapons development in the United States is directed toward satisfying military requirements for both limited and general war. To the extent practicable, weapons are developed which are discriminating in effects and which provide flexibility in employment. Two major areas of effort in past tests which require continuing emphasis in future tests are the increase of weapon yield for a given weight for strategic

weapons, particularly for missiles, and the reduction in size of tactical weapons. Another area of effort in tests prior to the moratorium was the development of “clean” weapons having reduced radioactive fallout. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Tests are urgently required in all these areas and we can expect great progress toward the following developments:

1. Missile warheads of smaller weight which will lead to smaller, more mobile, and more serviceable missiles or will allow better penetration through enemy defenses for a given total payload.
2. AICBM developments, mostly in terms of effects of nuclear explosions on incoming re-entry vehicles. The questions to be answered include more precise understanding of the effective range of known effects, the possibility of enhancing these effects by special design of the defensive weapons or choice of the circumstances of detonation, and possible unknown effects. This information is pertinent not only for defensive considerations but also in important to our own penetration of enemy defenses.
3. New types of tactical weapons, including [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].
4. Further study and development of reliable low-fission yield (clean) warheads.

The effort of DOD and AEC will be to develop weapons pointed at specific military requirements, rather than simply to develop higher yield weapons without obvious military benefit. Yet it must be realized that frequently in the past, and possibly in the future, new concepts or ideas of great value have developed from the effort to fulfill specific weapon needs.

An important part of development is related to increasing by all possible technical means the safety of all nuclear warheads and to incorporating various innovations to assure against unauthorized or illegal use.

Weapons systems tests will provide much needed information on the weapon system and effects in the environment in which the system will be used operationally.

Weapons effects measurements are urgently required in many areas to evaluate the effectiveness of our weapons in different environments. The

areas of principal uncertainty are the effects in the atmosphere, particularly at high altitudes, which are pertinent to our missile defense, and to radio propagation and radar blackout; to effects in the oceans which are pertinent to fleet operations and anti-submarine warfare efforts; and to effects on hardened underground sites, including both blast and electromagnetic pulses. We know all too little of effects of surface and subsurface bursts on partially protected structures and communications essential to effective command and control. These data are needed to decrease the vulnerability of our missile systems and to increase the understanding of the effects associated with the vulnerabilities of our missile sites. At the same time steps will be taken toward achieving a high degree of kill probability on the enemy's delivery systems, insuring continuous communications and radar capabilities, and determining optimum employment tactics for both fleet and land warfare. Sufficient data are not available in all these cases to be able to make calculations with sufficient reliability. Also, because additional considerations in the past three years have indicated more relevance of some effects than originally believed in these areas, there is a serious deficiency in data. Furthermore, it is highly probable, as history has shown repeatedly, that new kinds of pertinent effects of great military significance may be discovered.

The Vela Program, while directed primarily toward evaluation and development of methods of monitoring a treaty of test cessation, is also related heavily to the success of our intelligence efforts. In addition the Plowshare Program, which is a study of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, can derive large amounts of critical information from explosions for other purposes. However, to explore all the potentialities, specific explosions will be necessary to support both of these programs.

What are the necessary environmental requirements to meet the various stated objectives? In other words, can the necessary data be obtained by underground tests alone or do other environments need to be considered? These are best discussed by category, as follows:

1. Weapons Development

Many of the essential data for weapons development can be obtained through underground testing; however, tests to satisfy development

requirements for our larger weapons may be and probably are beyond the capabilities of underground testing which probably cannot be economically extended above a few hundred kilotons. The specific areas of weapons development that would require such large yields are:

- a. *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- b. *[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- c. Significant steps toward bombs of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* or more would require large yield above ground tests if it were decided such weapons are needed. It should be noted that a preliminary design exists, that might not require testing, of a *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*.
- d. Proof test of strategic bombs and warheads.
- e. There are no weapons systems performance tests which can be conducted in an underground environment. Systems which experience severe environments and which should be tested are the ICBM and AICBM missile systems. An example of such a test which would result in weapons development, weapons effects and weapons systems data would be to explode an antimissile warhead against our own ICBM warhead. Of course, this type test must be conducted in the high atmosphere.

For development tests at these yields either atmospheric or space shots are required. The time required to get ready for space experiments could vary from a relatively few months for simple proof tests, to at least two years for more complicated experiments.

2. Weapons Effects

In the consideration of weapons effects testing, great limitations appear with underground explosions. Examples of the most critical areas of desired measurements are:

a.

Blackout and Communication Effects

A very important known area requiring above ground nuclear test is in connection with blackout and communication effects caused by very high

altitude nuclear bursts. Little information is available on this subject from previous tests. Calculation of the effects is uncertain, and methods for simulation of the phenomena are unknown. Understanding of these effects is important to our own penetration capabilities as well as for anti-ICBM. To explore effects in this area would require explosions about as follows:

High yield at about 450,000 feet for effects in the D-region.

High yield at about 1,500,000 feet for effects in the upper ionospheric region.

High yield at about 3,500,000 feet to understand effects associated with magnetic containment and disturbances.

b.

Anti-ICBM Effects

The kill mechanisms for anti-ICBM systems must be better defined. These include X-rays, neutrons, and possibly thermal and blast effects. While some X-ray data can be obtained through the use of vacuum pipes underground, the studies would be limited to low yields. One experiment of this type is scheduled for spring 1962 [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] (Marshmallow Event). However, for larger yields and to get gross effects under actual environmental conditions as well as to search for unexpected phenomena, it seems impossible to avoid the necessity of high altitude bursts. At the present time no specific experiment has been designed.

c. *Atomic Demolition Munitions*—Of less over-all importance but of considerable interest for atomic demolition purposes and Plowshare (excavation), cratering explosions would be required to measure the throwout and distribution of radioactivities from such underground detonations. In this case experiments can be designed in such a way that the fallout that does occur will be highly localized (for example, to the test site in Nevada). As part of the Plowshare program two cratering experiments have been designed, one [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in hard rock at the Nevada Test Site and one at [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in Alaska. While these experiments

are basic to Plowshare, the results would apply to the employment of atomic demolitions.

d.

Hardened Sites

Finally, more data are needed for the design of hardened sites and the protection from induced electrical currents generated by surface or near surface bursts. Experiments are not yet designed, but to acquire the most useful information would require experiments involving construction in geological media characteristics of our hardened sites. Some preliminary information on structural response will be developed from the planned Hardhat experiment, which will be [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] underground in granite at the Nevada Test Site, and is scheduled for early 1962.

As a final point, it should be emphasized that even for the weapons development program, particularly in the critical months ahead, the United States does not possess enough underground sites to meet all of the urgent test needs. By having the option of some surface or above surface tests, and by avoiding too conservative a policy with respect to venting, a greater rate of progress can be achieved. (Venting limits should be related to levels of off-site contamination such as meet public health and safety standards.)

Once the present lack of readiness and backlog of test requirements have been overcome, it would probably be possible, assuming a large investment in facilities, to carry out an adequate program at a satisfactory rate underground except for the large scale tests. There may, however, be unforeseen obstacles which could make this more difficult than now anticipated. For example, our first underground shot in the present series [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] some of the diagnostic data were lost; and what was more serious, an unsuspected underground pool of water seems to have vented into the cavity or tunnel, causing contaminated steam to permeate that entire tunnel system. This may delay work in that tunnel complex for a few weeks.

It is important to recall that nuclear technology is a rapidly changing science—that surprises are in store. It is important that our opponents not be

the ones to make the first major discoveries and we can assume that their present test series include tests of the advanced ideas they have been able to develop over the past three years. It is also important to recall the major surprises the United States has had in every test series, and that major steps can be taken only by testing. The present Soviet tests could easily put them ahead of the United States in important areas, and by testing above the surface with large yields they have a substantial advantage in ease of experimentation and rate of progress under present circumstances.

In the past the Atomic Energy Commission-Department of Defense in conducting their experiments on the surface, underground, in the atmosphere, and in the oceans have developed operational procedures which have assured the public health and safety. These were accomplished by appropriately controlling areas of fallout or other disturbance, by development of reliable prediction methods, by using explosive yields as small as possible consistent with the experimental objectives, and by limiting the number of explosions to those required for development or effects data. A great deal can be accomplished to limit contamination through the firing of scaled-down versions [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The safety record is extraordinary. Future tests will be given the same careful consideration as in the past. The amount of radioactivity released will be limited to a minimum and in all cases will be very much below the concentrations at which there is judged to be a public health and safety hazard.

This does leave the question of genetic effects, which may exist down to any dose level. Past tests have increased temporarily the natural background of penetrating radiation by a few percent, which may have produced calculable but not observable genetic effects. For the foreseeable atmospheric shots it would appear that the total expected fallout would be smaller than for the U.S. Hardtack series of 1958.

In summary, optimum progress in weapon and device development and in obtaining effects information, would involve a diversified test capability, underground, atmospheric, underwater, and ultimately exoatmospheric.

In addition to minimizing problems of contamination, underground testing has advantages in certain cases; for example, to deny intelligence

information to the enemy, for diagnostics in specific instances, and for relative freedom from weather delays. Atmospheric tests are essential for large yield tests, for most effects determinations, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons, on nuclear weapons and on equipment. Determination of effects against underground installations should be possible largely through underground tests.

It must be recognized, however, that even those tests which can be done underground can in many instances be done much faster and less expensively in the atmosphere. Accordingly, in the event that large fission yield weapons are authorized in the atmosphere, small weapon tests not requiring heavy instrumentation might just as well be conducted on balloons in the interest of speed since they will contribute little additional activity to worldwide fallout.

The above considerations lead to the need to take immediate steps to ready ourselves for the whole spectrum of tests even though the actual decision to test other than underground may be made later and be based on other than technical or economic considerations. It is important that the President have the flexibility of decision inherent in a readiness posture.

For example, with some procurement and equipment maintenance actions, it should be possible to improve our readiness to test on balloons at the NTS so that we could test on one week's notice. Limited preparedness steps with respect to Eniwetok could put us on a three months' readiness posture for that site.

In any event, if a decision is made to resume testing in the atmosphere, tests should and can be confined to total yields that will not have too great an effect on worldwide fallout.

We therefore recommend that:

1. The presently planned test program proceed under the assumption that it will be conducted underground during the next year. Too conservative a policy with respect to venting should not be required.²
2. Exploration and appropriate preparatory steps be taken toward providing an underground test capability for the indefinite future.

3. Preparations be made for possible atmospheric tests in the range up to a few tens of kilotons at the Nevada Test Site. This capability should be available in the near future to give the President flexibility of decision in case of necessity.
4. Plans be made and steps be taken by the AEC and DoD to bring the Eniwetok Proving Ground to a three months' readiness posture. At least for the time being, these steps should be of such a nature as not to imply a commitment to early resumption of testing at Eniwetok.
5. The possibility of completely seaborne operations be given some attention.
6. Vela (detection) and Plowshare (peaceful uses) tests should proceed underground. Some experiments may be only partially contained under such conditions that fallout can be confined on-site (or nearby in remote areas).
7. Particularly because of the high altitude effects tests which will have great military significance, the United States should make no public statement foreclosing the possibility of carrying out a limited number of atmospheric nuclear explosions.³

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, June-Sept 61. Secret; Restricted Data. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to President Kennedy on September 20 under cover of a brief letter signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg. Another copy of the paper is in the Kennedy Library, National Security File, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/8-26/61.

¹ [Document 65](#).

² Seaborg's journal entry for September 15 states that at the initial test conducted that day in Nevada some venting, or release of radioactivity above ground, had occurred. (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, p. 163)

³ A September 29 memorandum from the JCS to McNamara recommended nuclear testing in the atmosphere. In an October 9 letter to the President, Gilpatric presented a detailed exposition of a testing program including many atmospheric and high altitude tests, with a request that the President "grant approval to prepare for a comprehensive test program." (Washington

National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, June-Sept 61 and Oct 61, respectively) Both are in the Supplement.

75. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

New York, September 21, 1961, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin, Disarmament, Red China

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
EUR—Mr. Kohler
S/B—Mr. Bohlen
D/P—Mr. Akalovsky (Interpreting)

USSR

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin. A telegraphic summary of this part of the conversation is printed in [volume XIV, pages 431–433](#).]

Without replying to the Secretary's last comment, Mr. Gromyko said that he now wanted to express his views on some other problems not [*sic*] related to the question of disarmament and China. He thought that the principles agreed yesterday between the USSR and the US had produced a favorable impression on the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, as well as throughout the world.

The Secretary agreed that was right.

Mr. Gromyko resumed, saying that if there were a real desire to promote disarmament then the Soviet Government was of the opinion that progress could be made in the disarmament field, in bringing about a disarmament agreement, and in implementing such measures as would rid mankind of the burden of arms and lead to a radical improvement also in Soviet-American relations. It would be of great significance in promoting general and complete disarmament if the US and the USSR would agree on bringing the Chinese People's Republic into the talks.

American statesmen, including the Secretary himself, had said that disarmament would be impossible without the participation of China. This was true, but it was not possible to elaborate a disarmament treaty and then simply submit it to the Chinese Government for signature when they had not been party to the negotiations. The United States had been negotiating with the Chinese People's Republic at the ambassadorial level in Geneva and then Warsaw for many years, had participated in 1954 with the Chinese in the Indo-China conference, and was now negotiating at the same table on Laos. Consequently, what reason could there be for the United States not to negotiate with the Chinese People's Republic on the all-important question of disarmament? Turning to Red China's membership in the UN, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government considered the United States position on the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the UN to be unjustified. That position would find no support. Solution of this question would be important to the UN, to Soviet-American relations, and of course also to relations between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. In any event, this was not a third-rate problem.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to raise this question in these talks. Perhaps he and Mr. Rusk could reach some informal understanding which could later be formalized.

The Secretary replied that he would have to take this matter under advisement. There were some practical problems. Certainly the United States recognized that effective disarmament, at least in the long run, would require the participation of Peiping. In this connection, he cited the US position in the nuclear test proposals providing for release from obligations if other governments, such as the Chinese Communists, did not tie in. However, there were some differences between this problem and the question of UN membership. Moreover, our experience in trying to negotiate with the Chinese Communists had not been encouraging. He commented that the Russians might also have found life with Peiping to be difficult.

Mr. Gromyko denied that the Soviet Union had difficulties with the CPR.

[Here follows discussion of a press statement on the meeting.]

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation:
Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky. The meeting was
held in the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Towers.

76. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Putsunda?, September 29, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, At present I am on the shore of the Black Sea. When they write in the press that Khrushchev is resting on the Black Sea it may be said that this is correct and at the same time incorrect. This is indeed a wonderful place. As a former Naval officer you would surely appreciate the merits of these surroundings, the beauty of the sea and the grandeur of the Caucasian mountains. Under this bright Southern sun it is even somehow hard to believe that there still exist problems in the world which, due to lack of solutions, cast a sinister shadow on peaceful life, on the future of millions of people.

But as you will fully understand, I cannot at this time permit myself any relaxation. I am working, and here I work more fruitfully because my attention is not diverted to routine matters of which I have plenty, probably like you yourself do. Here I can concentrate on the main things.

[Here follows discussion of general foreign policy issues and Berlin.]

I should like in this connection to dwell upon some of the basic problems which now preoccupy the whole world since the future of mankind depends on their solution. It can be said that in the disarmament question which is the major question of our time there have now appeared certain gleams. I would like to see those gleams in the fact that we have reached agreement on submitting to the United Nations General Assembly a "Statement of Principles" as a joint proposal of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. so that in subsequent negotiations a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be elaborated on its basis. Certainly it must not be forgotten that so far this is an agreement in regard to the principles of disarmament. This is as yet far from the achievement of the actual agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the more so this is not the practical start of such disarmament. But it is precisely the conclusion of such an agreement and its

implementation within the shortest possible time that all the nations are expecting of us. For them and for all of us that would mean great joy.

It is important to note that even understanding on the principles of disarmament which we have succeeded in reaching after protracted and intense effort and only after you came to the White House, is a good thing too. Naturally such understanding is not an end in itself. It must, so to say, be the harbinger, the first successful step on the road to general and complete disarmament. That is what we would like to hope.

If, Mr. President, you are striving towards that noble goal—and I believe that is the case—if agreement of the United States on the principles of disarmament is not merely a diplomatic or tactical manoeuvre, you will find complete understanding on our part and we shall stint no effort in order to find a common language and reach the required agreement together with you.

The Soviet Union, as you are well aware, has always advocated the prompt implementation of general and complete disarmament. The solution of that question would, in our profound conviction, radically promote the settlement of other major international problems as well. Our position in that respect is still unchanged.

But you will agree with me, Mr. President, that the present international situation and its tension can hardly be assessed as a simple arithmetical sum total of unsolved issues. After all, the series of measures and counter-measures aimed at strengthening the armaments of both sides which have already been put into effect by our Governments in connection with the aggravation of the German question cannot be disregarded. I do not want here to engage in an argument as to who is right or wrong in this matter. Let us leave this aside for the time being. The main thing is that events are unfortunately continuing to develop in the same unfavourable direction. Instead of confidence we are turning to an even greater aggravation. Far from bringing the possibility of agreement between us on disarmament closer, we are, on the contrary, worsening the situation still further. That is another important reason why the Soviet Union is now attaching such exclusive significance to the German question. We cannot escape the fact that there has been a second world war and that the problems we have

inherited from the last war—first and foremost the conclusion of a German peace treaty—require their solution.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and Laos.]

I am now working on the preparation of two reports which I shall deliver at the Congress of our Communist Party: a progress report and a report on the Program of the Party. Naturally, in those reports I cannot pass over such questions as disarmament and the German question. These are the major questions of the day because on their solution depends the course which relations between our countries take in their development, and consequently the course world events take: that is whether they will develop towards the consolidation of peace and cooperation among States or whether they will proceed in a different direction, a dangerous one for mankind. We want to find the solutions of both these questions, we want to clear the road for an improvement of relations between our countries, for the assurance of peaceful coexistence and peace on earth.

Please convey my best wishes to your wife. I wish you and your entire family good health.

I should like to believe that by joint effort we shall succeed in surmounting the existing difficulties and in making our contribution to the solution of the international problems which preoccupy the nations. And then together with you we shall be able to celebrate the successes achieved in the strengthening of peace, and this is something that the peoples of our countries, as well as all men on earth, are awaiting impatiently.

Accept my respects,

N. Khrushchev¹

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 76 D 435, Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence, 1961-1963. No classification marking. For the full text of this letter, see [vol. VI, Document 21](#) .

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, September 29, 1961.

SUBJECT

DOD Study on Atmospheric Testing

I do not believe that there are any critical requirements for nuclear tests in the atmosphere at this time. The material presented in the attached study^{[1](#)} does not change the following summary conclusion on this subject by the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing under the chairman-ship of Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky.

“The range of weapon development tests which can be undertaken would not be seriously impaired if only underground test were permitted. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the restriction to underground tests would make some tests more difficult and costly. In addition, some weapons effects tests at high altitude of interest to (but on the basis of present knowledge not critical to) the AICBM problem could not be carried out if testing is only permitted underground.”

It should be noted that none of the atmospheric tests discussed in the attached study, with the exception of certain large yield proof tests, could in fact be conducted for some time. The large yield proof tests in question could be conducted in space with some delay and additional cost. Therefore, a decision as to whether or not to initiate atmospheric testing in the near term should weigh the relative importance of the increased speed of weapons development and reduced cost of atmospheric testing against the political problems resulting from fallout associated with atmospheric testing. Aside from the issue of speed and economy, there is not any particular technical pressure for an early decision on atmospheric testing since the important tests for which atmospheric testing would be necessary for technical reasons could not be conducted for some time. Nevertheless, it

may be desirable to work out the plans for useful tests that might require long lead-time components.

The limited technical requirements for early resumption of atmospheric testing (apart from increased speed and reduced costs) are best shown by consideration of the specific areas set forth in the attached study. Under Weapons Development (p. 4-5) five areas are listed: (1) large yield clean weapons; (2) *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* (3) *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* (4) proof test of strategic warheads; and (5) AICBM-ICBM systems tests. Only the AICBM-ICBM systems tests inherently need to be conducted in the atmosphere. The other tests are judged to be unsuited for underground testing solely for cost considerations and could be conducted in space as well as in the atmosphere. In none of the cases, except proof tests, could actual devices be ready for test in the near future. This is particularly true in the case of complete systems test of Nike Zeus. It should be noted that military requirements do not now exist for *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. If such requirements did exist and it was desirable to avoid atmospheric testing, these requirements could be met reasonably well by modifications of existing designs. *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* strategic warheads where such increases are of most interest, it would presumably be possible to test such a device underground at a reduced yield of a few hundred kilotons at such time as it would be available for test.

Under Weapons Effects (p. 5-7), four areas are listed in the study: (1) blackout and communications; (2) anti-ICBM effects; (3) atomic demolition munitions; and (4) hardened sites. There is no question that underground testing places significant limitations on the effects data that can be obtained and that important information could be obtained from atmospheric testing. However, the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing concluded that additional effects information in these areas is not critical at this time to any of our military systems. In view of the complex nature of the experiments, none of these effects tests could be conducted in the atmosphere in the near future with the exception of the very low military priority area of atomic demolition munitions.

With respect to blackout and communications, there is no question that high altitude tests would be necessary to obtain more quantitative information in this area and that this information would be militarily useful. However, as pointed out in the report of the Ad Hoc Panel, we already have considerable information in this area and know what steps must be taken to assure the operation of our AICBM and communications systems. With respect to AICBM effects, additional information would also certainly be very valuable. However, as also pointed out in the report of the Ad Hoc Panel, a great deal of information is available on this subject and the problem is well understood theoretically. Only recently have serious efforts been made to react to the already available information. In this area, much additional information can probably best be obtained by non-nuclear laboratory tests and by carefully instrumented underground experiments such as the proposed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Nevertheless, an over-all AICBM system test, if desired, would require an atmospheric test. Such a systems evaluation test is some years in the future.

The need for additional information on atomic demolition munitions appears to be of very low priority. Such weapons, which are not very significant in our military posture, can certainly be effectively used on the basis of present effects information. The need to determine the relation between depth of burial and radioactive fallout is more important in determining the method of operation and acceptability of nuclear explosions for peaceful excavation purposes. However, the importance of this issue should be considered separately from military requirements. With regard to hardened sites, a great deal of information is available and more will be obtained from the planned underground Hardhat experiment. While a test of the over-all vulnerability (including possible electromagnetic effects) of a hardened site would involve atmospheric tests, such tests are probably not required if full use is made of available data. If it should be decided to go ahead with such systems evaluation tests, they could not be conducted for some time to come.

With regard to the specific recommendations in the attached paper, I would offer the following comments:

- (1) I agree with the recommendation that “the presently planned test program proceed under the assumption that it will be conducted underground during the next year.” As a separate issue, I believe that the tests in question should be carried out underground as quickly as possible, with particular emphasis on priority items, and should not extend over the next year if the time can be shortened. With regard to the recommendation on venting, I agree that the testing policy should not be so conservative as to not permit the possibility of small amounts of gas venting through fissures as occurred in the 15 September 1961 test. This would not only apply undue constraints on the AEC; but also the public relations problem will have been met since gas venting has already occurred and will be shortly announced. However, as long as we are maintaining a posture for public relations purposes of only testing underground, policy should not be relaxed to a point that would permit only partial containment of an explosion such as occurred in 1958 in the Blanca shot which broke the surface and vented several per cent of its fission products directly into the air. From the point of view of public relations, such detonations would probably be looked on as essentially the same as atmospheric testing.
- (2) I agree with the recommendation that “exploration and appropriate preparatory steps be taken toward providing an underground test capability for the indefinite future.” This will provide an important future capability.
- (3) I am not convinced that it is necessary or even desirable at this time to implement the recommendation that “preparations be made for possible atmospheric tests in the range up to a few tens of kilotons at the Nevada Test Site.” Tests of these small yields can easily be conducted underground. Such tests would satisfy few, if any, of the special test requirements associated with atmospheric testing. The reason for this type of testing would be to accelerate substantially the present test schedule. A decision to undertake such atmospheric tests would appear to be desirable only if it were determined that there would be less adverse world reaction to such fallout tests than to the continuation of our underground tests at a future time when the Soviets may discontinue testing. Unless a definite decision is made at an early date to conduct such small yield tests in the atmosphere, contingency preparations should

probably be restricted to long lead-time items not otherwise available in connection with underground tests.

- (4) While I do not object to the recommendation to bring the Eniwetok Proving Grounds to a three month readiness posture, I would suggest that before there are any significant expenditures for this purpose an evaluation should be made of the relative costs and timing of space testing. In addition, consideration should be given as to whether the proposed systems tests (i.e., AICBM and ICBM) which could not be conducted in space would in fact be conducted at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds.
- (5) I would agree with the recommendation that “the possibility of completely seaborne operations be given some attention” for comparison with the other methods of conducting atmospheric tests.
- (6) I agree with the recommendation that “Vela (detection) and Plowshare (peaceful uses) tests should proceed underground.” I do not, however, believe that a final determination should be made at this time as to whether or not Plowshare experiments that are only “partially contained” should be undertaken. Such a decision would clearly depend on the experiment in question and the circumstances existing at the time. I am not aware of any proposal for Vela shots that are only “partially contained.”
- (7) I agree with the final recommendation that “... the U.S. should make no public statement foreclosing the possibility of carrying out a limited number of atmospheric nuclear explosions.”

Jerry

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/27-10/11/61. Secret.

¹ [Document 74](#).

78. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, [*date not declassified*].

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, RD/Codeword, 11-61, USSR. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extract—5 pages of source text and the document number not declassified.]

79. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 7, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In his memorandum of September 22, 1961,^{[1](#)} advising the Commission of your approval of our proposed program for resumption of testing of nuclear weapons, Mr. Bundy indicated that you wanted the schedule accelerated if possible.

This issue has been thoroughly investigated during my absence. In our consideration of all possible avenues for speeding up the test program we are studying the possibility of using a weapon device in connection with the Gnome shot of the Plowshare program scheduled for December. However, it is the conclusion of the Commission that we cannot accomplish any significant speed-up in the presently-planned program without resorting to atmospheric testing, although it is not the purpose of this letter to make a recommendation for atmospheric testing at this time.

Due to its very nature, underground testing requires a substantial amount of advance planning and preparation. For the next year, therefore, the scale of our test program is limited primarily by the capacity of the facilities at the Nevada Test Site. Our experience in the first event in the current series has also shown that unforeseen events can further limit the rate of progress. In this instance a venting of steam carrying radioactive materials contaminated one of our two major tunnel complexes at the Nevada site. We are working three shifts per day to clean up the tunnel, but it may be unusable for a month or more.

Therefore, if you should determine that our test program should be accelerated and increased in scope, atmospheric testing would be a necessary supplement to our current underground program. This is particularly true with regard to the detonation of devices of higher yields and those tests desired by the DOD for effects information and to prove weapons systems. Additional factors to be considered in evaluation of the

pros and cons of resuming atmospheric tests are included in the joint AEC-DOD report submitted to you on September 20, 1961.^{[2](#)}

In this connection, we have noted recent cables from Ambassador Stevenson to the State Department regarding the resolutions being introduced at the current U.N. General Assembly suggesting various types of moratoria, including a ban on atmospheric testing.^{[3](#)} I enclose a copy of a letter of even date which I have sent to Secretary Rusk outlining our views on these matters.^{[4](#)}

Respectfully,

Glenn T. Seaborg

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/27-10/11/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

^{[1](#)} Not found.

^{[2](#)} [Document 74](#).

^{[3](#)} These USUN cables deal with various permutations of possible U.N. resolutions regarding nuclear testing issues and are in Department of State, Central File 700.5611 for September and October 1961. Regarding the eventual U.S. position on these issues, see [Document 83](#).

^{[4](#)} Not found attached. In this October 7 letter, Seaborg reviewed the history of the test ban moratorium, stated that the comprehensive nature of the Soviet test series had “given them an important relative advantage,” and concluded that in AEC’s opinion, “these factors clearly constitute strong reasons for retaining the President’s power to initiate atmospheric testing should he deem it necessary in the interest of national security.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, pp. 225-226) See the Supplement.

80. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle)[Source](#)

Washington, October 7, 1961.

In connection with the policy planning paper of September 13^{[1](#)} on the subject of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, I am not convinced that we should depart from our stated policy that we are opposed to the further extension of national nuclear weapons capability. For us to assist some other country, even for important political or psychological reasons, would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit. Our problems with other countries and other continents on this matter could become quite unmanageable. Further, we must keep in mind that our policy rests upon the geometric progression of political difficulties as the number of atomic powers increases. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

DR

^{*} Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Top Secret. Drafted by Rusk.

^{[1](#)} Reference is to McGhee's September 13 memorandum to Rusk, which argued that to counter the security and propaganda impact of a Chinese nuclear explosion, estimated for as early as 1962, the United States should begin to explore the possibility of [text not declassified]. McGhee stated that Ambassador Galbraith [text not declassified] would at most agree to Wiesner, on a scheduled visit to India, asking Dr. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Authority, what effect a Chinese explosion would have on India's atomic program. (Ibid., S/P Chron 1960-1961) See the Supplement.

81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, October 9, 1961.

JCSM-713-61

SUBJECT

Test Firing of Weapon Systems (U)

1. In response to the memorandum by the Military Representative of the President, dated 29 September 1961,¹ on the desirability of firing an operational missile with a nuclear warhead, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are forwarded herewith.
2. Test firings of ballistic missile systems throughout the development phase and during operational training establish complete confidence in the basic design and proper operation of all components and subsystems. Such firings also give a valid assessment of the over-all reliability of the complete missile system as an operational entity. From a technical viewpoint, operational test firings to include full-scale detonations of the nuclear warhead have not been required in order to demonstrate proper operation of those complete systems which are now in the inventory. However, from a military viewpoint, full-scale firings would serve the useful purpose of providing realistic crew training and increasing crew confidence in the complete weapon systems. From a political and psychological point of view, such firings could have a significant beneficial impact.
3. So far as is known the USSR has not as yet detonated a nuclear warhead as part of a long-range ballistic missile demonstration. Such a demonstration with its adverse psychological impact on the West should be anticipated as a possible move in their continuing effort to intimidate the Free World. If the Soviets conduct such a firing, a subsequent similar demonstration by the United States would be of little value. A United States "first" in this regard, however, could serve many useful purposes including the strengthening of Free World resolve and increasing public

confidence with regard to the operational reliability of US ballistic missile systems.

4. Successful firings of operational ballistic missile systems, complete with full-scale nuclear warheads, could and should be integrated into national cold-war planning so as to enhance our political posture in future negotiations. Of immediate importance, however, are demonstrations of the Atlas and Polaris as operational missiles. Such firings, if conducted on a timely basis, would serve as a powerful demonstration that the United States is negotiating from a position of readiness and strength. The firings could provide the initiative for a psychological offensive to counter the current Soviet series of nuclear weapons tests.
5. In light of the Berlin crisis, it is additionally desirable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the US and Allied tactical nuclear capability. An operational nuclear firing of the Honest John rocket could have significant psychological effect by confirming US and Allied troop confidence and in Soviet increased awareness of our capability to oppose major ground troop movements with this high density weapon. The Honest John rocket could be fired as a tactical demonstration on short notice and in conjunction with troop maneuvers.
6. With regard to safety aspects of the proposed firings, nuclear warheads are designed so as to give essentially no nuclear yield in event of accidental detonation of the high explosive by means other than the intended firing system. This provides safety for operations in the vicinity of the launch pad. In addition, numerous safety devices are incorporated into key elements of the arming, fuzing and firing systems to prevent detonation at other than the intended target area. It is considered that firing of operational missiles, including nuclear warheads, could be accomplished with adequate safety. World-wide fallout from such firings would be insignificant, and local fallout hazards could be controlled by proper selection of target areas and firing conditions, as set forth in JCSM-680-61.^{[2](#)}
7. Since there is a possibility of failure of any one shot, sufficient firings should be planned so as to insure a successful demonstration. In this connection, firings should be sufficiently classified so as to preclude unauthorized publicity. As an additional cover, they should be interspersed with normal firings so that only successful shots are publicized.

8. To gain maximum impact it is considered mandatory that the full-scale firings be conducted prior to possible similar demonstrations by the USSR. Since timing is critical to attainment of the desired objectives, the proposed firings should be conducted as operational tests, thus avoiding the lengthy preparations normally associated with weapons effects or warhead testing.
9. In view of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that early approval be obtained for full-scale, nuclear shots of the Atlas and Polaris ballistic missile weapon systems and Honest John rocket so as to achieve a successful firing of each at the earliest possible time. Upon approval of the proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose a plan of execution for your consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 Oct 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation reads: "SecDef has seen."

¹ Taylor's memorandum, addressed to McNamara, stated that the President's "attention had been drawn" to the fact that the United States had never test-fired a missile with a nuclear warhead. "As there is always a possibility that the USSR may do some such thing, he would like your view as to the military desirability of checking out a missile system to this degree and, if your view is affirmative, whether such a firing should be considered for inclusion in our program for test firings." (Ibid., OSD/AE Files: FRC 68 A 6453, 17 AWT WPNS Effects 1961) ² Not further identified.

82. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, October 10, 1961, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals on Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

See Tab "A"^{[1](#)}

The Secretary opened the meeting by asking Mr. Foster what the first matter for consideration was. Mr. Foster said the first question for consideration was atmospheric nuclear testing—our own need for such tests and the relation to the UN debate. He asked for the views of Defense.

Mr. McNamara cited the Defense memorandum to the President of October 9,^{[2](#)} a copy of which had gone to the State Department, which strongly urges making preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. Seaborg indicated agreement with the Defense position, but not necessarily on the same grounds, noting that AEC does not share Defense's view on the importance of proof testing.^{[3](#)}

Mr. Bundy noted that proof testing in three weeks differs from developmental testing in six to nine months and that the Defense position had undergone a radical change. Secretary McNamara said that Defense wants approval to undertake preparations only. If the U.S. has to modify the warheads of the Polaris missile, preliminary work should start shortly.

Secretary Rusk noted that in September the U.S. proposed an atmospheric ban agreement. Since then, the Soviets had exploded almost two dozen nuclear devices. He asked if Defense believed the situation had changed militarily or politically by this series of tests.

Secretary McNamara replied that he would say both. He felt we should have asked for authority six or eight months ago to prepare for these tests. Mr. Bundy cited the September 20 Defense-AEC memorandum on test needs.^{[4](#)} Mr. Gilpatric agreed that Defense had accelerated its recommended

program. We had not anticipated the rate of Soviet testing when the September 20 recommendations were made.

In response to a general request, Dr. Scoville summarized our information about the Soviet testing as follows: There have been twenty-four tests conducted over a broad range, including complete systems testing; four to six short-range missile launchings leading to a nuclear explosion, and an effects test at 100,000 to 200,000 feet which has not yet been announced. Our analysis of the debris is very tentative. Nothing so far has been done which is beyond the capabilities of the U.S. In summary, it shows a broad program including development, effects, and systems testing.

Mr. McNamara said the very breadth of the Soviet test program surprised us. However, he noted that Page 10 of the September 20 memorandum had asked for authority to prepare for atmospheric testing, so that the Defense position on this question was not really a basic change.

The Secretary asked about the political problem in the United Nations. Ambassador Dean replied that we have a joint US-UK resolution on the table and the Indians are planning to introduce a resolution.⁵ We are not sure what it will contain, but it will probably call for an uncontrolled indefinite moratorium on any further testing. The British and Swedes are very nervous about our position and the general estimate is that the Indian resolution will pass by a wide margin. However, the U.S. delegation feels that if it is clear that testing is essential, we can handle the political problem. He recommended that we clarify our position regarding further testing by the U.S. if we think it necessary, before the Indian resolution is passed rather than after. The British are pushing us very hard to renew the Kennedy-Macmillan offer. The U.S. delegation thinks our resolution calling for resumption of negotiations will pass by a very narrow margin with many abstentions. The Indian resolution will no doubt also pass, but by a wide margin.

Secretary McNamara noted that the Soviets may continue testing, or, alternatively, they may complete the test series and then accept an unpoliced moratorium. Chairman Seaborg noted that if we began testing preparations, they will become known and that will be tantamount to resuming testing.

He felt we could not make additional preparations without their becoming known.

Secretary Rusk noted: (1) If the USSR says it is now ready to sign a test ban treaty, we would presumably agree. (2) We offered an atmospheric ban in September. (3) If we cannot maintain this policy, are we not forced to say either that the Soviets' testing has changed the situation basically or that we were wrong six months ago?

Mr. Bundy stressed the difference between important developmental tests and proof tests, inquired as to the difference between the situation in September, when atmospheric proof tests had not been recommended, and October, when they were proposed for an early date. Mr. Nitze pointed out that the extent of Soviet tests had an effect on the political situation and that conducting proof tests would be a good idea if the Berlin talks failed and the international situation deteriorated. Mr. Bundy felt this was an essentially different problem. There was a difference between tests conducted for political effect and those conducted for significant military reasons.

Ambassador Dean thought that if we could postpone the tests and call for a moratorium for the duration of the General Assembly, it would help us politically. If we feel we have to test in the atmosphere from a military standpoint, let us decide the matter now so we can prepare for it politically. Mr. Foster agreed. Mr. Bundy asked if it made a difference if we “bang” now or “bang” later. Ambassador Dean thought it did not, but noted that Governor Stevenson thinks it does. Secretary *Rusk* said that the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency agree it is better to say so now if we decide it is necessary to test later. He wondered if there was any advantage in a short moratorium such as USUN had suggested in their telegram, 1123,⁶ and indicated he was not clear on the military and strategic implications.

Chairman Seaborg noted three factors for appraisal: (1) The extent of Soviet testing; (2) the fact of Soviet deception in preparing for tests while the Geneva talks were going on; (3) the Soviet rate of testing is so large compared to the rate of progress possible in underground testing. Mr.

Bundy wondered whether there was a paper available on outer space versus atmospheric testing, since it is fall-out that creates the diplomatic problem. Secretary Rusk noted that the political climate was now shifting and that many countries were now against all tests, whether underground or not.

Secretary McNamara said we don't know enough about the performance of our own weapons. Defense is increasingly concerned, especially about an anti-ICBM missile over the next four or five years.

Secretary Rusk said that we cannot have proposals outstanding which we are not ready to accept. While the test ban treaty is acceptable, we all agree that an uncontrolled moratorium is not. Ambassador Dean noted the Soviets might delay action on a moratorium resolution and then accept it at the end of the session when they were through testing. Ambassador Dean continued that if we could go back to Geneva, and agree not to test for say sixty days while we negotiated in good faith, we could knock the Indian resolution into a cocked hat. Secretary Rusk wondered what would be the effect of stating outright that we will sign a test ban treaty today but that we would not be a party to a moratorium hoax. We are prepared to negotiate but must reserve our right to test until the agreement is actually concluded. Under this procedure we would go ahead and prepare to test in the atmosphere. We were fully justified in taking a firm position on this matter in the light of the Soviet Union's fantastic performance: many other governments would secretly be in favor of our position.

Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Dean and Mr. Cleveland if the testing issue would be a continuing problem at the UN. Mr. Cleveland replied that it would be an annual one. Ambassador Dean felt that the position suggested would be only mildly damaging. However, it was important to state clearly our intention to test before the vote is taken. Mr. Bundy thought we should enter a reservation and at the same time be ready to negotiate. It seemed to him that tests made for political reasons were not useful to the U.S. position.

Mr. Cleveland noted that we asked for the GA debate partly to educate other countries. We could enhance that position if it is possible to propose the atmospheric test ban again.

Secretary Rusk wondered whether the U.S. resolution would pass. Ambassador Dean said our liaison people thought it would pass. Mr. Cleveland was not sure that we would obtain a two-thirds majority, and Mr. Popper noted that amendments would be offered and efforts made to merge the U.S. and Indian resolutions. This would further confuse the issue. Ambassador Dean noted that Canadian Foreign Secretary Green's efforts on radiation have already confused the situation. The Japanese, Canadians and the Swedes are very nervous. The newer nations would not support us. The British would not support us in an intention to resume atmospheric testing at this time.

Secretary Rusk noted the political burdens in the UN are heavy. He was not sure the U.S. could use up much political capital on this matter in the light of such issues as Chinese representation and Berlin. He asked Defense for a realistic specific assessment of the need for atmospheric testing. If we could repeat the Kennedy and Macmillan offer it would greatly facilitate our position at the UN.

Secretary McNamara thought (1) that if we renewed the offer and followed through with standby preparations, it would make us subject to criticism in the UN. We could not make preparations which would not become known. He was concerned about an open-ended moratorium. If the US knew the Soviets would test in the atmosphere, then he could agree; (2) if the international situation remains tense, Mr. McNamara thought we would have to assume the Soviets are continuing to prepare for more tests; (3) if this happens again in twelve to eighteen months, we will be in serious trouble.

Mr. Nitze assumed that if the Soviets agreed to a moratorium and then built on the 24 present tests, we would sustain a real set-back. If so, he would get away from a reliance on a nuclear deterrent, and change our Defense policy.

General Lemnitzer noted that if the Soviets said that they have developed an anti-ICBM missile, it could change the whole picture. Mr. Seaborg thought their ability to do so was unlikely.

Secretary Rusk said if the question is whether Defense can prepare for tests, can we say we will offer an atmospheric ban but at the same time tell the

UN we are going to prepare to test, so that we will not be caught off base again? He saw two choices: 1) to reserve our freedom of action but be prepared to negotiate; or, 2) offer an atmospheric ban but also prepare to test. Mr. Cleveland thought we could do both.

Secretary Rusk asked about a procedural resolution directing the USSR, U.S., and UK to consult and report by the end of the Assembly as a means of delaying action on this question. Mr. Spiers thought the Soviets would oppose such a move and that it would thus not solve the basic problem. The Secretary felt it would at least put the vote off until the end of the session and help on things like Chinese representation. He asked Mr. Cleveland to frame the two alternatives for an early discussion with the President.

Mr. Cleveland summarized this directive as follows:

- 1) The U.S. favors a test ban treaty.
- 2) It reserves its right to prepare to test in the atmosphere.
- 3) It does not favor a moratorium.

Mr. Nitze felt the Soviets might increase its military capabilities by a factor of three to five over the U.S. He asked if the State Department was prepared to live with this politically. Messrs. Dulles and Scoville disagreed on technical grounds that the Soviets could accomplish this.

Secretary Rusk asked whether if atmospheric tests stop today, the advantage still rests with the U.S.? Secretary McNamara said that it did. Secretary Rusk thought that with preparations for testing publicly announced, we could renew the Kennedy-Macmillan offer. Mr. Bundy thought there was a weakness in making the offer again especially from the domestic political point of view. He thought this factor should be weighed.

Mr. Johnson noted that if we do not prepare for tests now we will continue to fall behind. Secretary McNamara asked what our attitude would be if the Soviets continue testing. He said there were three reasons in the Defense paper for testing: 1) long-range weapons development reasons; 2) a need for weapons proof tests; 3) system testing requirements. He urged that preparations be made for all three reasons. Secretary Rusk thought that the fact of making preparations would not be too difficult for us in the UN. He

saw some advantage to adopting a simple, understandable position. He said he would like to discuss this further with his State Department colleagues after the meeting in preparation for further discussion with the Principals and the President. He summarized by saying the way to reach our objective is through a treaty; we cannot be a party to another moratorium hoax; we are ready to work hard for a treaty. In other words, we will stay with the treaty offer, but will not accept an uncontrolled moratorium.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by P.J. Halla of ACDA on October 12 and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room.

¹ Not printed. Rusk, Dean, Bundy, McNamara, Allen Dulles, Donald Wilson, Seaborg, Cleveland, Foster, Fisher, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Nitze, and Scoville were among the 31 present.

² In his October 9 letter to the President, Gilpatric presented a detailed exposition of a testing program including many atmospheric and high altitude tests, with a request that the President "grant approval to prepare for a comprehensive test program." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, Oct 61)

³ Seaborg's views on testing are set forth in a letter to the President, October 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 9/27-10/11/61) See the Supplement.

⁴ [Document 74](#).

⁵ See [footnotes 3](#) and [4, Document 83](#).

⁶ Dated October 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-761) See the Supplement.

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position for the General Assembly on the Nuclear Test Ban

The Committee of Principals reviewed the present state of the nuclear test ban issue,¹ in the light of the imminent discussion of this subject at the UN General Assembly.

At the United Nations, we are certain to be confronted with an Indian resolution calling for an uninspected ban on all forms of testing.² The British and we are sponsoring another resolution calling on the parties to the Geneva talks to bring to a conclusion negotiations for a test ban treaty with relevant controls and arrangements for inspection.³ (There will also be other minor resolutions in this field, including an Irish one against transfer of control over nuclear devices to countries that do not now have them,⁴ and a Canadian proposal to criticize all fall-out tests and declare that no country has the right to test in the atmosphere.⁵)

We have considered various ways in which we could improve the prospects for our resolution and reduce the almost unanimous support for the uninspected ban being pushed by the Indians. We conclude that, even though our position will clearly be a minority one, our responsibilities as a great power dictate a policy that is simple, honest and clear. Our position is stated on the enclosed page.

Enclosure

U.S. POSITION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

1. The Basic Position

- A. The proper road to a nuclear test ban is through a treaty among the countries that can test nuclear devices.
- B. We have negotiated in Geneva for three years in good faith for such a treaty. We will sign the present draft treaty today or at any other time that the Soviets are willing to sign it or will continue to negotiate for a mutually acceptable treaty.
- C. We will stop all kinds of tests as soon as there is a treaty.

2. Atmospheric Test Ban

It is the judgment of the Department of Defense that, despite the test series in which the Soviets are now engaged, a balance of advantage would still lie with us if both sides were now to agree not to conduct atmospheric tests.

We would therefore be prepared to sign an agreement not to undertake nuclear tests in the sensible atmosphere, provided this were done during the period of the current General Assembly, but with these three important provisions:

- a. We will not initiate an offer for such an agreement, in view of the Soviet refusal to consider the U.S.-U.K. offer of September 3, and in the event approaches are made to us, we will suggest that an approach be made to the Soviet Union first.
- b. We would insist on making such an atmospheric test ban a treaty obligation and would not agree to a moratorium while such a treaty was being negotiated.
- c. We would state frankly and publicly that in view of Soviet duplicity in the Geneva talks, we feel compelled to make preparations for atmospheric tests so as to be ready in case it is felt necessary to conduct them. (We would say that in our kind of society such preparations cannot be secret, and we are therefore announcing in advance our intention to make them. When and if, in the absence of a test ban agreement, we conduct atmospheric tests, we will do so out loud.)

3. Moratorium

We do not favor and will not vote for any general uninspected ban or moratorium on nuclear tests. We will make clear that the United States will

consider itself free to conduct any and all tests which it considers necessary for its security in the absence of an agreed treaty prohibition.

Your approval is requested for this line of policy, as a basis for instructions to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly. Mr. William C. Foster has participated in these discussions and is in full agreement with these recommendations. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency concur.⁶

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 10/11-15/61. Confidential. A typed note on another copy indicates that Rusk signed the memorandum on October 10 and gave it to Cleveland to deliver to the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1061)

¹ See [Document 82](#).

² The Indian resolution was passed on November 6 as Resolution 1648 (XVI) by a vote of 71-20-8; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 568; see also pp. 539, 560. The resolution was opposed by, among others, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, the Western nuclear powers, and the Republic of China.

³ The U.S.-U.K. resolution was passed on November 8 as Resolution 1649 (XVI) by a vote of 71-11-15; for text, see *ibid.*, pp. 578-579. The Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba opposed the resolution; France was among those abstaining.

⁴ Resolution 1665 (XVI) passed unanimously on December 4; see *ibid.*, p. 694.

⁵ This proposal did not come to a vote.

⁶ The covering memorandum bears a note: "JFK approved Oct 13." Instructions based on it went to USUN in telegram 918, October 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1361) In an October 12 memorandum to Kennedy, Stevenson did not oppose Rusk's proposals but suggested in addition a public statement offering to negotiate a test ban treaty within 30 days, to be made by himself or the President. Kennedy approved but directed that the statement be made by Stevenson or the Department. (Attachment to memorandum from Ball to Kennedy, October

12; *ibid.*, 700.5611/10-1261) See the Supplement. For text of the statement as delivered by Stevenson before the First Committee on October 19, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 537-542.

84. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman

Khrushchev [Source](#)

Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I regret that the press of events has made it impossible for me to reply earlier to your very important letter of last month.¹ I have brought your letter here with me to Cape Cod for a weekend in which I can devote all the time necessary to give it the answer it deserves.

My family has had a home here overlooking the Atlantic for many years. My father and brothers own homes near my own, and my children always have a large group of cousins for company. So this is an ideal place for me to spend my weekends during the summer and fall, to relax, to think, to devote my time to major tasks instead of constant appointments, telephone calls and details. Thus, I know how you must feel about the spot on the Black Sea from which your letter was written, for I value my own opportunities to get a clearer and quieter perspective away from the din of Washington.

I am gratified by your letter and your decision to suggest this additional means of communication. Certainly you are correct in emphasizing that this correspondence must be kept wholly private, not to be hinted at in public statements, much less disclosed to the press. For my part the contents and even the existence of our letters will be known only to the Secretary of State and a few others of my closest associates in the government. I think it is very important that these letters provide us with an opportunity for a personal, informal but meaningful exchange of views. There are sufficient channels now existing between our two governments for the more formal and official communications and public statements of position. These letters should supplement those channels, and give us each a chance to address the other in frank, realistic and fundamental terms. Neither of us is going to convert the other to a new social, economic or political point of view. Neither of us will be induced by a letter to desert or subvert his own cause. So these letters can be free from the polemics of the "cold war" debate.

That debate will, of course, proceed, but you and I can write messages which will be directed only to each other.

[Here follows discussion of general topics, Germany, and Berlin.]

Let me make it clear that I do not intend to relegate the achievement of complete and general disarmament to a place of secondary importance. I share your conviction that nothing would do more to promote good will among nations and contribute to the peaceful solution of other major disputes. Our agreement on the statement of principles jointly submitted to the UN General Assembly, while barely a beginning on a matter where we remain far apart, at least holds out the hope that we may someday achieve the final stage of such disarmament, verified to remove the fears of any people that devastation may ever again be suddenly rained upon them.

At the same time, however, our attention is urgently needed on those current problems which keep the world poised on the brink of war. The situation in Laos is one example. Indeed I do not see how we can expect to reach a settlement on so bitter and complex an issue as Berlin, where both of us have vital interests at stake, if we cannot come to a final agreement on Laos, which we have previously agreed should be neutral and independent after the fashion of Burma and Cambodia. I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere.

[Here follows discussion of Laos, Southeast Asia, and general topics.]

Sincerely,²

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 76 D 435, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1961-1963. Top Secret. For the full text of this letter, see [vol. VI, Document 22](#) .

¹ [Document 76](#).

² Printed from an unsigned copy.

85. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

New York, October 19, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am disturbed at the indications that the U.S. is contemplating a new series of tests at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds.

I believe any such tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands would be a grievous error for the following reasons:

- (1) This is not American territory. We are merely trustees. The inhabitants are Micronesians and are not American citizens.
- (2) We are obligated one day to give these people an opportunity to choose their political future. The earlier tests were bitterly resented by the islanders (some of whom had to be displaced from their homes, while others suffered physical illness from unexpected fall-out). Since then progress has been made in developing a friendly attitude toward eventual integration with the U.S. A new series of tests, or even an indication that the U.S. was seriously contemplating such tests, would create bitterness and hostility toward the U.S., thus hurting our long-range strategic interests.
- (3) Even if there were no question whatever as to whether we have the legal right to conduct such tests in the Trust Territory, the moral question is even more serious and should really control.
- (4) Entirely aside from the legal and moral questions, however, it is certain that to resume tests in the Trust Territory would cause us great damage here at the U.N., even among our friends and allies. It would sully our recent clean record on nuclear testing and would provide the Soviets with a priceless red herring.

I would strongly urge, both from the point of view of our long-range strategic interests and from the standpoint of our international relations, that the possibility of carrying out such tests elsewhere than in the Trust Territory be reexamined.

Faithfully yours,¹

Adlai E. Stevenson²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61. Secret.

¹ Wiesner stated in a memorandum to Kennedy of October 24 that he had reviewed Stevenson's letter and did not "believe that use of the Eniwetok Proving Grounds is required for any of the atmospheric tests that are now being considered within the Pentagon." Some could be conducted instead at Christmas Island, which was under joint U.S.-U.K. jurisdiction, and some at the Nevada Test Site. Wiesner recommended that planning and preparations for atmospheric testing proceed on the assumption that Eniwetok would not be used. (Ibid.)

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, October 27, 1961, 9 p.m.

2294. Following is text of proposed draft declaration handed Secretary by Ormsby-Gore Oct 25.¹ President telephoned Macmillan Oct 27 informing him US could not join in declaration and suggesting that US and UK each adopt policy not to conduct particular test in atmosphere unless (a) atmospheric test is necessary as part of program the results of which contain possibility improvements of substantial military significance, and (b) result cannot reasonably and effectively be obtained in any other way.²

President also stated US unlikely conduct atmospheric test in immediate future and would advise UK prior to final decision being made.

Begin verbatim text

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, mindful of the dangers to the health of mankind, including children yet unborn, and conscious of their responsibilities for the security of free men everywhere, solemnly declare that:

1. They condemn the Government of the Soviet Union for breaking off the discussions in Geneva for a treaty to ban nuclear tests and for resuming atmospheric nuclear tests on a gigantic scale, which cannot even have any military purpose.
2. They undertake that any future tests of nuclear devices which their governments make will if possible be conducted underground in conditions where no danger to health can arise. They would feel themselves morally and politically free to conduct further atmospheric tests only if it was clearly proved and agreed by them that they had a duty to conduct such tests because they were essential to the preservation of freedom and the maintenance of the balance of deterrence. Neither the U.S. nor the U.K. sees any military reason to conduct atmospheric tests

in the next six months and they will not undertake such tests during this period.

3. They propose to the Government of the Soviet Union that negotiations should immediately start again in Geneva or elsewhere in order rapidly to conclude a treaty for the controlled ending of nuclear tests within _____ months.
4. The President and the Prime Minister urge the Soviet Government to suspend all further nuclear tests, at least pending the consideration of the above proposals.

End verbatim text

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/10-2761. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Also sent to USUN.

¹ Memorandum by Farley of conversation between Rusk and Ormsby Gore held October 25. (Ibid., 700.5611/10-1661) According to Ewell, Bundy stated at the White House staff meeting on October 26 that “Mr. Rusk’s first reaction is that this cuts across our announced policy, and he doesn’t like it.” Bundy also “observed that the hidden veto is probably unacceptable in any case.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Staff Meetings, September-December 1961) ² Kennedy’s remarks to Macmillan were along the lines of an October 26 memorandum from Foster to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61) In an October 27 memorandum to the President, Bundy stated that “the agreed and unanimous position in the Government” was to reject Macmillan’s proposal, that Foster’s memorandum had “State, Defense and AEC” approval, and that “as the memorandum points out, the Prime Minister is trying to get you hooked to an agreement not to test without his consent. [text not declassified]” Bundy added that “our assessment is that the British Foreign Office and Ormsby-Gore both disagree with the Prime Minister’s proposal.” (Ibid.)

87. Editorial Note

In a memorandum of the White House staff meeting held on October 30, 1961, Thomas A. Parrott of the NSC Staff included the following item:

“4. Forthcoming NSC discussion on testing. Mr. Bundy said that the NSC meeting this coming Thursday will feature a briefing by CIA on the implications of the Soviet test series, which would then undoubtedly lead to a discussion of our own testing. He felt that it would be highly desirable to get the President’s views on testing out in the open before this meeting since otherwise the military and others would probably come in with carefully reasoned arguments in favor of resumption; the discussion would then take the form of trying to beat these arguments down.

“Mr. Bundy said the President’s view is that no tests should be undertaken by the US for political or psychological reasons, or in order to take advantage of any kind of 'open season' deriving from the fact that the Soviets have done it on such a massive scale. He referred to the President’s refusal to go along with Macmillan’s suggestion that a finite moratorium be placed on testing, in a joint statement. Bundy emphasized the President’s feeling that we should not be bound by the judgment of the British or the Canadians. (These last points are sensitive.)” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Staff Meetings, September-December 1961)

88. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 30, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This letter will bring you up to date on the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission in the program for testing nuclear weapons and will inform you of our current thinking with respect to future steps that we believe should be undertaken. My discussion will draw upon past letters which, for your convenience, are listed in the attachment to this letter.¹

In keeping with your instructions, we have been making plans and limited preparations for atmospheric testing, confining ourselves to such steps as are considered to involve little or no risk of public disclosure of the fact of preparation. The specific steps so far undertaken include the following:—

1. The laboratories and supporting test organizations have been authorized to develop and fabricate devices and procure or fabricate such diagnostic equipment as may be required to carry out all of the tests listed in the enclosures to my letters to you of September 15th and 19th.² To the extent that it may be decided to test some of these devices in the atmosphere, these may be considered as preparatory steps.
2. Rehabilitation of available balloons and supporting equipment to use these balloons, including procurement of diagnostic equipment unique to tests on balloons, has been authorized. We are not procuring additional balloons or related equipment, nor have we embarked on such steps as the testing of those balloons on hand, because of the risk that such steps would become publicly known.
3. Certain coordination with and appropriate planning to support the Department of Defense has been authorized for some of the specific tests proposed in the letter of the Secretary of Defense to you dated October 9, 1961.³ However, our instructions do not permit us to take many of the steps required for complete preparation. *[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

4. Detailed review of the Eniwetok Proving Ground and Johnston Island facilities by Holmes and Narver (the contractor now supporting Pacific Missile Range effort) and preparation of a complete planning report have been authorized.
5. All three weapons laboratories have been authorized to accelerate their normal activities in the area of development of new devices, techniques, and diagnostic equipment.
6. Authorization has been given to these same laboratories to furnish technical support as requested to the Department of Defense agencies designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out proposed early Department of Defense proof and system tests. For example, diagnostic equipment is being installed in aircraft of the Air Force Special Weapons Command.

Perhaps the most important and certainly the most ramified preparations we are *not* making involve the Pacific Islands. The earliest use of these Islands in an atmospheric testing program would relate most importantly to the fact that air drops now proposed by the Department of Defense for proof tests, as well as AEC developmental tests could be instrumented with higher reliability and somewhat more sophistication if the detonations took place in such a location that ground-based instrumentation could be used. While the earliest actions necessary for such tests are the obvious operational ones which must be implemented by task forces of the Department of Defense, there are certain Commission actions that also would require attention prior to actual testing. For example, DOD ground crews and AEC technicians must proceed to the Island site some weeks prior to a test if this capability is to be exploited. While surveys of the applicable Islands have been undertaken, no steps toward the transfer of people can be taken until authorized, since it would be almost impossible to keep the fact from becoming public knowledge.

While the type of air-borne testing capability just discussed could fulfill the need for early testing, in the more complex developmental program we would need to supplement it by providing for operations from a considerably more adequately equipped island base. From such a base, tests could be conducted on the surface, on balloons, by air drop, and at very high altitudes, as may be required. This is a much longer range program.

Study is under way to determine what Pacific base or bases should be proposed, but no actions have been authorized to move people to Johnston Island or Eniwetok for rehabilitation of test installations, nor—for fear of public disclosure—have we authorized procurement of long lead time items such as generators, instrumentation towers, communications equipment, aerodynamic balloons with launching and mooring equipment, and other supporting implements. These actions must await selection of the test site or sites.

In this connection, one might assume that Johnston Island (because of its missile launching capability) and the Eniwetok Proving Ground (because of installations already provided) are the logical choices. However, the Eniwetok Atoll is part of the Trust Territory which we administer for the United Nations. The State Department has informed us⁴ that very strenuous objections will be raised in the United Nations if we decide to go back into the Trust Territory to conduct nuclear weapons testing. We fully realize that representatives of various groups of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, as well as many others, will again raise charges against us in the United Nations if we decide to resume testing in the Trust Territory.

Johnston Island does not fall in this category, but we are not now of the opinion that this Island is adequate to fully satisfy the needs of a comprehensive and meaningful test program. It may be adequate for tests requiring missile launching, since it has facilities for this purpose which are not available on other possible islands. An alternative possibility for a test base is Christmas Island, which has been used in the past by the United Kingdom. The possibility of using the Christmas Island site for our test program was mentioned during my discussions with Sir Roger Makins in London.⁵ A preliminary survey is under way to explore this possibility.

Meanwhile, our own deliberations have been assisted by detailed discussions with the Directors of the Weapons Laboratories who visited with us on October 17th, by my visit to the Nevada Test Site, to the Sandia Laboratory, and to Berkeley on my recent trip West, and by a recent meeting of the General Advisory Committee some of whose recommendations were transmitted to you in my October 27th letter.⁶ These discussions, and the more detailed knowledge resulting from the

underground testing program, have increased our understanding of the requirements of the test program as a whole.

Additional experience has pointed up more clearly the limitations and difficulties of testing underground. To its limitations on testing larger weapons and its unsuitability for most important weapon-on-weapon effects tests must be added its relative slowness and the fact that great and time-consuming care must be taken to assure that useful measurements are achieved. In the case of tunnel complexes, there is the inherent danger that contamination may impede the conduct of future tests. Nevertheless, within its limitations, and with adequate precautions, the method is definitely useful.

Our deepened knowledge and understanding, together with the march of world events, have resulted in the formulation of certain definite opinions by the Commission as a whole. These are consistent with the position recommended by the Committee of Principals to you in their memorandum of October 11th,⁷ which the Commission heartily endorses. Hoping that these opinions may be helpful, I pass them on to you as follows:—

1. In view of the limitations of underground testing and in the light of the comprehensive nature of the recent Soviet tests, national security considerations require that the United States embark upon a program of atmospheric testing at the earliest appropriate time. Freedom to so test must be maintained, unless and until an enforceable test ban treaty is achieved.
2. Any atmospheric testing program should be carried out discriminately with the aim of holding to the minimum its contribution to the world-wide fallout. Although the dangers of such fallout have been greatly exaggerated in many minds, the best scientific evidence seems to indicate that it does contribute finite, though infrequent, undesirable genetic, and possibly somatic, effects. Hence, any particular test should be carried out only if its results will make a definite and important contribution to our defensive posture; in each case, every effort should be made to keep the fission yield as low as possible consistent with the results that are required. Important objectives that may justify a test include:—(a) significant technical advances—these include both anticipated advances

- requiring confirmation and unpredictable new knowledge acquired from experiments incorporating novel features; (b) the avoidance of potentially catastrophic situations—this includes avoidance of the danger that inadequately tested stockpile weapons may malfunction either by failure to perform their intended role or by untimely detonation with consequent damage to ourselves; and (c) weapons effects measurements including, importantly, weapon-on-weapon effects relating to anti-missile measures.
3. Whether or not we do proceed to atmospheric testing, it is mandatory that the underground program be continued. For certain low-yield tests requiring complex and accurate measurements, underground tests are superior to air-borne or balloon-based tests, and they are relatively free from restraints imposed by weather. They may continue to be or again become our only available testing method. Only by continuing to test underground can we develop the necessary experience and skill to conduct such tests effectively. For these reasons, as well as to minimize fallout, the Commission's plans contemplate a continuing, comprehensive underground test program.

In conclusion, I respectfully reaffirm our earlier recommendation that the United States forthwith proceed to full-scale preparation for atmospheric tests, and that those preparations be publicly acknowledged as recommended by the Principals.

Respectfully,

Glenn T. Seaborg

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/30-31/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ Not printed.

² Neither found. According to Seaborg's journal, the September 15 letter concerned "a proposed AEC test program through next February" and that of September 19 "the follow-on test series." (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, pp. 163 and 186, respectively) The initial test program became known as "Operation Nougat," the follow-on as "Ivanhoe."

³ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 82](#).

⁴ In a letter from Rusk to Seaborg, dated October 29. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61) See the Supplement.

⁵ These took place on September 21, and are described in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, page 186.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Apparent reference to [Document 83](#).

89. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 31, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In our letter to you of September 20, 1961,^{[1](#)} we outlined the basis for a proposed U.S. nuclear test program. By our letter of October 9, 1961,^{[2](#)} we further described the experiments which are urgently required and which can only provide the data needed if they are conducted in the atmosphere. The proposed atmospheric tests are listed in the attached tables and fall into four general categories as follows:^{[3](#)}

A.

Systems Tests

Operational test firings of selected nuclear weapon systems for demonstration, training and effects.

B.

Proof Tests

Proof test and yield verification of stockpile weapons.

C.

Development Tests

Weapon development experiments.

D.

Effects Tests

Weapon effects tests particularly directed toward study of the ICBM warhead and site vulnerabilities and AICBM effectiveness.

In our letter of October 9, 1961, we requested authority to proceed with planning and preparations for the listed tests. You approved this course of action on October 11.⁴ On October 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to proceed with plans and preparations in accordance with your approval.⁵

Preparations for the less complicated tests (those in categories A and B) have now reached a point where test operations could begin November 15. We could complete this portion of our program on an orderly schedule by the end of this calendar year.

Based on surface testing,⁶ at an overseas site, approximately six months will be required to prepare for the first of the vitally needed development and effects tests which are listed under categories C and D. The instrumentation for certain of the effects tests is so complex that approximately twenty-four months will be required to prepare for them.

While the requirements from a weapons development viewpoint for the systems tests and the proof tests are not great, such tests do assist in developing operational doctrine and they do add to our knowledge of weapons performance. (The tests of XW 59, XW 56 X1 and XW 50 X1, which are included in category B, will be the first tests of the warheads for Minuteman, Skybolt, Nike Zeus and Pershing.)

The long range missile systems like Atlas D and Polaris are expected to perform properly, but full scale systems tests would materially contribute to the overall confidence in the systems.

The most important question at the present time is whether resumption of atmospheric tests now, at first comprising those systems and proof tests which are useful but not critical from a technical or military standpoint, would facilitate or inhibit conduct of the vitally required development and effects tests some months later. It may well be easier politically to conduct the whole program if we begin atmospheric testing in the immediate future rather than wait for completion of preparations for the critically needed experiments. If this is not the case, and if it is believed as feasible for the United States to begin atmospheric testing some months after the Soviets

have concluded their current test series as to begin during or immediately following a Soviet series, the Department of Defense sees little objection to waiting. To have to delay the tests listed in categories C and D until the next cycle of Soviet tests would be seriously prejudicial to U.S. weapon and weapon system development.

We believe that whether or not category A or B tests are undertaken in the immediate future, we should proceed immediately with the selection and preparation of overseas sites for tests in categories C and D.

Robert S. McNamara⁷

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jan-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ [Document 74](#).

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 82](#).

³ Four enclosed charts, one for each category described in the letter, are not printed.

⁴ The President's Appointment Book shows that he met with McNamara, Rusk, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and others from 11 a.m. to 12:25 p.m. on October 11. (Kennedy Library) No memorandum of this meeting has been found. In an October 18 memorandum to Kennedy, Bundy stated that there was "an impression in Defense" that the President had approved the October 9 letter. Bundy thought that "the impression should be corrected unless in fact you do approve it. As far as I know, you have not read the letter yet." (Ibid., National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61)

⁵ In a memorandum from McNamara to Lemnitzer. (Ibid., Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/11-15/61) See the Supplement.

⁶ Within the past few days, consideration has been given to conducting some development tests as completely airborne operations over the open seas. If such tests were to be undertaken, preparations could be completed for them by mid-December. Studies of this possibility are continuing. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

90. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, November 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, 2 November 1961^{[1](#)}

In addition to the regular members of the NSC, and the invitees, former President Truman sat in for about half of the meeting.^{[2](#)} He made no comments on the substance of the material presented. The points discussed at the meeting can be usefully divided into the following categories:

a. The Secretary of Defense Recommendations.

The meeting opened with a brief statement from the SecDef pointing out that of the four types of nuclear tests—systems, proof, development and effects—only the last two are of importance to the United States at this time. The US could conduct about eight systems and proof tests between 15 December and 1 January, but DOD made no recommendation that these tests be conducted. Development tests and effects would take five to six months preparation, and DOD recommended that these preparations be commenced and that these tests be conducted.

b. Briefing on Soviet Nuclear Tests.

The President requested that before going further into the possibility of US testing, CIA should first present its analysis of the Soviet tests. Dr. Scoville gave the briefing and began by stating the Soviets had conducted thirty-seven, or perhaps thirty-nine tests, the last two being conducted this morning. The various tests had been conducted at the three different test sites in the Soviet Union. One test (#97) may have been an effects test for an AICBM; one (#98) may have been a failure; at least two (#82 and #86) appeared to be system tests of short range missiles; and apparently one sub-launched missile was fired (#103). The largest Soviet detonation may end up to be somewhat over 60 megatons. The intelligence community was impressed with the broad nature of the tests, which apparently included a

number of system tests (at least five missiles and a number of air-drops, with at least one aircraft dropping two weapons), a number of effects tests (surface, sub-surface, and altitude bursts), and a number of weapons development tests (which gave the Soviets high yields and improved yield/weight ratios). There was nothing conclusive, but preliminary analysis did not indicate tremendous gains in weight/yield ratios. With respect to types of weapons, analysis of the tests has not provided us with as much information on tactical nuclear weapons as it has on strategic ones. From other sources, however, we do have information which shows that the Soviets are interested in nuclear warheads—for guns and mortars—as well as short-range missiles. Further, there is evidence that the Army had a requirement for a 1 KT warhead; as late as March of this year, however, they had none.

To conduct such a series of tests, the Soviets must have continued their nuclear development program during the moratorium (so did we); some evidence of our knowledge of this fact over the years was presented. Dr. Scoville concluded by saying that the Soviet's nuclear weapons program was moving ahead fast, but that there is nothing to indicate any outstanding developments.

c. Discussion of Briefing.

The President opened the discussion by asking how long it would have taken the USSR to prepare for the conduct of such a series of tests, and was informed that given the Soviet's attitude of meagre instrumentation of tests, preparations could be, and probably were, accomplished in the several months after May of this year. Next the President desired to know if there was any evidence of Soviet testing during the moratorium. Dr. Scoville replied that there has been nothing yet to indicate the Soviets would have *had* to test, and everything the Soviets have accomplished is explainable in terms of laboratory work. He added, however, that there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets had not tested during the moratorium.

d. Discussion of US Nuclear Testing.

The President then turned to the problem of US testing and asked Dr. Seaborg for his views. Dr. Seaborg said he agreed in general with Mr.

McNamara, but that certain development tests could be undertaken almost immediately and would not necessarily require the five to six months preparation indicated by the SecDef. (It later came out that this time difference resulted from Dr. Seaborg's intention to conduct in the atmosphere some of the tests now being conducted underground in Nevada. These tests could be ready within a few weeks.) Dr. Seaborg stated that if the US tested only underground while the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, we would be in no position to compete with them. In response to a Presidential query, he stated if a decision were made to resume atmospheric tests on a large scale to test small nuclear weapons, the yield of all the tests could be limited to less than one MT—only a fraction of that involved in the Soviet tests. Dr. Seaborg concluded by stating if we are going to conduct tests in the atmosphere, an early decision had to be made in the choice of sites. The President then called on Dr. Harold Brown to discuss what specific tests were proposed by DOD and AEC, and what gains could be expected therefrom.

Dr. Brown agreed with SecDef that system tests and proof tests had only marginal value. With respect to development tests, his main point was they made for improved weight/yield ratios, noting that these were important for both Polaris and Minuteman. Dr. Brown centered most of his attention on effects testing. They would (1) judge the effectiveness of nuclear denotations on a hardened missile, (2) determine what effect Nike-Zeus warheads, exploded at high altitude, would have on incoming warheads, and (3) check the effects of the fireball on the radar systems of Nike-Zeus. Finally, a very high altitude burst [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was planned to determine the effectiveness of such a blast on the blackout of communications and radar, as well as the sorting out of decoys.

Following Dr. Brown's discussion, the President asked several questions concerning the total yield involved in all the tests discussed, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. He next asked the length of time the test series would take once they began. Firing with a rate of one or so shots a week, it came out the first series would last some four months. When the President indicated his preference for having the series shorter, if possible, Mr. McNamara filled a silence by stating that if the President wanted to

move faster, it could be done, and that he would look into it with AEC. The President next called on Dr. Bradbury, in charge of the Nevada Test Site. Dr. Bradbury first stressed the need for development tests; he then turned to the present underground series in Nevada and stated that the problem has been as difficult, if not more difficult than had been anticipated. The big problem is to determine the yield, and even now we do not know the precise value of any of the systems recently tested. He emphasized, as had Dr. Seaborg, that if we tested only underground and the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, they would surely pass us in nuclear technology. One major point of interest was his emphasis on the fact that our past progress in the nuclear weapons program has resulted largely from our precise instrumentation in each test. Underground testing denies us the precise result, and there is at least six months lag between a test and the diagnosis of the data. Thus, underground testing denies us the principal source of our previous gains.

The President next turned to the neutron bomb and asked when that could be tested. Dr. Bradbury replied that this was an unfortunate name; there is as yet no such thing as a neutron bomb. It is true that an explosion with immediate radiation could take place, but it is not yet certain that it could be made to take place in a manner of value to the military. The US is not ready to test the neutron bomb; testing is not the problem in this area. The President then commented that while there was not much hope for explaining this to Senator Dodd, it should be explained to Senator Russell, who apparently had some misconceptions. Again, when no one stepped forward to take on this task, Mr. McNamara stepped in and said that he would talk to Senator Russell.

The President next turned to the question of where atmospheric tests should be conducted. Choices discussed were Nevada, the Johnston Islands off Hawaii, Eniwetok, or Christmas Island. The President voiced doubts that we could ever test in Nevada again for domestic political reasons. Ambassador Stevenson pointed up the difficulty of testing at Eniwetok, stating the Soviets would surely say that the US is willing to risk the lives of others but not US citizens. Dr. Bradbury pointed out that on Johnston Island there are at present no facilities for getting precise instrumentation but that certain tests could be conducted there. From a technical viewpoint, however, either Nevada or Eniwetok was preferred.

The President then asked for comments around the table. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out the fact that the US will test in the atmosphere is largely accepted in the United Nations, and that the real question now is to see that it is done in a way to minimize adverse publicity. He emphasized that (1) he did not think we should test anything that is not militarily valuable, (2) it probably would be a good idea to hold off until April, for then the General Assembly would have recessed, and (3) once the tests began, the shorter the series the better. Mr. Foster of the Disarmament Agency said that he was convinced that the atmospheric tests were necessary to get the military results desired, that there seemed to be a reason to test, and that he thought the US should test.³ Mr. Bowles said he had the same reservations already expressed, and that he had little to add on that count. He did, however, feel that the Presidential statement on nuclear testing prepared by Mr. Sorensen (Attachment A)⁴ was too long. This led to a discussion of the proposed Presidential statement.

*e. Discussion of the Proposed Presidential Statement.*⁵

The President admitted his statement might be a little long, but he said he wanted it to say two things primarily: First, in spite of the Soviet tests, the US is still stronger than the Soviet Union, and second, that no decision has yet been made on testing, but that authorization has been given to undertake preparation for testing. At this point Secretary Dillon, heretofore silent, said he would like to make a few comments. He then stated that the proposed statement was not the right kind of statement to make. It indicated a lack of clarity and decision, and it looked like the President did not know where he was going. It was too defensive in tone, and in addition, it said some dangerous things. Its reference to unborn children could backfire when we wanted to test. It over-stressed that the Soviets were testing for psychological results, when the evidence pre-sented was that there were some real military gains involved, and finally, it gave the impression that we are so strong that we would never have to test, when again the evidence was that we did need to test. The President appeared to appreciate the frankness of this approach (or at least not to be visibly taken aback), and asked if Mr. Dillon had any alternative, to which Mr. Dillon responded that he did, and passed to the President an alternate statement. The State Department then came forth with its draft.⁶ After some discussion during

which the difficulty of walking the fence between indicating a decision to test and a decision not to test (Mr. Murrow of USIA was the only one who requested a clear statement to the latter effect)⁷ the President suggested that Secretary McNamara, Secretary Bowles, Secretary Dillon, Dr. Seaborg, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Sorenson stay a few minutes with him to draft a statement.⁸

f. Future Actions.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that he felt three things required action. First, the steps that could be taken to speed up the tests once they began should be explored; second, the site for the tests should be determined; and, third, Senator Russell should be informed that the neutron bomb did not enter into the testing equation.

WYS⁹

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File Aug-Dec 61. Top Secret. Drafted by Major William Y. Smith of Taylor's staff.

¹ According to President Kennedy's Appointment Book, this meeting, held from 10:15 am. to 12:30 p.m., was attended by 35 people; Bowles attended for Rusk. (Kennedy Library) Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, p. 348, and in notes by Colonel Burris dated November 2 in the Johnson Library, Vice President's National Security File, NSC Document on Nuclear Testing, WH Support Date. The latter is in the Supplement.

In a November 1 briefing memorandum to Kennedy, Bundy stated: "There is strong Rusk-McNamara agreement on the central point: it is better not to test now 'under Soviet umbrella,' but to wait and test beginning about April 1962. But this implies clear determination to test about that time no matter what 'world opinion' says." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61)

² President Truman was an overnight guest at the White House November 1-2.

³ According to Burris' notes, at this or a later point in the meeting, the President stated "that he did not want to leave the impression that this particular NSC meeting came to the conclusion that the United States will resume testing. He preferred not to state U.S. intentions or to commit himself to a future course of action. He said that he could agree only to an implication that preparations might begin if in the best judgment [testing] were absolutely necessary."

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Text of the draft statement, as circulated by Bromley Smith to the NSC on November 1, is in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 2, pp. 350-352. See the Supplement.

⁶ Neither found.

⁷ According to Burris' notes, at this or a later point in the meeting, Murrow "stated that the reaction of most nations of the world to the Soviet testing was more one of anger than one of fear. He would like therefore not to invite this same kind of reaction toward the United States. He expressed the belief that the United States should announce its intention clearly not to resume testing at this time. The President replied that such an announcement was not possible."

⁸ Text of the President's statement issued later that day is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 566-567.

⁹ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

91. Record of National Security Council Action No. 2440 [Source](#)

Washington, November 2, 1961.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- a. Following a briefing by the Central Intelligence Agency of the current Soviet nuclear testing program, the Council recommended to the President that preparations for nuclear tests in the atmosphere be undertaken now prior to any decision to resume atmospheric tests.
- b. The President asked the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission to examine whether, in the event atmospheric testing is resumed, the desired tests could be conducted in a relatively short period of time rather than being spread over several months.
- c. In view of the complications which might arise in the event the Eniwetok and Nevada sites were used again for atmospheric tests, the President requested that a study be made of all possible sites which could be used to test small, as well as large, weapons.
- d. The President approved a statement with respect to U.S. policy toward nuclear testing which he later read to the press.

* [Source](#): Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, Meetings of the National Security Council 1961. Secret. Taken at the 492d meeting (see [Document 90](#)).

92. Note Prepared in the Department of Defense [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

Follow-up on 11/3/61 NSC Action

General Luedecke for the AEC and Dr. Johnson for DOD are preparing a plan of action to carry out the Presidential decision authorizing atmospheric test preparation that will include the following steps:

- (1) State will immediately pursue with the U.K. the use of Christmas Island, and JTF-8 will concurrently make plans to utilize this site.
- (2) As an alternative in case Christmas Island is not available, JTF-8 will make preparations for airborne tests off the Hawaiian group of islands, and will pick another launching site such as Johnston Island for the two high altitude shots which cannot be air launched.
- (3) The Air Force and Navy task groups which are already at work on preparations for systems tests (ASROC, Atlas and Polaris) will continue their efforts.
- (4) In order to attain maximum compression (probably 12 weeks) of the time period for development and effects tests once started, the AEC will plan for dovetailing of tests and the DOD will see what can be done to equip more aircraft for air sampling during the four months' period prior to the tests.

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jan-Nov 61). Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, which bears the stamped notation: "SecDef has seen." Gerald Johnson prepared a lengthier but similar memorandum on the same subject on November 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61)

93. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, November 3, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Although I was sorry we could not agree on a joint declaration about Nuclear Tests,¹ I was grateful for your very helpful comments which Dean Rusk sent through David Gore² and which I used in my statement in the House of Commons on October 31.³ No doubt you will have seen what I said about our position and the possibility of having to resume tests. I hope that you broadly agree with the position which I took.

Although there was a certain amount of hostility in the House of Commons this came only from the left-wing of the Labour Party, and the official opposition would not I believe dissent from what I said. In any case this is a perfectly defensible line here because it gives us a very strong moral position. I would not like you to think therefore that my idea for a joint declaration was prompted by domestic preoccupations. What I felt, and still feel, is that the present series of Soviet tests, particularly the large explosions set off in direct defiance of a United Nations resolution, has put the Russians in a very bad posture throughout the world. I know that the neutrals are always much readier to criticise us. All the same I have no doubt that they do resent the callous Soviet behaviour. I believe that this is a situation which we can use and that it is very important to set out our position clearly and firmly. Otherwise if it does seem essential later on for you to hold further atmospheric tests, the full weight of neutral opinion will turn against us or will at least succumb to the argument that there is nothing to choose between the Russians and the West. That was why I believed and still believe that some solemn joint declaration by the two Western nuclear powers would have real value. I think that our public statements this week mean that the time for such a declaration has passed for the moment. But if you do decide to resume atmospheric tests, my own feeling is that a solemn declaration broadly of the kind which I have suggested may still be desirable when that decision is announced.

Meanwhile, we have been giving some thought to our own needs for nuclear testing. We have strong technical reasons to test a device which the Atomic Energy Authority have developed [*5 lines of source text not declassified*] and it could be ready in a matter of weeks. The Atomic Energy Commission know about it and your people have expressed interest in it.

We should wish, however, to test underground and we have no underground facilities. No suitable site exists in these islands, and the search for and construction of a site overseas would not only be difficult in itself, but would take an unacceptably long time. I hope therefore that you may be able to fit a test of this device into the United States underground programme. I have no doubt that there are many claims upon your facilities, but I believe that such a test would not only be of mutual advantage technically, but would be an overt sign of our solidarity and collaboration at the present critical time.

If you were agreeable in principle to this proposal, the detailed arrangements and conditions for the test could, I suggest, be worked out between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Atomic Energy Authority. I would not of course make any announcement either about the request or about a possible test until all arrangements between us had been completed.

There are also plans for one or two other United Kingdom tests underground, but these are not urgent and the devices would not in any case be ready until next year.

Our Atomic Energy Authority is also interested in Project Gnome and will make proposals to the appropriate United States agency with a view to participating in the observation of this test.

I was very glad to have our telephone conversation on October 27. I certainly found it very helpful. If we cannot meet for the moment, and I quite agree about the difficulties of this, I feel it all the more important that we should be able from time to time to have these exchanges of ideas on the new telephone,⁴ which is certainly a great convenience.⁵

With warm regard,

Yours sincerely,

Harold Macmillan⁶

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Volume II. Top Secret; Atomic. Attached to a covering note from Ormsby Gore to the President.

¹ See [Document 86](#).

² In a meeting with Ormsby Gore the afternoon of October 27, Rusk said that the President had the impression from his telephone conversation that morning with Macmillan that the Prime Minister “still desired to make a statement.” Despite reconsideration the United States could not “adopt a self-imposed moratorium for a period decent enough to meet the Prime Minister’s requirements.” The best solution was for Macmillan to say “unilaterally what he felt he must, taking into account our views.” Rusk also outlined potential points for a statement that would be acceptable to the United States. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/10-2761)

³ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 553-554.

⁴ Reference is to the direct connection between the White House and 10 Downing Street.

⁵ In his November 10 reply, Kennedy suggested U.S. use of Christmas Island for atmospheric tests, asking for “early assurance that you do not see obstacles to our use of this site.” He stated that the United States would not “emulate the Soviet demonstrative tests of big weapons.” No U.S. tests would be undertaken except for results of substantial military significance, which could not reasonably and effectively be obtained in any other way, nor without the most rigorous steps to avoid or reduce fallout. Kennedy concluded by noting the “agreement” between the U.K. October 31 and U.S. November 2 statements on testing. (Text in telegram 2599 to London, November 10; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan, 1960-1962)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

94. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

Supervision of Atmospheric Testing Policy

You have ordered preparations for atmospheric testing, while reserving the actual decision on tests until later. Now preparations are beginning, and it is important that they go forward in such a way as to leave policy control in your hands. The following arrangements are recommended for this purpose:

1. You should establish an NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy, with the following membership: Seaborg, Chairman, State (Foster), Defense (probably Gilpatric), and White House (Wiesner and Bundy). This has the approval of all concerned.
- 2.

You might instruct the Committee to review all preparations for atmospheric tests under the following criteria:

Tests will be conducted in the atmosphere only if

- a. the test will provide information of substantial importance to the national defense
 - b. the information needed can be obtained in no other way, with reasonable time and effort
 - c. atmospheric fall-out is minimized in all practicable ways
 - d. the military need for the test outweighs the general desirability of avoiding all atmospheric fall-out.
3. You may wish to add that in your present judgment, any tests will be limited to those which relate to important questions of weapons development and weapons effects, and that you do not expect to approve of either proof tests or systems tests unless there is a convincing demonstration of unusual need in each case. (There is currently no limitation on the kinds of tests for which preparations may be made, and

there is a good chance that individual services may make million-dollar preparations for tests that you are not at all likely to approve; it seems sensible to put up a warning flag here.)

4. Closely related to the problem of supervision is the budgetary problem. I attach a memo from Dave Bell on that.¹ We join in recommending (a) that no FY '63 proposals be made at this time, (b) that FY '62 expenditures should be financed by use of emergency funds and a later supplementary request as needed, and (c) that budgetary action should be subject to review by the NSC Committee recommended in paragraph 1. above, with advice from the Bureau of the Budget.
5. Finally, we think that division or disagreement in the NSC Committee should be promptly reported to you for decision—and of course any and all fall-out tests must require your personal approval.²

McG. B.³

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61. Secret.

¹ Not found.

² At the end of the memorandum is the handwritten notation: “Approved. JFK”. NSAM No. 112, November 13, formally established the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy and designated Seaborg as Chairman. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 112)

³ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

95. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, November 16, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, We have considered very anxiously your suggestion that the facilities at Christmas Island should be made available for further nuclear tests in the atmosphere.¹ I am, of course, committed by the public statement which I made to Parliament on October 31 that “if I were convinced that a particular atmospheric test was necessary in order to maintain the balance of the deterrent and to preserve freedom in the world, Britain would be bound either to co-operate in, or support, its conduct”. Your statement on November 1 [2]² was in very similar terms. It follows that, if we were both convinced that further atmospheric tests were necessary within the meaning of those statements, our two countries should stand together in making them. But I feel very strongly that we should be under no illusion that a resumption of atmospheric tests will be at all acceptable to world opinion. I naturally shrink, as you must do, from being forced to do anything which looks like following the evil example of the Communists. And as the world judges us and them to be of two different standards, we must be very careful not to prejudice our moral predominance, which is a factor, perhaps the only factor, by which in the long run we shall undermine their atheist creed. I fear that these pressures of world opinion would be brought to bear upon us as soon as preparations were started to re-activate the facilities at Christmas Island. These cannot, of course, be kept secret. I therefore feel very strongly that, before we become involved in the public outcry which would certainly develop as soon as we were seen to be preparing for further tests, you and I should have a clearer picture of what exactly the tests will be and what purpose they will serve. We need to be satisfied ourselves, if we are to satisfy others, that the programme is one which falls squarely within the public positions which you and I have both taken.

From the experts who were over here last week, I gather that what your technical people have in mind is a series of up to 24 or more tests to be run

off as fast as possible in a period of three to four months. All tests would be in the atmosphere, although one or two might be at heights of 150,000 to 300,000 feet. Some would be at sea level. These would be made by a combination of air drops and balloon shots, together with a few surface shots of small yield devices and possibly including barges. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We have not, however, been told what military purpose these tests would serve, i.e., in what way they are “necessary to maintain our responsibilities for free world security”, or whether any of their purposes could be met by tests made underground.

I consider that you and I ought both to be satisfied on this point before we get into the arena of public controversy. It may be that, until the Russian tests have been fully evaluated, we cannot know for certain what further experiments may be necessary in order to preserve the existing balance of the deterrent. But I think that we could at least get a clearer definition than we have yet had of the purposes and possibilities of any 1962 series. I should like, therefore, to suggest the following programme.

In the first instance, I would be ready to authorise the secret reconnaissance on Christmas Island which you suggested. If this is to be kept secret, it must be a really small Anglo-American party, just two or three a side. They should set out from Hickham Base, Honolulu, whence reliefs are normally made to the 300 or so officers and men that we maintain on Christmas Island and I suggest that they ought to fly on the British transport aircraft that we have.

Secondly, I suggest that our expert advisers should get together at once (presumably atomic and defence experts from both sides) so that we can have a more precise picture of what your people would propose as a series of tests for 1962, showing the general nature of the tests and the purposes which they would serve. To begin this study, I would be ready, if you agreed, to send senior people from our Atomic Energy Authority and, if possible, from our Ministry of Defence over to Washington for this purpose as soon as you are ready. I realise that it would not be practicable at this stage to obtain full details of all the scientific and engineering content of the programme, but we need to have enough to enable us to judge whether it

could be justified and defended in public as falling within the terms of the public statements which you and I have both made.

Thirdly, I would hope that a report of these discussions would be available for us to consider when we meet before or after Christmas.³ We could then take our individual political judgments whether such a programme is within our public definitions and whether the material and technical gain is such as to outweigh what would inevitably be a moral loss to our position in the world. We should need, of course, to be satisfied that the purposes of the programme could not be met by underground tests. I think myself that we should also exclude tests designed solely to reduce the cost or marginally to improve the efficiency of our weapons, e.g., to increase the yield per unit of weight. The sort of thing I had in mind, when I made my statement, was something much more directly related to preserving the balance of the deterrent, such as tests which protect the validity of our weapons (e.g., by safeguarding them against counter-measures) or tests which might promise a break-through of the anti-missile missile front.

I recognise that this programme will involve postponing the start of work at Christmas Island until the New Year. It seems to me, however, that we cannot avoid this if we are to discharge conscientiously our heavy responsibilities in this very serious decision.

I am, of course, concerned about the possible reactions of opinion in this country where, I must confess, the public pressures are running in the opposite direction to your own. But I am much more deeply concerned about our joint position in the face of world opinion. On both these grounds, I feel that, before we take our final decision, we ought to have the fuller information which I have suggested in this message.⁴ It will then, of course, be necessary for a more formal agreement to be drawn up, dealing with the many related questions which would flow from such a joint enterprise.⁵

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Harold Macmillan⁶

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret. Another copy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961.

¹ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 93](#).

² See [footnote 8](#), [Document 90](#).

³ President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met in Bermuda December 21-22.

⁴ The President's November 21 reply stated that despite preparations "no decision has been made to resume atmospheric testing," repeated many assurances given in his November 10 letter, and stressed that each proposed atmospheric test would be submitted to him for decision, with emphasis "for the present" on recommendations for weapons development and weapons effects tests. Kennedy accepted Macmillan's recommendations on a reconnaissance party. (Attachment to memorandum from Battle to Bundy, November 17; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962) See the Supplement. Regarding Kennedy's November 10 letter, see [footnote 5](#), [Document 93](#).

⁵ In a November 21 memorandum to Seaborg, designated NSAM No. 113, Kennedy asked for recommendations by November 30 on which tests to conduct, "if and when I decide that testing should be resumed," so that representatives could be sent to England "to argue the case for this approved testing program." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61, and Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 113)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**96. Draft Report of the Meeting of the Foreign Weapons
Evaluation Group (Bethe Panel), November 16-17, 1961**

Washington, November 20, 1961.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files:
FRC 69 A 2243, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965). Secret; Restricted Data.
4 pages of source text not declassified.]

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations [Source](#)

Washington, November 21, 1961, 9:41 p.m.

Topol 778. Paris deliver Finletter 8 am November 22. USUN's 1680 rptd Paris 228.¹ Department believes negative vote on Swedish resolution² is in best interest Alliance.

On surface Swedish resolution may appear well-intentioned attempt inaugurate UN inquiry into methods of preventing spread of nuclear weapons. However, terms of reference of inquiry itself strikes at heart of our present and prospective nuclear weapons arrangements within NATO. Language of terms of reference of inquiry refers to conditions under which countries would refrain from "acquiring" nuclear weapons and "refuse to receive" them in the future on their territories "on behalf of any other country." This not only would prejudice our position on any possible future multilateral arrangement (which was our objection to original Irish resolution),³ but much more seriously is clearly directed against existing arrangements under which we make weapons available (under US custody) to the forces of our Allies and train their forces in the use of nuclear-capable weapons systems. It also would prejudice our arrangements for stationing US military units with nuclear weapons in non-NATO countries.

Coming on top of serious NATO split on "ban the bomb" resolution,⁴ affirmative vote for Swedish resolution by substantial number NATO countries would be regarded as further weakening of NATO's resolve to support Western collective defense efforts based on nuclear deterrence. It would play into hands of those groups in Scandinavia which are attempting capitalize on fear of "resurgent German militarism" at time when we are endeavoring insure maximum support by all NATO countries for our Berlin NATO military build-up. And another split NATO vote might well lead Moscow to believe its current pressures against Finland bearing fruit.

We also are concerned at apparent Swedish motives in putting forward resolution of this sort without consultation.⁵ We feel Swedes may be moving toward establishment of “non-nuclear club” made up of nations which reject not only *national* ownership and custody of warheads (which is all to the good), but which also will not allow warheads to be stationed on their territory nor apparently take part in any future arrangements for multilateral ownership and control of nuclear weapons. This could prejudice NATO strength (on which Swedish security ultimately rests, as well) and have divisive effect in NATO by making still more difficult position of Norway and Denmark as members of NATO who, despite their Alliance ties, will not accept nuclear weapons on their territory.

In light of preceding considerations, at November 22 NAC meeting you should make statement along following lines:

USG concerned at implications of Swedish resolution which, although limited to call for UN inquiry re methods prevent spread of nuclear weapons, will redound against Western Alliance by casting doubts on existing and future nuclear defensive arrangements, since it would prevent continuation of existing stockpile arrangements and exploration of future arrangements for multilateral ownership and control of nuclear weapons. NAC has previously heard US views on unfortunate repercussions of NATO split on “ban the bomb” resolution. To large extent, many of these arguments apply in case of Swedish resolution because Swedish resolution bound to play into hands of those who believe we can make progress toward disarmament by passing resolutions with high emotional content but little substance and which prejudice existing and possible future arrangements advantageous to NATO. Cumulative effect passage such resolutions, revealing differences among NATO Allies, bound to damage NATO cohesion.

US has consistently opposed and will continue to oppose spread of manufacturing capabilities and ownership and control of nuclear weapons. It has sought to control these weapons and to prevent this spread through mutually agreeable arrangements within NATO. At same time, we have supported efforts in the disarmament field to limit spread of national nuclear capabilities and to bring about general and complete disarmament

under effective international control. As step in this direction, we have expressed our intention to vote for the Irish resolution and consider Irish resolution most satisfactory method handling this complicated subject. Swedish resolution serves no additional purpose but rather can serve to throw doubt on legitimacy of existing NATO arrangements, and can weaken NATO strength and cohesion and prejudice consideration of possible future multilateral arrangements, such as outlined in President's Ottawa speech.⁶

Although Swedish resolution undoubtedly will pass by overwhelming majority, USG feels it should be opposed and hopes other members of Alliance would agree.

FYI. Our final decision on vote will in large part be determined by outcome discussion in NAC.⁷ End FYI.

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-1661. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Copenhagen, London, Oslo, Ottawa, Stockholm, and USUN.

¹ Not printed. (Ibid.)

² For text of Resolution 1664 (XVI), passed on December 4 by a vote of 57-12-32, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 693. Voting against were the NATO powers except Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, all of which voted in favor.

³ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 83](#).

⁴ For text of Resolution 1653 (XVI), passed on November 24 by a vote of 55-20-26, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650. The Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba were among the supporters, which included many "neutral" powers. Denmark, Iceland, and Norway abstained; the other NATO members voted against.

⁵ Rusk said, in the course of a telephone conversation with Stevenson on November 30: "the Swedes were wicked to do it without consultation with us." (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

⁶ For extracts from the President's address before the Canadian Parliament on May 17, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 149-151.

⁷ The Swedish resolution was discussed at several NAC meetings prior to its passage by the U.N. General Assembly on December 4. Information on these discussions is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 for November and December 1961. Telegram 1831 from USUN, November 29, indicates that USUN had received final instructions by that date to vote against the resolution. (Ibid., 600.0012/11-2861)

98. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation with the President, November 22

The President called me at home at breakfast time this morning to discuss nuclear test ban negotiations, and (as it turned out) a number of other subjects as well—some of them IO business, some of them not. A summary of his concerns and requests, and the action taken on them, follows:

1. Nuclear Tests

The President was concerned at the way the press was playing the forthcoming resumption of test ban negotiations. He referred particularly to an article by Joseph Newman in the *New York Herald Tribune*,¹ to the effect that the United States had now been mouse-trapped on this issue.

The President developed his thinking about the line we ought to take publicly on this subject, and thought that we probably should have a background press conference on the matter today.¹ He did not contemplate making any statement himself on the subject before the negotiations get underway, but thought that he might be having something to say on the U.S. testing program in a couple of weeks.

The line he seemed to be suggesting was the following:

- a. To remind the world of our record in recent weeks, which is replete with clear statements by U.S. spokesmen, that we are free to test and that we are not buying any moratoriums.
- b. In view of Soviet performance we intend to be very tough about the need for adequate inspection and control arrangements in the resumed Geneva talks.

- c. If we can get agreement that would be strong enough to stick, and there is some prospect of getting other countries to adhere to it, and thus “lessen the proliferation” of nuclear arms, it would be a good deal from the U.S. point of view. In other words, we still do want a test ban treaty.
- d. No risk to the U.S. security attaches to this line of negotiations.
- e. We should stay off flat claims about the respects in which we're ahead on weapons development as a result of testing so far.

I passed these comments for action to Adrian Fisher in ACDA.

[Here follows discussion of Angola, Chinese representation at the United Nations, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and India.]

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, August-December 1961. Secret.

¹ Not further identified.

99. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

1. The President telephoned this afternoon and was very much concerned that public opinion might believe that we did not have complete freedom of action to test in all environments while negotiations were going on in Geneva. He suggested that I should make this absolutely clear at the opening of negotiations.¹ If the USSR were to accept a nuclear test ban treaty, he did not think it would be very popular.
2. He felt that there would be considerable misunderstanding if we again reiterated our willingness to maintain an unrestricted moratorium on tests yielding below 4.75 for three years to commence with the signing of the treaty, especially since it was now believed that in these lower yield tests the Soviets might be making very significant advances.
3. I explained to him my theory that we should at the very beginning outline the additional number of control posts, the manner of regrouping the control posts and the additional scientific control apparatus that would have to be written into the treaty before the treaty was signed in an effort to lower the threshold of the treaty as soon as possible. (I did not point out that this would mean abandoning our other alternatives of an eleven-man Scientific Commission to report six months before the end of the three-year research program.) I explained that this possibly could be done not as an additional concession to the Soviets, by eliminating the threshold, but rather as an additional control requirement without which we would not be willing to sign the treaty.
4. He said that if this could be set up in such a way so that it looked as though we were getting greater protection for the U.S. rather than as an additional concession, he was for it.
5. I said I felt it would be helpful if an announcement could be made before we resume negotiations on the 28th, that he now give all orders necessary

to start testing in all environments. He stated that Prime Minister Macmillan took the position that unless we could satisfy English public opinion that this was essential for our military security he would have considerable difficulty answering questions in Parliament, and we must not give the impression we were testing because we were behind.

6. I pointed out that I felt we were encountering rather a difficult situation at the United Nations where the heads of some delegations at least, appeared to feel that the balance of nuclear power had shifted from the U.S. to the Soviets as a result of their latest series of tests, and that contrary to the theory held this summer that the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union would make their public posture more difficult, it appeared to be having the reverse effect of making some delegations, at least, unwilling to offend the Soviet Union because of fear of its increased power.
7. I also expressed the opinion that it would take many a month before Prime Minister Macmillan would give permission to test at Christmas Island and since our legal position to conduct tests in Eniwetok was clear (see Becker's memorandum),² I thought we should, in the interest of our own military security, be prepared to run the necessary criticism in the United Nations.
8. He asked me to telephone him after the Principals' Meeting.³

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/11-2261. Confidential. Also addressed to Foster.

¹ In the course of his statement at the opening of the resumed Geneva Conference on November 28, Dean stated that because the Soviet Union had been "involved in an unwarranted attempt to gain for itself a unilateral advantage in the nuclear field," there was "naturally no chance whatsoever—and I want to make this very clear—of any pre-treaty commitment by the United States not to conduct any nuclear tests of any character in any environment which it deems essential for the national security of itself and its associates." For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 665-673.

² Not found.

³ No memorandum of this telephone conversation has been found.

100. Editorial Note

During the White House daily staff meeting on November 22, 1961, there was discussion of a Principals' meeting to be held later that day. Colonel Ewell's memorandum of the meeting reads in part: "Bromley Smith asked whether the principals will be aware of the new test analysis. Bundy said he thought so as Wiesner and Brown will be among the principals and they have heard it. Smith again raised the question as to whether the delegation should be instructed to seek agreement or not. Bundy felt that the proper line was that if we could get a decent treaty we should. Smith said that he doubted that this was wise in view of the fact that the Bethe Report (which I had never heard of) concluded that the Russians have done things in their tests which we can't do. Bundy responded with the traditional line that these were just improvements in degree and that the Russians had done nothing that indicated a real breakthrough. He still feels that the decision about testing is a political one rather than a technical one. Smith, much to my surprise, returned to the tack with the thought that, even if we are going to sign an agreement regardless, we should take a much harder initial position than before, that there is no reason for us to act as though the Russians had done nothing since the negotiations had been broken off. Whether Smith's line of thought will have any influence or not I couldn't detect. Bundy has always been primarily an exponent of agreement regardless, and I doubt if he would change his philosophical set based on actual developments. As to this Bethe Report, I gather that they concluded that the Russians had achieved a lot more than Scoville's initial appreciation indicated." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61)

Regarding the Principals' meeting, see [Document 101](#). The draft Bethe Report is [Document 96](#).

101. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Committee of Principals^{[1](#)}

PARTICIPANTS

(See Tab A)^{[2](#)}

The discussion was preceded by a briefing given by Dr. Scoville on the results of the analyses of the recent Soviet nuclear weapon test series.

Following the briefing Secretary Rusk asked Chairman Seaborg if he would care to evaluate the relative position of the US and the USSR in the nuclear weapons field in the light of the Soviet nuclear tests. Chairman Seaborg replied that it was almost impossible to give a meaningful answer to this question since there were so many factors that entered into the equation. In certain aspects of thermonuclear technology the Soviets seem to have caught up with and perhaps even surpassed the United States. The situation with respect to tactical weapons was not known. Dr. Wiesner added that it was certainly clear that the Soviet Union had improved its effective stockpiles by the recent series. Chairman Seaborg agreed and went on to ask Dr. Scoville if he would give the meeting an estimate of the length of time that the Soviet Union had been preparing for its recent series of tests. Dr. Scoville replied that the Soviet Union had probably been preparing the logistics for the series since the spring of 1961. The heavy build-up in the north probably had not begun until July 1961. Obviously design work had been vigorously prosecuted ever since 1958.

Ambassador Dean asked what the effect would be on nuclear weapons development work in the United States if the Kennedy-Macmillan offer to refrain from tests in the atmosphere were renewed. Chairman Seaborg said that it would be hard to conduct nuclear tests effectively and with sufficient speed underground and that the United States would not be ready for a test in outer space for another two years. The fact that a nuclear test ban treaty would not prevent preparations for another series of Soviet tests was the

most worrisome thing, however. After another several years of preparations the Soviet Union might again start to test. Chairman Seaborg said he would be willing to freeze weapons technology at the present state in the US and USSR but he saw no clear solution to the danger of preparations for another series being carried out in the Soviet Union during the early years of the treaty. Dr. Wiesner summed up by stating that without atmospheric tests the United States could not redress everything that the Soviet Union had accomplished in its recent series but that Chairman Seaborg was also saying that this did not worry him too much.

Ambassador Dean asked whether it was not true that the United States had been experiencing difficulties in its underground testing. Chairman Seaborg replied that underground testing had been much slower than expected and that diagnostics had been much inferior. Dr. Wiesner asked whether this situation might improve to which Dr. Seaborg replied that he assumed it would.

Secretary Rusk asked whether there was any objection to the proposition that the United States should not repeat the Kennedy-Macmillan offer for an atmospheric ban without international controls and that if the Soviet Union made the offer the United States would not accept it. There was no disagreement. Secretary Rusk then said that so far the United States position had been based on the October 11 decision³ that a nuclear test ban treaty was still in the United States interest. Everything we had been doing was based on that assumption. Secretary Rusk thought the question should be raised now as to whether the United States would sign the US-UK draft treaty if the Soviet Union said next week that they would sign it. Mr. Bundy asked whether there were things which could be added to the treaty to prevent the kind of preparations to which Chairman Seaborg was drawing the meeting's attention. It was felt that there was nothing which could be added to the treaty to cover this point.

Mr. Foster said that he had envisaged Ambassador Dean's asking the Soviet delegation to respond to the latest United States proposals to which no satisfactory answer had yet been given. He saw no need to hurry the negotiations and this lack of haste would be encouraged by the fact that the United Nations Secretariat would not be able to provide the kind of service

which would permit fast work in the conference. Mr. Foster also noted that on November 28 there would be a meeting of the committee established by the NSC to look into the question of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The results of the meeting would be important in determining whether the United States would be prepared to accept in the future a test ban treaty of the kind previously advanced by us. Secretary Rusk said he believed the situation had now changed and that whereas the United States could have signed a test ban treaty immediately we were now in a position of not having had adequate consultation with Congress, and were consequently without assurance that Congress would be ready to ratify the treaty and provide funds for its implementation. Secretary Rusk therefore felt that Ambassador Dean could not be instructed to sign the draft treaty⁴ until more work had been done with Congress. Mr. Foster agreed with the assessment.

Mr. Foster then asked Dr. Scoville whether it was a fact that the more that was learned about the Soviet tests the better the tests appeared. Dr. Scoville said that the first tests which were analyzed showed only moderate improvements in Soviet technology but that the series later blossomed out into something more significant.

Secretary Rusk enquired as to what, if anything, took effect when the treaty was signed, to which Ambassador Dean replied that each of the three proposed signatory states had said they would not conduct tests underground, below the 4.75 threshold, from the date of signature for a limited period of time. The treaty itself, of course, would not come into force until it was ratified. Secretary Nitze asked whether it would not be well to consider removing completely the moratorium agreement on shots below 4.75. Mr. Foster stated that the United States had strongly supported a test ban treaty as the beginning of a process leading to disarmament but now it appears that limitations on tests might not be in our best interest; on the other hand, a change in position would undoubtedly have the most serious consequences. Mr. Foster wondered if it would not be possible to avoid taking a final decision on signing a treaty until the committee appointed by the NSC had a chance to begin its work and until we had seen what the Soviet Union's position was going to be in the test ban conference. Mr. Bohlen said that the Soviet note accepting the resumption of

negotiations implied that the Soviet Union was not prepared to sign a treaty right away since it talked about events that would happen during the negotiations. Secretary Nitze said that to him there appeared to be a clear intent in the Soviet note to establish a moratorium on nuclear tests during the negotiations. Secretary Rusk replied that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we would not accept an unpoliced moratorium during the negotiations. The Secretary also said that Ambassador Dean should describe in no uncertain terms how the Soviet breaking of the moratorium had affected the negotiating situation.

Ambassador Dean then enquired whether it would be possible to announce the total number of Soviet shots in the recent series. Dr. Scoville replied that something like "almost fifty" could be said but not the precise number.

Mr. Foster asked whether there should be a backgrounder for the press in order to give them some information about our attitude toward the resumption of negotiations.

Mr. Nitze asked whether a revised approach to the treaty was not necessary and Chairman Seaborg said that perhaps the United States should say it wishes to amend the treaty so as to prevent preparations for testing from being carried out. Mr. Stelle suggested that the answer to this was simply to prepare for testing ourselves. Chairman Seaborg felt this was not a feasible course of action for the United States and Mr. Bundy agreed that it would be difficult for the United States to prepare to do something which it had agreed in a treaty not to do.

Dr. Wiesner said he felt that the key issue was not whether the United States was equivalent to the Soviet Union in every aspect of nuclear weapon technology but whether the United States is missing any of the things it should have for its security. Mr. Cleveland said that the United States position had been based on the understanding that the United States was so far ahead in nuclear weapon technology that it could sign a treaty to end tests. If this situation had changed perhaps some new balloon should be floated. Chairman Seaborg said he felt that the problem was would the United States be ahead if the Soviet Union once more prepared and conducted a large test series. Mr. Scoville said he felt the Soviet Union had

tested everything it had and that it would take at least 6 or 9 months before they would be ready to test anything else.

As to the backgrounder for the press, Secretary Rusk said that a high level backgrounder did not appear necessary, and that the press officers could make the necessary points known to the press in the usual way.

Mr. Cleveland observed that in face of the new factors that had come to light, such as the need to inspect preparations, the United States might have to move in the direction of combining the test talks with disarmament.

Dr. Wiesner said that when the question of the nuclear test negotiations was discussed with the President he should be advised that there are many dimensions to the problem and that there are many things which we could do to off-set any imbalance.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:25 p.m.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Goodby and approved in S on December 4.

¹ In a November 22 briefing memorandum to Rusk, Foster stated that the purpose of the Principals' meeting was to discuss the situation arising from the Soviet acceptance, in a November 21 note, of the U.S. proposal, set forth in a note of November 13 following conclusion of the General Assembly debate on the nuclear test question, to resume the recessed Geneva test ban conference. (Ibid., Central Files, 397.5611-GE/11-2261) For texts of the notes, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 594 and 636-637, respectively. The conference resumed on November 28.

² Not printed. Among the 28 participants were Nitze (representing McNamara), Lemnitzer, and Allen Dulles.

³ See [Document 83](#).

⁴ Apparent reference to the April 18 U.S.-U.K. draft; see [footnote 2](#), [Document 8](#).

102. Letter From the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy (Seaborg) to President

Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 29, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As requested in NSC Action Memorandum No. 112 of November 13, 1961,¹ a careful study has been made of all of the nuclear weapon test shots proposed by the weapons laboratories and by DOD for inclusion in an atmospheric test program which might be conducted over a three-month period, beginning in the spring of 1962. The proposals were reviewed in the light of the continuing objectives of our nuclear weapons program, our position vis-à-vis the USSR—taking account of the marked advances revealed by their recent test series—and our current state of readiness as adversely affected by the test moratorium. Some 49 possible test shots were reviewed, of which a minimum of 27 are recommended for inclusion in the early program.

The program under consideration has both general and specific objectives. In common with all technologies, the development of nuclear weapons combines the techniques of theoretical and experimental science with the development and design of specific devices. At each stage, data based on past experiments and tests are combined with known theory to devise new and more revealing experiments and improved devices which are subjected to experiment and the process is then repeated. At appropriate points the results are used as the basis for the design of specific weapons. The trends of the developments and the objectives and characteristics of the weapons are, of course, subject to such external factors as delivery capabilities, expected enemy countermeasures, the availability of special materials, etc.

The normal cycle of a year or so was, of course, perturbed by the test moratorium. During the three-year period the information gained from the Hardtack series was exploited about as far as it is feasible to go without further experimental checks. New weapons introduced represent the greatest extrapolations from tested configurations that it is prudent to use

without further test. Understanding of the underlying principles and of the probable behavior of extrapolated arrangements was extended by calculation and analysis to the limit in the absence of additional data. Except in a few limited areas, further substantial progress would not be possible without additional experiments. The resumption of underground testing has of course made it possible to progress in those aspects of the program for which experiments and tests are feasible in that environment. There remain, however, larger and more important areas that cannot be covered in an underground program. Hence, over a major portion of weapons technology, *above-ground testing is essential to any substantial future progress and recovery of momentum by the Laboratories.*

Urgency is added to the need for progress by the substantial advances made by the USSR. In certain areas of the underlying technology, they have surpassed any results that we have achieved or, indeed, know how to achieve with any degree of certainty; some of their devices, notably the larger ones, go beyond our own. *Even more importantly, they have a new accumulation of experimental data on which to base still further advances.* Especially if exploited through still further tests, these advances could well result in drastic, and possibly decisive, changes in the relative positions of the two countries unless we too make substantial progress.^{[2](#)}

Certain specific areas are of special military interest. Each potential adversary now has, or soon will have, a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons such that *if delivered on target*, virtual destruction of the enemy would result. Increasingly, therefore, much of the future effort of each side will be directed at measures designed to prevent the delivery of enemy weapons while, at the same time, preserving the deliverability of one's own weapons in spite of the enemy's preventive measures. This game of counter and counter-countermeasures can take many forms including (1) measures for destruction of enemy weapons on base—countered by hardened bases, and mobility (aircraft in flight, Polaris submarines, mobile Minutemen, etc.); (2) anti-missile systems including the use of defensive nuclear warheads—countered by hardening of offensive missiles, by clustered warheads and/or decoys and by offensive warheads effective at greater altitudes where defensive measures are more difficult; (3) increased defensive capabilities against aircraft—countered by low level penetration,

requiring rugged “lay-down” types of weapons, or by long-range air-to-ground missiles; (4) interference with radar and communications through nuclear explosions as well as by conventional means.

In general, strategic effectiveness can be enhanced by increasing the diversity of methods of accomplishing a given mission, thus complicating the defenses, and by improvements lessening the requirements on the carrier. For example, large dividends can result from improvements permitting weapons of a given destructive potential to be carried by missiles as well as by aircraft, by Minuteman or Polaris as well as by Atlas, etc.

These considerations lead to urgent requirements for (1) increased knowledge of the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened bases and on missiles and on radar and communications—as bases for designing both improved defensive measures and effective counters against enemy defenses; (2) developments leading to decreased nuclear vulnerability of our own offensive warheads; (3) decreased weight-to-yield ratios of strategic missile warheads in order to permit increased diversity and greater pre-strike mobility and to increase penetration capabilities through the use of clusters and/or decoys, through hardening of the individual missiles or through use of greater yields at higher altitudes; (4) developments increasing the effectiveness of our own defensive weapons through enhanced effects and through decreased weight-to-yield ratios, permitting longer range and higher altitude delivery at given yields or greater kill range at given weights.

In the area of tactical weapons, two considerations predominate: (1) developments permitting greater diversity of delivery methods for given missions such as developments permitting the use of simpler and more mobile launching mechanisms; enhanced effects and decreased weight and size are important here; (2) improvements and economies making possible wider deployment of tactical weapons in advance of knowledge as to places of potential need; reductions in requirements for special nuclear material per weapon are of importance in view of the large numbers that are involved. (Clearly, in this area, the number of weapons deployed is far larger than would ever actually be used.)³

In view of the above considerations and our present situation, our test program can be considered under three major headings: (1) measurements of weapons effects; (2) tests of advanced concepts leading to better understanding and to markedly improved and less vulnerable weapons; and (3) tests of actual weapons incorporating substantial extrapolations from previously tested configurations so that both developmental and verification objectives are achieved.

It is clear that measurements of weapons effects must be conducted in the environment to which they will pertain and, hence, require experiments in and above the atmosphere. It is also important that many of the tests required, for example, those relating to anti-missile systems and to improvements in strategic penetration, perforce involve large yields and, hence, either cannot be conducted underground at all or only slowly, with great difficulty.

It has been our experience underground to date that such things as the mechanical difficulties of digging very deep (up to 2,000 ft.), large diameter holes (36 inches), bring into question the feasibility of using the vertical hole approach for testing yields much above 20 KT. We have proposed and did plan that yields up to 100 KT be conducted underground in tunnels; however, our experience with post-shot contamination in the tunnels at the Nevada Test Site up to this time gives us some concern that our planning in that aspect was not realistic. It is now estimated that, if feasible at all, tests of this magnitude could be conducted at a rate of not more than a very few per year, even under favorable conditions, in a given tunnel complex. In contrast, large yield devices can be tested in rapid succession in the atmosphere with relatively little advance preparation of the means of testing.⁴

A second important factor in relative capability is that of diagnostic instrumentation. For test shots which can be satisfied by relatively simple instrumentation plus good radiochemical analysis, tests in the atmosphere can be much more effective in furnishing early information than can underground experiments, at least with current techniques. This is especially important when the results of one test determine parameters to be used on a succeeding test in the same series. (In one, so far extreme, case it

required almost two months to do the digging necessary to obtain an adequate radiochemical sample from a shot in the current series.) Even relatively complex instrumentation is easier for atmospheric tests if barge shots can be used.

Both time and place will influence the choice of test shots that can be included in an atmospheric test program. In accordance with your memorandum we are planning on a target date of April 1, but recognize that it may be advisable to postpone the date by a month or so, as more specific plans may require.

The choice of test site will dictate how the tests can actually be conducted. Technically the Eniwetok Proving Ground is the most desirable, extending as it does over a substantial area, with a lagoon suitable for barge shots. All of the contemplated tests could probably also be conducted, though not so well, at Christmas Island. Since Eniwetok has political difficulties and the availability of Christmas Island is at best uncertain, prudence dictates that we be prepared to test elsewhere if necessary. Fortunately, many of the proposed tests could be conducted without a highly-developed island site, although they would benefit from such a site. Some could be done by air drops probably staged from Hawaii with limited instrumentation on some small island, such as Johnston, not suitable for more extensive development; with some degradation of diagnostic information, others could be carried out by air drop over the open ocean using such instrumentation as could be carried in accompanying aircraft or on ships. However, some of the most complex experiments are of questionable feasibility except over an extended land base such as Christmas Island; in the absence of such a base, serious consideration should be given to conducting some of these above ground in Nevada. In any case, for geophysical reasons, one important test to determine the effects of a nuclear explosion on hardened missile bases could be conducted only in Nevada. A special requirement also exists in connection with rocket lifted test shots for which Johnston Island is the logical launch point because of available facilities.

It has been proposed that tests be conducted in space in order to avoid fallout. Preliminary analysis of space vehicle capability and reliability and

difficulty of instrumentation indicates that it would cost approximately 100 million dollars over a 2-year period to develop such a capability and about 20 million dollars per shot thereafter. Consequently, it was not considered available for this program.

Another important consideration in planning the test series is the restraint to be placed on yield because of fallout and its political implications. The series now proposed would have a total yield of approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] this compares to the recent Soviet tests totalling approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. By appropriate test techniques, it should be possible, within limits, to restrict the worldwide fallout, at the cost of producing local fallout. The balance struck would be dependent on the choice of site.

In studying the proposed series of test shots, it is apparent that no great advance in weapon technology can be attributed in advance to any one proposed experiment. Indeed, it is rare that a single test shot can, by itself, lead to a major advance in nuclear weapon technology. Progress in this area is much more likely to come from a broadly based, interrelated series of experiments—some empirical in nature and some the result of careful calculations—from which one can then advance to bolder, more advanced concepts. The group of 27 tests which appears to be a minimum program must therefore be considered in the context of the gains that could be made from this group of experiments as a program, recognizing that they fall logically into three categories.

The first category covers the general area of the effects of nuclear weapons on such things as hardened missile bases, on missiles in flight, on radar and communications and on naval vessels and their equipment. It is axiomatic that weapons effects in a given environment must be understood if we are to be able to plan for the proper design of weapons to fit a particular military requirement. While there have been many nuclear tests which sought to develop information about weapons effects, it is apparent that there are still significant areas of unknowns of importance to the military use of nuclear weapons. Four tests that fall solely in the effects category appear to be feasible for inclusion in an early series, but other recommended tests will have effects implications. The area of greatest interest lies in effects at very

high altitudes as they apply to AICBM defenses and to the kill capability of our own AICBM warheads. A series of five such tests has been projected, varying in yields from a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to about [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and in altitudes from 20 Km to above 400 Km. However, practical considerations with respect to development of instrumentation techniques and related preparations make it unrealistic to plan for more than two of these shots in the short time available. It is important that preparations go forward to conduct the others, and perhaps additional ones in the next test series. The effects of antisubmarine warheads are also of interest, as are the effects of the electromagnetic pulse from a surface burst as they relate to the operational effectiveness of hardened missile bases. One each of such tests is included.

The second major category into which test proposals fall is that of advanced concepts for improving weapon effectiveness and decreasing warhead vulnerability. Advances range all the way from exploring changes in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] design of “standard” devices through the exploring of very advanced concepts for greatly improving the efficiency of thermonuclear “burn”. New ideas in thermonuclear technology promise great enhancement of the fusion-to-fission ratio [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Direct practical objectives include significant reductions in the weight-to-yield ratio of all classes of offensive and defensive weapons; decreased vulnerability of our own offensive weapons; enhanced weapons effects, including progress [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and reductions in special nuclear materials, particularly for tactical and defensive warheads.

[*2 paragraphs (37 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Although it would certainly be desirable to include all of the proposed tests of advanced concepts, practical political considerations, and the short time available for design and fabrication of devices dictate that some of these proposals might be postponed to a later test series.

[*1 paragraph (22 lines of source text) not declassified*]

While the program recommended here represents the current best thinking, it must be pointed out that the underground test program particularly in the

area of advanced concepts, is almost certain to produce surprises which will dictate changes in any atmospheric series which might be planned now. Accordingly, one must recognize this and retain flexibility to add, substitute, or otherwise modify the program. On the assumption that such flexibility will be possible, for example, the recommended program has not included tests proposed by the laboratories that repeat completed or scheduled underground tests, or other tests that can presumably be carried out underground; in the event of failures in the underground test program, appropriate revisions to the atmospheric series will be required. On the other hand, knowledge gained from successful underground tests may call for elimination or modification of some of the presently proposed atmospheric tests.

In addition to provisions for flexibility, current planning should provide for preparations for a second test series, about a year later, looking to more dramatic advances than are possible in an early time frame. In fact, it is essential to plan for a second series in order to accomplish the very important effects tests that could not be included in this early time scale. In looking at what test devices can be made available in the April to July period, it is apparent that we are suffering to some extent from the three-year test moratorium. During that period, while the United States was negotiating in good faith, the bulk of our nuclear weapon design effort was oriented towards devices that could be stockpiled with adequate assurance without tests. Thus, the climate was not conducive to bold, new concepts requiring experimental checks. The possibility of being able to test seemed very remote. In contrast, the available evidence indicates that from the very outset of the moratorium, the Soviets have anticipated atmospheric testing and have oriented their efforts toward significant advances requiring such testing.

In summary, it is clear that a rate of progress adequate to maintain our relative military posture can be attained only through resort to atmospheric testing; indeed, much vital information on effects and many possible technical advances, would not be realized at all through underground tests alone.

Accordingly, it is recommended that a program to consist of a minimum of 27 test shots as indicated on the attached Enclosures “A” and “B”⁵ be approved for atmospheric testing to be conducted over a period of approximately three months beginning in the spring of 1962. A description of each of the additional tests proposed for consideration by the laboratories and by the DOD, but not now recommended for inclusion in this first series, is also attached as Enclosure “C”. For your information Enclosure “D” lists all known nuclear explosions conducted to date by the various countries.

Sincerely,

Glenn T. Seaborg⁶

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 11/29-12/6/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See [footnote 2, Document 94](#).

² Next to this sentence Bundy wrote a marginal note: “Spell this out.”

³ Bundy’s marginal note next to this paragraph reads: “not impressive.”

⁴ Bundy’s marginal note next to the upper part of this paragraph reads: “Of course it can be done.”

⁵ The attachments to this letter are not printed.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations [Source](#)

Washington, November 30, 1961, 8:47 p.m.

1392. Disarmament Forum; USUN-1821.¹ You should consult with UK, France, Canadian and Italian Dels on basis of following position for next session Stevenson-Zorin talks:

1. While US believes inclusion ten additional states is preferable on basis relative numbers NATO-Warsaw countries and remaining nations of world, we would as conciliatory move be prepared, if Soviets insist, to reduce to eight number of countries to be added. This would be minimum to which we would be willing recede and we leave it to your discretion when to fall back to this position. Our impression here is that Soviets rather anxious to come to agreement and they recognize obvious attractiveness of 5-5-10 proposal if we force it into public domain.
2. These countries should be added in accordance with agreed principles of geographic representation and not on any other basis. We would suggest accordingly the addition of two Latin Americans, two Asians, two Africans, one Middle East and one non-NATO, non-Warsaw European. We believe we should reach agreement on total number to be added and geographic distribution within this number prior to further discussion of specific countries.
3. If Soviets refuse to discuss principle of number or geographic distribution without settling on specific countries, US would take position for tactical reasons that we are prepared, within this agreed framework, to have the additional countries elected by GA. This would have greater virtue of allowing states truly interested in participation to pre-sent their own candidacies and will help in securing more representative forum.
4. If necessary to obtain Soviet agreement to this procedure we prepared reach prior understanding with Soviets as to countries we ourselves would support for election. We would be prepared support Mexico and Argentina from Latin America, India and Japan from Asia, Ivory Coast

and Tunisia or Nigeria from Africa, UAR from Middle East, and either Sweden, Ireland or Austria from non-NATO, non-Warsaw Europe. FYI: We could fall back to Brazil in lieu Argentina at whatever stage you deem necessary. End FYI.

Assuming Western Five agree on above position, USDel should consult with Pakistan (also Argentina prior any fall-back to Brazil) on foregoing in order that we may assess their reaction prior to actually putting it to Soviets.

In approaching Pakistan and Argentina, you should stress that as a practical matter US recognizes that no countries not mutually acceptable to both Soviets and US can be added and that GA itself would probably not support addition of countries which would result in Soviet refusal to participate in negotiations. Our aim is to avoid “troika-like” body (as in 5-5-5 or step in that direction, e.g. 5-5-3) and to gain reaffirmation principle geographic representation in disarmament bodies. You should state we prefer have countries added elected by GA, but that we may be forced to reach prior understanding with Soviets on mutually acceptable slate which we would support and that Soviets have objected to inclusion of Argentina and Pakistan.

Reporting—Agree necessary to change operative para 3 section B Soviet draft contained urtel 1826.² You should continue press Soviets accept formulation in US draft handed them on Nov 15.³ We see difficulty in Mission suggestion⁴ since this has disadvantage tending highlight possible failure reach agreement “draft treaty” by June 1, 1962 and unacceptable in unrealistic linkage of “draft treaty” and date June 1, 1962. Would agree to substitute words “draft program” as contained statement principles.⁵

Rusk

* ² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Office of Political Affairs in ACDA, and William G. Jones, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; cleared by Foster and by EUR, AF, ARA, and NEA; and approved by Cleveland.

¹ In telegram 1821, November 28, Stevenson stated that during a meeting with Zorin that day the Soviets “seemed desirous of agreement;” reported that agreement seemed possible on either a 5-5-8, a 5-5-7, or a 5-5-3 ratio of Western, Warsaw Pact, and neutral states in the Disarmament Committee; and asserted his preference for one of the higher numbers because a “non-aligned group of three including India, Mexico and perhaps UAR would be more likely to coalesce into a bloc which could exert pressure on West than would larger and more loosely organized group of 7 or 8.” He asked for authorization to agree on 5-5-8, “or as last ditch solution” 5-5-7. (Ibid.)

² Telegram 1826, November 28, transmitted a Soviet draft of a proposed General Assembly resolution setting up a new Disarmament Committee. The provision referred to would have requested “the Disarmament Committee to submit the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control for consideration by a Special Session of the General Assembly not later than June 1, 1962.” (Ibid.)

³ As directed by telegram 1241 to USUN, November 14, the Mission handed the Soviets on November 15 a draft based on portions transmitted in telegrams 566, September 16; 913, October 13; and 1139, November 4; all to USUN. (Ibid., 600.0012/11-961, 600.0012/9-1661, 600.0012/10-1361, and 600.0012/10-261, respectively) All are in the Supplement.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Documentation on further negotiations with the Soviets and consultations with allies on the composition and tasking of the proposed Disarmament Committee is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 for November and December 1961. As a result of these talks, the General Assembly passed on December 20 Resolution 1722 (XVI), setting up an 18-member Disarmament Committee composed of Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The resolution requested that “the Committee submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement [on general and complete disarmament] as soon as it has been reached, and in any case submit to the Disarmament Commission, not later than June 1, 1962, a report on the progress received.” For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 741-742.

104. Editorial Note

Seaborg's journal for November 30, 1961, reads in part as follows:

"From 5 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. I met with President Kennedy in my capacity as Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Bundy, Wiesner, Bill Foster, Harold Brown, Jerry Johnson, Phil Farley, John Foster, Norris Bradbury, Carson Mark, General Betts, Lee Haworth, Vice President Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone and Spurgeon Keeny were present.

"We presented our case for atmospheric testing, using the criteria laid down by the President. Arguments emphasized the need to test the effects of weapons to develop the AICBM and to test the vulnerability of our weapons, as well as to develop an increased yield to the weight ratio so that our weapons can include protective material to decrease their vulnerability without increasing their weight. Every aspect of confining our testing to underground was explored and the consequences of our not further improving our weapons as much as the Russians were explored to see if this is a tenable position.

"The President finally concluded that the U.S. should resume atmospheric testing, but it would not be announced until shortly before we proceeded with the three-month series to begin about April 1st. The President directed that the presented list be reduced in number. He also directed us to continue negotiations with the U.K. for use of Christmas Island, although we will also use the airdrop method with some instrumentation based on Johnston Island." (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 2, pages 440-441)

According to Colonel Ewell's account of the White House daily staff meeting held on December 1:

"d. Mr. Bundy said there had been a long discussion on atmospheric testing yesterday. The President was carefully non-committal. However, preparations for same are proceeding, and State has been asked to prepare some public statements to be used when a formal testing program is approved. Mr. Bundy thinks that Bill Foster will probably get the job of

preparing these statements. Mr. Bundy said that the problem is that no one test is extremely important in itself, rather it is the cumulative effect. (This represents a definite shift in Mr. Bundy's understanding of this problem. Previously he has taken a very hard line that because no one test is important we shouldn't make any.) Bundy then posed the political problem: Is there any conceivable value in an atmospheric test ban which has some type of policing arrangement. He implied that he felt not, due to the possibilities for Russian chicanery, and felt that the proper ploy is to start talking about something else. What 'something else' would be was not discussed. My guess would be general disarmament." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61)

105. National Security Action Memorandum No. 116 [Source](#)

Washington, December 1, 1961.

TO

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

The following instructions are issued by the President as the result of a discussion on November 30.^{[1](#)}

1. The list of atmospheric tests presented in letter from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing to the President dated November 29, 1961,^{[2](#)} is approved for the purpose of proceeding with preparations, subject to the following provisos:

- A. The list will be reviewed with a view to reduction in the numbers of atmospheric tests, in the length of time of the test series, and in the resulting radioactive fall-out. The NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing should promptly indicate to the President which tests can best be omitted from these points of view.
- B. In cooperation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Dr. Wiesner, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will at once pursue technical conversations with the British, with a view to a prompt assessment of the likelihood of British consent to effective use of Christmas Island. It will be appropriate in this connection to make available to the British the sort of information contained in the letter of November 29. Such conversations should be so conducted that the Secretary of State can pursue the matter with the British Foreign Secretary in Paris about December 11, if desirable.
- C. Preparations will proceed for conducting the series both with and without Christmas Island.
- D. Preparations should be based on the assumption that Eniwetok will not be available.

- E. A close study and interim report will be made on the question of the practicability of using a Nevada site for a one-KT or two-KT electromagnetic effects test, and conceivably for other particularly appropriate low-yield tests.
- F. The Secretary of State, or his representative, is requested to serve as Chairman of a sub-committee of the National Security Council Committee on Atmospheric Testing. This sub-committee should promptly make plans for the best possible program of explanation and justification for a resumption of atmospheric testing on the lines described in the letter of November 29 from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Representatives of other agencies, such as USIA, should be added to the sub-committee at its Chairman's discretion.
- G. The plans for this test series will be reviewed in the light of the President's strong desire that the whole series, if ordered, be begun and ended as soon as is consistent with sound planning and satisfactory results.
- H. Plans for these tests will also be reviewed in the light of the possibility that further atmospheric testing after this series may become undesirable for political reasons.
- I. The Atomic Energy Commission will give urgent attention to the expansion of its long-run capability for underground testing at levels of yield up to a megaton.
- J. It must be understood that the President has reserved judgment on the final decision for or against the resumption of atmospheric testing.³

McGeorge Bundy

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 116. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See [Document 104](#).

² [Document 102](#).

³ A December 1 memorandum from Gilpatric to the JCS, communicating to them the decisions reached on November 30, reads on this point: "The President has not made the decision whether or not to conduct atmospheric tests. The decision will be reached at the time it is necessary to make a

public announcement or about two weeks prior to the first readiness date.”
(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A
3464, Atomic 400.112, 8 Apr 61 (Dec 61))

106. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, December 4, 1961.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Test Ban Conference

On Thursday, November 30 I gave a lunch at the Hotel des Bergues, Geneva, for the Russian Delegation, British Delegation and United States Delegation to the Nuclear Test Ban Conference. Mr. Tsarapkin sat at my left and Mr. Godber, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the British Delegation, sat at my right.

I steered the conversation with Mr. Tsarapkin to the question as to whether it would not be a good idea to assemble the Soviet, United Kingdom and United States scientists in an effort to review the entire treaty control machinery and to see whether we could not work out something which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union from a control standpoint and from an on-site inspection standpoint.

Mr. Tsarapkin turned to me, and, with complete cordiality but nevertheless with complete firmness, said: "Do you really want to know why we resumed nuclear testing on December 1?"

In reply I said I would be very much interested.

He said: "The sole and only reason we resumed testing was because we were concerned lest you actually were ahead of us in this field of nuclear weapons. We know that you had plans to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with the use of nuclear weapons and when we proposed to end the allied rights in West Berlin by the negotiation of a treaty with East Germany requiring the renegotiation with them of these rights, that you said you would respond if necessary by the use of nuclear weapons in connection with West Berlin, and so far we have not been able to convince you that the signing of a treaty with East Berlin and the ending of your military

occupation rights in West Berlin was really realistic in 1961 as compared to 1945.

“Since we knew also that you planned to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, we decided to test. We have carried out a well planned and well executed series of tests and now we know that you are definitely not ahead of us in this field and that if you decide to use nuclear weapons, you will get a little worse than you send. You and your country might as well know that in view of the present tensions in this world, there is no possibility whatsoever of any further negotiations on the nuclear test ban agreement.

“The Soviet Union will not accept any control posts on its territory and will not under any circumstances accept on-site inspections.”

He added also that: “We don't care what safeguards you place around these control posts or on-site inspections or we don't care how intelligent and reasonable you may be in attempting to work out this treaty”; and he turned to Mr. Godber and said: “I must admit Mr. Dean has been most constructive and reasonable but we just cannot accept his suggestions in view of the present tension of the world.”

I briefly but pleasantly pointed out that he was wrong in thinking we wanted war or that we objected to their treaty with East Germany, but that we did insist on our rights; and kidded him a little bit about his views. I purposely tried to keep the conversation on a pleasant but firm basis.

Mr. Godber then asked a great many questions and Tsarapkin continued to reply, almost as if he were cranked up, that in view of the present state of tensions in the world that nothing could be worked out except general and complete disarmament and then of course there would be no nuclear weapons to test.

I then suggested that we might meet after the Thursday meeting.

At the conclusion of the Thursday meeting, Mr. Tsarapkin and I called on Mr. Godber in his rooms at the Beau Rivage Hotel. Mr. Godber made a strong and rather an eloquent plea to Mr. Tsarapkin for about twenty

minutes to reconsider. In substance, Mr. Tsarapkin again repeated several times the substance of what he had said at lunch and he turned to me and said: "In view of the plans of your militarists to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with nuclear warfare, there just can be no effective negotiation between us no matter how constructive until general and complete disarmament has been signed, sealed and delivered. After that there will be no nuclear weapons. They will all be destroyed so there will be no problem of a nuclear test ban treaty."

I said I didn't know to whom he referred as the "militarists" but anyhow the policy of the United States is laid down by the President and not by these alleged militarists and said that I could assure him that the President of the United States and the people of the United States had no wish, intention or desire to destroy the Soviet Union by nuclear warfare and that we did want a nuclear test ban treaty and effective disarmament.

Mr. Tsarapkin said: "I know that you make that statement most sincerely but you don't know what the militarists in your country are planning."

I said: "Maybe I don't know what the alleged militarists are planning, but I do know what the President of the United States is planning and I can assure you he has no such plans and that what he was saying did not make sense."

I again appealed to him to sit down and see whether on a reasonable basis we could not examine the treaty and its annexes, and the control system or any of its provisions to see if we could not get together. Mr. Godber also made a plea along these lines.

Tsarapkin continued to repeat what he had said before with practically no variations, although he said it a great many times.

The meeting lasted about 1-1/2 hours. The tone was pleasant and not disagreeable, but as far as Tsarapkin was concerned, he seemed to regard it as a finality that there could be no purpose in negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty with controls or effective inspection and that we might as well make our plans accordingly. He said they could easily put it [the new Soviet test ban proposal]¹ through the UNGA and that if we tested, they would

test. I said an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium was out of the question.

He insisted that they did want general and complete disarmament, but he again repeated the substance of what Mr. Zorin had said to Mr. McCloy and me at the disarmament meetings in New York and Washington that there could be no inspection and control of armaments until general and complete disarmament had been thoroughly and completely carried out.

Both Mr. Godber and I pointed out to him that this was not a very realistic or very constructive position.

Tsarapkin said: "Call it what you will, it is a fact, and you must become realistic in view of what is going on in the world."

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-461. Confidential. This memorandum was sent to the President. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations 4/28/61-3/62. Other copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, Stelle in Geneva, Foster, Ambassador Stevenson at USUN, McNamara, Allen Dulles, and Seaborg.

¹ Brackets in the source text. For details of the Soviet proposal of November 28, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 659-664 and 674-677.

107. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts [Source](#)

Washington, December 5, 1961, 6:06 p.m.

CA-590. *Background.*

Since the resumption of the Geneva test ban talks on November 28, the Soviet Union has been pressing publicly its four point proposal to end nuclear testing. In brief, the Soviets proposed:

- a) A ban on atmospheric, underwater and space tests.
- b) Above ban to be policed by “national detection” systems.
- c) A ban on underground tests pending agreement on a system to control such tests as a composite part of an international control system over the realization of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.
- d) The treaty to become effective on signature by the US, UK, USSR and France and then to be open to adherence by all other states.

During the next few weeks we anticipate Soviet propaganda output will stress the following themes in an attempt to justify the new proposal:

1. Control of nuclear testing can only be solved under conditions of general and complete disarmament.
2. National detection systems are capable of detecting atmospheric, outer space and underwater detonations. Reliance upon this “control” technique, already proposed by the West for atmospheric tests, coupled with an agreement to ban underground tests can serve as an interim solution to the problem of nuclear testing.
3. Present tense international situation, which is radically different from 1958-59, makes any control system impossible. Controls today can only serve espionage purposes.
4. The recent moratorium was not a joint agreement such as the USSR now proposes. It was a unilateral declaration which the US abrogated in 1959 when President Eisenhower announced that the US no longer regarded itself as bound by it.^{[1](#)}

5. Negotiations must be expanded to include France inasmuch as France is now a nuclear power and has been conducting tests on behalf of the Western bloc.

Guidance.

To counter these Soviet propaganda themes and to develop support for the US-UK position, you may wish to draw on the points noted below:

1. Unlike the Soviet Union which now repudiates it, the US continues to hold to the purpose of the Conference, i.e., the conclusion of a test ban treaty under effective international safeguards.
2. Latest Soviet proposal is not a treaty proposal. Rather, it is an invitation to sign an unverifiable paper declaration which could be violated at will.
3. In effect, the Soviet proposal calls for junking all agreements reached in the past three years and starting all over again. The US wants disarmament progress now and continues to believe that the conclusion of a test ban treaty, such as the US-UK have proposed, represents an immediate, practical step toward the goal of general and complete disarmament.
4. The proposal asks the US to place reliance solely upon Soviet promises which recent history has already shown inadequate to halt nuclear testing. In contrast, US-UK draft treaty provides for impartial control commission to administer test ban agreement and does not rely on good faith of either party.
5. The US September 3 proposal (Kennedy-Macmillan atmospheric ban proposal), which the Soviets cite as precedent for national detection system, was an effort to spare the world from fallout danger of impending series of Soviet tests—US would have taken the risk, at that time, of an unpoliced moratorium on atmospheric tests to prevent potential hazards to world population from fallout. The offer expired September 9 by its own terms and has not been reaffirmed in the present altered situation. It is obvious Soviet test series of approximately 50 detonations places the US in a position where it must give greater weight to military considerations than was the case four months ago.
6. Although it would appear that the Soviet proposals offer little hope of genuine progress, the US will remain at the Conference table in an effort

to determine full implications of these proposals and whether the Soviets have any intention of reversing their present position. At the same time, the US will continue to strive for the conclusion of an effective treaty banning all nuclear tests along the lines of the US-UK draft treaty tabled April 18, 1961.

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-561. Official Use Only. Drafted in the Public Affairs area of ACDA and approved by James E. Goodby.

¹ For President Eisenhower's statement of December 29, 1959, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1590-1591.

108. Editorial Note

In his memorandum of the White House daily staff meeting on December 8, 1961, Ewell included the following item on a discussion of nuclear testing:

“There was high consternation over the article on the front page of the *New York Times* that leaked the results of the Russian nuclear tests analysis. Our professional non-testers were extremely upset about this. State is forming a task force, under Foster, to write a public statement, to be held in reserve, in the event we resume atmospheric testing. Schlesinger asked to be put on this task force. He complained that USIA and CIA are beginning to shift their propaganda line in preparation for possible resumption of tests and this was wrong because the President hasn't decided to resume tests. I opened my big mouth and said that I thought this was right, that it was just obvious that sooner or later we would resume testing, and that we should get ourselves in a less exposed position so that we wouldn't look so foolish when we did. This, of course, went over like an iron balloon. I also asked Bundy whether the decision to limit tests in Nevada severely was based on political or technical grounds. He said it was political, that everyone would squawk about fall-out in their milk. I said that this, to a certain extent, was nonsense, that I didn't see why we didn't go ahead and test there rather than go through involved gymnastics to find some other place. This thought was received with a notable lack of enthusiasm also. I can detect that Arthur Schlesinger is now off the right wing militarist kick and has now joined the non-atmospheric testing bleeding hearts club.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61) The article mentioned was in *The New York Times*, December 8, 1961.

109. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, December 12, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In response to your request, I am submitting my personal views and comments on the nuclear weapons test shots proposed for inclusion in atmospheric test program during the Spring of 1962. I have taken as my point of departure the lists included in the letter to you of November 29, 1961, written by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.¹ I participated in the generation of that statement as a member of the National Security Council Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy, and I endorse in general the tests proposed in that letter. However, some of the tests are more important than others. I believe that test series plans should be laid out on a time scale determined by only those experiments which meet the following criteria: (a) they can be fully justified on the basis of real (though not necessarily immediate) military importance, and (b) there would be very great difficulty in performing them in other environments. The decision on whether or not to proceed should be made on the basis of these tests only.

If an affirmative decision is made, it is likely that there will be additional useful tests arising either before or during the test series which should be included providing that (a) they do not lengthen or delay the schedule, and (b) they do not substantially increase the total fission yield of the series. What follows is my own evaluation with respect to these criteria of the weapons effects tests proposed by the Department of Defense, my estimate of the military importance of the experiments which are suggested by the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of weapons development, and my comments on the utility of atmospheric nuclear explosions as part of weapons systems tests.

1. The nuclear weapons effects program which the Department of Defense has developed involves high altitude, surface, and underwater tests. Not all of the important high altitude effects tests can be done in the proposed series, nor can the best possible surface (electromagnetic pulse and

ground-shock) effects tests. However, I consider the high-altitude effects and surface effects experiments which can be done in the proposed series to be of such importance that I believe that resumed U.S. atmospheric testing is justified on the basis of these tests considered alone.

2.

The effects of nuclear weapons exploded at very high altitudes has been the subject of much calculation, and a few experiments, but little knowledge. An understanding of the nature and extent of these effects is equally applicable to the problems of defending against Soviet ballistic missiles and of U.S. penetration through Soviet AICBM defense. Whatever the relative difficulty of these two jobs (and I have said several times that I regard the penetration problem as the more feasible one) the information about such effects is of great importance to the design of weapons systems for either purpose.

The relevant effects at high altitudes are of two kinds. One is the effect of a nuclear explosion on an incoming ICBM. To understand this problem completely one would have to know the detailed design of the incoming re-entry vehicle, its warhead, and the yield and efficiency of the AICBM warhead. Since the construction of the Soviet warheads in re-entry vehicles will not be known to us (and the details of construction in ours may not be very well known to them) even a precise knowledge of the effects will not permit the defender to be sure of the lethal range of his AICBM warhead against an incoming warhead. Furthermore, the U.S. at least will be unlikely to be sure of the Soviet AICBM yield or warhead characteristics and so even with effects tests will not be able to design its penetration program with an exact knowledge of the distance at which a Soviet AICBM explosion can “kill” our incoming ICBMs.

However, there are defensive systems in which it makes a great deal of difference whether the kill radius is about one kilometer or about ten kilometers. For this reason it may well be necessary for us to “harden” our re-entry vehicles to insure that their high vulnerability does not make the Soviet AICBM problem much easier. Certain general characteristics of vulnerability can be explored and major causes of vulnerability eliminated understanding of the lethal radii is obtainable readily and

completely only from nuclear weapons tests performed at high altitudes in the atmosphere, particularly when one considers that there may be some phenomena not predicted on a theoretical basis which could produce a very large radius of vulnerability. Some of this data could be obtained by underground tests, but there are many phenomena (such as the motion of the nuclear fireball and its interaction with the earth's magnetic field) of which account can be taken only by tests in the atmosphere.

The other important kind of effect of nuclear weapons explosions at high altitude is the "blackout" effect in which radio communications and (of more interest for the AICBM and ICBM penetration problems) radars are prevented from functioning properly. In particular it is almost certainly possible within some limits to prevent an acquisition radar from seeing an incoming re-entry vehicle for some period of time by the detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of about 400 kilometers. It is also possible, within limits, to prevent the discrimination radar (which distinguishes between re-entry vehicles and decoys) from being able to locate correctly these objects by exploding a nuclear weapon at lower altitudes (50-80 kilometers). Something is already known about these phenomena, their dependence on radar frequency, altitude of burst, etc. from the tests which were carried out in 1958. However, they depend in great detail on these things and on the characteristics of the warhead. There are various causes of the ionization which produces this blackout effect, including the fireball itself, and X-rays, gamma rays and delayed fission products from the explosion. The blackout due to the fission products and the fireball itself, which may be most important from the point of view of influencing the radar for long periods of time or most completely for a short time, are matters about which we are in almost complete ignorance. We can fully understand them only with high-altitude tests. The 1.45 MT explosion at 400 kilometers and 165 KT explosion at 50 kilometers have been selected as the two which will give the most information within the limited time available for preparation, out of a longer list of such tests which are needed. The cut-off date of July 1 makes it infeasible to carry out more than two such experiments.

3.

Another experiment in the effects category is a surface explosion of one KT to tell us whether the electromagnetic signal induced by the explosion can burn out command links in varied ICBM sites, and to give us an experimental point in calculating whether our hardened sites will survive nearly multi-megaton explosions. Because of the many billions of dollars we will have spent on hardened missile sites by the mid-1960's, experimental verification of their survivability (and consequent usability as a second-strike capability) becomes extremely important. This is so despite our confidence in calculations which indicate that they can survive the earth shock from a large nuclear explosion and that the control circuits can survive the electromagnetic signal from such an explosion.

The electromagnetic signal simply cannot be tested except with a surface explosion. An experiment at one or two kilotons can answer unresolved questions about the source and strength of the signal and assure that the arming circuits will not be burned out by an enemy attack. The situation with respect to earth shock is more complicated. One cannot obtain complete confidence except from a full-scale test. This is infeasible in the proposed series since it would require a multi-megaton surface explosion in a geological conformation similar to that present in the areas of location of our proposed missile bases (a coral atoll will not do for this purpose). Furthermore, one can make a very small start on the problem by carrying out experiments completely underground. However, even a small (one or two KT) surface explosion will allow a normalization of calculations. As a result we would depend on a very much smaller extrapolation than we now must in judging the effect of a surface nuclear explosion on hardened structures.

All this argues quite strongly, in my view, for the importance of the proposed Nevada surface test. Additionally, on the same test experiments could be carried out on the effects on a nearby nuclear warhead more conveniently than those particular measurements could be carried out on some of the high altitude tests.

4. The anti-submarine weapons effects test, under water, would give useful information on whether the sound detection gear would operate after use of nuclear weapons for ASW purposes. Though less important than the

high altitude and surface shots, it should be included if the proposed test series is carried out.

5.

The list contains a large number (up to 7) of experiments designed to produce [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Some such a number of experiments will be required because the area is one that has not been explored in previous developments and will undoubtedly prove difficult, interesting, and rewarding. One would expect as a result of these tests to be able to increase the yield available at these weights by a factor of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or alternatively to reduce the weights presently required to give these yields by a factor of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would allow us to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] over the presently planned cluster of three to be carried by the Polaris A-3. Instead half the present weight of that re-entry vehicle could be allotted to penetration aids. The same arrangements could be made with each to increase the penetrability. A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be required for the mobile MRBM now under consideration.

One could also use these warheads (two or three times lighter than what would otherwise be available) to produce correspondingly lighter missiles for air launching—[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This could allow such missiles to be launched from lighter aircraft. Alternatively, the lower warhead weight could reduce the weight of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] allowing them to be launched from aircraft or small trucks.

I believe there will also be applications in which bombers carrying rather small payloads might by use of these warheads be able to deliver twice or three times as many bombs as would otherwise be possible.

Not all of these are desirable weapons systems. They are mentioned to show what additional flexibility in systems design in the mid-1960's is allowed by warhead development in this weight class.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can be carried out underground, but it would cost considerably more in time (several years)

and money to develop such warheads without atmospheric tests.

6. In the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] category the list contains a number of development-proof tests. This is the weight of the current Minuteman and Polaris A-1 and A-2 warheads. These tests would allow the weapons design laboratories to establish the correctness or otherwise of their current design calculations on weapons which have been certified for stockpile without exact knowledge of their yield. I believe that still further gains can be made in this weight class, but not without the normalizations to experiment which these tests would provide. I believe that these tests are justified by the future progress to which they will lead. To carry out the normalization of calculations on the burning of thermonuclear fuel, they must be done at full yield, which precludes them from being done underground in the next few years.
7. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] three experiments are proposed which would about double the available yield at these weights. Alternatively they can be viewed as about [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] presently required for those yields. They would allow us to double the present yields of our Atlas and Titan I re-entry vehicles, or to devote half of that weight to penetration aids, or to use multiple warheads (two of the present yield, or four of half the present yield). Changes of the kind indicated are unlikely to make the difference between successful and unsuccessful deterrence unless the deterrence is marginal to begin with. At the same time the factor of two in yields or weights is not negligible in military calculations, and further tests would produce larger factors.
- 8.

A number of tests of a more experimental or exploratory nature are also included in the proposed list, to be carried out in various weight classes. For example, there is one experiment which is aimed at reducing the weight required for a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This would mean a reduction in weight at that yield of about [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] below what is presently planned for the stockpile. Following the inclusion of such an atmospheric test in the proposed series, it might be possible to complete the development with underground tests.

Another of the proposed ideas, which is in a considerably earlier stage of development, would involve in the actual experiment a very large and heavy box to examine the effects of a different kind of implosion. This could ultimately lead to a yield of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Here again, additional underground and possibly atmospheric tests might be required to complete the development. If such development is successful, one could replace the currently planned cluster warhead of the Polaris A-3 by two warheads of [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. This would be a very much more effective system, considerably surer to be able to penetrate possible defenses than one using [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] (as presently planned) for the following reasons. If the warheads of an entering ICBM are of low yield, and known beforehand to be of low yield (the difficulty of knowing this would in any event, complicate the defender's problem) intercept can be delayed until they have reached a rather low altitude. This allows considerably more sorting in the atmosphere by measurement of the different rates of slowing down, and makes the AICBM problem substantially easier. By increasing the yield of such warheads as we have in the Polaris A-3 we would have a noticeable effect in increasing the penetrability.

A third experiment of an exploratory kind is one involving the use of fissile material in the [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. There have already been a number of not very successful experiments along this line. If success could be achieved it would allow a general increase in efficiency and correspondingly of the yield per unit weight throughout the spectrum of warhead weights from a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Experiments of this kind, although they may not produce an immediate change in the characteristics of the nuclear stockpile, are precisely the kind of work which in the long run can lead to large factors of improvement. I believe therefore that they should be included in the proposed series; in fact I believe that they are the most important of all the weapons *development* experiments suggested, with the possible exception of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

9. A number of tests have been suggested which have yields of less than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. These are the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Though they are interesting and useful, I believe that they can be done adequately underground. I would therefore not recommend their inclusion in the basic atmospheric series, although if they could be sandwiched in after the series is laid out they would be worth doing. Since additional experiments in the series inevitably will make it more complicated and difficult to do, I advocate the exclusion of these experiments. I also advocate the exclusion of the suggested experiment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which would save about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In my view a 10 percent change in weight does not justify inclusion in the series of this kind.

10.

To summarize the effect of the weapons development tests (sections 5-9) on our military posture, one can expect from this test series a decrease in weight at a given yield ranging from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the larger numbers corresponding to smaller yields. Over a longer period of time, perhaps as a result of subsequent underground tests and perhaps requiring further atmospheric tests, one could get factors of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would result in greater penetrability of missiles through the use of larger yields and the allocation of more weight for penetration aids, and better survivability of missiles through the greater mobility of their launching systems. It would also allow bombers of limited payload to have a greater effect. For example, if strike-reconnaissance bombers can be developed their effectiveness will depend to some degree on the number of bombs of a given yield which they can carry on a single sortie.

How important these advantages are is a matter of individual judgment. The most likely military situation, in the period at which most of the weapons resulting from these tests would become available, is that the U.S. deterrent posture will be maintained by the variety and numbers of our delivery systems. At the same time a first-strike capability which would prevent unacceptable retaliatory damage to the United States will be very difficult no matter what we are willing to spend or do (including

atmospheric nuclear testing). This argues that failing to reduce warhead weights by factors of two or even five is not likely to make deterrence infeasible instead of feasible, nor will systems made available by these factors of improvement by themselves make pre-emptive attack feasible instead of infeasible.

There is, however, a broad spectrum of intermediate situations between pure minimal deterrence and a full first-strike capability, and almost inevitably that is the situation in which the U.S. will find itself. If a war ensues under these conditions, the limitation of U.S. civilian damage resulting from Soviet follow-on attacks or as a result of spill-over from Soviet counter-force attacks will depend to a considerable extent on the details of the survivability, penetrability and deliverability of our own counter-force attack. This statement is not intended to gloss over the fact that in a nuclear war civilian casualties would be enormous in any event and that the societies of the countries involved would be catastrophically and perhaps irreparably damaged. There remains the additional fact that damage will depend in detail on how much explosive power is delivered, and at what stage of the conflict, on the enemy's nuclear delivery capability. These factors depend upon the quality of the nuclear weapons as well as of the delivery systems on each side. This in turn cannot help but affect the calculations made by each side in determining its own estimate of its military strength and its resulting political behavior.²

One could probably not justify resumption of U.S. atmospheric tests on the basis of any one or two of the development experiments proposed for this series. However, the entire set of development tests, and the disadvantages which would probably result from a growing lag in U.S. nuclear weapons technology in the middle and late 60's if we do not carry out atmospheric tests, argue strongly for, and I believe justify, resumption.

11.

The argument in favor of the systems tests (Polaris and Atlas) is as follows:

There is no real doubt that, if a missile is tested and works, with experiments being done on a dummy warhead in the missile (perhaps

including a chemical but not a nuclear explosion), and if the warhead is separately tested and works, the system will function as a whole.

However, the confidence obtained in operational forces by virtue of having carried out tests with actual nuclear weapons in actual systems is of very great importance. It is notable that the Soviets in their recent test series have included a large number of air drops of thermonuclear weapons involving several aircraft, apparently designed to provide operational training for at least a fraction of their force, and have also carried out several explosions of large nuclear weapons in missiles fired operationally. Though by themselves such a set of tests would not justify the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, I would strongly urge that if the proposed test series is carried out these two tests be included. They will neither lengthen nor delay the proposed test series, since they would be carried out by quite different groups from those carrying out the other experiments.

12.

I have omitted in the body of this paper discussion of political considerations for and against resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing as being outside my area of responsibility. In order to make a recommendation, however, I must include my personal and undoubtedly oversimplified estimate of these factors. The long-term political issue of greatest significance is the arms race, and the need to limit it so as to improve the security of all nations. To the extent that this aim is advanced by refraining from atmospheric tests, resumption is undesirable. To what extent is the aim of arms limitation so advanced?

Atmospheric testing is not open to “cheating.” However, the Soviets have not offered to sign a treaty banning atmospheric tests, and even if they did it is not clear what would keep them from breaking it at their convenience. Thus we are faced with a unilateral and unreciprocated exclusion of the U.S. from atmospheric nuclear testing.

The unilateral limitation imposed by not resuming U.S. atmospheric tests is unlikely to prove fatal. But it will allow a clear shift in the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union, and there is in high-altitude nuclear effects a small chance of decisive military advantage. To close off or

seriously hamper one line of military development unilaterally while other areas of military technology go forward seriously limits U.S. flexibility in design of our military systems. Seeing no counterbalancing political gains, and on the basis of the military-technical considerations given in earlier sections, I recommend that the series comprising items 2-3 and 5-8 above be carried out. The tests mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 11 should be included only if they do not lengthen the series.

Respectfully yours,

Harold Brown

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/7-18/61. Secret; Restricted Data. Another copy is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 (8 Apr 61).

¹ [Document 102](#).

² Kaysen commented on the preceding two paragraphs in a December 27 memorandum, arguing that what the United States would give up by postponing testing in the atmosphere was “a reduction of an unknown but not very large amount in the size of the margin which our strategic striking force will offer over the minimum survivable force which provides deterrence. Since we are in some doubt as to how big this margin ought to be, the military significance of a reduction in it is small.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62) In a revised version, dated January 5, 1962, Kaysen added that a second consequence of refraining from atmospheric tests would be “a slowdown in the growth of our knowledge on the problems of designing AICBM systems, which we expect can only reach a moderate degree of effectiveness in the most favorable circumstances.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

110. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy[Source](#)

Washington, December 19, 1961.

I have reviewed Dr. Brown's letter of 12 December¹ to you setting forth his views on the need for atmospheric tests. Dr. Brown has prepared a thoughtful document which makes the best case for atmospheric testing that I have seen. I believe that he has focused on the most important technical and military issues involved and has correctly identified the relative priorities of the tests. Nevertheless, my assessment of the proposed tests leads me to the conclusion that, while these tests would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military posture. I believe that our most important task is to maintain an extremely effective deterrent and that we have the capability to do so without conducting atmospheric tests. I believe, therefore, that you have the flexibility to make whatever decision on this matter best supports your broader foreign policy and national security objectives.

I agree with Dr. Brown that the proposed effects tests are the most important part of the proposed atmospheric test series. These tests relate to significant problems on which our knowledge is far from complete. I do not believe, however, that the proposed effects tests will be nearly as significant as Dr. Brown's analysis would indicate. Specifically, while the proposed effects tests relating to warhead vulnerability would certainly increase our knowledge on this important military problem, I do not believe these tests are critical to our understanding of this problem or that they would as stated result in the elimination of major causes of vulnerability. This problem was studied last Spring in great detail by an Ad Hoc Panel of your Science Advisory Committee² whose report on this subject was in a large part responsible for stimulating the present justifiable concern within the DOD about the vulnerability of our missiles. With regard to the vulnerability of our own warheads, the Panel's investigation showed that we have considerable knowledge on this subject from calculations and laboratory experiments and could obtain a great deal more knowledge both by these

techniques and by highly instrumented underground tests. In fact, unless full advantage is taken of the information we already have on this subject, the proposed atmospheric tests will probably simply confirm what we already know about our weapons, namely that they are quite vulnerable to certain nuclear effects. Improvement of the “hardness” of our missiles to nuclear effects is an engineering problem which requires tests of a large variety of structures; such a program clearly has to rest primarily on laboratory experiments. With regard to any future nuclear AICBM defense that we might develop against Soviet missiles, our lack of knowledge concerning the specific design of Soviet missiles probably will introduce, as Dr. Brown points out, a much larger factor of uncertainty than our lack of knowledge concerning the effects themselves.

I consider that the effects tests concerned with nuclear “blackout” of certain regions of the radar and radio frequencies spectrums to be the most significant aspect of the proposed test series since additional data on these phenomena probably cannot be obtained without atmospheric tests. In view of the complex nature of this problem, I have asked an Ad Hoc Panel of highly knowledgeable scientists to meet on 19-20 December³ in order to examine the actual state of our knowledge on this problem and to evaluate the proposed experiments. It must be recognized, however, that we already know the general nature of these effects on radar and communications as the result of previous high altitude nuclear tests and extensive calculations and that this factor has been taken into account in technical planning for the last year or two. For example, in view of the severe effects anticipated on high frequency radio communication, SAC has already modified their communication procedures so that they are confident that they will not be affected by any nuclear blackout phenomena associated with high altitude nuclear explosions. As another example, Nike-Zeus radars have also been modified to the extent that appears possible to minimize the effects of nuclear blackout.

I also consider that the proposed small surface test to determine whether the resulting electromagnetic signal in the ground will affect command links at an ICBM site to be an important experiment. However, as Dr. Brown indicates, calculations indicate that this effect will not introduce any serious problems and special equipment is being incorporated in these systems to

protect them against this effect even if it were to prove considerably larger than expected. With regard to the question of ground shock on hard ICBM sites, as Dr. Brown indicates, the proposed surface tests would give only limited information on a problem on which there is already a great deal of general knowledge. In addition, a rather elaborate underground test has been included in the present underground series to provide specific data on this problem.

With regard to the proposed development shots, I would agree with Dr. Brown that the most interesting development area is that of achieving [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in weights of 50-100 lbs. This could prove of real value in permitting the use of multiple warheads or allow incorporation of additional penetration aids in some of our smaller missile systems such as Polaris and Minuteman if there should be concern at some future date that they were too vulnerable to a future Soviet AICBM system. This would also provide an option for smaller more mobile missile systems if these should be desired. It should be recognized, however, that tests in this yield range could be conducted underground. This would result in some, but certainly not prohibitive, increases in cost in the test program and a stretch out in the test program. The resulting delay in availability of weapons would not be out of phase with the long range nature of these requirements. While I have always thought that underground testing would be more difficult than many of its advocates claimed, the current problem that the AEC is having with underground testing appears to be part of the normal learning process, and I am confident that adequately instrumented testing at these higher yields could be accomplished if there were a real need to do so. At yields above a megaton, underground testing will always be extremely difficult if not impossible as a practical matter. However, I do not believe that the higher yield tests proposed are particularly important to our military posture. Increasing the yield of our larger strategic warheads for Atlas and Titan by a factor of two is of little military significance as these vehicles have adequate payload capacity to carry large yield weapons and significant quantities of penetration aids if these prove necessary because of any future Soviet AICBM systems.

If we begin atmospheric testing, I would agree that the tests of some of the higher yield weapons which are based on the extrapolation of proven

designs would be justified so that the laboratories could have confidence in extrapolating further improvements in these designs. However, in themselves these tests are not necessary to establish confidence in the weapons since they have been certified by the AEC for stockpiling and there is a very high degree of confidence that they will give yields very close to those estimated.

I think that it should be recognized that, if it is considered important to test weapons of higher yield than can reasonably be tested underground (above a few hundred kilotons), the technical option exists to test such weapons in outer space. While this possibility has been largely ignored in recent discussions, it is clearly within our present technical capability. The penalty for space testing would be an initial delay of a year or so and considerably higher costs than of atmospheric testing. However, these costs would not be prohibitive if the requirements were considered important.

In these comments on Dr. Brown's paper, I have attempted to put the various proposed atmospheric tests in proper perspective as to their importance. However, I agree with Dr. Brown that the significance of atmospheric testing should be judged not by the criticality of any individual test but by the over-all significance of the proposed series. Clearly the cumulative significance of the proposed tests is greater than that of any individual test. Nevertheless, I believe that a realistic appraisal of the proposed test series even when taken as a whole, indicates that it is not only not critical to our military posture but would not, in fact, be particularly significant to it. I believe this to be a particularly valid conclusion when one considers the alternative paths of weapon development available to us in aggressive use of underground testing, imaginative laboratory work, and possibly even space testing if it should prove necessary. Therefore, I have concluded that, while the proposed atmospheric tests would be desirable as part of our over-all military development effort if there are no political objections, the military security of the U.S. would not be endangered in the event that you determine that our longer range national policy would be better served by a decision not to test in the atmosphere at this time.

J. Wiesner

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/19-20/61. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ [Document 109](#).

² Apparent reference to the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel); see [Document 42](#).

³ Not further identified.

111. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 5–6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS

PRESENT

United States:

The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Seaborg
Dr. Brown (from 5:40 PM)
Mr. Bundy

United Kingdom:

The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Sir William Penny
Mr. de Zulueta

The Prime Minister asked Sir William Penny to explain the technical aspects of the problem. Sir William said that the first question was whether it was possible for the USSR to combine an effective defense against missiles and an effective capacity to devastate the United States. The balance of missile/anti-missile capabilities was the crucial one.

He believed that even after the recent Soviet tests the United States today has a slight advantage. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] One particular Russian operation caused some apprehension: the execution of a very sophisticated test series in a location closely associated with anti-missile defense.

Sir William believed that if we can stand where we are today we will be all right. But how can either side avoid the effort to set up an anti-missile defense? No one can say that this cannot be done, if enough time and money is put into it. It seemed fantastically hard, but he thought both sides would have to try. If the United States should hold its hand, and the USSR should go full steam ahead, then in two or three years the United States

would be behind. Could the United States allow the Soviets that two or three year period start on anti-missile defense?

As Sir William saw it, the President could give his technical people three different orders. The first would be to go ahead, in which case they would have lots of energy and enthusiasm and would make rapid progress. The second would be to prepare for testing, without a direct go-ahead order. In this case they would do well, but not as well as in the first case. The third order would be to stop. In this case we would lose more than just the time in which such a stop-order held. If the order to resume were given after two or three years, we should be less ready to make progress than we are today, because of the decay of the research laboratories in the meantime.

Sir William made one further point: a hundred megaton weapon like that tested by the Soviet Union can do enormous damage from a distance of twenty-five miles by heat. This may make a very great difference in the effectiveness of anti-missile defenses, since interception at such a range is very much more difficult than interception at five or six miles (where the atmosphere is thicker). The President asked if we should attempt to make such a weapon ourselves, and Sir William answered obliquely that we could probably make it without tests. Mr. Seaborg indicated that without tests it would be substantially heavier than the indicated Russian weapon, but he urged that the problem was worth careful study.

The Prime Minister discussed at some length the terrifying prospects of an indefinitely conducted and enormously expensive arms race in this field. If all of these talented people go on about their business, more and more and bigger and bigger bombs would be piled up and if even one of these new bombs should go off, it would burn up all of France. On and on, the two great powers would go. The Prime Minister said of Great Britain, "We shall probably drop out." We have of course an absolute justification for going on with it, because of what the other man is doing. But as we are now, we are even. Neither side has a defense nor will have one for many years.

This pattern worried him. Should mankind in the next generation be dedicated to this kind of effort? If the weapons are not fired off, of course, it is only a waste. But if they are fired off, it will be the end. Of course, the Soviet Union must not get ahead of us to the point where they could bully

us, but could they really do so? This was the picture for the next twenty-five years, and while the only ones engaged in the highly sophisticated race would be the US and the USSR, everyone else would have the simpler forms of bomb in a few years. What would have happened if the Portuguese had had only two or three little Hiroshima bombs in the Goa affair? Would they have dropped them on Indian cities? The Prime Minister found Berlin very small beer compared to the destruction of mankind. He believed we have to make another effort. Mankind could not go on this way.

Should we do it by bringing great weight on the disarmament discussions now scheduled for April?¹ They now look as if they would make very small progress. Yet we cannot sit in an ordinary little room three days before Christmas and talk about these terrible things without doing anything. The Prime Minister turned back to look at the lesson of the test ban discussions. To these discussions both the United States and Great Britain had given great effort. David Ormsby Gore had spent three years in Geneva, the dullest city in the world. The Prime Minister thought we had been close to agreement and then somebody—he asked Dr. Seaborg to forgive the allusion—unveiled the “big hole” underground and agreement on underground controls had proved impossible. Now it appeared that underground testing was not a very serious business, and he thought the failure of the test ban effort was a great pity. We might have got it then. He thought the Russians might have agreed.

So is it worth contemplating a new test series in which the British would give Christmas Island to the Americans, or the Americans would use Johnston Island? Or should we call it off if we can really get down to a new effort which will give a real impetus to serious disarmament? Perhaps he and the President and Khrushchev might really get together and give a great new push. And such a new “push” might put other things, like Berlin, in perspective. We might fail but if so we would have lost only a few months. The Prime Minister’s feeling about these people, after reading their novels and all that he could about them, was that they might come around. In short, he would suggest a great new effort to break the cycle of the arms race. (At this point Dr. Harold Brown joined the meeting.)

The President remarked that what the Russians had done in the last nine months suggested that they do not really want an agreement, and asked if it were not true that they must have been preparing tests since February.

The Prime Minister then briefly reviewed the kinds of tests which are proposed, in the following four categories:

1. High altitude effects which would not require Christmas Island.
2. Existing warheads of Polaris and Minuteman.
- 3.

Tests of advanced designs to reduce the weight-to-yield ratio, and

[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Such tests would take two or three months to prepare, and the Prime Minister wondered if we could not use the time for one further try. He compared the arms race to a rogue elephant against which we must all act. We had very nearly succeeded before. With no disrespect to his great friend General Eisenhower, he thought that the U-2 incident and the pressures on Khrushchev had broken up the last effort. He thought the Russians were not very happy about it and he pointed out that after all a continuation of the arms race will cost them ferociously. They had got into this business when we had a monopoly and they had to catch up. If the Prime Minister had had to face this decision, he would probably have done the same thing. But if you just bid up and up, it is a grim prospect.

The Prime Minister asked Sir William why the Russians did test in this case. Sir William replied that he was inclined to think there had been a change in the thinking of their military men, who suddenly “went nuclear.” The President thought our technological lead had not been so large as to give them any great concern. Sir William was inclined to agree and pointed out that he was interested in the fact that the Soviet Union had not gone for light-weight, high-yield weapons of the sort which would be most useful in anti-missile defense.

Dr. Brown said he thought that the Soviets had initially believed that they could hide their large missiles. The effectiveness of the U-2 had been a

great shock to them. They now felt that they needed more smaller, lighter ones, which they would be able to make as a result of their tests. He thought also they were on to some new principles of design in the 5-10 megaton range, and also at the level of very large yield. He pointed out, as Sir William had already done, that there were two or three high-altitude tests associated with their anti-missile efforts and that we had a particular need to know more in this field, partly for our own anti-missile program and still more for the purpose of penetrating theirs. The Soviets apparently were not interested in 600-pound or 300-pound warheads, but in every area where they had displayed real interest, they were now equal to or ahead of the United States.

The President asked Sir William whether it is possible to get a good anti-missile defense. Sir William replied that in any ordinary way he would say it was impossible. But at these stakes and with these resources committed, "I contract out."

The Prime Minister asked what a 100-megaton bomb would do. Sir William replied that it would cause great destruction and the Prime Minister asked what it would do to people. Sir William replied that it would burn up all the people in even the largest city. It was repeated that the United States could build such a weapon if it were needed.

Dr. Brown remarked that penetration was easier than defense as long as other things were equal. One purpose of the proposed new tests was to make sure that other things were indeed equal. The Prime Minister asked how many large bombs would be needed to destroy England, and Sir William remarked that eight of the existing multimegaton weapons would make a terrible mess of England.

The Prime Minister remarked that a very large part of the early wave of the Western strategic forces was based in England, and he said, "Every time you lift the phone, Mr. President, I think you are about to say that you are going to go, and I always wonder what I would answer."

The Prime Minister could see the reason for every one of the proposed tests. They were all proper enough in their own terms but he could not see any end to it.

Secretary Rusk agreed with the Prime Minister that this was an enormous problem and agreed also that the point was to get ahold of the easy end of it—not the machines, but the men who make decisions about them. Was there not some way in which we could change the minds of these men? In particular, was it not possible that the real trouble is what the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are trying to do, in their persistent effort to take the world over. If they would only shift from this policy, how much they could transform the face of the world and improve its hopes.

The President said that in a year or two this nuclear arms race would come to a stand-off. Nobody would be able to use these things. We could not use them; the Soviets could not use them, since each side would be destroyed if it did. Secretary Rusk remarked that this stand-off would work only if it really were a stand-off, and others commented that it would have to be a stand-off in which both sides believed. Dr. Brown said it must be psychologically as well as technologically stable.

The Prime Minister remarked that the stronger the great powers became, the less they could control the weaker powers. Returning to Secretary Rusk's comment he said that perhaps the position of the Russians is changing. They are half-way between Asia and Europe. They see with foreboding the rise of China and the possible spread of nuclear weapons. We think of them as enormously different from us, but their economic structure, seen from afar, is not very different. Their railroads and mines are nationalized; so are the railroads and mines of Western Europe. Children of their ruling class are put in Public Schools like ours (the British Public School, he meant), and in general there is a spread of unequal privileges throughout their society. Could we not, gradually, without giving in, allow the forces of humanity to operate? And in that context we might work for an end of the arms race. If not, every little country would want what the French call a force de frappe and then make a nuisance of itself. The Prime Minister thought we were at a turning point. Could we not pull it out of the ruck and get it back on the road?

Lord Home asked how all this would fit into the new U.S. disarmament plan.² This new plan was not very different from that of the Soviets. We look for general disarmament in six years against the Soviet five. Their

early phases call for more nuclear disarmament than ours but basically the plans are similar except in the very important area of inspection. Here Dr. Seaborg remarked that the test ban negotiations would have to be moved toward the forum of general disarmament. A test ban treaty in itself would be harder and harder for the West to accept, because of the problem of secret Soviet preparations.

Lord Home continued on disarmament, pointing out that the eighteen chaps will have to meet. Their plans are not too far apart. Moreover, the Pugwash boys go on meeting, with some quite high-level Russians in the party. So there is at least some hope. Could we not make the opening of the eighteen-nation conference a moment of major effort? We might get the President and the Prime Minister and Khrushchev to meet and really start it off.

The President replied that the experiences of earlier months were discouraging. What assurances could we have? It seemed to him we should test unless we make major progress on either Germany or disarmament. He quite agreed that the Soviet edge, if any, was not decisive now, but he also agreed with Sir William Penney that the problem was what would happen in 1964 if we did not continue and the Soviets did. We could not get taken twice. Therefore, we ought to go ahead and prepare to test, and test, if there was no great progress in other fields. The President said this was his view even though he was a "great anti-tester."

The Prime Minister asked what would happen if all the bombs in the world went off, and the replies all indicated that the disaster would be enormous. The Prime Minister said that he had talked to Khrushchev on the same subject, and Khrushchev had answered that there would be nobody left but the Chinese and the Africans. Lord Home repeated that we ought to make some great exercise. Mr. Macmillan asked if by doing so we might not help the Berlin situation. The President continued to reply that we ought to prepare to test, and test, unless we get something serious that helps our security in the world. He added that there was one and only one serious issue, the balance of missile/anti-missile capabilities.

There followed a brief discussion of bluffing in which Prime Minister Macmillan remarked that the real question was what the other man thought. Mr. Brown remarked that bluffing was easier for a man who had looked at

his cards while his opponent had not. The Prime Minister replied more seriously that to a man with the responsibilities of great-power leadership it would always seem hard—if not impossible—to give the order on a mere suspicion of bluff.

The Foreign Secretary said that if there were to be a resumption of testing, there must also be a major effort to get on with disarmament. The arms race really must stop. The President replied that the timing of such a great effort of disarmament was difficult. We could not start such a great effort and then begin atmospheric testing just when there were new hopes for disarmament.

Lord Home suggested one last try in which the three great leaders would open it up and then all the heads of the eighteen nations might come to Geneva. The President asked whether the Russians would agree to anything serious and it appeared that Lord Home thought we would be testing in the meantime. (But the recorder is not sure of what Lord Home said here.)

The President summed up the discussion by saying that there seemed to be three issues:

1. Should we prepare to test and test?
2. Should we make a parallel effort in disarmament?
3. Would the British wish to join in the testing program by making Christmas Island available, or should the United States plan its program alone?

At this point Prime Minister Macmillan ended the discussion, remarking that he felt better and that he thought the discussion had been most helpful.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)

¹ The first plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was held on March 14.

² Apparent reference to the U.S. plan presented to the United Nations on September 25; see [footnote 3](#), [Document 73](#).

112. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS

PRESENT

United States:

The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Seaborg
Mr. Brown
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy

United Kingdom:

The Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary
Mr. de Zulueta
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir William Penny

The Prime Minister asked whether the Christmas Island group had reported. The experts replied that the advance party had given its report. The Prime Minister asked how long a time would be needed for preparations. Mr. Brown answered that they must start in early January in order to be ready for testing between April and the first of July.

The Prime Minister asked about underground testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing could usefully be done at levels up to 100 KT and that the United States would expect to continue with underground testing even if atmospheric testing should be decided on. The Prime Minister asked whether underground testing could be detected. Dr. Seaborg replied that we could certainly expect to detect Soviet tests at the level of 20 KTs but that detection would be less certain at lower levels, down to a point which could not be definitely stated, at which detection would not be possible.

The Prime Minister said that what worried him was that the Soviets had negotiated when they were behind, although they were preparing tests. He

said there was a theory that the U-2 really did give them a shock because they did not know how much we could learn from such photography. Now we are even, and the question was how to prevent them from further testing. If they did any in the atmosphere, the tests could be detected. Now we have a situation that may be decisive. (The Prime Minister remarked that the British played only a small part in this situation, through having convenient facilities.) He asked whether we could make a new try toward some agreement. Here he remarked that he must have Cabinet consent to any decision on these matters. He thought it might be possible, with no real delay, to embark upon an attempt to break through. On one side was Berlin, which could be settled if people wanted to settle it. On the other side was this problem which might involve twenty-five years of terrible effort in a travesty of the purposes of human life.

The Prime Minister then read a draft paper¹ proposing in essence that a new effort should be made to spare future generations these costs and dangers, even though on a fair assessment it was agreed that the United States should make all necessary preparations and that Christmas Island should be used in such preparations. The paper proposed that the final decision should be postponed until this effort had been made. What the Prime Minister hoped for was that this effort might have its effect both in Berlin and on disarmament. He hoped for a new phase of understanding. He believed it might be possible to summon Khrushchev to a meeting for such purposes and that we could thus get a great moral advantage.

The President said that he could not believe that the Soviets would give us such a propaganda advantage. If we embark on such new discussions, it would delay us another year. We would not have a better case a year from now, and what could we expect the Soviets to agree to in such a period? He agreed that we should have had an agreement before, and that the problems of underground testing had been greatly exaggerated, but now the Soviets had tested and could prepare secret tests again, while we on our side could not stay in the posture of real preparedness.

There followed a discussion of the disarmament proposals of the United States and of the optimum time for the proposed new test series. Dr.

Seaborg stated that if this were the last series, and if we knew it, and if we knew that it would happen, we would go somewhat later.

The President restated the position as he saw it: we must decide to test, but we could couple the decision with a restatement of our purposes of disarmament. He thought we should not announce a decision now but only that we were making preparations. The Prime Minister wanted to make it clear that we would make a new and real effort for disarmament. If real progress could be made we would not test. We should only have to defend our preparations, on the first round; the President agreed to this last point. The Prime Minister teased the scientists about their destructive powers, but in reply to their remonstrances he said that they were really only “the innocent victims of the folly of politicians.”

The President asked the Prime Minister if he could agree on Christmas Island with an understanding that tests would occur if the situation did not change. The Prime Minister replied that he wished to think of the two countries as partners in this. Whether testing occurred on Christmas Island or not, we were in it together and Britain would have to back up the United States. But could we not announce our plans so that they would be less a threat than a hope. The President said we could do this as long as we did not use any words that would trap us.

The Prime Minister repeated his hope that we could “summon this fellow.” After all, *on paper* the disarmament plans were close together, and historians looking back from the distant future may wonder why it had been so hard to reach an agreement.

The Secretary of State thought it was extremely important not to think of our testing as opening a new chapter. It was the Soviet tests which opened the new chapter.

The Prime Minister said that a great deal depended on what the Soviet Union really wanted in the nuclear field. He thought that these tests had occurred because Khrushchev was frightened.

Lord Home asked if the President really intended to link the testing decision to Berlin. The President replied in the affirmative. If a really good

settlement could be achieved on Berlin, he believed—as a private matter, not for publication—that it would be easier to make a decision not to test. The Secretary of State emphasized that these two propositions would never be linked formally with the Soviets.

Lord Home asked again if we could not summon the Soviet leaders to a disarmament meeting.

The Prime Minister asked if there were really a grave problem of keeping teams together. Secretary Rusk restated the American view quite simply. The Soviet Union can agree not to test and still prepare in secret for a new series. The United States cannot; no democracy could take that course. Dr. Seaborg remarked that we had been accused of preparing even when we were not, and now any such course would be doubly difficult.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that we could say that we now have an absolute justification for testing and mean to prepare, but before we execute tests we will make a further great effort. The Prime Minister said that there must be a private agreement, subject to Cabinet understanding, and that meanwhile a simple public statement should be made. The President asked Ambassador Bruce to work with Ambassador Ormsby Gore and the technical experts in preparing such a statement. It was later decided not to reach a private agreement at this time; the Prime Minister instead gave the President a letter explaining his intentions.² Meanwhile the technical experts did reach a tentative agreement ad referendum, on rules for the use of Christmas Island.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)

¹ Not found.

² In his letter of December 22, Macmillan stated that the experts should agree on the terms of a formal agreement for the use of Christmas Island, that the matter would be subject to a decision of the British Cabinet, and

that “it would be unreasonable for the British Government, should it approve in principle of the use of Christmas Island, to be in a position to disapprove the tests if you and I feel ourselves unable to reach agreement.” He did not think the “decision should rely only upon the state of the world at the time, as if this was something that could not be changed by human effort. I should like to feel that we had done everything possible to control events and not merely to follow them.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961)

113. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, December 29, 1961.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Atmospheric Testing: A Proposal

1. On November 2, you said that the atmospheric testing decision would rest on a prior technical decision as to whether “the orderly and essential scientific development of new weapons has reached a point where effective progress is not possible without such tests.” Unfortunately, as we now know, technical evidence will not yield a clearcut answer to this question. Our most expert scientific judgment is that the recent test series enabled the USSR to make gains—but not breakthroughs. Mr. Wiesner, after a study of the data, has reached the conclusion that, while atmospheric tests “would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military picture.” The decision, in short, is back in the political field.
2. In the meantime, opinion around Washington is crystallizing in favor of the decision to resume atmospheric testing. Even some who see no overriding security need for resumption are fatalistic about the possibility of avoiding it. The essential arguments behind this crystallization are (a) that, if we deny ourselves the right to do what is necessary for our security, nuclear superiority may pass to the Soviet Union by default—not this time, but next time, or the time after that; and (b) that there is nothing to be gained by non-resumption except the transient, illusory and meaningless favor of “world opinion.”
3. I would agree that non-resumption per se is a pallid and negative position, and that an unexplained failure to resume might even be construed as weakness. However, I wonder whether it might not be possible to put non-resumption in a positive and dramatic context—and, at the same time, protect ourselves against the threat of a new cycle of Soviet tests.
4. The underlying reason for world concern over the resumption of atmospheric testing, I believe, is not so much the fallout problem (which

will become of diminishing importance as we move into a clean-bomb period) as it is a spreading fear that the arms race is getting completely out of control and the world is sliding hopelessly into chaos. The pattern over the last few years shows rather clearly that, if we start a series of atmospheric tests (especially if at the same time we continue to proclaim that we still have a commanding lead over the USSR), this will precipitate and—for some people—validate the next Soviet cycle and thereby induce further degeneration. At present we are holding the arms race in check; if we go ahead, then the sky becomes the limit. What the world yearns for is a leader who will point out the ominous significance of this process and make one mighty effort to arrest the slide into international anarchy.

5. Would it not be worthwhile for you to consider issuing a statement containing two elements:
 - a) the announcement that, in a last effort to halt the process of degeneration, we have decided that we will not resume atmospheric testing;
 - b) the statement that at the same time, we will, in the interests of our own security and that of other free nations, complete all necessary standby preparations for the immediate resumption of atmospheric testing and, if the USSR conducts one more atmospheric test, we will instantly begin a massive group of militarily significant atmospheric tests.
6. The serious arguments against this are (a) that the USSR is going to resume atmospheric testing anyway, and that a unilateral moratorium would give them time to digest the 1961 series and prepare for new strides forward in, say, late 1962; and (b) that, in the meantime, the morale of our own laboratories would so decline that we would be unable to resume our own momentum.
- 7.

As for argument (a), if we kept our testing program in a state of continuous ground alert, ready to go at the first new Soviet test, we would lose, at the most, six months.

As for argument (b), we very much need an impartial evaluation of the extent to which we can, if we put our minds on it, maintain readiness to test. AEC and DOD scientists tend to say that it is impossible to maintain

the morale of scientists and the pace of scientific advance unless the men in the laboratories know that they can test their hypotheses. However, the reasons cited for this are not very persuasive. It would seem to me (and I think that Bill Foster agrees) that this is one of those cases where what is convenient and what is necessary are confused; i.e., that it would clearly be nice if all devices could be tested in the open air; but the essential work can still probably be done without such tests. I have raised this subject with Ros Gilpatric, who has now ordered a DOD analysis of the issues involved.¹

I do not believe that the real problem has yet been posed: that is, how to maintain morale and advance in the laboratories without assurance of atmospheric testing. If some one were given an order to do this, I am sure it could be done. If a disgruntled set of scientists went out of the laboratories, for example, another set would respond to the very possibility of avoiding atmospheric tests. Moreover, the present proposal would not exclude testing underground or in outer space, nor would it exclude bringing testing atmospheric tests to the very brink of fulfillment. And it commits us to resumption as soon as the USSR resumes; so that those who argue that the USSR will resume in any case should not (if they believe their own argument) suffer any loss of morale at all. I see no reason why this could not be a time of vigorous technical advance in our weaponry.

8.

There is also the argument that non-resumption would show us to be weak and would strengthen the Soviet claim to be the greatest power in the world. But it can be argued with equal plausibility that it is resumption which would produce this effect because it would suggest that we have to go into the atmosphere in order to make up for our deficiencies. We are, indeed, in a logical dilemma as a result of repeated statements that we are "ahead." If we are "ahead," why test in the atmosphere? If we do test in the atmosphere, does this not constitute a confession that we are "behind"?

The arguments in terms of political effect tend to cancel each other out, though I agree that any nation indisputably ahead in the nuclear field

would have a major psychological advantage. But since an indisputable lead is hardly possible for any nation, it would seem better to stick to your assurance that “no nuclear test in the atmosphere will be undertaken, as the Soviet Union has done, for so-called psychological or political reasons.”

9.

On the other side, conditional non-resumption would not necessarily make the essential balance of military power more insecure than it would be if we resumed atmospheric tests; for the relative gains we would make by resumption would probably be cancelled out by the next Soviet cycle which our resumption would provoke and legitimize. In other words, we would presumably prefer to have our nuclear superiority (or the nuclear standoff, whatever the situation is) at the lower rather than higher stages of the nuclear apocalypse; and presumably the cessation of atmospheric testing, as compared with what would be the case if both sides pressed on in the atmosphere, would—at least by precluding the development of a reliable AICBM system—tend to maintain more stability as well as to halt the slide into chaos.

Everyone agrees, in short, that the serious danger to the US comes, not from the past series of tests, but from the next series. Everyone seems to agree that we would be ready to settle for things as they are now, if we had absolute assurance that the USSR would not start a new sequence in the atmosphere. The problem, in other words, is to deter the USSR from atmospheric resumption—and the threat of a series of our own, ready to go, is probably the best possible deterrent.

10.

More than that, with Khrushchev discredited by Hungary, testing and a thousand other things, with Nehru discredited by Goa, with the UN discredited by Goa and the Congo, the US has an unmatched opportunity to recover the moral and political leadership of the world. I know that it is currently fashionable to say that “moral leadership” could not matter less. But history refutes this contention. For years, we rested our policy in Latin America on the employment of force—and our position, by all power criteria, grew steadily worse. Then FDR renounced the use of

force, established the Good Neighbor policy—and our power position in Latin America was transformed. Wilson and Roosevelt enjoyed an influence on world events out of all proportion to the military power at their disposal simply because they regarded “world opinion” as a basic constituent of power. Even Soviet policy is not based on a rejection of “world opinion”; it is based rather on the belief that world opinion can be more successfully manipulated by terror than by ideals—an option not open to us unless we change the whole character of our society.

The good opinion purchased by the refusal to resume atmospheric testing would not be in itself a great accretion to our power. But it would enable us to move swiftly ahead in a number of areas which can mean a genuine strengthening of our world position. We should not consider this as an act in isolation but as a prelude to a number of planned actions and demands which would enable us to cash in on our self-restraint.

Nor is it necessarily so that a conditional refusal to resume atmospheric testing would be unpopular in the United States. The most recent Gallup Poll shows the general public evenly divided on the question of whether, in the light of Soviet testing, the US should go into the atmosphere (yes 44%, no 45%). This showed a decided swing of opinion *against* atmospheric resumption; 4 months earlier 55% favored resumption and only 26% opposed.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “President saw.”

¹ See [Document 118](#).

114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, December 30, 1961.

SUBJECT

Atmospheric Testing

Attached is a really powerful paper¹ arguing for a last effort to avoid atmospheric testing, by announcement that we will not test in the air unless and until the Soviets do it again. This is the best statement of the case I have seen, and it satisfies a feeling I have had for some time that you have a right to hear a better argument against testing now than you have yet heard from advisers nearly all of whom personally favor testing.

I believe that if you personally care enough, and want to make the argument strongly enough, you can carry a decision against atmospheric testing with the Congress and the country. I also believe it is safe. The missile/anti-missile balance is the only serious area of possible danger, and we can be confident that Soviets are not decisively ahead here on what they have done so far. I know no one who believes they can deploy an effective AICBM system without further tests and long lead time of construction. If I myself, on balance, prefer to test, it is because I think the net military advantage is real, and the political balance a very even one. But this case for the other view deserves your close attention. Especially you should weigh the consequences of unlimited testing on both sides, through time.

An alternative to the course in the memo would be to keep our April 1 deadline and simply renew—perhaps first privately and earnestly—the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of September, with a sixty-day time limit. This would put quite a lot of heat on Khrushchev, and if he is prepared to come along at all, it would offer him the carrot of preventing some tests of ours which otherwise will surely happen.

The Soviet answer to either of these proposals will probably be, at first anyway, to demand also a moratorium on underground tests. We cannot

accept such a moratorium, as I think nearly everyone agrees. We need underground tests to maintain the readiness and morale of our nuclear laboratories and to avoid falling behind decisively in the case of new Soviet secret preparations and massive tests. But I now believe that underground testing would be enough to keep our labs alive, and I think this point was seriously neglected in our Bermuda talks.

If you like either of these proposals enough to want to go further with them, I believe we should schedule a prompt *small* meeting for extended discussion. I would limit such a meeting to yourself, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, Brown, and me. I regret to say that every one of these men, except yourself, favors atmospheric testing. But a decision to go the other way, if you take it, should be yours alone—not yours with support from politically vulnerable disbelievers like Wiesner, Sorensen, and the author of the attached memo. I believe that every one of these men, except perhaps John McCone, will do his best to support and defend whatever decision you do take—and even John would try—though he’s deeply committed the other way.

McG. B.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A handwritten note reads: “President saw.” In a covering note to Clifton, not found attached, Bundy stated that this memorandum and Schlesinger’s memorandum ([Document 113](#)) needed to be “called to the President’s attention for careful consideration.” The President had “several times indicated to me his desire to have the other side of the atmospheric case sharply stated,” as Schlesinger’s memorandum did. “Since it will be very important, if the President should ever take this course, not to have the author of this memo blamed for it, I am emphasizing the quality of the argument and not the name of the creator.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/12/61-1/8/62)

¹ Reference is to [Document 113](#), not found attached.

115. Editorial Note

In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 2, 1962, Colonel Legere reported that Arthur Schlesinger complained “that the Disarmament Advisory Committee, which consists of 15 individuals, includes only one person who could be fairly described as a liberal: Ralph McGill of the *Atlanta Constitution*. Mr. McGill has had no exposure to disarmament matters, and, besides, Mr. Schlesinger felt that a group as big as 15 could well have included 2 or 3 persons of liberal persuasion. Mr. Bundy shut this off rather firmly when he said that the President himself had approved the list and felt that it was important to have the Administration’s disarmament policy supported by the Republicans, who in general were not as likely to be quite as liberal as some might like. Anyhow, almost everyone agreed that the immediate future of disarmament activity would be largely in the nature of a propaganda exercise, although Carl Kaysen entered a moderate dissent to this view by saying that we must always stand willing to negotiate substance if the Soviets appear forthcoming.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, January 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Atmospheric Testing

The Foster group met today.¹ Most of the talk was in terms of a Presidential announcement of the resumption of atmospheric testing early in February.² (At my behest, however, and in order to hold the balance even, a paper has been prepared entitled “Program to Explain U.S. Decision to Refrain from Testing in the Atmosphere”!)³

1. If this is the way the decision is going to go, I would like to make the following proposal: that the President announce early in February (a) that we have no choice but to begin atmospheric testing on April 1, (b) that spectacular test preparations are under way, but (c) that we will cancel these tests on one condition—that *the Soviet Union sign the test ban treaty submitted at Geneva*.
2. This proposal has some obvious advantages:
 - a) it puts testing in the context of disarmament and makes clear which we prefer;
 - b) it puts the USSR in the position of triggering our test series and may therefore do something in the weeks before actual resumption to transfer popular indignation from the USA to the USSR. Pressure will be applied to the Communists to sign the treaty as well as on us to suspend the tests.
3. I see no disadvantage in our making this proposal *if we still want the Geneva treaty*. This suggests the need for a thorough reappraisal of the Geneva treaty in the light of recent developments.
4. The USSR could respond by accepting the Geneva treaty. Or it could respond by denouncing the whole proposal (most likely). Or it could respond by throwing the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of last September back on us—that is, by proposing a moratorium on atmospheric testing.
- 5.

What should we do then? My view is that we should reject a moratorium on the ground that experience has defined a moratorium as a space of time in which the Soviet Union prepares for its next series of tests.

But what if the USSR proposes a *treaty* banning atmospheric tests? Because it would be harder for the USSR to violate a treaty than to end a moratorium, I think that a treaty might well be considered in a different category. Query: would such a treaty be disadvantageous to us? Since our underground testing capability is greater than the Soviet Union's, we would surely stand to gain by an arrangement which allowed underground testing but banned atmospheric testing.

6. Anyway what is wrong with saying that, if the USSR will sign the treaty, we will stop the tests?

A.S. jr.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Put in folder of things to talk to Pres. about."

¹ A memorandum by Goodby of this meeting of the Subcommittee of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing, chaired by Foster and established by NSAM No. 116 ([Document 105](#)), is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-462)

² On January 5, Foster submitted the Subcommittee's report to the President. It recommended that the United States, in announcing a test resumption, avoid a defensive or apologetic attitude and demonstrate forcefully that U.S. national security required atmospheric testing. The Subcommittee suggested Presidential announcement of a decision in mid-February, with atmospheric tests to begin in Nevada at the end of February and in the Pacific 2-3 weeks later. The series would conclude by the end of June. Text of Foster's letter and a summary of the report are in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 3, pp. 22-26.

³ Not found.

117. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, January 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

Daily Staff Meeting, January 8, 1962

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Latin America, public relations, security, the Military Assistance Program, and the forthcoming State of the Union speech.]

h. There was a rather fuzzy, involved discussion of atmospheric testing. Evidently Bundy and Schlesinger have written memorandums to the President¹ which promote maintenance of a laboratory state of readiness to resume atmospheric testing by utilizing underground tests to accomplish certain fundamental testing objectives. Mr. Bundy plans to talk “quietly” to Seaborg and Wiesner about the feasibility of this approach. State has submitted a paper outlining a suitable statement in the event that we do resume atmospheric testing.² AEC has submitted an underground testing program which includes 23 or more shots.³ Kaysen suggested that Wiesner convene a panel to re-study the problem. Bundy takes a dim view of these panels because they usually come out in favor of testing. Kaysen said if we decide to go to underground testing completely, perhaps we should use this decision to sandbag the British into giving us Christmas Island for atmospheric testing if necessary, and should also use the decision to entice the Russians to renounce atmospheric tests. Bundy said that he was impressed with this line of reasoning also. He felt that we also ought to keep in mind the necessity for avoiding a nuclear testing arms race. According to Bundy, most people think that we can live with the present situation, i.e., that the Russians haven't gained too much in the recent test series. As a result, the basic policy question is—can you deter the Russians from testing? Bundy quoted Kaysen as stating that the need for ballistic missile defense related to atmospheric tests was not really very great because such tests would only show how much harder it is to defend against missiles by the Zeus approach. He originally thought there is no point in making a test to increase your difficulties. The only useful type of test is

one that makes things easier for you. Kaysen, to his credit, said that this wasn't entirely true, whereas such tests would tend to undermine the Zeus approach itself. It is also possible that some aspect of the test would lead us to a different approach to missile defense. My own reaction to this confused discussion is that the non-atmospheric testing boys have discovered another rationalization to postpone atmospheric tests, i.e., the “laboratory state of readiness” slogan.

JJE

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. The records of White House staff meetings were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.

¹ [Documents 113](#) and [114](#).

² Not found.

³ [Document 102](#).

118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, January 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

Atmospheric test ban

Mr. Gilpatric asked Dr. Johnson and me to look into the question of an atmospheric-only test ban. He asked Dr. Johnson to study the question of how ready-to-test we could keep ourselves. He asked me to put that question in its broader context—i.e., with other factors which bear on a decision whether or not to resume atmospheric testing. Dr. Johnson ultimately joined forces with Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Wiesner and General Starbird to produce a report on his question for Mr. McGeorge Bundy on January 10 (you have a copy)¹ His results are summarized in my paragraphs 3(a)(iii), 3(b) and 3(c) below. This memorandum represents my results (I have deliberately oversimplified the issues, hopefully without distorting them in any relevant way).

1. *Why NOT test in the atmosphere?* The primary reasons for stopping atmospheric testing are (a) to *dampen the arms race* (especially by preventing the development of a reliable Soviet disarming or AICBM capability) and (b) to make a net *propaganda-prestige gain*. (c) The avoidance of *harmful fallout*, except as it bears on the propaganda battle, is not as important as the other reasons (see draft report of Federal Radiation Council).²
2. *Must the U.S. test in the atmosphere even if the Soviets do not?* We probably do need to test if we wish to maintain, as long as possible, nuclear superiority. (“Superiority” will probably still have some meaning—in fighting war, and in deterring Soviet lower-level adventures by fanning fear of a possible U.S. first nuclear strike—when our 1962 test results reach stockpile.) But we probably *do not* need to test in the atmosphere if we intend to permit things to evolve into a nuclear standoff

and to handle lower-level Soviet threats by conventional (or other non-nuclear) means.

(a) *Deterrence.*

(i) *Against a Soviet first nuclear strike.* The Soviets are, even after the 1961 series, quite unlikely to build weapons and defense systems sufficient to permit them to carry out an effective first, disarming strike on us without expecting to receive unacceptable retaliation. It is conceivable since the 1961 Soviet series may have produced “surprises,” but it is unlikely. Whether they would be likely to create such capabilities after their next series of tests is another question.

(For dissent, see JCSM-880-61.)²

(ii) *Against lesser Soviet adventures.* The Soviets are now capable of building weapons and defense systems sufficient to convince them (and us) that they can, despite our best disarming and defensive efforts, deliver on us an unacceptable retaliatory blow. A decision by the U.S. not to test in the atmosphere will, by giving up the 18 months mentioned in paragraph 3(a)(ii) below, probably accelerate the demise of the credible U.S. first-nuclear-strike threat.

(b) *If deterrence fails.* Since a major purpose of the atmospheric ban is to prevent development of reliable AICBM capability (i.e., to keep each side in a “hostage” condition), it follows that the ban could contribute greatly to the losses in the event of a war. This effect will be offset to the extent that the ban succeeds in dampening the arms race and therefore reducing the destructiveness of the war.

3. *What PRICES do we pay for an atmospheric ban?*

(a) *Time lost in the technology race.*

(i) The first “time price” is not properly chargeable to the decision not to resume atmospheric testing because it has already been paid and cannot be retrieved. It is the *7-months'* jump the Soviets got on us when they surprised us with their 1961 series. (The time periods mentioned in this and ensuing paragraphs are meaningful, but figurative. Here, for example, it is clear that, with respect to tests of AICBM systems, the Soviets got perhaps an *18-month* jump on us. We will not be ready for such tests in the 1962 series.)

(ii) The second “time price” must be paid only if there is a moratorium but whether or not the moratorium sticks. It is the equivalent of *18 months* in the technology race. This is the time difference between

April 1962, when we will be ready to go, and the fall of 1963, when the Soviets probably will be ready with an equally mature series.

(iii) The third “time price” will have to be paid only if the Soviets break the ban in a surprise move. This price can be said to be the equivalent of 2 or 3 months in the technology race. This figure is based on the judgment that the highest state of readiness that we can maintain over time would put our “canned” series roughly 2 or 3 months behind the Soviet surprise series.

(b) *Quality*. The quality of U.S. tests will be lower, if “canned,” than they would be if testing were going on regularly. This is because of the effect of the ban on morale. The best people will work on what can be done rather than on what *cannot* be done. The quality differential will increase as time passes.

(c) *Money*. After the initial capital investment (which might be \$15 to \$28 million, depending on whether the development of Christmas Island should be included), the cost per year of remaining on quick-reaction testing alert would be between \$1 and \$1.5 million a year. No estimate has been made of the net dollar effect on the military budget of a decision not to test in the atmosphere (no atmospheric testing but vigorous underground testing, different weapons systems, etc.). The effect would probably be a money saving—perhaps a substantial one.

4. *Will the Soviets accept a proposal to ban only atmospheric tests?*

Probably not—at least not in good faith. Their military interests, as contrasted with ours, probably make them more reliant than we on atmospheric testing. It is unlikely that they would agree to a deal in which we could continue underground testing.

(a) If the Soviets *refuse* a U.S. offer of an atmospheric ban, it would probably produce a net propaganda gain for the U.S.

(b) If the Soviets “*accept*” the ban for two or three years and then find a pretext to break it, we will have been “taken” for 20 months or so in the vital technology race. *The risk of losing these 20 months of time and the incalculable increment of test quality is the big risk facing the President!*

5. *What TACTICS should the President employ if he decides he wants the atmospheric ban?*

(a) *WHO should propose it?* The ban should be proposed by the U.S.

This gives the U.S. more control over its timing and form, and it gives

us the major propaganda value. However, if the Soviets proposed it, it might be more likely to “stick.”

- (b) *What FORM should the ban take?* The ban should be in the form of a treaty. This makes it somewhat harder to break (which, by the way, may work to our disadvantage if we want to break it). It may also provide a better vehicle for obtaining the participation of France, China, etc.
- (c) *What should be the TIMING?* The President should make the offer not long before the date when the tests are scheduled to begin. Optimum timing would be a month before D-Day or, on the present schedule, by March 1. This permits preparations to go on. But it heads off the great movement of planes to the Pacific; it avoids a big item of psychological damage to our testing people; it allows time for negotiations; and it does not appear to be an ultimatum.
- (d) *How can we structure pressures to make the ban STICK?* Here are some factors (in addition to the disapprobrium which would follow from the breaking of a treaty) which could be employed to help make the ban “stick”:
 - (i) *U.S. readiness* to launch a major series in the atmosphere (although this readiness, which would surely be reciprocated, makes it physically easy to break the ban and therefore makes the ban fragile). U.S. can, for an indefinite period, maintain readiness on a 3-months' basis with the quality of the “canned” series being degraded somewhat by the passage of time.
 - (ii) Maintenance of *U.S. military position* (A) strong and invulnerable enough so that the Soviets will not believe that with testing they can achieve a first-strike capability, but (B) not so strong that they will believe that we with testing can achieve a first-strike capability. (Our present near-to-disarming capability, for example, probably put pressure on the Soviets to conduct the 1961 series; this problem cannot be avoided as long as we rely on a first-nuclear-strike threat, instead of lower level capability, to deter Soviet non-nuclear adventures.)
 - (iii) *UN resolution* supporting the ban.
 - (iv) *Military sanctions*.
 - (v) *Economic sanctions*, possibly including forfeitures.

(vi) Vigorous *information program* designed to emphasize factors favoring continuation of the ban.

6. *Would the ban be better LATER?* If the proposal to initiate an atmospheric ban does not now appear attractive, the proposal may nevertheless be attractive (a) after the U.S. has completed its mid-1962 series, or (b) after both the Soviets and the U.S. have completed their next series after that. That is, the proper thing for the U.S. to do may be to conduct its mid-1962 series and then, when that series has been completed, to offer an option to the Soviets: (a) An atmospheric ban dating from that moment, or (b) one dating from the conclusion of the follow-on series by both nations, perhaps with the dates of the follow-on series to be set by the two sides so that they coincide. This would not pick up the 7 months we lost when the Soviets jumped the gun in 1961, but it would avoid further time losses.
7. *How does the atmospheric ban compare, in attractiveness, with the US-UK all-environments treaty?* It is important to note that both permit us to be taken by surprise, and therefore we should object to both unless the partial “opening” of the USSR involved in the US-UK treaty is worth the risk. In more detail:
- (a) The atmospheric-only ban is *as good* in one respect (in both cases atmospheric tests are “self inspectable”).
 - (b) It is *as bad* in one respect (it allows us to be taken by surprise).
 - (c) It is *not good* in one respect (it involves no “opening” of the Soviet Union).
 - (d)

It is *not as bad* in one respect (it does not allow the Soviets to perform, clandestinely, tests which we deny ourselves).

(See McNaughton-Rostow letter of 3 January 1962 on this subject.)³

8. *Conclusions.*

(a) *Advantages and disadvantages.*

- (i) It probably would be to our advantage (but not necessarily, though probably, to the Soviets' disadvantage) if atmospheric tests could be stopped permanently now.

- (ii) It would probably be to our advantage (and probably to the Soviets' disadvantage) if we make the offer and they refused it.
- (iii) It would probably be to our disadvantage (and to the Soviets' advantage) if we made the offer and they “accepted” it, but the ban lasted only (say) six months to four years—long enough to cause us to sacrifice much or all of our present readiness-to-test advantage but not long enough to be worth, in terms of dampened arms race, that sacrifice.
- (b) *Structuring the deal*. If there is to be an atmospheric ban, it must be structured to stick. It must be created and nursed along with that thought in mind.

John T. McNaughton

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 400.112 12 Jan 62. Secret.

¹ Not found.

² Not found.

² Not further identified.

³ A copy is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments 1962. For text, see the Supplement.

119. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister

Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, January 13, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: We are giving the most urgent consideration to your letter of January 5¹ and to the additional comments made on it by David Ormsby Gore. I find myself in deep agreement with nearly all of what you say about the dangers of the arms race and the boldness of action required from those of us who bear primary responsibility in these matters. We must do all that we can to turn the nuclear spiral downward, and to save mankind from the increasing threat of events of surpassing horror.

Whatever may be your final decision about Christmas Island, or mine about American atmospheric testing, I can assure you that we are ready to examine with you the possibilities for new efforts toward disarmament, on the most urgent basis. We are eager to work out together an initiative which might, if successful, mark a significant step forward and which would demonstrate, at a minimum, that we are continuing to press in every possible way to bring the arms race to an end. Dean Rusk is seeing David Ormsby Gore in order to determine how best to proceed. We have questions about some of the tactical aspects of your proposals. But we have no differences at all on the importance and urgency of the effort for progress.

Meanwhile, the preparations for testing must, as we agreed, go forward, and so we are forced to make a definite decision on the matter of Christmas Island. I am very glad to learn that you and your colleagues have agreed to make Christmas Island available, subject to the conclusion of agreements on scientific and technical collaboration, and on financial and administrative matters. I am glad also that, in your judgment, the program of tests proposed for Christmas Island does fall within the criteria of justifiable tests.

May I take it that our agreement on this last point is now definite?

Your letter does not make it altogether clear to me how far the Cabinet's decision to make Christmas Island available is conditional upon agreement on the shape of a new initiative toward disarmament. I would hope very much that the Cabinet would not intend a coupling of this sort. It will take us some time to work out the details of the next steps on disarmament; on Christmas Island, for the reasons we considered in Bermuda, there really must be a definite decision within the next few days. Moreover, while of course we must consult closely at every stage, I am sure from our previous talks that you understand the requirement on me, as President, to retain freedom to prepare to test, and freedom to test, on the basis of the whole situation and the best judgment available at the time. I know we are in agreement on the urgency of disarmament, and I am most eager to find ways of making effective progress, but it would be hard to accept specific conditions, in this range of effort, that might prevent me from meeting my responsibilities for military security. In particular it would seem wrong, at this stage, to make any definite link between the timing of tests and the progress of new efforts toward disarmament. As I said at Bermuda, it is important not to expose ourselves to Soviet maneuvers designed not for progress but simply to tie our hands on testing.

Thus what I hope is that we can agree now to go ahead with Christmas Island and go ahead with a real new effort toward disarmament, but avoid any tie-up between the two that might now or later lead to misunderstanding. We would rather make our preparations without Christmas than run any risk of putting that sort of strain on our old and vital friendship.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy²

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from Bundy to Rusk, stating that Kennedy wanted Rusk to deliver it to Ormsby Gore. A draft by Foster, dated January 11, is *ibid*.

¹ In his letter, Macmillan stated that his Cabinet had agreed to make available to the United States “the facilities at Christmas Island which you require,” subject to an agreement on “scientific and technical collaboration,” and provided there was “full consultation before a decision to start tests from Christmas Island is actually made.” The Prime Minister also stated that he would want to link an announcement on the availability of Christmas Island for U.S. testing to a major new disarmament effort to be implemented through the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy 1962-1963) For text, see the Supplement. The letter is also printed in Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the day, 1961-1963*, pp. 154-163.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

120. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, January 15, 1962.

SUBJECT

Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty

This paper examines the merits of a U.S. initiative in proposing a treaty to the USSR and others banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as the immediate step in our “supreme effort to break the log jam on disarmament and nuclear tests” promised in the State of the Union message.¹

1. If we propose the treaty, and the Soviets reject it, we will be in a better public position when we begin our proposed Spring test series. This alone is not a sufficient reason for proposing it; although it is much more likely than not that the Soviets will refuse our offer.
- 2.

If the Soviets do sign such a treaty, we will have achieved a politically significant pause in the arms race. In the first instance we can expect the UK to join us, and France and Communist China not to. While nuclear tests are not the most critical element in our strategic posture, they are the most highly visible and emotionally charged aspect of the arms race. Thus, the value of any first step involving them cannot be judged merely by its technical military significance, but must take into account its symbolic value. The pause might naturally last three or four years; after which increasing attention to development of kinds of new weapons not dependent on atmospheric testing and problems posed by nations outside the treaty—France and Communist China—will erode the usefulness of the treaty as an arms control device. The prospect that it can be extended to cover these nations is poor. Nonetheless, a pause of several years' duration is of high importance: a first step is necessary, and this might be an achievable one. The period of the pause would create both the opportunity and the incentive to take a second step. For these reasons the

proposed treaty should run for a definite term, say, four years, with provision for review. Review could take into account whether other countries with nuclear capability have acceded to the treaty, and the achievement of other further steps in arms control.

The present moment offers what is almost certainly the last opportunity to achieve such a pause in this Presidential term. Our Spring tests in the atmosphere will certainly provoke Soviet response. Further, they clearly will not, in themselves, provide satisfactory answers to many of the most interesting questions to which they are directed, and thus must be viewed not as a self-contained series of tests but as the first step in what will be a continuing and expanding program of testing in the atmosphere, especially taking into account Soviet responses. The next opportunity for a pause will not arise till we and the Soviets have each completed at least two test series, a period of three or four years.

3. Are there any military risks in signing such a treaty? This depends on our assumptions about Soviet behavior during and after the term of the treaty, and the goals of our own military policy. It is clear that we can continue to keep a secure deterrent, capable of surviving the largest Soviet strike that is possible in this period, and thereafter inflicting such damage on the Soviets that they would not knowingly initiate general nuclear war as a rational policy choice. It will also be possible to maintain some war-fighting capability beyond this; to what extent cannot be so simply stated and will be discussed in (6) below. In (4) the chief points bearing on the security of our deterrent are examined.

4.

Our confidence in the deterrent power of our strategic striking force rests on our estimate of its capacity to achieve what we confidently consider an unacceptable level of damage to Soviet society, in the most unfavorable circumstances which we should take into account in our planning. Now, and for at least the next five years, our present and proposed deployments of aircraft and missiles promise to achieve the required capability, unless the Soviets (1) deploy a much larger missile force than our present intelligence estimates lead us to expect and (2) are capable of a coordinated attack on a large number of targets simultaneously, with no strategic warning and less than 15 minutes tactical warning, *and* (3)

achieve and deploy an AICBM capability far superior to any we now foresee. It is only the conjunction of these three capabilities which would permit the Soviet Union to feel secure from retaliation by the alert-bomber force, which can be launched on 15 minutes warning, the Minuteman force, and submarine-launched Polaris missiles. The argument is further strengthened if account is taken of our bombers on airborne alert, naval strike forces and tactical forces in Europe.

The growth of the Soviet missile force is not directly related to the presence or absence of an atmospheric test ban; neither is its capacity to achieve a highly-compressed, zero-warning attack. (To be sure, there may be an interaction between Soviet force goals and Soviet technical plans, such that their acceptance of an atmospheric test-ban treaty might lead them to revise their missile deployment program, but this possibility does not affect the argument.) The possibility of achieving an effective and reliable AICBM capability based on present concepts is associated with testing in the atmosphere, and it is this which must be examined first. In the worst case, let us assume that the Soviets sign the treaty, and prepare for atmospheric testing, so that they can begin a large series of tests at the end of two or three years—having indeed signed the treaty with this end in view. We on our side will be in the state of maintaining such readiness for atmospheric testing as we can in circumstances in which it is not clear that we will ever conduct such tests again. In these circumstances we can maintain some reserve capacity, consisting of test facilities and support facilities on Christmas Island, and a specially outfitted group of test ships, and such scientific readiness as can result from the existence of laboratories and development teams engaged in underground and possibly space testing. The support facilities would involve costs on the order of an initial \$30 million in capital investment and then \$15 million per year of operating costs.

By the end of the period the attention of the best people in the laboratories would certainly have turned away from questions which can be answered only by atmospheric testing. To the extent that there were problems of this category which were not at all related to the questions involved in underground testing, some desirable people would have drifted away from the laboratories. On the other hand, the problems we are proposing

to examine in the Spring series of tests can be further studied, and instrumentation for these problems can be brought to a higher state of development. All this can, so to speak, be put on the shelf as a reserve against the resumption of testing in the atmosphere. The extent to which still further theoretical work on problems and instrumentation could be maintained is not clear. Presumably the best people would find it less interesting than working on ongoing underground testing. On the other hand, the underground tests and laboratory work would continue to suggest new questions to be answered by atmospheric tests.

We would be prepared to perform atmospheric tests on some 60 to 90 days' notice. This notice might be provided by Russian testing or, in a less likely case, by some other event which we would interpret as a violation of the treaty. The first series of tests we would be prepared to perform would be directed in part toward warming up interest in the problems, and recruiting personnel, but it would also produce immediately useful knowledge. This series would probably be more fruitful than the presently proposed Spring series both because there had been more time for thought on the problems and preparation of instrumentation and because the continuing underground testing and laboratory work would provide more ideas to be tested. However, it is equally clear that these first tests would not operate at maximum efficiency and it might take as much as a year after atmospheric testing was resumed to achieve a really good posture by the process of rebuilding interest and recruiting additional personnel not then engaged in underground testing and associated weapons development.

How significant is this gap? Assuming that both sides have used the interval to do whatever can be done without nuclear testing in the atmosphere in developing guidance systems, radars, and missiles, as well as in exploring quite different concepts of AICBM systems and that neither has made any significant breakthrough in this way (which is what we expect, and the only situation relevant to our discussion) the gap is not militarily threatening. The most likely results of the atmospheric testing efforts will be to reveal further the weaknesses of AICBM systems. But if this is not the case, the time from a test revealing significant new information about AICBM to the achievement of a large-scale deployment of weapons will

be of the order of five years. Many of the steps in this sequence will be such as to give us notice, from the first nuclear tests themselves to the systems-testing of weapons and the initial phases of deployment. In this period we would have sufficient time to ready our own responses to the new developments. What these responses might be would, of course, depend in part on what we learned about Soviet developments and from our own resumed tests. In the interim, however, we could continue to explore the possibilities of weapons which would not be vulnerable to AICBM's, such as low-trajectory aerodynamic re-entry vehicles for Minuteman and Polaris, and the proposed SLAM supersonic, low-level ramjet, and similar devices. Further, and with more certainly predictable success, we can now intensify our programs to modify existing missiles to make them less vulnerable to AICBM systems of the general Nike-Zeus type. This can be done on the basis of our present knowledge and of new knowledge from underground testing and laboratory experiments, and does not depend on atmospheric tests. Finally, if we become aware of what appear to be substantial deployments of Soviet AICBM's, we can build up our own missile force at a faster rate. The economic exchange ratio in such a case would favor us by a wide margin; it would be quicker and cheaper for us to add to our offensive strength than for them to add to their defensive strength. The same point can be made in relation to an increased build-up of Soviet missile forces over that which we now anticipate. In the first case it might be mainly further hardened Minutemen and advanced Titans that we would deploy; in the second, mainly further Polaris submarines. The essential point in this argument is that significant changes in Soviet weaponry and deployment take time, reveal themselves to us in the course of their occurrence, and allow us time to react: the margin of deterrence cannot disappear in six months or a year, much less overnight.

The discussion above started from the assumption that the Soviets do what is most damaging to our capacity to learn from atmospheric testing, namely, wait essentially the whole of the two or three years and then test. A shorter life for the treaty would not change the argument significantly. A much shorter life would probably result in a smaller degradation in the capacity of our weapons establishment to produce significant tests in the first new series.

5. This discussion has not attempted to explore what the next step in arms control might be. The proposed treaty would give us the space to explore this step, and it would be quite important to begin preparations for that exploration now. As a first step, an atmospheric test-ban has the advantages and disadvantages of being chiefly political. It avoids the difficult problems of inspection and control. A natural next step might be the present Geneva test-ban treaty or some revised version of it. However, it is possible that the very justification put forward for accepting the proposed ban on atmospheric testing would argue against an extension of the ban to other environments. It might be that a more acceptable next step should be a much bigger effort, going either in the direction of an attempt to limit development of new nuclear weapons altogether or tackling the problem of limiting fissionable-material production, or controlling inventories of delivery vehicles. The difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to refuse to take the first one now, unless we never intend to take it, since we will always face this difficulty.
- 6.

The extension of the foregoing argument to the problem of assuring that under an atmospheric test-ban treaty we can maintain that something extra, more than survivable deterrence, which our currently planned strategic force is supposed to provide presents no new issues of principle, but it does raise a difficult quantitative problem. The purpose of maintaining such a margin in the event of nuclear war is to be able to prevent Soviet follow-on attacks after a first strike, and still maintain a reserve capacity for deterring yet further attacks. The highest figure that could be set for this margin is an ability to strike all identifiable targets in the relevant category. However, neither the proportion which is ideally desirable nor a rationale that would determine it has as yet been defined.

Our previous arguments apply; the possible Soviet developments in AICBM which could diminish the capacity of our force to strike at the Soviets could be countered in the same ways. What is not clear is what would be the magnitude of fluctuations in the extra margin above deterrence which we might have to accept, since the exact times of Soviet developments and subsequent deployments, and of our reactions thereto, are unpredictable. We must recognize that the extra margin might fluctuate

somewhat in the period in question under the proposed treaty. However, the same thing can be said in its absence. It is in the nature of this margin that it is never known to even a fair degree of precision at any time. One way to define it is by the proportion of the total of Soviet offensive targets—missile sites, long-range bomber fields, and the like—we can attack after absorbing a first strike and still maintain a defined reserve capacity to attack cities or other targets. Our estimate of this magnitude depends, of course, on our knowledge of the Soviet striking force. It seems that inevitably this knowledge is subject to a substantial margin of uncertainty, and further, that there are elements of the force, such as missile-firing submarines or air-alert aircraft which it is difficult for us to account for and impossible for us to target. Even the maximum possible figures could be maintained over time by a sufficient increase in our own forces, although of course the scale and expense of so doing might rapidly climb to astronomical heights. But it is clear that it cannot be asserted that this margin can be maintained at its maximum level continuously, whether or not there is a test-ban treaty. What can be asserted is that, under the adverse circumstances discussed above—namely, a treaty which expired after four years with no further arms control measures—the period of our uncertainty as to how near the maximum margin we were might be greater. Whether we should tolerate this additional uncertainty depends on the relative value we place on the political benefits of an atmospheric test-ban treaty on the one hand, including its effect on international tensions, and the unknown possible loss of counterforce capability in the light of whatever chance there may be that we in fact may be forced to general nuclear war during this period on the other.

7. A “full first strike” counterforce capacity can never be any more than our ability to hit all the offensive targets we know. In what sense this is “full” is open to debate since we never know just how ignorant we are. It is clear that the argument in paragraph (6) above applies to this case.
8. On the other hand, there are advantages to us if the Russians sign and abide by such a treaty. Indeed, it is precisely because of these advantages that the Soviets might not sign. The U.S. is far ahead of the Soviet Union in the capacity to test underground. The Russians have had little experience here, and it would be both costly and time-consuming for them to develop suitable facilities. This might well slow down their

testing progress for the equivalent of a year in relation to our own efforts. This is no more or no less significant on their side than a corresponding lag would be on ours.

9. In sum, on the one side are the opportunities to move on arms control in a striking and dramatic fashion. The probability of success is not high, but the value of success would be substantial. On the other, the military effects of a signed treaty are such as appear risky only in terms of the proposition that anything short of the maximum effort of which we are capable in building up our strategic forces, is dangerous. This view makes any step toward arms control or disarmament impossible; and, logically, it would require that we do much more than we are now doing. The great difficulty that has attended past discussions of arms control measures within our own government arises from the desire to secure assurance of an exact balance between the impact of the proposed measures on ourselves and our opponents. The whole thrust of the preceding argument has been that this is an unnecessary goal. In the framework of a strategy of deterrence, quite large fluctuations in specific elements of relative strength need not alter the fundamental military equilibrium. Even in the framework of a strategy of deterrence plus controlled counterforce, moderate fluctuations in effective strength are tolerable unless we in effect assume that general nuclear war is both inevitable and imminent. If we consider general war an unlikely event and, further, think that its probability is affected by the level of international tension, on which arms control measures, among others, may have an effect, we need not seek an unattainable precision of balance in the effect of any arms control measure.

C.K.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/13-15/62. Top Secret.

¹ For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 5-15.

121. Editorial Note

[Summary of the Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group (chaired by Hans Bethe), January 16, 1962 (3 paragraphs of source text), not declassified. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 58 AWT USST Tests (1961-1965)) The Report is in the Supplement.]

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations [Source](#)

Washington, January 18, 1962, 1:27 p.m.

1875. Eyes only Stevenson. There follows text of letter from Macmillan to the President.

January 16, 1962

“Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your message of January 14¹ about nuclear tests. I am very glad to feel that we are in such close agreement about the need for some new initiative to break the deadlock on disarmament and to try to stop the nuclear arms race. I shall be very interested to hear what you propose about this.

“I quite understand your wish to start soon the preparations necessary at Christmas Island to enable you rapidly to carry out the programme of nuclear tests there which we discussed, should you in the event decide that these tests must go forward. I also accept that once you begin preparations at Christmas Island it would not be right for the United Kingdom to claim a veto on the actual decision to start the series of tests, although of course we should, as I said in my letter of January 5,² expect full consultation with you on this point. But opinion here while it would accept our decision that tests are militarily right would not like an arrangement under which we gave you the right to decide unilaterally whether or not actually to conduct the nuclear tests from Christmas Island. It was for this reason that I suggested in my letter that it would be better to state straight away that you and I had jointly decided that further tests were indeed militarily justified, rather than saying only that we had agreed to make preparations for tests against a possible decision to hold them. That is still our position.

“As I explained in my letter, my colleagues, while recognising the military need for further tests, nevertheless wanted to find a way out of this sterile contest. They would prefer, therefore, to connect the announcement on tests with an announcement about a disarmament initiative.

“While I recognise the practical difficulties about this, I think we could overcome them. I have, therefore, prepared a formula for your consideration somewhat different to the one which I suggested on pages 8 and 9 of my letter, and I attach this as an annex to this letter. You will see that I have left a bracketed passage in section C of this annex, as this will turn on what kind of initiative you feel able to agree to. Perhaps Rusk and Ormsby Gore could discuss the wording of this. The more we can make it look like a constructive initiative, the better. If you felt able to agree to a presentation on the lines of this annex, I would propose to recommend it to my Cabinet colleagues at a meeting which I would arrange for the purpose on Thursday, January 18.³ If, as I hope, the Cabinet accept my advice, we could then discuss the timing of the announcement, in relation to whatever disarmament initiative we mutually agree, and meanwhile our experts could be discussing the draft agreement about the scientific, technical, financial and administrative arrangements at Christmas Island.

“I hope very much that this suggestion may meet both our difficulties.

“With warm regard,

“Yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan.”

ANNEX

Possible joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom

“A. It is the joint view of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments that the present state of nuclear development, in which the recent massive Soviet tests are a factor, justifies the West in making a further series of nuclear tests for purely military reasons. The United States and British Governments have therefore decided to make preparations to conduct a series of tests in various places including Christmas Island.

“B. The two Governments recognise the possibility that further tests by the West may be followed by more Soviet tests. Nevertheless, they do not accept that this situation in itself justifies them in putting at risk the military security of the free world.

“C. The two Governments are, however, deeply concerned for the future of mankind if a halt cannot be called to the nuclear arms race. The two Governments are, therefore, determined to make a new effort to move away from this sterile contest. [They propose accordingly to approach the Soviet Government at an early date with the object of finding ways and means whereby the nuclear aspects of disarmament, for which the three Powers have a special responsibility, could be discussed again at a high level, preparatory to the meeting of the 18-Power Conference on general and complete disarmament.] ”⁴

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-1862. Top Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text.

¹ The President’s January 13 letter ([Document 119](#)) was delivered on January 14.

² See [footnote 1](#), [Document 119](#).

³ A January 19 memorandum from the British Embassy to the Department of State states that on January 18 the British Cabinet had decided it was “willing in principle to agree to” U.S. use of Christmas Island subject to a number of conditions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62) See the Supplement.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, January 17, 1962.

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two papers are really of high importance. One is by Kaysen, with help from a lot of others.¹ Kaysen says:

1. You can safely offer an atmospheric test-ban, because without atmospheric tests we can be sure of a nuclear stand-off, and even with them we cannot get anything better after 1963.
2. If Russians accept, you get a real step toward arms control—though further steps would be needed.
3. If Russians reject, you shift much of the weight of our test series to them.

This paper rests on evidence provided by Defense, AEC, and Science Adviser. Defense and AEC would accept its facts but not its conclusions—but only because neither is prepared to say a stand-off is all we can expect. This is the gut issue.

Those who want atmospheric tests think there is a real prospect that one side or the other can get decisively “ahead” in strategic nuclear power. This paper says they are wrong, and the argument is one that is of great importance; you should read it and then expose it to discussion.

The other paper is a summary of a Teller-dominated report to LeMay in favor of much more massive testing than anything you now plan.² It gives the flavor of the sentiment on the other side. The document is probably of high political importance, because men like Bethe and Baker have also signed it,³ and because it is already being leaked privately to the Hill.

McG. B.⁴

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62. Top Secret.

¹ Neither paper was attached. Kaysen's paper is [Document 120](#).

² Only an undated fragment of the summary was found. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/16-22/62) The report is presumably "Military Implications of 1961 Soviet Nuclear Tests: Report by the Twining Committee to The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force," dated January 5 and known as the Twining Report after its Chairman, General Nathan F. Twining (Ret.). Bethe, Teller, and Dr. William O. Baker were among the 14 members of the committee. (Ibid., Twining Report 1/5/62)

³ Bethe signed the Twining Report but submitted some partial dissents in a memorandum to Twining on January 26. He did, however, agree with the Twining Committee that a nuclear test ban treaty at that time would not be to the military or technological advantage of the United States, and agreed also that some atmospheric testing was necessary. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965))

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

124. Editorial Note

In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 30, 1962, Ewell included the following item on nuclear testing:

“b. Bundy said that the President feels that we must have a definitive review of the atmospheric nuclear testing problem in the next week to 10 days. This should include what sort of results we are getting and can anticipate from our underground tests, an assessment of the present DOD/AEC atmospheric testing schedule, and a review of technological progress. Komer asked whether there was any articulate policy support for testing. Bundy said yes, that every one of the President’s senior advisers was for it. He didn’t say whether this was articulate support, however. (I sense that the senior policy people see the answer so clearly that their staffs have not bothered to get into the staff level and wrestle out the sophisticated arguments which are being used against the testing program.) Bundy said that the reason he and the NSC staff had taken a line against the testing program was that no one else would articulate this side of the question, and that he felt that the President deserved a balance to the weight of Government opinion. He did not mention how he planned to organize the development and presentation of this problem to the President. (My guess would be that this would be presented to the President in a highly controlled way, with as small a group as possible participating. I am sure that this would not be considered a suitable topic for the NSC due to the fact that the non-testers would be completely swamped by the pro-testers.)” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

125. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, January 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

Developments in connection with Kennedy-Macmillan letter to Khrushchev on Disarmament

In your discussion with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on January 20,¹ it was agreed that we would undertake to prepare a draft letter to Khrushchev regarding a Foreign Ministers meeting on disarmament, that we would study the problem of the desirability of sending a special emissary to deliver the letter and to make certain additional points, and that we would consider specific points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers when they met.

On January 22, we met with representatives of the British Embassy and gave them a draft of a possible letter to Mr. Khrushchev (see Memo of Conversation attached at Tab A).²

On January 24, the U.K. Embassy stated that Macmillan believed the U.S. draft formed an excellent basis for a message to Khrushchev and suggested several modifications of a minor nature. The text as agreed appears at Tab B. At the same time, the U.K. Embassy gave us for comment a copy of a draft letter to President de Gaulle, advising him of the proposed initiative. (See MemCon of January 24 at Tab C.)³ This letter was approved by the President without change, and was dispatched to General de Gaulle immediately. As yet, no reply has been received by the British from General de Gaulle and the draft letter to Khrushchev is being held in abeyance for possible revision after de Gaulle's comments are received.

At the meeting on January 24, the U.K. Embassy indicated that they did not feel the idea of a special emissary should be pursued or that specific proposals for an agenda for the Foreign Ministers, who would meet together prior to the opening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, should be

proposed. The UK hoped that the letter to Khrushchev could be delivered by January 31, so that the agreed announcement which appears as Tab D could be issued on February 1.⁴ This timing is now clearly out of the question.

The UK has also given us (Tab E MemCon of January 25)⁵ a series of questions and answers which would serve as guidelines for the UK in dealing with the press. We have several minor comments to make on the suggested questions and answers at the time it is decided to proceed with the message to Khrushchev.

On January 31, Ambassador Ormsby Gore advised us that the UK did not expect a reply from de Gaulle before the end of this week.⁶ In the meantime, London wished to secure U.S. views on what specific points we could propose to Gromyko be taken up by the Foreign Ministers in their meeting prior to the 18-Nation conference. We have expressed the tentative view that it would be best not to suggest specific points of discussion, since there would not appear to be any questions which could be dealt with conclusively in a three-day meeting of this character. It might be better to justify the meeting primarily in terms of its symbolic demonstration of the importance which we attach to the 18-Nation negotiations and, at the most, as giving an opportunity to exchange views in a tentative and exploratory way on areas of inquiry in which our representatives in the 18-Nation group might concentrate. Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported that London was particularly interested in whether we could be prepared to make a “bold” and specific proposal on reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, since this was at the heart of the disarmament problem. We advised Ambassador Ormsby Gore that our studies had not yet proceeded far enough to allow us to anticipate being in a position to make such a proposal even during the early stages of the 18-Nation negotiations, and this was a further reason why we should attempt to keep the Foreign Ministers' discussion quite general.

Adrian S. Fisher

⁴ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-3162. Top Secret.

¹ The memorandum of conversation by F.E. Cash of EUR is *ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2062.

² No attachments were found with this memorandum. The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is *ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2262, to which is attached the draft letter to Khrushchev. For the letter as sent on February 8, which contains only a few changes from the draft of January 22, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 25-26. Khrushchev's reply of February 10 is *ibid.*, pp. 32-36. See also [volume VI, Documents 30](#) and [31](#).

³ The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2462. Attached to it is the draft letter, in which Macmillan invited de Gaulle to join the United States and the United Kingdom in mounting a major initiative on disarmament in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Macmillan sent the letter to de Gaulle on January 28.

⁴ For the announcement as it appeared on February 8, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 31-32.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ President de Gaulle, in his February 6 reply to Macmillan, stated that while France was "entirely favorable" toward any measure that might lead to disarmament, it seemed to him quite hopeless to expect "anything impartial or effective in this realm" from the Committee of Eighteen, since both it and its source, the General Assembly, had "too marked a demagogic and irresponsible character for one to be able to take towards it any other attitude than one of complete reserve." (The English text is attached to a note from Ormsby Gore to Kennedy, February 6; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) According to Spiers' memorandum of a conversation between Fisher and Lord Hood, also February 6, the French had advised the British that de Gaulle would "allow" France to attend the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee without playing an active role. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/2-662)

126. Editorial Note

On February 2, 1962, President Kennedy was briefed on the recent Soviet test series. Seaborg's account of the meeting reads as follows:

"From 4:15 p.m. to 6 p.m. I attended a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room. Others present were: Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze; Drs. Brown and Johnson (DOD); General Lemnitzer (Chairman, JCS); Amory and Scoville (CIA); General Taylor, Bundy, Wiesner, Keeny, Carl Kaysen (White House) and General Betts.

"Scoville, Betts and Brown made presentations regarding the Russian progress on their tests, our underground and proposed atmospheric test program and our proposed effects program respectively.

"The President expressed some doubt that the arguments for the developmental tests are sufficient to justify carrying them on, and he wondered whether it wouldn't be best to conclude the atmospheric test ban agreement, say for four years, with the USSR. I pointed out again that if the Russians broke such an agreement in about two years we would find the capabilities of our laboratories reduced even further because it is difficult to have a capability for testing in the atmosphere after such a long period of refraining from atmospheric testing. The President did, however, direct that the negotiations for Christmas Island be speeded up, and also asked that the proposed atmospheric test series be planned in such a way that weapons systems tests such as those for the Polaris and Atlas missiles could be carried out in the event they are authorized." (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 3, page 159)

A lengthy summary of the briefing by Keeny, which does not include any report of remarks by the President, is in the Kennedy Library, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 497th NSC Meeting, Keeny Report. See the Supplement.

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Source

Washington, February 2, 1962, 7:48 p.m.

Topol 1110. Re Polto 998, rptd London 195, Brussels Polto 34, Bonn Polto 187 and Moscow Polto 114.¹ Breakdown of nuclear test ban talks² should not be interpreted as anything more than US unwillingness continue indefinitely with talks which Soviet rejection of concept of international control had made devoid of content. Trend of test ban talks had been pointing towards this conclusion for many months. That talks resumed at all after Soviet Fall series only reflected US desire to exhaust all efforts to reach agreement before deciding test ban treaty on acceptable terms was unlikely outcome at early date. Soviet tactic in presenting four-point Nov 28 proposal³ was assessed by us as attempt recoup propaganda losses and shift blame for lack of agreement to US. In this situation continuation of talks on separate test ban treaty seemed fruitless exercise. We therefore tried tactic of suggesting we willing explore relationship of test ban to other disarmament measures. When this too was rejected it was apparent that proposal for conference recess was only sensible course. This outcome, of course, means that impetus which agreement might have given to disarmament prospects and to hopes for improvement in East-West relations may never be achieved through test ban route. However, other effects on disarmament and East-West relations likely be minimal.

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-262. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, London, and Moscow.

¹ Not found.

² The Geneva Test Ban Conference adjourned on January 29. For the final Soviet and U.S. statements, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I,

pp. 15-18 and 18-24, respectively. In March the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee established a Subcommittee made up of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States as a forum for test ban negotiations.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, 1961, p. 664.

128. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing

It is the Department of Defense position that immediate military requirements exist which provide a clear basis for resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing at this time. Of particular importance are weapon effects data which are critically needed to assure that both offensive and defensive weapon systems are and continue to be effective.

Weapon development tests in the atmosphere would provide increased diversity for existing and future weapon systems in the face of changing and sometimes unpredictable threats. The particular weapon development experiments in the proposed series are unlikely by themselves to produce radical changes in our relative strength. However, the developments resulting from several test series will certainly produce an important difference in military capability. Furthermore, prudence demands we be alert to the possibilities of major breakthroughs which can only be explored with a vigorous basic weapon development program including atmospheric testing.

Operational tests of existing systems, though less critical than effects and development tests from a purely technical viewpoint, are highly recommended if the decision is made to test in the atmosphere. Such full scale tests of systems would go a long way toward strengthening the confidence of the Congress and the public in the forces on which we place so much reliance in our defense and war plans. The reliability of our deterrent forces should be credible to ourselves as well as to our potential enemies.

(1) Weapons Effects

Preparations are being made for four specific weapons effects tests for early execution: two at high altitude, one on the surface in Nevada, and one underwater. These tests by no means satisfy the total needs, but will, even if no others are subsequently carried out, make a qualitative change in our ability to understand and predict such effects, and to make changes in our operational forces to take account of them. It should be noted that though these tests will probably raise as many questions as they answer, our military capability and flexibility will be improved greatly even by the posing of the unanswered questions. Preparations and planning are also underway for overseas tests which could build on the results of a first series and be ready about twelve months later, as well as additional small-scale tests in Nevada.

The first series of high altitude tests will provide critical data for both offensive and defensive systems. In the absence of an active enemy defense, existing systems are adequate to insure unacceptable damage to any enemy. However there is clear evidence that the U.S.S.R. is working vigorously on AICBM development. To counter this possibility we must minimize the vulnerability of our delivery systems and provide measures to penetrate their defenses. The high altitude tests will provide critical data necessary to evaluate nuclear “blackout” and associated electromagnetic effects. They will also provide some additional information on the vulnerability to enemy attack of U.S. nuclear warheads and reentry vehicles at two altitudes of interest. With these data we can provide inputs for the design of systems to aid in the penetration of potential enemy defenses.

The same kinds of information are essential to an evaluation of defensive problems. The attacker may attempt to “blackout” our AICBM systems and in any case we may have “blackout” problems from our own defensive explosions. To evaluate and optimize the kill effectiveness of our possible AICBM systems we must, for lack of precise knowledge of the enemy warhead, obtain and use basic information on the vulnerability of U.S. systems.

High altitude nuclear bursts produce widespread and long-lived disruption of certain radio communication systems. Considerations of command and control demand that we understand the magnitudes of the effects and adjust

to the possible loss of communication channels on which we now place heavy reliance.

The low yield surface effects test planned for Nevada will provide important information on the vulnerability of hardened missile sites to enemy attack. This experiment will tell us whether the electromagnetic signal induced by the explosion can damage command and communication links in varied ICBM sites, and give us an experimental point in calculating whether our hardened sites will survive nearby multi-megaton explosion. This test will also provide important data on blast and shock relevant to estimating effects on hardened structures. Certain warhead vulnerability experiments, pertinent to AICBM problems but best performed on the surface, will also be incorporated in this test.

The underwater test is both an effects test and a systems proof test. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ASROC warhead will be detonated at a depth of 750 feet. An example of the critical effects information that defies simulation or calculation is the response of the complex sonar gear to such an explosion. It is probable that in a combat situation more than one ASROC would be fired and it is important to determine how accurately if at all track can be maintained on hostile targets. In addition information will be obtained on the fleet operational problems in a nuclear environment of blast and radioactivity.

(2) Weapons Development.

The planned AEC weapon development shots fall in three general categories:

(a) *Tests of devices designed during the moratorium and now entering stockpile.* Each specific device of this category represents the maximum acceptable extrapolation from tested devices and because of the critical nature of the systems they are part of they should be tested. Further these tests will provide normalization of the design calculations for the more advanced devices also proposed for testing. If the advanced designs do not perform as expected this normalization data will be essential for understanding the reasons.

(b)

Tests of advanced designs providing increased yield-to-weight and/or greater diversity. These designs represent in general extrapolations beyond those acceptable for certification without testing. Present devices *delivered on target* would be adequate. However, in the face of an active enemy defense these advanced designs will make major contributions to the penetration problem. Our possession of multiple warheads [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to produce systems able to intercept the variety of penetrating attacks we could then mount.

One basic point about yield and penetrability needs to be understood. If a single ballistic missile warhead has a yield of less than a megaton the enemy has a real advantage in AICBM design because to be effective the incoming device must be detonated at low altitude. This gives the enemy AICBM system maximum time and use of the slowing-down effects of the atmosphere to aid in discrimination and intercept in the face of whatever penetration tactics we use. Increasing the yield at a fixed weight will make detonation at a higher altitude possible for existing systems such as Minuteman and Titan II, thus increasing the enemy AICBM problem.

Finally, some counter-force capability seems desirable even with a second strike strategy. Large yields then become essential and must be compatible with existing weight capabilities of our systems.

(c) *Developmental tests exploring major new design concepts.* These tests represent first steps toward major improvements in weapon performance. Being first steps they will undoubtedly require further testing at future times to exploit the knowledge gained in this series. If we wish to maintain a vigorous weapon development program over the next decade these experiments are essential. The two groups of tests previously discussed are addressed to immediate problems, whereas this group look to the future. Weapon development, like any exploratory area, takes time and usually contains many surprises. A few of the proposed experiments are thus of an exploratory nature rather than oriented toward immediate or easily foreseen requirements.

(3) *System Tests.*

It appears possible and highly desirable to incorporate in the planned test program proof tests of the complete Polaris and Atlas systems. These tests will not jeopardize either the weapon effects or weapon development program since they can be carried out almost completely independently of the others. It is recommended that these system tests be included in the planned series; they have a total [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

It is a matter of judgment how much testing, and of what kinds, is necessary for confidence in system performance. Plans are underway for exhaustive user-type missile tests. Missile tests have been carried out measuring the environment to which the nuclear warhead is subjected, and verifying that the separately tested nuclear warheads will perform after missile flight. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposed systems tests are essential to building confidence in our major existing deterrent forces and to confirm the operability of complete weapon systems. They are submitting a paper outlining in more detail the basis of their requirements.¹ Mr. McNamara and I concur in the desirability of complete system tests of selected systems.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time support the critical need for both the weapon effects and weapon development programs as outlined above.

(4) Effect of Not Resuming Atmospheric Testing on Future Weapons Development and Weapons Effects Capability.

It is in the nature of weapon effects and weapon development research that one must rely heavily on theoretical studies. But theory without experimental confirmation and guidance soon becomes sterile. We are now at a point in important areas of such research where full scale experiments are absolutely essential to any further progress.

Even ignoring the immediate military requirements that motivate most of the proposed atmospheric tests, this serious loss of momentum and capability with time should weigh heavily in a decision to resume atmospheric testing. A vigorous and reasonably unfettered weapon program is the best insurance against unpleasant and unpredictable surprises of the future. If the decision is made not to conduct atmospheric tests during 1962,

and if the Soviets carry out another extensive test series in 1963 or 1964, we would at that time be in a substantially worse position than we are now with respect to both state and momentum of development compared to the Soviets.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President dated February 16. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. Also on February 16, Seaborg submitted to the White House an unaddressed memorandum reviewing objectives and operational plans for the proposed test series, and detailing changes in the program since his November 29 letter ([Document 102](#)). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting)

129. Editorial Note

On February 16, 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom effected by an exchange of letters a Memorandum of Understanding regarding U.S. use of Christmas Island for nuclear tests and related exchange of information. (Department of State, Files of the Office of the Legal Adviser) In a note to Battle dated February 26, Farley stated that the agreement was “probably more satisfactory to the U.K. than to the U.S. Moreover, it was not concluded with particular speed on the part of the British.” Farley’s note transmitted a letter of February 19 from Macmillan to Kennedy, in which Macmillan mentioned the exchange of letters and stated his desire that “the exchange of scientific information should be of mutual benefit and flow easily” and that pertinent agreements would be “applied and interpreted on both sides in the broad spirit of the collaboration on which we are embarked.” Farley stated that no reply to the letter would be necessary. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II)

130. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, February 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Atmospheric Tests

Without more information than I have it is not possible to hazard an opinion as to whether atmospheric testing should be resumed. From what I have heard I assume a decision has been reached, however, to resume tests for legitimate reasons of military security, and not for political and psychological considerations.

The political price of test resumption will be paid most directly in the United Nations and in terms of public opinion around the world. The immediate problem, therefore, is to cushion the shock and moderate the adverse political effects of such testing. There are the following possibilities:

- (1) Assuming that it is not realistically possible to delay the announcement on March 1 that the United States will resume atmospheric testing, every effort should be made to channel the controversy out of the United Nations and into the Geneva 18-nation Conference. We should press there for immediate consideration of a test ban treaty together with an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as specified in the present U.S. disarmament program, but without prejudice to more general disarmament discussions.
- (2) A new test ban agreement, to be most negotiable, should not involve elaborate international controls or inspection arrangements. One possibility would be a comprehensive ban on all testing, with a limited number of inspection challenges by each side to investigate whenever national detection systems indicate that there is clandestine testing. The agreement would be temporary—perhaps of two years duration—so as to allow time to work out a definitive treaty with broader controls, in the context of other disarmament measures. To deal with the problem of

clandestine test preparations, we could propose continuous observation of known testing sites and maintain our own standby preparations for resumption of tests. This is not the only type of treaty we might propose, but it has the virtue of relative simplicity. The important point is to keep pressing for a test ban agreement even as we test.

- (3) Other initial steps which we could suggest at the outset of the Geneva meeting to improve our posture include:
 - (a) a proposal to set aside specified quantities of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) for eventual destruction;
 - (b) immediate cut-off of fissionable materials production, with sequestration of specified quantities of weapons material for ultimate peaceful use;
 - (c) various measures to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation through systems of fixed or mobile observation groups, aerial observation, and reciprocal inspection in specified zones. (We should prepare the best possible mix of regional security arrangements: area to be covered; limitations to be placed on weapons, manpower and movement; facilities for observation and inspection);
 - (d) an agreement prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction;
 - (e) an updating of the 1925 Convention to prohibit the use of chemical, biological and radiological warfare;^{[1](#)}
 - (f) a non-aggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, perhaps linked with limitations on certain types of forces near East-West demarcation lines;
 - (g) immediate drafting of the Charter of an International Disarmament Organization and of arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force.
- (4) I recognize that each of the foregoing measures could involve some disadvantages for the United States, but we must realize that without any of them our disarmament posture is thin and featureless. We should be prepared to offer some specific proposals to offset the Soviet propaganda onslaught calling for immediate and radical disarmament measures without adequate controls.
- (5) I assume that the rationale for the decision to resume testing will be set forth fully and persuasively in a statement by the President which will be circulated to all UN Delegations in New York.

- (6) I conclude with the suggestion that if testing must be resumed and an announcement is to be made promptly, we should attempt to:
- (a) channel the discussion into the 18-nation Conference in Geneva;
 - (b) urgently propose a new test ban treaty;
 - (c) propose at the outset an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
 - (d) propose two or three other initial arms control steps of the type suggested above.

Unless we are prepared to come forth with a group of such initial measures, and unless the President indicates in his announcement that he intends to make such proposals, we shall be exposed to widespread protests and growing demands for unrealistic and unacceptable disarmament measures.

Let us *lead* not *follow*. The essential point is that test resumption makes it all the more necessary to press for a test ban and other immediate disarmament measures. Let us not insist on unattainable perfection in inspection and control and thereby jeopardize the whole disarmament enterprise.²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Confidential.

¹ For text of the protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and entered into force on February 8, 1928 (for the United States on April 10, 1975), see 26 UST 571.

² This last paragraph is handwritten.

131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Atmospheric Nuclear Testing

You have asked for my recommendation as to whether the United States should, in the near future, resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. This question is one of extreme gravity and of exceptional complexity. The views and recommendation which follow can reflect this in only a small way. I hope that the long and searching discussions we have held on this subject have done more justice to the multitude of issues involved.

In my judgment the most important argument against resuming nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere is the possibility of prejudicing formal or tactic steps toward arms control arrangements by making it more certain that the USSR would again test and thereby further escalate the nuclear arms race. Any step we can take to damp down this race is obviously in the national interest if consistent with our national security. Furthermore, to the extent that our nuclear weapons capability is superior to the Soviet capability, a freeze on nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere would be to our military advantage.

This said, I think the problem for decision can thus be formulated. If there is no reason to believe that the Soviets will agree to a test ban of a type we deem necessary to safeguard our national security over the long term, can we risk our national security by gambling that the Soviets will parallel restraints we could unilaterally impose on ourselves? I do not personally believe we can accept this risk in view of the Soviets' declared objectives and their recent resumption of testing.

There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union now regards an agreement to ban tests under appropriate safeguards as a serious matter for negotiation. Their influence in inhibiting the Chinese Communists has

diminished. We know that they are engaged in a massive drive toward an AICBM capability. Their recent test series has doubtless whetted, rather than damped, their determination to surpass us in the state of the art. I think the conclusion to be drawn is that the Soviets will again test in the atmosphere to achieve what they believe may be significant military advances, regardless of whether or not we resume atmospheric tests. Our failure to resume atmospheric tests might indeed encourage the Soviets to capitalize on their recent advances by launching another massive test series which could in fact seriously jeopardize our national security.

This situation might change in the future, and for this reason I believe we should continue to support a comprehensive test ban treaty with adequate international control.

Other reasons which are commonly advanced to support the argument that the United States should not test in the atmosphere do not seem to me very convincing when our national security is at stake. One argument is that world public reaction would be adverse and inimical to our interests.

We may certainly expect losses to our international position as a result of a decision to proceed with a test program. For example, the decision would be viewed as having a damaging effect on the forthcoming disarmament conference, even though we do not believe that the Soviets would use this as a pretext for breaking off the negotiations. However, such losses may be balanced to a certain extent by the fact that much of foreign public opinion is already conditioned to a U.S. resumption of atmospheric tests. Moreover, our international posture may be strengthened by the evidence of our will to do what is necessary to protect our national security interests, and those of that part of the free world which depend upon us for protection from Soviet aggression.

The problem of radioactive fallout is another argument against testing in the atmosphere, and I share the concern you once expressed at having even one individual affected by radioactive fallout. Nevertheless, I believe that the hazards from fallout produced by such testing as we may carry out are minimal as compared with the hazards which might be caused by misunderstandings about our nuclear strength.

In any event, our security must be the primary consideration, and I am convinced that we can do much to minimize psychological and propaganda losses by careful explanation of our policy, including taking advantage of our improved disarmament program. If, in addition, we are scrupulous in the exercise of responsibility in the conduct of our program, limiting our tests to the kind and number which are essential for military and scientific purposes and conducting them with careful regard to health and safety factors, we should be able to hold our political losses to manageable size.

I have noted the Secretary of Defense's statement that immediate military requirements now exist for resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, particularly with respect to effects data to assure a continued capability for our offensive and defensive weapons systems. These requirements are particularly persuasive in the light of the major advances in weapons technology, including weapons effects information in the AICBM field, which I understand the Soviets made in their recent test series. If, as seems to be the case, atmospheric tests are necessary to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, then I believe we now have no satisfactory alternative but to proceed with our test series.

The atmospheric test program of about twenty-four shots proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission seems generally satisfactory and appears to conform to the criteria you have established.

While I believe our best approach in general would be an obviously sober and businesslike approach which would confine the tests to the fewest possible events in the shortest possible period of time in the least inhabited area of the Pacific, I believe there are political and psychological advantages in scheduling cratering or balloon shots in Nevada prior to the commencement of the main series. Specifically, this would permit the briefest possible time lag between your announcement and the first test in the series, and, although it would lengthen the period of tests, it would serve to alleviate criticism that the United States is callous about the safety of inhabitants of the Pacific area but does not use its own territory for tests.

In sum, the reasons for resuming testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere appear to me to be more compelling than the reasons for

refraining. My recommendation, therefore, is that you decide to order such atmospheric nuclear weapons tests as you may deem militarily necessary along the lines of the program proposed for the period March-July 1962.

I should like to emphasize the importance of preparing our allies and friends in other parts of the world to assist us in facing up to the criticism which a test series will produce. Diplomatic consultations, including those at the United Nations in New York, will be an essential element in this process. I recommend that we provide our ambassadors in selected countries and at the United Nations with a summary of the reasons which you will advance in your statement of a decision to test, and authorize them to communicate it to the governments to which they are accredited and to the U.N. Secretary General preferably twenty-four hours in advance of its release here. We have developed, and are coordinating with your staff, arrangements for carrying out such diplomatic consultations, including a contingency plan involving a possible initiative with respect to the Security Council. In addition, of course, we will presumably need to take in advance of this some more formal step to consult with the British.

We plan to use the United Nations to bulwark a decision, if taken, to resume atmospheric testing. We would hope for Ambassador Stevenson on the day following the announcement to circulate to the United Nations a document for the information of the entire membership explaining fully our rationale for testing in the atmosphere. At the same time Ambassador Stevenson might hold a press conference which would give him an opportunity to play a full public role in support of your decision. In Washington the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense would play similar roles.

In addition, we have developed plans to take this question to the Security Council in the event it appears likely that the USSR or a third power will seek to convene a special session of the General Assembly. If there is no such move, we would prefer to avoid formal United Nations actions since we will be confronted with difficult proposals calling for an uninspected ban on atmospheric tests. Moreover, the USSR can be expected to use the United Nations in order to build up the pressure for a summit meeting. If the indications are that a special General Assembly is likely, we believe there is relative political advantage for the United States to preempt the

situation and convene the Security Council to consider this matter. The Security Council is a much more manageable organ than is the Assembly. In the Security Council our objective would be to remand this question to the Geneva conferees.

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the United States Information Agency concur in the views expressed above.

Dean Rusk¹

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Secret. Attached to a February 21 memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy stating that the memorandum had been approved at a meeting in the Secretary's office on February 20.

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

132. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State

(Ball)[Source](#)

Washington, February 22, 1962, 10:35 a.m.

The President said the matter which he thinks some people over there should think about and give their advice is the question of testing and disarmament conference. One alternative has been strongly recommended by Gaitskell;¹ another was the one we originally were going to follow—to have a meeting at the end of this month and announce that before the disarmament conference begins we were not going to get entwined with testing in April. Gaitskell feels that we will be charged with sabotage. He, of course, would like us to announce that we would give this one last chance on the presumption that the Soviets would not respond and we could test. The President does not particularly want to announce, but make one more effort because he thinks it places us in a weak position. He does not think there is a question as to whether we should make our announcement the end of February or the first of March and take the risk of saying we are sabotaging or whether we should just say nothing—let the ship sail—and then about April 10th announce that it seems to be inevident the Soviets are going to agree to anything. Then go ahead with speed for the choice is—do we make it the first of March or some time the end of next week, recognizing when the conference begins. Or do we wait until the last minute and then say that the conference has not produced any indication we are going to get any place and that we are going to test. We have to begin to decide which of these two.

Ball said Secretary Rusk had talked at some length with Gaitskell about this problem.² One of the possibilities that we put forward was to say that by such and such we are going to make up our minds, but we really want to see if there is any evidence of serious intention. The President said that this was the course he thought Gaitskell wanted us to do. In addition he thought it laid us open to a lot of “Oh, my God, we're not going to start that!” sort of thing. Ball agreed saying it was like giving an ultimatum. He thought that

the Secretary's own inclination as well as his own was probably to feel that we ought to go ahead as the President had suggested—around the 10th of April, or something like that—after we see that there was enough evidence one way or another to indicate whether there was any serious intention here. That is, without saying anything. But not to make it, in other words, the first of March. Ball would like to have another look at it, after the Secretary calls around 11.³ The President said this should be decided next week. Ball agreed.⁴

* Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.

¹ No memorandum of the President's conversation held February 19 with Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party, has been found, but a briefing memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy with two attachments, dated February 19, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. See the Supplement. A February 20 letter from Gaitskell to Kennedy, urging Kennedy not to announce resumption of testing before the commencement of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1962.

² Memoranda by Alf E. Bergesen of BNA of Rusk's conversations with Gaitskell on February 19 and 24 are *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

³ The memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Rusk at 11:50 a.m. reports Ball as saying that the President wanted "to get some thoughts as to three possibilities: The announcement next week, or about the 10th of April, or try to adapt." The conversation was inconclusive on this point. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament)

⁴ In a memorandum for the record of the White House staff meeting held February 23, Legere reported Bundy as saying that Kennedy would "make his decision on the resumption of nuclear testing presumably at the NSC meeting Tuesday [February 27]" and would later that week make a speech in which he would "announce his decision." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

133. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, February 22, 1962.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary

Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires

Oleg Sokolov, Employee, Soviet Embassy

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

Mr. Smirnovsky called under instructions to deliver the text of a letter from Chairman Khrushchev to the President.¹ The letter was in reply to the President's letter of February 14 on the subject of disarmament and the forthcoming meeting of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva.² Mr. Smirnovsky noted that Khrushchev in his letter expresses disappointment with the negative attitude of the President toward the proposal that the 18-nation meeting be opened by Heads of State.³ The letter, Mr. Smirnovsky said, argues for the Soviet proposal and explains why the USSR cannot agree with the President's arguments in support of the U.S. proposal. The letter deals, he said, with the control problem and the nuclear test question. In conclusion the letter expresses a strong belief that the Geneva meeting should be opened by Heads of Government and expresses the hope that the President has not yet said his final word on the subject. Mr. Smirnovsky said a similar message was being sent to Prime Minister Macmillan and that the text of the letter to the President would be published.

The Acting Secretary said that the President would give full consideration to Mr. Khrushchev's letter.⁴

^{*} ¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in U on February 23.

¹ Apparent reference to a letter dated February 21; for text, see [vol. VI, Document 36](#), or *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 49-57.

² In his letter, Kennedy maintained that attendance by the Heads of Government at the forthcoming Geneva Conference might be useful, but not until progress had been made on substantive disarmament issues. For text, see [vol. VI, Document 32](#), or *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 36-38.

³ Khrushchev made this proposal in a February 10 letter to Kennedy and Macmillan; for text, see [vol. VI, Document 31](#), or *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 32-36.

⁴ Kennedy's February 25 reply again argued against attendance by the Heads of Government at the beginning of the conference; for text, see [vol. VI, Document 37](#), or *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 61-63. Extensive documentation on the U.S. replies to the Soviet Union in these exchanges, including consultation among the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (the "Western Five") at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 and *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 for January and February 1962.

134. Letter From the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, February 26, 1962.

DEAR DEAN: I think it may be useful to you if I send you the exact wording of the telegram I sent to the Foreign Secretary on February 21, recording my telephone conversation with the President on the previous day.

Yours ever **David**

Attachment

February 21, 1962.

The President telephoned me yesterday to say that he had planned to hold a meeting of the National Security Council at the end of this week in order to reach a final decision on atmospheric tests. An announcement would then have been made on March 1 with the idea of starting tests on April 1.

2. The President told me that on consideration he was not happy with this timetable and, after discussing various alternatives with me, he thought that it would be wiser to make no announcement at the present time other than confirmation that preparations were going ahead as rapidly as possible. In addition he thought that April 1 was too soon after the opening of the Disarmament Conference and that the West would inevitably be accused of not allowing sufficient time for the Soviet Union to show whether their participation in the Conference was genuinely in good faith.
3. He therefore thought that the target date for the first atmospheric tests should now be postponed to April 15.
4. Finally, the President told me most emphatically that the one thing he was determined to avoid was to get tied down by language which specifically linked progress in the talks with a decision on testing. This would inevitably lead to tremendous pressures on the Administration and

he hoped very much that we would bear this consideration in mind in any statements we might make in Parliament or elsewhere.

^{*}
_ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.

135. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, February 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

Daily Staff Meeting, 26 February 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided.
2. The principal subject discussed bracketed the NSC meeting tomorrow on atmospheric testing and any follow-up announcement by the President which may derive from that meeting. As of last week, the feeling was that the President would probably be making a speech sometime this week which would tie together the announcement of the decision on testing with some depiction of the broad US approach to disarmament in anticipation of the Geneva Conference which begins on 14 March. However, it now appears that the President, in Bundy's judgment, will likely prove cool toward a quick and definitive announcement. Instead, he will probably take the line (I gather in response to questions rather than in a speech) that the testing preparations of the United States are being completed but that we are always open to acceptance by the Soviets of a truly significant system of international inspection. Bromley Smith demurred somewhat at this rather flabby approach, but Bundy shut him off somewhat sharply with a reminder that we must never foreclose our minds to possible Soviet agreement to our position.
3. In connection with the above exercise as envisioned last week, when it was thought that the President would surely be making a speech sometime this week, Mr. Adrian Fisher of Mr. Foster's disarmament organization, has prepared a paper which apparently was designed to state the broad US approach to disarmament.¹ According to Hansen, it doesn't conclude anything, but rather sketches four or five possible alternative approaches. I gather that there was an intention to submit the Fisher paper to the JCS for comment, but that Mr. McNaughton of ISA has said that the Chiefs would probably take at least a week, and probably more, to come up with any comments. I further gather that this will shunt out the Chiefs, despite the fact that a lot of the pressure, which was created because of the President's speech intentions this week, has

disappeared. I will be mentioning this right away, orally, to Colonel Ewell because I think that a discreet telephone call to the office of General Lemnitzer or Admiral Riley is indicated.

[Here follows discussion of counterinsurgency programs, the Panama Canal, and the strategic stockpile.]

LJL

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Legere. These memoranda for the record were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.

¹ Reference may be to an ACDA paper, "U.S. Position at the Forthcoming 18-Nation Disarmament Conference," dated February 24. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, NATO-NSC Mtg)

136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, February 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

The National Security Council Meeting on Testing

So far there has been no publicity about this meeting, but you will undoubtedly want to repeat your warning against any discussion of the meeting itself or its subject. Equally, you will want to reserve any final decision in the meeting itself.

There are two main items of business:

- A. To test or not to test
- B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series.

A. To test or not to test

The documentation which has been circulated on this point has been unusually comprehensive. It includes a memorandum from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,¹ and a summary of the basic briefing on the positions of the U.S./U.S.S.R. which was presented to you on February 22² (this is the one which you have been using with Gaitskell and Stevenson.)³

This documentation reaches the unanimous judgment that we should test. Since it has been available to all present for several days, you will not want to ask for repetitive speeches. My suggestion is that you may want to ask for questions and comment in the following order:

1. Intelligence on the Soviet position after the tests of 1961 (John McCone will respond if there is questioning).

2. The technological meaning of our test series (Glenn Seaborg will respond).
3. The Defense recommendations (McNamara and Lemnitzer).
4. Foreign policy recommendation (Dean Rusk will respond).

At this point I suggest that you may wish to ask the Vice President to comment (or, alternatively, you may want to hold him until the end). I have asked him to be ready, and indicated to him that we are eager to have as solid an expression of opinion as possible. The men who still may have reservations in this group are Stevenson and Wiesner, though Wiesner will limit his comment, if asked, to a statement that the technological balance of judgment is very even and that political considerations should govern.

Stevenson has asked to have a memorandum written for him by Harlan Cleveland,⁴ but I do not yet know what is in it.

I doubt if you want to go all the way around the room, but Wiesner will not speak until spoken to, so perhaps the decisive question is how you wish to handle Adlai. Douglas Dillon will not be present, but I have a short memorandum from him expressing his firm advice that you should go ahead.

When you have heard as much as you want on the basic question, I assume that you will reserve the final judgment and turn to the question of timing and tactics in the event of a decision to go ahead.

B. The timing and tactics of an announcement and of the test series

Here there are three serious problems:

1. Should your position be stated in a speech this week?
2. Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings on March 14?
3. Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15—or conceivably further?

1.

Should your position be stated in a speech this week?

The argument here is more evenly balanced than I have thought. Harold Macmillan has an ally in John McCone and, to some extent, in Douglas Dillon. The argument is that no decision should be stated until the very last moment before testing, in order to avoid very heavy propaganda pressures from good people in the English-speaking world and self-righteous neutrals everywhere.

It is also contended that an announcement this week will be just as bad for the Geneva conference as an announcement in early April.

On the other side, there is very strong feeling that we must not go to Geneva with this issue still apparently open. To complete our preparations for testing with no public explanation, and to test on one or two days' notice would, on this argument, be deeply resented and would appear to be a torpedo attack on the Geneva meeting. In this argument, it is much better to state our position straightforwardly this week and to stick to it calmly through whatever criticism we may get in the intervening period. The men who hold this view most strongly are Bill Foster, Jack McCloy, Ed Murrow, and your own staff.

2.

Should there be any atmospheric tests before the Disarmament Committee Meetings on March 14?

I think you have already pretty well decided against atmospheric tests before March 14, and I have alerted the principal Departments to this probability. If we could make a lot of tests quickly, the question might be more difficult, but the fact is that the only truly atmospheric test which is possible is a low-yield balloon shot of marginal importance which could not be set off now before March 8. This timing is so obviously unfortunate that no one is much in favor of it at present.

There is a minor technological question about an underground crater shot which will give off some radioactive gas (though less than the venting shot of last December).

I think this should be approved for next week, as a respectable underground noise with no significant atmospheric effect.

3.

Should we hold to the date of April 1st for the main series, or should it be moved back to April 15—or conceivably further?

The test program is now scheduled for an April 1st opening, but I am informed by Defense and AEC that there is no technological loss in a 2-week postponement, assuming that tests can continue 2 weeks longer at the other end. Indeed, Harold Brown believes that there would be a technological improvement if this additional time is allowed. Major General Starbird, the Task Force commander, has no objection.

The disadvantage of the postponement is simply that we have to wait that much longer for the other shoe to drop if you make an announcement this week. Macmillan much prefers April 15, and while the 6 weeks of open time is troublesome to USIA and some others, it is generally agreed that the United States Government can stand it, as long as the decision itself is firm and you yourself are willing to take it calmly.

My own summary judgment on these tactical points is that, once we have made a decision to test, our tactics should be as open, calm, reasonable and forthcoming as possible. I take this to mean a full explanation this week, an avoidance of tests before the Disarmament Committee meetings, and the delay of the test series itself to the middle of April. The decision to test will itself satisfy all the tough guys, and the rest of our tactics should be aimed at those who have hoped for a different decision.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Top Secret.

¹ The memoranda from the Secretaries of State and Defense are Documents 131 and 128, respectively. The memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Seaborg's memorandum, both February 16, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 497th NSC Meeting. The JCS memorandum (JCSM-127-62) is in the Supplement.

² Apparent reference to Keeny's summary mentioned in [Document 126](#).

³ Kennedy had lunch with Stevenson on February 22. There is no record of the conversation, but Legere reported Bundy as saying "in a rather horrified manner" at the White House daily staff meeting on February 23 that "Stevenson had proposed to the President the institution of a two year moratorium on testing." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

⁴ Not further identified.

137. Memorandum of the 497th Meeting of the National Security Council [Source](#)

Washington, February 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

The meeting of the National Security Council was convened on Tuesday, February 27, 1962, at 10 a.m., to discuss nuclear testing. Present at the meeting were those listed in the preliminary attendance list,¹ with the following exceptions: the Secretary of the Treasury and The Attorney General were absent, while Lt. Col. Burris, the Assistant to the Vice President, was present.

The meeting began with a brief report by the Director of Central Intelligence on recent reports of possible Soviet preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone reported that there were indications of aircraft movements parallel to some which had preceded the Soviet test series of 1961. He reported that while we might expect additional indicators before testing occurred in the northern testing grounds, we could not anticipate such additional warning in the event of renewed Soviet testing in the missile range. He reported that Khrushchev found himself in a flexible position, since his statements in recent months had carefully avoided commitments that might limit his freedom to test.

At the request of the President, the Secretary of State then summarized his recommendations on atmospheric testing. He believed that in the light of the progress which the Soviet Union had made in recent months, and in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union can test again whenever it is ready, common prudence now requires the United States to test. He recognized that atmospheric tests had some political disadvantages, especially in the short run. But he noted that the Soviet Union today did not seem to be suffering greatly from the public indignation which had greeted its tests last fall. Memory was short in these matters. The Secretary believed that we would not want a time to come when we were—or were thought to be—behind. We must not fall behind, but must rather rise to the expectations of those who wish us to succeed. The Secretary noted the spontaneous

enthusiasm which had broken out in other countries after the successful space flight of Colonel Glenn.

Turning to more specific questions, the Secretary indicated that in his belief, from a political point of view, the United States would be in a strong position if it could say that it was ready, still, to sign today the treaty which had been presented last April, for the prevention of nuclear tests.

The Secretary recognized that this position might be criticized from two sides. On the one hand, there were those who believed that it was important to try to be more liberal, in the face of the fact that the Soviets have rejected the existing proposal. Could we not do better? And could we not offer an arrangement more nearly compatible with Soviet views on inspection? Mr. Rusk believed that in April we had gone as far as we could—even to the edges of security—and to a point which might make Senatorial consent to ratification uncertain.

On the other hand, there were those who argued that the April treaty offered no safeguards against preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. Rusk was prepared to take the risk of this weakness, because if we could put inspection teams in, in accordance with the treaty of April, then we would create a great political weight against any Soviet decision to resume testing.

More broadly, the Secretary of State believed that Khrushchev might well be willing to accept some limitations upon his freedom to test in return for a limitation upon the costs and dangers of the expanding arms race. The Secretary then turned to the question of the timing of U.S. tests, in relation to the Geneva talks. He believed that it was important not to tie the tests tightly to “progress” of an indeterminate sort at Geneva. He believed that we should announce before the Geneva meeting that we do mean to conduct tests, though he also argued that we should not in fact begin the test series until after the meeting had begun in April. He recognized that others felt that we should in fact conduct a test or two before the Geneva meeting, but his own review of the tests proposed for this period convinced him that they did not amount to much and would not in fact do what their advocates desired.

Finally, the Secretary believed it extremely important that we should have strong and far-reaching proposals to put before the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The track ahead might be hard to see, and the future murky, but we must make a major effort.

The President asked how the Secretary of State would reconcile his statement that we must not link our tests to “progress” but that we should be prepared to sign an effective test ban treaty. The Secretary of State replied that we would undertake not to test only if there were a major change—as, for example, consent to an effective test ban treaty, or a major settlement in Berlin.

The President then asked the Secretary of Defense to comment. Mr. McNamara began by stating his agreement with the Secretary of State that we must neither fall behind nor appear to fall behind. From the military point of view there were 3 questions to which tests would contribute answers.

1. Should we modify our design for the penetration of enemy defenses by our strategic vehicles?
2. Should we modify our command and control system in order to increase its survivability against enemy attack?
3. Can we redesign the Nike-Zeus system for anti-missile defense to overcome its present weaknesses? The Secretary believed that the answer to the third question was probably negative, but he considered it highly important to obtain additional information on the point.

The President asked whether the Secretary of Defense would be willing to refrain from testing if we could obtain Soviet agreement to the April treaty. Mr. McNamara replied that he would indeed sign on to such a treaty. He believed that the United States would be more secure if there could be a complete and effective end to testing. The President put the same question to Mr. Harold Brown, and Mr. Brown also indicated that in his judgment, on both technical and political grounds, it would be to the advantage of the United States to accept such a treaty.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric indicated his agreement with the position of the Secretary of Defense, with the addition of his belief that the proposed tests

would be most important in indicating, in addition, the degree to which our 1200 missile sites were appropriately protected against attack.

General Lemnitzer, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the Chiefs strongly favor the resumption of tests. He particularly emphasized the importance of proof tests of complete weapons systems. He reported the agreement of the Chiefs that the tests listed are the most important at this time.

General Lemnitzer also reported that the Joint Chiefs could not approve a treaty such as the April proposal, from the military point of view.

In their judgment we do not now know the level of Soviet progress in full detail. The Soviets may have made a major breakthrough in the last series of their tests. The U.S. needs one series at least in order to feel confident that it has not been dangerously surpassed. Gen. Lemnitzer emphasized that these considerations were advanced from the strictly military point of view and indicated his recognition that there might be other reasons which might govern the decision. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs believed that there was too much at stake not to go ahead with the tests currently proposed. Without knowing all the provisions of the April treaty, General Lemnitzer nevertheless recorded his doubt that it would offer hard assurance that there would be no resumption of Soviet testing.

The President indicated his own doubt that these tests—the Soviet tests of 1961—sophisticated as they may have been—had given the Soviets a clear breakthrough. Then after some discussion with General Lemnitzer on the point, the President indicated that in his judgment this question did not have to be decided at the moment.

Mr. William Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, indicated his general agreement with the Secretary of State. In particular, he reported that in his judgment the treaty of April was a good document. It would allow us to break through the barrier of secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union, and would have great value from this point of view alone. Mr. Foster's one disagreement with the Secretary of State was that he hoped there might be an early test, promptly after an early announcement. He was in favor of the posture which Ambassador Dean had described as "test and

talk.” He believed that the tests available before the opening of the Geneva meeting did have some significance, and he thought that if we had not tested before March 14, we would come under considerable pressure from neutrals and others not to test at all.

Secretary Rusk indicated his own support for the notion of “test and talk,” while he could not accept the argument for an early test. In supporting the “test and talk” idea, the Secretary reminded the meeting that the United States and the Soviet Union had worked out the statement of agreed principles in the fall of 1961 while the Soviets were conducting their great series of atmospheric tests.

Chairman Seaborg reported that the Atomic Energy Commission recommended that they return to atmospheric testing. He found some trouble with the question of the starting date, but he agreed that the proposed early tests would not have great significance, since their yield was limited pretty much to what can be done underground. Still there would be some significant elements in any such tests.

The President, at this point, remarked that it would be a mistake in his view to have a first atmospheric test in the United States. Such a test would result in widespread press attention, including pictures of the mushroom cloud in the U.S. newspapers. The domestic reaction would more than offset the gains from being in a position to say that our first test was in the U.S., not abroad. The other arguments in favor of a U.S. test were not important.

The President then asked Ambassador Stevenson to comment. Mr. Stevenson remarked that while he did not like to disturb the wholesome unanimity of the meeting, he had misgivings. These were not because he doubted the gains made by the Soviet Union—which he was not competent to judge. He wondered whether the United States had weighed the political and moral elements of the problem. He saw the world scene as a contest for the non-aligned, non-Communist, non-nuclear nations, and he believed that if we could avoid testing, we might make major gains with these nations. He expressed his doubt about the concept of “nuclear superiority” which appeared frequently in the briefing papers. He believed that for the hope of eventual arms control, nuclear equality was a better concept. He hoped that the moral and political balance had been carefully weighed, and he believed

that if after such consideration there was a decision to test, there were a number of things which could be done. He proposed a package of proposals for a “Peace Offensive,” as follows: The President should present to Geneva a number of proposals including a modified test ban treaty, with emphasis on inspection for preparations and reduced emphasis on inspection of clandestine testing. The proposal should also include an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an agreement on the cut-off of nuclear production, an agreement on the sequestration of materials, an agreement to set aside certain numbers of delivery vehicles, an agreement which might limit the dangers of accident, miscalculation, and surprise, an agreement to prohibit the orbit of weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps other proposals.

Asking how it was possible to get an agreement to a test ban treaty, Ambassador Stevenson asked if we could not hold our hand on testing and simply threaten to resume if nothing serious were accomplished—but in the next sentence he indicated his belief that such a threat would not have any effect on the Soviet Union.

The President asked Ambassador Stevenson in what way he would adjust the treaty of April, and Ambassador Stevenson said in reply that he believed there should be less emphasis on the detection of underground testing and more on the detection of preparations. He interjected the thought that we are on the eve of a historic event—the opening of the Soviet society—and that we should conduct our affairs accordingly. He also remarked, however, that he did not assume for a moment that the Soviets would now accept an adequate test ban treaty.

The President asked Ambassador Stevenson directly whether he was against the resumption of testing. Ambassador Stevenson avoided a direct answer and asked again whether we have adequately weighed the moral and political elements of the problem. He thought there was no question but that we should prepare for tests, and certainly we should test if the Soviet Union tested again. And it was perfectly clear, also, that the Soviet Union had made significant gains. And if it were the judgment that these gains required a resumption of testing, Ambassador Stevenson would not disagree with the judgment. The Ambassador returned to the question whether nuclear

superiority was really desirable, and Secretary McNamara in reply indicated that his reasons for favoring a resumption of tests were more complex. It was not so much a belief in the necessity of American superiority as a determination to prevent Soviet superiority which seemed to him governing in this matter.

Returning to the prospects for disarmament, the Secretary of State emphasized his own belief that a chance does exist and that this chance must be worked for. Dr. Wiesner agreed, pointing out that each passing year makes disarmament more difficult.

The President then indicated his own judgment that we must be prepared to test and indeed to test, unless we can make significant progress. Turning to Mr. Foster he asked which elements of Ambassador Stevenson's peace offensive were a part of the current thinking of Mr. Foster's agency. Mr. Foster replied that many of these proposals were in the President's own speech of September 25, 1961, while most of the others were in the current plans of the Disarmament Agency.

The President then asked Ambassador Dean for his opinion. Mr. Dean replied that he would like to get something in the April treaty that would provide for an inspection of preparations. He believed that the Soviet government had never seriously negotiated after the April treaty was tabled, probably because of its own prior decision to turn toward the resumption of testing.

He believed that we would be met at Geneva by propaganda tactics, and at a very violent level, and he believed, in consequence, that we must follow our own line with calm determination. There followed a brief discussion of the tactics of debate in the United Nations between Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Dean, in which it was generally agreed that we might look forward to the possibility of a full propaganda exercise by the Soviet Union in June.

The President indicated that he saw some advantages in updating the April treaty, both in order to make it more responsive to the actual situation and in order to avoid any appearance of stale rigidity.

The Vice President was then asked by the President for his opinion: The Vice President's judgment was that we should proceed with tests with a minimum of delay. On the basis of the papers available to him, he concluded that there was an urgent necessity, and he shared the Secretary of State's conclusion that testing was necessary. He was in favor of an early decision and early tests. He believed we should test in Nevada and as quickly as possible. We might have superiority or we might not. But there had been a time when there had been no question on this point, and in the Vice President's judgment it was no longer right to hesitate. He would rather have nuclear superiority than a test ban treaty. He believed that American people look to America for leadership. He favored the resumption of tests as soon as possible. It was time to stand.

In response to a final question from the President, Director McCone indicated his belief that the importance of Soviet efforts in the anti-missile field had been too little recognized in the discussion thus far. He believed that these efforts were very great, and he noted that there was much opinion in the intelligence community to the effect that both Soviet capabilities and Soviet deployment were far advanced. There followed a complex discussion of the anti-missile problem among Chairman Seaborg, Dr. Wiesner, and Dr. Brown, the result of which was general agreement that the problem is a very difficult one, both to attack and to estimate.

Director Murrow, responding to a question from the President, indicated his belief that if a decision to test should be made, there should be very little delay in actual testing. He believed that delay would look like indecision, and while he believed that our resumption of tests had been considerably discounted by public opinion throughout the world, he would like as short an interval as possible for such opinion to exert itself between a decision to test and the tests themselves. On the other hand, he could see the importance of an announcement of the American position before the Geneva meeting, and he recognized the physical facts which made significant testing in the immediate future difficult.

The President noted that this was the dilemma with which the meeting was faced, and after brief and inconclusive further discussion, he adjourned the meeting by expressing his thanks for all their participation.^{[2](#)}

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. A complete list of the 22 attendees is *ibid.*, President's Appointment Book. Other accounts of the meeting are in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 3, pp. 225-227, and in a memorandum for the files by McCone in Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/61.

¹ Not found.

² NSC Action No. 2448 states in part that, at this meeting, the Council: "Noted that the President would shortly reach a decision with respect to the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1962)

138. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister

Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, February 27, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Since I last talked with David Ormsby Gore,¹ I have had a most careful review of the testing problem with my senior advisers, and I should now inform you that they have unanimously recommended to me that the United States should resume tests in the atmosphere, starting about April 15. I myself believe that their advice is correct, and that once this decision is definitely taken, it should be promptly announced to the American people, and not allowed to dribble out in gossip and rumor. Our present plan is that I should announce such a decision in a television address to the American people on Thursday evening, the first of March. But before this decision becomes final, I wish to take this further opportunity of consultation with you, and I am sending you this letter in the hope that we may talk it over tomorrow, if you wish.

The military reasons which are leading me to this decision are, I think, familiar to you and to your advisers. The essence of it is that I do not believe we can accept a further moratorium on atmospheric testing while the Soviet Union remains free to move onward from what it learned last fall and test again and again. My central concern is not with the size of any particular weapon—the Western stockpile is large enough, in all conscience, from that point of view. The problem is rather one of assuring the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent against possible surprises in missile or anti-missile technology in future years. Until we can get a reasonably safeguarded agreement, of the sort which you and we have worked for in recent years, I feel that I have no alternative.

There remain a number of tactical questions on which I hope we may not be too far apart. You will see that I have somewhat changed my thinking since I talked to David Ormsby Gore a week ago. It now seems plain to me that I should not allow the Disarmament Committee to begin its work under the illusion that the United States is not yet settled in its own mind about the need for testing. I believe that a sudden announcement of a quick decision

to resume, sometime in early April, would be seen as more of a blow to the work of the Disarmament Committee than a careful and moderate explanation of our position ahead of time. The honest way is to put the matter plainly now.

I would, however, intend to make it clear in any speech that the United States is still ready to sign and put into effect a properly safeguarded treaty which would protect the world from nuclear testing. I would like to be able to say that Great Britain joined in this position. I would also plan to say that if any such agreement could be signed in the next six weeks, there would be no American atmospheric testing.

The test series which we now propose is essentially the same as that which has been discussed at length between your experts and ours. I am giving David Ormsby Gore a short memorandum which contains a precise description of the current proposals.² The one notable addition is a pair of what are called “systems tests.” These are designed to show whether all of the components of our basic Polaris and Atlas missiles work together as well as the individual parts have done in separate testing. If we had not reached a decision to test on other grounds, these two, in my judgment, could be omitted. But once the general decision is made, I believe it would be wise to accept the strong and unanimous military advice that such tests would be necessary to give our commanders proper confidence in our basic strategic deterrent systems.

I shall be at my desk all day tomorrow, Wednesday, and would hope to be able to talk with you about this whole subject at any time that you wish.³

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,⁴

² * Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret. Attached to a note from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk, stating that the original had been delivered to Ormsby Gore.

¹ This meeting or conversation has not been identified. Kennedy was in Florida from the evening of February 22 until the morning of February 26. On February 24, Ormsby Gore gave Rusk and Bundy text of a message from Macmillan suggesting that Kennedy resolve the question of a meeting of Heads of Government by inviting Khrushchev to come to Washington at the end of April. If no progress were made, then “our tests could still be carried out with no real disadvantage, by announcing the dates immediately after the meeting. This plan would really trump his card. It would be difficult for him to resist.” (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement. No documentation on U.S. reaction to this proposal has been found.

² Not found.

³ In his February 28 reply, Macmillan thanked Kennedy for his “message about nuclear testing. It is of course very short notice and as you frankly say represents a change in plan.” Macmillan indicated that the systems tests were not along previously discussed lines, “but I agree with you on this, that in for a penny in for a pound.” Macmillan asked, in order to aid in explaining the decision, that Kennedy delay his speech by a day or two, that the date of testing be postponed until May 3, and that Kennedy insert in his speech language stating that the United States and the United Kingdom would present proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty to the Geneva Conference. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) See the Supplement.

⁴ Printed from an unsigned copy.

139. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, February 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

Issues on Disarmament

1.

At the Geneva meeting, which begins in two weeks, we are committed to try to make progress on all three levels of disarmament: a plan for general and complete disarmament; first steps in putting this plan into effect; and concrete measures not necessarily connected with the GCD plan. You have made these commitments in your recent exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev.

The Conference will present a challenge to us at three levels: making some real progress in getting disarmament agreement in the not too likely event that the Soviets are interested in so doing; conducting the discussion in such a way as to educate the participants to the realities and complexities of the problems of disarmament, whether or not we achieve useful agreements at this time; and seeking a victory in what will undoubtedly be a propaganda contest with the Soviet Union.

2. There is as yet little agreement within the government on many of the problems involved either in choosing a plan for GCD to present to the Conference, or in deciding what concrete independent measures we should offer. Accordingly, there will be many issues which you must decide in the next week or ten days. They fall into two classes: those related to plans for GCD and first steps thereunder, and those related to concrete measures of disarmament not necessarily part of GCD.
3. At present we have a broad U.S. statement of principles on GCD (25 September Statement of Principles to the UNGA) and three attempts of varying degrees of completeness to embody these principles in plans.

These are the ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; the White House Staff revision of ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; and the proposals of the ACDA Memorandum of February 24.¹ None of these has been finally selected by ACDA or cleared within the government. The major features of the three principal plans are sketched below:

4.

ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD in a series of stages that deal first with the strategic delivery vehicles of the NATO-Warsaw Pact countries and would subsequently be broadened to cover all armaments in all countries. Specifically, the first stage of the plan would reduce strategic delivery vehicles of all types of the NATO and Warsaw Pact states to parity at 1,000 vehicles for each side. Within this limit, continued production would be permitted. In the second stage, Communist China and other allies of the NATO-Warsaw Pact states would be included, and all arms would be reduced to a parity at defined levels, with a parity of 500 for strategic vehicles. Subsequent stages would apply to all countries and all arms. Inspectors would be stationed at declared production facilities, and all destruction would be verified. Inspection against undeclared activities would be based on progressive opening of zones which would result in the progressive opening up of all countries as disarmament progressed. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the third stage.

The White House Staff revision of ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD through stages that deal from the outset with all major armaments. Initially it would apply to the NATO and Warsaw Pact States, and would subsequently be broadened to include all countries. Specifically, the first stage proposes to reduce all major armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Pact States by 30% for each individual type of weapon. From the outset there would be a complete production cutoff. In the second stage, the armaments of all countries, including Communist China, would be reduced to 40% of initially declared levels. Subsequent stages would reduce armaments by stages to final agreed levels. Inspectors would be located at declared facilities and destruction would be verified. To inspect against undeclared facilities complete access would be obtained

progressively to zones so that access would be obtained progressively in direct proportion to the amount of disarmament achieved. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the second stage.

The ACDA memorandum of February 24 does not contain a complete plan. The alternatives it examines deal only with the first stage of a GCD plan. The apparently preferred alternative calls for a 30 percent reduction of strategic delivery capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The paper discusses, without recommendation, whether the 30 percent reduction should be measured in terms of individual types of equipment, categories of equipment, or delivery capacity measured in megatons. The paper also discusses, without recommendation, whether or not a production cutoff should be included in the first stage. Later stages are not discussed in detail in this proposal, although presumably the agreement would be broadened to cover all armaments and all countries in a second or subsequent stage. Inspection methods are not discussed, even in broad, conceptual terms.

5. In choosing among plans there are five major issues to be considered:
 - a. *Specificity of the plan.* Do we discuss only the first stage, plus a general discussion of goals? Do we discuss the first and second stages, with a more detailed discussion of goals and some discussion of transition procedures from stage to stage? How much attention is given in the plan to the development of international peace-keeping machinery and its relation to the stages? The February 24 ACDA memorandum really discusses only the first stage. The two earlier documents are complete plans which go through all stages with more or less equal detail. Perhaps a middle position would be more satisfactory; namely, a fairly detailed discussion of the first two stages, plus some indications of how the processes might run further and the character of the ultimate goals.
 - b. *Linkage.* What should the relation be between reductions in strategic striking forces and reductions in conventional forces, and, in particular, reductions in personnel strength? Neither the first ACDA plan nor the latest memorandum provides for linkage at the outset. The revised ACDA plan does. The arguments involved are complex. On the one hand the present balance of forces is in our favor in nuclear striking

power; in the Soviets' favor in conventional forces. This argues for parallel reduction in both. On the other side is the argument presented in ACDA's memorandum that we should not reduce conventional strength until we get the Chinese Communists into the agreement, and that this must be left for the second or even a later stage. This argument applies with particular force to personnel strength, but it also reaches naval and tactical air strength. Linkage avoids the difficult problem of defining "strategic" and "tactical" weapons.

- c. *Production cutoffs*. Do we forbid new production, as well as reduce existing stocks? In essence, this is a problem of whether we limit numbers but continue to have an armaments race in the various quality dimensions of armament, or try to eliminate the race altogether. A related question is whether we define reduction in terms of individual types of weapons, or broader or narrower categories such as strategic delivery vehicles, or missiles with ranges of 6,000 km or more. A combination of reductions defined in terms of types and a production cutoff result in limiting competition in all dimensions of weaponry. Reductions defined in terms of categories, delimited in various ways, without production cutoffs, represent an attempt to allow quality competition to go on within limits.
- d. *Inspection and its relation to staging*. A major part of the negotiability of any proposal will depend on the inspection procedures contemplated. An important general question is whether or not we wish to decide on an inspection plan now or leave the whole matter open for the conference. Both of the earlier ACDA plans rest on the notion of zonal inspection in which each side selects for inspection one of a number of previously agreed zones in the territory of the others. The memorandum of February 24 proposes no specific inspection procedure. Zonal inspection appears to be the most promising attempt yet made to meet the Soviet opposition to inspection without disarmament. It is clearly easier to operate this form of inspection if all armaments are included from the first stage. Otherwise the question of what facilities within a zone should or should not be open for inspection arises, and again the question of inspection without disarmament appears.
- e. *Proportionality vs. parity*. There is the question of whether reductions should be by equal proportions or should have a goal of parity. This

issue is really one of staging. The ultimate goal might be parity or some other agreed set of force levels, but movement toward it could be by equal proportional reductions in early stages, adjusting in later stages to achieve the agreed goal.

6.

The proposed concrete measures of disarmament which are effective independently of a plan for general and complete disarmament fall into three classes: those concerned with nuclear weapons, more general measures which purport to reduce the danger of surprise attack and proposals for establishing expert study groups. The important measures of the first class are a cutoff of the production of fissionable material for military use combined with a transfer from stockpiles to peaceful uses and a nuclear test ban. The combination of the first two of these measures would provide a substantial measure of arms control. The problems inherent in them are well known. In respect to the nuclear test ban, the most important question is what controls additional to those proposed in the Geneva treaty would be needed to deal with the danger of secret preparation for testing in violation of the treaty. In connection with the production cutoff and transfer from military stockpiles to peaceful uses, the problem arises as to whether the offer of 40,000 kg per year, suggested in the ACDA memorandum of February 24, is not too one-sided even as an initial position. The relative size of our stockpiles and production facilities suggest that a 2-for-1 offer on our part might be both more attractive and a better propaganda point.

The proposals for advance notification of major military movements, the establishment of observation posts at transfer station centers, and the exchange of military missions between NATO and Warsaw Pact raise little question except as to their effectiveness. The same cannot be said about a proposal to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. The distinctions between transfer and the present procedures under which we operate both our NATO stockpile and the bilateral arrangements with certain of our allies is so subtle that it is difficult to see how we could succeed in explaining it in the Geneva forum in the face of the obvious target it would present for Soviet polemics. It may be better to treat this as the ACDA memorandum proposes treating the

problem of an experts committee on biological and chemical warfare, something we respond to but take no initiative on.

CK

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Eighteen Nation 1/62-2/62. Secret.

¹ ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 72](#). The White House revision, dated January 30, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Regarding the February 24 ACDA paper, see [footnote 1](#), [Document 135](#).

140. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, March 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

Daily Staff Meeting, 1 March 1962

[Here follows discussion of Latin America and the timing of the President's announcement of the resumption of nuclear testing.]

c. *Disarmament*. There is increasing pressure to come up with something concrete on this. Kaysen allowed as how he had been working on it. Bundy told him to look at the April draft treaty¹ (which, incidentally, is not on disarmament but is on the nuclear test ban) to see whether it is sufficiently dramatic and forthcoming to get something out of it. The British think we can do better. Kaysen, Wiesner and Harold Brown will presumably sit down over the weekend and see if they can dream up some new ideas. Bundy cautioned Kaysen that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is responsible for coming up with the formal papers for Presidential review, and that the White House should help them rather than steal the action from them. However, he wanted it made clear that our proposals at Geneva should be more forthcoming. I inquired as to what the purpose of this afternoon's meeting of principals would be in this context.² Bundy said that it would cover a lot of related "junk." However, it could be used to indicate the direction of the President's thinking. (Major Smith tells me that Raskin, who has been doing Kaysen's leg work in this area, really hasn't studied the problem enough to know what he is talking about. To be more specific, neither Kaysen nor Raskin know what is in either the disarmament or the nuclear test ban proposals, and that they don't seem to realize that the Foster Plan³ is new to some extent. As an example of this, several of their so-called new proposals really go back in the direction of the original papers. Major Smith is going to try to diplomatically put across to Kaysen that there is some confusion as to the basic elements of all these plans which should be clarified before anyone starts trying to develop so-called new proposals.) [Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items.]

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. Bundy presided at the meeting.

¹ For text of the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty, tabled at the Geneva Conference on April 18, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 82-126.

² See [Document 141](#).

³ Reference presumably is to the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 72](#). A comparison of that plan with a White House disarmament plan is in a memorandum from William Y. Smith to General Maxwell D. Taylor, February 27. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron (2) T-134-69) William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, created an interagency Inspection Study Group in October 1961 “to define and evaluate the inspection and control implications of ACDA Plan 1, a comprehensive arms control program which had been developed by a panel earlier in the year.” (Preface to the July 1962 Report) In addition to Foster, who chaired the Inspection Study Group, other members were Bruno W. Augenstein (DOD), Lloyd K. Belt (ACDA), Eugene C. Fubini (DOD), Larry Holmes (ACDA), George M. Kavanagh (AEC), Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. (White House), Louis Marengo (CIA), Herbert Scoville (CIA), Stanley Van Voorhis (DOD), and Captain Frederick Welden (DOD). The report of the Inspection Study Group, July 1962, is printed as [Document 207](#).

141. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, March 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List [1](#)

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to outline the problem before the Committee. Mr. Foster referred to his memorandum of February 28 to members of the Committee [2](#) which detailed the problems for consideration and which centered on the necessity to know where we are going as we attempt to become more precise in the forthcoming negotiations regarding the September 25 Plan, [3](#) particularly the first Stage. ACDA has attempted to focus on the possibilities of reducing the power to destroy while preserving the power to deter. Mr. Foster recalled that ACDA Plan #1 [4](#) emphasized the exploration of the possibilities of reduction on a parity basis of strategic delivery vehicles which were at the heart of the modern nuclear threat. The February 28th memorandum suggests five alternative bases for effecting reduction in strategic delivery vehicles and also other armaments. He noted that these alternatives had been discussed with the Defense Department. [5](#) He would now like to get the views of the Committee on which alternative it might be most useful to pursue in further detail and which might serve as the basis for meaningful bilateral agreement with the Soviets which would avoid the necessity of including China at the early stage. The second major item for consideration was what particular methods of verification and control warranted more exploration. He referred specifically to the ACDA work on zonal inspection and sampling techniques.

At Mr. Foster's request, Admiral Parker presented a series of charts [6](#) illustrating in specific terms the impact on the US and USSR's strategic delivery vehicles of each of the five approaches, i.e. reduction by types, reduction by categories, reduction by total number of vehicles, reduction by

total megatonnage capacity within categories and reduction by total megatonnage delivery capacity.

Secretary McNamara expressed the wish to go back to the more general considerations after viewing the charts presented.

The Secretary inquired whether we have at hand the practical inspection techniques to verify the kind of reductions proposed. Mr. Foster said that we have good capabilities, even unilaterally, to check on aircraft. If we had as well sampling and ground control posts, the capabilities would be excellent. We do not have the same feeling of confidence with regard to inspection of reductions in the missile areas. He noted that there was an inter-departmental committee studying this problem⁷ which is reaching the conclusion that, with specified improvements, a high degree of confidence might be achieved. Dr. Wiesner noted that in the first phase there was little need for any inspection beyond verification of destruction. As the disarmament process got deeper, verification of destruction alone would not suffice. The Secretary said the broad question is whether we move toward proposals involving proportionate reductions or toward parity in reductions. Secretary McNamara said an additional basic question was whether our initial proposals should apply to conventional and nuclear armaments across the board or should be limited to reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles alone. The Department of Defense would not support either limitations related only to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or reductions on a parity basis in the initial stages. If the parity concept is to be applied, Defense would like strategic nuclear reductions tied in with conventional reductions. Therefore, he would like serious attention to be given to proposing reductions, by categories, of all important weapons—both conventional and strategic nuclear. However, he would be willing to consider as a substitute for the proposed reduction of all classes, reduction of certain classes of strategic nuclear vehicles on a proportional basis. Until some of these basic considerations had been decided, he felt it would be unproductive to discuss the details of the five possible approaches outlined in the February 28th memorandum. He noted that the JCS has serious questions on a number of these points and he asked that General Lemnitzer be allowed to comment in due course.

Mr. Foster said that it was easy to speak of across the board reductions but he is much concerned by the sheer magnitude of the problem. That is why ACDA recommended the exploration of the degree of risk which might be involved, in a limited first stage, in dealing with strategic nuclear vehicles alone. Such a proposal would not only be more readily operable, it would be more negotiable. This would also allow us in the meantime to build up our conventional forces, where we are inferior. He noted that there were certain categories of strategic aircraft which would be phased out in any case in the not too distant future. Although there would inevitably be some risk in a first stage such as he was proposing, this may be worth doing because of its greater simplicity with respect to inspection. The numbers presented by Admiral Parker, in his view, indicated that there were some steps we could safely take in this direction even though they would have to be followed by conventional cuts.

The Secretary said he was interested to know whether we can begin to achieve steps in disarmament which are consistent with our security and that of our allies. From this point of view, he questioned whether the problem of administrative difficulty was really relevant. The major question was whether we impaired our security. Mr. Foster indicated his complete agreement with this observation. He was looking for the best of both worlds. In the judgment of many close students the approach that he proposed was a feasible one both from the administrative and security standpoint. This approach would not only result in saving a lot of money but have a significant effect on the possible destructiveness of war should it come.

The Secretary asked whether if we made the kind of reductions in the nuclear field of which Mr. Foster spoke we would have to build up our conventional forces. General Lemnitzer said that it was impossible to identify a precise point at which this would be the case. We were in a bad way at present regarding our conventional strength in Europe in any case. Mr. Foster agreed it was impossible to be precise. A 50% reduction in the nuclear field might indeed force us to build up our conventional armaments.

Secretary McNamara said that a proportionate reduction of 30% would probably not require more of a build-up in conventional forces than will be

required anyway. He noted that he was not certain the JCS would not take the same view.

Mr. Rostow inquired whether it would not be easier, if we opted for the sampling or zonal approach to inspection, to reduce on an across-the-board basis. It would be complicated and difficult to restrict the inspection to selected weapons. Mr. Foster said he was not sure this was the case since we intended to concentrate on the big items. Dr. Wiesner agreed that it would be much easier if everything were reduced, since there would be no basis then for excluding certain plants from inspection. He thought that in the first phase it would be possible in the case of all major armaments to rely on initial declarations and upon our own unilateral intelligence capabilities; inspection of declared levels would not be required. He was not sure that it was in our military interest to concentrate only on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

General Lemnitzer said that the JCS's view was that although the approach limited to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles might be simpler from the standpoint of counting, these should not be separated from other elements of disarmament. The JCS was also worried about omitting China. The JCS view was that nuclear reductions should be linked with conventional reductions. Further they feel it is important to move cautiously and slowly and to have a sure test of the inspection system at an early stage. Anything that limits the inspection process is "phony". If inspection is limited only to certain categories of weapons it is simpler to spoof.

The Secretary asked what the effect would be on total U.S. security if we were to propose a 30% reduction in all weapon categories across the board. Secretary McNamara observed that the answer to this could not be simple since disarmament cannot be viewed as only an alternative to the status quo—since that will not continue—but to what the situation would be in the future if disarmament did not take place. Without disarmament, the Soviets will continue to close the nuclear gap. This is why he would be willing to support disarmament action which in effect limits the increase in nuclear armaments on both sides. He felt that a 30% reduction would leave us in a stronger position than we would be in if the present situation continues. Mr. Nitze stated that an across-the-board cut of 30% in all armaments would

freeze the inferiority of the United States in conventional armaments. He wondered how our allies would react to such a freeze in U.S. conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He noted it was highly unlikely that the allies would do what they might otherwise do to improve their conventional strength position if we adopted a program such as Mr. Foster was referring to. Mr. Foster felt that the need for improving our conventional position was another sound reason for sticking to a first stage which was limited to nuclear vehicles, although the ultimate objective is to deal with all categories of weapons. The major expected Soviet increases would be in this field; the approach he was suggesting would check this increase. Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the possibility of a stand-off with the Soviet Union; namely that the U.S. would reduce proportionately more in the strategic field than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets in turn would reduce proportionately more than the U.S. in the conventional field.

The Secretary inquired how we would establish the basis from which the reductions would begin. Mr. Foster said that we were taking a January 1, 1964 target date for a basis. We would begin on the basis of declarations of strength by either side. As the inspection capabilities increased in the early periods we would improve our possibilities of spotting any cheating in declarations. He felt that not much risk was involved in such an approach. Mr. Amory noted that the quality of our information varies drastically from one category of weapons to another. We could catch any arrant cheating in the declarations in many of the categories right at the beginning (he cited heavy bombers and tanks as an example). Mr. Foster said that we had not viewed verification of the starting level as a requirement. He described the zonal approach to inspection, which he said would probably offer the best opportunity of gradually closing in on the problem while avoiding taking a politically untenable position. Dr. Wiesner said that our unilateral intelligence information was good enough to allow us to rely on initial declarations, particularly in view of the relatively modest size of the first cuts. The Secretary observed that it might be well to have some sort of challenge procedure in the event we suspected that the declarations were substantially incorrect.

With respect to the basic question, the Secretary stated that his view was that we should adopt the proportional rather than the parity concept. He felt

also that any significant nuclear cuts should be linked with cuts in the conventional area. Dr. Wiesner raised the problem of production cut-off, noting that the attractive feature of such a cut-off would be the degree it would ease the inspection problem. Secretary McNamara stated that any continuation of production would be within some formula related to the reduction. The Secretary asked for views on the five alternative approaches presented in the paper. Mr. Amory noted that the fifth alternative presented most incredible difficulties from the standpoint of inspection. He favored very much the use of categories. Secretary McNamara noted that Defense would object to approach #3, although it might be the easiest to carry out. Dr. Wiesner felt that approach #1 might be preferable. Secretary McNamara suggested that a combination of #1 and #5 might be examined. Either one could be modified in the direction of the other. He did feel, however, it was unproductive to discuss these details in this meeting and proposed that a sub-committee be established.

Mr. Bundy asked what the basis was of the 30% figure. He did not feel that this was an impressive figure over a three-year period, if the basis for reductions was total megatonnage capacity. Why not, for example, a 20% cut each year? The Secretary preferred the small number in view of our special geographic disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR. Mr. Rostow said that he was not worried about the propaganda drawbacks in the 10% a year proposal. It had a serious ring to it and would meet the world's appetite for some kind of a down-turn in the present situation. Mr. Foster said that 30% was quite substantial enough and would meet the pressures we were under for early specifics from our allies. Mr. Fisher noted that this general percentage fitted in with the 2.1 million force level in the first stage of the September 25th Plan.

Mr. Foster inquired whether it was the sense of the meeting that it would be best to work for an across-the-board cut of about 30% over a three year range. If this was the case, we could work out more of the specifics for presentation to the President on Tuesday.^{[8](#)}

Secretary McNamara said that he could accept this expression of consensus. While he preferred a reduction of all weapons he believed that it would be well to study as an alternative, the plan for proportionate reduction limited

to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. He proposed the establishment of a technical sub-committee to consider the five approaches and possible modifications thereof. Mr. Kaysen said that we could substantially improve our position by talking in a more forthcoming way about the follow-on second stage and making clear that we were thinking of a similar or even larger cut in this subsequent stage, assuming the first stage went well. Dr. Wiesner agreed.

Mr. Rostow asked how specific we could be with regard to inspection. Mr. Foster said that we would be in a position to discuss the zonal approach on an informal basis with the Soviets but that we would not be ready with all of the details required for a formal proposal. We could indicate our willingness to explore ways of ensuring that the “intrusion” was proportionate to the disarmament involved.

Secretary McNamara proposed that we agree to pursue three areas of study: (1) the specifics relating to a 30% proportionate reduction in all major weapons categories, conventional and nuclear; (2) a similar reduction limited to specified categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and (3) a sub-committee to study the five approaches and to develop any necessary modifications in them. He said that he considered that such reductions could be accomplished as between the U.S. and USSR, without involving China, although an escape clause of some kind would be necessary and we could not go beyond 30% without China. He said that the sub-committees studying the first and second problems should consider also the kind of formula which might govern cut-off of production in both cases. In answer to a question by Mr. McGhee, Secretary McNamara said that he would not propose exceptions be made in “defensive” weapons. If we were to reduce our ICBM’s he would want to insist that Russian SAM’s be reduced.

Mr. Kaysen said that we need specifics on the inspection problem as well, in view of the central place inspection has had in our disarmament position. He felt we should organize ourselves to present a decision-issue to the President on Tuesday on the zonal inspection approach. We should decide whether this approach is good enough to warrant discussion with the Soviets. Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended the zonal approach as a basis for further study within the United States Government. Mr. Marengo

reported on the work of the interagency inspection group which would meet again next Monday. Secretary McNamara said that he was not yet in a position to decide on the specific acceptability of the zonal approach although he could accept, in principle, the concept of inspection being proportionate to the disarmament accomplished. Mr. Kaysen said he had not wanted to imply that we should be pressed to decide on details such as the number of zones, etc.

With respect to transfer of fissionable material from past production, Mr. Amory said that since US-USSR stockpile ratios were on the order of five-to-one, we should be willing to offer to transfer material on at least a two-to-one basis with the Soviets. He suggested we offer to make an initial transfer of 100,000 kilograms to 50,000 from the Soviets. Secretary McNamara noted that the JCS has not yet accepted the idea of a transfer on a one-for-one basis, although he, himself, was quite prepared to accept this. General Lemnitzer said that all of the Chiefs were not yet ready to go along with a one-for-one transfer until they had seen the results of our next series of tests.

Dr. Wiesner said that he thought it was better to make no proposal than a one-for-one proposal since this would be so clearly non-negotiable and would not be taken seriously by the Soviets.^{[9](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-162. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on March 3. Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 3, and in a memorandum for the record by Kaysen, March 1, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda 2/62-4/62.

^{[1](#)} The attached list of 37 participants is not printed.

^{[2](#)} Not found.

^{[3](#)} For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, pp. 475-482.

^{[4](#)} ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 72](#).

^{[5](#)} The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a February 24 ACDA draft (see [footnote 1](#), [Document 135](#)) are contained in their memorandum to

McNamara, February 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)

⁶ Not found.

⁷ For the report of this committee, July 1962, see [Document 207](#).

⁸ March 6.

⁹ Seaborg's account of this March 1 meeting concluded: "There seemed to be general agreement that inspection to account for planes is quite feasible and that inspection to account for missiles is much more difficult, but probably not impossible. The consensus of the meeting seemed to be that the U.S. policy should be: (1) a proportionate reduction of all nuclear and conventional weapons and that this would include a cut-off of production of fissionable material; or alternatively (2) a proportionate reduction of any strategic nuclear capacity, including cut-off of production of fissionable material; and (3) a choice should be made between the five alternatives described in the memorandum of February 28th to effect 30% reductions, with a general feeling that a combination of alternatives (1) and (5) would be most desirable. It was decided that there would be committees to work on each of these three points and possibly a fourth committee to work on the general inspection problem and its sampling and zonal features."
(*Journal*, vol. 3, pp. 240-241)

142. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Hood) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, March 2, 1962.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The President and the Prime Minister have exchanged messages recently about the resumption of nuclear tests.

One of the points made in the Prime Minister's message of February 28¹ was that it would not be easy to open the Geneva Conference by tabling again the Draft Treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban of April 1961. The Prime Minister added that we have some other ideas which we wish to put to the United States Government. In his reply of March 1,² the President said that he agreed with the Prime Minister that we ought not to tie on tight to the Treaty of April 1961; he went on to say that he was instructing his experts to work at full steam with the British experts so that a really good offer on the nuclear test ban deal could be made at Geneva.

This point was discussed, I think, subsequently by the Ambassador and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.³ In addition, the Minister of State, who has been attending the recent disarmament talks, has talked about it to Mr. Arthur Dean, and gave him copies of a memorandum dated February 3 drawn up by Sir Michael Wright, which illustrates some of our ideas.⁴ Since then the Ambassador has prepared a further memorandum on this question, and I have been instructed by the Foreign Office to put this to you as representing some first thoughts so that your experts may take it also into account in developing your own ideas. I enclose two copies.

In view of the importance which both the Prime Minister and the President attach to the presentation of a modified proposal to the Russians at Geneva, I hope it will be possible now to work something out very soon.

I am sending a copy of this letter, with the Ambassador's memorandum, to Mr. McGeorge Bundy.

Yours ever

Hood

Enclosure

Washington, March 1, 1962.

Memorandum by the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore)

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The President has now indicated that he would like to present a modified test ban treaty when the Geneva conference meets on March 14. He would not want to add control provisions to guard against preparations for testing in this context.

I suggest that to meet the present requirements a modified treaty should be based on two criteria. First of all, it should look like an offer which world opinion would regard as reasonable and capable of acceptance by the Soviet Union if they had any serious intention of reaching an agreement. Secondly, it should be a treaty which, in the unlikely event of the Soviets agreeing to it, we and the United States could live with.

In the time available before March 14 I cannot see how we and the Americans could hope to work out a complete draft treaty based upon some new set of principles. In addition, it might be a bad precedent to abandon at this stage the experts' report of 1958 when we have gone on record with the view that the best method of proceeding in the disarmament field is to get the experts to solve the technical problems involved and then to translate their findings into a political agreement.

In these circumstances, what modification to the April 1961 treaty could we offer which would look like a genuine attempt to reach agreement with the Russians? One way I suggest would be to meet, so far as is possible, all the major Russian objections which they originally advanced against the United States-United Kingdom proposals of last April. The major points of difference between the two sides were really four: the length of the moratorium, the single administrator, the number of control posts and the quota of inspections. I do not think that at this stage it is worth bothering

about the minor differences on criteria for inspections, on the division of contributions to the budget, etc., as these make no impact on the public and could certainly be resolved if the major differences had been removed.

I therefore take the four major points of difference in order and suggest how we might alter the draft treaty in order to meet the Russian objections to the maximum extent.

Length of Moratorium

The best solution would be to do away with the moratorium altogether and make the treaty comprehensive from the date of signature. We were already prepared to accept a 3-year moratorium on underground testing so that the additional risk we might run applies only to the subsequent years, and my impression is that scientific opinion would now support the thesis that small clandestine underground tests, if they were possible, could not significantly alter the present balance of nuclear power. If however it is thought undesirable to drop the whole idea of a moratorium on underground tests for a fixed period, then we might accept the Russian proposal for a 5-year moratorium. Here again the additional risk of clandestine tests giving the Russians a significant military advantage seems to me to be acceptable. In this case, therefore, we would either meet or better Soviet demands.

A Single Administrator

Here we can obviously not accept the Soviet demand for a troika but we might put forward a proposal which precisely followed the arrangements that the Russians agreed to in respect of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations. These arrangements were accepted by the Russians as recently as last October and it would be distinctly awkward for them to oppose such arrangements without exposing themselves to the charge of inconsistency and even implied criticism of U Thant's impartiality which would go down very badly with all the neutral countries.

Number of Control Posts

We have proposed 19 for the U.S.S.R., and the latter have insisted on no more than 15. We were in fact prepared to go down to a figure of 17. It is of

course possible, by juggling the grid proposed by the experts, to increase or decrease the number of posts within the borders of the U.S.S.R. If such juggling can really produce a figure as low as 15, I think we should accept it. The effectiveness of the control system is not going to turn on whether there are 17 posts within the Soviet Union or 15 posts within and 2 just over the border outside. Here again, if we agree to 15 control posts we shall have met the Russian demands one hundred per cent.

Quota of Inspections

Here we are wide apart. We claim 20 inspections per year, the Russians offer 3. I suggest that we accept 3 veto-free inspections a year and then add some such proviso as the following:—

“Should the quota of veto-free inspections have been exhausted and a further seismic event take place on the territories of any party that meets the criteria for an unidentified event which might be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, then any party to the treaty may request a further inspection, such a request not to be unreasonably refused. The unreasonable refusal by any party of such requests shall constitute a breach of Article 2 of this treaty.”

This proposal would look to the general public very like an acceptance of the Russian offer of 3 inspections a year, since I doubt whether they would be very much concerned with the small print. On the other hand it could be shown that in practice this proposal would enable us to do all the inspections we wanted, even up to the figure of 20 per year. If the Russians refused our reasonable requests for inspections above the quota of 3, we could then withdraw from our obligations under the treaty. I think we in the U.K. have always felt that if the Russians signed such a treaty the chances are that they would probably abide by it; but if they did cheat, as I have indicated earlier, the carrying out of some small undetectable underground tests could hardly affect the nuclear balance in the world.

A variation of this proposal would be to suggest a quota of 5 veto-free inspections a year. This would still look like a very reasonable offer to the rest of the world.

To sum up, I think we should base ourselves upon the treaty into which we have put three years of work, but as regards the four most important points in our draft treaty to which the Soviet Union took exception last year, we should in two of the cases meet them one hundred per cent. In one case we would look as though we had met them one hundred per cent, and in the fourth case over the Administrator we would be making an offer which would seem reasonable to the vast majority of nations and which it would be difficult for the Russians to argue against. Such a treaty offer would have a very considerable impact on world opinion and in the unlikely event of the Russians agreeing to it, I believe it would be defensible on scientific grounds and would constitute a minimal risk to Western security.

(D. Ormsby Gore)⁵

^{*} Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62. Secret. Attached to the source text is a March 2 note from Battle (S/S) to Halla (ACDA) asking Halla to take “appropriate action” on the letter.

¹ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 138](#).

² President Kennedy’s reply to Macmillan, dated February 28, not March 1, was transmitted in telegram 4608 to London. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2862) See the Supplement.

³ No record of this discussion has been found.

⁴ This memorandum from Sir Michael Wright, British Alternate Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, has not been found.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

143. Editorial Note

On March 2, 1962, in preparation for his address to the nation on nuclear testing and disarmament, President Kennedy and senior administration officials briefed the bipartisan Congressional leadership. Glenn Seaborg summarized the briefing as follows:

“From 4 p.m. to 4:45 p.m. I attended a meeting the President called for the purpose of briefing the bipartisan leaders of Congress on his decision to resume atmospheric testing. Present were: the President, Senators Anderson, Mansfield, Russell, Pastore, Dirksen, Fulbright, Saltonstall and Hickenlooper; Congressmen Holifield, Price, McCormack, Van Zandt and Vinson; Secretary McNamara, John McCone, Harold Brown, Mac Bundy and I. The President described the general outline of the announcement that he intends to make on nationwide television tonight. Following this McCone gave a description, using charts, of the results of the Russian tests and their significance. Brown then made a brief statement regarding the four classes of tests in the U.S program: (1) effects, (2) advanced concepts, (3) verification, and (4) systems. I mentioned in particular the 2000 kilometer test to develop a capability for testing in outer space and also the role that Johnston Island and Christmas Island will play.

“The President said that Prime Minister Macmillan asked him to delay his announcement until today; the original plan had been to make the television announcement last night. The President said that the only dissenting message from a Head of State which should be taken seriously was from Japan. Countries like England, France, Switzerland, etc. have expressed approval. Senator Anderson said he feels the Soviet Union would accept our offer for a Treaty but in such a manner that prolonged negotiations would result; but the President assured him he meant it should be a signed Treaty before the deadline mentioned. The President said that we won't announce the number of tests, but merely give a general description of the types and total fallout. It was the unanimous reaction of the members of Congress present, voiced individually by such people as Vinson, McCormack, Mansfield, Dirksen and Hickenlooper, that the President has made the proper decision in the proper way.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 3, pages

243-244) From his office in the White House at 7 p.m. the same day, President Kennedy delivered a major radio and television address on nuclear testing and disarmament. The President reviewed the U.S. attempts to achieve “an effective world-wide end to nuclear tests,” which would check the nuclear arms race, and the Soviet Union’s breaking of the moratorium in September 1961, which had prompted his decisions to renew underground tests and to begin preparations for atmospheric tests. Following the National Security Council’s completion of its review of the Soviet tests, the President continued, he had authorized the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense earlier that day to conduct a series of atmospheric tests “beginning when our preparations are completed, in the latter part of April and to be concluded as quickly as possible (within two or three months)—such series, involving only those tests which cannot be held underground, to take place in the atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean.”

In his address, President Kennedy provided an extensive review of the recent Soviet test series and the U.S. security needs that required additional U.S. tests, including some aboveground tests. He also emphasized the determination of the U.S. negotiators to reach a comprehensive disarmament agreement at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on March 14. “And of greatest importance to our discussion tonight, we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty—with appropriate arrangements for detection and verification—to halt permanently the testing of all nuclear weapons, in every environment: in the air, in outer space, underground or under-water. New modifications will also be offered in the light of new experience.”

For full text of the President’s address, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, volume I, pages 66-75.

144. Editorial Note

On March 3, 1962, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a long message on disarmament, which in turn was a reply to Kennedy's February 25 message to him (see [footnote 4, Document 133](#)). For text of Khrushchev's March 3 message, see [volume VI, Document 38](#) , or *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume I, pages 75-81. On March 5, the President replied as follows: "I have received your message of March 3, and I am glad to know of your agreement that the meeting in Geneva on March 14 should be opened by Foreign Ministers. I am particularly glad that Mr. Gromyko will be able to join with Lord Home and Secretary Rusk before the meeting for preliminary discussions; our hope is that these conversations might begin on March 12. It will be the purpose of the representatives of the United States, headed by Secretary Rusk, to make every possible effort to find paths toward disarmament."

"Our object now must be to make real progress toward disarmament, and not to engage in sterile exchanges of propaganda. In that spirit, I shall not undertake at this time to comment on the many sentiments in your letter with which, as I am sure you know, the United States Government cannot agree. Let us, instead, join in giving our close personal support and direction to the work of our representatives, and let us join in working for their success."

This message, drafted by Vincent Baker (ACDA/IR) and cleared by Kohler, Foster, Spiers, Bundy, and Secretary Rusk, was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow, with instructions to deliver this reply to Khrushchev's March 3 letter. (Telegram 2037 to Moscow, March 5; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-562) The letter is also printed in [volume VI, Document 39](#) .

Secretary Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 for the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

145. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, March 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Wilkinson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Foster, ACDA/D
Ambassador Dean
Mr. Conger, ACDA/D
Mr. Goodby, ACDA/IR

Lord Hood came in at his request to give London's preliminary comments on possible modifications in the April 18, 1961, test ban treaty¹ as suggested by the United States in the paper which is attached. Lord Hood said that in general London was disappointed by the US paper, particularly since the Prime Minister and the President had taken the initiative to make a success of the Geneva conference. London felt that in the nuclear test ban field the United States and United Kingdom ought to go further to meet the Soviet position than they had hitherto done. In proposing modifications to the US-UK draft treaty, proposals of real substance should be put forward so long as basic principles of control were not sacrificed. The British felt that ideas of the kind advanced by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore ought to find their place in any proposal that we make.

Turning to the US paper Lord Hood said that the British welcomed Item No. 1 (reducing the threshold). The British hoped that we would be able to go all the way to a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Foster remarked that at this point the United States had not concluded its review of this particular idea but the more it was explored the less acceptable it seemed to be.

Continuing to refer to the US paper, Lord Hood commented that Item No. 2 (speeding up the inspection process and inspecting for preparations) seemed to be aimed at meeting the ideas the President had put out in a press conference concerning preparations.² Mr. Foster said that this was correct;

the problem of inspecting for preparations was admittedly a difficult one but the United States was working on it. Lord Hood said that items 2. A. and 2. C. (speeding up on-site inspection) seemed sensible to London although the Soviets would, of course, dislike these two proposals. London felt that neither of these proposals would be likely to get anywhere unless there were other elements which would appeal to the Soviet Union. Mr. Foster said that he was personally concerned by the thought that the United States should have to make further concessions to the Soviet position. Lord Hood replied that the passage of time might have certain consequences in the sense that there might be certain concessions we could make now which might not have been feasible earlier.

Turning to Item 3 (six months delay in being relieved of treaty obligations) the British felt that this proposal would not accomplish very much and they rather disliked the idea of putting it forward.

With respect to Item 4 (a nuclear “package” to include a test ban), London felt that it would be preferable to avoid linking the test ban to other disarmament measures. London preferred to keep this as a separate item. Amb. Dean stated that the United States was inclined to agree but that Tsarapkin had always talked about a test ban as involving no real disarmament. On the other hand, it would clearly take some time to negotiate a package of measures. Mr. Foster stated that in the context of the late April deadline for signing a test ban treaty there did not appear to be too much validity in presenting a package proposal for the Soviets to accept. Lord Hood agreed and pointed out that a test ban would, of course, be one element in a broader approach.

Lord Hood then inquired whether the United States had arrived at any views on ideas advanced by (see attachment B)³ the British. Mr. Goodby said that we had looked into the question of arrangements under which the UN Secretary General had been appointed and exercised his office and had been informed that the Soviets seemed to have more of their position already written into the test ban treaty than we could give them by offering this kind of a suggestion. In the first place, U Thant had been appointed with no prior understandings about deputies. After being appointed, he had stated that he would consult with the Soviet and US under secretaries. We

had already provided in our treaty that there would be two deputy administrators appointed from each of the two nuclear sides. Amb. Dean pointed out that offering the Soviet Union the proposal mentioned by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore might be considered a retreat. As a talking point it might have some value, however. On the question of the quota and the number of control posts, Mr. Foster stated that his personal belief was that the United States should not make concessions in these areas. In particular, Mr. Foster stated, the way the British proposal on quota was drafted looked as though the Wets might get four inspections annually but not 12 to 20. Concluding the discussion Lord Hood remarked that going to the comprehensive treaty seemed to be the most constructive thing which we could do. Mr. Foster replied that perhaps the threshold could be reduced but it would be difficult to make the treaty comprehensive from the outset.

Attachment A

Washington, March 3, 1962.

ACDA MEMORANDUM

We are now urgently studying several possible modifications in our position on the draft test ban treaty of April 18, 1961, as follows:

1. We are considering reiterating and possibly elaborating our proposals of last August 28 with respect to lowering the threshold.⁴ It may be possible to make the treaty a comprehensive one, to all intents and purposes, from the very beginning.
2. We are considering proposals for giving greater authority to the Preparatory Commission provided for in the April 18 treaty. For example, the Preparatory Commission could:
 - (a) Upon receipt of data indicating a suspicious event had occurred in the territory of an original party, make arrangements for verifying the nature of the event through an on-site inspection.
 - (b) Arrange for observers to visit known or declared nuclear test sites used by the original parties in order to check whether preparations for testing had reached an advanced stage.

- (c) Begin the construction of control posts in the territories of the original parties as soon as the treaty is signed. Arrangements worked out by the Preparatory Commission for performing the above functions could be carried over, as agreed, into the period between ratification of the treaty and the date upon which control posts begin to provide data.
3. We are considering proposing a new article to the treaty providing that no party to the treaty could be legally freed from its obligation not to test nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, on or under the oceans, and underground if such tests produce signals of 4.75 seismic magnitude or above, until six months after such party had given notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty. Under the present treaty it is legal to withdraw from the treaty one day and to test the next.
4. We are considering making an offer for a “nuclear disarmament” package, which would link a test ban to one or more disarmament measures, such as the cut-off of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. It would then be possible to merge the control systems required for the various measures. The control system for a nuclear test ban might then not be at all disproportionate to the measures proposed.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-662. Confidential.
Drafted by Goodby.

¹ See [footnote 1](#), [Document 140](#).

² Reference presumably is to the President’s concerns about any delay in the implementation of the provisions of a disarmament treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union, which he expressed at his press conference on February 7. See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, p. 31.

³ Attachment B is an extract from Ormsby Gore’s March 1 letter to Rusk attached to [Document 142](#). The extract, not printed here, comprises the five paragraphs outlining the four major points of difference between the U.S.-U.K. and Soviet positions on nuclear testing.

⁴ See [Document 57](#).

146. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, March 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Disarmament, Cabinet Room, March 6, 5:00-7:00 PM^{[1](#)}

PRESENT

The President; The Vice President, The Secretary of State and Messrs. Foster, Dean, Fisher, McGhee, Kohler and Farley of State Department; the Secretary of Defense, General Lemnitzer, and Messrs. Nitze and McNaughton of Defense Department; Mr. Amory, CIA; Chairman Seaborg, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Schlesinger, Mr. Keeny, Mr. Kaysen, White House

Secretary Rusk began the meeting by some comments on the problem of procedure at the Geneva meeting. He raised the possibility that it might be more desirable to seek a procedure which would avoid opening statements and would resolve the Conference into committees as quickly as possible. The President then indicated that he wanted first to consider the questions on the modifications that were desirable or necessary to the April test ban treaty. These changes had to be considered in the light of his speech, our relations with the UK, and the political acceptability of the treaty at home. Dr. Wiesner and Ambassador Dean indicated that there were possible desirable modifications on the time lapse before the international control system began to work and reporting began, and on the number of control posts. Dr. Wiesner raised the question of dropping the threshold and also of allocating the on-site inspection in different parts of the Soviet Union in proportion to the seismic activity. There was some discussion of both these points, and the President, in summing up at a later stage of the meeting, indicated that he thinks for the moment we should hold fast to the threshold as it now stands in the treaty, but that we should be willing, if the Soviets showed interest and serious discussion, to reconsider this point. As to the pro-rating matter, he indicated that this would be desirable as a point to examine, and if the ACDA and the technically competent people (AEC, Defense, Science Adviser) agreed on this question, this would be included. The proposal of keeping the UK in line with our position was discussed. The President indicated that he thinks it most important that we avoid a split, and if there is going to be a split, it would be better to come at the end

of the period rather than now. He asked Secretary Rusk to follow his point. Secretary Rusk commented that the British agreed with us on the April treaty as of now. In the course of the discussion, he indicated his own feeling was that our past experience argued for a tougher treaty rather than an easier one. Perhaps we should keep things that way. The President indicated the problem raised by his discussion of modifications. On the matter of monitoring of the preparations, Messrs. Foster, Wiesner and Seaborg indicated that it was difficult to get anything that was effective. Nonetheless, the President said we had to say something on this. He then asked Mr. Foster to come up by Thursday for a Thursday afternoon or Friday meeting² with agreed language on the treaty modifications, except that for the matter of preparations, it might be a discussion in memorandum form rather than treaty language.

In sum, it was agreed that we should get agreed language which can meet the needs on a shorter time interval between signing and effective operation of the control system and should say something about preparations and be prepared to speak on the number of control stations, the removal of the threshold and the proportionate distribution of inspections by zones of seismicity in the event that the Soviet Union showed interest in serious discussion. In his discussion of the test ban treaty, the President repeatedly indicated that he thought good preparation on this point was of the greatest importance.

The discussion then turned to the general disarmament question and the ACDA memorandum of March 3, 1962.³ At Mr. Foster's request, the President asked Admiral Parker and Captain Greelee to present a briefing on the impact of the various alternative plans on the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles on our and Soviet forces. After the briefing, the President remarked that he didn't see how it was possible to come to any conclusion about which of the methods presented, Option 1, pages 9-11 of the Foster memorandum was preferable from our point of view, or even which was safe. He thought it was a problem for electronic computers and that it couldn't possibly be solved in the time available. Dr. Wiesner argued the case for a 30% across-the-board cut of all armaments applied by types (Foster memorandum, Alternative 2, page 12) and a complete production cutoff. Mr. Foster indicated his objections to freezing types and cutting off

production of the R&D. Secretary McNamara said he thought this a highly complicated question which obviously required more study. The President raised the question of linkage: should we confine our attention to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or consider conventional armaments as well. Mr. Foster presented the following argument against linkage: the problem of China; the need for building up our own conventional strength; the impact of a reduction in our conventional strength on NATO; and the complications of trying to do everything at once. Secretary Rusk said that he felt that focussing on strategic delivery vehicles produced a pattern that was too complicated to make sense. The first staging of any proposal had to be thought out chiefly as a political probe and related to the cutting down of crises, such as Berlin, Viet-Nam, etc. This demanded something simple. His own judgment would be in favor of a 30% across-the-board reduction with inspection as a first stage and a production cutoff deferred until the second stage. The President raised the question of whether we were talking about categories or types. This was not immediately followed up in the discussion, but at a later point Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of distinguishing long-range vehicles from medium and short-range vehicles in any categorization scheme for a production cutoff. The President asked Secretary McNamara and Mr. Foster to explore this and come to an agreement before the next meeting on the subject, if possible, and that he should have a memorandum on the subject in advance of the meeting. There was some further discussion in which Mr. Foster indicated his preference for the proposal which focussed on strategic delivery vehicles, while Dr. Wiesner, General Lemnitzer, Secretary McNamara expressed their preferences for the 30% across-the-board proposal. Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer agreed that this served our security interests better than a reduction focussed entirely on strategic vehicles. The President indicated that he favored a 30% across-the-board cut with a production cutoff deferred to the second stage.

Mr. Foster raised the question of what should be said about a second stage. He indicated he thought it should provide for a continuation of the reduction in armaments at a rate like that of the first stage, plus a large buildup in international peace-keeping machinery and the adherence of other states to the treaty. The President then raised the question of inspection. Mr. Foster indicated that he thought it was well worth discussing

with the Soviet Union the proposal for zonal random sampling system. In addition, we had of course to bear in mind our own unilateral capabilities. He mentioned some proposed tests of our inspection capabilities in the U.S. The President asked whether we didn't need to have an inspection proposal concretely incorporated in our presentation, and Mr. Foster responded that the zonal random sampling system was the best. The President then summarized the discussion up to this point by saying that we needed by Thursday or Friday at the latest the modifications of the April treaty discussed above in as good shape as we could get them, and agreed with the UK, and a proposal for at least the first stage of a GCD plan with the 30% across-the-board reduction of all armament but with a production cutoff deferred until the second stage. Mr. Foster raised the question of the cutoff of fissionable material production with an offer of 40,000 kg transferred to peaceful uses. There was some discussion about whether this offer was big enough, in light of our estimates of our own and Soviet production and stockpile vehicles. The President indicated that he was perfectly willing to raise the offer to 60,000 kg as against 40,000 kg for the Soviet Union. General Lemnitzer pointed out that other members of the Joint Chiefs were against any transfer, but he himself was in favor of a transfer offer if it were in equal amounts. The President decided then that we should begin with an offer of equal amounts but be willing to bargain on this point. Secretary Rusk raised the tactical issue again. In the ordinary course of events, he would expect to make a speech at Geneva next Thursday or Friday (15th or 16th), but his own preference was to avoid speech-making by heads of delegations. Therefore he was not sure he would make one.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, 3-62. No classification marking. The source text, dated March 7, bears no drafting information.

¹ A summary of the decisions reached at this meeting are in General Maxwell D. Taylor's memorandum for the record, March 7. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-37-71) See the Supplement.

² For minutes of the meeting on Friday, March 9, see [Document 148](#).

³ Reference is to a 23-page memorandum, with 2 appendices totaling 9 pages, on the U.S. position at the forthcoming Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which Foster sent to the President on March 3. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Chron File, Jan-Mar 1962)

147. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, March 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

US

ACDA/D—Mr. Foster
ACDA/ST—Dr. Long
ACDA/IR—Mr. Spiers
Ambassador Dean

UK Embassy

Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Mr. Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary

Ambassador Ormsby Gore apologized for feeding in more “bright ideas” from the UK on the nuclear test issue and handed Mr. Foster the paper attached at Tab A.

After reading the document, Mr. Foster observed that there was one major new proposal, i.e., the dropping of international control posts in Soviet territory. He observed that this suggestion would not be acceptable to Congress and the American public. Ambassador Ormsby Gore inquired whether the fundamental U.S. position was to build on the present treaty and not to consider any substantial departures from it. Mr. Foster said this was the case, although it was possible that we would choose simply to stand on the present treaty without any changes.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that the U.K. feels strongly that after the statement of the President regarding the modifications which would be suggested at Geneva, it will be necessary to put forward a proposal which seems reasonable both to our own and to world public opinion. We need to offer the Soviets a “new choice.” The U.K. agreed that the controls incorporated in the offer must be scientifically adequate and offer a reasonable safeguard to national security. However, two elements in the over-all situation had changed since last April. First, there had been some

important technical advances that suggested there would be even further improvements. Dr. Long asked what the new U.K. evidence was.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he could not discuss the details until tomorrow, since his "brief" had not arrived. Continuing, he said that the second element was our assessment of the advantage to be gained by one side or the other from undetected underground tests. Such advantage was apparently much smaller than we had heretofore thought and this should change our approach to the importance of controls in this area. He noted that this was an argument used by the President in justifying atmospheric testing. Mr. Foster agreed that we would not be as frightened about underground testing as before, but such testing *was* useful, particularly in the area of small weapons. He said that the US had spent some \$50 million last year on Vela. Although areas had been uncovered which showed some promise of improvements, the actual progress was relatively small.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he understood that important advances had been made in depth of focus theory. He promised further details on this tomorrow. He noted, also, the success the UK had had with a 15-array seismic equipment system. He added that it would be difficult for the West to defend itself against a Soviet attack on the 19-kt threshold when it was well known that 5-kt shots had been picked up without difficulty.

Dr. Long noted that there was a wide spread of scientific opinion in the U.S. on these points. While some of these developments showed theoretical promise, it was hard for us not to rely on the assessments of the men in charge. Ambassador Ormsby Gore asked whether it was the U.S. position that it knows of no significant technical advances justifying major changes in the control system. Mr. Foster said this was correct. He said that we had been instructed by the President to come up with an internally agreed U.S. position by 5:00 today.¹ The President believes that the treaty as it exists today is essentially the proper basis on which to proceed. However, he believes we should explore possible modifications to take care of the problem of inspection for preparations and in order to speed up the on-site inspection process. The question of elimination of the threshold is still being debated. Some believe it should be unchanged and some feel that the proper course of action for the US is to drop it entirely. He did not believe there would be any major difficulty on the question of the number of control posts and it would be possible to consider a minor liberalization in

the number of inspections. Inspections might be weighted in seismic areas. He said that the President was extremely anxious that we reach an early understanding with the U.K. on how we would play our hand in Geneva. Dr. Long pointed out that the U.K. proposal seemed to ignore the problem of location. With the U.K. approach, the area subject to inspection would be huge. He felt that this was a most vulnerable point in the U.K. approach.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought that the West might be in a good position if it could move to a fully comprehensive treaty and make the modification he had suggested on the question of the Administrator. This would stand well with public opinion even though the Soviets would certainly not accept the proposal. The U.K. felt that sticking with the present treaty without change would not fulfill the promises made by the President and the Prime Minister to present modifications. He recalled that the President had said to him in response to a specific inquiry that the U.S. would not suggest any increase in the burden of inspection. Mr. Foster said that the President would be quite willing to consider elimination of the threshold if the majority of his advisers thought this was reasonable. Dr. Long said that, on balance, we were coming to the conclusion that it would be best not to change the inspection posts grid through relocation.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that he felt the single most important thing we could do is abolish the threshold. In addition, we could speed up the control post installation process, and make some provision for inspection of known test areas. Dr. Long felt that it might make some sense to abolish the threshold, since this would give us the possibility of on-site inspection of seismic events below the 4.75 level. Since the moratorium on sub-threshold tests is presently part of our position, we would not necessarily be giving up anything by moving to a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Foster agreed, but reiterated that his personal feeling was that the U.K. suggestion in Point 3 would be unacceptable, although he would, of course, put the matter up to the President.

Tab A

Washington, March 8, 1962.

Memorandum by the British Embassy

NUCLEAR TESTS TREATY

Our latest scientific advice is that national systems do or can provide a reasonable degree of assurance of detection of all atmospheric tests of a yield that matters, and of underground shots above an insignificant level: and that the types of shots unlikely to be detected are unlikely to affect in any serious way the balance of nuclear power.

2. At the same time, it is only reasonable that there should be some form of international system of verification to give the world some positive check on the findings of national systems and to provide a negative check if one party accused another of carrying out a test and the accused party denied the charge. This minimum international system would have at the least to comprise machinery for organising sampling flights by aircraft, for studying evidence submitted by nations and for sending inspection teams. With regard to negative checks at the request of the accused party, there would be no problem over the number of inspections. For positive checking the organisation ought to be allowed at least a quota of inspections at its request, refusal of which would be presumptive evidence of a breach of the treaty.
3. The essential point of this proposal is that there would be no permanent control posts in Russian territory which is a major Russian objection. In return we could reasonably ask for a veto-free quota of inspections of at least ten or more. It would also be reasonable to demand the right to make periodical inspections of known testing sites in order to detect preparations for testing; and to require that the Preparatory Commission should have additional authority so that some verification might start immediately on signature.
4. Finally, to meet another possible Russian objection, we hope that the Administrator of the Organisation could as we have suggested be on a comparable basis to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.
5. In short, we hope that the U.S. Government would join us in proposing a modified treaty on the following lines:
 - (a) The parties agree to conduct no more nuclear tests.

- (b) An International Tests Verification Organisation with the basic structure as in the Western Treaty proposals of a Conference, a Commission, a single Administrator, and inspection machinery (but not control posts) should be established to investigate any accusation by one party that another has tested by arranging air sampling flights and by studying records produced by the parties: the Organisation may, on the basis of its study, make inspections in the territory of the accused party, to a limit of say ten occasions in any one year in any one party's territory at the request of the other side; the Organisation shall inspect any site or installation at the request of the Government responsible for that site or installation: the Organisation shall publish its findings.
- (c) The Organisation should also have the right to carry out periodical inspections of known testing sites.
- (d) The Organisation shall be run by an Administrator who consults with deputies broadly on the U Thant basis.
- (e) The parties agree not to carry out peaceful explosions except after inspection by the Organisation of the object to be exploded and of the instrumentation of the explosion and its records.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-862. Secret.
Drafted by Spiers.

¹ See [Document 148](#).

148. Minutes of Meeting [Source](#)

Washington, March 9, 1962.

Minutes of Meeting with President held on March 9, 1962 on U.S. Position for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference

Mr. Foster summarized the attached memoranda to the President¹ setting forth the proposed U.S. position for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. He stated that the ACDA understood that the U.S. position would contain the following points:

- (1) An across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in all armaments in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. Strategic armaments would not be separated out as an initial measure.
- (2) The 30 per cent cut in strategic vehicles refers to both numbers and “destructive capability.” Neither “destructive capability” nor the categories into which strategic weapons would be separated have yet been defined.
- (3) No production cutoff in the first phase. Whether production will be unlimited or limited to some percentage of inventories has not yet been determined.
- (4) The 30 percent reduction in non-strategic armaments will involve both numbers and total weight.
- (5) No reduction in inventories of nuclear warheads and BW-CW in the first stage. Our position on these problems is contingent upon the outcome of experts conferences which will be proposed.
- (6) Force levels should be reduced to 2.1 million.
- (7) Authority to discuss with Soviet representatives the possibility of sampling or progressive zonal inspection techniques.
- (8) A cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons and an initial proposal for the U.S. and USSR to each transfer 50 thousand kilograms of U-235 for peaceful purposes.
- (9) The second stage of the U.S. plan would involve further reduction of inventories of the same magnitude as the first stage and a more stringent production cutoff.

With regard to the nuclear test ban treaty, Mr. Foster stated that ACDA recommended that we present our April 18 treaty with the amendments offered last summer² and indicate that we would like to discuss methods of speeding up the installation of the control system with the Soviets. In addition, we should urgently explore the possibility of eliminating the threshold from our present treaty proposal. With regard to inspection of preparation for testing, he reported that there did not appear to be any really effective inspection measures; however, the proposal could be made to call for declarations by heads of state that preparations were not in process and to periodically inspect the principal test sites.

The President stated that there were three new factors in the nuclear test ban issue: (1) the problem of guarding against clandestine preparations for testing is now recognized; (2) underground tests are probably easier to inspect than previously thought; and (3) underground tests of small weapons are not as important as had previously been contended. As a consequence, the President said that a smaller number of inspections would probably be acceptable and that a serious question was raised as to the real value of the threshold in our proposed treaty in view of the three-year moratorium associated with it. Mr. McCone reviewed the history of the proposed three-year moratorium, pointing out that it had been agreed by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at Camp David as a measure to balance our introduction of the threshold in the treaty.³ He noted without a threshold the treaty would bar us from any future testing and that there would be some level of small Soviet clandestine tests that could not be detected. Dr. Wiesner then stated that removal of the threshold would constitute a major initiative on our part and would answer one of the basic objections to our treaty by the USSR, the U.K., and other countries. He argued that a treaty without a threshold would be more to our security advantage than a treaty with a threshold. With a three-year moratorium, we would as a practical matter almost certainly be giving up the possibility of future underground testing since such testing would not be resumed if the treaty were being honored. However, under a threshold we would not have the right to inspect detected seismic events below magnitude 4.75, even though the Geneva system could detect and locate much smaller events than this. This would give us some ability to verify that the Soviets were, in fact, honoring the treaty below the threshold down to the point of detectability of

seismic events. Our unilateral intelligence could assist us with selecting the most suspicious detected events for inspection. He noted that retention of the threshold would permit Nth countries to develop and test Hiroshima-size weapons under the full treaty obligation. Dr. Seaborg stated in response to a question that there were probably no experiments critical to national security that could be conducted by either the U.S. or USSR underground below the threshold of detection of the Geneva system although the initial development of a nuclear capability could be achieved by an Nth country below the threshold of 4.75.⁴ He emphasized that his principal worry was that it would be very difficult to maintain the weapons laboratories in the event that either a complete test ban was signed or a treaty with a threshold and a three-year moratorium.

Mr. Nitze suggested a possible alternative proposal in which we would withdraw our offer of a moratorium upon treaty signature but would agree to a complete ban without a threshold as soon as elements of the control system became operational. He pointed out that this would maintain the laboratories during the period when Soviet intentions to fulfill the treaty were being tested. Ambassador Dean stated that in his opinion it was impossible for us to withdraw our offer of a moratorium upon signature of the treaty. He pointed out that, although this was not part of the treaty, this was a firm offer that had been repeated on many occasions by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The President stated that it would be logical to give up our present threshold position for a speed-up in installation of the Geneva detection system. Ambassador Dean noted that a speed-up in installation of the system could be accomplished within the existing treaty language provided this proposal was acceptable to the Soviets.

Dr. Wiesner suggested that, if we wanted to have a nuclear test ban treaty, we should offer a complete test ban without a threshold at the outset of the negotiations and not wait to see whether or not the Soviets were willing to negotiate on our present treaty. Mr. Bundy stated that this tactic would be very effective in obtaining the support of world opinion for our position. The President asked what the position of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was on the threshold problem. He was informed that Mr. Fisher, who had just left an executive session with the Committee, reported that the

Committee was skeptical about removing the threshold but that they were also skeptical of the treaty in general. The President stated that, while the views of the Joint Committee were important, it was the responsibility of the Executive Branch, and not the Joint Committee, to draft the treaty.

In response to further discussion as to whether an offer to withdraw the threshold should await Soviet initiative on the test ban problem, Mr. Bundy recommended that we should obtain the full advantage of this move at the outset of the conference.

The President concluded that if the Soviets were willing to discuss nuclear testing, we should make an initiative on the threshold proposal. He stated that he desired a treaty and wanted the world to know that we were prepared to walk the last mile to obtain it. He recalled that it was Secretary McNamara's position that an effective treaty in this area would be to our national security advantage. He did not want to be put in a position where the U.K. or other countries could maintain that we did not in fact really desire to have a test ban treaty. Secretary Rusk stated that he interpreted this to mean that every effort should be made at the conference to obtain a treaty that is acceptable to us. The President asked Mr. Foster to be certain that Ambassador Ormsby-Gore was informed of these decisions.⁵

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Secret. The source text, which is dated March 12, bears no drafting information. An attached list of participants is not printed.

¹ No memoranda were attached to the source text.

² Not further identified.

³ For text of the Eisenhower-Macmillan joint declaration on nuclear testing at Camp David, Maryland, March 29, 1960, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 77-78.

⁴ In a March 10 letter to the President, Seaborg elaborated on his remarks:

“In response to a question from Secretary Rusk at the meeting yesterday, in which we discussed the proposed test ban treaty, I replied that I thought the U.S.S.R. probably could not make a major breakthrough by means of clandestine underground testing.

“I want to be sure that it is understood that I was speaking within the context of the discussion, namely, clandestine underground testing for a limited time period prior to the imposition of adequate controls.

“I feel that if the Russians should have a long period of clandestine underground testing, they might make substantial steps toward the development of an all-fusion weapon (that is, the so-called neutron bomb), which probably should be classified as a major breakthrough.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing)

When Seaborg telephoned McCone on March 10 to tell him he was sending this letter to the President, “McCone replied that he thinks I should bring this to the attention of the President; he feels that continued clandestine testing underground at low yields could do some harm.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 3, p. 269)

⁵ In a March 10 memorandum to Ormsby Gore, Bundy transmitted to the British Government the U.S. position on the test ban question in Geneva. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Secretary Rusk’s Conversations with UK Officials, 1961-1962, Vol. I) See the Supplement.

149. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva [Source](#)

Washington, March 10, 1962, 4:24 p.m.

Tosec 2. Eyes only from President for Secretary, Foster, and Dean.

1. This message summarizes my views on the test ban issue at Geneva and records the decisions we reached yesterday¹ as I understand them.
2. In renewing discussion with the Soviets on the test ban treaty at Geneva we have three objectives to pursue. If we can get the Russians to sign a treaty which is consistent with our security interest, we wish to do so. If they are unwilling to sign a treaty and we are accordingly to test, we wish to show the world that we have gone the last mile with them and that it is their intransigence which has brought about the result. Insofar as possible, we wish to maintain a unified position with the UK on these matters, and certainly to avoid a public split.
3. In pursuing these aims we have agreed that four kinds of changes in the package which we have previously offered are appropriate.
4. First, we need to shorten the time spent between signature of the treaty and the beginning of the inspection process. This is a matter, not of treaty language, but of the functioning of the preparatory commission and thus depends on Soviet willingness to accept our goal.
5. Second, we wish to add to the treaty something on preparations for testing. Our best judgment is that a declaration in behalf of the heads of state that there will be no preparations for testing plus the right to inspect a certain number of times per year an equal number of named sites on each side is the best that we can do in this matter.
6. We should propose to drop the threshold of test events that the treaty covers from its present level to zero, i.e., a complete test ban, and thus eliminate the need for a moratorium on testing below the threshold. This change provides for a more effective control system than the combination of a moratorium and inability under the treaty to inspect events of less than threshold magnitude.

7. We should re-propose whatever changes Dean has been authorized to present since April.
8. As a final ingredient, we should propose to allocate the agreed number of inspections according to zones defined in terms of natural seismic activity.
9. This combination of changes meets what I had in mind in my speech in talking about modifications of the treaty in the light of experience.² It seems to me essential that the first extended public presentation of our views in Geneva should make plain not only our willingness to accept the April treaty but our willingness to offer this set of modifications.

Ball

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1062. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Andre J. Navez (S/S). Secretary Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 to head the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

¹ See [Document 148](#).

² See [Document 143](#).

150. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, March 12, 1962, 6 p.m.

Disto 11. Dean met March 11th with UK (Godber and Wright) re test ban. Dean indicated US intends make following proposals: (1) US desires some inspection for preparations—declarations of activities re test preparations and preco inspection certain test sites. (2) US hopes shorten time between treaty signature and beginning inspection. (3) US agrees to drop treaty threshold to zero. (4) US would hope propose reallocation on-site inspections by zones within USSR. In large portion of USSR which is aseismic, i.e., no earthquakes for last ten years, we would propose minimal number annual on-site inspections.

Remainder of annual inspection quota could be utilized in seismic areas. Re point 3, Dean indicated he presently uncertain whether his instructions call for increase in number control posts and on-site inspections as part of process elimination threshold. Noted we attempting clarify this point urgently with Dept and would report results UK soonest.

Godber's general reaction, not unexpectedly, was "disappointment". UK had hoped we would be more forthcoming. True, forward movement on threshold is most appreciated by UK. Nevertheless we were backtracking on two major issues—inspection for preparation and time at which control system and inspection process would begin to operate. These would make things terribly difficult publicly, would not be welcomed in London and could not be called bold initiatives. Wright backed up Godber's disappointment. Godber explained he felt proposal to inspect for preparations was retrograde because it was going back on treaty of April 18, 1961.

Dean pointed out during test ban conference we had received solemn Sov assurances they were not testing while all the time Sov secret preparations were underway. Noted also removal of threshold and limitations of inspection in aseismic areas both forward moving proposals.

Godber said UK scientists believe real progress has been made in detection and therefore bolder proposals in order. If this not the case then US and UK scientists had better quickly get together.

Dean pointed out re inspection for preparations that declaration plus inspection of certain test sites relatively modest proposal. True we couldn't inspect labs but we had to have assurances against secret preparations for weapon field tests. Godber replied if that case, in presenting proposal we were assuming large political liability for very little in return on inspection side.

Godber asked if we ruled out all use of national systems—even in case of detection atmospheric tests. Dean replied Sept. 3 atmospheric ban offer¹ made only to prevent extensive Sov atmospheric series and that series is now over. Wright asked if we could agree to propose only changes in April 18 draft, i.e., threshold, limited inspection aseismic areas, and last year's treaty modification, while at same time make clear that we would be prepared at appropriate time to negotiate on questions inspection preparation, keeping specifics submerged for moment.

Del comment: As reported Disto 4,² del not clear about circumstances under which treaty threshold would be dropped as explained first para this tel. Therefore del made no suggestion US would be prepared sign April 18 draft with three amendments noted last sentence last para above.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1262. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.

¹ Reference is to the joint statement on nuclear testing by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on September 3, 1961; see [Document 63](#).

² In Disto 4, March 11, the Delegation asked the Department for clarification on the relationship between abandonment of the threshold and any increase in controls, and on U.S. willingness “to sign treaty as it now stands even without supplementary inspection for preparations and speed-up provisions.” (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-1162)

151. Editorial Note

On March 13, 1962, Acting Secretary of State George Ball sent a reply to the January 2 letter of U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant to the U.S. Government on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI). Regarding this resolution, see [footnote 2, Document 97](#). In his letter, Thant had asked for U.S. views “as to the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country.”

Ball’s reply divided the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons into two categories: “(1) the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the deployment of nuclear weapons.” Concerning the first, Ball reviewed U.S. legislation precluding the transfer of ownership or control of information about nuclear weapons. This policy, he added, was reflected in the U.S. comprehensive disarmament proposal submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, and subsequently incorporated with U.S. “full support” in General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI). Regarding the second, Ball emphasized “the firm belief of the United States that the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons, wherever located, from national defense establishments is through realization of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” The United States, he added, believed that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was the proper forum for resolution of this problem.

For text of Ball’s letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume I, pages 87-90. Regarding Resolution 1665 (XVI), see [footnote 4, Document 83](#).

152. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva [Source](#)

Washington, March 13, 1962, 8:06 p.m.

Tosec 26. For Sec and Foster. At White House suggestion this telegram is to set forth armament decisions of March 9, 1962 as supplemented by further discussion. It has been approved by the President.

1. The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.
2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. Since the distinction between intercontinental and less than intercontinental is still under study, some more general formulation should be used such as that strategic weapons will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation.
3. Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. Begin FYI. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using 5, 10, 15 and 20 as possible percentages for permitting production of new vehicles. End FYI. The percentage should be in addition to production needed for replacement, training and peaceful purposes. With respect to all of the above, Delegation is authorized to propose that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II.
4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 memorandum to the

President.^{[1](#)} Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable as later decided to be appropriate.

5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups of weapons the U.S. will propose at an appropriate time that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 memorandum to the President.
6. The United States should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The United States would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined.
7. Inspection is the subject of a separate detailed telegram, Todis 44.^{[2](#)}
8. The United States will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kg. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. FYI. Study is being given to whether we should propose a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions. End FYI.
9. The United States will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

Ball

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Fisher (ACDA) and cleared by Kaysen (White House), Nitze (Defense) (by Fisher), and Navez (S/S).

^{[1](#)} See [footnote 3, Document 146](#).

^{[2](#)} Todis 44 to Geneva, March 13, transmitted a suggested text for Secretary Rusk's statement on verification to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament

Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1262) Rusk's statement to the committee on March 15, however, touched on the verification issue only in general terms. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 142-149.

153. Editorial Note

During 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held three sessions in Geneva: March 14-June 15, July 16-September 8, and November 26-December 20. Chairman of the U.S. Delegation was Arthur H. Dean, whom President Kennedy appointed on March 6. Text of the White House press release announcing the appointment is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments. For text of the Department of State statement, March 9, naming the principal U.S. advisers to the U.S. Delegation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 2, 1962, page 536.

Secretary Rusk headed the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee during his March 10-27 visit to Geneva. He participated in preparatory meetings mainly with the British and other NATO delegates but also with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and representatives of the other nations on the committee. For a memorandum of conversation of one meeting with Home and Gromyko, see [Document 154](#). In addition to his comments during the plenary sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Secretary Rusk made two formal statements to the committee on March 15 and 27. For texts of these statements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume I, pages 142-149 and 190-199.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (and its subcommittees) addressed three major issues during the year: general and complete disarmament, the discontinuance of nuclear testing, and confidence-building measures to decrease international tensions (e.g., cessation of war propaganda, creation of “nuclear-free” zones, measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, prohibition of nuclear explosions in outer space, and measures to reduce the possibility of accidental war).

Major initiatives during the 1962 sessions included a Soviet draft treaty (U.N. doc. ENDC/2), March 15; an eight-nation (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic) joint memorandum (U.N. doc. ENDC/28), April 16; a U.S. treaty outline, April

18 (U.N. doc. ENDC/30), and revisions (U.N. doc. ENDC /30/Corr.1, April 25, and U.N. doc. ENDC/30/Add.1, August 6, and Add.2, August 8); and a revised Soviet draft treaty (U.N. doc. ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1), September 22. Texts are *ibid.*, volume I, pages 103-127, 334-336, and 351-382, and volume II, pages 718, 728-730, and 913-938, respectively.

For text of the first interim report by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Disarmament Commission, May 31 (U.N. doc. ENDC/42), see *ibid.*, volume I, pages 577-581. A second interim progress report, September 8 (U.N. doc. ENDC/62), is *ibid.*, pages 865-871. A summary of the work and accomplishments of the three sessions is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1962, pages 5-14.

Documentation on the Geneva committee meetings is in Department of State, Central Files 396.12-GE, 397.5611-GE, 600.0012, and 700.5611. Verbatim transcripts of the committee sessions are in U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.1-95.

154. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Geneva, March 14, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Foster
Ambassador Dean
Mr. Stelle
Mr. Spiers
Mr. Akalovsky

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Mr. Godber
Mr. Shattuck
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Samuel¹
Mr. Lambert
Maj. Gen. Riddell
Mr. Russell

USSR

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Tsarapkin
Lt. Gen. Gryzlov
Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

Disarmament

Lord Home opened the meeting stating he believed it would be useful for the three delegations to exchange views on how the conference should proceed and on disarmament matters in general. He invited Sir Michael Wright to report on the results of the consultations among the representatives of the three delegations on conference procedures.

Sir Michael Wright stated that the group had had several meetings to discuss procedure and that he was happy to say that agreement had been found upon proposals to be put before the other delegations.

After some discussion of the arrangements for the opening meeting, as well as the subsequent meetings of the conference the three principals agreed that limitation on publicity as agreed among the US, the UK and USSR delegations would apply only to the conference as a whole and that each delegation would be free to act at its discretion as far as making its views known through its own media. The UK also stressed the importance of the role the Co-chairmen would play, particularly as a steering committee.

Lord Home observed he was encouraged that this conference would open under the conditions of US-USSR agreement on principles. He noted that the disarmament principles developed earlier by the Commonwealth Conference² were very similar to those agreed by the US and USSR. Thus, he thought, the conference had a good start.

Referring to the question of verification, Lord Home particularly emphasized the problem of verifying unidentified events in the nuclear test context and the question of verifying the levels of armaments remaining during the process of general disarmament. He said it would be helpful for the conference if the US and USSR stated their views on these two matters, which were likely to be the central difficulties in the conference work. He observed that his opening speech would deal primarily with these two problems, noting that it would not contain any propaganda but merely the suggestion that these problems be studied objectively.³

Mr. Gromyko responded by saying that he would not object even if Lord Home's speech contained some propaganda, provided that there were different kinds of propaganda.

Mr. Gromyko then made a prolonged exposition of USSR views, stressing that the US, the UK and the USSR carried the main burden of responsibility for the solution of the disarmament problem. The reasons for this were obvious and certain conclusions from this should be drawn as far as the committee's work was concerned. He noted that this conference was to take place in a city where representatives of the three countries had made many speeches as far back as during the days of the League of Nations, although the US had not been a formal member of the League of Nations. No practical solution had been found at that time and he wondered whether the

three powers could not now use their authority and prestige in order to further the cause of disarmament and peace. As far as the USSR was concerned, its representatives had come to Geneva to contribute to the solution of disarmament. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko recalled Mr. Khrushchev's proposal that the conference be opened at the heads-of-government level and regretted that no agreement had been reached on that proposal.⁴ Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the main requirement for the solution of the problem was the desire on the part of all participants to reach agreement; negotiations were only a means of reconciling differences.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the USSR believed that the solution of the disarmament problem should be sought on the basis of general and complete disarmament, i.e., on the basis of decisions already adopted by the UN General Assembly. He contended that such an approach would eliminate many difficulties presented by partial approach. He observed, however, that the solution of general and complete disarmament could not be implemented by simply pressing a button. This was why the Soviet proposals provided for sufficient time and several stages. He stressed the need for an agreed over-all time limit, time limits for the implementation of each measure and stage, as well as on the allocation of disarmament measures among the different stages, and contended the USSR was aroused by proposals not providing for specific obligations in this respect.

Referring to the problem of control, Mr. Gromyko observed that much had been said on this issue, both in the League of Nations and in later disarmament negotiations. Perhaps many aspects of this problem were still unclear, but much of what had been said attested to a lack of desire on the part of certain states to resolve the problem. He contended that the Soviet Government was not against control; on the contrary, it was for strict and effective control. The other participants in the Committee would see during the negotiations that the USSR was indeed in favor of such control and was not merely paying lip service to it. However, the USSR was in favor of control over disarmament and not over armaments. The USSR was for control over disarmament measures up to and including all-embracing control after the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament. He contended that the USSR, taking into account past experience, could not rely on verbal pledges in the disarmament field; it

believed that international control was important and therefore there was no need to convince it on that point.

Observing that the present discussion was only in general terms, Mr. Gromyko said, however, that he wished to touch upon a specific issue which had been raised in past negotiations. He recalled that in post-war disarmament negotiations, as well as during the US-USSR bilateral exchange of views, some participants, and particularly the United States, had mentioned the need for the establishment of the necessary arrangements and international institutions, both during and after the process of general and complete disarmament, to prevent aggression and ensure security of all states during as well as after the disarmament process. He said that the USSR would not object to such agreed arrangements and perhaps some international institutions to maintain peace and prevent aggression. He claimed that the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament took this problem sufficiently into account and that Soviet statements in the committee would make that evident.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. Delegation had come to Geneva with every intention to work seriously and hard in order to make headway in the disarmament field. Observing that more than 30 active discussions of this problem had taken place in the past, the Secretary expressed the view that the time had come to make a breakthrough toward progress. He indicated he intended to stay in Geneva some ten days, but expressed readiness to return at any time when his participation was required to advance progress. In any event, the US would have a strong delegation in Geneva at all times. The Secretary stressed the President's personal interest in the Conference and stated the President would follow it on a daily basis. In this connection, he referred to the President's statement with regard to the possibility of a Heads-of-State meeting if the situation warranted such a meeting.⁵

The Secretary then said that the US was encouraged by the US-USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and by the fact that that statement had been welcomed warmly throughout the world. He expressed the view that our task was now to give reality and life to those principles.

Referring to the question of verification, the Secretary expressed the hope that the USSR would give careful thought with regard to what the US meant and what it did not mean in the field of verification. He stressed that it was important to give assurance to all parties that agreed measures were indeed carried out, and observed that confidence and trust were based on knowledge, whereas ignorance bred suspicion and fears. He emphasized that the US had no desire to intrude in the life of other countries or interfere with their activities any more than it was necessary only to verify compliance with the obligations assumed under a disarmament agreement. The US was prepared to sit down and discuss, within the context of specific disarmament measures, methods of verification which would involve minimum intrusion. He expressed the view that this problem should not affect over-riding strategic considerations in the first stages, since the US and USSR knew enough about each other to inflict great damage even today. He also thought that there was no need to worry about minor tactical problems or espionage. The main problem before us was to stop the armaments race.

Referring to the problem of nuclear tests, the Secretary recalled the distinction drawn by the Soviet Union between “inspection of disarmament” and “inspection of armaments”. He wondered whether the Soviet Union could accept cessation of nuclear weapon tests as disarmament and noted that a test ban would involve not a partial but a total elimination of tests. He expressed the view that nobody should say his final word now on the various problems we faced; rather, a thorough examination of those problems should be undertaken to see what could be done to resolve them, so that general and complete disarmament should become a reality instead of remaining merely an aspiration.

Lord Home inquired whether Mr. Gromyko’s reference to special international institutions to maintain the peace also covered the organization to verify the implementation of obligations during the disarmament process.

Mr. Gromyko replied that this meeting had not been convened for the purpose of detailed discussion. However, he said he would be prepared to engage in such a discussion at any time. He went on to say that certain measures to keep the peace were needed. The Soviet Union believed that

establishment of an international force was one of the possible ways of resolving the problem.

Turning to the question of control, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that there must be an organization to deal with control on a daily basis. Such an organization must be agreed in advance and must encompass an agreed system. He said the Soviet Union would set forth its detailed views on this subject at a later date, perhaps also in written form. He expressed the hope that the West would do the same, provided its efforts were aimed at disarmament. He went on to say that the most decisive factor in determining the state of peace was disarmament as such. In fact, he was inclined to believe that disarmament accounted for some 99 per cent. As to whether there would be aggression if general and complete disarmament was implemented, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that it would be difficult to provide a complete guarantee against such a possibility; after all, wars had taken place even in the ancient times, and Hanibal had waged war against Rome. Nevertheless, the Soviet proposal provided for guarantees in that respect too.

The Secretary stated he did not believe that disarmament was a hopeless problem and expressed the view that we should be able to find a solution to it. However, any solution should be based on Aristide Briand's precept that disarmament should be such as would leave no one a dupe or victim. He said he understood the nervousness some people might have with regard to the possibility of strangers wandering in their country during the disarmament process. Our task was to find a solution to this problem and to define the job of verification personnel in such a way as to limit it only to actual verification functions.

Lord Home expressed the view that it should be possible to combine the provision for an international disarmament organization in the US program with the idea of creating an international institution for maintaining peace as mentioned by Mr. Gromyko. He also observed that it should not be beyond our imagination to develop a method of verifying that the arms reduced are not being replaced. He suggested that all the participants should think about these problems and perhaps meet again at a later date.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to make one additional point. He stated that he understood that all the participants in the conference would work on general and complete disarmament in accordance with U.N. decisions and that the Committee's task should be to translate those decisions into specific obligations of states.

Outlining his general conception of the Committee's work, he said that the following should be done: (1) spell out obligations for general and complete disarmament as a whole; (2) allocate specific measures to appropriate stages; and (3) spell out commitments with regard to time limits both for the over-all program and the individual measures and stages. Finally, he contended that U.S. proposals thus far had not included some of these very important problems.

The Secretary expressed the belief that the Committee should deal with general and complete disarmament on a comprehensive basis and that it should stay in session until agreement on a total program was reached. He agreed that stages were necessary but noted that some immediate steps could be found which could be implemented as soon as agreed and which would help us move forward in the broader disarmament field. He expressed the view that as the work of the Conference proceeded, it might be necessary to establish subcommittees, particularly when specific obligations were spelled out.

Lord Home stated he was in basic agreement with the method of work as outlined by Mr. Gromyko, i.e., general and complete disarmament should be attained at the earliest possible time and concluded by stages, with each stage containing measures of physical disarmament and an appropriate control machinery to verify compliance with obligations. During each stage, the operation of the next stage would be planned in great detail. He stressed the need of starting with actual physical destruction of weapons, since this was what mankind desired. Reverting to the question of verification, he stressed the importance of having assurances of compliance during the disarmament process so that the ultimate outcome of that process be not prejudiced. In this connection, he reiterated the need for the creation of an appropriate organization.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1462.
Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on June 14. The meeting was held at the British Mission, Villa la Fenetre.

¹ Ian Samuel, Principal Private Secretary to Lord Home.

² At the conclusion of the tenth conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London March 8-17, the Prime Ministers issued a nine-point statement outlining the principles to be followed in bringing about general and complete disarmament, with effective inspection and control.

³ The text of Lord Home's speech is in U.N. doc. ENDC/1.

⁴ Khrushchev first formally advanced this proposal in his February 10 message to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan; for text, see [vol. VI, Document 31](#), or *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 32-36.

⁵ In his March 2 address, President Kennedy had stated that if the Soviet Union would accept a treaty in the opening month of talks, he and Prime Minister Macmillan would meet Khrushchev at Geneva to sign the treaty. See *ibid.*, p. 74.

155. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)[Source](#)

Washington, March 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position on Disarmament Measures at Geneva Negotiations

The following paper amplifies and supersedes the Memorandum for the File of March 9, 1962 from William C. Foster.¹ It consists of the basic disarmament positions of the United States, as authorized by the President and as discussed by the Committee of Principals, and the status of current work regarding the further development of these positions.

1. The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.
2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. The cuts in strategic delivery vehicles are to be in two categories: the present thinking is to divide them between intercontinental systems and less than intercontinental systems. However, since this distinction is still under study, the U.S. delegation at Geneva has been instructed to use a more general formulation such as: the strategic delivery vehicles "will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation." To develop the above a paper is in preparation which deals with the definitions of the intercontinental systems and the less than intercontinental systems, including what weapons come under each category.² The paper also deals with the use of gross weight as a measure of the destructive carrying capacity of each United States and Soviet vehicle to be included in the above two categories. Included in this paper will be tables of what reductions might

look like when the double 30 per cent is applied to all vehicles in the above two categories.

3. Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using (a) 5, 10, 15, and 20 as possible percentages of inventory in the category, and (b) numbers of systems in the category.³ Some data on DOD planned production rates has been obtained, but its completeness and long-term validity is doubtful. Also, NASA is being asked to furnish ACDA with planned rates for use of vehicles for peaceful uses and exploration of outer space. The Federal Aviation Agency will be asked to supply certain information in the event we need to make statements regarding the production of aircraft for peaceful purposes. Finally, ACDA is preparing a paper on the extent to which the testing of missiles, aircraft, and other armaments would be permitted in connection with the various schemes for limiting and halting production.⁴ With respect to all of the above, the present U.S. position is that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II. Included in the production study by ACDA will be recommendations regarding the extent to which the same percentage formulas for limiting strategic delivery vehicle production can be applied to limitations on the production of other armaments.
4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 Memorandum to the President.⁵ Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and may be by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable. ACDA is preparing a paper in elaboration of the reductions in these categories of armaments.⁶
5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups the U.S. will propose that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the

March 3 Memorandum to the President. ACDA is now preparing papers regarding each of these proposed experts commissions and also ways in which stockpiles of such weapons might be reduced under effective verification.⁷

6. The U.S. should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The U.S. would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined. ACDA is completing for government clearance its position paper on the relationship of Communist China to disarmament and the Geneva disarmament negotiations.⁷
7. The U.S. disarmament delegation has been authorized to present to the Conference the concept of an inspection system based on sampling techniques accompanied by progressive zonal techniques. With respect to the entire matter of inspection ACDA is preparing a paper with details, given current knowledge, on the type of inspection which would probably be required for the various disarmament measures in the U.S. plan.⁸ These include inspection for remaining agreed levels of strategic delivery vehicles, remaining agreed levels for other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for fissionable material production, reductions in armed forces, monitoring the testing of missiles, and the establishment of internationally supervised depots for inspection of the destruction of vehicles taken from inventories. Attached to this memorandum is an outline of a verification system based on the progressive zonal concept, which the U.S. delegation may draw as needed.
8. The U.S. will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kgs. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. ACDA is preparing a paper to determine whether we could agree to a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions.⁸
9. The U.S. will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

10. ACDA is preparing additional details on other features of the U.S. disarmament plan including: relationship of military bases and missile sites to reductions in strategic delivery vehicles; means by which reductions can be made in weapons of other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; and extent to which research and development can be monitored.^{[8](#)}

Attachment

OUTLINE OF A VERIFICATION SYSTEM BASED ON THE PROGRESSIVE ZONAL CONCEPT

A basic position of the U.S. is that whatever measures are agreed to must be subject to verification in order to determine whether the agreed measures are in fact being carried out. It will be apparent that this is the only manner in which disarmament can proceed with the certainty that no state will obtain military advantage during the disarmament process.

A major problem of past general disarmament negotiations has been that there has been no opportunity to explore the key question of verification thoroughly, objectively, and constructively. This Conference provides such an opportunity, and, for its own part, the U.S. is willing to consider seriously any proposed verification system in the light of the degree of assurance of compliance that it would provide and in the light of the significance of possible violations.

For its own part, the U.S. would be prepared to accept from the outset, if others also agreed, a verification system involving total access to all parts of its territory. However, the U.S. has concluded that it may be possible to design an adequate verification system based on the concept that although all parts of the territory of a state should be subject to possible verification from the outset, the extent of the territory actually inspected in any step or stage would bear a relationship to the amount of disarmament and to the degree of risk involved in particular disarmament measures. Under such a system, a program of disarmament might be initiated with limited actual territorial access for verification purposes as long as retained armaments were adequate to provide security against the effects of possible violations.

However, assurance that violations were not being committed would have to increase as retained armaments were reduced. Consequently, as disarmament proceeds, actual territorial access would necessarily have to increase.

The U.S. believes that this concept could be implemented by a system of zonal inspection which would be generally applicable to measures limiting or reducing armaments and forces. Such a system might incorporate the following principal features:

1. At the outset of disarmament, each state would declare existing levels of armaments, forces, and activities covered by agreed Stage I measures.
2. Verification of reductions would be conducted at agreed depots. The U.S. contemplates, as a general matter, that the location of such depots might be selected by the host state.
3. Verification of limitations on certain types of activities (such as production) would be carried out at the declared locations of such activities wherever they may be located within the territory of a state.
4. Verification of retained armaments and the search for undeclared armaments or clandestine activities would be accomplished on the following basis:
 - a. Each state would divide itself into an agreed number of appropriate internal zones and during each step of disarmament would declare the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within each zone would not need to be revealed.
 - b. One or more of these internal zones would be subject to unannounced complete inspection in an agreed period of time. During the verification process, arrangements would have to be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified are concerned, access within the zone would have to be free and unimpeded, and verification would have to be carried out with the full cooperation of and without harassment from the state being inspected.

- c. Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

The U.S. believes that if agreement could be reached on a verification system incorporating the features such as the foregoing, such a system should satisfy the interests of all concerned:

First, from the standpoint of the state being inspected, the extent of its territory actually inspected during the early phases of disarmament would be limited. Moreover, although a number of inspectors would be required in the zone or zones being inspected, the total number of inspectors stationed on the territory of the inspected state would, throughout the disarmament process, be far less than the number that would be required to verify the implementation of disarmament simultaneously in all parts of its territory from the outset.

Second, at the same time, from the standpoint of effective verification, such an approach would make possible full verification of reductions, full verification of limitations on declared activities (such as production), and, as disarmament proceeds, increasing assurance that no undeclared armaments or forces were retained and that no clandestine activities were being pursued.

The U.S. is prepared to explore at this conference the possibility of designing along the foregoing lines a verification system applicable to an agreed program of disarmament.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Confidential. The source text does not indicate to whom this memorandum was sent. An earlier March 13 draft, identical in most points to the text printed here, was sent to Kaysen. (Ibid., Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62) See the Supplement.

¹ Foster's memorandum for the file, March 9, summarizes decisions on disarmament made at the meeting with the President that day. Several of the points contain handwritten question marks in the margins. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62)

² See [Document 164](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

⁴ See [Document 164](#).

⁵ See [footnote 3, Document 146](#).

⁶ Not further identified.

⁷ Not further identified.

⁷ Not further identified.

⁸ Not further identified.

⁸ Not further identified.

⁸ The papers have not been found.

156. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, March 14, 1962.

DEAR FRIEND, As I promised in my message of March 13,¹ I am now in a position to send you my further thoughts elaborating the proposals made in the latter half of my message of March 9.² I am very glad that you feel able to accept our scientific team in Washington at the end of this week, when they will be able to discuss the scientific assessment with your people.³

Our United Kingdom scientists believe that they have made important improvements to instrumentation and they believe that substantial amounts of information could now be obtained from seismic measurements at distances of about 1,500 to 2,000 miles from an underground explosion. This would be in what I understand is called the third seismic zone and remoter areas. The British scientists are therefore considering urgently the technical aspects of a detection and location system which would be manned only by the nationals of the country in which the posts were situated. This suggestion requires a full technical appreciation of the possibilities of detection and accurate location from measurements in the third zone and beyond. The data which we have obtained causes us to think that the conclusions derived, both as regards detection and location, are much less influenced by anomalies in the geology of the test site than are those in the first zone. No doubt you have a great deal of data relating to the third zone and beyond which you will have derived from the recent shots in Nevada and our scientists would be particularly interested to test their ideas against these data. We believe that from measurements in the third zone and beyond we can locate an event within a radius of better than five miles. This would mean pin-pointing the event in an area of something less than 75 square miles. We recognize, however, that it may be more difficult to diagnose whether the event was natural or an explosion if the measurements are only made from these distant stations. We therefore believe that if the West is to rely on measurements made from outside Russia in monitoring a test ban, more inspections may be necessary than if the original Geneva

ideas were followed. This is, of course, on the basis that if either side attempted a violation, they would try to falsify records from stations under their control.

If our fall-back position proves to be of a nature which does require more inspections within the U.S.S.R. than the original Geneva proposals, we may have to consider whether there are any possible further modifications on the political or administrative side which would make the inspections more acceptable to the Russians. There are two possible modifications which might be worth further thought—

(a)

The composition of inspection teams

We might consider adding a neutral element to the United States/United Kingdom teams which, under our present draft treaty text, verify doubtful events in the U.S.S.R. This is, I know, not wholly a new proposal, since we put forward ideas on these lines at Geneva last August when the Russians ignored them.

(b)

Our right to demand inspections

So far, we have said that inspections in the U.S.S.R., whether within our quota or on a sliding scale above it, should all take place at our own demand. If the total number of inspections is likely to be increased, we might think of a fixed quota of inspections at our request, for which we would ask, plus a sliding scale of further inspections, in proportion to doubtful events, each to take place at the request, not of ourselves, but the majority of the Control Commission.

Both these points would need further detailed consultation, but it seems to me that we should be able to make an offer on them which looked reasonable but did not endanger our essential position.

I see from the preliminary reports from Geneva that you may have doubts about the reliability of detection posts outside United States/United Kingdom territory. This is, of course, a point of serious examination. But if we were to move to a national detection system, we could presumably overtly increase the existing number of stations by general agreement. As a check, we might consider continuing some covert stations of our own, on the present pattern. We would certainly be prepared to examine whether there are any new areas where the United Kingdom could profitably help. And if the national stations were overt it seems to me that the risk of disturbances to them because of a change of regime would be much less great.

In the penultimate paragraph of my message of March 9, I suggested that the Russians would need a series of tests if they were to cheat for any worthwhile purpose. A single 100-kiloton shot could not possibly provide the basis for any sort of breakthrough. This could only be given by a series of shots; I am advised that the very least would be one or more low-kiloton shots, followed by one with a yield in the megaton range. Even then, it is really only development of a successful anti-missile-missile that could seriously disturb the validity of the deterrent. Even such a development would have more of an effect in principle than in practice, since I believe that the construction and deployment of a defence system likely to reduce the scale of damage to a supportable level would be so vast as to be beyond Soviet capacity.

The more I think about this, the more I feel certain that we cannot afford to let the hopes of the world for a nuclear test ban be dashed at Geneva without a further public effort which would be demonstrably fair and will catch the imagination. Of course, if the Russians are forced finally to a position in which they refuse all form of inspection on their territory then we shall fail, but if we can get them into this position, we should have world opinion on our side.

With warm regard,

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan⁴

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962. Top Secret.

¹ President Kennedy suggested in a March 10 message to Macmillan that British and U.S. scientific experts convene in Washington to exchange views on the status of scientific data regarding detection of underground seismic data. (Ibid., K-M, 1961-1962) In accepting the invitation in his March 13 letter to President Kennedy, Macmillan proposed to send a junior group of experts on March 14 to be followed by Sir William Penney and Sir Solly Zuckerman. (Ibid., M-K, 1961-1962) For text of both letters, see the Supplement.

² In his March 9 message to Kennedy, Macmillan wrote that if it could be justified by the scientists, “we might accept a much simpler treaty based on national detection systems alone, but with the very important proviso that these shall be supported by an international authority (as provided for in our 1961 treaty) but responsible in the main for two primary functions.” These two functions were: “(i) to collate and evaluate seismic data from all over the world, and (ii) to have under its control mobile inspection teams, who could be sent to investigate without hindrance any suspected violation of the treaty in any country.” Macmillan believed that the latest British scientific advice seemed to suggest that this would give acceptable coverage, and he hoped U.S. and British scientists might be able to come to “a rapid joint assessment” on the question. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.

³ British scientists headed by Sir Solly Zuckerman met with their U.S. counterparts in Washington March 17-18; see [Document 159](#).

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

157. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, March 15, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you know, the Atomic Energy Commission is hopeful that it will be possible to negotiate and sign a nuclear test ban treaty that will appreciably slow down the arms race and at the same time not jeopardize national security. We are concerned, however, that certain aspects of the proposed treaty could, in our opinion, adversely affect that security.

Our major concerns arise from the obvious danger that, having signed the treaty and thus having forestalled our atmospheric test series, the Soviets will later abrogate it and again mount a secretly-prepared test series. Unfortunately, we have little or no capability of detecting preparations now, and, in our opinion, the anti-preparation measures visualized for the inspection system will not appreciably improve that capability. In view of the impossibility—so well expressed in your March 2nd speech¹—of our maintaining any real state of readiness to test during a moratorium or treaty, a repetition of their 1961 action by the Soviets could result in their making an even larger and possibly a decisive step forward relative to our nuclear weapons capability.

In view of this danger, the Commission deeply regrets the apparent necessity of continuing the offer of a moratorium on testing below the 4.75 threshold, since—with all testing suspended immediately—our weapons development capability would soon deteriorate to a very low level and our response to a new Soviet series would be even less effective, and appreciably slower, than if it were possible to continue low level underground testing.

Also, we are concerned by the proposal that abolition of the 4.75 threshold be substituted for the moratorium and that testing at all levels be *permanently* forbidden by the treaty, thus perpetuating the restraints on our laboratories. Admittedly, this change, which would extend inspection below

the 4.75 threshold, would be technically attractive if we could assume that inspection would be introduced much sooner than the draft treaty now requires, and if we must make the further assumption that a moratorium would not actually end as planned after the three-year period. However, on the much more likely assumption that the Soviets will not cooperate in drastically speeding up preparations for inspection, no inspection will be possible during most or all of the three-year period (which will start with treaty signature), so that little or no technical or security advantage would be gained by abolition of the threshold now.

The Commission therefore respectfully urges that the threshold be retained, since—even with the moratorium—we would have the possibility of testing below some threshold after the three-year period, whereas abolition of the threshold now would not only limit our future action, but—by its finality—would add to the immediate adverse psychological effect on our laboratories. Even if a resumption of low level underground testing is ultimately found to be undesirable or not feasible and we then concede abolition of the threshold, little or no practical advantage will have been lost by postponement of the decision to abolish the threshold.

Respectfully yours,

Glenn T. Seaborg

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, March 62. Confidential.

¹ See [Document 143](#).

158. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, March 15, 1962, 10 p.m.

Disto 30. Dean and Godber (UK) called on Tsarapkin 5:00 pm for informal discussion test ban treaty.

Dean said US prepared grant one point to which Sovs had apparently attached importance, namely, to drop 4.75 threshold and make treaty comprehensive on banning all tests in atmosphere, outer space, underground and in oceans. Noted this change would do away with need for US proposals in August for scientific review of threshold after research program or for re-examination treaty to lower threshold by increasing number of control posts or inspections. We would retain sliding scale of 12 to 20 inspections, retain same number of control posts (19), retain our offer to remove administrator by vote of 7 to 11 in commission, and retain offer to place neutrals on inspection teams. We would be prepared to sign April 18 treaty as fully comprehensive with only two additions:

- (a) Would want to see if in some way we could have the head of state certify there were no preparations for tests and work out agreed rights for preparatory commission to inspect, certain number of times per year, declared test sites.
- (b) Would want to shorten time for control installation to something like six months and would be prepared contribute mobile control posts toward this end. We would in addition be willing to allocate agreed limited number of inspections within inspection quota to zones which had normally little seismic activity. A large seismic zone covering heartland of Soviet Union might thus be allocated only very small number inspections; possibly three.

Dean handed Tsarapkin informal aide-mémoire (text separate tel) covering these points.^{[1](#)}

Following indication by Godber of concurrence in proposal, Tsarapkin said could tell us even without careful study of proposal that it does not coincide completely with Soviet position which has been submitted to US and explained to us November 28² and on subsequent occasions. Under now existing situation, idea international control is completely unacceptable to USSR. Only basis for agreement possible is national control. Dean proposal is quite different approach. This document based on previous positions now out of date. It is impossible come to agreement now on any proposal based on this approach.

Dean stated that without trying be argumentative, seemed should be some way work out agreement on basis international control. Asked Tsarapkin his reaction to US proposal for comprehensive treaty contained aide-mémoire. Tsarapkin said if US desired comprehensive treaty it could have comprehensive treaty on basis Sov Nov 28 proposal. USSR could not accept US proposal contained in aide-mémoire even if first two paras (inspection for preparation and speeding up installation control) were dropped.

Godber asked whether there was any way to combine approaches of national and international control. Even if tests could be detected by national systems some control posts and some inspections would be necessary to locate and verify violation. Tsarapkin said if we would sign agreement there would be no violators; could not understand approach of signing treaty and then violating it. USSR not against control but under very difficult situation between East and West it is impossible admit agents other side under whatever color of international inspectorate. We should know that. But if West wanted control, Sov November 28 proposal would give it. Scientific advances are such as to make national control adequate; international control might have been required five years ago but not now.

Dean said our scientists do not agree national control adequate. Asked if USSR nevertheless wished stand on Nov 28 proposal; Tsarapkin said Sov position is readiness come to agreement now on tests on basis Nov 28 proposal. Without waiting for GCD USSR also willing accept any reasonable way settling matter within GCD framework.

Godber said even if we could or might in future be able to detect tests, Tsarapkin had given us no way clear up dispute on whether events detected were natural phenomenon or test. Gromyko this morning had expressed, in conference, Sov willingness accept control.³ Even relying upon national detection as provided Sov Nov 28 proposal it would seem essential, if not to accept control posts, at least to accept inspection teams. UK has no position to put toward on this; was merely looking far ahead. Moreover Godber would have thought that since Sovs were prepared accept controls up until they began tests in September, they might surely find it advantageous to their country to do so at this point in time after test series. Frankly could not understand reason for change Sov position. Tsarapkin replied that speaking equally *frankly*, he thought we knew very well what had happened to cause change. International situation changed sharply and USSR now had to concern itself with problem of military reconnaissance so could not accept international control which permitted such reconnaissance. If we three sign treaty in bona fides there would be no need for inspection. Godber said there could be need in case of dispute over event. Tsarapkin said if such need should arise we could perhaps exchange data and conduct consultations. He deeply convinced such consultations would resolve any misunderstanding. Agreement could be found on basis Nov 28 proposal. Godber inquired meaning of the term “basis”. Tsarapkin said no hidden meanings should be read into that phrasing—by November 28 basis he meant national systems and no international control. Inspectors could be espionage agents. Godber reminded Tsarapkin UK ready accept inspectors.

Dean said Tsarapkin should sleep on it and perhaps we could have further talks. Tsarapkin said he ready. Would be happy if we could come to agreement on basis November 28 proposal or to settle in connection GCD. Dean said we wanted agreement now. Tsarapkin replied agreement now would be acceptable without waiting for GCD.⁴

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and Moscow.

¹ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, p. 150.

² Reference is to the Soviet draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/122, December 11, 1961), November 28, 1961; for text, see *ibid.*, 1961, p. 664.

³ In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 15, Gromyko said, “the Soviet Union is ready to accept any proposals on control over disarmament put forward by the Western Powers if they will accept Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.” For text of his statement, see *ibid.*, 1962, pp. 94-103.

⁴ Dean supplemented his report of this meeting as follows: “I should like to add that in course our discussion of comprehensive treaty, I specifically asked Tsarapkin whether he would accept April 18 treaty if threshold were dropped to zero and additional safeguards proposed paras 1 and 2 of informal aide-mémoire were dropped. He replied categorically that he would not and would only negotiate on their November 28, 1961 proposal.” (Disto 35 from Geneva, March 16; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1662)

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [Source](#)

Washington, March 18, 1962, 4:17 p.m.

Todis 57. Verbatim text. Following is text of agreed conclusions of US-UK technical meeting on nuclear test detection held here March 17-18: *Begin verbatim text*

1. That Western unilateral detection systems can currently detect seismic events in the USSR of magnitude 4.75 or slightly less. This will lead on the average to detection of about 125 shallow seismic events per year within the USSR.
2. That the proposed Geneva system is predicted to detect seismic events down to 3.75 magnitude, which implies detection of about 1,000 shallow events per year in the USSR. This system could not be available much before 1965.
3. That improvements of detection by unilateral systems to perhaps magnitude 4.2 in the USSR is a reasonable technical goal for 1965. This we now believe implies detection of 300 shallow seismic events per year within the USSR. Among the research areas of particular promise are use of deep hole detection systems and correlation of data from phased arrays.
4. That a unilateral system can currently locate detected seismic events to within a radius of from 10 to 20 km.
5. That, with utilization of data from an improved internal USSR seismic detection system for the purpose of calibrating the external system, the location capability of an external unilateral system might improve to the point where location to within a radius of ten km. or less in seismic areas would be feasible. This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that the USSR data are not falsified.
6. That at present it is impossible unilaterally to identify shallow seismic events in the USSR as earthquakes, excepting at large magnitudes but that future improvements, in particular ones involving processing of data from large arrays, offer hope of reducing the magnitude at which identification of some earthquakes is possible down to about magnitude

five. There does not appear to be any prospect of identifying a given event as an explosion by seismic means alone.

7. That if a unilateral system (for example a non-Soviet system for detecting events within the USSR) is to be used as a basis for initiating inspections, it will be necessary to agree on objective criteria which will determine eligibility for inspection and to establish a mechanism for certifying the eligibility of a given event. Although these problems were discussed no specific proposals have been formulated.¹ *End verbatim text.*

Ball

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1862. Secret. Drafted by Goodby (ACDA) and cleared by Long (ACDA). Repeated to London.

¹ In responding to a query from the delegation in Geneva about specific paragraphs in these agreed conclusions, transmitted in Disto 48 from Geneva, March 19 (ibid., 700.5611/3-1962), the Department concluded: "UK may attempt use joint report to reinforce their views on unilateral control systems. However, agreed conclusions indicate no significant changes in capabilities of unilateral detection systems as previously understood by both US and UK." The telegram concluded: "in short, we believe US-UK agreed conclusions indicate no reason for making change in previously agreed view of need for international control system for monitoring underground tests." (Todis 61 to Geneva, March 19; ibid., 700.5611/3-1862)

160. Memorandum From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Haworth) to the Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Long)[Source](#)

Washington, March 20, 1962.

Our meeting with the British on March 17 and 18 clearly brought forth a number of points which, for differing reasons were not explicitly stated in the written conclusions.¹ I have listed them below adding, for context sake, some points that were included in the memorandum.

1. The data and interpretations presented by the British constitute an interesting and useful advance in the technique of observing seismic events. In my opinion, however, they do not represent a major improvement over methods that have been projected in our own plans for the future; certainly they do not, at least at this stage, constitute a “breakthrough.”
2. Using these and other projected methods, an external system can probably be made adequate for detection and localization purposes after a few years. There is, however, no real evidence that such systems will have any appreciable identification capability except possibly at the upper end of the yield range of interest.
3. Of crucial importance is the fact that, as stated in the memorandum, *there appears to be no prospect of being able to identify an event as an explosion by seismic means alone*. At best, seismic systems can merely reject certain events as being earthquakes, leaving a substantial fraction of the observed events uncertain as to origin. External systems alone would, so far as can be foreseen, leave this fraction very large. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that on-site is an absolute requirement for any system.
4. The technical possibilities of cheating are such that no dependence can be placed for identification and inspection purposes on data derived from stations manned only by nationals of the country under observation. *Hence, proposals in which the criteria for inspection would be based on*

Geneva (or any other) networks manned by Soviets inside the USSR are completely unacceptable.

5. The only national system arrangement that could conceivably be satisfactory would be one in which inspections could be demanded on the basis of data acquired from external stations with no veto power resting in the country under observation. (In this connection it should be noted that it is technically possible to manufacture data on which to base a claim for inspection rights.) That the Soviets would grant such unilateral inspection rights to us seems inconceivable even though they might not fear that we would cheat for intelligence reasons. Indeed it is not clear that we should grant such rights to them.
6. Any system using internationally manned external stations to determine the eligibility of events for inspection would, if used both ways, be the mirror image of the Geneva plan and therefore unacceptable to the Soviets.
- 7.

Suggestions that data from nationally manned stations be submitted to international groups to evaluate in terms of inspection eligibility criteria are impractical for many reasons, including the difficulties of agreeing on satisfactory criteria and the possibilities of doctoring the original data.

Although I did not take time to show this memorandum to the other Commissioners, we have thoroughly discussed the subject and are in complete agreement on the substantive points that I have made.^{[2](#)}

Leland J. Haworth^{[3](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Haworth to McGeorge Bundy, March 20, which reads: "It occurred to me that you might be interested in the enclosed memorandum I have written to Dr. Long in connection with the UK-US technical meeting last weekend."

^{[1](#)} See [Document 159](#).

² In a March 20 memorandum to McNamara, Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, similarly concluded that in the meetings “no technical results were presented by either the U.K. or U.S. scientists to indicate that the problems of underground test detection had been solved”; and he recommended that McNamara oppose any move toward a test ban agreement with only national systems for control. A draft of the agreed conclusions reached at the meeting is attached to Brown’s memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 000.01-400.112, 1962) See the Supplement. In a March 20 memorandum for the record, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Deputy Director for Research at the Central Intelligence Agency, noted that Sir William Penney visited the CIA on March 19 to discuss the recent weekend meetings with U.S. scientists. Penney reported that “preliminary data” revealed in the meetings “gave considerable hope of eventually improving the ability to detect nuclear explosions,” but no data was presented indicating that these new techniques “could specifically identify explosions.” Scoville concluded that “the data is still very preliminary and considerable research will be required before any change in the present US/UK negotiating position would be warranted.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

161. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball [Source](#)

Washington, March 20, 1962.

Ball: ... to know that.

President: We don't have historically the argument that well, we could have gotten an agreement but the United States stopped it. Why don't they let the British go ahead and ask Tsarapkin if he would agree to—even with their proposal, just informally, of national inspection rather ... I don't ... I think even the British plan provides for inspection, if there is an event, doesn't it?

Ball: That's right.

President: We don't want to have just for the record that an agreement could have been reached, but we bitched it up, because I think that everybody there is going to be against us. I don't think there is anybody that takes our position. They're all going to be with the British. You see, you got the neutrals; you got the pro-Communists; you got us and the British. I just hate to let the thing go and look like they could have gotten a deal, the British could have, but we stopped it because I think that would really be a ... and I don't think they can get a deal.

Ball: Well, he seemed to feel pretty confident that they were going to be able to get all the other delegations to understand the implications of this thing; that they are doing a big educational job.

President: Well, it may be if the British don't put forward a formal proposal to them, they ought to ask if they would agree to a part of any program in inspection after the event. It ought to be possible to get that question put by the British and just have it on the record, because we keep getting the scientists say it could be done. I don't want to be like Eisenhower was in '59 when he cranked up the deal, but didn't. I don't want them to be able to always say “Well ... “

Ball: Course this meeting of the scientists over the weekend really undercut the Macmillan position a lot on that.

President: Yes, but, George, I think there must be some way without making it a formal proposal to put it on the record and maybe it is already on the record, that he would not agree to inspection following an event, even after there was a suspicious one.

Ball: Let me see if we can't get that point made.

President: And then at least Macmillan is not able to say "Well, the British ... " We got to get the deal there. You know Adlai will be up in arms, and we will have a lot of heat that we could have gotten a deal, but we didn't. They don't want to break up that way.

Ball: Sure.

President: Because I don't think they will give them a deal, even on the British plan.

Ball: No, I don't think they will either. The problem I know the Secretary is worrying about is that we don't want to get ourselves in a position where we are beginning to bargain from the starting point of the British plan.

President: I agree with you.

Ball: I am going to talk to him a little later on the secure line, and I will see what we can do along that line.

President: Yes, just take a look at the British plan. Somebody over there is an expert. Put the toughest part of it. Somewhere I would like to find out when this portion of discussion seems to be impossible by saying "Would you even accept this?" Then if Tsarapkin says "No", then say to the British "Even your plan doesn't go". Otherwise, I am sure Macmillan will have a lot of political problems at home and if then he blamed it on us, we will look like we have lost a great moment.

Ball: All right. Let me try that with him and see what he can do there.

President: What else do you have?

Ball: Oh, I don't think much. This Argentine business is nasty, of course.^{[1](#)}

President: Here is Mac now. He has something. Oh, did you get any place on Berlin?

Ball: No, I don't know whether you saw the cable that came in late last night.^{[2](#)}

President: Yes, he is giving it to me.

Ball: It is pretty discouraging. They are meeting again tonight.

President: That is why I don't think they will take anything of the British plan, either. And I think just for the record we've got to get it made.

Ball: Okay.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball's office.

^{[1](#)} Not further identified.

^{[2](#)} Reference presumably is to Secto 65 or Secto 67, both messages on the Berlin question which Secretary Rusk transmitted from Geneva on the night of March 19-20 to the President and Acting Secretary Ball. See [vol. XV, pp. 48](#) [↗](#)-[50](#) [↗](#).

162. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

New York, March 20, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I told you the other night that I had some further ideas about nuclear testing.¹ I am sending them along now and would be happy to discuss them if you cared to.

1. Now, before the tests, is the most reasonable time there has ever been for the US and the USSR to make a test ban treaty, because any arms control is most practicable between near equals in the categories controlled.
2. The argument is both familiar and persuasive that by testing in April we will be doing the Soviets a big favor, because their fallout can be expected with the spring rains and we will have to take at least a share of the blame, since it would be impossible to convince the skeptical that it is not *our* fallout. The arrogance with which they conducted their tests and broke off negotiations may, indeed, have been intended to induce us to do our atmospheric testing soon, so as to mitigate the effects of their abuse of world opinion.
3. The Soviets probably see some military disadvantage in our resumption of atmospheric tests. The prospect of our testing thus does act as a lever to pry an agreement out of them. However, if we test at the height of the spring fallout, it will probably nullify this effect and the prospect of the April tests will apply no leverage at all. Thus, unless we postpone the resumption by about two months, we fail to take advantage of the opportunity mentioned as point 1.
4. I have had an uneasy feeling that the tests scheduled in April may not yield as indispensable technical information as they would if there were a little more time for preparation. If that is so, the inconvenience of maintaining the task force longer would be compensated by an increase in the scientific results.

If there was adequate reason for postponement, I doubt if we would “lose face,” even though the announcement has already been made for April. Colonel Glenn’s superb flight has recently reminded the public that delays

are not abnormal or unwise.² Also I suspect we are only now beginning to feel at Geneva the impact of the basic anti-testing feeling of the neutrals, and further evidence of our anxiety to make a treaty before resuming would be helpful.

Such a delay would bring the period of testing uncomfortably close to the General Assembly. And I have, you may recall, felt that if we were going to test we should do so, after a suitable interval for the Russians to reach an agreement, as far in advance of the General Assembly as possible. However, on further thought, I have concluded that any embarrassment at the General Assembly would be outweighed by the advantage of not taking the blame for the Soviet fallout.

I submit the foregoing with little thought that it presents anything original.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a March 20 cover note from Stevenson to McGeorge Bundy, in which Stevenson wrote: "I hesitate to prolong this discussion, but I wonder if you would be good enough to consider the enclosed letter and pass it along to the President."

¹ This conversation has not been further identified.

² Colonel John Glenn's successful orbital flight in a Project Mercury space capsule on February 20 had been delayed mainly because of bad weather.

163. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball [Source](#)

Washington, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

Ball: I just had a talk with Dean Rusk¹ and I wanted to give you the burden of it. He said that at dinner tonight Gromyko had shown a certain amount of interest in the modus vivendi, which he had given him early this afternoon.² He's holding out and putting off talking about it seriously; instead of coming back Monday evening he might wait and continue it a day or two. He just has to play it by ear.

The President: Right.

Ball: [Here follows discussion of Berlin.] On the nuclear test business, he is going to make his statement tomorrow.³ He is going to highlight the things that you had in mind. We are sending him over a text tonight which has already been telephoned over and which is being cabled over to follow.⁴ It attempts to emphasize that. I might just read you what ... It is very short. It's the verbatim text of the written speech: "The essential element upon which we must insist is that there be an objective international system for assuring that the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that there must be an international system for distinguishing between natural and artificial seismic events. The April 18 treaty provided for such a system. Last week the United States and the United Kingdom made some modifications of that proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet objections. I have described these modifications. These proposed modifications were rejected almost immediately by the Soviets on the grounds that international verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form of international verification strikes at the very heart of our effort to guarantee the world against the resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in the position of the United States is that there must be effective international verification of the obligation undertaken in any such treaty. The United States will consider any proposal which offers such

effective international verification, but the United States will never settle for anything less.”

The President: Why don't we say “cannot” rather than “will never”.

Ball: “Cannot”

The President: Well, “cannot settle for anything less.”

Ball: OK. He is going to cable over tonight a long appreciation of the situation.^{[5](#)}

[Here follows discussion of Berlin.]

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.

^{[1](#)} A transcript of Ball’s telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk on March 22 at 5:20 p.m. is *ibid*.

^{[2](#)} Reference is to a *modus vivendi* on the problem of Berlin.

^{[3](#)} Text in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 167-176.

^{[4](#)} The proposed final paragraphs of the Secretary’s statement were transmitted in Tosec 114 to Geneva, March 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2262) ^{[5](#)} The text cited in [footnote 5](#) above includes the phrase “cannot settle for anything less,” as the President suggested.

164. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of Defense

McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, March 22, 1962.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, a series of meetings during the week preceding the departure of the U.S. Delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference resolved a number of questions related to the initial U.S. proposals to be presented to the Conference, but left other questions undecided. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been reviewing those issues not fully resolved within the U.S. Government in order to arrive at recommendations which could form the basis of a U.S. position.

The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you for your comments the tentative views and recommendations of ACDA on several of the unresolved issues. As ACDA prepares its views on other issues these will also be submitted to you for comment and clearance.

Categorization of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. It has been tentatively agreed that we should divide strategic nuclear delivery vehicles into two categories. We believe these two categories should be termed long-range and medium-range. In considering the criteria to be used to distinguish between these two categories, it is recognized that it is possible to arrange the limiting criteria in a U.S. proposal so as to provide us certain advantages by virtue of the characteristics of weapons peculiar to our current inventory and theoretically to prevent the Soviets from having the same advantage. However, as a practical matter, we cannot expect that the Russians will be taken in by such tactics. Therefore we should decide whether it is more advantageous to us to have a plan which permits a conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems within the framework of a total reduction, the Russians having the same option, or whether it will be better to preclude such a conversion on both sides. In view of the decision to continue some modernization of our forces, we believe it would be best to distinguish between the two categories of

strategic missiles on a basis that would permit conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems.

Therefore, we believe that long-range delivery vehicles should be defined as including all armed combat aircraft over 30,000 kg empty weight, all missiles over 5,000 km in maximum range, and all submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles with ranges over 300 km. This would place the following delivery vehicles in the long-range category:

1. *Long Range*

U.S.: B-52, B-58,¹ B-47, Titan, Atlas, Minuteman, Polaris, Regulus, Hound Dog, Skybolt.

U.S.S.R.: Bison, Bear, Badger, *Blinder*, SS-6, SS-7, SSN-4, SSN-5, AS-3, AS-4.

2. *Medium Range*

U.S.: B/RB-66, A3J, A3D, P3V, P2V, P5M, Mace, Matador, Pershing, Redstone.

U.S.S.R.: Madge, SS-5, SS-4, SS-3, SS-2.

All missiles between 300 km and 5,000 km maximum range and all aircraft between 15,000 kg and 30,000 kg empty weight would fall in the medium range strategic delivery vehicle category except as noted above.

Criteria for Determining Destructive Capability. It has been agreed that in reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a dual criteria will be used: numbers plus some measurement related to destructive capability. We believe that total gross loaded weight (maximum designed take-off weight for aircraft) is probably the most reasonable measurement to use for total destructive capability. Such a limitation would, we believe, inhibit the Soviets from trading smaller delivery vehicles for larger delivery vehicles or from building considerable numbers of larger missiles to carry 100 megaton warheads. Such an additional limitation is obviously advantageous for the long-range category of missiles since otherwise there would be no limit on the size of vehicles that the Soviets might build. Although in the medium-range category there will be weight and range limits on individual aircraft and even probably on individual missiles as a result of engineering criteria, the medium-range category still confronts Western Europe with a

potential threat of vast destructive capability. While the requirement for a dual criteria may be considered less necessary in the medium-range category, we believe it is still desirable for political as well as technical reasons to limit this category by total gross loaded weight as well as numbers.

Reduction Criteria for Armaments Other Than Strategic. The question remains open whether a criterion in addition to numbers should be applied in determining reductions of tactical nuclear and conventional armaments. We are inclined to believe that, with the possible exception of the 5-300 km missile category, an additional criterion such as total weight would simply complicate the verification process without achieving any additional meaningful limitation. There may be some advantage in placing an additional weight limitation on the 5-300 km missile category. However, the range limitation of 300 kilometers itself may provide all the limits we would need. To summarize, we believe it advisable to reduce the above categories solely on the basis of numbers.

Categories of Non-Strategic Weapons. We believe the categories of non-strategic armaments which were listed on page 13 of the March 3 memorandum for the President² are appropriate with two exceptions:

a. We would suggest that category (4) might be changed to read:

“Surface-to-surface and air-to-surface ballistic and air-breathing missiles and free rockets with range capabilities from 5 to 300 kilometers.”

This change is intended to permit the exclusion of such missiles as the Bullpup, which are in reality ordnance for fighter bombers.

b. We suggest that a new category encompassing surface-to-air missiles, but excluding AICBM's be added as Category (7). The inherent short-range characteristics of this category distinguishes it from the anti-missile missile category. Reductions in armaments in this category, and limitations on production and testing, should be treated in a similar manner to that adopted for other non-strategic weapons.

Production Limitations. It has been previously agreed that production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the numbers of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. However, upon re-examination, we believe there are some serious difficulties which would result from applying limits on production based upon an agreed percentage of existing inventories of each category of weapons. As far as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are concerned, this method would affect the U.S. and U.S.S.R. about the same since inventories on both sides will be roughly equal. The problem of basing production quotas on inventory of agreed categories becomes more serious in the non-strategic category. In some of the non-strategic categories of armaments, particularly land weapons, the vastly superior Soviet inventories would permit them to produce at far greater rates than the United States.

In each category, this apparent asymmetry can be adjusted by basing the annual production limitation for both sides on a percentage of that national inventory which is the smaller. Thus, in those categories where the USSR is numerically superior, e.g., tanks, the U.S. inventory would be the basis for limiting production for both sides, and vice-versa. For the strategic categories, inventory would be determined by the product of the numbers of units and their respective gross load weight. For armaments other than strategic, numbers of units in each category would constitute the inventory. Further, we believe that consistency with an overall disarmament program indicates the desirability of establishing permitted production rates for Stage I below past production rates in those cases in which there has been substantial production (e.g., strategic delivery vehicles). However, we recognize that in certain categories, such as armaments for ground forces, past production in the U.S. has been so low, as compared to that in the U.S.S.R., that, in these cases, establishment of production limitations on the basis of past production may present serious problems. There are the bases of ACDA's recommendations on the question of production. ACDA is not at this time recommending the specific percentages that should be proposed.

It is our present thinking that permitted production rates should be required to absorb any replacements required as a result of accidental loss of any type of armament as well as production for testing and training. However,

production for peaceful purposes, e.g., space vehicle boosters, would have to be declared and verified but would be permitted within specified limits and safeguards. ACDA is also studying the problem of how production limitations would affect sales or grants of armaments from the major powers to smaller powers.

Testing of Weapons Systems in Categories Proposed for Reduction or Control. The U.S. is committed by the September 25 Plan³ to proposing that testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles should be limited or halted in Stage I. The U.S. is not committed to halting or limiting the testing of other armaments.

We believe the U.S. should take the following position in elaboration of the September 25 proposals on testing in Stage I:

- a. As general principles:
 - (1) As long as some production is permitted some testing should be permitted.
 - (2) In Stage I, testing would be allowed only for those armaments for which production of operational units was planned prior to the end of Stage I. However, this restriction should be subject to abrogation if the period of transition from Stage I to Stage II is delayed excessively.
- b. Limitations on testing should apply to strategic missiles, but not to other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Strategic missiles, defined as those having a maximum range of 300 kilometers or more, would thus be the agreed category referred to in the September 25 Plan. For each stage concerned, an annual quota of strategic missile tests should be established. For the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the quota should be fixed at a figure which bears the same proportion to the permitted annual production of strategic missiles that the number of tests of such missiles now considered necessary bears to current production of such missiles.
- c. Within the quota, either new types of vehicles or newly-produced units of older types could be tested.
- d. Delivery vehicles produced for peaceful purposes could be tested outside the quota figure, but within specified limits and safeguards and subject to

inspection to insure that the vehicles were in fact being utilized for peaceful space exploration purposes rather than for military tests.
e. The testing of anti-missile systems is covered in the succeeding paragraph.

AICBM: Concerning AICBM's, the memorandum to the President stated that "restrictions be placed in Stage I on production, deployment and testing of anti-missile missiles by the U.S. and U.S.S.R." ACDA believes that these restrictions should be such as to reduce to zero any existing AICBM's and to prohibit any production or testing of such weapons. This recommendation is premised on the assumption that agreement would be reached prior to any Nike-Zeus systems becoming operational in the U.S. Once these systems become operational in the U.S., we, of course, would have to re-examine our position. Our recommendation is based on our strong belief that the destabilizing effects of technological breakthrough in this area pose such a potential threat that we should prohibit these weapons as far as practical, i.e., destruction of existing weapons and prohibitions on all production and testing.

We will make available draft staff studies which were taken into account in formulating this letter.

I believe that after you have had an opportunity to review these subjects it would be appropriate to form a joint task force of DOD and ACDA representatives to discuss and consider the above views and recommendations, and any others which the Department of Defense may wish to advance. If this idea meets with your approval, I would appreciate your designating Defense representatives to meet with me with a view to early establishment of an agreed U.S. position on these matters for use of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Adrian S. Fisher⁴

^{*} Source: Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62. Confidential.

¹ Though not within the weight range, it is recommended that the B-58 be included in the long-range category to retain consistency with regard to mission. [Footnote in the source text.]

² See [footnote 3, Document 146](#).

³ For text of the U.S. program for general and complete disarmament submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 475-482.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council

[Source](#)

Washington, March 28, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

The President opened the meeting by saying he was glad to have the Secretary of State and his team back;¹ that they had done a good job and he had heard from the Secretary, in particular, of the helpfulness of Dr. Wiesner, Commissioner Haworth and Dr. Press.

The Secretary of State said he wanted to report on three topics: testing, general disarmament, and Berlin. On testing, it was utterly clear that the Soviets would accept no inspection in the USSR, in any way, shape or form. They had made this position plain in public and in private; Gromyko had told the Secretary privately that even one foreigner loose in the Soviet Union could find things out that could be most damaging to the USSR. There seemed no room to negotiate on this point, nothing to talk about and no Soviet proposal except a draft of November which contained no provision whatever for inspection. The Soviets had argued that inspection was not necessary, adding hints that they had special instruments which could provide all the necessary information, but they had refused the challenge of Lord Home to produce their instruments or to deal with the arguments of Western Scientists on this point.

Thus the problem was that of getting our position clear to other countries. The Secretary felt able to report that in Geneva at least two points had now been made clear. One was that the notion of espionage is nonsense. The Secretary referred to the paper, prepared for his use by the U.S. Delegation, which made clear the impossibility of serious espionage under the system of control and inspection of the April treaty. Secondly, he thought the Neutrals now understood the difference between detection and identification. In making this distinction clear, the support of the scientific group had been particularly helpful. As a result, the Burmese had told the Secretary that a secret vote on these issues would go 12-5 for us against the Soviet Union, although for political reasons many delegations could not make a public statement on our side. The Secretary thought Brazil and Mexico might be

very helpful. But he thought we had much more work to do with the nonaligned countries in general.

The President asked whether we should plan to make a statement on these matters, and after some discussion it was agreed that a draft should be prepared for possible use in the President's press conference on Thursday, March 29th.² Such a statement might be based on a welcome to the Secretary and then go on to make some of these basic points in support of the U.S. position and in clarification of the adamant Soviet refusal to accept any inspection whatever.

The Secretary then pointed out that we would get pressure to delay our tests. Some delegations will urge us not to "wreck" the conference by testing. The Secretary remarked that Soviet testing had not wrecked discussion in 1961 nor had we received pressure from other countries not to talk to the Soviet Union because of its tests. We thought the Disarmament Committee's work would go on for a very long time indeed, although there would be interim points like the reporting dates scheduled for June 1st. He had looked at the forward calendar and it looked to him that there would never be a really good time for testing. We must resist such pressure for delay.

Turning to the problem of general disarmament, the Secretary remarked that the Soviets had brought in a complete treaty covering complete disarmament by stages.³ But the Soviet position clearly allows only for inspection of disarmament and not of retained armaments. Gromyko had remarked to the Secretary that the attitude toward inspection which was evident on the testing issue would be multiplied many times in the field of general disarmament. The Secretary himself believed that the requirement for inspection would be much greater in the general disarmament field. There is thus no sign of an agreement on this critical point in the field of general disarmament.

There remained what the conference had taken to calling "collateral points" on which some agreement could perhaps be reached: examples were outer space, surprise attack, and the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons. But in the latter case the Secretary foresaw complex and tough negotiations with

respect to our possible need for a NATO deterrent force. Gromyko had said that we must not use third parties in order to provide weapons to Strauss. He also noted that the Soviets wished a non-diffusion agreement to be quite specifically limited to the two Germanies, perhaps because a more general agreement might collapse for reasons external to Europe, like a Chinese failure to conform.

Mr. Foster, in response to a request for a comment by the Secretary, said he had only two additional points to make; one was the moderation of the eight neutrals, which was in large part the result of the Secretary's own effective presentations. The second was that we did perhaps make a slight advance in keeping the conference on the procedural tracks we wanted instead of those desired by the Soviets. We have avoided making the Soviet treaty the main item on the agenda and we are securing agreement to our proposal to have two permanent co-chairmen, U.S. and USSR. On balance, the tone of the meeting was better than we had expected.

The Secretary then made the comment that from a number of sources the delegation had received the impression that Soviet armed forces may be significantly weaker than we think. Thus it had been argued that our proposal of a 30% reduction would create an imbalance against the Soviet Union, and some of the satellites had indicated that this imbalance would be produced because we were stronger in strategic forces than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government also seemed embarrassed by our proposal for handing over 50,000 kgs. of nuclear materials because they did not wish to admit an inferiority of nuclear resources—so they had taken the strange course of asserting that 50,000 kgs. is an insignificant amount.

Mr. McCone asked the Secretary to comment on the difference between the present Soviet position of inspection and the position in favor of inspection that had been stated very plainly by Khrushchev in a letter to President Eisenhower in 1959. The Secretary said that the Soviets had clearly reversed themselves.

Then followed a discussion of means of influencing neutral opinion. It was suggested that one important forum was the UN, and Dr. Wiesner also urged visits to leaders of selected countries, because without face-to-face

encounter one could not tell just what kind of ignorance or misunderstanding one might need to deal with.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, space negotiations, British Guiana, Indonesia, and Laos.]

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 498, 3/27/62. Top Secret. The source text, which is dated March 29, bears no drafting information. A summary of this NSC meeting from Gerry Studds (S/S-S) to various Department of State and ACDA principals, March 29, and the NSC record of actions of this meeting, March 28, are both in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. A memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, March 28, was prepared by McCone. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President 12/1/61-6/30/62) See the Supplement.

¹ Secretary Rusk returned to Washington from Geneva on March 27.

² For text of the President's statement on nuclear test-ban inspection at his March 29 press conference, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 215–217.

³ Reference is to the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (U.N. doc. ENDC/2) submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 15. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 103–126.

166. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister

Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, April 3, 1962.

DEAR FRIEND:¹ Your letter of March 30² raises again the question of a last appeal to Khrushchev on the test ban treaty. I agree with you that if we are ever to make a last statement on nuclear testing, the time is coming soon. I should think some time next week would be good.

What needs to be said is familiar. The discussions in Geneva have done much to clarify in the minds of others what we have understood for some time, that detection and identification are two separate problems, and identification is the hard one. No matter how we arrange to detect seismic events that might or might not be nuclear explosions, the only way we can always verify the proposition that a given event is not a nuclear explosion is by on-the-spot inspection. Thus, some provision for on-the-spot inspection by international teams is a necessary part of a satisfactory treaty. If the Soviets continue to rule out any inspection as an element in any test ban treaty, further discussion of the subject at this time is useless. If Khrushchev should reverse the previous Soviet position on this point, it might just be possible to resolve whatever outstanding issues there are about the nature and location of detection systems in such a way as to get an effective treaty before our tests are scheduled to begin, and it would be worthwhile to try.

However, I must confess that I am not optimistic about the prospects of securing such a reversal of the Soviet position. It seems clear to me that the Soviets have decided both that they wish to test again and that they are not now prepared to accept any system of international inspection on their territory.

Nonetheless, I agree with you that it is useful to make a last statement, for whatever chance it may have of succeeding, and to keep our position clear to the end. I think it important that any statement should define the issue sharply enough in terms of inspection and verification that it offer

Khrushchev no occasion to start a fruitless discussion on the subsidiary issues of location and ownership of detection stations.

Your proposed draft of March 24 appears to me to be a good basic document,³ although we have some suggestions which we will be discussing within the next 24 hours with David Ormsby Gore.

I have written in terms of a statement and not of a joint appeal because I do not think that I myself can join in a renewed direct communication to Khrushchev on this matter. I do not quite share the view that the statements made by Soviet representatives cannot be taken as authoritative, and opinion in this country would not hold that a further appeal from me to Khrushchev was appropriate or constructive. On the other hand, I also do not share your feeling that an appeal from you alone will lack its own effectiveness, and I can even see some advantage in your taking this course, from the general Western point of view. I refer to a joint statement only because you have indicated that you would prefer not to act independently.

Sincerely

John F. Kennedy⁴

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–362. Top Secret. The source text bears a typed notation: “Send thru Department, night action, Eyes Only for Bruce for earliest delivery Wednesday a.m. (April 4) to the Prime Minister—from the President.” The text was transmitted in telegram 5292 to London, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–362)

¹ The salutation is written in an unidentified hand.

² Not printed. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961–1962) See the Supplement. Secretary Rusk frankly expressed, “in a preliminary way,” U.S. reservations to the proposals in Macmillan’s letter at a meeting with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on March 30. (Memorandum of conversation, March 30; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-3062) See the Supplement.

³ Attached to a March 24 letter from Ormsby Gore to McGeorge Bundy is an undated draft text of a joint statement the two nations might issue on the nuclear testing issue. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.

⁴ The closing and President Kennedy's signature are written in an unidentified hand.

167. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, April 5, 1962.

T 183/62. Message is in two parts. Part 1 begins.

Dear friend

Thank you very much for your message of April 3 about nuclear tests.¹ I have discussed the problem with my Cabinet colleagues today.

We are all agreed that there should in any event be a joint statement by us both in the next ten days or so. The question as to whether I should in addition send another letter to Khrushchev is in their view nicely balanced.

I am not really so much concerned with the public opinion of Britain at the present time. In my experience that always stabilises itself in the long run behind what is right and sensible. But my colleagues are interested by your thought that there might be advantage in such an approach from the whole Western point of view. There is always the off chance that Khrushchev would accept the principle of on the spot verification. That of course would be an enormous advantage from the point of view of the future of the world even though it might, and I am sure you have thought of this, cause us both some immediate difficulty. If he did accept it would be almost impossible for you not to hold up the tests to see whether an effective treaty could be got. It would also, I think, imply that we might be forced to the position of agreeing that there would be no static stations on Russian soil.

Another possibility is that Khrushchev might ask for a summit for discussion either at Geneva or elsewhere. If he did so without clearly accepting verification by on the spot international inspection then we would stand firm and be in a strong position. But if he accepted verification and asked for a meeting on this basis it would be difficult to refuse.

In other words, if he accepts we are in the short run in some difficulty as to how to proceed but in the long run we will have secured an immense advantage which the whole of humanity will welcome. So, on the whole, I am inclined to send a letter on the lines of the attached draft.²

There is one subsidiary point which I think could easily be overcome. We would be asked why I wrote this letter and why it was not a joint one. My reply will be that since Bermuda we have been in the closest consultation about every step, and that it had been our practice sometimes to operate singly and sometimes jointly in our dealings with the Russians.

I would be grateful if you would think this over and send me your view either by this wonderful new teleprinter system or by telephone call.

With warm regard

Harold Macmillan

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing 4/10/62, 3/62-4/62. Top Secret.

¹ [Document 166](#).

² Not printed.

168. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, April 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list [1](#)

The Secretary noted that the tabling of a draft “treaty” by the Soviet Union had confronted us with a tactical problem and that although the fundamental barrier to negotiations was the negative Soviet attitude toward inspection, we should try to put in the hands of our delegation the materials they need for negotiating purposes. A treaty outline was being prepared for this purpose, and a number of questions needed to be answered.

Mr. McNamara said that he had wondered how soon this needed to be done, but the Secretary’s statement that materials were needed for the present negotiations had answered that question. He also wished to ask what degree of detail was needed. He hoped that certain matters could be dealt with in general language.

Mr. Foster replied that we had to be more specific than heretofore and that although the complete details of our proposals could be unfolded gradually, we needed to give a sense of direction to the negotiations.

The Committee then turned to discussion of the specific issues posed in Mr. Foster’s memorandum of April 4, 1962, [2](#) for the Members of the Committee of Principals.

1. Criteria for determining the dividing line between long- and medium-range strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Mr. Foster recalled that Mr. McNamara had previously suggested that a distinction be drawn between vehicles of inter-continental and less than inter-continental range. He noted that a major problem was whether to

consider the B-47 and Badger as falling in the inter-continental category. ACDA recommended that they should be treated as inter-continental. Treating them as less than inter-continental gave the United States such an advantage as to be non-negotiable. Admiral Parker reviewed the alternatives which had been considered calling attention to the fact that under the alternative recommended by ACDA, the numbers of vehicles in the inter-continental categories for the United States and Soviet Union were roughly equivalent.

Mr. McNamara questioned whether this was an accurate reflection of the true situation. He stated that for the Badger to achieve inter-continental range, part of the Badger force had to be utilized as tankers. Accordingly, although the Soviet Union did not now have an inter-continental force equivalent to that of the United States, it could achieve such a force under the proposed categorization by, in effect, trading tankers for missiles. He believed that the recommended categories would be disadvantageous unless tankers for the B-47 were also included. For similar reasons, he expressed his opposition to considering all strategic delivery vehicles in a single category. General LeMay agreed that the question of categories had to be looked at from the operational standpoint.

Dr. Wiesner commented that if both we and the Soviet Union try to maximize advantage through “juggling” categories, we would never get an agreement. He suggested that reductions should be by types across the board but that production should be by categories. Reductions should be by numbers alone, but destructive capability might have to be considered in connection with production limitations. Proposed reduction of a given type might be traded-off against allowed production. Mr. McNamara thought that this approach would meet Defense’s problems.

Mr. Fisher asked whether this did not mean that we were not really reducing by types since, in view of continuing production, the effect of this approach would actually be an increase in certain types supposedly subject to reduction. He also asked how this approach would affect determination of retained levels. The Secretary requested further clarification of the proposal.

Mr. Foster reserved his position on the proposal and suggested that Dr. Wiesner work it out mathematically to show what was involved.

2. Criterion for Determining Destruction Capability.

Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended that destructive capability be measured by the gross loaded weight of the vehicle involved but that he understood there was some difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of this criterion. General LeMay said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were examining the matter. Mr. McNamara said that this was one matter which he hoped could be dealt with in general language. Mr. Beam stated that he thought it might be possible for a time to deal with the matter in general language.

3. Reduction Criteria for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster said that ACDA recommended that reductions in the non-strategic area should be by numbers only. He noted that weight might be of some importance in some categories but that reduction by numbers represented a simpler approach.

Dr. Wiesner suggested that reductions should be by numbers but that types rather than categories should be used in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. He suggested a continuous list of armaments to be reduced in both areas.

4. Categories for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster recalled that with one exception the categories suggested for non-strategic armaments had been under consideration for some time, the exception being ACDA's proposal to add a new category for surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems.

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara said that he was inclined to the belief that the larger the number of categories the better in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. General LeMay believed that a larger number of categories would be needed in the non-strategic area than had been proposed. Mr. McNamara thought in particular that ships should be divided into more than a single category.

Dr. Wiesner renewed his suggestion that reductions in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area be by types and that production be by categories. He believed this approach would solve the problem presented by the fact that the Soviet Union has so much to draw on. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there would be a problem in defining types.

Mr. Foster noted again that the issue had been under discussion for some time. However, Mr. McNamara stated that he was not prepared to give a final answer and that it would take some time to work the matter out. He was inclined to agree with Dr. Wiesner and wondered whether, if the suggested categories were to be used, they could not be described as “illustrative”. The Secretary thought this approach might be possible.

5. Limitations on Production of Armaments.

Mr. Foster expressed the view that the issue of limitations would have to be resolved in connection with the determination of categories.

6. Limits on Testing of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation was based on relating past testing experience to new levels of production. He believed this would not present problems. Mr. McNamara agreed to this approach.

7. Anti-Missile Missile Systems.

Dr. Wiesner thought problems would arise from treating anti-missile missile systems differently from other types of armaments and that calling for prohibition of such systems might be interpreted as reflecting fear on our part. Mr. Wilson agreed that there might be a propaganda problem.

General LeMay expressed the view that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was doing well in this field but that we could beat them if we wished to do so. He thought we should not give up our chance of doing so.

The Secretary asked whether it was assumed that we would continue developments. Mr. McNamara affirmed that we could proceed with developments in every category in which we were allowed to produce. Dr.

Wiesner believed that until the second stage of disarmament was reached, we had to be able to turn around.

Mr. McNamara suggested that one way to handle the matter would be to treat anti-missile missile systems as a separate category of non-strategic armaments. If any such systems had been produced, they would be reduced thirty percent. If none had been produced, no production would be allowed.

It was agreed to handle the matter in this manner.

8. Elimination of Armaments Intended for Reserve Forces.

Mr. Fisher noted that the Soviet Union had proposed the elimination of armaments for reserve forces and that ACDA believed that it would be advantageous to the United States to take the Soviet Union up on its offer. Mr. McNamara said that he had not had an opportunity to think the proposal through, that he did not know how armaments for reserve forces would be defined, but that the offer seemed advantageous. General LeMay stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted another look at the proposal. Mr. Foster urged that it be given serious consideration since it was hard to think the proposal was not to our advantage. Mr. McNamara was inclined to agree with Mr. Foster but was not certain how to ensure that it would be to our advantage.

9. Destruction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles During Negotiations

Mr. Foster noted that the proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union destroy on a mutual basis between 10 and 30 B-47's and Badgers each month for a limited period during the negotiations had been discussed many times. He called attention to the proposal's value in reassuring others of our sincerity. Mr. McNamara stated that he could agree to the proposal but that he believed the number destroyed should not be above 15 vehicles a month.

The Secretary asked whether the proposal would jeopardize our position in the present confrontation with the Soviet Union. Mr. McNamara said that it would not. General LeMay, however, doubted that a Badger was worth a B-47.

Mr. Wilson commented that Mr. Murrow doubted that the proposal would have lasting psychological impact since we were phasing B-47's out anyway. Mr. Foster pointed out that we had decided to retain the B-47 longer than previously planned and that it remained a significant instrument of war.

Mr. Rostow feared that the proposal would prevent the neutrals from facing up to the problem of inspection and that trading bombers might offer the neutrals a soft way out. He wished to study the matter further and believed that every device should be used to make the neutrals confront the inspection issue. Mr. Bundy was concerned that the proposal would open a Pandora's box of bonfires.

No conclusion was reached respecting the proposal.

The Secretary asked that ACDA and Defense prepare a joint statement of issues for the President.^{[3](#)}

Upon completion of the review of issues posed in Mr. Foster's memorandum of April 4, Dr. Wiesner raised the following questions regarding the Treaty outline that had been circulated: whether destruction of missile launching sites should not be subject to the thirty percent reduction; whether the proposed definition of "control" in connection with transfer of nuclear weapons might not be disadvantageous; whether the verification annex should not be placed in the body of the Treaty outline; whether the Treaty outline should not specify the Parties to the Treaty; and whether the Treaty outline did not give undue weight to experts commissions. It was agreed that these questions could be examined in connection with redrafting the Treaty outline. Dr. Wiesner also suggested that the thirty percent reduction factor might be applied to armed forces as well as armaments, but Mr. Foster and Mr. McNamara thought it wiser to leave the United States proposal in its present form.

^{[3](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/4-562. Secret. Drafted by William E. Gathright (ACDA/IR) and approved by Foster for ACDA on April 9 and by the Secretary on April 10.

¹ This 2-page list of the 34 participants at the meeting is not printed.

² Foster's 7-page memorandum to the Committee of Principals, April 4, which summarizes the issues for discussion at the April 5 meeting, is reproduced in Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 3, pp. 369-369F.

³ Reference presumably is to Foster's April 6 memorandum to the President, summarizing the issues for imminent discussion at the meeting that day with the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62) The issues still to be resolved after this Principals' meeting were also summarized in a memorandum from Kaysen to the President, April 5. (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62) Both memoranda are in the Supplement.

169. Minutes of Meeting [Source](#)

Washington, April 6, 1962.

Minutes of Meeting with the President on April 6, 1962, on the ACDA Draft Outline of Provisions for a Basic Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament

Secretary Rusk stated there was an urgent need to provide the U.S. delegation at Geneva with an outline of our proposed treaty for general and complete disarmament. He noted that the Soviet delegation had already tabled a draft treaty and that there was considerable pressure on our delegation to begin a detailed discussion of the Soviet document. Therefore, unless the U.S. delegation can table a treaty outline by the end of next week, we will be faced with a serious negotiating problem. He suggested that there be another meeting with the President on Friday, 13 April, following a Principals' meeting on 11 April, to obtain final agreement on the treaty outline.

The President asked if interagency agreement on all controversial points in the treaty could be obtained by April 13 so that the document could be tabled in Geneva at that time. Mr. Foster responded that agreement could not be expected by that time on all points. The JCS had, for example, asked for more time to consider the military issues involved in the treaty. After the U.S. delegation received the document, it would also have to coordinate it with other delegations. In addition, it was estimated that at least an additional week would be necessary to coordinate the document with the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Rusk stated that he wished to be able to table something in Geneva as soon as possible even if we have to leave some portions of the document in general terms.

The President asked why it was that we were not further along with the treaty draft at this point since we presumably had been working on it for the past several months. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD would have to share some of the blame with ACDA since they had been slow in replying on some policy issues.

Mr. Foster, referring to the attached memorandum to the President,¹ stated that the most basic substantive issue to be resolved was the manner in which reductions of armaments and limitations on production could be controlled. He noted that there were now two alternative proposals: (1) percentage reductions by broad categories and limited production within the same categories; (2) percentage reductions by specific types of armaments and limited production within broad categories. He stated his strong preference for the first approach. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD considered the second approach, i.e., reduction by types and production by categories to be the preferable approach. General LeMay said that he was not sure of the consequences of either method, and wanted to reserve judgment pending study. Dr. Wiesner stated that he also endorsed the second alternative. He noted that reduction by types provided a simple, direct approach to the basic problem of treaty which would continue through all stages leading to general and complete disarmament and avoided dangers that might arise from the definitions of categories that we do not at present entirely understand. At the same time, the use of broad categories for limited production in the first stage would permit some flexibility but would not become a matter of over-riding importance in the treaty. Mr. Fisher provided a numerical example of the two approaches and pointed out that from the negotiating point of view he preferred categories since the total number would be progressively reduced for the entire category while under the second approach the total number of items of certain specific types would increase. Dr. Wiesner pointed out under either alternative the total number of items in certain types would increase and that paper categories would not obscure this in the eyes of world opinion. He further emphasized that since production would presumably only take place in the first stage, this would not be a continuing problem.

Mr. Kaysen pointed out that the use of categories was further complicated by the requirement that “destructive capability” as well as numbers be considered in determining reductions and limitations on production. General LeMay commented that the essential problem was to cut the combat potential of both sides and he was not sure how to measure this; it was not simply a counting matter. Dr. Wiesner observed that, considering the problems we were having defining categories within our own government, it would be most difficult to obtain mutually satisfactory

definitions with the Soviets since they would obviously try to modify the category definitions to their maximum advantage. Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was his conclusion that, for both the purposes of ourselves and our allies, we should stick to the concept of reduction by types and base continued limited production on some form of categories. Secretary Rusk stated that he continued to feel that the position based on the reduction by types and production by categories would present problems to the negotiators. The President stated that on the basis of what he had heard that, if he had to make a decision today, he would pick the second alternative of reduction by type and production by categories. Dr. Wiesner observed that it was his opinion that this approach was to our advantage from the point of view of security. Mr. Foster stated that he could not accept this conclusion. Mr. Gilpatric stated that alternate drafts covering both approaches be prepared.

Mr. Foster recommended that we incorporate a provision in our treaty calling for the destruction of conventional armaments intended for reserve forces since this provision was included in the Soviet draft treaty of March 15 and would, he believed, be substantially to our advantage. While this would affect our mothball fleet, it would have an even more significant effect on the very large Soviet stockpiled tanks and artillery. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD was willing to accept this as an item for bargaining at Geneva.

Mr. Foster recommended that consideration be given to the earlier ACDA proposal to deposit a certain number of B-47's for destruction provided the Soviet Union deposit an equal number of medium jet bombers. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD would go along with this proposal if it were incorporated in the U.S. position. General LeMay objected to a one-for-one trade of B-47's for Badgers, but agreed that some other ratio might be acceptable. He also raised the question of whether this did not accept the Soviet position on verification of disarmament. Mr. Wilson stated that Mr. Murrow felt that this proposal was actually very transparent since it was generally known that we were going to destroy the B-47 aircraft in any event. The President agreed that this proposal could be made if it were subsequently decided to be desirable in connection with the Geneva negotiations.

The President asked that a small interagency task force be formed to prepare a final draft of the treaty. It was decided that the drafting committee be made up of representatives of ACDA, Defense, JCS and White House.

Mr. Kaysen observed that the present treaty draft makes very extensive use of the mechanism of the so-called experts commission. He considered this undesirable since it focussed undue attention on secondary problems such as BW-CW and implied a lack of general knowledge on the subjects in question. He suggested that it would be more appropriate to give the IDO general powers in the treaty to study the problems and to discuss any commissions and annexes or appendices to the treaty outline. The President stated that the drafting committee should deal with this recommendation.

Dr. Wiesner stated that the present draft did not specify the states that would have to be party to the treaty in order for the first stage to come into effect or the states that would have to adhere to the treaty as a prerequisite to the transition from Stage I to Stage II. Mr. Foster agreed that this was an important point that had not yet been dealt with in the treaty. The President asked whether adherence of China was a requirement for the second stage. The Secretary said he felt it most certainly should be. Dr. Wiesner suggested that the original parties should include all of the NATO and Warsaw Pact members although it might be adequate to have only the U.S. and USSR as initial parties to the treaty.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of 14 participants on the last page of the memorandum is not printed.

¹ Not attached, but it was probably Foster's April 6 memorandum to the President; see [footnote 2](#), [Document 168](#).

170. Editorial Note

On April 9, 1962, the U.S. and British Governments sent a joint statement on nuclear testing to the Soviet Government, and a day later Prime Minister Macmillan sent a short letter to Chairman Khrushchev, asking Khrushchev seriously to consider the proposal set forth in the U.S.-U.K. statement.

Both the joint statement and Macmillan's letter were developed in a series of personal letters and telephone calls between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy and meetings between Kennedy's aides and British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore in Washington. The suggestion of a joint appeal to Khrushchev was contained, for example, in Macmillan's March 20 letter to President Kennedy, which also contained a draft text for such a message. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) See the Supplement. Regarding the draft text, see [footnote 2, Document 166](#). Additional documentation on the preparation of this joint statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing, 4/10/62, and Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K and K-M, 1961-1962.

The joint statement reiterated the British and U.S. view that international inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union was required in any nuclear test ban treaty in order to determine the nature of unexplained seismic events which might be nuclear tests. The statement asserted, "For nearly three years this need was accepted by the Soviet delegation at Geneva," but in the most recent negotiations had been "repeatedly rejected" by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Zorin, the Soviet representative at the talks. The joint statement also rejected national detection systems as adequate protection against clandestine tests. "In the present state of scientific instrumentation," it continued, "there are a great many cases in which we cannot distinguish between national and artificial seismic disturbances as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance and locating its probable epicenter." The statement concluded with the hope that the Soviet Government might reconsider its position and accept the principle of international verification; but if there was no change in its position, "the

[U.S.] test series scheduled for the latter part of this month will have to go forward.” For text of this statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume I, pages 292-293.

Macmillan’s April 10 letter personally appealed to Khrushchev “to give the most earnest consideration to our proposal. After all, the object of verification is not to increase suspicion, but to dispel it, to identify an event as a natural one so that confidence may not be threatened. I feel sure that once the principle of international verification is accepted, there will be a real chance of reaching an early agreement as to its application.” For text of the letter, see *ibid.*, page 294.

171. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, April 10, 1962.

JCSM-269-62

SUBJECT

Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ACDA Draft of April 9, 1962)^{[1](#)} (U)

1. The subject draft treaty has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views and comments are contained in the Appendix and Annexes A, B and C hereto.^{[2](#)}
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note with satisfaction that the current draft treaty in several respects is more nearly in consonance with their previously expressed views than earlier drafts. Of grave concern, however, is the expansion of previously expressed proposals concerning the untested, controversial and inadequate concept of inspection by random sampling. The recent history of disarmament negotiations with the Soviets has hinged in large measure on the critical issue of inspection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that provision for complete inspection is a requirement that must be met as part of any agreement to a reduction of armaments. They consider that the security of the United States is contingent upon this principle. Any proposals which are deliberately designed to be “unintrusive” and therefore, acceptable to the Soviets are a hazard to the security of the country.
- 3.

Other objectionable features of the proposed draft treaty are listed as follows:

- a. No provision for inclusion of Communist China or other militarily significant states in Stage I.
- b. No provision for establishing an International Disarmament Organization prior to start of Stage I reductions.

- c. Reduction of armaments by categories which could be disadvantageous to the United States.
- d. Complete elimination of armaments for reserve forces in Stage I.
(While this is a problem affecting all the Services, it particularly strikes at the 480 ships in the US reserve fleets which have no Soviet counterpart.)
- e. Inclusion of launching pads as an item of armament.
- f. Limitation on production during Stage I tied to armaments inventory.
- g. Prohibition on replacement of military personnel by civilians.
- h. Provision for compulsory jurisdiction of an International Court of Justice in Stage I.

Changes recommended in the Appendix would make the draft treaty satisfactory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- 4. It is recommended that the appended views be used as the basis for establishment of Department of Defense position, and that vigorous efforts be made to influence interdepartmental agreement toward this end.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting. Confidential.

¹ Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen Nation Committee)

² A 16-page Appendix entitled "Specific Comments" and Annexes A, B, and C are not printed.

172. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, April 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List [1](#)

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.

1. Methods of Reducing and Limiting Production of Armaments

Referring to the ACDA draft “Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World” (April 11, 1962), [2](#) Mr. Foster noted that differences between ACDA and Defense proposals respecting methods of reducing and limiting production of armaments had been substantially narrowed as a result of Defense’s modified presentation of its proposal. However, ACDA continued to regard its proposal of reduction and production by categories of armaments as preferable to Defense’s proposal that armaments be reduced by types and produced by categories.

Mr. Foster saw two advantages in the ACDA proposal. First, it permitted greater freedom to “vary the mix” of armaments during the uncertain first stage of disarmament. Second, it avoided negotiating problems which would arise from the Defense proposal which, although proposing reductions by types, would, as a result of production allowances, lead to increases in certain types. Defense’s presentation of its proposal had been improved, but the negotiating problem remained essentially the same.

The Secretary thought it unlikely that the two sides would wish to turn each other loose to make their own “mix” and that the “mix” would probably have to be negotiated. He asked Mr. Gilpatric whether Defense would be comfortable letting the Soviet Union make its own “mix”.

Mr. Gilpatric believed that by 1963, the earliest time a disarmament program such as that being discussed could realistically be initiated, our own "mix" of inter-continental weapons would be good and that Defense would prefer to freeze the "mix" at that point. Defense considered a production allowance in Stage I as primarily important from the standpoint of being ready to turn around if Stage I did not work. If a way could be found to keep production lines ready to go again and to allow only the production of parts during Stage I, Defense would prefer to hold the "mix" on the 1963 basis rather than to reduce and produce by categories which would permit a change in the "mix".

Mr. Foster asked whether by 1964 the "mix" would not be further improved from our viewpoint. Mr. Gilpatric affirmed that this was so but thought the 1963 "mix" a good one and considered it preferable to negotiate and inspect on the basis of "knowns" rather than "unknowns".

Dr. Wiesner agreed with Mr. Gilpatric and thought that reduction by types was a more understandable approach, one that the neutrals could be expected to understand.

Mr. Foster doubted that either approach was simple and commented that, on the basis of experience to date at Geneva, it would be necessary to explain matters time and time again. Referring to the problem of maintaining the readiness of production lines, he recalled that Mr. McCone had pointed out that production could be resumed more quickly in a controlled economy than in a free economy. Mr. Foster thought the problem needed to be weighed.

The Secretary recalled that Mr. Gilpatric had expressed the view that perhaps production during the first stage could be limited to production of parts. From the standpoint of disarmament, small production during the first stage would be better than large production. However, as Secretary of State, he also had to be interested in the combat capability of the retained 70 percent of armaments. He wondered how a small production allowance would affect this.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that production of parts would be required throughout disarmament in order to maintain the retained armaments. In so far as

maintaining production in readiness to turn around was concerned, he believed we had learned a good deal from experience during the past decade about how to control the flow of military production. We should not stop every wheel from turning during Stage I, but he did not think a large production allowance was needed to maintain production lines.

The Secretary reaffirmed his view that it would in fact be necessary to negotiate the “mix”. Vast increments of power could not be applied on a free-wheeling basis.

Mr. Kaysen believed that reduction by types would provide a tighter framework and that the variation of the “mix” resulting from production would be smaller than in an approach based on reduction and production by categories. Reduction by types tended to control shifts resulting from subsequent production although the degree of control was sensitive to the amount of production allowed.

Mr. Foster stated that he would agree with Mr. Kaysen if he were certain that security during disarmament could be preserved by maintaining the same relationship among types. Reductions by categories would ensure that higher quality armaments could be retained during the uncertainties of Stage I. Moreover, there were new armaments we would want to produce.

Mr. Gilpatric, however, thought it safer to freeze the “mix” at a known point. He said Defense was willing to look at the question of what specific production allowance should be provided and was willing to keep production low but not cut it out.

Dr. Wiesner wondered whether in view of the foregoing discussion agreement could not be reached on the Defense proposal. However, the Secretary and Mr. Foster believed that although it would be appropriate to include the Defense proposal in the next draft of the “Outline”, the President should be acquainted with the basic issues and that ACDA’s proposal should also be presented for this purpose.^{[3](#)}

Dr. Wiesner asked whether it would not be desirable to advise Ambassador Dean of what limits on production the U.S. contemplated.

Mr. Foster thought the percentage should be small but that it was difficult to decide.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Dean could be authorized to say that production would be not more than 10 percent a year? This should be sufficient for maintenance.

Mr. Kaysen noted that this would make the production allowance equal to the proposal percentage for reductions. Although any additional production would be carried out within the ceilings established by the reductions, it would be good to have two figures with the figure for production substantially lower than that for reductions.

Dr. Wiesner recalled a suggestion made by Dr. Haworth on another occasion that production might be limited to ten percent over a three year period.

After some discussion of a formulation to the effect that production would be “substantially lower than 10 percent a year”, the matter was left unresolved.

2. Application of percentage reductions to launching pads

Mr. Foster then called attention to Dr. Wiesner’s proposal that fixed launching pads as well as missiles should be subject to reduction during Stage I. The proposal was a recent one, and there had been no opportunity to examine it in detail. Although the proposal concerned fixed launching pads, Mr. Foster wondered how, for example, Polaris submarines would be counted and noted that since they were already included within a category of armaments subject to reduction, there was danger that they might become subject to a double reduction. He also understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were troubled by the proposal⁴ and feared that it might lead to opening up the issue of foreign bases in Stage I whereas it was now proposed to discuss their reduction as a Stage II measure.

Mr. Gilpatric thought there were definite advantages in getting the concept of reducing launching pads in at the beginning. The availability to the Soviet Union of higher yield missiles magnified the value of their launching

pads. Moreover, he thought it easier to inspect the destruction of launching pads than missiles.

Gen. Lemnitzer did not see how Polaris could logically be excluded from a discussion of launching pads and confirmed Mr. Foster's understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the possibility that the foreign bases issue might be raised if the U.S. proposed a Stage I reduction of launching pads.

Dr. Wiesner acknowledged that the proposal had been advanced only recently. However, it had been realized that we had left a loophole, which he thought it important that we should try to close. It was his understanding that at least in the case of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union had produced back-up missiles for each launching pad. Consequently, if missiles alone were reduced, the Soviet Union could merely keep filling up the launching pads, and no effective reduction of their capability would take place. He believed that the fact that Polaris submarines were already subject to reduction would eliminate them from consideration in connection with the launching pad problem.

The Secretary saw some advantages in destruction of fixed launching pads if Polaris submarines were not subject to double-counting. He thought that it was desirable to move targets such as launching pads away from populated areas and out to sea and did not understand the point of view of some of the Europeans who apparently felt more comfortable living by the side of strategic targets. Development of the concept of open cities might be one way to save the human race from destruction. He wondered how CIA felt about the matter.

Mr. Marengo responded that unless the proposal were adopted, we would seek to control only missiles, which were easier to hide than launching pads. He confirmed Dr. Wiesner's understanding that the Soviet Union did keep more than one missile per pad. Consequently, Soviet salvo capability might be untouched by a reduction of missiles alone.

The Secretary concluded that, on balance, the proposal to reduce fixed launching pads should be accepted.

3. Elimination during Stage I of armaments for reserve forces

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had introduced a new proposal calling during Stage I for the elimination of armaments for reserve forces. ACDA did not feel too strongly about the matter but believed that it might be advantageous to take the Soviet Union up on its offer.

Gen. Lemnitzer recalled that he had at an earlier time been concerned about what might be done with respect to Soviet reserve forces. The new proposal might be a way of getting at this problem, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about its practicability. They did not see any clear way of determining what amounts of armaments were for reserve forces.

The Secretary thought the matter was complicated by the fact that certain reserve stocks are maintained for active forces. He thought it would be difficult to differentiate between such stocks and other stocks for reserve forces.

Gen. Lemnitzer agreed and said that he did not know how this could be done.

Mr. Gilpatric recognized that since the Soviet Union had raised the issue, it was bound to come up. However, he thought it undesirable for the United States to put the proposal in its own "Outline." Since the matter would come up, it should be studied further.

Mr. Foster agreed not to put the proposal in the "Outline" but noted that we would have to be prepared to respond to the Soviet proposal.

4. Restraints on replacement of armed forces by civilian personnel

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had proposed that civilian personnel be subject to the Stage I reduction of force levels. The United States could not accept this, but at the same time in view of the greater flexibility of the Soviet Union in replacing military personnel with civilians, it did not seem desirable to leave the matter untouched. ACDA had proposed language which was intended to restrict the replacement of military personnel by civilians.

Mr. Fisher commented that we did not wish to leave room to change the “mix” of civilian and military personnel.

Mr. Gilpatric thought a restriction of this character would prove difficult to police, but he considered the ACDA proposal acceptable.

5. Stage II production

Mr. Foster pointed out that ACDA had proposed that Stage II production be limited to replacement in kind on a one-for-one basis and that Defense had proposed that parts only be produced. ACDA was prepared to accept the Defense proposal if Defense had concluded that production of parts only would meet needs during Stage II.

Mr. Gilpatric confirmed that this was Defense’s conclusion.

The Secretary and Mr. Webb departed at this point.

Mr. Fisher called attention to the fact that in order to provide an opportunity for the President to examine the “Outline” before the meeting scheduled for the next afternoon, it would be necessary to make a revised draft available to the White House by 10:00 a.m. in the morning. Accordingly he requested that any additional comments on the present draft be made available to ACDA as rapidly as possible. In this connection, he inquired whether AEC had had an opportunity to review the language on Stage II proposals respecting nuclear weapons which had been revised in the light of staff level discussions (the proposals referred to appear on p. 48 of the draft of April 11). Dr. Haworth confirmed that the new language was acceptable to AEC and asked, with respect to another matter, whether language respecting the coming into force of the Treaty could not be modified to preclude the possibility that failure of a single state (other than the United States or the Soviet Union) to ratify the Treaty would delay its coming into force. Mr. Fisher agreed to modify the language to preclude this possibility.

Mr. Kaysen then summarized the results of the meeting as follows:

1. Both the Defense and ACDA approaches to the problem of reducing and producing armaments would be presented to the President. In this

connection, the question of how to handle the B-47 and the Badger continued to be in disagreement. It should be made clear to the President that the size of the production allowance plays a central role in the merits of the two proposals. If the production allowance were large, there was little difference between the two approaches.

2. Fixed launching pads would be subject to reduction during Stage I.
3. Reduction of armaments for reserve forces would not be proposed but the matter would be studied.
4. Restraints on replacing military personnel with civilians would be proposed in Stage I.
5. Stage II armaments production would be limited to production of parts.

In closing the meeting, Mr. Foster noted the Delegation's desire that "will" rather than "would" be used in the "Outline". He thought the drafting and clearances of the "Outline" had proceeded to the stage where it was difficult to adopt the Delegation's suggestion.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1162. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in ACDA by Foster on April 16 and in S by Emory C. Swank on April 20.

¹ The list of 17 participants is not printed.

² Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen Nation Committee)

³ See [Document 173](#).

⁴ See [Document 171](#).

173. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy[Source](#)

Washington, April 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Issues

1. The attached draft outline treaty, the final result of a long process of discussion between ACDA and other interested agencies, is submitted for your approval. (Tab B)^{[1](#)} It is now all agreed; except for one major issue left for your decision.
2. The open issue is the way which we specify for reducing armaments. The treaty draft (Stage I, Section A, pp. 8 through 13) is organized in terms of reduction by types and production by categories. This is the alternative preferred by all the principals save ACDA. Defense, JCS, AEC and the White House Staff prefer this alternative strongly. At the Principals Meeting yesterday,^{[2](#)} Secretary Rusk indicated that he shares this preference. CIA and USIA have indicated no strong position on this point. The ACDA method (Tab C)^{[3](#)} is drafted in terms of reduction and production by categories.
- 3.

As you will remember, this is a problem which has been discussed at some length before, and specifically in your last meeting with the Principals on April 6.^{[4](#)} In the first stage, reduction by types involves a 30% cut in the inventory of each individual type of weapon (e.g., B-52, Minuteman, Atlas, etc.). During this stage, there would also be a production allowance for each category (e.g., long-range strategic delivery vehicles, which includes all the types listed above). This allowance could be used to offset the reduction in, or even increase the numbers of, any type, provided that the numbers of some other type within the same category were reduced correspondingly to maintain the over-all 30% reduction for the whole category. In the second stage, when there is no production

except for maintenance, reduction proceeds by types, and categories are no longer significant. The alternative formulation of reduction and production by categories means that the reduction of 30% is charged against a category as a whole, and can be taken in terms of any specific weapons within the categories, i.e., the whole reduction could be charged against a single type of weapon if it constituted 30% or more of the category. The production allowance is treated similarly. Tab A gives a model computation which illustrates the difference between the two methods.⁵

The most significant difference between the two methods lies in the extent to which they permit a change in the mix of armaments. For any given rate of reduction (e.g., 30%) and any given production allowance (e.g., 10%), reduction by types permits a much smaller change in the mix than reduction by categories. Of course, the larger the production allowance, the less important this difference becomes, but all parties to the discussion agreed that we should be thinking in terms of a small production allowance. Further, under reduction by types, changes in mix cease after the end of Stage I, when production ceases except for maintenance requirements. Reduction by categories, however, permits the change in mix to proceed until complete disarmament is reached.

4.

There are two arguments in favor of reduction by types. First, it is desirable to stabilize the mix of weapons on both sides, from the point of view of our security interests. A method which allows only small and relatively predictable changes in the mix leaves the military balance more or less where it is now. Even if we could foresee a balance of advantage in the game of changing the mix, that balance in fact is very sensitive to the boundaries of the categories. These would be a matter of negotiation and accordingly it is difficult to predict where we would come out. In yesterday's meeting, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer and Rusk all stated clearly that they considered a more or less stable mix more desirable than a situation in which each side tried to take advantage of its freedom to vary the mix substantially.

Further, despite the complications introduced by production allowances in Stage I, reduction by types, carried through the three stages of the treaty to the eventual goal, corresponds more nearly to the simple notion of disarmament across-the-board than does reduction by categories.

Accordingly, it will be easier to explain and defend in Geneva.⁶

5.

On the other side, the arguments of ACDA for reduction by categories are also two. First, they assert it is an important strategic advantage to be able to vary our weapons mix considerably. Second, they fear that the problem of explaining reduction by types during the first stage, when there is a production allowance, is such that we might give the impression that our offer is deceptive. ACDA does agree that the present language on this point (see p. 8, A, I, a.) has minimized this problem, although they do not think it has disappeared entirely. USIA is of the view that there is no significant difference in ease of explanation between the two. It should be observed, however, that there is in fact more room for a large increase during the first stage in the numbers of a specific weapon, e.g., Polaris missiles, under the ACDA alternative than under reduction by types.

ACDA's presentation of its view on this point is attached at Tab D. Note that in the computation on page 3, they have included B-47's in the intercontinental strategic category, although their proposal (Tab C, pp. 1-2, items 2 a, b) put them in a separate category.

6. The treaty is long. The more important provisions which you might wish to scan are listed on the first page of Tab B. Those that are starred (*) are especially significant.

7. Tab E contains a brief chronology that I prepared of the steps to the agreed document.

Carl Kaysen⁷

⁶ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, Memorandum to the President 4/12/62.

Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

¹ This attached draft, April 12, is not printed.

² See [Document 172](#).

³ Tabs C-E are not printed.

⁴ See [Document 169](#).

⁵ For text, see the Supplement.

⁶ A summary of the Department of Defense views on reductions by types and categories as well as on other issues is in a memorandum from Gilpatric to McNamara, April 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Editorial Note

The Committee of Principals met with President Kennedy in the Cabinet Room of the White House on April 12, 1962, from 5 to 6 p.m. Glenn Seaborg wrote the following summary of the discussion on disarmament:

“Rusk explained the reduction by category in comparison to reduction by type. He emphasized the key role of production in the decision between the two. He says that if production is not small, we would have a modernization program rather than a disarmament program. Foster said he thought there was more flexibility in reduction by category, and said he wanted the DOD to be sure that they saw the implications of reduction by type with small replacements. Rusk said he thought about 5% per year of production might be negotiable while Foster said it might be only 3%. The President decided to go ahead with reduction by types.

“Rusk again asked whether DOD understood the figures, and McNaughton answered in the affirmative. McNaughton said they want production by type so as to keep the plants warm, that is, keep them in good condition. The President pointed out that this presents a real problem from the standpoint of public relations in the disarmament negotiations. He wanted to know how we could explain the reason for keeping our plants warm. Wiesner said we needed to protect ourselves until we are sure of disarmament.

“The President asked if they agreed to inspection from the beginning, could we forego this. Kaysen said the explanation should be along the lines of saying that it is an honest plan and that the Soviet plan is not honest; that it is a complicated problem not to be solved by a radical change, and that serious people should think about starting cautiously. Wiesner also mentioned the need for economic turn-around time.

“The President then said OK, but we can back off from this insist-ence on production if we can get inspection from the very beginning and, of course, the success of our negotiating such a position depends on our skill in handling it. Rusk said the DOD must agree that the production should be

low and McNaughton said they do so agree, and they can work out suitable language.

“Next, the question of the reduction of launch pads was considered. The representatives of the Chiefs of Staff said that the Chiefs can't agree to this because they haven't had enough time to study it. McNaughton said that he and McNamara and Gilpatric feel this should be included and that they see no defect in the argument for putting it into effect from the beginning. The representative of the Chiefs said it could be put in later, and Rusk pointed out it could also be put in at the beginning and dropped later.

“McNamara and Lemnitzer, who entered the meeting at this stage, both agreed that the reduction in launch pads should be put in the treaty from the beginning.

“The next question involved the reduction in reserve armament and Rusk suggested that it should not be in the treaty.

“The President asked who was going over to Geneva and was told that Foster and McNaughton were.

“Kaysen pointed out the problem of accepting jurisdiction of the international court under the treaty. Lemnitzer objected to the inclusion of the principle of zonal inspection in such definite language, and McNamara suggested that the language in the last sentence of page 27 of the April 12 draft could be made more conditional by including the phrase, ‘for example.’ The President said that the more he looks at this problem, the more complicated it seems to be and, therefore, he appreciates the efforts of Foster, Fisher, McNaughton and the others who have worked on it.”
(Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 26, Supplement, pages 128-130)

The meeting then turned to preparations for the upcoming U.S. nuclear tests, the discussion of which Seaborg also summarized in his journal. (ibid., pages 130-131)

175. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, April 17, 1962.

DEAR FRIEND, Mr. Khrushchev has at last given a definite, if somewhat prolix, reply to my simple question on international verification.¹

Now we have the problem of the eight well meaning neutrals.² I understand that after further discussion this morning it was agreed that the neutrals should clarify their proposals at a meeting on Thursday morning, April 19.³ On the assumption that these remain substantially unchanged, I suggest that Dean and Godber should take this line. After referring to other difficulties, for instance that the right to initiate a verification in the neutrals' original proposal seems to lie not with the complainant nation but with the commission or even with the nation complained of; i.e. not the plaintiff but the court or even the defendant, they should say that there is still the vital point of Russian objection to any form of inspection on Russian soil. This point was made quite clear by the President and the Prime Minister in their joint statement and by the Prime Minister in his letter to Mr. Khrushchev who has turned it down flat. They should repeat that if the Russians will now, even at this late hour, accept the principle of international verification, negotiation becomes possible. If not, it cannot for the moment be fruitful. Therefore the tests must proceed.

One of my difficulties is that the House of Commons rises at 4 p.m. on April 19. My normal time for a statement would be at 12 noon that day. If this is the agreed line for Dean and Godber to take I could confine my statement to giving it to the House.

My reading of the situation is that the Russians are determined to have their own series of tests and are relying on yours as the excuse. Therefore I think it very unlikely that they will accept this principle which obviously must have the effect of, at any rate, postponing both your tests and theirs.

With warm regard,

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to the source text is a note from Ormsby Gore to the President, April 17, explaining that the Prime Minister asked him “to pass to you the enclosed message on the neutrals' proposals at Geneva on nuclear tests.”

¹ For text of Khrushchev's message to Macmillan, April 12 (U.N. doc. ENDC/27), see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 318-328. Regarding Macmillan's letter to Khrushchev, to which Khrushchev replied, see [Document 170](#).

² Reference is to the eight-nation memorandum on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (U.N. doc. ENDC/28) on April 16. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 334-336.

³ For text of the statement by Acting Ethiopian Representative Petros Sahlu, who spoke on behalf of the eight delegations before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 19, see *ibid.*, pp. 394-395.23

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

176. Editorial Note

Glenn Seaborg sent a letter to President Kennedy on April 12, 1962, requesting the President's approval of the proposed atmospheric testing program of 26 shots, plus 2 contingency shots. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) See the Supplement. The National Security Council met on April 18 from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House to review this proposal. A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 18, presented the agenda for this NSC meeting and reviewed the issues for decision and the options available to the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 499)

Seaborg summarized the NSC meeting as follows:

“The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary McNamara to discuss the proposed Polaris and Atlas systems proof tests. The Secretary described the need for the Polaris test and the nature of the test, and said he recommended its inclusion. He said that the Atlas test presented some problems with respect to the possibilities of an abort and the effect that this would have on the public confidence in it as a system. He also said that there could be a small, but negligible, health hazard in connection with such a test. In view of this and other factors, he said that he would like more time to study the matter.

“Lemnitzer spoke in favor of the inclusion of both tests. He showed a number of charts which pictured the locale and described in some detail the nature of the Atlas and Polaris tests.

“I described briefly the safety considerations with respect to the Atlas test, indicating that it probably did not present a real health hazard but that there certainly were public relations problems involved.

“The President then asked me to discuss the proposed surface shot in Nevada. I said that this is a shot in which both DOD and AEC have an interest, that it is an effects test that has to be conducted in the atmosphere

and has to be conducted over dry land because its aim is to measure the effects of electromagnetic radiation on electronic instrumentation under possible operating conditions. I said that, in addition, the AEC has the aim of measuring the effect of weapons on weapon component parts.

“The President inquired as to the possibility of a photographer taking a photograph of a mushroom-like cloud and publishing it. He asked whether the cloud would be of that type. I said that it is difficult to describe it accurately in those terms; that some might call it a mushroom and others not. In answer to his further question, I said that it would rise to about 20,000 feet.

“Bundy and I indicated that there would have to be at least 24 hours' notice to the airlines and, hence, it would become publicly known so that possibly photographs could be taken. The President indicated that the shot should be placed at the end of the series, in view of these complicating factors.

“There was then a discussion of the starting date and proposed timing of the announcement. Foster felt that the starting date should not be next Monday (April 23rd) because this is the day of reconvening the group in Geneva, and it seems that Tuesday or Wednesday would, therefore, be indicated.

“Rusk suggested, and the President concurred, that the announcement should be by the AEC, and just at the time, without much lead time. I indicated that a definite time has to be set pretty soon, and Haworth added that 5 days lead time is needed, to which the President replied that we will be given a starting date with that much lead time.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 3, pages 421, 425)

NSC Action No. 2450, April 18, recorded the following decisions reached at this meeting;

- “a. Discussed the spring 1962 nuclear atmospheric test series proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
- “b. Noted the President's approval of the tests in the attached list with the exception of the Atlas D (MK-49) weapons system test, which is not to be fired pending further study in the Department of Defense.

- “c. Noted the President’s desire that the 2 KT surface test in Nevada be fired toward the end of the test series.
- “d. Discussed the timing and announcement of the test series and agreed that announcements of tests would be made in the lowest possible key by the Atomic Energy Commission.”

The attachment cited in paragraph b listed 26 tests plus 2 contingency tests. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

In a memorandum for the record of the White House staff meeting on April 19, Colonel Ewell noted:

“i. Bundy laughingly referred to the NSC meeting, and said that it was rather pro forma, that the actual decision had been made five minutes before the meeting in a talk between the President and Mr. McNamara. The meeting itself just went through a ritual discussion of the problem, and I gather that the President made the decision that had already been agreed on. Bundy also said that Secretary Rusk expressed dismay at discussing such a sensitive subject in front of 30 or 40 people. Evidently Ambassador Stevenson had felt that this meeting would afford him a vehicle in which to sound off at length about atmospheric testing, and when it was cut off rather short Bromley Smith was left holding the sack of placating Ambassador Stevenson. This brings to mind the increasing tendency of late to obtain early decisions in the back rooms and corridors of the White House rather than on the floor in formal debate.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

The nuclear test series, called Dominic I, consisted of 36 detonations held in the Pacific Ocean area from April 25 to November 3, 1962. The first 27 were held in the vicinity of Christmas Island in the spring and summer. The remaining nine tests were conducted in the Johnston Island area during the fall. (Regarding the last nine shots, see [Document 218](#).) These tests complemented other nuclear test shots, which had been resumed in the continental United States in September 1961. President Kennedy approved additional nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean area and Nevada on May 8 (memorandum of decision, May 9; Kennedy Library, National Security

Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) and June 20 (see [Document 189](#)).

On May 10, President Kennedy requested Prime Minister Macmillan's approval of two of the proposed tests in the Christmas Island area (memorandum from Bundy to Ormsby Gore, May 10; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 5/62), and Ambassador Ormsby Gore conveyed the Prime Minister's oral approval to Bundy on May 16. (Memorandum for the record, May 18; *ibid.*, Additional Tests, 5/62) Bundy requested the Prime Minister's assent for another Christmas Island air drop shot on July 7. (Letter from Bundy to Ormsby Gore, July 2; *ibid.*, 5/6-7/30/62) The British response has not been found, but presumably approval was given because the shot took place on July 11.

President Kennedy was also sensitive to world reactions to the U.S. test series. On June 13, for example, "The President urged Mr. Bundy to see what he could do about getting the nuclear tests outside the atmosphere speeded up and accomplished as fast as possible. He feels that there is too long a delay." (Memorandum for the record by Clifton, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, Dominic, 2/62-4/62) In a telephone call to Seaborg a day later to put a hold on an above-surface Nevada shot scheduled for June 26, Bundy remarked that "the President would like to have the other high altitude shots over with as soon as possible." (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 3, page 605) And shortly before the June 20 meeting, "Bundy observed that the President is quite keen to end the series and would probably resist stretching it in order to get another high altitude shot." He added that "everyone but the President seemed to feel that radiation in milk was no real problem. However, the President, like Lincoln, constituted a majority of one in this case." (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, June 20; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-Sep 62)

Most of the shots were airdrops, but two were conducted in the open ocean and five were high-altitude bursts launched by rockets. A history of the Pacific series, with emphasis on the participation of Department of Defense personnel, is *Operation Dominic I—1962*, DNA-6040F (Defense Nuclear

Agency, 1983). The dates, location, type, purpose, and yield range of each shot are summarized in *Announced United States Nuclear Tests, June 1945 Through December 1990*, DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 11) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office).

The Soviet Union resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in early August 1962.

177. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) [Source](#)

Washington, April 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

During my conversation with Mr. Dobrynin today we had a few words about nuclear testing. I pointed out to him that the President had more than once said that his principal disappointment since assuming office was the failure of the three governments concerned to reach a mutually acceptable agreement to ban nuclear tests. I pointed out that we had made strenuous efforts, beginning in March 1961, to meet what we understood to be the Soviet position and had continued these efforts at the present Geneva Conference. I pointed, as examples, to our proposals to eliminate the threshold and to ban tests in all environments (without an increase in inspection arrangements), and to locate control posts in the Soviet Union in direct relationship to seismicity. I outlined to him the principal points in my Geneva talk which led us to conclude that espionage could not be a serious question.^{[1](#)}

I added that it now appears that we shall have to resume tests and, from what has been said in Moscow, we would assume that the Soviets will also test again. I said that it was a continuing policy of the United States to bring about a complete and permanent end of all testing on the basis of an agreement which would give reasonable assurance to the signatories that the agreement was being lived up to. I thought it important for our two governments to remain in contact with each other on this matter and to make every effort to bring to an end the kind of nuclear race in which we are now engaged.

He said he was concerned that the resumption of tests by the United States would lead to a worsening of relations between our two governments. He used the familiar arguments about the numbers of tests conducted by the West and by the Soviet Union and said he did not understand why we had not accepted the statement of the eight powers in Geneva as a basis for

further discussion.² After a brief discussion of well known positions of both sides this portion of the conversation ended without a defined conclusion.

DR³

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2362. Secret. Drafted by Secretary Rusk.

¹ In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 23, Secretary Rusk disputed the Soviet complaint that the test ban control system “would facilitate Western espionage against the Soviet Union.” For text of his statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 167-176.

² See [footnote 2, Document 175](#). For text of the U.S. paper submitted in response on April 17 (U.N. doc. ENDC/29), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 336-338.

³ Rusk’s initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Rusk signed the original.

178. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, April 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The Secretary reviewed the vital interests of the West in the Berlin situation: the presence of our forces and of access to West Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin to have whatever arrangements with others which were important to its continued free life and viability.¹ These were the more immediate questions and then there were broader ones. He referred to Gromyko's comment on the fact that there is some interdependence between progress on disarmament and progress on Berlin. In this connection he wanted Mr. Dobrynin to know that the United States was very serious in its approach to the disarmament question; this was equally true as regards nuclear testing and the United States would be happy to sign a satisfactory agreement on this subject, for example, this afternoon. Other broader questions about which he had talked with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva included the questions of diffusion of nuclear weapons, of boundaries and of non-aggression. The American side had repeatedly said that if the question of the vital interests could be disposed of, we considered that the others would easily fall into place. He observed, however, that Mr. Gromyko had repeated a demand for an end to the Occupation as an essential condition and if this were so, then Mr. Gromyko's reference to obstacles in the way of an agreement was an understatement. On the question of access, both sides had put up proposals for an International Access Authority. Perhaps some progress could be made if these were discussed on the basis of the essential needs on both sides. He pointed out that the United States had tried to take into account the fact that the USSR had put forward over several years public positions with respect to Germany and Berlin. He pointed out that the United States had also made

proposals. It was clear that these proposals on both sides were unacceptable and he had discussed with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva the question of how we manage a state of disagreement. This was why the United States had put forward its working paper on "Draft Principles" which had deliberately omitted certain points of interest to both sides but provided a means for continuing to try to talk out these disagreed matters.² The Secretary said frankly he did not see how we could be expected to go much further without knowing where we stand on the central issues. As he had told Mr. Gromyko, the matter of diffusion of nuclear weapons was a US national policy which we applied even to our own allies, with the single exception of the UK which had been an original partner with us in atomic development. In general, therefore, we found ourselves in a situation where the broader range of questions was subject to some movement and improvement. This brought us down to essential elements which were really, in the case of Berlin, the matter of our presence there and, in the case of disarmament, the question of verification. These were the keys which would unlock a whole series of possibilities. For the moment he would leave aside the disarmament aspect. He could, of course, repeat all that we had said in many conversations about our presence in West Berlin, but the Ambassador already knew our position. After the Ambassador confirmed that he did, the Secretary commented that since Mr. Dobrynin was a new participant in these talks perhaps he could bring some fresh air into them. Laughing, Mr. Dobrynin observed that he had his instructions. He then went on to say that he understood the Secretary was not directly linking the problems of Berlin and of disarmament. The Secretary confirmed this was the case and Dobrynin said that similarly the USSR was not linking the two. He said he thought the relationship between them had been made very clear in Mr. Khrushchev's statement. The Secretary agreed that this was essentially our own interpretation.

The Secretary said he wanted to call Ambassador Dobrynin's attention to his statement at his press conference yesterday³ and to Ambassador Dean's statement in Geneva on nuclear testing.⁴ He hoped that the Soviet side understood that this question is discussable every day and not just after the completion of the present series of United States tests. There must be some point at which the two sides could agree to acceptable terms on nuclear

testing since he could see no interest to either of them in spending billions in a continuing nuclear race.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the question was on what basis agreement could be reached. He referred to the Secretary's statement in reply to a question at his press conference about the possibility of an agreement to stop atmospheric testing. He said that the press had discussed this possibility and he had been asked to clarify whether this meant that the United States is disposed to conclude such an agreement limited to atmospheric tests.

The Secretary replied in the negative. He said that in replying to this question he had just not wanted to foreclose the possibility of future developments and to emphasize the importance that we should continue talking on this subject. For example, he said, Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet scientists have improved the instrumentation capable of distinguishing between an underground explosion and an earthquake. Perhaps the Soviet scientists had something that we did not have and maybe it would be a good idea if our scientists could be brought together with them in this connection.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he understood the Secretary's position. He had simply wanted to clarify the matter. As he understood it, both sides are ready today only to sign their own treaty proposals.

After indicating his acceptance of the Ambassador's formulation the Secretary said he wanted to add that we could not accept the Soviet charge that the minimal amount of verification in the US proposals amounted to "espionage." However, he concluded, if we continue talking all aspects of the matter can be further discussed.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2762. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 11.

¹ A 7-page memorandum of the conversation on Berlin is *ibid.*, 762.00/4-2762. A telegraphic summary is printed in [vol. XV, pp. 121](#) -[122](#) .

² Reference is to a paper handed to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva on March 22; for text, see [ibid., pp. 69-71](#).

³ For extracts of Rusk's remarks, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 462-464.

⁴ In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 26, Dean explained the U.S. reasons for resuming nuclear testing in the atmosphere. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 456-457.

179. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

Prime Minister Macmillan's Visit to Washington, April 27-29

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Secretary
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA

British

Prime Minister Macmillan
Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
Mr. M.A.M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
Mr. John Thompson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister

The President said he would like to review what the Prime Minister and he had discussed about nuclear testing. We should wait until after our tests which would take three or four months and the Soviet tests which we expected to follow. Then we should consider after analyzing the results whether we should make another offer limited to tests in the atmosphere or consisting of an entire treaty. We should be considering now what should be done. We would have to take into account pressures in our two countries and around the world.

The Prime Minister said he had been watching this matter for a long time. We are always on the point of agreement then, such is the ingenuity of our

scientists, they think of something which makes agreement impossible. In fact we have steadily moved to less vigorous requirements. We always seem to miss the proper moment. We could have had an agreement some years back on what we are offering now. That is, assuming the Russians want an agreement. Years ago we never heard of underground testing. We ought to get our scientists together on this in the three or four months period available. They should work partly in light of world reactions and partly in the light of what might be acceptable to the Russians. A nuclear test agreement has its relations to the whole disarmament discussions. The Russians were saying that if we were prepared to disarm they would accept some control. We are only asking for an occasional team to look at some explosion.

The Prime Minister said that if we develop a new plan on nuclear testing we should present it directly to Khrushchev. We should not make it public. Doing so would only lead to propaganda. Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought that whatever offer is made on nuclear tests cannot be based on the 1958 treaty. Having turned it down completely all along the line, the Russians could not go back to the old treaty. We would have to say that our proposals were based on something new.

The President remarked that we could offer an atmospheric test ban. If we go further, however, we have to tread on old ground. Anyway we should have our scientists go to work.

Mr. Bundy commented on the importance of keeping the plan quiet. If the possibility of new proposals on tests was discussed in advance in this country it would be much more difficult to defend once it was presented. The President said he was sure we should not reveal that we were discussing another atmospheric test ban offer. After an analysis of the tests we may find that we cannot make one. The Secretary noted that our present offer involves only a farthing of inspection. If it is rejected by the Russians the prospects for general disarmament are most discouraging.

The Prime Minister pointed out that our position calls for episodic inspections or fixed controls. We have really exhausted all the arguments about the offer before we have even made it. Agreement will not come about as the result of a long elaborate process. We spend half our time

defending offers before our own people. We did quite well at Geneva until right at the end. Then we did not do too well with the neutrals. The Secretary paid tribute to the way in which Lord Home had handled Gromyko at Geneva.

The Prime Minister recalled that when he sat down with Khrushchev he said to him that we might have three or four inspections or some agreed number. Khrushchev accepted. The Prime Minister had gotten into trouble with President Eisenhower over this suggestion. Khrushchev had tried to hold him to it. The point was that a formal, elaborate approach gets us into trouble.

The Prime Minister raised again the subject of nuclear tests in the afternoon meeting. He said he understood there had been one or two changes with respect to the systems tests. The President replied that the Atlas test had been cancelled. We were still thinking of carrying out the other systems tests. Mr. Bundy said that the other changes were marginal and technical in nature.

The Prime Minister explained that he wanted to be able to say that the President and he had worked out the question of tests together, that any changes were made together. Mr. Bundy said that the number of tests remained the same.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret. Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Reference to “the afternoon meeting” in the penultimate paragraph indicates that the discussion of nuclear testing resumed in the afternoon. Macmillan visited Washington April 27-29 to discuss questions of common concern with President Kennedy.

180. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

Prime Minister Macmillan's Visit to Washington, April 27-29

SUBJECT

The Future of Disarmament Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

[Here follows the same list as [Document 179](#).]

The President noted that the Prime Minister and he had not discussed the future of disarmament negotiations. He understood that the talks at Geneva would continue until June. The Secretary said he anticipated only an interim report by June 1. We hoped to work out agreement on something. The disarmament conference, however, should stay in session. We might get a break-through on the point of inspection. The President said that was right. We should keep at it. He recommended continuing the conference beyond June 1. The Prime Minister asked whether we regarded the conference as a propaganda exercise or a real exercise. The Secretary replied that at the moment the Soviets were playing it as a propaganda exercise. It was important that we put forward only those proposals we believed in. The Russians talked of inspection of disarmament only, yet in the nuclear test field they refused to agree to inspection of a cessation of tests.

* [Source](#): Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret. Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House.

181. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, May 10, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I believe the moment is approaching for us to make a new proposal for a test ban treaty which will stand a better chance of acceptance than anything we have yet put forward.

Such a proposal may offer the only method of preventing a non-stop series of competitive nuclear tests in the atmosphere. I have little doubt that if, as we expect, the Russian test in the near future, there will be strong pressure for a “follow on” series of American tests in 1963, to which the Russians will again respond. I do not believe we stand to benefit in the long run, either technically or politically, from unrestricted atmospheric testing. It is bound to result in a rising tide of protest all over the world.

I therefore recommend, along lines I proposed before we resumed atmospheric testing, that at the first useful opportunity we offer the Russians a test ban treaty providing for detection and location of nuclear explosions through existing systems, with a right to a limited number of on-site inspections for suspicious underground events. If accepted, such a treaty would stop atmospheric testing and provide some deterrent even to clandestine underground testing. Since underground tests now seem to be of only minor importance for security purposes, we should today be able to accept less stringent controls for underground shots than we have previously demanded.

I believe we should make this proposal at the first useful opportunity, certainly well before the beginning of the September 1962 General Assembly session. If the Russians refuse to agree to any on-site inspection by outside authorities—as they do today—we should then be prepared to offer a simple atmospheric test ban treaty without international controls.

An initiative of this kind is required not only to stop atmospheric tests, but also because we have not persuaded third parties that we really need the

volume of international control on which we have been insisting for a test ban covering the most significant tests—namely, atmospheric and large underground explosions. It would be a pity if we were forced by outside pressures grudgingly to accept a stripped-down treaty after long resistance. Instead, we have an opportunity here to exercise real leadership, if we move in the right direction in time. And if our efforts should fail, there would be no question where the responsibility for continuing nuclear competition rested.

Turning to disarmament, I observe that after the opening flurry and the debate on testing, the Geneva Conference has tended to bog down. To maintain hopes for progress, and to demonstrate our continued interest in helpful initial steps, I suggest that:

- a. We continue to press for Soviet agreement to take up the question of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. It seems to me that this is the most timely possible initial step, and we ought to push the Russians unmercifully on it.
- b. We should accept the Russian proposal to start talking about measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Of course we may have to tangle with them on the precise terms of an agreement on this subject. We favor the “Irish resolution” formula, which would prohibit transfer to states but permit us to carry on with NATO-type arrangements for multilateral control of nuclear weapons;¹ the Soviets may press for “Swedish resolution” arrangements precluding this type of transfer as well.² But I think we can be perfectly straightforward in justifying our position, and that we can gain considerable support for it. I believe it is in both the Russian interest and our own to prevent China and Germany from acquiring an independent nuclear capability. I am not aware that we have carefully explored the possibilities of using this factor to reach agreement with the Russians on the no-transfer problem.
- c. I suggest a further look at the idea of agreeing to the establishment of denuclearized zones. I believe we should be able to distinguish between areas where nuclear defense is critically important to us and areas where it is not. We suffered badly in the General Assembly last Fall through our inability to agree to a resolution proposing a denuclearized zone in Africa. If the African states want one—and this is not entirely clear as

regards all of them—I do not see why we should not support their wishes. The same is true of Latin America. We could logically demand inspection provisions to ensure compliance.

- d. I believe we should make a specific proposal, apart from a full disarmament treaty, for an inspected agreement to bar weapons of mass destruction from orbit. This would involve inspection to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction were included in vehicles launched into orbit. There may be some risk in permitting international inspection of our launchings, but I should think, first, that inspection limited to this single purpose would not have to compromise most other classified information on vehicles, equipment, propellents, etc., and second, that we would gain at least as much from participating in inspection of the Russians as they would from inspection of our launchings. In any event, given the present Soviet phobia on inspection, I think we could get the advantage of a “no bombs in orbit” proposal without much probability that the Russians would ever agree—though if they did I think we would still be the gainers.

Finally, as regards the peaceful uses of outer space, I am happy to note that my earlier concern about our failure to report to the U.N. on short-term orbiting vehicles has now been largely dissipated. Beginning with our next report to the U.N. I understand we shall list in our reports vehicles which were launched and have decayed between successive reporting dates. This will include all of our reconnaissance satellites to date. We may be criticized because we shall not report the orbital characteristics of such vehicles. I believe we could do so in general terms without sacrificing any vital security interest. But at least our current position is a great advance over the situation which has hitherto existed.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson³

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1062. Secret.
Attached to the source text is a May 11 note from Stevenson to Secretary

Rusk, indicating that the enclosed is “a copy of a letter I delivered to the President today.”

¹ Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI), unanimously approved by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 694.

² Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI), passed by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 693. See also [Document 97](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Memorandum of Meeting [Source](#)

Washington, May 14, 1962.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster called on the President to report on the progress of the disarmament negotiations at 10:00 A.M., Monday, May 14, 1962. Ambassador Dean gave his judgment that we are making good progress in Geneva. The eight neutrals are generally well disposed toward us, and we have convinced them that we have a serious commitment to disarmament. Our draft treaty has generally been very well received. The Indians are an exception: Lall¹ has been undercutting us in every way possible. In response to the President's question as to whether Lall was a fellow traveler, Mr. Foster expressed the view that he was a Communist. Ambassador Dean indicated that he and Zorin had managed to hold their meetings as co-chairmen in a quiet, business-like and non-polemical key. On the time schedule, he indicated that we now plan to work on in Geneva until the 15th of Aug. and adjourn until the end of September, having overcome Soviet opposition to continuing the session.

Ambassador Dean answered the President's question as to whether the delegates viewed disarmament as a real possibility, in the affirmative. He indicated his own reasons for thinking that the U.S. had to consider this as a real possibility in terms of the mounting costs of armaments. Zorin, on the other hand, clearly viewed the Geneva conference as merely an occasion for propaganda. It was Zorin's basic view that the West could not accept disarmament, because the Communists would succeed in their "wars of liberation" once we were disarmed. However, Ambassador Dean stated that in his judgment, the problems of cost and fear of falling behind the United States in the arms race would have an effect on Soviet thinking.

Ambassador Dean raised several problems he now has with our draft treaty outline in terms of certain repeated criticism from the neutrals:

1. Reductions by type and production by category in the first stage leaves open the possibility of a large change in the composition of weapons in favor of newer types.
2. Lack of a definite time limit in the third stage and thus lack of a time period for the achievement of General and Complete Disarmament. Mr. Foster commented on Senatorial opposition to a definite time limit.
3. Provision for a veto on transitions between stages by permanent members of the Security Council. Ambassador Dean suggested that a specification of conditions which must be met before transition could take place would be a desirable substitute for a veto.
4. The inability to discuss non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Soviets were pressing hard on this issue, and the neutrals were much interested in it. The President indicated that he thought our present position on this matter was correct, and that we must save the issue for discussions in the Berlin context. Ambassador Dean indicated that he did not think the support for a denuclearized zone in Africa was strong. The Nigerians believed the South Africans would not accept it, and they certainly could not accept it if the South Africans did not.

The President commented that we could not discuss a denuclearized zone in Europe. Ambassador Dean indicated that he had received a personal letter from Segni,² requesting that this matter not be brought up because if it were the Italian delegation would have to support it in order to maintain the support of the Socialists for the government.

Ambassador Stevenson's letter to the President of May 10³ was discussed. Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster explained that we were already pressing points a. through d. of that letter. The question of a new test ban treaty was raised. It was agreed that now is not the time for a new offer. We should be prepared, however, to make a new offer after the Soviets tested. Mr. Foster indicated that he was examining with the interested agencies the possibilities of an atmospheric test ban treaty. The question of whether an atmospheric treaty was better than one which extended to other environments but with a less rigorous control system was raised, but left open. Mr. Foster undertook to prepare a response to Stevenson's letter.

Mr. Foster indicated that the Business Council had received him cordially and supported the Administration's effort with respect to disarmament.

CK

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. In a May 14 note to Bundy, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Kaysen wrote: "As you can see from the attached, Dean did nearly all the talking. I don't know whether the record makes clear the only impression I got from the thing: Dean's confidence that he is doing a great job is unlimited. The President was not very much interested and had relatively little to say. He expressed no opinion on any of the specific questions that Dean raised. (p. 2) Foster's purpose, I think, was to get Presidential support to deny all these requests. At the moment none of them is pressing although I think we will require some give in our position on the first three in order to continue the discussions." (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62)

¹ Arthur S. Lall, Indian Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

² Antonio Segni, President of Italy.

³ [Document 181](#).

183. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, [*date not declassified*].

[Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, May-June 1962. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extract—6 pages of source text and the document number not declassified.]

184. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, May 16, 1962, 10 p.m.

Disto 414. In course of continuing consideration of possible future policies on nuclear test ban question believe Dept should bear in mind effect of current situation in test ban discussions here, both on any new policy decisions and on method of their presentation.

For four weeks now since presentation 8-power memo¹ USDel has addressed all statements on test ban in plenary and subcommittee primarily to that memo. We have of course been careful neither to abandon any portion of present US position on test ban nor to give appearance acceptance any suggestions in 8-power memo inconsistent with that position.

To do this we have carefully hedged all discussions of memo by putting them in guise of mere tentative explorations thereof. Nevertheless, we have drawn up long list of factors involved in test ban negotiations on which we have sought exchange of views as to how they would be handled under 8-nation plan.

By this tactic, we have been enabled meet Soviet move of claiming to accept memo as basis of negotiations, by creating impression that we too are seriously exploring its potentialities. We have taken line that Soviet acceptance is illusory because USSR only accepts its interpretation of memo and that this interpretation is almost same as Soviet position of Nov 28, 1961. Thus, we have made it appear that real issue is one of whose interpretation of terms of memo is correct, and co-sponsors have been deterred from involving themselves in this direct East-West quarrel by offering definitive interpretation of their own document.

This approach will continue to work as long as SovDel maintains current rigidity and insists that US commit itself to idea of "invitational inspection" (which we say is incorrect interpretation of memo) before SovDel will talk

about working out any other details of treaty following 8-nation plan (such as inventory of national stations, composition of international scientific commission, etc.). However, if SovDel should begin to move from this, and, particularly, if SovDel should produce draft treaty allegedly implementing joint memo, we would be in difficult position which would require further instructions.

It would seem desirable to have foregoing tactical situation in mind in consideration of any new US moves. Whatever we may do, it should be, we believe, at least superficially, related to 8-nation proposals and related to recent conference discussions of test ban issue. Would also be useful for some official statements from Washington in near future to refer to joint memo, as indication of serious consideration which it is getting within US Govt.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1662.
Confidential.

¹ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 175](#).

185. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, May 19, 1962.

JCSM-389-62

SUBJECT

Request for Comments on Aspects of the US Draft Disarmament Treaty Outline Tabled at Geneva on 18 April 1962 (U)

1. This memorandum is in response to memorandum I-4487/62, dated 17 April 1962, and I-5522/62, dated 8 May 1962, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),¹ which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on seven issues relating to the draft treaty outline on disarmament. These views, along with comments on other related aspects, have now been formulated with one broad criterion in mind: What effect the measure, if implemented, would have on US National Security.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that disarmament without full verification of retained armament would jeopardize our national security. They believe that verification can only be achieved by unhampered inspection. The fact that such inspection is anathema to the Soviets and will render negotiations more difficult does not warrant concession to a point that places the safety of the United States and of the West in question. There is no evidence that the zonal inspection system as presently conceived will fulfill security requirements. However, if this zonal system is so designed as to permit rapid and unimpeded inspection of any zone by a well trained inspection team which is fully loyal to the side desiring this inspection, the zonal system might be capable of insuring positive verification.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that since late 1961 there has been continuing pressure to negotiate the reduction of the US nuclear capability in isolation of other proposed disarmament measures. Success in this effort would seriously reduce the major military advantage we now enjoy and drastically alter our military posture. Further there is

danger of US positions being weakened by proposals which have been submitted in attempts to make them more “negotiable” by approaching the Soviet positions (see Appendices D through I).² Despite Presidential approval that reductions would be made on an across-the-board basis, there still appears to exist a continuing effort to single out the US nuclear capability for reduction in isolation. Dispatches from Geneva reveal that discussions now are centering on reduction of the nuclear “threat”.

Rather, the initial phase of a disarmament agreement should be regarded as an evaluation period in which the Soviets must conclusively demonstrate good faith prior to continuance by the United States. The degree of good faith demonstrated will determine the rapidity with which continued disarmament steps can be safely taken. Measures included in the latter part of Stage I or beyond should be contingent on this demonstration of good faith and a concomitant reduction of international tensions.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave misgivings as to the proposal that verification in reduction in armaments would be accomplished by the International Disarmament Organization. Our experience with the complete inability of international control organizations to function in Korea, Vietnam and in Laos raises questions regarding the effectiveness of such an organization.
5. It is recommended that the appended views on the seven issues contained in the memoranda from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and two additional issues be used as bases for DOD positions relating to the draft treaty outline.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer³

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Gen. 388.3, Jan-July 62. Top Secret.

¹ Neither found.

² None of the attached appendices, A-I, totaling 28 pages, is printed.

³
_ Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

186. Letter From President Kennedy to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) [Source](#)

Washington, May 23, 1962.

DEAR ADLAI: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 10 on disarmament and nuclear testing.¹ I found it most helpful and pertinent.

I agree that the time may be approaching when we should make a new test ban proposal, and the alternatives you suggested are being examined by the appropriate people. I share your feelings about the consequences of round after round of tests, first by the Soviets and then by us. However, at the moment, I am reserving judgment as to what the timing of this initiative should be. There is every indication that the Soviets are prepared to begin a new series of tests shortly. It seems to me that an initiative at this moment would be rejected by the Soviets as an attempt to prevent them from responding to our test series, and this might not be the case after they began to test.

Three of your proposals on desirable initial steps in the disarmament field are now being pressed by our delegation in Geneva. We are asking for discussion of measures to reduce the risk of war as the next item on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole. We also contemplate having a discussion in the Committee of the Whole of measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. However, as you know, discussion of this item in Geneva is complicated by our feeling that it would be preferable to discuss the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, with respect to Europe, in the context of the negotiations on Berlin. I am sure you will share my view that the importance of exploring any useful avenue on the Berlin problem justifies our holding off in Geneva if we can.

With respect to denuclearized zones, our delegation understands that if the countries in a given geographic area desire to establish such a zone, the United States should respect their wishes.

The last item you mention, an agreement to bar weapons of mass destruction from orbit, is also a subject which our delegation in Geneva has suggested as appropriate for discussion in the Committee of the Whole. So far, the Soviet Union has refused to accept this idea, even for discussion.

While the prospects for early agreement in any of these areas are not encouraging, I entirely agree that we must continue to do what we can to change the Soviet attitude towards these problems.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see [Document 182](#). A draft of this letter was prepared in ACDA, concurred in by Harlan Cleveland and Ambassador Dean, and transmitted under cover of a May 15 memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk for the Secretary's approval. The Secretary's initials indicating his approval appear on the memorandum. Also attached to this draft is a May 21 memorandum from William H. Brubeck (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, indicating that the draft response, "which has the approval of the Secretary, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Cleveland, may be of use to the President in responding to the Ambassador." (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2462) The first, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of the text printed here are identical to the draft, but some minor differences appear in the second and third paragraphs. In a letter to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., May 15, in which he enclosed a copy of Stevenson's May 10 letter, Kaysen wrote that he would probably answer the letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62) No further documentation on the White House role in preparing this reply has been found.

¹ [Document 181](#).

187. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, May 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR

Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

The Secretary said he would like to add some comments on one or two other problems affecting the general situation.¹ We did not fully understand why there seems to have been a tightening up of the situation. From our point of view, this seems to have been coming from the East, not from the attitudes or hopes of the West in these matters. Organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament. If there were movement on the one, there could be movement on the other in the sense that there would be mutual reinforcement for the effort to bring about normalization and reduction of tensions.

We have made, the Secretary continued, what we consider important disarmament proposals. The Soviets have also made certain proposals. These present many points of difference but they also contain some important points of agreement. We would hope that we could move towards actual disarmament. It was not clear how the Soviet Government planned to proceed in this matter if its idea was all or nothing. We still have the problem of how we move from where we are to general and complete disarmament. This was a highly complex question involving the factor of safety for both sides.

At a later point in the conversation, Dobrynin stated that his Government likewise felt the seriousness of developments in other areas. The Secretary was aware of how the disarmament situation stood. The two countries agreed on one thing, namely that the security of both countries had to be respected. The basic concept was that when the first stage of disarmament had been completed, there would be no relationship of advantage or disadvantage and both sides would have the same amount of security. He could agree that there was no direct connection between disarmament and the Berlin problem, but that they were related. The settlement of the Berlin question would obviously have an effect on disarmament in the situation. If the Secretary wished to discuss any matters arising out of the Zorin-Dean talks, or if the Secretary had any concrete proposals how these matters could be handled better, he would be prepared to engage in such discussions.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/5-3062. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 31. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

1 A memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin on Germany and Berlin on this occasion is printed in [vol. XV, pp. 161-172](#). A memorandum of their conversation on Laos is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, [Vol. I](#).

188. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, May 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals, May 31, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list [1](#)

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to outline the issues before the Committee.

Mr. Foster noted that seven issues were being presented to the Committee for decision and two additional issues for discussion. He regarded the most important issues for decision as those concerned with the possibility of reducing military bases in Stage I; the question of a criterion for measuring “destructive capability” and application of the criterion to additional categories of armaments; and the problem of relating retained armaments to agreed force levels. Remaining matters for decision were concerned with the initiation of certain studies.

The Committee then turned to the discussion of specific issues.

1. Military Bases.

In response to a question by the Secretary regarding the extent of discussion of the bases problem at Geneva, Mr. Foster stated that this question had been discussed as much as any other single issue. As in past disarmament discussions, the Soviet Union has maintained that it is surrounded by U.S. “foreign” bases. The issue is particularly acute in present negotiations since, in view of our proposed 30 percent reduction of armaments and substantial reduction of armed forces, we probably would not need all bases. In view of other Stage I reductions, the non-aligned countries believe that bases should also be reduced. The ACDA recommendation is designed to blunt the Soviet attack on foreign bases by continuing our present position that no distinction can be made between foreign and domestic bases but opening

the possibility of some reduction in bases both by the United States and the Soviet Union in Stage I. The Delegation believes it can defend this position.

The Secretary recalled that our foreign bases came into existence because of post-war Soviet pressures. These pressures produced not only bases but military alliances as well. If we placed ourselves in a situation where we could not bring support to our allies, we would confer military advantage on the Soviet Union. We have to maintain our capability to project our forces to the Eurasian land mass. A particular base may be regarded as crucial by certain allies. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss bases in general, and we will need to examine the problem in terms of specific bases.

The Secretary thought, however, that there were certain things that might be said about bases during the negotiations. We could call attention to the fact that we are in the process of eliminating some bases. Morocco and Dhahran, or other examples, might be cited, as appropriate. Moreover, some discussion of bases will be necessary in connection with surprise attack measures. But before we could agree to a formula for reduction of bases in general, we will have to look at bases one by one. Unless we can find some we would be willing to give up, we cannot agree to a reduction.

Mr. McNamara agreed that it would be all right to discuss actions we were already taking to reduce bases. However, he was reluctant to encourage discussion of the possibility of reducing bases in Stage I. He believed that the matter should be studied in relation to conditions that would exist in Stage I. What we might require in the way of bases may not vary directly with reductions of armaments and armed forces. For example, we might want even more dispersion of nuclear delivery vehicles, and our capability to project our forces might require a shifting rather than a reduction of bases. Moreover, there are problems of definition. We have some 6,700 installations we call "bases", 4,500 in the United States and 3,300 abroad. These range from listening posts to elaborate installations for B-47's.

The Secretary asked whether there should not be a cut-off point for the study of bases and suggested use of a restrictive definition which would limit the study to consideration of bases where combat forces are located.

Mr. Foster thought that the present study could be limited in this manner. With respect to the broader issue, he said that although he agreed with much that the Secretary and Mr. McNamara had said, he thought that as we built more hardened missile sites and Polaris submarines, we would probably reduce bases, such as those for B-47's. We ought to take advantage of this circumstance in the negotiations. He believed we could protect essential bases better by considering all bases together rather than by allowing the Soviet Union to single out foreign bases.

The Secretary expressed the view that if we could reach agreement on an otherwise satisfactory Stage I, we might consider a Stage I reduction of bases. But with the Soviet Union taking a rigid attitude on inspection and other issues, there did not seem to be much point in going through the agony of trying to reach agreement on bases. There are so many obstacles in the way of agreement, we ought to get some of the others out of the way first. He called attention to the Soviet Union's reversal of its decision on the proposed declaration on war propaganda² and said that he considered this move interesting as an indication of Soviet tightening up of its relations with the Free World. He was inclined to place some stock in the report through the Polish representatives in Geneva that the Central Committee had overruled Gromyko in this matter in order not to show concessions to the United States at this time. He thought that we would see more pressure in other areas (Berlin and Southeast Asia) as well as in disarmament.

Mr. Foster wondered whether we could not, as a matter of tactics, refer to the possibility of reduction of bases as needs change and offer the possibility that later in the negotiations we might consider doing something about bases in Stage I. Meanwhile, we should study the matter in detail.

Mr. Nitze thought there was a question as to what should be said before the study was completed.

The Secretary suggested that a page or two be prepared and cleared with the interested agencies.

Mr. McNamara agreed with the Secretary's suggestion that something be put down on paper. This might include reference to reductions already under way.

Mr. Kaysen questioned the tactics of trying to take credit for reductions already planned. He thought that if it had been concluded that we should for the present reaffirm our position, we should “take the heat” and inform ourselves by study. Calling attention to reductions already under way might simply reopen the issue.

Mr. Foster did not feel that it had been decided that we were precluded from discussing reduction of bases in Stage I if real progress were made in other areas.

The Secretary thought that bases were among the last items that should be discussed. We should see if what is agreed opens up possibilities for reducing bases. There may be some such possibilities.

Mr. McNamara agreed that there was no question that we would get rid of some bases.

The Secretary inquired whether we could get an urgent study of the bases problem. We should use a restrictive cut-off on the definition of bases and focus on installations where combat forces are located. He thought we should look at such bases from two standpoints: first, to see if even now there are some we plan to eliminate; and second, to determine the impact of other Stage I measures on the need for bases. In response to a question from General Smith regarding the status of NATO infrastructure bases, the Secretary stated that we would not necessarily call the presence of our forces on someone else’s territory a determinant of a United States base.

Mr. McNamara agreed that a study of the problem should be undertaken.

2. Stage I Force Levels for the U.S. and USSR.

Mr. Foster noted that only a study had been recommended. ACDA felt that we didn't know enough about force levels of 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7 million to determine the acceptability of reductions below the proposal of 2.1 million level. We thought, however, that the 2.1 million level may have acquired a degree of undeserved sanctity. Although we were under pressure to accept a compromise at 1.9 million, we did not know whether a level of 1.9 million would enable us to meet essential requirements.

Mr. McNamara recalled that the Joint Chiefs had studied the force levels problem last summer and regarded their study as definitive.³ Defense was prepared to study the matter further; however, they would like to take a somewhat different approach than that suggested in the ACDA memorandum. They would like to approach the problem from the standpoint of using their imagination to find ways of maintaining at the 1.9 and 1.7 million levels the same effective combat strength that would be available at the 2.1 million level. There might be ways of doing this.

The Secretary thought we would need very convincing reasons to support whatever level we decided to insist on. We ought to be able to distinguish clearly between levels of 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7 million in order not to go further down the slippery slope than we thought we should go. He recalled that he had been queried about this matter by certain of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva. He had offered two arguments in support of the 2.1 million level: first, we thought this figure could be accepted without the participation of Communist China; second, we thought this level would enable us to project our power to the Eurasian land mass if necessary. We will need to give as much content to our conclusions as we can.

Mr. McNamara considered it important to distinguish between two aspects of this matter: first, the implications of lower levels; second, the presentation of our conclusions. Defense was willing to study the matter.

3. Criterion for Destructive Capability and

4. Application of Destructive Capability to Other Categories.

Mr. Foster recalled that at a previous meeting with the President, ACDA had suggested that the full loaded weight of delivery vehicles seemed the simplest way to measure destructive capability.⁴ The matter was not resolved at that time. Our further analysis had not turned up any simpler criterion. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom had raised the question of extending the criterion to categories which included smaller nuclear delivery vehicles. ACDA recommended the adoption of full loaded weight as the criterion for measuring destructive capability, the application of this criterion to categories 3 and 4 as well as to categories 1 and 2, and

examination of the usefulness of this criterion in the case of other categories.

Mr. Fisher added that the destructive capability criterion had lost some of its criticality in view of the decision to propose reduction by types. However, it remained important in connection with production proposals.

Mr. McNamara stated that Defense had not found any more suitable index. Full loaded weight had some limitations. The Joint Chiefs were reluctant to accept it and suggested that the matter be studied by an international scientific commission at a later time. Mr. McNamara, however, thought there was a close enough correlation between full loaded weight and destructive capability to meet the objective he had had in mind when he had initially suggested the importance of a destructive capability criterion. He was satisfied that we could not find a better measure and thought it should be accepted. He agreed that the criterion should be applied to smaller nuclear delivery vehicles and that its application to other categories should be studied.

5. Stage I Production Limits.

Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended only a study. He recalled that in discussion of the matter with the President it had been suggested that production should not be over 5% annually. In order to explain what our production proposal means, it is important now to consider whether any changes should be made in the illustrative categories of armaments and what production limitation should be proposed for each category. Study of the matter should be based on two criteria: first, ensuring capability to resume production if a disarmament agreement were terminated; and second, ensuring the availability of replacements for weapons expended in test or training. Economic implications of production limits could be considered in the light of specific proposed limitations.

Mr. McNamara agreed that study of the matter was certainly warranted.

6. Relating Armaments to Regular Armed Forces.

Mr. Foster observed that this was a highly controversial issue. There was controversy within ACDA as well as between ACDA and other agencies. On balance, ACDA had decided to recommend an approach relating retained armaments to agreed force levels. The Soviet Union had raised the matter, and ACDA believed that on balance the recommended approach would be advantageous since it offered a means of cutting the Soviet preponderance of conventional armaments. Although the Soviet Union might seek parity in the strategic area, they were doing this anyway, and since we do not have strategic vehicles for reserve forces, the present recommendation would not directly affect our strategic weapons. Even recognizing that the recommendation might hit reserve naval forces and some air defense units, ACDA felt on balance that there would be net advantage in moving toward the Soviet proposal.

The Secretary recalled that he had felt we could go ahead under Stage I because our proposal would preserve our war-making capability to the extent that would be necessary without having achieved major transformations in the world political field. There is a critical dividing line at some point. When we move from Stage I to Stage II, we'll have to know a lot more about Soviet attitudes and about means of keeping the peace. Since we are prepared to undertake Stage I in a period of normal relations, the forces we retain will have to be fully effective. In Korea we were critically limited by the state of our reserve stocks. We should not permit that kind of situation. On the other hand, if you have adequate stocks for active forces, some of these stocks might be diverted to use by reserve forces. This posed something of a dilemma.

Mr. McNamara expressed his strong opposition to adoption of the recommendation at this time. He was willing to study the matter further and try to develop a formula although he doubted that this would be possible.

Mr. Foster maintained that the basic consideration involved is that we are trying to cut down the arms race. If we're going to keep such high levels of reserve stocks, we're not cutting down very much. Active armed forces should be fully equipped, but there are finite limits to this. It was Mr. Foster's understanding that the Soviet Union had small active units which

are normally flattened out and then expanded. We ought to cut their ability to expand.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that we have 960,000 men in 16 divisions. The Soviet Union has 2 million men in 147 divisions. They would want to retain full armaments for divisions which are now staffed only with cadres. There would have to be complex adjustments and formulae to reach agreement.

Mr. Kaysen considered the principle of simplicity to be of importance. To implement the ACDA recommendation it would be necessary to get agreement on formulae; he found it hard to see how such matters could be settled as a workable item of agreement. He understood Mr. Foster's point of view that if it were possible to reach agreement on definitions, a major step forward could be taken. However, Mr. Kaysen thought the problem of definition was so difficult, that we wouldn't know what we were buying. If we can reduce along a fairly predictable path, we feel that our security can be protected. He recalled a statement by Mr. McNamara at a previous meeting that we would rather stick with what we know. The proposal to reduce reserve armaments invites a scramble, and the outcome of such a scramble would be uncertain in the absence of a hard and fast rule.

The Secretary believed that we have proposed in Stage I some important measures of disarmament, but retained forces must be combat capable. If we have too little back-up for our forces, we are actually reducing our effective forces below the agreed level.

General Decker thought this might result from the proposal.

Mr. Foster agreed that there had to be adequate back-up for our active forces.

Mr. McNamara thought it would be a serious error to advance the proposal but expressed willingness to study it further. He then departed.

Mr. Fisher pointed out that the proposal meant that armaments retained would be related to armed forces retained. Unless we can do something about Soviet superiority in conventional armaments, they could put a large force into the field more rapidly than we. Everyone had looked at what the

proposal would do to us. We ought also to look at its effects on the Soviet Union. To a large extent the Soviet cadre system makes the 2.1 million level fictitious. We shouldn't negotiate ourselves into a position of continual inferiority in conventional armaments.

Mr. Foster noted that our present approach might actually encourage a build-up of reserves. The Secretary asked whether arrangements could be made to ensure that no one would use the 2.1 million level to flow through a large number of forces and build up reserves. Mr. Foster and Mr. Nitze agreed that it would be important to try to prevent this.

Mr. Kaysen commented that the theory behind our plan recognizes that we would have nuclear superiority and they would have conventional superiority. Mr. Keeny believed that if we proposed parity in conventional armaments we might have to discuss parity in nuclear armaments. Mr. Fisher thought we might have to do this in any case.

Without passing judgment on whether the proposal would be advantageous or disadvantageous, Mr. McNaughton thought it important to recognize that in effect the proposal would produce an entirely new plan. Our present approach is to freeze the existing situation and shrink it. The proposal would change the whole conventional side of our approach to an effort to active [*achieve?*] parity. Our present approach is to shrink all armaments 30 percent. The proposal means that conventional armaments would be reduced even more. These would represent basic changes.

The Secretary expressed the view that on its face the proposal appeared advantageous to us. Mr. Nitze believed that this depended on working out satisfactory definitions. We should work out the definitions first. Mr. McNaughton recalled that Mr. McNamara had expressed willingness to grapple further with this "elusive problem".

The Secretary and Mr. Foster departed at this point. The Secretary reaffirmed his view that a "crash" study should be undertaken of the bases problem.

7. Study of the Means of Verifying the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Fisher noted that we had had to give up the idea of waiting until Stage I for an international examination of the problems involved in eliminating nuclear weapons, but we have not said what the timing of such a study should be. We should undertake an intra-governmental study now in order to be prepared for international study prior to the beginning of Stage I. We ought to get out of our present dilemma of saying that we can't enter into an international study because we don't know what our position is.

Mr. Kaysen thought there was nothing wrong with getting our own position clear but we should not commit ourselves on the timing of an international study.

Dr. Seaborg agreed that the matter should be studied. He thought that ACDA as well as AEC should participate in the study. Dr. Haworth believed that CIA had an interest. He noted that the problem was not a lack of information but rather that the information was negative.

Mr. Nitze expressed his view that the question of whether we should put forward the probable negative results of the study is a political question. Equipping of the UN Peace Force was involved.

Mr. Murrow wondered whether if the results looked negative, we should not make this known at an early time. Otherwise, the negotiations might appear to have been futile. Mr. Keeny pointed out, however, that the approach we were taking was to try to get hold of the problem by eliminating delivery vehicles. Mr. Kaysen thought that if we could make progress on the delivery vehicles question, the difficulties of eliminating nuclear weapons might not seem so important. There is a question as to when you should face up to a negative fact. If there are positive achievements, the negative fact may not be important.

Mr. Fisher asked whether an intra-governmental study would be a waste of time under the circumstances. Mr. Kaysen and Dr. Seaborg both thought the study was needed. Dr. Haworth urged that meanwhile we should not permit ourselves to be nudged closer to an international study. Mr. Keeny believed that if we were forced into an international study, it should be broadened to cover the delivery vehicles question. If pressures for an international study increase, we could send knowledgeable people to Geneva. Mr. Kaysen said

that we may want to head off such pressures by exposing the facts informally and explaining why we don't want an international study now.

Mr. Fisher affirmed that we were not placing emphasis on undertaking an international study now, only on doing it before a treaty is signed.

Calling attention to the two issues on the agenda for discussion purposes but not decision (the questions of transition and nuclear weapons for a UN Peace Force), Mr. Fisher noted that most of those present had attended the earlier meetings of the Deputies of the Principals when these matters had been discussed.⁵ Accordingly, it did not appear necessary to discuss these matters again.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-3162. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on June 8.

¹ The list of 20 participants is not printed.

² Reference is to a proposed declaration against war propaganda, approved by the Committee of the Whole of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on May 25, which the Soviets refused to approve without several changes. For text of the declaration and statements on the issue by the Soviet, British, and U.S. representatives in Geneva, all on May 29, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 545-552.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ See [Document 174](#).

⁵ A memorandum of conversation of a meeting of the Deputies (or Sub-Principals) on May 23, drafted by Gathright, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. A memorandum for record of the same meeting, prepared by Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. on May 25, which summarizes the main points made at the meeting, is *ibid.*, Current, 5/62-8/62.

189. Memorandum for the Record Source

Washington, June 20, 1962.

Meeting with the President on Wednesday, June 20, at 5:15 p.m., attended by Secretary of Defense, Chairman of AEC, Drafted. Jerome B. Wiesner, McCone, and others to discuss the status of the nuclear test program.¹

1. It was decided that all scheduled Nevada underground tests and the scheduled [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] above ground tests and the large crater test should be made.²
2. It was agreed that all of the remaining tests in the Pacific should be made.
3. It was agreed that two high altitude effects tests should be made and these would be completed if no slippage or failure occurs, about July 20.³
4. It was agreed that the outer space test desired by the AEC would, in all probability, be cancelled. However, Dr. Seaborg was to discuss this subject with the President at a later date.⁴ The problem was that one test would extend the operation into August and this was considered undesirable.

The President agreed to all of the above.

John A. McCone⁵

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on June 26.

¹ Bundy also wrote a memorandum summarizing the President's decisions at this meeting. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing) See the Supplement.

² Reference presumably is to the final Nevada tests in Operation Nougat and the Nevada tests in Operation Storax I, the first of which was a 104-kiloton thermonuclear crater test on July 6. (*Announced United States Nuclear Tests*, pp. 20-24) ³ Starfish Prime, the first high-altitude nuclear

shot in the Dominic series, took place on July 8. Bluegill Prime, July 25, and Bluegill Double Prime, October 15, both misfired during the launch phase and had to be destroyed. (*Operation Dominic I—1962*, pp. 232-241) ⁴ At a meeting with Seaborg, Wiesner, Keeny, and McGeorge Bundy on July 10, the President approved preparations for Urraca, a high-altitude shot, to take place about August 6. (Seaborg, *Journal*, Supplement, pp. 19042-19043) This event was cancelled before this date, however, to avoid further damage to orbiting satellites. High-altitude shots Checkmate (October 19), Bluegill Triple Prime (October 25), Kingfish (November 1), and Tightrope (November 3) were later conducted successfully as part of the Dominic series. (*Operation Dominic I—1962*, pp. 236-247) ⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

190. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

London, June 24, 1962, 8 p.m.

SET/MC/29

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18-28, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler

UK

Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Foreign Minister Edward Heath
Lord Privy Seal Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Ian Samuel

SUBJECT

Nuclear Tests

Lord Home opened this phase of the discussion by asking what possibilities the Secretary saw for new moves in the nuclear test field. The Secretary replied that we were studying the possibilities for an atmospheric test ban. However what were referred to as national detection capabilities were in fact not national at all on our side. Rather they depended on arrangements with other countries and if we were to consider an atmospheric ban, agreements would have to be made with other peripheral countries which would enable us to be sure that the system would be continued. We could not, for example, be entirely confident of our present arrangements with a country like [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. In any case, we would never be able to agree to an underground ban without verification.

The Prime Minister commented that even when he had met the President in Bermuda he had felt that the important aspect of the nuclear question was the possibility of development of an anti-missile missile. This development could not take place on the basis of underground tests. Consequently he had felt that we could risk a completely unpoliced ban, perhaps for a period of three to five years. He felt that this was the only way that could stop other countries from nuclear development. The only hope was to have a complete ban and thus be able to put diplomatic pressure on other countries to join in.

The Secretary commented that we were not seeking to stay in a nuclear race. Our objective was just to be sure that everybody gets out of the race. Following up on the Prime Minister's remarks, Lord Home wondered whether it would not be possible to agree on an atmospheric ban for perhaps a period of one year, during which it would be agreed that there should be a joint study of the problem of underground tests. The Secretary replied that we could consider this possibility depending on the result of our present analysis of the problem. If the Soviets had really wanted a nuclear test agreement it was difficult to understand their motives in turning down our March proposals. They could then have had a test ban at a great bargain. Speaking on a personal basis, the Secretary commented that perhaps it would be possible after the conclusion of our current tests to approach the Soviets again privately—though not publicly—on this problem.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held at Carleton Gardens. The Secretary was in London during a visit to several European capitals June 18-28.

191. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

London, June 25, 1962.

SET/MC/42

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18-28, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler (for the beginning)

Great Britain

Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Joseph Godber
Mr. Ian Samuel
[Ramsbotham, Mason]^{[1](#)}

SUBJECT

Testing and disarmament

After lunch, Lord Home, Mr. Godber, Mr. Samuel, the Secretary, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. Bohlen met to discuss testing and disarmament. The British point seemed to be primarily that they should have something new to offer at the resumed session of the Geneva conference. On testing, Lord Home and Mr. Godber expressed great interest in the possibility of a moratorium on atmospheric testing, to which the Secretary pointed out that it would be necessary to have something on the underground tests, since the United States is not prepared to rely solely on national detection systems. Mr. Godber said he thought it would be useful to have a gathering of scientists, if only to explode the Soviet theory, pointing out that the Russians were always challenging the West, citing United States and other Western citizens to support their contentions.

The Secretary mentioned the question of Chinese involvement, pointing out that some of the Soviet-Chinese installations were near the Chinese border and would be difficult to tell where a suspicious explosion had taken place.

Mr. Godber said that China was very much like France in that all recognized that in any serious nuclear arrangement, the Chinese would have to be in, and the Russians said the same thing about the French.

The Secretary reported that Couve de Murville had told him in Paris that one of the biggest French problems was the question of nuclear disarmament.² Lord Home said that it would be well to find out whether any future French tests would be underground. Mr. Godber inquired whether there was any possibility of getting the French into Geneva. The Secretary replied that he felt there was a greater chance of getting them into the Berlin discussions.

Lord Home said that the British Government was very interested in the possibility of an atmospheric moratorium, leaving the underground matter for future considerations. The Secretary repeated that we felt more than national verification was necessary for underground detection. He said the Soviets counted ninety-eight percent on publicity and two percent on espionage, whereas we must rely on international cooperation for both atmospheric and underground testing.

Lord Home said the meeting in Washington in July might well examine which countries we would need for cooperation in an adequate system of tests. There ensued some discussion as to the procedure during the Geneva conference, which might be followed after the recess.

Mr. Godber was in favor of starting with the Eight-Power proposal and then when that was rejected, then turning to the atmospheric tests. He repeated again the necessity of having some positive move to make in this field. The Secretary said that our people were studying the matter and they would have to await the results. Lord Home then raised the question of the inspection of "the remainders" under the first phase thirty percent cut. The Secretary said that we could not get the American people to support anything based on trust in people who were out to do us in. The British pointed out that from their point of view, there would not be much to trust

in phase one, since there would be inspection of that which was destroyed. Mr. Godber said that the main criticism of the Western proposals was the fact that phase one and two seemed to involve little disarmament, whereas in phase three there was no fixed figure for the amount of nuclear destruction. He could not understand why we could not put in something more specific in phase three.

Lord Home was of the opinion that the way to handle the phases was to only start on one when the preceding phase had been fully completed, which would not necessitate any veto. He also could not see why we could not put in some specific amount. The Secretary pointed out that this was a very major political matter in the United States and that there was one decision of President Kennedy to the effect that we would not put forth any proposition that we could not live with, no matter what impression is created.

Mr. Godber argued that appearance was equally important if only to smoke out the Russians. He said the introduction of some fixed figure in phase three would help very much the presentation. Then ensued discussion on the question of presenting lists in the various phases which would be favorable to one side as against another, with particular reference to the superiority of the West in nuclear weapons and the superiority of the Russians in conventional. Mr. Godber seemed to be particularly concerned about the effect on the neutrals and on world public opinion.

Lord Home raised the point as to whether we would be better off without any nuclear weapons at all. The Secretary mentioned that the United States was only vulnerable to nuclear attack. Mr. Godber said there was no means of being absolutely sure that no nuclear weapons would be concealed, even in the event of complete and total disarmament, and wondered whether the whole exercise was worthwhile.

The Secretary said that while he doubted if any great and general disagreement would ever be achieved, there were a certain number of peripheral things which would reduce instability and have a dampening effect on tensions. He had in mind surprise attack and the danger of some madman, on either side, starting a weapon on its way. Mr. Godber said that the discussions at Geneva had more or less been stopped by the Russian

double cross on Russian propaganda, but felt that when we returned to Geneva we should have some new initiatives to make.

The Secretary said that he could not agree that it should always be up to the West to make new initiatives when the Russians stood pat. Mr. Godber said that this was why he thought it would be valuable to take initiative since this would provide the neutrals with ammunitions to bring pressure to bear on the Russians. The Secretary questioned this thesis, pointing out that neutrals usually occupy a point midway between the Soviet and the West, no matter what these positions are and that experience had shown us that this was not a very true basis on which to act.

The Secretary mentioned that he was having a study made which would permit immediate reference to the Security Council in the event of any action, identical nuclear explosion, before the chain was set off.

Mr. Godber inquired whether President Kennedy would go to the Security Council if a bomb exploded in New York. The Secretary pointed out that it might be a bomb in transit and, anyway, worthwhile looking into arrangements which might prevent the chain reaction to the ultimate catastrophe. Mr. Godber said that at Geneva the plans seemed to be to talk until the General Assembly and then after a brief discussion there, to come back to Geneva. He repeated the importance of taking some Western initiative.

Lord Home agreed with him that the absence of any figures in stage three put the West in a bad position. He repeated that in his view each stage hinged on the proper completion of the preceding one. Mr. Godber, in reply to the Secretary's question, said he was thinking of neutral and UN opinion rather than domestic British opinion. The discussion was, in general, inconclusive, with the Secretary merely saying that some of these matters were under discussion and would be considered in the July meeting in Washington, with the British pressing for new initiatives, even though the Russians had made no move at all in their position.

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held after lunch in the British Foreign Ministry.

¹ Brackets in the source text.

² Secretary Rusk discussed disarmament with Couve de Murville in Paris on June 20. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

192. Editorial Note

On June 28, 1962, Adlai Stevenson sent President Kennedy a 6-page letter on current disarmament problems. The letter is printed in full in *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965*, volume VIII, pages 265-269. Attached to a copy of the letter in the Kennedy Library is a June 29 memorandum from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to Carl Kaysen that reads, “You may wish to consider the attached letter from Governor Stevenson—and also how best to answer it.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, General, 6/61-12/62) No response to the letter has been found.

193. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, July 5-6, 1962.

SUBJECT

US-UK Bilateral Discussions on the Nuclear Test Ban Issue

PARTICIPANTS

(See attachment)[1](#)

The following three ACDA papers were under consideration at the meetings: “Possibilities for a Nuclear Test Detection System which Responds to Basic Ideas of the Eight-Nation Proposal” by Dr. Franklin Long, a draft atmospheric test ban proposal, and a draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (The references in the text are to the fifth revision of this draft.)[2](#)

Morning Session, July 5, 1962

Ambassador Dean opened the meeting by calling on Dr. Long to discuss his new paper. Dr. Long explained that he had concentrated on the technical problem of seismic detection by use of national stations. He then described the system proposed in his paper. In estimating the system’s capability, Dr. Long stressed the possibility that a country could “spoof” by a variety of technical means, for example, by delaying on the time scale, in order to conduct clandestine tests. Less attention had been paid to detection of high altitude and outer space tests although some of the core stations could have the necessary technical equipment. However, core stations chosen for their seismicity might not be as useful for outer space detection and it might therefore be necessary to separate the two. He explained that more detailed studies of the system were being made, that the national stations would be effective for detection, but much less so for identification, and that the necessity for on-site inspection would remain.

Amb. Dean pointed out that there was still the problem of the international commission’s right to determine the necessity of on-site inspection if identification were impossible. Dr. Long agreed. This would be an “internationally operated national system.” The advantage would be in

having an integrated system under the control of the international commission. The nationals operating the stations would be under firm obligation to the commission to do correct detecting. In answer to a question from Amb. Stelle, he added that distance location would not be very much downgraded and that a ten kilometer radius would still suffice for inspection.

Amb. Dean asked whether the distant stations would be able to confirm an event inside the Soviet Union if that country refused a commission's request to inspect. Dr. Long answered that "spoofing" had not yet been studied in depth, but that the data from a country which was suspected of spoofing would have to be discounted. Responding to Sir Michael Wright's query as to whether atmospheric tests in the Soviet Union could be established without the use of special air over-flights, he said that it would not be possible to locate very small tests, but that there existed a finite possibility of identification which might act as a deterrent. There would be a problem of locating the event if the time element were uncertain.

Less consideration had been given to underwater testing, but a nuclear event could be identified by sampling ocean currents for radioactive debris. For weapons effects tests, underwater testing would be very important, especially in regard to submarine warfare. On the whole, the April 18th, 1961 treaty would be downgraded in every mode by this new system.

Sir Michael Wright asked about the importance of the "series" concept in detection. The UK had felt that in calculating the capabilities for the April 18, 1961 treaty, full justice had not been given to the fact that one was really looking for a series and not an isolated test. Dr. Long said that in principle there was no reason why a series could not be separated in space and time and for certain developments, such as the "neutron" bomb, single tests were useful. However, there was a very good case for the importance of a series.

Amb. Dean inquired about the United States Government's position in regard to the national detection system. Mr. Adrian Fisher replied that there was, to date, no government position on the matter. Underground tests were again considered to be quite important and there was no indication that the government would accept a national detection system as a treaty basis at

this time. Dr. Long confirmed that a large majority of the recent Nevada tests would not have been detected if the data from American stations had been discounted. However, as each station sees tuff signals at different magnitudes, there was a pretty good possibility that of 20 stations some would see a test as bigger than 4.5 kiloton and thus detect some of the smaller tests which might be a useful deterrent.

Amb. Dean asked whether this study would be completed by July 16 and how long it would be before a new treaty on this basis could be tabled. Dr. Long said that he would have a better picture of the seismic possibility of this new system by the 16th after a discussion with British scientists in London.³ Amb. Dean pointed out that even if the US and the UK agreed to pursue this system further there was still no evidence that the Soviet Union would agree to on-site inspection. He questioned whether it was worth presenting a new system less effective than that of April 18, 1961 if the Soviet Union would still not accept inspection. Sir Michael Wright stressed that the 8-nation memorandum fell into three parts: (1) an internationally coordinated detection system based on national control posts; (2) an international scientific commission and (3) verification. The US and UK had interpreted the third point as providing for obligatory on-site inspection and seven of the eight neutrals had stated their agreement with this interpretation. He felt that a major round would be lost if a new proposal based on the 8-nation memorandum were not presented. The system described by Dr. Long for detecting underground tests would probably necessitate more on-site inspection. Tactically it would be better to meet the neutrals on the detection and commission points, while taking a harder line on on-site inspection. A second point, however, was to determine how much value our governments attached to underground testing. If they did not find it very important it was not worth foundering the project on it. Dr. Long stated that the AEC would not agree to leaving the underground tests uninspected.

The meeting proceeded to a discussion of the ACDA draft atmospheric treaty. Amb. Dean pointed out that the draft was not yet cleared and not ready to be tabled at the conference. Furthermore, he wondered whether it would be wise to offer an atmospheric treaty if we still wanted a

comprehensive treaty as there might be pressure from the neutrals and the USSR to omit on-site inspection from all types of treaties.

Afternoon Session, July 5, 1962

The discussion of the atmospheric draft treaty resumed in the afternoon.

Sir Michael Wright recalled that our offer of an uncontrolled ban on September 3, 1961 was on the record and he asked whether the renewed offer would include aircraft sampling. Mr. Fisher explained that the inspection provisions in the draft were almost nonexistent. Inspection was purely invitational although each country was committed to maintaining qualified observers who represented a type of ad hoc commission. There was no provision for over-flights. The country charging a violation would be responsible for the observation costs. He added that it would be necessary to consider the observation of peaceful explosions to insure that they were not weapon tests. Sir Michael Wright asked whether this would not give away the principle of on-site inspection in terms of underground tests and disarmament. Amb. Dean agreed that to some extent the draft did expose us to the invitational principle advanced by the USSR on underground tests and that it also omitted the commission principle. Amb. Stelle pointed out that it reopened the possibility of pressure for a moratorium on underground tests. Mr. Fisher replied that the principle of inspection could be stated in such a way that one would request as much international inspection as was needed. Answering a question of Sir Michael Wright's he added that the application of this draft to underwater and outer space tests had not even been tentatively decided.

Sir Michael Wright had serious reservations about Article VII on Withdrawal and Denunciation which sanctioned withdrawal for reasons of national security. This was not very different from the Soviet November 28, 1961 proposal to which we had objected because of its provision for withdrawal on the basis of national rather than international determination. He suggested that the wording of Article 22 in the April 18, 1961 treaty might be better. He hoped that it would be possible to have a statement less blunt on the question of national security. Amb. Stelle remarked that the duration article in the 1961 treaty was fairly satisfactory in regard to violations of the treaty, but not in regard to non-party violations. It would

perhaps be possible to use the non-party formula in this draft treaty and the 1961 formula for non-fulfillment. Mr. Goodby and Mr. Spiers pointed out that the International Conference procedure had been included to make it as difficult as possible to withdraw. This was especially important when there were no control conditions.

Sir Michael Wright asked whether the International Court of Justice would be called upon to determine questions of fact or of law. Mr. Fisher observed that it was not very important as it was unlikely that many legal matters would arise and the Court was not an especially good body for establishing fact. Article IV was not intended as a substitute for Article VII. Proceeding to Article VI, he explained that the US experience during the moratorium had shown the difficulties of maintaining a readiness to test unless the right to do so was spelled out. It was simply a recognition of the fact that it was impossible to prevent preparation for testing, but the matter had not yet been decided. Amb. Dean pointed out that nothing in the treaty prevented a country from being ready to test. Sir Michael Wright, Amb. Stelle, and Mr. Fisher agreed that the article did look a little strange.

Turning to a discussion of a draft comprehensive test ban treaty, which he felt the neutrals would certainly favor, Sir Michael Wright remarked that paragraph 1 of Article 9 seemed a step back from the Geneva system by making “a” seismic event eligible for inspection. This would seem to make it possible to request inspection of an earthquake simply because it was in a sensitive area which we wanted to inspect. He suggested substituting “a seismic event suspected of being a nuclear explosion.”

In regard to the reverse quota system, Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would not be preferable to allow the Commission to request inspection of all unidentified events. Mr. Goodby remarked that the quota protected both sides. The commission could determine the necessity of an inspection if the objective criteria were spelled out in detail. However, we would want to use all possible information and we might have more available than the commission did. The reverse quota giving the Soviet Union the possibility of conducting 15 free tests within a three-year period would meet the Soviet charge of espionage and at the same time might protect us from inspection

of some very sensitive areas. Moreover, a refusal of inspection on the Soviet side would in itself be a very informative fact.

Amb. Dean had serious reservations about the reverse quota which could in effect be a license to test. Amb. Stelle did not think that the reverse quota would remove the Soviet fear of espionage. He thought it better to maintain the classic position that everything would be done to remove the possibility of espionage rather than to spell out this possibility in a treaty.

On the matter of tactics for the Geneva conference, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet Delegation would come with a treaty text based on 100% national systems with invitational inspection. Sir Michael Wright hoped that an allied document would be available which would not have to have every paragraph filled in but could be very general. He preferred a comprehensive draft treaty to an atmospheric treaty. Mr. Spiers said that the draft comprehensive treaty would not be ready by July 16 although we would be in a better position to estimate if and when it would be ready after the scientific talks in London. Amb. Stelle expressed reluctance to proceed with the atmospheric treaty if the possibility of a comprehensive treaty had not been ruled out. The inspection principle had now gathered some support and the introduction of an atmospheric treaty now might politically preclude the possibility of agreement on a comprehensive treaty for several years. Amb. Dean also felt that it would be better to risk waiting for a comprehensive treaty.

(End of Meeting—July 5)

Morning Session—July 6, 1962

The meeting resumed with a detailed discussion of the two draft treaties.

Sir Michael Wright stated that although we had to accept the fact that no comprehensive treaty text based on the 8-power memorandum could be tabled on July 16, he had recommended to London that no atmospheric or underwater test ban treaty be tabled until we were forced to give up on a comprehensive treaty. He urged that such a draft treaty be ready as soon as possible. Amb. Dean agreed that our optimum goal would be to have the “Long version of the 8-power proposal” and a draft treaty ready in a few

weeks. If this were impossible we should then decide on an alternative in order to avoid a detailed disarmament discussion in the General Assembly and a possible General Assembly decision that the 18-nation conference was not productive.

Sir Michael Wright stated that London accepted in general both US draft treaties, but had some specific questions and suggestions. In the comprehensive draft treaty in Article I, paragraph 1, he proposed changing the last sentence to “place subject to its jurisdiction or by any person subject to its control.” He asked whether in Article III the Commission’s duties of collecting data and reporting on all seismic events could be more clearly stated and questioned whether the quota should be exercised unilaterally rather than by the Commission. London thought that the neutrals would object and that it would be better if the decision rested with the Commission. Amb. Dean recalled our earlier thinking that if we thought an event had occurred in the USSR we would not want to argue over this with the Commission. Amb. Stelle remarked that in our past attempts to establish objective criteria with the USSR we had been forced to fall back on location criteria. Mr. Spiers pointed out that the exercise of the quota by either side had been originally a USSR proposal and if the Soviet Union ever accepted the quota again it would probably be on this basis.

Sir Michael Wright remarked that the quota system could perhaps operate on a national basis but if the treaty were to include unlimited inspection, the decision should be left to the Commission. Moreover, even if the treaty included unlimited inspection on the basis of a Commission decision, the reverse quota system could still apply. He further commented on the provision in Article III for periodic visits by the Commission to all elements of the system. He recognized the necessity of this paragraph but suspected that the USSR would object to an inspection of its detection posts. Mr. Goodby said that it had been hoped that the Soviet Union would allow the Commission to construct new posts on its territory.

Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would be desirable in Article IV to spell out that the members of the Commission should be scientists. Amb. Stelle cautioned that non-scientists should not be excluded from the Commission’s work which was, after all, of a political nature.

Sir Michael Wright suggested that the word “possible” be inserted before the words “nuclear explosions” in paragraph 1 of Article VII. He also stated that in Article VIII, paragraph 5, “back-scatter radar” was not negotiable. He repeated his previous remark that in Article IX the non-qualified “a seismic event” would cause complications. He asked about the 10 kilometer radius in Article IX, paragraph 4, and with regard to paragraphs 7 and 8, of the same Article, wondered whether special aircraft sampling flights for detection of atmospheric tests would be included. He remarked that under the Geneva system, the host country had been responsible for the transportation and necessary equipment mentioned in paragraph 8.

Amb. Stelle stated that 10 kilometers was a compromise between the 8 and 12 mentioned in the Geneva system.

Mr. Goodby explained that over-ocean flights rather than flights over territories had been contemplated. Sir Michael Wright stressed that Article XIV worried the UK the most. In this treaty as opposed to the atmospheric treaty, there was a Commission and there existed thus a stronger argument for giving the responsibility of finding a breach to the Commission rather than allowing withdrawal on the basis of national determination. Mr. Baker proposed that if withdrawal were permitted as a result of identification of an explosion *anywhere* by the Commission, both the problems of a treaty violation and of testing by a non-party to the treaty, could be met.

Sir Michael Wright stated that he now had an official reaction from London on the atmospheric treaty. A comprehensive test ban treaty was considered to be preferable, but if we were able to offer only an atmospheric treaty, it should be a simple one. As the Soviet Union would probably reject it, it would be as effective as possible for world public opinion. For the sake of simplicity, London had queried the value of Articles IV and V and had been unenthusiastic about Article VI which seemed to throw doubt on the sincerity of the treaty. There had also been objection to the Withdrawal Article (VII) and a suggestion had been made to take the relevant Article of the April 18, 1961 treaty plus a provision for withdrawal if testing, other than underground, were conducted by another party. He added that he had meanwhile sent to London the rationale for Article IV, namely, to make frivolous denunciation more difficult.

Amb. Dean pointed out that the structure of Article VII depended on whether its purpose was to make it difficult for the other party to contract out of the treaty.

Mr. Spiers said that it had been felt that there were only two possible reasons for denouncing the treaty and the necessity of calling a conference would make it difficult to withdraw. Sir Michael Wright said that the article should provide the right of withdrawal if another country conducted a nuclear explosion. In an atmospheric treaty this could take place after a finding by observers. Who should make the finding in a comprehensive treaty was still a debatable point. He would ask the Foreign Office to propose some alternatives. Mr. Wilkinson questioned a possible inconsistency between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, since paragraph 2 seemed to annul the value of paragraph 1 by providing an alternative exit from the treaty without a conference. Mr. Goodby remarked that if a party to the treaty resumed testing there would be little need for a conference.

On the subject of tactics for the resumed session of the 18-NDC, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet delegation would have a draft treaty, that if we did not also table a draft treaty, the eight neutrals probably would. Hopefully, we would have a treaty to present and it would then be better to undergo an uncomfortable first two weeks. If we could not table a comprehensive treaty, he asked whether we should table an atmospheric treaty before the General Assembly convened. We could not maintain the position of the April 18, 1961 treaty indefinitely. If the scientific problems of the new comprehensive draft could be solved, we might have something more workable and more realistic despite the downgrading of the identification process. Sir Michael Wright pointed out that the new system would enable detection and identification to start within 6 months whereas the Geneva system could not have been put into operation for 4 years.

Amb. Stelle suggested another alternative. The real decision was whether we could proceed on the basis of national detection systems, which would give us a new basis for agreement. It might be simpler to present a skeleton working paper at Geneva on what we were prepared to accept without entering into details. If we were starting on a new basis we would probably want to abandon the historical wording of the April 18th treaty.

Mr. Beam commented that whereas we could commit ourselves by tabling a treaty, the presentation of a working paper would have more leeway for discussion. Mr. Neidle⁴ remarked that this procedure had been used in the early stages of the Antarctic Treaty. Amb. Dean stressed that the actual drafting of the treaty probably presented the least problem. The important thing was to have the fundamentals cleared. Mr. Spiers said that it would be possible to prepare such a working paper a little more quickly than a draft treaty but that its primary advantage would be as a better negotiating technique allowing greater flexibility.

Sir Michael Wright recalled that the US disarmament treaty had been called an outline and that it might have been better to put forth a fuller paper. The small print in the test ban treaty was also very important. It would be better to think this over. He reported that London was very much in favor of Padilla Nervo's proposal for a time lapse between the signing and coming into force of a treaty.⁵ He then asked about the possibility of tabling the two alternative treaties simultaneously. Mr. Beam felt that we would gain greater moral credit if we started with the comprehensive treaty. We would then have the atmospheric treaty as a fall-back.

Amb. Dean commented that it was hard to put verification measures into the atmospheric treaty. If both were advanced simultaneously the Soviet Union would always play one off against the other and thus preclude the possibility of agreement on inspection. It would be better to fall back on the atmospheric treaty.

Recapitulating his preferences, Sir Michael Wright listed first, a full treaty text on a comprehensive test ban; secondly, a full treaty text on an atmospheric test ban as a fall-back position; and thirdly, a skeleton working paper.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662. Confidential. Drafted by Marie deGunzburg (ACDA/IR). The meetings were held at the British Embassy.

¹ The list of 17 participants at the July 5 meeting and 13 participants at the July 6 meeting is not printed.

² A copy of the fifth revision of the comprehensive test ban treaty, dated June 18, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The other two ACDA papers have not been found.

³ A summary of the record of these Washington meetings, transmitted in Todis 417 to Geneva, July 6, reads in part: “US and UK scientists (including Long of ACDA) would meet in London next week and discuss technical aspects new US ideas and that outcome this discussion would be relevant re further tactical planning.” (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662) In his journal, Seaborg briefly refers to a meeting of the President’s Science Advisory Committee on July 16 at which Wiesner described the previous week’s meetings with the British on “test detection, permissive links, and general disarmament.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 4, pp. 41-42)

⁴ Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/GC)

⁵ Reference presumably is to the proposals of Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, for an end date for atmospheric testing. On June 14, for example, he said that the agreed date might be January 1963. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 479-484.

194. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, July 12, 1962, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

During a discussion devoted mainly to Berlin¹ Dobrynin referred to the need of the Soviet Union to be militarily prepared in view of what he described as provocative American statements about a possible attack on the Soviet Union. As to nuclear tests, the Soviet Union had felt that the United States had been ahead. It had then caught up, and now the United States was testing again. This was a vicious circle. The Secretary said that an announcement was being made that the Christmas Island phase of the tests had ended.² Dobrynin observed that we would still be testing on Johnson Island and in Nevada. He asked if there were any deadlines on these tests. The Secretary said that he thought they would end soon. Dobrynin asked if he meant in one or two months. The Secretary responded that it would probably be in that range, but he could give no commitment on this since he was not in charge and such matters as weather could affect timing. However, if Dobrynin wanted a base of reference we had said that we would make fewer tests than the Soviets had made in their last series. Hence the Soviets could do a certain amount of calculating on their own.

Dobrynin observed that newspaper reports indicated we had obtained good results from our underground tests. The Secretary commented that the Soviets should have sent their people as observers. Dobrynin said that the tests seemed to be proving the Soviet point. The American press had indicated detection as taking place over 3000 miles. The Secretary said this applied to certain kind of events only. Although a full report was not yet available, we believed that some control points and inspections would still

be required. Some improvement had been achieved. If the Soviets felt that their scientists had instruments which went all the way, this was a matter which should be discussed between the scientists of both countries.

The Secretary observed that he had been sorry to see that Khrushchev, in his recent speech, had come back to the point that any kind of inspection was tantamount to espionage.³ This was not in accord with the facts of what would really happen under international inspection. It was difficult to put this development into correct perspective, since up to a year or a year-and-a-half ago, the Soviet were talking of international inspection. In the last year or so, however, the Soviet Government has maintained that all inspection is unacceptable because it is equivalent to espionage. Inspection was not really capable of producing espionage, and this question had no relation anyway to the techniques of modern war.

After a rather obscure reference to a 1957 proposal for control posts and air inspection which had been rejected, Dobrynin admitted that a year ago the Soviet had changed its position because its security was involved. He wondered why the US so strongly insisted on inspection in connection with a test ban. Since detection can take place without inspection, this insistence merely increased Soviet suspicions. The Soviet Union was fully aware that the US had adequate facilities in adjacent countries to detect Soviet tests. The Secretary said that this would not apply to underground and small tests. Dobrynin said that perhaps tomorrow American scientists would announce that they could detect explosions 5000 miles away. The Secretary responded that, if Soviet scientists had such a capability in their instruments, why were they not willing to talk about it. Dobrynin asked why, if American scientists were so sure, the US did not sign the treaty. The Secretary observed that our scientists were not sure of the possibility of effective detection and identification at such great distances. The full technical analysis was not yet completed, and perhaps the Vela Tests would help to solve the problem, but they would not eliminate the need for inspection.

Dobrynin said signature of the treaty would eliminate distrust and provide progress, which so far had not been made. The Soviet Government felt strongly about this and the need to discuss these disarmament questions. All tests could be detected. Only underground tests had been in question. Now

even US scientists were convinced, as British scientists previously had been. Soviet scientists were convinced. Why did the US have to be so stubborn and continue saying that it must have posts in the USSR? The Secretary said that, even on the basis of the Vela Tests, national systems would not suffice, but scientists from the various countries might discuss the question and see if they could not come to some conclusions.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

¹ The memorandum of conversation on Berlin is printed in [vol. XV](#), pp. [215](#)–[222](#). Regarding their discussion of other subjects, see [vol. V](#), [Document 127](#).

² The Atomic Energy Commission made this announcement on July 12. (*The New York Times*, July 13, 1962)

³ In the course of a long speech to the World Congress on Disarmament in Moscow on July 10, Khrushchev said that the U.S. control proposal was “designed to set up a legalised system of international espionage for the benefit of a potential aggressor.” (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 642-643)

195. Editorial Note

On July 7, 1962, the Department of Defense released to the public some of the preliminary results of its seismic research program, known as Project Vela. (Press Release No. 1150-62, printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, volume II, pages 633-635) As summarized by Glenn Seaborg, among the technical conclusions of this project were: 1) the possibility of improved detection by properly placing and reinforcing instruments; 2) the promise of ocean-bottom seismometers; 3) the large variation in signal strength of underground explosions depending on the medium surrounding the shot place; and 4) the existence of many fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union that might be mistaken for nuclear explosions than had previously been estimated. (Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, page 162)

U.S. officials had earlier learned about the Vela findings and their implications for U.S. insistence on control posts in disarmament, but this knowledge had not yet resulted in any change in policy. Nevertheless, when Ambassador Dean arrived at the airport in Geneva on July 14, he reportedly said that the Vela findings suggested that international detection stations inside the Soviet Union might not be necessary if the United States could get non-nuclear nations to cooperate.

When Secretary Rusk learned of Dean's statement, he telephoned ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher (Foster was away), and together the Secretary and Fisher sent a message to Dean, which reads in part:

"A Reuters dispatch from Paris quotes you as having said 'Perhaps we could do without them' referring to control posts in the Soviet Union and that you may be able to cut down the number of on-site inspections but it is too early to tell. While we have no way of knowing whether or not this is an accurate quotation of what you said, you should know that there has been no decision on the part of the U.S. Government, in its position on a test ban, authorizing a change, and that my position and the position of the Department and ACDA, when asked, will continue to be that, while the recent results of the Vela Program are promising and are being evaluated, the evaluation to date has not led to a decision to abandon necessity of

control posts in the Soviet Union or reduce the number of on-site inspections. Your position should be the same. Whether and to what extent U.S. position should be revised, based on new data now under active consideration in Executive Branch and in consultation with Congress, and speculation as to possibility of a change can only prejudice this consideration.” (TODIS 432 to Geneva, July 14; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1462)

The Secretary and Fisher also wrote a statement emphasizing that the conclusions of the Vela program were preliminary and “do not demonstrate the possibility of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine the precise nature of suspicious events.” As a result of further evaluation of the Vela findings, the statement continued, the United States “will make in the near future whatever modifications in its present position as seem possible.” This statement was given to the press on July 16. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 6, 1962, page 234)

Fisher later recalled President Kennedy’s reaction to Dean’s statement:

“Now I didn't discuss this with the President directly, but I talked with Mac Bundy about it. And frankly, the President was very upset. He liked to have things done well. And the idea that we had made a proposition and we were saying something else: he had a rather adverse reaction to that, to put it mildly. So he passed the word down: 'Now look, let's get this thing straight. Either we've got a position or we don't have.' (Frank Sieverts, interview with Adrian S. Fisher, May 13, 1964, page 34; Kennedy Library, Oral History Program)

The Embassy in Moscow reported on July 19: “Soviet press predictably seizes on US press stories that Ambassador Dean publicly corrected by Department following his alleged July 14 statement Vela tests might make it possible for US to accept national control system. *Pravda* describes Dean statement as constituting ‘certain retreat from former US position’ but asserts even this hint at change ‘created panic in Washington.’ *New York Times* Finney article quoted at length to bolster Soviet contention US obstructing test ban agreement.” (Telegram 178 from Moscow, July 19; Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/7-1962)

John W. Finney's feature article on the Soviet and U.S. nuclear tests and on the impasse in the Geneva negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty was published in *The New York Times*, July 15, 1962.

196. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy[Source](#)

Washington, July 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

New Data on Detecting Underground Nuclear Explosions

1. You asked last week how long the Defense Department had known the new figures on the basis of which they made their announcement about the change in our ability to detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union a little while ago.¹ There is no simple answer to this question in terms of time. In one sense the Department of Defense did not know that they had the new information until they were asked by Disarmament (ACDA) on 15 June to give an evaluation of the proposals that the neutrals had been making in Geneva.² These proposals rested on the proposition that we could reliably detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union without requiring seismic stations inside the Soviet Union. But in the course of looking up the answer to this question they looked at all their earlier figures and thought about them anew. This led to a realization, by 3 July,³ that the previous estimates of how many small earthquakes per year of a given size occurred on the average in the Soviet Union were too high by a significant factor.
2. However, the answer that we first knew the new figures on 3 July is an over-simplification. In fact, the scientists in the Air Force who run the detection system for nuclear explosions (AFTAC) suspected as early as 1958 that their current interpretation of their measurements might be incorrect. The Hardtack shot at the end of 1958 raised this suspicion. However, we changed our official estimates in the opposite direction. In the summer of 1961 the first half-year report from one of the new accurately-instrumented and specially organized stations in the Vela program led to further doubt about the validity of our previous estimates. These doubts remained no more than doubts until February of this year. Then this data on the Soviet tests made the suspicion stronger. Our measurements on the French test of 1 May and our measurements on the

Aardvark shot in our own underground test series of 12 May changed suspicion to new knowledge.⁴ The inquiry by ACDA crystallized the new knowledge into a new estimate.

3. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that our previous measurements rested on the observations of the world-wide system of existing academic and governmental seismic stations. These stations had two shortcomings. First, their instruments were not carefully calibrated against each other or a known standard. Second, they were chiefly useful in measuring relatively large earthquakes in which seismologists were interested for scientific purposes. When we created the Atomic Energy Detection System of stations operated by the AFTAC, we got the first set of stations with high quality, uniformly calibrated instruments directed toward measuring small underground shocks, such as arise from underground nuclear tests. These stations were designed to measure a different kind of seismic shock than the others, namely the underground or body wave as opposed to the surface wave which was used to measure large earthquakes. The problem has always been: what is the relation of the two kinds of measurements? It is only on the basis of this relation that we are able to interpret our observations to make an estimate of the number of earthquakes of given magnitude in the Soviet Union. What the events I have summarized above did was lead the scientists in AFTAC to conclude that the old formula for relating these two sets of measurements was wrong, and that a new formula was needed.
4. The estimates of the frequency of small shocks⁵ in the Soviet Union which we presented at the Geneva Experts Conference⁶ were challenged by Soviet scientists. Their figures differed from our figures by roughly the amount of the correction factor which we have now accepted. Thus our new figures are about the same as those the Soviets offered in 1958. We still do not understand whether this is a coincidence, which is what the AFTAC scientists say, or whether the Soviets did have a better understanding of the real relation between the two sets of measurements. We cannot simply say that the Soviets had the right formula, because the nature of their argument about the difference between these two sets of figures was not couched in these terms. Frank Press, one of the leading seismologists in the country, who is a member of your Scientific Advisory Committee, does not accept the explanation that the identity of our new result and the Soviet figures in 1958 is just a coincidence.

However, he is still unsure of just what the relation between the two sets of figures is. The important practical fact, of course, is that we have changed our figures to look more like the Soviet figures, whatever the reason.

5. It is still too soon to say precisely what the significance of the new figures is for our position on a test ban treaty. The interested people will be discussing this in the coming week, and you will probably get an evaluation by the end of the week or early the following week.
6. I think there is one significant moral to be drawn from the story. It is the fact that the accurate data which AFTAC collected on its new system was highly classified and its existence in detail was unknown to all except a few scientists inside the Government. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the technical people who had produced the original set of figures, did not quickly leap to the thought that the discrepancies which they had observed, and the questions which others had raised, based on the small amount of public data and the Russian figures, might be explicable in some other way than as mistakes in public or Soviet data. If the AFTAC figures had been made more widely available, or if AFTAC's activities had been reviewed in detail more frequently by outside scientists, the change in understanding and evaluation might have come a good deal more quickly. It is fair to say, of course, that this is a speculation. How hard and how long a man has to look at new figures before he sees that they are inconsistent with an old theory remains one of the inscrutable mysteries of science.

CK⁷₋

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5-7/30/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

¹ See [footnote 1, Document 204](#).

² This ACDA request has not been further identified.

³ Reference presumably is to an interagency meeting on July 3 at which the Vela findings were discussed in some detail. John McNaughton summarized the consensus at the meeting in a July 3 memorandum to Nitze.

(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP, Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962)) See the Supplement. See also [Document 204](#).

⁴ Aardvark was an underground shot with a yield of 40 kilotons in the Nevada test series. (Department of Energy, *Announced United States Nuclear Tests*, p. 19) ⁵ The word “shots” has been crossed out and the word “shocks” inserted by hand.

⁶ Regarding the conclusions of this conference, which met in Geneva July 1-August 21, 1958, see *Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office), Miscellaneous No. 11 (1958). Additional documentation on the conference is in [Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III. 456](#) 

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

197. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Geneva, July 21, 1962, 1 p.m.

USMC/5

SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Price, Ministry of Defense^{[1](#)}

SUBJECT

Nuclear Tests

Lord Home brought in Sir Michael and Mr. Price for this phase of the discussion with the Secretary. He opened with the question as to when the US expected to have new proposals in the nuclear testing field. The Secretary replied that he hoped we would be able to develop our conclusions by next week. He would comment as regards the Vela tests that they had produced entirely new data which needed a considerable amount of further analysis. As Lord Home knew, the President was prepared to go as far as was technically possible. However another factor was that considerable education would be necessary for key Congressional leaders, especially in the Senate. From what he had learned to date, though he had not been fully briefed, the Secretary thought that the Vela results would certainly not do away entirely with the need for on-site inspections and would probably not entirely obviate the need for some control posts in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Price gave a brief review of the consultations with the President's Science Adviser, Jerome Wiesner, in London² and commented that these had come to considerably more optimistic conclusions than those voiced by the Secretary.

Sir Michael commented that if the Vela results enabled us to have satisfactory assurances on the basis of 25 posts mainly around the periphery of the Soviet Union rather than inside, we could be in business within six months. This contrasted with the present plan under which it would take six years to build the control posts called for, and since there would not be enough to be effective at all for at least two years, we would in fact be faced with a two-year moratorium for the Soviets.

This part of the conversation terminated with the Secretary saying that we would push ahead on this matter and that he would give it his personal attention after his return to Washington.

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held during luncheon at the British Mission. Secretary Rusk was in Geneva July 19 for sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which reconvened on July 16, and for the signing of the Laos Accords on July 23.

¹ Benjamin Terence Price, Chief Scientific Officer, British Ministry of Defense.

² Regarding these London meetings, see [footnote 3](#), [Document 193](#).

198. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Geneva, July 24, 1962, 1:25 p.m.

USMC/20

SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Ilyichev^{[1](#)}
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodriev

SUBJECT

Disarmament and Related Topics

While drinks were served, Gromyko contended he had made two new proposals in his speech during the morning at the Disarmament Conference.^{[2](#)} The Secretary replied he was very much interested in Mr. Gromyko's remarks on the question of force levels. Gromyko said that, since some delegations at the conference had mentioned the possibility of splitting up the difference between the US 2.1 level and the Soviet 1.7 level, the Soviet Union thought that the 1.9 million level might be a good compromise. The Secretary then observed that, when he got back to Washington he would see what could be done to get for Ambassador Dean instructions to follow up on the conversation Mr. Gromyko and he had had earlier on the subject of nondiffusion.^{[3](#)}

During the luncheon discussion between the Secretary and Gromyko, there was an exchange on the relationship between disarmament and the solution of other problems. The Secretary made the point that the lowering of tensions which would result from solution of some of these other problems would undoubtedly have its affect on progress in disarmament. Gromyko at first seemed to think that the Secretary was claiming that progress in disarmament could not be made without first resolving these other problems and said that, while the USSR recognized a certain relationship between solution of disarmament and other problems, it objected to making solution of one question dependent on solution of the other. That would create a vicious circle. The Secretary then pointed out that we wanted to go ahead with disarmament and to make progress in this field, but as Khrushchev himself had said, there was an obvious relationship between disarmament and other political problems. The Secretary thought that the US could not agree to reduce its military capabilities before the Berlin problem was settled. He also called attention in this context to the relationship between the increased pressures on Berlin last summer and the acceleration of US military preparations and increased arms expenditures. Gromyko said we could not expect that he could accept this was a justified result. The Secretary responded that he was merely referring to an obvious fact and called attention to what Khrushchev had told President Kennedy in Vienna.⁴ Khrushchev had mentioned the pressures his military and scientists were putting on him to increase arms expenditures which were put in terms of matching US capabilities; then when the Soviets increased their expenditures, pressures were applied to President Kennedy to increase US expenditures, and a chain reaction ensued.

Gromyko stressed the need by the US to control its official spokesmen who made belligerent and threatening public statements. The Secretary pointed out the fact that under the American system the Executive required public and Congressional cooperation in order to obtain appropriations, something that was different from the situation in the Soviet Union. The Soviets could divert resources from one area to another purely by executive action whereas this was not possible under our system. Hence, there was a need to convince public opinion and this required speaking about the subject.

Gromyko also stressed the point that the US was wrong in thinking that it could bankrupt the Soviet Union through the arms race. The Soviet Union was doing very well and its seven-year plan for economic development was being greatly overfulfilled. Gromyko emphasized he was mentioning this latter point only in passing, and not for any special purpose. The Secretary said we were aware the USSR was a great power with large resources and assured Mr. Gromyko that there was no theory in the US of making the USSR bankrupt through the arms race.

The Secretary recalled the remarks by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs at the Disarmament Conference this morning, in which Mr. Green had expressed the view that there should be no recess of the Disarmament Conference during the General Assembly.⁵ The Secretary observed this thought was a new one and that he personally felt that there would be at least some break in the Conference during the GA, particularly since many of the delegates to the Conference were the obvious persons to discuss disarmament in the GA. Mr. Gromyko said that only 17 nations were participating in the Conference and that, therefore, other nations should have the chance of expressing their views on disarmament at least once a year, i.e., at the General Assembly. While a recess had its pros and cons, the USSR felt that some recess during the GA would be in order. As to the Secretary's remarks that the delegates at the conference table would be the logical persons to discuss disarmament, Mr. Gromyko said this was of course something to be decided by each individual country and that he personally did not want to be deprived of the opportunity to speak on that subject. The Secretary denied that he had any intention in this respect.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2462. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Akalovsky on July 26. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

¹ Ivan Ivanovich Ilyichev, Chief of the Third European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

² For text of Gromyko's remarks to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on July 24, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 681-688.

³ Reference is to a private dinner meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko, probably on July 22. No full report of their conversation on that occasion has been found, but see [footnote 6, Document 201](#).

⁴ Documentation on the Vienna summit June 3-4, 1961, is printed in [volumes V](#) and [XIV](#).

⁵ Green's statement is in U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.60.

199. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Geneva, July 25, 1962, 10:30–10:50 a.m.

USMC/22

[Here follow a list of participants and a paragraph on Germany and Berlin.]

Mr. Kohler said the second point was connected with a long private discussion between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko at dinner the other night on the question of nondiffusion of nuclear weapons and the possibility of finding a formula which would be acceptable to both sides.^{[1](#)} The question had been posed by Mr. Gromyko as to whether the wording, “direct or indirect,” could be accepted from the Soviet formulation on this question but which, as the Secretary had explained, would apply only to assistance to national nuclear capabilities. The Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to be informed that he would consider and work on this after his return to Washington and would be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject. Mr. Gromyko replied that this was a question for discussion. Wording must be found which would ensure that there were no loopholes. The Soviet Government wanted an agreement on this subject. However, as he had stressed to the Secretary, if there should be any delay in reaching a broader agreement on the subject, this should not entail any delay in reaching an arrangement on this point with respect to the two German states. The Soviet Union was opposed to making one problem dependent on another.

[Here follows discussion of other U.S.-Soviet issues.]

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2562. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

¹ See [footnote 3, Document 198](#).

200. Editorial Note

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson had a 2-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev in the morning of July 25, 1962, followed by a 3-hour conversation with him the same afternoon at Khrushchev's dacha. These conversations covered several subjects in U.S.-Soviet relations. Records of their discussions on Berlin are printed in [volume XV, pages 252-255](#). Following a discussion of military matters, Thompson reported, "Throughout conversation K made many references to U-2." Thompson continued:

"In discussing disarmament I said I could not understand why Soviets had not given serious consideration to our zonal plan of inspection. I said this was serious effort on our part to meet their preoccupation with secrecy and to meet their insistence that amount of inspection be related to amount of disarmament. Our whole effort in this field seemed breaking down because of Soviet obsession with secrecy which I believe based on outmoded analysis. I cited Telstar as latest evidence world shrinking and said whatever advantage they had from secrecy wasting asset. K responded it might be true they gave too much attention and importance to secrecy but said on our side our military obsessed with desire acquire ever more information. He said of course every country had spies but sending U-2 across frontier was essentially act of war. We wanted to know where their rocket bases were but these like anything else could be camouflaged. I said it was natural human trait to fear unknown but pointed out this not to their advantage since it caused our military to prepare to meet threats which might not exist. K said he was more concerned now with use of outer space than with planes but said his own people had shown him photos (not clear whether from planes or satellites but I inferred latter) showing airfield or factories and even planes on field, but not showing what purpose of planes was or what factories produced. Always possible conceal essential information.

"With regard to our zonal proposal K said there were only limited number of Soviet rocket bases and we knew where they are. It would therefore be simple for us to arrange to inspect them all. He did not seem convinced by my counterarguments that if disarmament were 30 percent in first stage,

only 30 percent of zones could be inspected. He said essence of disarmament problem was that we wanted to take away weapon with which they could hit us while preserving our overseas bases for use against them. I pointed out that in our first stage they would retain 70 percent of their missiles but he said in order know what 30 percent reduction was we would have to know what their total strength was, and pushed aside my argument that this would not involve inspection of all of them.

“K began discussion of test ban by asking Sobolev whether their announcement of resumption had been published. When answered in affirmative he said they would begin about August 5 or 6—he could not remember exact date. Soviets had resumed testing only because of our actions in military field. He added however somewhat cryptically that he understood President’s action. He hoped that as result of our experiments we would now be able to conclude test ban, implication being after their next series was completed. I observed there appeared to be hope that as result of our new studies it might be possible to agree not to have permanent observation posts but it would still be necessary to have verification of suspicious events. K brushed this aside saying that we could detect anything from outside and he cited fact that Soviets had conducted unannounced underground test in last series which we had detected and publicized. He said same true of French test which I gathered Soviets had detected. He said test agreement could be reached but he did not think Pentagon wanted it.

“From nature of conversation I gathered K has little hope that disarmament agreement can be reached.

“He said, for example, that greatest problem was fact that we have many invested interests in arms race and our monopolists would prevent agreement. I replied this was absurd and that what he called monopolists knew as well as anyone else that arms race was dangerous and war would hit them as well as anyone else. I added we had many interesting projects and needs which would require all our resources. It was true sudden disarmament would cause dislocations but we were confident we could deal with them. I expressed opinion military people on both sides responsible for security of country prudently always tended give other side maximum

capability and worst intentions but it would be tragic if we let this determine our overall policy, and that arms race was not only vast economic waste but also cause of dangerous tensions.

“K said Soviet 7-year plan would be fulfilled whether or not there was disarmament and said plan had been based on assumption there would not be. If disarmament achieved they would probably complete plan by end of five years.

“I brought up subject of prevention war by accident or miscalculation saying we had taken many unilateral steps in this field but others called for which required cooperation of both sides and I hoped Soviets would pursue this problem with us. I indicated agreement but did not pursue matter.”
(Telegram 227 from Moscow, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2662)

On July 27, Thompson, who was to be replaced by Foy D. Kohler as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, left Moscow to return to the United States. During a stop en route in Copenhagen, Thompson transmitted further reflections on these talks. Following his comments on Berlin, Thompson added:

- “(2) Even if we are willing to give up insistence upon having control posts inside Soviet Union I do not think Khrushchev will agree to more than one or two verifications of test ban a year and probably none. He is obsessed with idea we want to locate his missiles but probably more important he wants to conceal his relative weakness.
- “(3) The mere fact that Khrushchev asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case but I doubt that we will get anywhere on real disarmament at this time. I got impression, however, that Khrushchev will be prepared seriously to consider steps to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. If we can get over the Berlin hump and then let him know our intelligence capabilities we might make progress on GCD.” (Telegram 76 from Copenhagen, July 28; *ibid.*, 762.00/7-2862)

201. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, July 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list [1](#)

Nuclear Test Ban

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.

Mr. Foster stated that findings reported by Project Vela and by AFTAC hold some hope for modification of the present U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. These findings have received intensive consideration. As the result of press coverage, Congress has been taking a substantial interest in the matter. Alternative approaches have been discussed with the Congressional committees, which have been informed that no decision has yet been made. The alternatives presented for consideration by the Principals have been reviewed by the scientists and by the Deputies. [2](#)

The fundamental question is whether, in contrast to continued “leap-frogging” of tests, the national interest is best served by taking advantage of technical improvements in order to propose a treaty that might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union. ACDA feels that two types of treaties might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union than present proposals while at the same time providing assurance that we would be able to catch any gross cheating.

ACDA considers that the most desirable approach would be to present a modified comprehensive treaty with no threshold and no right to test at all. There would be an “international-national” system involving fewer stations than previously proposed. The stations would be operated by nationals of the host countries and would feed data to an international commission, which would determine suspicious events and request on-site inspection.

The alternative would be a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing but not on underground testing; any party would be entitled to proceed with underground testing under conditions which would preclude venting outside of national borders. Both approaches seem technically possible. ACDA believes that we should first present the comprehensive treaty. If that fails, we should offer the atmospheric ban.

Technical presentations should be made at Geneva to prepare the groundwork and explain why it is still necessary to have on-site inspections.

The Secretary noted that the draft “U.S. Program”³ described the new findings as “tentative” and asked how tentative they were.

Mr. Fisher explained that in an appearance before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Doyle Northrup of AFTAC had described the findings in this way and that his view had been reflected in the Holifield-Jackson letter to the President.⁴ On the other hand, Northrup had developed suggestions for an improved detection system based on the new findings. The findings do look very good, and we should make up our minds.

The Secretary thought we should interpret “tentative” as meaning that to the best of our present ability to know what is correct, this is the way things look.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there is enough certainty so that people are reasonably comfortable. His view was that the data will get better and that it is unlikely that there will be any retrogression. Present lack of agreement is largely over the subtleties of numbers.

Secretary McNamara thought there were two unknowns. The first was the level of the detection threshold and of undifferentiated events above the threshold. Knowledge of this is fairly certain; there is a degree of uncertainty, but not very great. The second unknown, about which there was greater uncertainty, was the amount of advancement in nuclear technology that can take place below the threshold.

Dr. Seaborg pointed out that the detection threshold differs as between tuff, granite, and alluvium, the threshold for the latter being 14 kt. If we accept

the possibility that the Soviet Union can test below 14 kt, a lot can be done.
[3 lines of source text not declassified]

Dr. Wiesner did not believe that one would dare conduct tests as large as 14 kt.

Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviet Union would face the possibility of detection. By unilateral means, we would be able to detect tests in alluvium.

Secretary McNamara was prepared to believe that the actual threshold might be around 7 kt; testing below that level, however, might give substantial gains to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, although it seemed that the degree of risk from cheating was substantial, we also needed to know the risks of not having a ban at all.

Dr. Seaborg identified the principal purposes of tests below 10 kt.⁵ However, he thought there was a more important question than that of the data that could be obtained from underground testing and explained that AEC's chief concern was the effect of stopping underground testing on the vitality of our laboratories. If we stopped but the Soviet Union continued to test underground, they would be prepared to resume atmospheric testing. Dr. Haworth stated the problem in a somewhat different way, pointing out that AEC's concern was that the Soviet Union might at a future time abrogate a comprehensive treaty with a big, all-out atmospheric test series. We couldn't forestall such a possibility completely, but we could minimize its effects. An atmospheric ban, with continued underground testing, would permit us to maintain a posture of readiness.

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara stated that he believed that if we could be certain that the Soviet Union would stop testing, we should do so. Dr. Seaborg had no reservations about this.

The Secretary then said that it is fundamental to the U.S. position that we should not put forward proposals for purely propagandistic or political reasons. Public statements on the Project VELA findings have built up great expectations, but we must be prepared to live with the proposals we advance. We are always under steady pressure, from those bearing less responsibility, to alter our proposals. The numbers (of detection stations and

on-site inspections) we talk about are significant to us but less so to others. They will urge concessions and try to whack the numbers down still further. Unless we are prepared to state our position and stick with it, there will always be erosion.

There are two approaches we might take. We could go in with a fairly complete and tight comprehensive treaty, support it with the data we have, and be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric ban. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is categorically saying that it will accept no on-site inspection. Gromyko repeated this in personal conversations. Under these circumstances, our numbers are not particularly relevant. Changes in our numbers don't move us toward agreement. Perhaps we should say that we would like to work on a comprehensive treaty but that we are aware of the Soviet position on on-site inspection. So long as that position prevails, there is no point in playing a numbers game. For our own part, we want to make a start somewhere, so we propose starting with an atmospheric treaty and making it comprehensive as soon as possible. Since the rest of the world is primarily concerned with atmospheric tests and the effects of fallout, this approach should be well received.

Mr. McCone recalled that we had tried this approach twice before, once in 1959 and again in 1961.

Mr. Fisher, however, pointed out that the 1959 proposal had been an elaborate one whereas the present proposal was pared down. The 1961 proposal had been put forward under special circumstances and a time limit had been placed on its acceptance. We have not put forward a proposal for an atmospheric ban in the manner in which we would do so now.

Although not feeling at this point in a position to express a final preference, the Secretary had the impression that atmospheric tests seemed more important than underground tests and that it would be more desirable to seek an atmospheric ban than to go through a series of conflicts over numbers, both at home with the Congress as well as abroad.

Mr. Murrow agreed. He thought our posture would be good in terms of world opinion.

The Secretary then noted that we have supposed that the Soviet Union would not accept an atmospheric ban. However in view of Soviet concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he thought that if we could move forward simultaneously with an atmospheric ban and something on non-proliferation, the Soviet Union might accept it.⁶

Dr. Wiesner asked why we should use Soviet interest in non-proliferation to get an atmospheric ban. Why not try to get a total ban. Moreover, he thought that other countries were unlikely to agree to a self-denying non-proliferation agreement, if we ourselves retained the right to test underground.

With reference to the apparent impossibility of obtaining Soviet agreement to a comprehensive treaty with on-site inspection, Dr. Seaborg assumed that there was no disagreement in the U.S. regarding the need for inspection, and the Secretary asked whether it could be reported to the President that there was no opinion that zero inspection would be acceptable.

There was general agreement with this statement. Mr. McNamara added, however, that although he was not prepared to say that zero inspection was acceptable, he was also not prepared to say what risk would be involved in a continuation of testing. He thought that we should put down the risks that would arise from the Soviet Union's beating the system and put alongside these the risks involved in continuation of testing. His personal view was that the risks of continued testing were very serious if we looked ahead ten years. He was seriously concerned about the degree of proliferation that would take place in this period.

Mr. Murrow asked whether this did not argue against putting forward a specific number of required inspection. Mr. McNamara thought it might. He thought the Secretary's suggestion of associating an atmospheric test ban with a non-proliferation agreement was interesting, but he wondered whether we could get agreement.

Mr. Bundy thought this approach was so one-sided that we were unlikely to get agreement. Only those countries which now had nuclear weapons would be free to test. Dr. Wiesner supported this view, but Mr. Nitze disagreed. He thought that there was a certain inequity anyway and that if the Secretary's

approach were followed, the situation would not be much more inequitable than at present. However, he suggested that we add to the atmospheric ban and nonproliferation proposals, an expression of our willingness to extend the ban to underground testing if the Soviet Union would agree to inspection. Mr. Foster agreed that the possibility of a comprehensive treaty should be part of the package.

The Secretary concluded that both the principal alternatives should be presented to the President. He continued to fear, however, that if we presented specific numbers in Geneva, we would generate much controversy at home and that such controversy would be purposeless in view of the Soviet position. If we don't go in with numbers, we will have more time to explain the situation to the Congress. We could say at Geneva that it would be possible to work the matter out on the basis of lower numbers but not prior to acceptance by the Soviet Union of the need for inspection.

Mr. Keeny cautioned that this approach would, in effect, invite the neutrals to present proposals involving very little inspection. Dr. Wiesner agreed and thought that by extrapolation, the old numbers would go way down in the light of the new findings. If we go forward with the findings but without the numbers we want, we may be compromising our own position. Mr. Foster noted that this did not seem to change the fundamental point which was that apparently the Soviet Union would not accept any numbers at all. We can say that if the Soviet Union will accept inspection, the number will be lower than 20.

Mr. Bundy agreed that it would not be fruitful to present precise numbers. As far as Congress was concerned, he thought we would have an additional problem with the question of "international-national" systems. It might be desirable to remain uncommitted on this point. Dr. Wiesner, however, pointed out that we had agreed to study the neutrals' proposal and that it would be strange if we said nothing. Mr. Foster thought this could be handled by stressing the use of national systems in support of an atmospheric ban. The Secretary hoped that we could clarify the term "international-national" and avoid any confusion with the Soviet interpretation.

Mr. McNamara stated his understanding that under the foregoing approach we actually would continue underground testing. Mr. Bundy noted that the second round has been approved with no time limit. Mr. Murrow asked whether there was any necessity of announcing completion of the current series. He noted that the beginning of each new series was always greeted with a poor reaction abroad. He wondered why we could not simply drag the present series out. Mr. Bundy said that was, in effect, what we were doing.

Mr. McNamara then asked whether, under an atmospheric ban, we would contemplate preparing for resumption of atmospheric tests to prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union might do so. Mr. Bundy thought it would be important to be prepared, that we would need to maintain standby readiness through time. The Secretary pointed out that the kind of preparations we undertook would be affected by the question of whether preparations were initiated before or after an agreement. We should try to set up categories of preparations that would be desirable and acceptable after the signing of a test ban. Dr. Seaborg noted in this regard that Christmas Island presented a knotty problem. Mr. McNamara thought we could determine what things could be done without becoming known internationally.

Dr. Wiesner commented that we were probably taking too narrow an approach in considering countermeasures to possible resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. Rather than resume testing ourselves, we might, for example, say that we would double the size of our missile force. This might be a more effective deterrent to Soviet resumption.

(Note: In connection with the foregoing, no discussion took place respecting the texts of the draft treaties.)

Production During Stage I of Disarmament

Mr. Fisher explained that ACDA recommended that Stage I production of armaments be on the basis of one-for-one replacement by types.⁷ Even under this approach, there would have to be an upper limit on production. As a basis for negotiation, we could say that the reduction should be at least 10 percent a year during Stage I but that it might be greater. A reduction on

this basis would parallel the reduction of armaments, and we could take advantage of the Soviet proposal that armaments and production be reduced proportionately.

Gen. Lemnitzer thought that much depended on the definition of “types”. He asked whether a Minuteman could be substituted for an Atlas.

Mr. Fisher explained that all B-52’s would be regarded as one type regardless of series but that Minuteman and Atlas represented different types.

Mr. McNamara stated that production by types was acceptable.

Gen. Lemnitzer expressed the view that there should be no ban on production of prototypes or on modernization of production facilities.

Mr. Foster, however, pointed out that there would be a need to show that we were prepared to go ahead with disarmament. Production of new prototypes would raise doubts about this. Moreover, the approach was based on the belief that by 1964 the U.S. would be in a good position and that it would be best to freeze types at that time. Dr. Wiesner added that we certainly would not want to permit new facilities for producing weapons to be established during Stage I.

The Secretary asked about the cut-off between production of items for military and for civilian use. Mr. Foster thought the dividing line was sufficiently clear for present negotiating purposes, but there would be problems later. He noted that this problem had been encountered in the JCS wargame on inspection and believed that it would be desirable to have additional wargames.

It was agreed that the recommendation on production should be presented to the President for approval.

Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I

Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation⁸ put discussion of military bases back toward the end of Stage I but did permit discussion. The

U.S. would not accept the singling out of “foreign” bases but might be willing to begin a reduction of bases at some point in Stage I. It would be inconsistent to be unwilling to discuss this if progress were made on other points.

The Secretary asked whether there will be any foreign bases we will be prepared to give up in the next few years. Mr. McNamara estimated that we would probably give up a small number in the next two or three years, perhaps 20-50 out of, say, 500 of the larger bases (not counting the many small installations). Mr. Murrow thought it might be useful to have a definition of “military bases” that would differentiate between large bases and small installations.

Gen. Taylor asked whether this presupposed redeployment. Mr. McNamara said that what he had in mind was some of the B-47 bases and other bases of that character. Twenty was not a large number. The Secretary pointed out that we do not redeploy in order to reduce bases; we reduce bases when we redeploy.

Mr. McNamara accepted the recommendation on military bases, and it was agreed that the recommendation should be presented to the President for approval.

Stage I Force Levels

The Secretary noted in view of the Soviet action accepting a Stage I force level of 1.9 million, there would be increased pressure for the U.S. to accept the same level. Mr. McNamara recognized that this would be the case. Mr. Foster requested that the force level study be expedited so that we might be able to say something before the next recess, which was expected in September. Mr. McNamara agreed that the study should be expedited. Mr. Nitze noted in this connection that the question of civilian personnel was of great importance.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on August

16. McCone also wrote a memorandum for the record of this meeting, July 26. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.

¹ The attached list of 23 participants is not printed.

² A meeting of the Deputies on July 20 discussed a draft nuclear test ban treaty. No record of this meeting has been found.

³ “U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests”, draft of July 25. [Footnote in the source text. The draft has not been found. A July 24 draft is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Regarding a July 26 draft, see [footnote 2, Document 202](#).]

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Restricted Data on file in ACDA and AEC. [Footnote in the source text. A memorandum from C.E. Conger (ACDA/D) to William H. Brubeck (S/S), August 10, attached to the source text, notes that because certain of Seaborg’s remarks involved atomic energy restricted data, ACDA/D “summarized this part of Seaborg’s remarks in a brief separate memorandum, copies of which will be on file in ACDA and AEC.” This memorandum of conversation has not been found. A note from Brubeck to Emory C. Swank (S), August 13, also attached to the source text, notes that S/S would obtain a copy of the memorandum containing Seaborg’s remarks “if the Secretary desires to read it.” No response from the Secretary has been found.]

⁶ Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Limited Distribution on file in ACDA and S/S. [Footnote in the source text. In his August 10 memorandum to Brubeck, Conger wrote that during the meeting “the Secretary requested that references to a recent talk with Gromyko be closely held.” Thus this part of the Secretary’s conversation was summarized in a separate, limited distribution memorandum. This separate memorandum, attached to the source text, reads: “Referring to recent conversations with Gromyko, the Secretary stated that he thought the Soviet Union was seriously concerned about the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the case of West Germany. Gromyko had suggested language to the effect that we would not help other countries 'directly or indirectly'. The Secretary had questioned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would interpret 'indirectly' in the same manner. However, he thought

there was some possibility that we could develop mutually acceptable language on non-proliferation which would safeguard our position on a multi-national European nuclear force while assuring the Soviet Union that we would not assist any state in obtaining nuclear weapons for use on the basis of a national decision.”]

⁷ See “Recommendation on Production Limits in Stage I”, draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.]

⁸ “Stage I reduction of military bases”, draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. This draft has not been found.]

202. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapon Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals

The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962 to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva.¹ At that meeting, we considered alternative lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests. These lines of approach are based on a combination of technical and political developments which are described in the attached memorandum.²

There are two proposed alternatives which are described below. The members of the Committee of Principals are prepared to discuss the issues with you tomorrow to help you in making your determination as to which is most in the national interest.

1. *Alternative One.* The United States should simultaneously pursue the following five courses:
 - a. *Atmospheric test ban.* The United States should table an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty.
 - b. *Comprehensive test ban.* With respect to a comprehensive treaty, we should not table one now.³ We should declare a willingness to accept a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving no foreign-operated control posts on Soviet soil and involving fewer than 20 on-site inspections (but we should state that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union agrees to at least some on-site inspections).⁴ We should at the same time provide the Conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally coordinated “national” systems. We should express our willingness to negotiate in any of

these areas even though the Soviet Union commences an atmospheric test series.

- c. *No-transfer agreement*. The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically to the other courses of action.
 - d. *Underground testing*. We should continue our underground testing program.⁵
 - e. *Readiness to test in the atmosphere*. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere.⁶
2. *Alternative Two*. The United States should pursue the following courses in the order indicated:
- a. *Tabling of data*. The United States should provide the Conference with the recent data relating to detection, location and identification capabilities.
 - b. *Comprehensive test ban*. We should propose a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving the following changes:
 - (i) The total number of control posts in the USSR to be reduced from 19 to perhaps 5.
 - (ii) The control posts to be operated by nationals of the country where they are located but standardized and coordinated by an international organization. There would also be permanent international observers at these posts or periodic visits to them by such observers.
 - (iii) The number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union to be reduced from the present range of 12 to 20 to a flat figure which might be less than the present minimum of 12.
 - c. *Atmospheric test ban*. We should be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty in the event that the Soviet Union is unwilling to agree to on-site inspections.

In discussing the problem of nuclear testing, the Committee of Principals agreed that two concurrent studies should be undertaken on an urgent basis: an assessment of the risks to U.S. security under the alternative types of test bans, and an assessment of the risks to U.S. security that would result from the indefinite continuation of testing of nuclear weapons by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries.

In addition to considering questions related to cessation of nuclear weapon testing, the Committee of Principals also considered and recommends for your approval the following positions related to general disarmament negotiations:

Stage I production. The Committee of Principals proposes that production of armaments during Stage I should be limited to replacement and repair of existing armaments. Replacement would be “in kind.” The amount of production would be reduced at least as much as the reduction of armaments. Production of new types of weapons, of prototypes, and of new armament production facilities would be prohibited.

Bases. The Committee of Principals also proposes that the United States should state at the Geneva Conference that it would be willing to discuss the possibility of a Stage I reduction of military bases but that any such discussion should take place only after substantial progress has been made toward reaching agreement on the central problems of reducing armaments and armed forces and on verification and other measures providing necessary safeguards in a disarming world.

William C. Foster

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a note from McGeorge Bundy to the President that reads: “Here is a basic paper for tomorrow’s testing-disarmament meeting—set for 10:15 AM. It puts the main issues clearly. The positions relating to the general disarmament treaty are easy—and unanimously agreed. The testing scenario is the hard one. My belief is that you will want to listen hard, and not decide, tomorrow morning.”

¹ See [Document 201](#).

² Entitled “U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests,” dated July 26, not printed.

³ This sentence has been crossed out in the source text, presumably by the President. It is also crossed out by McGeorge Bundy on a carbon copy attached to the source text.

⁴ This sentence contains the following markings presumably in the President's hand: "foreign operated" has been crossed out, and inserted in the margin are the words, "internationally monitored nation'l control posts"; "fewer than 20 on-site" has been deleted, and inserted by hand in the margin is "possible reduction in on site"; and from the word "but" to the end of the sentence has been placed in brackets. The first change is the same on Bundy's carbon copy; the second is the same except Bundy has not crossed out "on site" and has written in "a possible reduction in". Instead of brackets for the last clause in this sentence, Bundy has written in the margin: "reserved for discussion with Dean".

⁵ McGeorge Bundy wrote in the margin on the carbon copy: "no public announcement".

⁶ Next to this paragraph on the carbon copy, Bundy wrote: "prepared to".

203. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 27, 1962, 10:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Proposals

Secretary Rusk introduced the Committee of Principals' proposals with respect to a nuclear weapons test ban and other disarmament measures. He said that we must proceed with prudence and that we must have reasonable assurances that the other side is not testing if we are to live with treaty provisions prohibiting our testing. He added that everyone was agreed that if we can get an acceptable treaty, we want a nuclear weapons test ban. He presented two alternatives:

- (1) We can go all the way for a comprehensive all-environment ban, relying on a national protection system. This system involves neutral observers at each station, plus twelve on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. The Soviet inspection figure is zero. Thus, we are exposed to pressure from the neutrals to reduce our minimum figure of twelve. He noted that key Congressional leaders were not pleased with the thought that we would be putting forward to the Russians any new disarmament proposal.
- (2) The second alternative is to start with a fallback position in anticipation of the Russians' refusal to accept any on-site inspection. The fallback position would involve a ban on atmospheric testing.

Secretary Rusk favored going to an atmospheric ban treaty now and move toward a comprehensive treaty just as soon as the Russians would accept on-site inspection. He saw no point in playing with the number of inspections when the Soviets had clearly told us that they would accept no inspection.

The President asked what happened when the Soviets renew their tests. He called attention to the fact that we might have to resume testing, depending on what the Russians do and what we think they have learned from their most recent tests.

Secretary Rusk said we would have to protect ourselves from a situation in which the Russians would be obtaining new information while we would be treaty-bound not to test.

The President asked whether we would hold off until the Soviets have finished their testing. He also asked what we would do if they made us an offer on, say, January 1, to henceforth cease all testing. Between now and January 1 we would be embarrassed to test even if we were in a position to do so.

Secretary Rusk said we must keep open the possibility of future U.S. testing until we know as much as we can about what the Russians had learned during their current series.

Mr. Murrow agreed that we should make every effort to avoid playing the numbers game with inspections. He suggested that we ask the Russians to hold off for eight months or as long as we did before resuming tests.

Dr. Wiesner said we would have to continue our tests for at least a month or six weeks.

The President asked why we chose twelve as the number of inspections. He noted that our latest information on the number of earthquakes was lower in percentage terms than the reduction in the number of U.S. inspections we said we wanted. He asked why we shouldn't put the number lower in view of the probability that the Soviets were going to refuse all inspection.

Mr. Bundy responded that Ambassador Dean's view is that he wants a fixed number of inspections so that he can resist pressure from the neutrals who are insisting that we be precise about our proposal.

Secretary Rusk replied that Dean must negotiate with the Soviet representatives and not with the neutral representatives.

Mr. Foster commented that we should not discuss merely the number of inspections but look at the entire inspection system we are proposing.

Dr. Wiesner noted that the national detection system being proposed is a British system now adopted by the neutrals. He stated his view that it is almost certain we can detect nuclear weapons tests by a system located entirely outside the USSR. The proposal is to go from nineteen international stations down to five national stations inside the USSR. He acknowledged that the new proposal involved a degradation of from one to two KT over the Geneva system. He noted that inspection outside the USSR would continue. He mentioned 70-plus events, thirty of them outside the Kurile Islands, with which we would have to deal. He thought that we could accept six to nine inspections.

Secretary McNamara said the number of inspections we were asking was lower because we had raised the threshold. He said the threshold was now one KT in granite.

Chairman Seaborg said what we were talking about was two KT in tuff.

Mr. Bundy intervened to state that we were not trying to reach a decision now because we don't know what our new data actually means. We haven't war-gamed the situation on the basis of the new data. For example, reconnaissance satellites might be in a position to photograph alluvial shots.

In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said we could learn much from underground tests smaller than ten KT. In addition, underground tests would keep alive the laboratories and permit us to experiment with new ideas involving vulnerability of our weapons, weapons effects, primers, and the all-fusion weapons.

Director McCone said he favored underground tests but commented that other countries could conduct underground tests, thereby resulting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recalled that in April 1959 President Eisenhower had proposed a test ban very similar to the one now being considered. To do so again would involve repeating an idea previously turned down by the Russians. He read an extract from President Eisenhower's letter containing the test ban proposal. He said he was not proposing an atmospheric test ban but he did recall that the Soviets proposed such a ban immediately after they had finished their last test series and we, at that time, ridiculed their suggestion.

The President said that if we now propose such a ban, they would turn it down. He suggested that we may want to reserve this proposal for use after they complete their test series, if we believe they have learned little in this series.

Secretary McNamara said we are not in a position now to decide on the number of inspections. He saw the situation as involving the risks of continuing tests affecting the risks of the treaty ban. He suggested that we agree to an atmospheric test ban, a willingness to accept a simplified comprehensive test ban treaty, and an agreement prohibiting transfer of weapons but continuance of our underground testing program.

Mr. Bundy said he felt we were not yet ready to decide on a national detection system.

Secretary Rusk said what he had in mind was a national system which would include neutral observers at the national stations.

The President said it was reasonable for us to have neutral observers in the national stations. He suggested that we proposed this idea even if we had to give way on it later.

Secretary Rusk said that Congressional leaders were asking why we kept talking numbers of inspections in view of the fact that the Russians kept rejecting all inspections. He thought one way around this Congressional problem was to keep attention focused on an atmospheric test ban.

The President said that if we could get all tests stopped it would be very good. The danger of proliferation and the prospect that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] might acquire a nuclear capability offset the danger involved in possible Soviet cheating. He thought we should go to Congress with this argument.

Mr. Foster said he thought we could impress Congress with the new data which we have acquired. He said we could evaluate the risks of Soviet cheating as compared with the risks growing out of a continuation of the arms race.

Mr. Bundy said we need more information as well as more education of our negotiators in Geneva. He wondered if we could ask for a delay in negotiations. Secretary Rusk pointed out that we ought to brief our Geneva officials on the nature of the new technical data.

The President commented that we had messed up the handling of the new data in the U.S. Government. He said that information about it was all over town before we had decided what effect it would have on our policy. For the future, he said we must make our policy decisions before the U.K. or anyone else is informed of new information. We cannot publicize new data in such a way as to make it appear that information is ahead of policy. He asked that we seek a three- or four-day delay in the Geneva negotiations and that we order Ambassador Dean to Washington to talk to him here on Monday.^{[1](#)} He could tell us his problems and the scientists with their information could return with him to Geneva.

Mr. Bundy said the posture would be that the President had discussed new policy proposals, had asked Dean to return for further policy discussions, and that Dean would return to Geneva carrying the decisions we had reached.

Secretary Rusk said that we must have on-site inspections and the Soviets will not accept such inspections. In his view, Vela information did not open the door to a solution.

The President suggested that Mr. Foster hold a background press conference, making the point that new information improves the detection situation but does not solve it and that the purpose of the press briefing would be to cool off Congress and the British by repeating our view that on-site inspections continue to be necessary, even with a national system under an international organization.^{[2](#)}

The President said Alternative I sounded right to him (see the July 26, 1962 paper attached).^{[3](#)} He asked that a memorandum be written to the British on the limitations of the new data. The group would meet with Dean on Monday. In his view, we could not get away with a position which involved

refusal to discuss numbers of inspections. He wanted additional information on the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The press would be told about Dean's return but would be given no information or background on details of Alternative I proposals. The press would be told that the President was reserving a decision until he had talked to Dean and until several questions which had arisen in today's meeting could be answered. An effort would be made to knock down any reporter's view that there was a division within the government or that a major controversy had arisen with respect to the test ban treaty proposal.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of the 19 participants at the meeting is in the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) McCone also prepared a summary memorandum of this NSC meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, NSC, 7/1/62-7/31/62) See the Supplement.

¹ July 30.

² No record of this press briefing, if held, has been found.

³ Not attached, but presumably Foster's memorandum to the President, [Document 202](#).

204. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 28, 1962.

This is in reply to your memorandum of 21 July 1962¹ on the way in which the new conclusions about nuclear test detection were evaluated and disseminated in the Government.

The information disclosed by Dr. Carl Romney of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) at the 3 July meeting called by ACDA² had been developed in final form by Dr. Romney only over the previous weekend, and had been approved for dissemination outside AFTAC by Dr. Romney's superiors. Dr. Romney had anticipated that the ACDA meeting would be much smaller than it actually was, and he had not had an opportunity to present his report to the chairman of the meeting, the Deputy Director of ACDA, before the meeting actually took place. The information could not, in my judgment, have been developed at an earlier date.

Apart from ensuring that chairmen of similar meetings inform themselves in advance of the content of scientific reports to be rendered, I believe the best way to avoid a recurrence of this situation is to provide for review of information to be disseminated outside ACDA by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, as I have already directed.

The detailed facts and chronology underlying the 3 July disclosure are as follows:

The new information disclosed at the 3 July meeting related not to our ability to detect small underground shots from a distance, but rather to the fact that it now appears there are significantly fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union, producing signals equivalent to an underground nuclear explosion of a given yield in a given medium, than had hitherto been assumed. Measurements of the Soviet underground explosion of 2 February, the French underground explosion of 1 May, and the U.S. Aardvark explosion of 12 May, all taken together, gave the first indication that a

correction factor previously used for determining Soviet earthquake statistics was in error. These explosions occurred during a period when our measurement abilities were rapidly increasing, primarily as a result of the Vela program of nuclear testing detection research. The information obtained from the 1 May shot was not available for interpretation until June. When taken together with the information from the February shot, it led Dr. Romney to direct a further analysis of the 12 May data. This analysis was received by Dr. Romney at the end of June. At the same time he was working on a study requested by ACDA to evaluate the technical capabilities of a system of existing external national seismic stations to detect and identify Soviet nuclear explosions. On 29 June, he decided to work over the weekend in order to test the hypothesis that the earlier accepted conclusions about the level of Soviet earthquake activities were in error, so that he could include the results in his report to ACDA on 3 July. It should be noted that the previously accepted estimates of Soviet earthquake statistics had several times been presented to both government and consulting scientists, and had been unchallenged.

Dr. Romney consulted his superiors about the form and content of his report, including the new evidence that the number of earthquakes in the Soviet Union might have been previously overestimated. They instructed him to include this information, since they thought it was relevant and timely.

The 3 July meeting was attended by some 25 officials from the White House, AEC, ACDA, State, CIA, and DOD, including Dr. Wiesner, Ambassador Stelle, Mr. Fisher, and Dr. Long of ACDA, and Commissioner Haworth of AEC.

As you know, after the 3 July meeting there was a great concern that if these new estimates should leak to the press, the government would be in the embarrassing position of being accused of withholding information that would tend to ease the inspection problem in a nuclear test ban, and it was, therefore, decided that a news release be made. The Department of Defense concurred reluctantly with this position, on the grounds that (1) a release of this estimate alone would tend to exaggerate its significance, and it would give the impression of a major technical breakthrough; and (2) the new

estimates had not been independently evaluated outside AFTAC. Therefore, the Department issued a release covering all Vela results and including the new Soviet earthquake estimates as only one of these results; and, in addition, prior to the release, a group of technical experts reviewed the AFTAC conclusions. Although some skepticism was expressed, the group generally agreed that the AFTAC conclusions were reasonable. Since then, the analysis of much more data tends to confirm the AFTAC conclusions.

AFTAC is recognized to have special scientific competence associated with detection of nuclear tests, not found elsewhere in government. Because of this competence, AFTAC has continuously received high priority assignments not only from other Defense agencies but also from such organizations as State, CIA, AEC, and even the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It has been very difficult for AFTAC to establish relative priorities amongst this continuous input of requirements. Therefore, I have decided to assign to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering the responsibility for establishing these relative priorities, and for the staff supervision of AFTAC in all technical activities not primarily a matter of intelligence collection and processing. The assignment will include responsibility for the evaluation, control, and dissemination of new results of AFTAC technical analyses.

Robert S. McNamara³

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. In a July 28 note to McNamara, attached to a carbon copy of this memorandum, Harold Brown wrote that Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Jack Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Research and Engineering, had drafted the memorandum on the previous day and, regarding the final paragraph, Solis Horwitz, DOD's Director of Office of Organizational and Management Planning, "concurs in the proposed assignment of responsibility. So do I, though somewhat reluctantly." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 000.01-400.112, 1962)

¹ Reference is to National Security Action Memorandum No. 174, July 21, addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, which expressed the President's puzzlement at the release of new data on the U.S. ability to detect small underground nuclear tests and requested these agency heads to "consider how matters can be reorganized to avoid a repetition of this unfortunate event." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 174) Secretary Rusk responded to NSAM No. 174 in an August 15 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.) Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, replied in an August 31 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)

² See [footnote 3, Document 196](#).

³ Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

205. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests and Other Disarmament
Proposals (as revised)^{[1](#)}

The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962, and with you on July 27, 1962,^{[2](#)} to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva. At that meeting, we considered various lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests in the light of recent developments of a technical and political nature.

The principal political development has been the tabling, on April 16, 1962, of a memorandum by the eight non-NATO, non-Warsaw Pact, delegations. This memorandum suggests that nationally operated seismic stations should be the basis of any test ban agreement and contains a statement on on-site inspections which can be interpreted as either obligatory or invitational.

There have been two technical developments. The first was the achievement of a long-range seismic detection capability which will make it possible to detect events in the USSR from stations outside the country. The second was the determination that the number of earthquakes which might produce unidentified events comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude had been substantially reduced above the previous estimate—by a factor between 4 and 5.

These developments are significant in three respects. First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop a system of some twenty-five stations, internationally monitored and coordinated but nationally manned and controlled, which would have a detection capability not significantly different from that originally contemplated for the 180 internationally operated stations planned for the “Geneva” system. Second,

the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a detection system will have to cope will make it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification. Third, these developments do not provide a way of determining from seismic data that a particular suspicious event was an underground explosion and therefore do not eliminate the requirement of some on-site inspections as an essential element of any system of verification.

On balance, it is my judgment that the over-all risks to the security of the United States would be less under a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the twenty-five detection stations described above and with a number of on-site inspections lower than that we have been discussing in the past than they would be under the indefinite continuation of nuclear testing by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other countries. I believe that this conclusion is reinforced by the material submitted to you by the Department of Defense. On balance, however, I would not recommend the tabling of such a treaty at the present time. I have three reasons for this latter conclusion.

First, our thinking on the number of on-site inspections has not progressed to a point where there is any particular number lower than the figure of 12-20, which is now on the table, which we could defend against both the neutrals who would want it lower and the congressional critics who would say it is too low already.

Second, as long as the Soviet Government holds to its present position that there should be no on-site inspections, there are disadvantages to talking specific numbers lower than those discussed before.

Third, domestic opinion, particularly Congressional opinion, is not prepared for such a move. A treaty based on a reduced number of nationally-operated, internationally-monitored seismic stations with a reduced number of on-site inspections represents a substantial scaling down of safeguards that this administration and the prior administration have been insisting was the minimum necessary for national security. It is based on information which has only been available outside of the Department of Defense since July 3 of this year, and this information has been very skeptically received in the legislative branch of the Government. Our best information is that if a modified comprehensive treaty were to be tabled at this time, Congressional leaders, whose support would be essential at

the time of ratification if agreement were to be reached, would take public positions adverse to the proposals. Similarly, the tabling of a modified comprehensive treaty now without further domestic political preparations might result in their becoming an issue in the fall Congressional elections.

On the basis of these considerations, I recommend the following course of action:

- a. *Atmospheric test ban.* The United States should table an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty.
- b. *Comprehensive Test Ban.* At the time of tabling an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty the United States should declare its willingness to accept a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-monitored national control posts on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. We should be prepared to provide the Conference³ with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally-monitored and coordinated “national” systems while making the point that this data does not eliminate the need for on-site inspections. We should avoid proposing specific numbers either of stations or of on-site inspections on the ground that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union accepts the principle of on-site inspections.
- c. *Soviet testing.* In the event the Soviet commences an atmospheric series we should continue to indicate willingness to negotiate in both areas (a) and (b) above but should indicate that we might wish to conduct further tests ourselves if the Soviet series produced extraordinary results.
- d. *Domestic political preparation.* The decision to table a revised comprehensive treaty should await the developments both at Geneva and in this country. A major campaign of domestic information and political preparation should be begun as to the new data and its significance.
- e. *No-transfer agreement.* The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically, to the other courses of action.

- f. *Underground testing.* We should continue our underground testing program until a comprehensive treaty has been achieved.
- g. *Readiness to test* in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere. This will involve discussions with the U.K. as to the continuing readiness of Christmas Island as a test site.

William C. Foster⁴

^{*} Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy—Armaments 62. Confidential. Copies were distributed to the Principals under cover of a July 30 memorandum from Foster, which is attached to the source text.

¹ Regarding the revised version, see footnote 4 below.

² See [Documents 201](#) and [203](#).

³ The only change in the revised version was the substitution in this paragraph of the words, “We should be prepared to provide the Conference” for “We should, at the same time, provide the Conference”. A copy of the earlier draft, also dated July 30, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-3062. According to a July 30 memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to another copy of the revised version, “The revision is one of emphasis in playing down the significance of the presentation of scientific data made by technical people. It has been made after consultation with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dean.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

206. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 30, 1962, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Negotiations

In response to a question, a Defense spokesman said the destruction of the launching pad would delay our test series some weeks.¹ A new pad would be ready in September and could be used in October.

The President stated that he did not want to conduct U.S. tests after the Soviets have finished their current test series if we can help it.² He was informed that we now think the Soviets will end their current series on October 20. He noted that there was a risk in talking about a test ban if the Soviets finished their series and we have not held our final test in the current series.

Secretary McNamara presented his paper on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (copy attached).³ He estimated that in the next ten years sixteen States would be added to the four which now have a nuclear capability. Some three to seven years would elapse after a decision to go for a nuclear capability had been made, before a weapons capability would be achieved.

Mr. Nitze discussed the situation during the next ten years in China, Sweden, India, Japan, Australia and South Africa, including the capabilities of these States to produce nuclear weapons and the restraints involved in their deciding to seek a nuclear capability. He acknowledged that in Germany and Italy pressures for nuclear capability was very great. This pressure might be dealt with by creating a multilateral force in NATO.

After ten years, the picture became quite different. The cost of producing nuclear weapons would drop drastically if the U.S. and the USSR continue testing and improving their weapons. As the years go by, the ease of getting a nuclear capability rapidly increases. States which do not now have a

weapons capability can learn a great deal from the operation of their peaceful use reactors. If fusion is achieved, bombs become much cheaper.

Secretary Rusk estimated that by cheating it is possible to achieve the all-fission bomb underground and below the present threshold. In answer to the question, do fission bombs contribute to our military capability, he replied that at present they did not in view of our existing stockpile of bombs.

Dr. Wiesner said the fission is a time bomb and is not advantageous as a battle field weapon because its action in causing deaths is not instantaneous and its effect on personnel is delayed, thus reducing its usefulness in active combat.

Commissioner Haworth summarized an AEC paper on test readiness.⁴ He discussed the use of Christmas Island which he said would take two to three months to be made ready, but this could be reduced to thirty to sixty days if sufficient funds were expended. He also discussed a test system involving the use of no land by relying only on shipborne and airborne diagnostic instruments. He mentioned the value of using Johnston Island for weapons effects tests. He spoke of the possibility of conducting a high-altitude test by launching a missile from a ship at sea.

The President suggested that we first try to reach a long-term agreement with the British covering the use of Christmas Island. If the British refuse, then we can proceed to ready the other test systems.

Commissioner Haworth then briefed a paper on the various limitations which apply to different kinds of tests.⁵ He summarized the information we can learn from underground tests. In his view, the most important point in connection with cheating is the stimulating effect on the laboratories of the cheater. The cheater scientist will continue to work on new ideas because of the knowledge that they will have a chance, even underground, to prove out these ideas. If during a treaty period there has been cheating, the advantages gained by the cheater are much higher if the treaty is suddenly abrogated, thus making possible prompt tests of the new ideas.

Dr. Wiesner said that if there was an abrogation of the treaty, we had numerous options.

Mr. Foster summarized his memorandum (attached).⁶ In response to a Presidential question, Mr. Foster summarized the internationally monitored national control system. The President asked whether the data gained by the proposed system was important. Mr. Foster responded that this data was not important, but the political aspect of the system was important. The President asked whether we could agree to drop the international monitoring aspect of the control system if we had to and Mr. Foster agreed that we could.

Dr. Long, in response to a question as to what kind of a system would do a good job, said that we could reduce the number of stations from 180 to 50, comprising 20 seismic stations and 30 electro-magnetic acoustic stations.

The President requested additional information from Dr. Long. In response, Dr. Long said the capability of the system is 20 KT in tuff, while the Geneva system was estimated to have a 1 KT threshold.

There followed considerable confused discussion of seismic events and required number of seismic and electro-magnetic and acoustic detection stations.

Commissioner Haworth said in summary that in his view the Soviets could achieve no decisive technical advance by cheating on a test ban system.

Ambassador Dean predicted that if we offered the Russians only a ban of atmospheric tests, they would turn this down. They know we are far ahead of them in the technique of underground testing. In addition, the neutrals expect us to come back to Geneva with concessions, plus a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The President suggested that we could answer both the French and the Russian arguments about underground tests by telling them that our figures relate to 50 KT devices exploded in rock.

Ambassador Dean commented that 8 neutrals in Geneva are just about ready to abandon hope of an agreement, and, therefore, they are putting pressure on us to come forth with a comprehensive test ban treaty in advance of the UN General Assembly meeting.

The President said that as he understood the situation new information which we now had made it possible for us to reduce the number of stations inside the Soviet Union from 19 to 5, in a worldwide system comprising 50 stations in lieu of 180 stations.

Mr. Foster reviewed the political situation in the Senate. He cautioned that if we moved too fast, we would lose the prospect of obtaining Senate approval of any treaty.

Mr. Bundy commented that our difficulties in Congress are the result of the Congressmen's lack of information.

The President acknowledged that we could not go to the Senate with a treaty this summer. We might be able to do so in the fall after the Soviets have finished their test series and we have decided that there has been no Soviet breakthrough as a result of their tests.

Ambassador Dean said he felt a strong need to come up within the next two or three weeks with new proposals.

Secretary McNamara denied that our new data and information we now have had been kept from those who need to have it.

Mr. Foster summarized his view. We should table a treaty banning only atmospheric tests now. We should tell the neutrals that our new data means we can accept a national detection system, fewer detection stations, and fewer on-site inspections, but we must first get acceptance from the Russians of the principle of on-site inspection.

Ambassador Dean repeated his view that we should table a comprehensive test ban treaty even though all its details could only be spelled out later.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that tabling a comprehensive treaty would upset the Senators.

The Vice President acknowledged that many Senators were upset. They are concerned about what we are now doing and they need additional information. Possibly the President will have to talk to certain key Senators.

Ambassador Dean restated his view that we should introduce a revised comprehensive treaty now.

Mr. McCone said that the Congressmen are worrying [about?] the test sites in the Soviet Union.

It was decided that a further discussion would be held tomorrow.⁷ The control post system would be described. It was acknowledged that Ambassador Dean would have to return to Geneva with some change in the U.S. position because of all of the interest in news stories indicating he had returned to Washington for further policy instructions.

The President pointed out that no real progress would be made by the Soviets or the U.S. until after the current test series is ended, but there would be an advantage in creating a situation in which the Russians would be blamed by the UN General Assembly for failure to achieve a disarmament agreement. It was acknowledged that our decisions depend on whether the new data made possible new test ban proposals.

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. McCone summarized this meeting in a memorandum for the files, August 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62) See the Supplement. A July 30 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, which sets forth the agenda for this meeting, indicates that Foster's memorandum ([Document 205](#)) and two memoranda each from McNamara and Haworth, submitted in response to "certain questions on which you asked for reports over the week end," were attached to his memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62) None, however, is attached. An "index" identifies the subjects of these memoranda as follows: The US-USSR Military Balance With and Without a Test Ban, The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement, Maintaining Readiness to Test During a Test Ban, and Relative Technical and Military Advantages of Testing or Non-testing Under Various Testing Constraints. (Ibid.)

Undated drafts of the former two are *ibid.* Haworth's two memoranda have not been found.

¹ Reference is to the failure of the Bluegill shot in the Dominic series, a Thor missile-launched nuclear test from Johnston Island on July 25. The missile malfunctioned and blew up shortly after ignition causing major damage to the launching pad and radioactive contamination to the surrounding area.

² A TASS announcement made over Moscow radio on July 21 said in part: "In response to the series of nuclear tests by the United States, the Soviet Government has ordered tests to be held of the newest types of Soviet nuclear weapons." The statement is reproduced in *International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapons Tests, September 1961-September 1962*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 9, October 1962, pp. 253-255. For a variant translation of the same statement, dated July 22, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 677-679.

³ Not attached but see the source note above.

⁴ Not attached and not found. [note: document 206 has two numeral 4 footnotes. I've changed the first one to footnote 5 and the second one to footnote 6. We might need to check the original manuscript for the correct citation]

⁵ Not attached and not found.

⁶ [Document 205](#).

⁷ See [Document 208](#).

207. Report of the Inspection Study Group [Source](#)

Washington, July 1962.

[Here follow a title page, preface, contents, Part A. History of the Inspection Study Group Project, Part B. Task of the Inspection Study Group, and Part C. General Remarks Concerning Inspection.]

D. CONCLUSIONS

1.

Need for Experiment and Testing. It appears to us that the resources of existing technology will allow an inspection system that will support an arms control agreement. We are impressed, however, with the gap in our knowledge of such capabilities and therefore believe that a program of experiment and test is much needed to determine and perfect inspection equipment, techniques and methodology, and to permit the determination of a minimum level of inspection needed to support various objectives of arms control. Knowing then what type and degree of inspection is necessary to achieve specific inspection goals, an evaluation can and should be made of the minimum rights of access essential to meaningful inspection, and the policy implications of these necessary rights should be developed. On the basis of field test results and access requirement studies, longer range research and development programs can be formulated.

There is a very great need for determining what is an acceptable balance of cost and effectiveness in an inspection system: that optimum employment of people, techniques and equipment which correctly balances the (unacceptable) cost of additional information with the cost of less—and insufficient—information. Even before this there is much testing to be done to determine whether a certain device will indeed do a specific inspection job, and how well. There is little question but that the inspection concepts we have proposed in Appendix III,¹ for example, are redundant in combination and in many individual cases more thorough

than will be required in the actual inspection situation. The technical “minimums”, however, cannot be satisfactorily determined until actual field tests of inspection equipment and techniques have been carried out. Considering the abstract physical properties of equipment and techniques is not sufficient. It is necessary to take them off the shelf, into the field and try them, individually and in combination, as nearly as possible in the context of an actual arms control inspection situation.

2. *“Critical Components” Philosophy.* Zonal inspection is itself a form of sampling.² Within the inspection process, another sampling method which may cut down the number of inspectors and kinds of inspection is to locate the critical points in the production, handling, or use of the item to be inspected. We need to look at the things that give the greatest gain in information. Much productive research could be conducted to establish for each inspection target the critical components—those items, stages or people without which the inspected thing cannot be produced or distributed. (Such research will have to keep pace with new technology, especially when an inspection system is actually in operation.) It must be kept in mind, however, that this is and must remain a sampling technique, and that there should be no corresponding diminution of inspection rights; that is, any limitation to inspection of critical components should be one of choice for efficiency within a secure inspection framework, not a restriction written into an agreement. As a matter of principle, no agreement should have as one of its requirements limitation to critical components, for it would always be technically possible to circumvent such an agreement.
3. *Transport Inspection Problems.* In our preliminary description of the general characteristics of an inspection system for zonal disarmament, by far the greatest number of inspectors and consequently the major portion of the personnel costs are those connected with transport inspection, where there must be provided a capability to detect a sufficient fraction of any illegal movement out of zones to deter efforts at evasion. The Group looked into countrywide inspection at all zonal boundaries and found it impractical because of the very large number of inspectors required; we therefore suggest restriction to the boundaries of the single zone selected for inspection. Careful advance planning can reduce the interval between announcement of the zone and arrival of inspectors; a moratorium on traffic out of the zone for even a few hours, checked by

air surveillance, would help; and the zonal inspection forces can first be assigned entirely to seal off the zone, then move to their regular assignments. Even then, transport inspection will require substantial numbers of inspectors. A priority research task is to develop equipment and techniques which will reduce the numbers necessary for this critical portion of the total inspection process.

4. *Need for Precise Definition and Designations.* In the past the USSR has been able to evade the general purposes of declarations to international organizations by using special designators for equipment which cannot be compared with those in general use either internally or internationally. It is essential that arms declarations agreements include explicit provisions for giving all designators for the item under consideration, definition of locations by name *and* geographic coordinates, as well as meaningful and internationally acceptable specifications for items to be declared. Similarly, all necessary inspection rights and procedures must be defined explicitly and precisely, with their practical application spelled out in detail. Zonal design criteria must be decided upon which will balance potential gerrymandering against the requirements of efficient and secure inspection. (See Appendix VI for further discussion.)³
5. *Intelligence Capabilities.* Unilateral intelligence probably has the capability to assess the accuracy of armaments declarations relating to strategic aircraft, fixed strategic missile launch facilities and AICBM installations, location and class of airfields and ports, the number and location of major surface ships, and the number of missile-carrying submarines and the number of launchers they contain. In other areas of armaments declarations, intelligence can aid in evaluating their general reasonableness. There is particularly a weakness in capability to evaluate operational inventories of missiles, including those on submarines, and declarations concerning mobile land-based missile launchers. (See Appendices II and VII.)⁴
6. Intelligence can aid in the identification of evasions by discovering indications of suspicious activity and guiding inspection efforts to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources. Intelligence may not, for various reasons, justify a smaller inspection effort, but it can increase the deterrent influence and effectiveness of one in being.
7. *Addition of Fixed Launch Facilities as Inspection Target.* The relative confidence in intelligence and inspection capabilities in connection with

fixed launching sites for strategic missiles, compared with the lack of confidence in ability to verify declarations on the missiles themselves, leads us to suggest that any control agreement, in addition to numbers of missiles and their deployment, include as well inspection of fixed launch facilities.

8. *Use of Indications Intelligence*. The method of indications intelligence, i.e., the comparison of intelligence information with a list of “indicators” which taken together suggest the occurrence of some significant event, should be developed in application to arms control. It may help to disclose evasions of the agreement which are not individually susceptible to detection or measurement, or which in isolation are seemingly not significant. (See Appendix VII.)

[Here follow Part E. Intelligence and Arms Control Inspection, Part F. Some General Characteristics of an Inspection System, Part G. Research and Development, Test and Evaluation Programs on Inspection Techniques, and seven appendices.]

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Inspection Study Group. Secret. The typescript report is 12 pages, plus 4 pages of front matter and 7 appendices, totaling 98 pages. Regarding the interagency Inspection Study Group (also known as the Foster Panel), see [footnote 3, Document 140](#). In an August 31 letter to McGeorge Bundy, Foster enclosed copies of the report “for yourself and for the President if you find, as I hope you will, that it is worthy of his attention.” He called the report “the most thorough investigation of inspection and verification, and of the relations of intelligence to arms control inspection, that has so far been made,” though he emphasized that it was “but a beginning, and that its preliminary estimate of the scope of inspection that might be required for comprehensive arms control on a zonal basis, for example, is only illustrative.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/62-6/63)

¹ Appendix III is entitled “Some General Characteristics of an Inspection System To Verify Comprehensive Arms Control Programs.”

² The Inspection Study Group did not concern itself with the technical problem of statistical sampling in inspection. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The title of Appendix VI is “Some Aspects of Zonal Schemes.”

⁴ Appendices II and VII are entitled respectively “Intelligence and ACDA Plan 1,” and “Findings and Problems.”

208. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, August 1, 1962, 4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Negotiations

The President read the Prime Minister's reply to his cable concerning the future use of Christmas Island as a test site.^{[1](#)} In summary, the British were prepared to permit us to use the island for the time being.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the pressure which was being put upon us by reporters to define the internationally monitored national control post system.

The President responded by saying that Mr. Salinger had been given guidance. Ambassador Dean would spell out the details of the system in the current negotiations. Our position is that we would be prepared to discuss control posts under effective international supervision but we have not accepted national control posts alone as being sufficient.

Secretary Rusk said the key question before us is what should we do if the pressure in Geneva is to move to an atmospheric test ban. He favored going ahead with an atmospheric ban.

The President asked whether we should accept immediately or on a fixed date, such as September 1 or June 1, so that we could test again before it became effective if we desired to do so. Pedro Nevilla's proposal was mentioned.^{[2](#)}

The AEC and the Department of Defense spokesmen agreed we should go for an atmospheric ban.

Ambassador Dean said he differed with Secretary Rusk. He felt that we are walking into a Soviet trap. Inevitably, the Soviets and the neutrals would push us toward an unpoliced moratorium, including underground testing.

The President said he felt no pressure for a moratorium.

Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett both noted that we are not talking about an impractical moratorium on underground testing and Secretary Rusk said we needn't fall into a trap because we know in advance that it is there.

There followed discussion as to what test cutoff date we should accept.

Secretary McNamara said we cannot decide whether the date should be September 1 or June 1 until we know the results of our tests and have a good idea of the results of the Soviet tests.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that we will have to give figures on the number of inspections and Ambassador Dean agreed with him.

Mr. Bundy said we must not reveal the number of inspections which would be acceptable to us, but the number of control posts was not very important.

Secretary Rusk said he realized our position would be difficult for Ambassador Dean, but he said Dean must negotiate with the Russians first and then the neutrals.

Ambassador Dean said that before we presented our last proposals we had informed our allies and we must do so again. The Canadians especially will insist on advance knowledge. If we hold four-power Western discussions, *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*.

The President noted that Macmillan's position indicates a willingness to accept a national detection system. He asked how many stations would be involved in such a system.

Dr. Long replied 50 to 80 stations, adding that 25 seismic stations are now as good as the Geneva system because we have learned so much since the Geneva system was proposed.

Ambassador Dean added the number was 80 in all environments, including seismic, acoustic and outer space stations. He added that we must relate the number of on-site inspections to the ratio of unidentified events.

The President said he would be prepared to sign a treaty tomorrow if it resulted in an immediately effective ban on atmospheric tests. If we did not sign tomorrow, then we would have to negotiate the date the treaty would go into effect.

Mr. Kaysen noted that we would undermine our position on comprehensive treaty if we appeared ready to negotiate the effective time of an atmospheric ban.

Mr. Foster read from the July 26 paper, pages 3 and 4, a proposal on Stage I production of armaments, copy of paper attached.^{[3](#)}

General Lemnitzer stated that the Joint Chiefs were not clear as to the meaning of the sentence “replacement would be in kind.” He said these words must be defined precisely in an annex.

Mr. Foster said the definition had been narrowed to types (B-52s) in order to avoid dealing with categories.

Mr. Foster referred to the same paper and read the position on U.S. bases. He noted that the recommendation involved only discussion of the possibility of including military base reduction in Stage I.

General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs had a major problem with this paragraph because they did not know how the word “bases” was being used. He said the proposal would affect NATO deployments. In any negotiations on bases, the U.S. was at a disadvantage because if the Russians gave up bases outside the USSR, they could return to them very quickly but that if we withdrew from our overseas bases our re-entry would be very difficult.

Ambassador Dean raised the question of briefing the disarmament delegates on the technical aspects of our new information. He suggested that the scientists come to Geneva on August 9 following a week of political talks with the four Western nations and with USSR representative Zorin.

Ambassador Dean said the Soviet position on total armed forces had gone from 2.5 million to 1.9 million. Mr. Foster and Secretary McNamara said

we were studying what our position should be in the light of the difficulties any new position would have for the Joint Chiefs.

With respect to background briefing as to the meeting, Secretary Rusk stated that he felt little more should be said than the President had said in his past press conferences. At the Joint Atomic Energy Committee meeting tomorrow, Ambassador Dean would merely report on what he is now to do.⁴ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be invited to join the Armed Forces Committee to hear Ambassador Dean's report.⁵ Mr. Foster has already seen Congressman Holifield and Senator Jackson. He would see Senator Russell separately.

Secretary Rusk said it was important that reports of differences within the Administration be knocked down. We should emphasize the new data we have in the simplest possible terms. We should avoid too much optimism in stating what we thought the Soviet position was. We should avoid discussion of the internationally supervised national control post system.

Mr. Bundy agreed that the last point was the most important.

Director Murrow asked whether our position was that we would accept an atmospheric test ban immediately.

Ambassador Dean said no. He hoped to see Mrs. Myrdal⁶ first in Geneva to learn what it is the neutrals will be proposing. He noted that Prime Minister Macmillan had told the British Parliament recently of the possibility that all on-site inspections could be eliminated.⁷ It was acknowledged that Macmillan was under heavy Parliamentary pressure.

In response to questions, both Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett stated they agreed in general and had no comments to add.

⁴ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/1/62-8/23/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

¹ In his August 1 message to President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan thanked the President for his July 27 message, summarized their differences on nuclear testing, accepted his proposal for promoting an atmospheric ban treaty, suggested a comprehensive test ban, and “if the treaties were tabled” would agree to keep Christmas Island “on a care and maintenance basis” in case further testing was required. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.

² Reference is to Luis Padilla Nervo; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 193](#).

³ Not attached; it was attached to Foster’s memorandum to the President, [Document 202](#).

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ No record of Dean’s appearance before the House or Senate Armed Services Committee on August 2 has been found, but on that day he, Foster, and Fisher briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s subcommittee on disarmament in executive session on the Geneva talks. See *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 1962, vol. XIV, p. 671.

⁶ Alva Myrdal, Chairman of the Swedish Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

⁷ Macmillan told the House of Commons on July 19 that the recent U.S. Department of Defense statement on the Vela program “shows that further progress has been made in work on which the scientists have been engaged for a long time. I hope that this may facilitate all that we hope for, which is a final and comprehensive treaty.” (*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 663, col. 631)

209. Memorandum for the File Source

Washington, August 2, 1962.

At the conclusion of the meeting on Monday, July 30th,¹ the President requested that Messrs. McCloy and Lovett² be asked to come down from New York to study the seismic results and also that DCI study them and the three of us serve as an advisory group. Mr. Bundy decided to ask them to come on Wednesday.

On Tuesday Secretary McNamara and I spent approximately three hours with Drs. Northrup,³ Romney, and others, and DOD General Counsel Norton, reviewing the results of the Vela seismic improvement program. We developed the attached table⁴ as representative of the changes in the basic detection capability and the appraisal of natural events by number which would remain unidentified under the system as it existed or was known in March 1962, the March '62 system with the present technology and knowledge, and the so-called national system. Also are noted the probabilities of success and the deficiencies.

On Tuesday evening Mr. Lovett came to my home at 7:00 o'clock. We discussed the situation generally and he remained in my home for dinner in my absence and read the transcripts of the Joint Committee hearings of July 19th and 23rd, a number of documents given to him by the White House, and other material which I had assembled for him.

On Wednesday morning, August 1st, Mr. Lovett reviewed the content of these documents with Mr. McCloy and at 10:00 o'clock Messrs. Lovett and McCloy met with the same group of scientists that McNamara and I had met with on Tuesday.

On Wednesday at 11:30, the President convened a small meeting, attended by the Secretary of State, Mr. Gilpatric for Defense, the Vice President, Foster, Bundy, Arthur Dean, Murrow, to further discuss negotiating policies at Geneva and also the statement the President should make at his press conference at 4:00 o'clock. A statement substantially along the lines read by

the President was agreed upon; the final draft was prepared and was cleared by those in attendance at 2:30 in the afternoon.⁵ In this meeting McCloy and Lovett strongly urged the President not to engage in detailed negotiations until and unless the Soviets change their position on zero on-site inspections and indicated that there existed a climate which would permit negotiation. I strongly supported this recommendation. It was agreed that we should follow this course. Mr. Dean felt that we should present a comprehensive program indicating the revised arrangement of stations as well as a minimum number of on-site inspections. In this connection it was stated that Secretary McNamara concluded that six on-site inspections per year was sufficient.

Note: After this meeting I called Secretary Gilpatric questioning McNamara's position. Gilpatric told me that McNamara had felt that some number between six and twelve was acceptable and the President had seized on the number of six as representative of McNamara's position. I urged that this be straightened out, indicating that if this information was given to anyone on the Hill, serious difficulties would result.

The meeting was adjourned and was reassembled at 4:45, with a larger group in attendance.⁶ At this meeting it was definitely decided that:

- (a) We should not agree to negotiate unless the Soviets change their position on on-site inspections.
- (b) That a complex of stations totaling about 80, of which 25 would be seismic and five of which would be in the USSR, would represent an acceptable modification to the original Geneva plan.
- (c) On-site inspections were a must, there was no decision as to the required number.
- (d) International supervision and inspection of national stations meant that we must have an international supervisor in residence on each station. The President wished to remain flexible in this regard. However, he was urged to accept this definition as a must.

A difference arose between Arthur Dean and Secretary Rusk, the latter favoring immediate acceptance of an atmospheric ban but Dean maintaining that this should be a holding position and we should exhaust the

possibilities of a comprehensive ban before proceeding with a discussion of an atmospheric ban.

The meeting adjourned about 6:00 o'clock. I was requested to contact Senator Russell and members of the Joint Committee prior to Mr. Dean's appearance on the Hill on Thursday, which I did the following morning, and transcripts of my conversations are available.

John A. McCone⁷
Director

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

¹ See [Document 206](#).

² Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State and former Secretary of Defense, who served as a member of ACDA's General Advisory Committee and a consultant to the Kennedy administration.

³ The Air Force superiors of Dr. Doyle Northrup, technical director of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC), severely criticized Northrup for his handling of the AFTAC's newly developed information on seismic detection. (Memorandum of July 27 discussion by McCone, drafted July 31; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ For text of President Kennedy's opening statement on nuclear testing at his press conference on August 1, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, p. 591.

⁶ For a fuller account of this meeting, see [Document 208](#).

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

210. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, August 3, 1962, noon.

Disto 683. Godber and Wright told Stelle this morning they deeply disturbed at message they had received from British Emb in Wash describing, on basis talk with Foster, substance new US position on test ban. Their particular concern is with what they understand is provision that there should be a minimum of one foreigner per eight hour shift at control posts in USSR.¹ Godber said such a provision would vitiate whole political value of acceptance "national stations" concept. Also said his understanding from US-UK technical talks was that Sov posts could be excluded from system and system could still have satisfactory detection capabilities.

Godber feels so strongly he is flying back to London this morning to see Home in effort to get Macmillan to intercede with President.

Godber said if US would not move on provision in question, he would personally recommend that UK not support new US position even if this resulted in public split.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-362. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

¹ Foster told Hood in a meeting on August 2 that Dean's instructions included continued insistence "on a form of international control for control posts." This could range from international staffing to staffing by nationals of the countries "but with some form of international representation at each post." The exact form of international representation was not spelled out in the U.S. position, but "one might think in terms of one representative or 'prisoner' for each post or possibly one to cover each 8-hour shift." Upon further questioning by Hood, Foster stated that international representation "could serve as a deterrent to spoofing and that the precedential value, in terms of other disarmament agreements, of maintaining the principle of

international control was important.” (Memorandum of conversation by Goodby, August 3; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-362)

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [Source](#)

Washington, August 3, 1962, 12:24 p.m.

Todis 469. Eyes only for Ambassador Dean. Following are your instructions on the nuclear test ban issue at Geneva:

- a. *Comprehensive Test Ban.* The United States should declare its willingness to discuss a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-supervised national control posts, including some on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. Our position on the nature of the international supervision is that it must be effective international control but that it might range from an arrangement similar to that contemplated in the April 18, 1961 treaty draft to an arrangement providing for the permanent stationing of international inspectors at the station. We should avoid negotiating the precise arrangements for international supervision for specific numbers of control posts or of on-site inspections on the ground that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union accepts the principle of on-site inspections. After a period of time spent focusing on the political significance of the USSR's refusal to accept on-site inspections, we should be prepared to provide the Conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally-supervised national systems while making the point that this data does not eliminate the need for on-site inspections. As part of the scientific presentation we should be prepared to discuss the range of possible numbers of control posts in the order of magnitude of 70-80 of all types. We should indicate in general terms a willingness to relate the number of on-site inspections to the number of unidentified events but should not refer to any specific number.
- b. *Atmospheric Test Ban.* If the Soviet Union continues to indicate unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspections on Soviet soil, the United States should be ready to discuss affirmatively an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty, possibly around the latter part of

August, taking the position that the Soviet refusal to agree to on-site inspection makes it necessary to go to this type of treaty. We should indicate this is an attempt to reach the widest area of agreement in banning nuclear tests but should make it perfectly clear that our proposing such a treaty does not involve any willingness to consider a moratorium on underground testing. We would not accept an atmospheric ban without the necessity for considering the security aspects of further Soviet testing which may make it in the interests of U.S. security to conduct further tests following the Soviet series. Therefore we should indicate receptivity to a cut-off date which is either very soon or reasonably far off such as mid-summer 1963.

- c. The issue of nuclear proliferation will be the subject of a separate instruction.
- d. As you know the President is deeply and personally interested in the course of these discussions. You are faced with complex problems of timing and tactics in the interrelation of technical discussions and proposals of others with these instructions. For this reason the President hopes to have unusually close communication between Geneva and Washington and at moments of decision we will try to respond speedily.

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-362. Top Secret. Drafted by Foster and Fisher; cleared by Edward S. Little (S/S), Bundy for the President (White House), Haworth/Seaborg (AEC), Nitze/McNaughton (DOD), and McCone (CIA); and approved by Secretary Rusk.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Disarmament Committee [Source](#)

Washington, August 3, 1962, 5:58 p.m.

Todis 474. Eyes only Ambassador Dean and Fisher. Following message despatched by President to Prime Minister today.

“Dear Prime Minister:

I got your answer just in time for it to be helpful in our concluding conversations with Arthur Dean.^{[1](#)}

I recognize your own feeling that we could get along with a simple abolition of nuclear tests. I wish I could agree with you, and I am grateful in the circumstances for your understanding of our views.

We are now sending Arthur Dean back with the general position which I announced in my press conference.^{[2](#)} Our people here have talked with Lord Hood to give him full details of this position.^{[3](#)} In essence, our view is that we will be glad to go into serious negotiations on other matters if only the Soviet Union will go back to its earlier position that a limited number of on-site inspections is acceptable. We could not get five votes for any other position in the Senate.

We have concluded that we should not table a comprehensive treaty, even with blank numbers, for the moment. Our technical analyses on the problem of control posts are most incomplete and we think it will be helpful to let this question work itself out in the technical channels for a while. In these discussions we shall be using for purposes of illustration a system with a total number of control posts ranging between 70 and 80. This larger number includes many stations for detection in other than seismic media, and its seismic stations are similar in number to the figures in my last message.

We have had much discussion here on the question of the degree to which we can accept the neutral proposal for fully national detection stations. It has become very plain that we shall have a first-class political row here if we move to full acceptance of this position at this moment. While the technical data are promising, they are certainly not definitive. The furthest we can go for the present is to indicate our willingness to discuss national control posts with a resident international representative.

I hear from Geneva that your negotiators are disappointed at this position,⁴ and I hope very much that both publicly and privately you may be able to join with us in avoiding a public disagreement on this issue now. I am convinced that it is foolish for us to have a division on side issues at a time when there is no flexibility at all in the Soviet position on a fundamental point. If we can ever get a reasonable response from the Soviet Government, I can make great progress here at home on this matter—but a purely hypothetical debate between the U.S. and the UK, prior to any indications of a possible accord with the Soviet Union, would only bring division and weakness in our effort for a treaty. In short, I am suggesting that we both reserve our positions on this point until we know whether we can move forward with the Russians.

Meanwhile, there is some sign of new life in the area of the atmospheric test ban, and this is certainly a reasonable second best. The timing and tactics of discussion of the two kinds of treaties are going to be quite complex. I am therefore asking Arthur Dean to keep very closely in touch with us and we, for our part, will try to keep in the closest communication with you. Our different angles of vision must not prevent us from working closely together for the best possible common results.

As for Christmas Island, I am glad of your friendly first reaction, and I am asking our technical people to begin to work on the question, keeping in touch with yours.

With warm regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, K-M, 1961-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beam and approved by Brubeck (S/S) and Bromley Smith (White House). Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador.

¹ See [Documents 206](#) and [208](#).

² For text of President Kennedy's remarks on the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban and disarmament at his press conference on August 2, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1962, pp. 591 and 595-597.

³ See [footnote 1](#), [Document 210](#). Secretary Rusk informed Lord Hood at a meeting on August 3 at 6 p.m. that "the President was sending a message to the Prime Minister on this subject, and that we thought it very important that we not make this a matter of issue between ourselves, but rather probe the Russians and see how far we could bring them in our direction."

(Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, August 3; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-362)

⁴ See [Document 210](#).

213. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

London, undated.

I got your message asking me to help you on the matter of the test policy at Geneva. Of course we will do what we can but we are in a great difficulty.

Considerable expectations were aroused by the information about new data on detection which was given out in Washington some week ago. Dean raised them higher on arrival at Geneva.¹ Now it seems that we cannot put forward any concrete proposals corresponding to the new data, and this will get us into a very bad position.

It had, we thought, been agreed at the Washington Scientific talks² that adequate machinery for detecting and inspecting underground tests could be provided by a national system of detection posts, reporting to an international commission, and a minimum number of on-site inspections. We thought that this understanding was reflected in the draft treaty of July 24.³

I can understand that you have great difficulties in putting forward anything like this draft at present. But I am very much concerned that we should not gravely prejudice our position by putting forward at this stage other detailed proposals which have no scientific justification.

It seemed probable for instance from the Washington talks that we could for detection purposes dispense with national stations in Russia. It may be useful to include them in the system, but it would surely be impossible to justify on a scientific basis including three or four international bodies in each Soviet station, which is what an 8-hour shift amounts to.

If for political reasons, you cannot drop this demand, the only thing we can do is to avoid discussion of it. For this purpose I am sure that it is useless to go back to the old dodge of asking the Russians to accept inspection in principle. We must put forward something concrete and show that they are

being unreasonable in refusing it. I very much hope it will be possible to say that, on the basis of present data, we thought that the number of on-site inspections could be reduced to a maximum of say 10 or 8 a year, that this would be a maximum need and that any number below this would be a matter for discussion and we hope for agreement.

We could then say that after this had been accepted we could discuss questions about detection posts and their relation to the international commission: but first things first. This would be a more pointed variant of our earlier tactics at Geneva.

Next best would be to propose at this stage a ban on atmospheric tests only. But after all the publicity about the new data, I do not see how we can stall on everything else without creating the impression that we are hopelessly insincere. If we want a test ban—and I take it that militarily we do—we should get on with the job of making proposals based on the new data, and hold the point as best we can in the meantime. I think that great pressures will build up, so I do hope that you can tell me that Dean is being given fresh instructions. We can then go all out to help. I do not see otherwise how we can conceal our concern that more positive proposals are not being made. The cross-examination by other members of the Conference is going to be very penetrating. I shall much welcome your views.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. An attached note from Lord Hood to Secretary Rusk, August 5, notes that Foreign Secretary Home had asked him to transmit the enclosed message. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Brubeck (S/S) through McGeorge Bundy to Kaysen, August 6, saying that the message was received from the British Embassy on August 5. “A proposed reply,” the memorandum concluded, “is now in preparation and will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.” This reply has not been found.

¹ See [Document 195](#).

² See [Document 193](#).

³ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 201](#).

214. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, August 6, 1962.

In view of the present discussions with the British, it appears appropriate to put down what I know of the conversations that have taken place between U.S. and U.K. experts since the new technical information became available.

The British first became aware of the new technical information when they came here for the Four Power Disarmament Meetings early in July.^{[1](#)} At that time the Disarmament Agency showed them a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty depending upon national stations for seismic detection.^{[2](#)} During the course of these talks, they were also made aware of the new seismic data. I was not involved in any of these meetings, and so have no first-hand knowledge of the extent of the conversations.

Our new technical data and British seismic research were the subject of a day-long meeting in London as part of more general technical discussions involving people from the Defense Department, ACDA, and my office.^{[3](#)} The attached memorandum was prepared by the British to provide a record of their understanding of the technical discussions.^{[4](#)} It is an accurate representation of the discussions. I did not join in the memorandum because we had agreed that the meetings were to be informal exchanges of technical information.

In a conversation with Lord Home, I went out of my way to avoid any statement regarding what the U.S. position would ultimately be, on the grounds that it was still being discussed at home.

Jerome B. Wiesner^{[5](#)}

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.

¹ See [Document 193](#).

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 193](#).

³ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 193](#).

⁴ Not attached and not found.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

215. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, August 7, 1962, 7 p.m.

Disto 716. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. Re: Todis 469.^{[1](#)} As indicated in recent delegation telegrams, my presentation of new US test ban position to Zorin has stressed that Soviet acceptance in principle of obligatory on-site inspections is key to successful negotiation on other outstanding questions. Following instructions reftel, I have also avoided details. To extent possible, regarding arrangements for control posts and for international supervision thereof which the United States might be prepared to accept. I have, of course, confirmed to Zorin that “US believed that as practical matter there would have to be international officials at control posts” (Disto 709)^{[2](#)} and I will not hesitate to repeat this if point is again directly raised. However, the main focus has been on the scientific necessity for firm commitments regarding on-site inspection.

We had assumed that for this phase of work on test ban Zorin would not only marshal arguments against obligatory inspection, but would also zero in on US insistence that there be international resident supervisors at control posts on Soviet territory to support Soviet allegation that US position has not substantially changed. However, initial informal comments by Zorin (though this line could be greatly changed at formal meetings) have not paid much attention to matter of resident supervisors, but have attacked entire US proposal that nationally manned control posts be subject to international integration, coordination, and supervision. He has, in informal session, attacked idea that international scientific commission could give directives to host country nationals operating control posts regarding procedures of work, training, use of instrumentation, etc.

We believe that if Zorin persists on this tack, we will find it very useful to focus on broad principle of integrated international control network as well as on broad principle of obligatory inspection. If eight-nation April 6 memo is clear on anything, it states that the international commission is to get data

from national stations and to arrange for their equipping in modern fashion when necessary. Moreover, agreements are to be made to cover the use of existing stations in the worldwide system. Soviet position which denies any shadow of authority to international commission to coordinate and standardize operations of numerous national posts will be vulnerable and we believe it would be tactically advantageous to capitalize on this aspect of Soviet inflexibility just as much as on Soviet rejection of obligatory inspection. Moreover, such course would minimize divergences with UK and make it easier for them to give full support to our general position. If question is specifically raised by others, we will, of course, repeat our position that international supervisors will have to be in residence at control posts, but Godber advises that if this is done at subcommittee on Thursday,³ UKDel will have to say their scientists disagree both as to necessity Soviet control posts and necessity resident inspectors for improving quality scientific data. Therefore, we have agreed play specifics on international scientists in residence in very low key unless Zorin's tactics require otherwise.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.

¹ [Document 211](#).

² Dean held private meetings with Zorin on August 5 and 6. A summary of their August 5 meeting was transmitted in Disto 702, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-562) A summary of the August 6 meeting is Disto 709, August 6. (Ibid.)

³ August 9.

216. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, August 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

Non-diffusion of nuclear weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR

Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary

Philip H. Valdes, EUR/SOV

The Secretary, who had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to call, said he would like to ask him to convey a personal message to Gromyko, following up the conversations Gromyko and he had had in Geneva.¹ He would like to give the message orally, though if Mr. Kornienko wished to, he could go over his notes with Mr. Valdes later. The message concerned non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Secretary then read the message, which follows:

“This personal message follows upon our very informal conversation in Geneva about the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them.² I have had an opportunity to consider this matter further in Washington and believe that we could clarify how best we might proceed.

“It seems to me that we could agree that our two countries share a common interest in preventing the further diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional nations. There are many elements in this common interest; high among them is the prospect that further diffusion would greatly complicate the possibilities of progress toward disarmament to which the U.S. attaches the greatest importance.

“As I explained to you in Geneva, it has been a longstanding United States policy to oppose the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. We estimate that it is now within the capabilities of up to twenty countries to achieve nuclear weapons within the next several years if they make the necessary effort. Indeed, the amount of effort required is steadily decreasing

for technical and scientific reasons with which you are familiar. Obviously, the countries of greatest concern to us are not necessarily those of greatest concern to you; our respective priorities might be different. But surely we could agree that you and we would both be better off if none of them developed nuclear weapons on a national basis.

“It seems to me, therefore, that we ought to be able to find a way to move promptly with other nuclear powers to propose an agreement which would have two principal provisions: (1) a commitment by existing nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to other nations, and (2) a commitment by all others not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. I am not now using technical language but simply expressing the general idea. I recognize that there are other problems, such as the transfer of nuclear warhead technology, which might have to be covered.

“The difficulty about our moving promptly in concert on this matter arises with respect to multilateral arrangements. Your Government apparently wishes to consider multilateral arrangements with respect to nuclear weapons as a part of the central problem of the multiplication of national nuclear forces. I sincerely believe that this point of view rests upon a misunderstanding and that it stands in the way of our acting together on a common interest.

“From our point of view, we consider the discussion of multilateral arrangements in the West as, among other things, a means for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis. You apparently are fearful that multilateral arrangements are intended to provide a pretext or a screen for giving nuclear weapons to national forces to be used by national decision. This is not our purpose.

“As you know, the question of multilateral nuclear forces within NATO has been under discussion for quite some time. It is not possible to be precise about just what such arrangements might be because, as you also know, there are different approaches within NATO on what is a highly complex matter. Indeed, whether there will be anytime soon any consensus in the West on this matter is impossible to predict. But I can tell you that the United States does not have in mind equipping other national forces with nuclear weapons under circumstances which would make it possible for

national governments to make individual decisions about their employment. As you know, under present United States law and allied military arrangements, United States nuclear warheads remain under all circumstances under United States custody and control.

“I had the impression from our conversation in Geneva that it might be possible for us to concentrate on the single issue of national nuclear capability.”

The Secretary explained to the Ambassador that Gromyko had asked if we do concentrate on national nuclear capability, could we be sure this meant not transferring either directly or indirectly. The Secretary said he had replied that this would be possible if it were clearly understood what was meant by indirectly. If this meant that multilateral arrangements could not be used as a screen or device to permit use by national decision, then we could work out an agreement. The Secretary then continued with the message:

“If it is clear on both sides that this is the object and that we are not now trying to deal with the issue of possible multilateral arrangements, it seems to me that we might be able to reach an agreement with respect to the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, to additional national forces.

“This is a matter which we would, of course, have to discuss with our allies because two of them have their own nuclear capabilities and because the others would be among the large numbers of states who would be expected to renounce national nuclear weapons. If you believe that there is a possibility of progress in this direction, we would be glad to take up this matter with other governments producing nuclear weapons and try to find as quickly as possible a basis for agreement. We could keep in touch either through your Ambassador in Washington or through our Ambassadors in Geneva. My own personal view is that it would be of advantage to take this important step and that we should not abandon the effort because of other factors not directly related to the central issue. If we find that we can agree on the substance, we would need to consider how best to move rapidly to bring the matter to a conclusion. It may be, for example, that we should seek to obtain declarations on the part of other governments that they are

prepared to enter into the type of agreement we would put forward; this would give us an opportunity on both sides to ascertain that all governments essential to an agreement would in fact participate.

“Will you be good enough to let me have your reactions at your early convenience?”

He summarized for the Ambassador by saying he was asking whether there is enough prospect for agreement in order to pursue it urgently to bring it to a conclusion. If not, we would not wish to go through the exercise, which could worsen matters if it failed. Here is one point where for a dozen reasons you and we have a common purpose in not seeing atomic weapons move to other hands.

Dobrynin recalled Gromyko had raised three questions: possible loopholes, inclusion of international alliances, and the two Germanies. As Gromyko said, we think this is most important. He would like to repeat what Gromyko had said. Agreement on a broader scale will take time. We want to work on it. Meanwhile, we want an agreement with you on the more narrow question of the two Germanies. This would include not giving them weapons or data, and their not acquiring either themselves.

The Secretary said his proposal does not contemplate a special arrangement for Germany. From the Soviet point of view, it already exists. He knew our longstanding national policy that we have applied even with respect to France. Germany itself took commitments in 1955 on ABC weapons. We consider this a formal commitment. We do not see an advantage at this time in making special arrangements for Germany. Other countries are important. He was interested in Germany; we were interested in mainland China; we both should be in Israel.

Dobrynin said he had the impression the Secretary thought a separate agreement for the two Germanies was possible.

The Secretary said he supposed this agreement he proposed was not possible unless Germany was included.

Dobrynin said Germany is the number one problem for the Soviets. They are therefore prepared to proceed with a general agreement, but want another on the two Germanies, undertaking on our side not to transfer weapons or data, and on theirs not to produce or try to get nuclear weapons in any way.

The Secretary said he had the impression from Gromyko that if there were any delays in reaching a general agreement, he might want to come back to one on Germany.

Dobrynin said this was not his impression.

The Secretary said there was a reference to a non-transfer agreement in the principles paper,³ but the Soviet side did not take this up for discussion. The Secretary supposed that if we had an agreement of this sort including Germany, Soviet concern would be taken care of, as well as our concerns.

Dobrynin objected that there are too many states. It would take quite a time.

The Secretary asked if the Soviet Government has ever made a formal announcement on its policy concerning non-transfer.

Dobrynin replied it had at the UN last March.⁴

The Secretary said he meant a statement of existing Soviet policy, not what the Soviets would be prepared to do. We have said we are opposed on a national basis to proliferation. He said that in our principles paper we indicated the Deputy Foreign Ministers could go into non-diffusion, or this could be done in a different forum—we had Geneva in mind. He said he thought the Soviets overestimate the difference in time between the two agreements (general, or on Germany). His guess was that of the 104 in the UN and the 6 or so not in the UN that were involved, most would agree promptly. Some who could produce nuclear weapons have never declared themselves, for example Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil and India.

Dobrynin said the Swedes have said they are prepared to enter into an agreement. The Swiss have not. He understood the Secretary's point, however.

The Secretary said his point was that we do it on a comprehensive basis, including Germany.

Dobrynin asked if Germany would be mentioned in the agreement.

The Secretary said every country would be mentioned, since all would sign.

Dobrynin asked if Germany would be specifically mentioned, in a clause.

The Secretary asked why it should be, anymore than mainland China?

Dobrynin replied Germany was an issue between our two countries. This is one of the most explosive areas.

The Secretary commented there are other countries in that area of Europe which should be added.

Dobrynin recalled the Soviet Government has made proposals concerning this. He said he had had the impression the Secretary accepted Soviet apprehension over West Germany having atomic weapons. It is our problem number one, he repeated. If we proceed with the other agreement, there would be a delay.

The Secretary said that the discussion concerning our principles paper was in the context of the German question as a whole. He did not see how we could pull out non-diffusion and deal with it as a special German problem. We can deal with it, however, in a general way, and he did not see why this should take so long.

Turning to the point in the Secretary's message concerning multilateral arrangements, Dobrynin said he thought this was all right—it is not part of the central problem. He asked about Germany, however. The Soviets had three points, not to give Germany atomic weapons directly, indirectly, or through multilateral arrangements.

The Secretary said we should clarify this. If Dobrynin asked him what multilateral arrangement was likely to come into being in NATO, he could not tell him. There are differences of approach, and he did not know what

consensus could be reached, if any. He could say, as an example, that we would not consider a nuclear-armed Dutch submarine, with a Dutch crew and a Dutch captain to be multilateral just because it was assigned to NATO, for this would be a case of a national government's being able to use nuclear weapons by national command.

Dobrynin asked if it would be written in the treaty that it does not include multilateral arrangements.

The Secretary said it would not be, not in that way. We would describe what the treaty forbids. No additional country would be able to use nuclear weapons through its own national decision.

Dobrynin added but we would be free to give them through NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Secretary said not to national forces. With our existing arrangements, we have nuclear weapons to support NATO forces, but they are in our hands. If you said the decision to use nuclear weapons would be made jointly by the Warsaw Pact nations, we would not object. But if you transferred weapons to the Czechs or East Germans, and they could use them, we would object.

Dobrynin objected that this sort of agreement does not cover everything.

The Secretary agreed this was true. He said, however, that we are concerned with the overriding problem of not transferring to national use. We are not concerned with just Germany, or even China. We know, for example, that Egypt is giving high priority to nuclear physics.

Dobrynin objected that he did not think Egypt was really a problem, unless perhaps Israel obtained nuclear weapons. The Secretary had said, he added, that it was impossible to be precise about just what multilateral arrangements there could be.

The Secretary replied he had said that because we simply do not know. What we say is that whatever they may be, they cannot involve transfer to national forces. We are removing that possibility.

Dobrynin asked about procedure. Would there be some negotiation between the two of us?

The Secretary replied that he needed to know if Mr. Gromyko thinks there is sufficient possibility for agreement to make it worth going into. If so, he would then take it up with the British and French, who produce nuclear weapons, to see if we could define our position further. Then we would see if we could work out language.

Dobrynin said he would send the Secretary's message, but he was certain his government would have difficulties over these questions.

The Secretary said it may be there is a broader field on which the Soviets want agreement. If we cannot reach agreement on this broader field, let us take the central, most important two thirds of it, and screen off and block out national capability from the multilateral area.

Dobrynin said this would be more limited.

The Secretary agreed, but said it gets at the greatest problem.

After a discussion of other issues the Secretary returned to the question of non-diffusion to say that he wished we could report agreement on non-diffusion at the UN General Assembly.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/8-862. Secret. Drafted by Valdes and approved in S on August 15. A memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin on a comprehensive test ban agreement on this occasion is not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

¹ See [Document 198](#).

² See [Document 198](#) and [footnote 6, Document 201](#).

³ Reference is to a paper prepared for discussions with the Soviets on Berlin; for the fifth revision, see [vol. XV, pp. 95-98](#).

⁴ Reference may be to Gromyko's letter to Acting Secretary-General U Thant, March 10, 1962, on the spread of nuclear weapons; text in *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 83-86.

217. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)[Source](#)

Washington, August 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

Comparison of US and USSR Atomic Energy Programs[1](#)

Of the attached thick volume,[2](#) only the first 9 pages need to be scanned. Even then, the report does not contain much that is new. It does reaffirm the following points.

- a. Although US has overall superiority to the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear energy, the USSR has apparently made technological advances at rates at least equal to those achieved by the US in several areas which are of prime significance to the Soviet national defense posture. [*3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]
- b. The Soviet system for control of nuclear weapons is generally similar to that of the US, but we have thus far been unable to identify Soviet storage of nuclear weapons within the satellites.
- c. The US has 26 nuclear submarines in operation and a total of 61 have been authorized. The USSR has about 20 nuclear submarines. The Soviet missile nuclear submarines carry either 3 ballistic-type or 6 cruise-type missiles, both of short range and with a yield approaching 3 megatons.
- d. It is estimated the Soviets could have an aircraft nuclear power plant in early 1963-1964.
- e. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] The US has conducted more nuclear tests, but the USSR has detonated a larger total yield. It is known that 10 or more additional small yield Soviet tests were not detected.

W.Y.S.[3](#)

[*](#) Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Jul-Sep 62. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ NSAM No. 168, from McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, June 26, directed the three agencies to prepare a comparative study of U.S. and Soviet atomic energy programs, “using insofar as practicable the recent [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] , and 1 AP 1-62 and comparable data on the U.S. program.” Bundy requested completion of the report by August 1. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) See [Documents 78](#) and [183](#). 1AP 1-62 has not been found.

² Not attached and not found. At the White House daily staff meeting on August 3, Chuck Johnson reported that this comparative study of U.S. and Soviet atomic energy programs had been finished, “but that Mr. McCone was considering it and had not yet released it. Bundy said that the President would like to see this as soon as possible, preferably this weekend.” (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, August 3; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-Sept 62) According to Ewell, at the August 6 White House daily staff meeting, Johnson remarked that the paper, which was “very interesting,” was not to be distributed, but the President had a copy and Johnson was holding Bundy’s. Ewell added that he thought General Taylor would like to see this study, and Taylor wrote in the margin, “Let me see.” (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, August 6; *ibid.*)

³ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

218. Editorial Note

On August 10, 1962, Glenn Seaborg wrote a letter to President Kennedy advising him on the current status of the results of Operation Dominic, the atmospheric nuclear test program in the Pacific. The first phase of these tests ended on July 11, 1962. Seaborg's letter did not discuss in detail individual shots or those that were primarily of interest to the Department of Defense, but he provided a general review and assessment of the test series.

Seaborg asserted that the "over-all objective of Operation Dominic, to increase our understanding and improve our technology in the fields of weapons effects is being achieved." He noted, among other things, that the testing of various weapons "verified the performance of several warheads which are now or soon will constitute a critical portion of our strategic weapon stockpile" and "provided a storehouse of information leading to significant improvements in weapon efficiency and higher yield-to-weight ratios." He singled out as "particularly significant" successes in the following two categories: development and weapons verification, and advanced concepts (e.g., improvement in yield-to-weight ratios of future devices [*text not declassified*]).

At the end of his letter, Seaborg offered this evaluation:

"The current test series have produced many important successes. They have also yielded some surprises and some failures which confirm that we are indeed experimenting at the frontiers of weapons technology. The test successes vindicate, in a large measure, the elaborate computational and certification procedures which were developed during the moratorium. The surprises and failures serve to remind us that our theories and procedures are, at best, only approximate, particularly in the very important limit represented by fully optimized warhead designs.

"Although not a stated objective of our test program, I believe that one of the most significant results is the fact that our laboratories have become revitalized to a major degree. The importance of this reawakening to our

defense posture cannot be overstressed.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Operation Dominic, 2/62-4/63)

In a letter to McGeorge Bundy, August 10, Seaborg supplemented his letter to the President with additional data, especially in the area of advanced concepts tested in the series. He also enclosed with this letter a detailed analysis of Atomic Energy Commission sponsored events in Operation Dominic. (Ibid.)

Seaborg also provided a summary statement of the achievements of Operation Nougat, the Nevada test series, in a letter to President Kennedy, August 15, and he provided additional details on the results in a letter to McGeorge Bundy, August 15. Both letters are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jul.-Sept. 1962.

219. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, August 14, 1962, 8 p.m.

Disto 748. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. My instructions, Todis 469,¹ stated that if the Sov Union continues to indicate unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspection, the US should be ready to discuss affirmatively an atmospheric, outer space, under water test ban treaty possibly latter part August. The clear Sov rejection of on-site inspection by Zorin in our informal meetings² and in the test ban subcommittee and by Kuznetsov today in the plenary meeting of the conference³ will undoubtedly be repeated in further meetings but the clarity and firmness of the rejection of obligatory on-site inspection is now well established. Both our own general tactic of focusing on the inspection issue and not being drawn into detail on the numbers of detection posts or on-site inspections, or the degree of international supervision required, as well as our continuing differences on the last point with the British, argue for early introduction of an atmospheric test ban offer.

The Secretary has, of course, already brought this up with Dobrynin,⁴ but we should make a formal presentation here in Geneva and I believe the appropriate time would be next week.

I would hope, very strongly, that we could accompany our offer of an atmospheric agreement with the text of at least the essential portions of a draft treaty. I understand there may be some difficulties about precise language on peaceful uses explosions but I should think, for our present purposes, we could table a draft which merely permitted such explosions in accordance with an annex which we would not need to table simultaneously. It would, of course, be helpful in our relations with the British to have a draft treaty soon enough so that we could discuss it with them here at least a couple of days before we table it in the conference.

We have already made use of the presence of our scientists here in informal discussions of the technical problems of a comprehensive treaty⁵ and intend, insofar as test ban matters are concerned, to continue our present general line for at least the remainder of this week. But I believe we should be fully prepared to table a draft atmospheric treaty next week, and possibly as early as Monday though believe we should pursue some negotiating tactics on atmospheric with Kuznetsov as we did with Zorin on comprehensive before formal tabling which would mean few days delay. I would greatly appreciate it if clearance of a draft atmospheric treaty could be expedited and if I could be given discretionary authority for tabling it as early next week as may seem appropriate in the light of further developments of discussions here of a comprehensive agreement.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-1462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

¹ [Document 211](#).

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 215](#).

³ Vasily Vasilevich Kuznetsov replaced Zorin, who was going on vacation and leaving Geneva on August 15, as Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Disto 741 from Geneva, August 13; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-1362)

⁴ See the source note, [Document 216](#).

⁵ Wiesner, Long, Haworth, Matthew L. Sands (ACDA consultant), and Carl Romney (AFTAC) traveled to Geneva as scientific experts on August 11 to brief Western and neutral delegations on their conclusions on present scientific knowledge of the limits of identification capabilities without inspection. On August 13, the U.S. team, “with UK scientists attending and contributing as desired,” briefed seven of the eight delegations that had earlier put forward the eight-nation memorandum. (Disto 744 from Geneva, August 13; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-1362) They briefed the eighth (Mexico) on August 14. (Disto 751 from Geneva, August 14; *ibid.*) For Wiesner’s report on these discussions, see [Document 220](#).

220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, August 20, 1962.

The situation in Geneva doesn't look any more hopeful seen first-hand than it does when viewed through cables and newspapers. The Soviet delegation maintains the same rigid position with which they began this conference and does not appear to have any leeway to negotiate in a meaningful way. This applied to both issues on the agenda—the test ban treaty and General and Complete Disarmament. There was some hope that the arrival of Mr. Kuznetsov to replace Zorin really meant more than an opportunity for Zorin to have his holiday before the U.N. General Assembly convenes on September 15, but in statements and private discussions during his first three days there has been no evidence whatsoever of a desire to seek resolution of the differences over the test ban on any terms but theirs. GCD was not discussed while I was in Geneva.

The primary purpose for having scientists join the U.S. delegation for a few days was to interpret the new seismic information for the Western and neutral delegates so that they would understand the changes in position that are made possible and, more important, to make them aware of the technical limitations which still exist.¹ Our first meetings were with the British scientists, who later helped us greatly in presentations to the eight-nation groups. We easily agreed with the U.K. group on a technical position which emphasized the need for international specification and control of the control posts and the continued requirement for some on-site inspections.

Our technical position was sound—as of the moment—while Zorin had repeatedly made the extreme claim that inspection was now altogether unnecessary technically, while ducking demands to supply technical information to substantiate his stand. On the whole, we succeeded in making our points to those capable of understanding them. Some delegations, such as the Nigerian and Ethiopian, had no scientists in their group.

Though the technical facts were accepted by most groups, they did not all accept our position regarding the need for rigid safeguards. I think it fair to say that most of the neutrals at the Conference and our allies too would advocate accepting the invitational inspection proposal on the grounds that the risks of the arms race far outweigh any conceivable danger from clandestine testing. Much of the time of the Conference is now occupied in a discussion of obligatory versus invitational inspection.

It is obviously impossible to get any reliable explanation for the Soviet attitude, but most delegates echo two propositions—fear of the U.S. striking force and the fact that Khrushchev would be called an appeaser by the hard-line groups who have constantly opposed his co-existence. The Polish delegate Lachs² stressed the latter point in conversation and stated that it was his firm belief that the Soviets would only accept on-site inspection if the test ban were linked with other agreements. As you know, I believe this too.

Just before I left Geneva, Ambassador Dean, Mr. Fisher and I spent about two hours with Kuznetsov and other members of the Soviet delegation. Kuznetsov made two points very clear: 1) their objections to on-site inspection stemmed from political not technical considerations—he stated this very plainly—and, 2) that they do not have completely reliable identification methods—this was essentially admitted in response to direct questions.

There is a deep feeling of frustration and gloom among the delegations at the Conference because of the lack of any real progress. Some of the delegations, particularly the Swedish and the Indian, had hoped that they could work out a satisfactory compromise on the test ban treaty and they are deeply disappointed. They tend to blame both sides for the impasse, though the Soviets' behavior has, I think, caused most of the uncommitted delegations to be somewhat more understanding of our viewpoint than of the Soviets'.

I do not believe that real progress toward resolving disarmament issues can be made at a large semi-public conference such as this. I now have had four years of relatively intimate association with such meetings, and I am still

appalled at how little real information is exchanged. Both sides are so busy scoring points that there is little opportunity for serious private discussion. Even the small private get-togethers are badly inhibited by the knowledge that the plenary sessions are certain to follow, I think that bilateral meetings such as those held last year between Zorin and McCloy might make more progress.

On the positive side, the Conference has served to educate the neutral groups and excite their interest as well. I believe that several of the delegations, particularly the Swedes, have developed an enduring interest in the technical and political problems of disarmament which will lead them to set up their own research groups.

Everyone expects that the eight-nation group will be very active at the U.N. during the General Assembly, and that they will introduce a series of resolutions on the test ban and on GCD, some of which could be embarrassing or even dangerous to the U.S. I recommend that we prepare to send people, particularly some scientists, from the Arms Control Agency, DOD and possibly any office to help our U.N. delegation. This will require a substantial effort because it will be necessary to talk to 100 delegations, not the dozen that we had at Geneva.

Attached is the cable report filed by Ambassador Dean following the meeting with Kuznetsov.³

Jerome B. Wiesner⁴

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.

¹ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 219](#).

² Professor Manfred Lachs, Polish Deputy Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

³ Not attached. (Disto 757 from Geneva, August 16; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1662) See the Supplement.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

221. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State [Source](#)

Geneva, August 23, 1962, 1 p.m.

Disto 799. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. In various conversations with Kouznetsov (Sov), other than at formal meetings, he does not hesitate to speak in English, speaks warmly of his post-graduate work and stay in the United States, emphasizes great admiration Soviet people have for US technical achievements and absolute necessity of our solving both nuclear test ban and disarmament problems. Speaks warmly of his friendship for Foster and of their excellent cooperation at surprise attack conference in 1958, and recalls gifts of *Life of Lincoln and Lee*.

Yesterday he expressed great admiration for my practical approach to problems and cordially invited me but in rather casual than formal terms to come to Soviet Union to see Khrushchev, preferably before UNGA, but at any time.

Nevertheless, despite the fact he is seemingly more gracious and more cordial and outgoing than Zorin, believe it is largely a surface cordiality and he is actually somewhat harder and tougher than Zorin, who is always polite but more of a skilled technician. Kouznetsov never fails in a charming way to extol the virtues of the Soviet Union, the Russian people, and Communism, and to ridicule in a polite way failings of American system.

Constantly talks about necessity breaking down economic barriers in trade between US and USSR and firm necessity of our standing shoulder to shoulder together in solution world's problems and tends by subtle form of flattery to indicate that if we two were left together, we could easily solve problems.

Cannot detect any evidence of any softening in Soviet position and in fact detect slight hardening in general tone, although it would be difficult to fasten on any particular words or expressions to prove this with evidence.

Believe they fully intend to carry out their present series of atmospheric tests and they look upon Padilla Nervo's suggestion as another uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground testing;¹ though when I point out we would be against this, Kouznetsov's answer is "Let's not use the word 'moratorium'." Or "Let's not speak of inspection or control." "Let us just say that neither of us will conduct underground tests, as inspections are no more necessary in connection with underground tests than they are with respect to atmospheric."

Advises definitely he will not go to UNGA and in respect to question as to whether Khrushchev would, stated he was uninformed.

Believe that theories which I have heard often expressed that Kouznetsov was sent here to expound easier policy on test ban and disarmament is so far not warranted by actual facts, and that their principal aim is to get us to stop testing underground.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-2362. Secret.

¹ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 193](#).

222. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, August 23, 1962, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William O. Anderson, EUR/SOV

The Ambassador called by appointment at his own request. He opened the conversation by stating that he had received, and was instructed to convey to the Secretary, a message from Foreign Minister Gromyko responding to the Secretary's message of August 8.¹ (Note: Subsequent to the conversation Mr. Anderson informally obtained from Counselor Kornienko a Russian text of the Gromyko message;² a translation is attached.) In brief, the message from the Foreign Minister noted that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions now appear to be quite close as regards the non-transfer problem. It is proposed that an international undertaking be sought involving three points: (1) an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their production; (2) an obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not to receive technical information necessary for their production; (3) there should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance.

A question now arises concerning the steps which should be taken next. It would seem that the four nuclear powers, the U.S., U.K., France and the U.S.S.R., should take the initiative in attempting to formulate an international agreement to which other powers would be invited to adhere.

The Secretary commented that, as he understood the presentation, the position outlined by Foreign Minister Gromyko would appear to be a constructive and positive step forward. He then stressed that it is very important that there be no misunderstanding as regards the third point mentioned in the Gromyko message. The Secretary stated carefully that we are ready to agree not to transfer weapons directly to a non-nuclear nation and we are likewise willing to agree not to pass nuclear weapons indirectly through a military alliance to a non-nuclear power. However, it must be clear that alliance arrangements as regards the possible use of nuclear weapons constitute a subject which, as the Ambassador well knows, has been under discussion on our side for some time. We cannot now define the hypothetical formula upon which the alliance on our side may agree; however, it should be clear that we would not use an alliance arrangement for the purpose of passing nuclear weapons indirectly to a non-nuclear power. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that we had discussed this matter in some detail on several occasions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva and it is highly desirable that the Foreign Minister not misunderstand the U.S. position on this point. The Ambassador stated that he understood the Secretary's concern and would report this point fully to the Soviet Government.

Attachment³

MESSAGE FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO SECRETARY RUSK, DELIVERED ORALLY BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO THE SECRETARY AUGUST 23, 1962

Your message regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, sent to me through Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin, concerns a question to which the Soviet Government attaches great significance. During our conversations in Geneva I told you that the Soviet Government is in favor of preventing the further diffusion of nuclear weapons in the world. The Soviet Government has already put forward proposals on this matter in the General Assembly of the UN as well as in the Committee of Eighteen in Geneva. It is apparent from your message that the position of the United States Government at the present time is close to the position of the Soviet Government on this question. It is clear that between us there are no differences concerning the

fact that an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should contain provisions under which the nuclear powers would take upon themselves the obligation not to make nuclear weapons available to other states and the latter [would assume]⁴ the obligation not to receive or produce such weapons.

As you will recall, during the course of our discussion of this question in Geneva, I pointed to the importance of avoiding the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers through military alliances. You then declared the readiness of the United States to find a formula which would exclude the transfer of nuclear weapons to national possession through the agency of military alliances and blocs. It is in this light that the Soviet Government is also examining the words contained in your message to the effect that the U.S. and the USSR could reach an agreement regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to national armed forces of other countries, not only directly but also indirectly, i.e., through blocs such as NATO. In other words, the agreement should guarantee the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to the national forces of non-nuclear states also in those cases where such forces are component parts of the armed forces of one military bloc or another.

Thus, inasmuch as there is between us in essence agreement relative to the contents of the agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, the next step could be the working out of the concrete provisions of such an agreement.

From the exchange of opinions between us it follows that the basic points of an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should clearly be the following:

1. An obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their production;
2. An obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not to receive technical information necessary for their production;

3. There should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance.

What course of action would it be advisable to take in order to achieve practical results more quickly with respect to preventing the diffusion of nuclear weapons? I think that the nuclear powers could already agree on the necessity of working out an appropriate agreement. It is quite obvious that all powers which possess nuclear weapons, i.e., the USSR, the U.S., England and France, could undertake an initiative for the preparation of an appropriate international agreement which would be proposed for the signature of all governments.

We are prepared to continue maintaining contact with you concerning this question through our Ambassador in Washington.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8-2362. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on August 28.

¹ See [Document 216](#).

² The Russian text has not been found.

³ Secret. Translation drafted by Lewis W. Bowden (EUR/SOV) on August 23.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

223. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Next Steps in Nuclear Test Negotiations

We would like to be in a position to submit to the Geneva Disarmament Conference the text of a modified comprehensive test ban treaty, as well as of a limited atmospheric-underwater-outer space agreement, either on August 27 or August 29. This would be sufficiently in advance of the recess now scheduled for September 8 to allow for a limited discussion of these two documents. The agreed texts are attached as Tabs A and B.^{[1](#)}

We have the formal concurrence of State, Defense and AEC in these texts. Although the UK has continued to have some reservation about the handling of international observers at nationally manned control posts, they have agreed not to pursue these differences given their feeling about the urgent need for an early tabling of these documents.

The comprehensive treaty draft reflects the new approach which Ambassador Dean has already presented in general terms in Geneva. It does not include any numbers for on-site inspections or control posts, since we wish to avoid discussing such matters while the USSR rejects the very principle of on-site inspection.

Although Soviet acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection is currently not likely, submitting specific treaty language will pose the question to them in terms which are clearer and more pointed than has been possible during the past several weeks.

More importantly, we believe that having both treaties on record will serve to define the U.S. position on the nuclear test question with considerably

more precision and will provide us with a platform on which to make our case in the General Assembly during the next months.

In the absence of a comprehensive proposal which is as specific as we can make it, we are concerned that our efforts to negotiate a limited treaty will be doomed from the outset. Unless we have an attractive alternative, the Soviet Union will probably be able to make headway if it attempts to round up support for an atmospheric, underwater and outer space test ban agreement coupled with and inseparable from a moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests. Unquestionably, the Soviet Union will attempt to make the issue in the coming General Assembly debate one of American refusal to accept a moratorium on underground tests and thus shift the focus from Soviet refusal to accept on-site inspection. We will be in a good position to fend off this attack if we have on the record a sound and reasonable comprehensive test ban treaty based on the most recent scientific findings.

William C. Foster

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/24-31/62. Confidential.

¹ Tab A, Comprehensive Treaty, July 23, 23 pages, and Tab B, Atmospheric Treaty, July 23, 8 pages, are not printed.

224. Editorial Note

On August 27, 1962, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan issued a joint statement indicating that they had instructed their representatives in Geneva to submit to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee “a draft treaty containing proposals for an end to all nuclear testing in all environments as well as an alternative draft treaty providing for an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space.” The two leaders expressed a “strong preference” for prompt action on the comprehensive treaty but indicated that they were also prepared to conclude a more limited atmospheric, underwater, and outer space agreement. The latter “would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race,” “would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them,” “would free mankind from the dangers and fear of radioactive fallout,” and “might be a first step toward an agreement banning testing in all environments.” For text of this statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume II, pages 791-792.

For texts of the draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments (ENDC/58) and of the draft treaty banning these tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater (ENDC/59), as submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 27, see *ibid.*, pages 792-804 and 804-807. Extensive documentation on the development of these draft treaties in the U.S. Government as well as coordination with the United Kingdom is in Department of State, Central Files 396.12-GE, 600.0012, and 700.5611. An August 14 draft of the comprehensive treaty and an August 17 draft of the atmospheric, outer space, and underwater treaty are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Committee. See also Foster’s memorandum to Bundy, [Document 223](#).

225. Informal Communication From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Moscow, September 4, 1962.

We have familiarized ourselves with the statement which you and the Prime-Minister of Great Britain Mr. Macmillan made August 27, concerning the latest Anglo-American proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests.^{[1](#)}

Now I would like to address myself to you to find out whether we can reach at last a practical agreement on this important problem even though it may not solve the whole problem completely.

The positions of our sides on the question of cessation of nuclear tests are well known. We believe that it would be in the interests of peace to put an end to all nuclear tests with an appropriate control by the national means of states to be established. You still express doubts with regard to this position of ours. At the same time you appeal to us to accept your proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments on such conditions which in our deep conviction do not have any justification and are absolutely unacceptable to us for the reasons to which we have pointed out more than once. I think you yourself understand that too. Perhaps that is why the Anglo-American proposals contain also an alternative version. You propose to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and leave aside underground tests.

We are ready to take into account your position. Let us immediately sign an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water but at the same time let us agree that with regard to underground tests negotiations will go on with an aim to reach an agreement on the underground tests as well. However we are of the opinion that the peoples would be extremely disappointed if the underground tests continue even at the time when negotiations are in progress on the possibility of an agreement on this problem. We believe that the

governments of nuclear powers would act with honor if they agreed, and fixed that in the agreement as well, that the negotiations on the cessation of underground nuclear tests must go on and that during these negotiations and henceforth until an agreement banning also underground nuclear tests is reached, nuclear powers shall refrain from conducting such tests.

We think that an agreement on such basis though in our opinion it is not satisfactory in every respect, would, nevertheless, be a major step forward.

I will tell you frankly that accepting such an agreement we make a step to meet your position which we cannot justify since we are convinced that there is every possibility to conclude already now a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, but which we are ready to take into consideration.

You may say that there is not much new in what I have said. May be. But we are convinced that such a solution and such an agreement do not give either us or you any unilateral advantage, but benefits arising out of them for all nuclear powers and for the cause of peace in general are obvious.

And, finally, the last consideration: it is not clear from your and Mr. Macmillan's statement what role France as nuclear power shall play. We proceeded earlier and proceed now from an assumption that under any international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests France should assume commitments analogous to those of the USSR, the US and Britain.

I await with great interest your reaction to the considerations I have expressed. If you react to them positively then our representatives could, evidently without great difficulty, work out the text of an appropriate international treaty.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1961-1962, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy,

Adrian Fisher (ACDA), Secretary Rusk, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 52](#) .

¹ See [Document 24](#).

226. Editorial Note

During 1961 and 1962, Kennedy administration officials became increasingly concerned about a possible arms race in outer space. On September 25, 1961, for instance, President Kennedy had proposed in an address before the U.N. General Assembly “keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space” and extending the rule of law on earth “to man’s new domain—outer space.” (*Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pages 470-471) On December 20, 1961, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. For text, see *ibid.*, pages 738-741. The U.S. treaty outline on general and comprehensive disarmament, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 18, 1962, proposed: “The parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.” (*Ibid.*, 1962, volume I, page 360)

On May 26, 1962, President Kennedy issued NSAM No. 156, which called for the Department of State to organize a committee composed of representatives of the Departments of Defense and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This committee would review negotiations on the peaceful uses of outer space “with a view to formulating a position which avoids the dangers of restricting ourselves, compromising highly classified programs, or providing assistance of significant military value to the Soviet Union and which at the same time permits us to continue to work for disarmament and international cooperation in space.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 156)

This NSAM 156 Committee submitted its Report on Political and Informational Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy, dated July 1, under cover of a July 2 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President. The report made several recommendations, but the committee members did not reach a decision as to whether to propose a separate arms control agreement (i.e., outside the framework of the April 18 treaty outline on

general and comprehensive disarmament) “banning weapons of mass destruction from being carried in satellites, with appropriate verification controls,” but agreed only that no such proposal should be tabled until the issue had been reviewed with the President. (Ibid.) Attached to the report was a paper listing the pros and cons of a separate ban on bombs in space. Following NSC discussion on July 10, President Kennedy issued NSC Action No. 2454, which accepted the NSAM 156 Committee’s recommendations and referred the question of a separate arms control accord back to the Committee for further study. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The Committee’s unanimous recommendations, which were incorporated into a July 12 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President, included opposition to a declaratory ban, the need for adequate verification controls, and further study by ACDA of the inspection requirements. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 156)

The President questioned the need for inspection, however, and asked for study of the prospects for a ban relying on unilateral verification. After further study by the NSAM 156 Committee, the Committee of Principals on September 19 agreed on a declaratory ban monitored by national technical means, which would be put forward in the U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/9-1962) This position was incorporated in NSAM No. 192, October 2. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 192)

Meanwhile, the NSC and State and Defense Departments cooperated in a separate initiative, which consisted of making authoritative administration public statements denying U.S. intentions to place any weapons of mass destruction in outer space. They hoped these statements would encourage the Soviet Union to take a similar position and contribute to an eventual agreement. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric led off on September 5 with an address, “Research and Development as a Factor in Defense Procurement,” which he gave to business and university leaders in South Bend, Indiana. A major theme of Gilpatric’s speech was the problem of nuclear weapons in outer space: “The United States believes that it is highly desirable for its own security and for the security of the world that the arms race should not be extended into outer space, and we are seeking in every feasible way to achieve that purpose.”

Gilpatric continued: “We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a U.S. commitment to such a program. This we will not do.” (*Congressional Record*, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, September 21, 1962, Appendix, page A7008)

Documentation on U.S. initiatives on outer space both privately with the Soviet Union and in the United Nations is scheduled for publication in [volume XXV](#) . See also *Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962*, Staff Report Prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, Document No. 18 (Washington, 1963); and Raymond L. Garthoff, “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space,” *International Security*, volume V (Winter 1980/81), pages 25-40. Garthoff, a Foreign Service officer and Executive Secretary of the NSAM 156 Committee, was intimately involved in the development of U.S. space policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

227. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, September 6, 1962.

T 446/62. Your message CAP5408-62 of September 5. Please pass following message to President Kennedy from Prime Minister Macmillan.

Begins

Dear Friend,

Thank you very much for sending me the private message from Khrushchev.^{[1](#)}

Of course I share your view that we should try to keep this matter in play and at first sight Khrushchev's message seems intended to do the same. However there are some pretty obvious difficulties in his plan.

I wonder if we could deal with the matter in two parts. The first part would be an unpoliced ban in the atmosphere, under the sea and in space. The second part would be to urge Khrushchev once again to set up a joint working party with Russian scientists to see if an agreed basis for detection and verification could be found. A time limit of three or six months could be given.

The French point is very awkward and meant to be so. We could perhaps answer it by saying that it is for the three of us to set an example and that we would invite all other countries, including France and China, to join us in the atmospheric ban and of course, if the other negotiations succeed, to join us later in the comprehensive treaty.

I have been tied up with Commonwealth meetings all day but I thought you would like to have these first thoughts. I should be interested to know how you view the matter.

With warm regard,

Yours sincerely,

Harold Macmillan

Ends.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Prime Minister Macmillan Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1962-1963, Vol. III. Secret; Eyes Only.

¹ A note from Bromley Smith to Edward S. Little (S/S), September 12, attached to the source text, indicates that the text of the message from Khrushchev ([Document 225](#)) was transmitted to Macmillan, presumably over private wire, “without any comment.”

228. Editorial Note

On September 5, 1962, Glenn Seaborg and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent President Kennedy a memorandum proposing additional atmospheric tests to the Dominic series. This memorandum has not been found, but in a memorandum to the President, September 5, Jerome Wiesner wrote that the DOD-AEC proposal called for eleven tests, six high-altitude shots and five developmental tests. After summarizing the altitudes and yields of these proposed shots, Wiesner commented:

“Two points should be considered in judging these tests:

- “1. The timing and scope will make the series look like a new U.S. test series. If all the tests are approved, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. This group of tests would produce about 40% of the fallout produced by our previous tests this year. It is also possible that these tests would extend beyond the end of the Soviet series.
- “2. The extensive high altitude series, though of low yield, could stimulate further Soviet high altitude tests and these might be of considerably greater yield with the known undesirable consequences.”

Wiesner concluded by suggesting a prioritized list of three categories if the President wanted to restrict the series. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62)

President Kennedy met with his principals in the Cabinet Room of the White House on September 5 from 5:10 to 6:30 p.m. to discuss the proposed add-on tests. According to Seaborg: “The President directed that we cut the proposed eleven to eight tests and to relate the alternative schedule to Astronaut Schirra’s September 23rd flight. The President suggested dropping Urraca. In a later meeting, dominated by McNamara, it was decided to drop Urraca, Thumbelina (a Los Alamos shot) and a DOD high altitude shot.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 4, page 180)

On the following day, September 6, from 10:35 to 11:15 a.m., President Kennedy presided over a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. Seaborg noted in his journal after the meeting: “As a result of

the meeting yesterday with the President, in which it was decided to reduce the 11 Johnston Island events (five developmental and six high altitude tests) to eight, it was decided to drop the AEC Haymaker Prime and Urraca tests and the DOD high altitude test. The President raised questions about including Thumbelina, the developmental Los Alamos test. On the basis of my representations, the President decided that, in the balance of the developmental base that this would give Los Alamos, it counterbalances the disadvantage of the fallout.

“Prior to the meeting, the President was given a memorandum, signed by Secretary McNamara and me, and dated today, which included Haymaker Prime, but not Thumbelina, on the basis of the preliminary discussions in the meeting with the President yesterday. In view of today’s discussion, this memorandum will be revised to reflect the decisions made, i.e., substitution of Thumbelina for Haymaker Prime. It includes two alternates for the eight tests, depending on whether Astronaut Schirra goes into orbit on September 25th as scheduled, or is delayed, because the Bluegill shot must not go until after his orbiting.

“It was decided that the announcement would be the regular AEC-DOD announcement, as a follow-up of that which announced the closing of the Johnston Island danger zone, and which indicated that such a new announcement would precede the reopening of this zone.

“The addition of the four developmental tests to the series, which will end early in November, will be played in a low key. Special attention will be paid to the problem of fallout from the Thumbelina event.” (Ibid.)

NSC Action No. 2456, September 6, which summarized the decisions reached at this 504th NSC meeting, is in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. See the Supplement.

An unsigned copy of the 12-page draft letter from Seaborg and McNamara to the President, September 6, is *ibid.*, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. The subsequently revised version mentioned in Seaborg’s journal entry has not been found. The President’s approval of the eight tests is in NSAM No. 185 to McNamara and Seaborg, September 7. This memorandum specified,

however, that only preparations were authorized for Kingfish, a high-altitude shot, and that “the final decision to execute is reserved.” (Ibid.) In NSAM No. 198 to McNamara, Seaborg, and NASA Director James E. Webb, October 24, Kaysen wrote that the President had that day authorized the Kingfish event. (Ibid., S/S-NSN Files: Lot 72 D 316)

The Project Mercury orbital flight of astronaut Walter Schirra, which is also referred to in Seaborg’s journal entry above, took place on October 3.

President Kennedy informed the U.K. Government of his decisions on the eight tests in a message to Macmillan, September 7. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, K-M, Vol. II) See the Supplement.

Ultimately, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense conducted nine atmospheric tests in the Johnston Island area from October 2 to November 3, 1962. These tests are summarized in *Announced United States Nuclear Tests*, DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 11) and *Operation Dominic I—1962*, DNA-6040F.

229. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman

Khrushchev [Source](#)

Washington, September 15, 1962.

I am happy to note your suggestion that you are prepared to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in the immediate future. Now that the subcommittee on nuclear test ban is continuing in session throughout the recess in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, I think we should make a serious effort to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target date of January 1, 1963 which both sides have mentioned in the Geneva negotiations. We have prepared such a treaty,¹ and our representatives and those of the United Kingdom will be working with yours in the subcommittee to get the earliest possible agreement on a final text.

While we are negotiating toward a limited ban of this type we should at the same time be negotiating towards a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments. As part of this effort we could be working to eliminate the difference of view as to a question of scientific fact which has so far kept our negotiators apart. Our scientists advise me that although substantial progress has been made in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions on the basis of instrumentation, it is not possible to do so on a basis which renders the requirement of on-site inspections unnecessary. Your delegation has taken the opposing view but has not supplied any scientific information which may have led your government to hold this view. A joint working party of your scientists together with ours and scientists from the United Kingdom might be able, finally, to dispel the differences which have so far blocked our efforts to obtain agreement.

I believe that when we have prepared and put into effect a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, we can then look at the problem of continued testing under ground and take such steps as we may then determine seem most likely to be helpful in arriving at a comprehensive treaty in the light of the progress which has been made at that time.

In your message you mention the role that France should play in the treaty. Of course, our comprehensive treaty draft provides that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union shall cooperate in encouraging other states to become parties to the treaty. For its part, the United States would work in close consultation with France and would hope that France would adhere to the treaty. Indeed, both you and we have a great interest in assuring the adherence to the treaty of all states or authorities capable of conducting a nuclear weapons test. Without their adherence the treaty could not endure.

A test ban agreement, together with an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons of the kind which Secretary Rusk has discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin,² would have a powerful effect in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries. I firmly believe that obtaining this objective is in our mutual interest. It cannot be in the security interest of any of us if the present small number of nuclear powers is expanded, for, to the extent this is the case, the possibilities of war by accident or by design can only increase. There is still time to put an effective end to this threat.³

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. No classification marking. Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 54](#).

¹ See [Document 224](#).

² See [Documents 216](#) and [222](#).

³ Printed from an unsigned copy.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, September 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

You are aware of the conversations which I have been having with the Soviet Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on the question of restricting the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities.

At the last meeting, August 23,¹ a potentially important shift occurred in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider reaching an agreement on non-diffusion couched in more general terms than its previous position which had specified that a prior agreement had to be reached separately concerning the specific problem of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the East German regime. In addition, although the language is ambiguous, the Soviets have not apparently precluded considering an understanding which would not rule out international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multilateral nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework.²

1. I propose that within the next few days I discuss the substance and tactics of negotiating a non-transfer agreement with the British Foreign Minister and British Ambassador. The points I would make are attached as Tab A.³ I would also show them a draft Declaration, attached as Tab B,⁴ and a draft Minute, further clarifying our proposal, which is attached as Tab C.⁵
2. Assuming a generally favorable response I propose that we then could approach President De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer regarding our interest in securing a non-transfer declaration. We would seek the active participation and support of France in further negotiations with the Soviet Union, and we would seek the support and approval in this effort of the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States will be in a better position to urge the Soviet Union to place pressure on Communist China

to sign a non-diffusion declaration if the U.K. and France join with the U.S. in being willing to sign such a declaration, and the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to undertake an obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.

3. Assuming that agreement can be worked out with the heads of the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, we would again take the matter up with the U.S.S.R. In the event that one or more of the other three Western governments refused to participate in this endeavor or attached conditions to their acceptance, I would then propose reviewing with you further steps that could be taken.
4. The above course of action has not been discussed by the Committee of Principals. It is supported by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the course of action and the measure on the grounds that it contains no provisions for inspection; that it may have a very bad effect on our defensive alliance within NATO; and that the measure prohibits transfers which the U.S. itself may wish to make. I am advised that the Department of Defense does not oppose the measure but does question the timing involved in the course of action proposed.⁶
5. I have outlined a course of action to give you a picture of my thinking. At this time, however, I am only asking for approval of the action discussed in point 1. above, the discussion of the measure and the course of action with the U.K. on an exploratory basis. I will ask your further approval of the next step in this negotiation after consulting with the U.K.

⁶ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. An undated memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to the source text, states, "The attached documents while not actually seen by Secretary Rusk, have been discussed with him by me and he has expressed his present intention to discuss this matter with Lord Home in New York, probably on Sunday." A copy of the source text identifies ACDA officers Adrian Fisher, James Goodby, and Betty Goetz as the drafters. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Chron File, July-Sep 1962)

¹ See [Document 222](#).

² In the margin next to this sentence, the President wrote, “Get an understanding.” In view of these potential shifts in the Soviet position, I now propose for your approval an immediate program of action looking toward the formal submission to the Soviet Union by the United States and its principal Western allies of a declaration regarding the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. In doing so it would be made clear that we did not propose to give up our right to work out a truly multinational NATO nuclear force, with appropriate safeguards to assure that nuclear weapons assigned to that force could not be used on the basis of a national decision alone.

³ Talking Points for Discussions with U.K. on Non-Dissemination, not printed.

⁴ Draft Non-Transfer Declaration, not printed.

⁵ Minute for Use in Discussion with Draft Non-Transfer Declaration, not printed.

⁶ In a September 21 memorandum to the President on non-diffusion, Carl Kaysen wrote that he had “talked to the Secretary again on the telephone this afternoon and indicated your desire to talk with him on the subject.” He added, among other things, that “Ros Gilpatric has indicated that the Defense Department would go along with this proposal, but the Chiefs object to it strenuously. If possible, Bob [McNamara] and Ros would rather fight with them another time than now.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

231. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

New York, September 25, 1962, 1:15 p.m.

SecDel/MC/1

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

Test Ban

The second subject the Secretary raised in his post-lunch conversation with Mr. Gromyko was that of a test ban.

The Secretary observed that both the US and USSR were now conducting nuclear tests, but stated that our first choice was to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments. At the same time, from our standpoint we did not see how such a treaty could be agreed upon without adequate arrangements for on-site inspection in case of suspicious underground events. The Secretary stressed that we were unable to understand why the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the minimum arrangement which would make it possible to stop all nuclear weapons tests. He went on to say that if no agreement on a comprehensive treaty were now possible, agreement could be reached on a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, pending further negotiations on a comprehensive treaty. He pointed out that such a limited treaty would not require any inspection mechanism because not national but

international means existed by which atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests could be detected. He said he hoped very much that the Soviet Union could accept such a treaty and noted that as far as the US testing program was concerned, it was such that there would be some time ahead during which both sides could work diligently on a comprehensive treaty.

The Secretary then said he wished to raise one point, noting that he was doing so in all seriousness and not with any desire to be frivolous. He said that some two weeks ago he had seen an article published in the *People's Daily* in Peiping in which it was stated categorically that under no circumstances would Peiping accept a nuclear test ban, non-proliferation arrangements, or any other arrangements inhibiting the development of a nuclear capability by Peiping.¹ Since any treaty banning nuclear weapons tests would have to contain the provision that tests by a third country would terminate the treaty, the Secretary said it had occurred to him that the current lack of interest on the part of the USSR with respect to a test ban might be motivated by this attitude of Peiping. He stressed that he did not insist on Mr. Gromyko's answering this point, but that he simply wondered whether this might not be at least a partial reason for the current Soviet attitude. He emphasized that as far as the United States was concerned it wished to make progress in Geneva with the hope that a report about the conclusion of an agreement could be submitted to the General Assembly.

Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had been and still was very serious about the problem of stopping nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was resolutely in favor of stopping all types of tests. It wished to reach agreement on this matter with the United States, the UK, and France. It believed that this would be the best solution, serving the best interests of all. However, the USSR was prepared to agree that no further atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests would be conducted and that during the negotiations on a comprehensive treaty no party would conduct underground tests. He asserted that this was a compromise solution because it would provide for a ban on tests in three environments and for negotiations with respect to the fourth environment, but with the understanding that no underground tests would be conducted during such negotiations. Without such an understanding an atmospheric ban would be of no use because, as the Secretary knew, from the standpoint of nuclear

weapons development it did not really matter in what environment one tested. He wished the US Government would think about this point.

As to the Secretary's remark about Peiping, Mr. Gromyko said that test ban and proliferation were two different things. The USSR was in favor of having a test ban agreement signed by the four existing nuclear powers—the US, the UK, the USSR, and, of course, France—because no other nation was known to be a nuclear power at present. Thus, the Soviet Union was in favor of proceeding on the basis on which negotiations on this subject had been taking place so far. As to proliferation, Mr. Gromyko recalled that he and the Secretary had discussed this matter in Geneva and that subsequently the Secretary had sent him a letter to which he had given an appropriate reply. He said that the Soviet Union believed that it would be useful if agreement could be reached with regard to non-proliferation and that the Soviet position on this point remained unchanged. He noted, however, that of course any country, including the socialist states and the Chinese People's Republic in particular, were fully entitled to express their own views. As the Secretary knew full well, the CPR did not participate in disarmament negotiations and was not in the UN as a result of the US position. Mr. Gromyko thought it was dangerous to prevent the CPR from taking part in those activities. Thus the CPR must speak for itself and if the US was creating obstacles in the path of reaching agreement on a test ban or non-dissemination this was not the fault of the USSR but its own.

Referring to the Secretary's remark that the current Soviet lack of interest in a test ban was perhaps motivated by Peiping's attitude, Mr. Gromyko asserted that this was not correct and could not be applied to the Soviet position. He said he wished to state once again that the USSR had believed and continued to believe that a test ban would be a great contributing factor toward relaxation of tensions and progress in disarmament, although in and of itself it would not constitute disarmament. He reiterated that any implication the Secretary had made with regard to the Soviet position being influenced by the Chinese attitude did not hold water and was contrary to the facts.

The Secretary said he was glad to hear this, but wished to add just one more point. He stated that an atmospheric treaty accompanied by an agreement to

forego underground tests pending negotiations on a comprehensive treaty was something that could easily become a comprehensive treaty without inspection. Now, during the period when both the US and the USSR were testing, a comprehensive treaty could be reached; on the other hand, refusal to agree to a comprehensive treaty under conditions suggested by Mr. Gromyko could become a prolongation of an uninspected moratorium with regard to underground tests, and this was something the US could not accept. The Secretary then expressed the hope that both sides would give full attention to the sub-committee meeting in Geneva so as to work on a comprehensive treaty.

The Secretary then said that he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko's remarks with regard to the value of a limited test ban. He said that the most dramatic and costly advances would require atmospheric or outer space tests. Although underground tests did make some difference, a ban on atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests would place a useful ceiling on testing.

Mr. Gromyko said that with regard to inspection he could only reiterate the Soviet belief that both the US and USSR, as well as some other states, had means of ensuring the observance of a treaty by all. This had been and remained the Soviet position on this question.

The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gromyko might perhaps think over the possibility that on this point the difference might perhaps be over facts rather than policy. He thought scientists from both sides might consult in order to resolve this problem. Noting that as far as the US was concerned its position stemmed from facts rather than policy.

Mr. Gromyko failed to respond and changed the subject.

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on September 26. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled "Part II." A memorandum of conversation on Laos, the first subject of their talk, is not printed. (Ibid.)

¹ An attachment to a memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, August 11, which summarized the attitude of the People's Republic of China on the development and testing of nuclear weapons and on nuclear-free zones, contained extracts from and summaries of articles from *People's Daily* on these subjects. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/C-R Files: FRC 77 A 8, State Department, Memoranda to the Secretary)

232. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Moscow, undated.

I studied with interest your reply to my considerations forwarded through Ambassador Dobrynin on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests.^{[1](#)}

It is said in your reply that a serious effort should be made to work out by January 1, 1963 an agreement on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Well, I can say quite definitely that we will not make you waiting. The Soviet Union in the course of many years has been pressing for concluding an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and we are prepared to make new efforts in this direction for the sake of achieving this aim.

The Soviet Government is convinced that national means of detecting nuclear explosions now at the disposal of the states are quite adequate to ensure strict control over the fulfillment by all states of their commitments with regard to cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as well as underground. And the U.S. too recognizes this now with respect to three types of tests—in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water—and no longer insists on establishing international control over the cessation of these tests. Thus there seems to be no difference between us on this point any longer. There remains the question of underground tests. In the U.S. doubts are still being expressed as to the adequacy of national means for detecting underground tests. We do not have such doubts. Nevertheless we are prepared to use every opportunity to come to an agreement on this question on a mutually acceptable basis, on such a basis that would remove your doubts.

I do not know whether you have noticed a suggestion of British scientists Bullard and Penney put forward at the recent Pugwash conference of scientists concerning the use of automatic seismic stations working without any personnel.^{[2](#)} As we understood, the idea of this suggestion is that

automatic seismic stations help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that underground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earthquakes. It would be a sort of mechanical control without men. After thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be accepted if this would make it easier to reach an agreement. In this case it could be provided in the treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the nuclear states and 2-3 such stations directly on the territory of the states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes.

The Soviet Government agrees to this only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement. We do not intend to violate the commitment that we assume regarding cessation of tests but we also want to make you and the public opinion of the U.S. to feel confident that all sides will display an honest approach in fulfilling this commitment.

If you agree to this then we could without much difficulty come to an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

I would like to view as an encouraging sign the fact that the American scientists who took part in the Pugwash conference—and as I was told, very prominent ones—approved of the suggestion about the use of automatic seismic stations for the purposes of control. The Soviet scientists—participants in the Pugwash conference also approved of this suggestion. So it appears that the scientists are already in agreement.³ Then there is a possibility to move ahead quickly. And as for us, we would like very much to put an end to all that and reach, at last, an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests of all kinds. There have been enough—both for us and for you—of experimental blasts carried out in the atmosphere and underground.

If we can come now to the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests we will make good for the peoples of our countries and for the peoples of the entire world.

We prefer to conclude now a treaty on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. But if the Western powers are not yet prepared for that even taking into account the suggestions put forward at the Pugwash conference we, as I have already told you, are ready in this case also to make a step toward the

Western powers and to conclude at this time a treaty on cessation of nuclear weapon tests in three environments; in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

It would be incorrect in doing that to leave open the question of underground nuclear tests. For it would create a false impression with the world public opinion, a kind of illusion, that an agreement on cessation of tests has seemingly been concluded and that the competition among states in perfecting nuclear arms is coming to an end whereas in fact this competition would continue. The weapons already created would be remodeled on the basis of new scientific data obtained as a result of experimental underground blasts, that is the states would replenish their arsenals with ever more perfect, ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons. With that we cannot agree. I must say frankly and openly that it is impossible to agree to conclude an agreement on the basis of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water if the United States intends to continue underground nuclear explosions. Since in this case we too would face a necessity to carry out experimental nuclear weapon tests and we would conduct those tests, as we are doing now, in the atmosphere.

What is the way out? From our previous exchange of opinion you know how we propose to overcome this difficulty—to agree that after a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in our outer space and under water is signed negotiations on cessation of underground tests as well should be continued and while these negotiations are in progress and until the agreement is reached all nuclear powers should refrain from conducting such tests.

But some people in the West do not want even to hear about any commitment by the states to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. And on the part of some statesmen and in the American press assertions are made from time to time that the Soviet Union has allegedly violated some agreement on moratorium on nuclear tests. However those who make such statements have neither proof nor ground to support them.

And what are the facts? No international agreement on moratorium on underground or any other nuclear tests ever existed and nobody ever signed such an agreement. It can be reminded that as early as March 31, 1958 the

Soviet Union unilaterally discontinued tests on all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons and called upon the Western powers to follow its example. But the U.S. and Britain responded then to that proposal of ours with an unprecedented in scope new series of tests of nuclear bombs. In subsequent period since the end of 1958 neither the United States or Britain nor the Soviet Union conducted nuclear weapon tests, but they acted so not because of any obligation coming from an international agreement but because of their own unilateral decisions. However, as early as December 29, 1959 your predecessor President Eisenhower clearly and definitely stated that the U.S. did not consider itself any longer bound by its statement that it had no intention to conduct nuclear tests. As for France—a NATO ally of the U.S. and Britain—it was even at that time conducting one nuclear explosion after another.

All this is perfectly known and he who nevertheless claims that the Soviet Union allegedly violated some moratorium on nuclear tests either has a short memory or simply seeks to torpedo the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground explosions be accepted. If this, is so, then it opens certain prospects.

You believe at the same time, as I have understood, that there should be no unlimited moratorium on underground tests. But we do not put the question that way. We do not propose to declare an unlimited moratorium on underground explosions. We suggest to declare such moratorium for a certain period of time, while the negotiations on banning underground tests of nuclear weapons are in progress. For how long those negotiations will go on—it is of course, impossible to say. But we do not think that much time is needed to conclude a final agreement on underground tests, provided, of course, that both sides display interest in reaching such an agreement promptly.

Anyway we are ready to agree on a term for the course of which the states will assume commitments not to conduct underground nuclear explosions,

if an agreement banning nuclear tests only in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is reached. We agree, for instance, on a 5-year term. And during the five years it will certainly be possible to agree on a final solution of the question of banning also underground nuclear explosions though I repeat, I am convinced that it could be done much faster, especially if the idea of use for the purposes of control of automatic seismic stations is acceptable to you. During this period of time, one should assume all American scientists too will get convinced that the national means of detection of nuclear explosions are quite adequate for ensuring a foolproof control over cessation of nuclear tests, underground tests included.

If, however, even during that term an agreement is not reached—what to do in this case? Then the whole question of banning nuclear weapon tests will have to be reconsidered anew. And if the American side then insists on renewing underground nuclear tests, then—I want to say this already now and in plain terms—the Soviet Union will consider itself free from assumed obligations not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

These are considerations which came to my mind in connection with your reply on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Giving you these considerations I think of nothing else but how to move from the dead point, and out of deadlock the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

If you being concerned about the same are in agreement with our considerations let me know and then the Soviet representatives in Geneva will at once be given instructions to get down together with your and British representatives to practical work of preparing a draft agreement.

One cannot doubt that an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be greeted with tremendous joy by all mankind. The peoples wherever they live—in Europe or America, in Africa, Asia or Australia—desire peace, a lasting peace, they want an end to the nuclear arms race, they want the threat of nuclear war be eliminated.

[Here follows the remainder of the letter.]

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The portions on Berlin and Cuba are printed in [vols. XV, pp. 337-338](#), and [volume X](#), respectively. The full text is printed in [vol. VI, Document 55](#).

¹ [Document 229](#).

² Reference is to geophysicist Sir Edward Bullard and Sir William Penney, Deputy Chairman of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, who attended the tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which met in London September 3-7, 1962.

³ For text of a document calling for a new approach on the test ban negotiations and including the suggestion of utilizing sealed automatic recording stations, which was signed by three U.S. and three Soviet scientists at this Pugwash conference, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 863-865.

233. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 1, 1962.

Attached is a copy of the "black box" proposal that prompted the recent discussions about unmanned seismic stations.¹ It proposes that a number of tamper-proof automatic seismic detectors with built-in recorders be provided by an International Control Commission and put in place by the host country. They would be returned to the Commission when needed to help resolve an ambiguous seismic event which had previously been detected by the proposed national seismic system. The only statement in the paper concerning the number of such black boxes is, "the number of sealed automatic stations in the network should be large enough so that it provides a good check of the seismic data supplied by all stations."

I have talked with Professor Rich of MIT² who participated in the discussions and learned from him that the number of such stations considered ranged from 20 to about 200 with general agreement that a large number was needed. The Russian scientists were unwilling to put any numbers in the paper, so the first draft read "a high density net" but in subsequent drafts they pulled away from that statement and said successively, "large number of stations," "number sufficient to insure multiple records of events," etc.

We have made a hasty evaluation of the proposal and have come to the tentative conclusion that such stations would not eliminate the need for some on-site inspections. This is also recognized in item 4 of the London statement.³ It is impossible to judge just how much good such additional stations would do because we don't know enough about the characteristics of earthquakes in the Soviet Union. Statements made by Soviet seismologists lead us to believe that they don't have the needed information either. This is not surprising, because a large fraction of the Soviet earthquakes occur in the remote, wild Kuriles Islands-Kamchatka Peninsula area where there are very few seismic stations. We don't have sufficient data

about earthquakes in the United States to resolve similar questions here. Some properly placed stations, possibly as few as a dozen, might make it possible to resolve half of the ambiguous events that we might have previously expected. We had previously predicted that in an average year there would be approximately 70 to 100 such events in the Soviet Union, so that there would still remain a substantial residue to be inspected. At this time we cannot say whether or not a much larger number of unmanned stations would reduce the residue substantially. A further study of this is being made, and I will report any new results to you as they occur.

There is a further difficulty. We believe that the stations could only be trusted if they were inspected by representatives of the control commission after installation and such inspection might be regarded as a more serious infringement of Soviet territory than a few obligatory inspections.

I believe that the reports of Sir Edward Bullard's attitude on nuclear test detection problems has been garbled. Sir Edward Bullard (he owns a large interest in the Brewery of the same name) is a world renowned geophysicist on the faculty at Cambridge University. He was one of the U.K. members of the original Committee of Experts and is an important governmental adviser. I have learned that Bullard did not participate in the discussions of the black box plan, nor was the black box plan discussed by the Pugwash Disarmament Group at Cambridge in which Bullard did participate. This plan emerged later, at the London Conference and was a result of conversations among American and Soviet scientists who had previously been at the Cambridge meeting.^{[4](#)}

The talks on test ban issues at Cambridge focused on the need for on-site inspection, and it appears that Bullard was the most outspoken proponent of the position that the Soviet Union should accept the principle of mandatory inspection and that the West should accept a very few inspections. The Working Group paper on nuclear test problems prepared at Cambridge is also attached.^{[5](#)}

It seems likely to me that the discussion of inspection requirements and the black box proposal have become mixed up in re-telling to your informant.

With your permission I would like to call Sir Edward, whom I know quite well, and see what I can learn about his present views directly from him.

Jerome B. Wiesner⁶

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.

¹ Not attached, but the reference is to the statement signed by U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conference; see [footnote 3](#), [Document 232](#).

² Professor Alexander Rich, one of the three U.S. scientists who signed the Pugwash statement.

³ Item 4 of this statement mentioned only the manufacture or procurement of the sealed automatic seismographs, but the first sentence of the following paragraph stated: "We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections." (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 864-865)

⁴ Another account of the London meeting is in a memorandum from George W. Rathjens to Fisher, December 21. Rathjens attended the meetings with Soviet and U.S. scientists in London but not in Cambridge. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/RIC/R Files: FRC 77 A 10, Conferences, Pugwash (COSWA))

⁵ Not attached and not found.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

234. Letter From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)[Source](#)

Washington, October 1, 1962.

DEAR MR. FOSTER: Thank you for sending us a copy of your September 26 letter to Secretary McNamara, which requested the comments of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs on the current draft proposal for a nuclear non-diffusion agreement.[1](#)

I understand that General Carter has already made known our reservations about parts of the September 18 draft letters to President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.[2](#) It occurred to me that further comments might be useful to you.

As you know, we believe that the material transmitted to the Committee of Principals on September 18 exaggerated both the imminence and the probable scale of nuclear diffusion.[3](#) In addition to the considerations discussed in NIE 4-3-61,[4](#) with which you are familiar, I should like to add that we also consider the cost of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability still to be an important deterrent. It is true that costs are in general declining as uranium becomes easier to obtain, as plutonium becomes more widely available and as information on weapons technology increases. Nonetheless, the minimum cost is still on the order of two hundred million dollars merely to acquire a single crude nuclear weapon. This does not allow anything for an effective modern delivery system. The French spent one billion dollars before their first test shot in 1960 and will probably be spending this much each year by 1968 on weapons alone. To this must be added the cost of acquiring appropriate delivery vehicles. The French will need at least fifty Mirage IV light jet bombers for a real strike force, and these would cost between 200-250 million dollars. Some seven hundred million dollars more would be required for an intermediate range ballistic missile now under development in France.

A second point we would like to make concerns the feasibility of keeping Communist China from acquiring nuclear weapons. The September 18 draft letter to the President stated that "... the possibility of obtaining the adherence of Communist China to such an agreement is very remote unless the appeal can be put as a joint effort by the three Western nuclear powers." We would go considerably farther than this statement. We believe that the Communist Chinese are determined to go ahead with their nuclear weapons program and that the Soviets do not have (and are not likely to acquire) the leverage to produce a change in this decision. In July, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen-yi stated in a speech that the Chinese were going ahead with their program and would achieve success soon. Early in September, the Peiping *People's Daily* charged that the real purpose of US disarmament proposals was to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons. We suspect that the Chinese are well aware of what is in the wind and that these remarks and their timing are not coincidental. Thus we should be very cautious in assuming that it is feasible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Chinese Communists or that other nations (including the USSR) will find this one of the practical benefits of a nuclear non-diffusion agreement.

With the hope that these observations will be helpful to you,

Sincerely,

Ray S. Cline⁵

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files. Secret.

¹ Foster's September 26 letter to McNamara summarized developments regarding a possible international agreement on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons and provided ACDA's recommendations on such an agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/9-2762) See the Supplement.

² The comments of Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, have not been found. Undated draft letters from the President to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer were transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals,

September 18. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals Jan-Dec 1962)

³ In addition to the draft letters cited in [footnote 3](#) above, the material included an undated draft memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President and an undated draft declaration on non-diffusion. The draft memorandum, somewhat revised, was sent to the President on September 21; see [Document 230](#).

⁴ NIE 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK," September 21, 1961, is scheduled for publication in [volume VIII](#) .

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Cline signed the original.

235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, October 6, 1962.

The attached preliminary report by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group, a committee of weapons experts from Los Alamos and Livermore under the chairmanship of Dr. Hans Bethe, evaluates the results to date of the 1961 and 1962 Soviet nuclear weapons test series.^{[1](#)}

The report indicates that the same group significantly over-estimated Soviet capabilities in its original review of the data on the 1961 Soviet test series. On the basis of data from the current Soviet series, including a new source of information from close in electromagnetic signals and a re-evaluation of data from the 1961 series in the light of current knowledge, it is now concluded that the Soviets are probably *[6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*.^{[2](#)} The group has also concluded that the tests in the 1962 Soviet series do not involve any substantial advances over the 1961 series and that a large number of them appear in fact to be repeats of the 1961 tests, presumably in weaponized versions. The new data continues to highlight the fact that the U.S. has a substantial technological lead in the thermonuclear weapons *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*.

These conclusions which have been agreed to by senior scientists from the Livermore and Los Alamos Laboratories and the RAND Corporation are considerably at odds with the views of Dr. Teller who, as the attached newspaper article indicates,^{[3](#)} has undertaken a program of public education on the status of U.S. and Soviet weapon capabilities. He has access to all classified weapons data, presumably the analysis on which this report was based.

Jerry

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Safe, Drawer 1, Bethe Report 10/4/62. Top Secret.

¹ The attached 6-page “Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group Meeting of 2-3 October 1962,” dated October 4, is not printed. See the Supplement.

² For a summary of the previous Bethe report, November 17, 1961, see [Document 96](#).

³ The attached, unidentified newspaper clipping, not printed, contains a United Press International story in which Dr. Edward Teller, Associated Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, expressed criticism of the U.S. nuclear testing program and said, among other things, “It is my guess, and it is only a guess, that the Russians are ahead of us in the nuclear race today.”

236. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman

Khrushchev [Source](#)

Washington, October 8, 1962.

I am giving careful consideration to your communication of September 28th,¹ and I am glad that we can continue to use this channel as a means of communicating privately and frankly.

I shall want to comment separately on other aspects of your letter, but because of the imminent discussions in the UN I want you to have my views promptly on the subject of nuclear testing. I believe that we are nearer to agreement on this issue than on others, and I believe that we should keep at it to see if we cannot promptly reach the understanding which the world wants and needs.

With respect to this topic, I am encouraged by the areas in which we are in accord and by your statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to make “new efforts” in order to conclude an early agreement. Certainly it would seem we are agreed in our approach to three types of tests—in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

With respect to underground tests, I am inclined to agree with you that the recent Pugwash conference of scientists brought forth some interesting suggestions, particularly those of British scientists Bullard and Penney.² I must comment that we interpret those suggestions in somewhat different light than your letter indicates you do. Nonetheless the suggestions certainly are worthy of intensive development. The development of automatic unmanned seismic mechanisms might very well, if properly worked out, facilitate agreement on the means of actually detecting underground explosions—although my scientists indicate that it would require much more than the two or three such stations you mentioned as being located directly in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes. Of course, these mechanical devices would still have to be supplemented by a modest number of on-site inspections—for scientists agree that the data gathered by these machines would still leave doubt as to the cause of the explosion in a

number of cases. Surely, considering the great value for international relations and the general security and tranquility of the world which the comprehensive agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests would entail, we can agree on the number of such inspections which would be necessary to identify the nature or cause of these explosions. Once that is done, with the number of unmanned stations worked out scientifically, and the method for international coordination established, we can conclude a treaty which will enable all peoples of the world to rest easier.

In the meantime, you suggest that the agreement we can more promptly reach on the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water be accompanied by a five year moratorium on underground explosions. But surely it will not take five years to reach agreement—if agreement is ever to be reached—on banning underground tests, particularly in view of our mutual interest in the role of automatic seismic stations for detecting explosions. I would not feel justified in submitting to the Senate, moreover, a treaty on tests in other environments which would be discarded if agreement was not reached on testing under ground. It is nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water which increase the percentage of fall-out and are the cause of grave concern to all peoples of the world. Such a treaty, in short, would be in itself a great step forward, both for humanitarian and political reasons.

So I continue to think that we are within striking distance of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. I believe we should try to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target day of January 1, 1963, and I think also that in the meanwhile we should be working intensively to make progress as rapidly as possible on the remaining problem of testing under ground. I believe that our negotiators should return to their labors in an intense effort to reach agreement on the questions that still divide us, and I hope very much that they will be able to make real and rapid progress in the meetings now scheduled to resume on November 12th.

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with USSR Officials, 1961-1964, Vol. I. Top Secret. Also printed in [Vol. VI, Document 58](#) .

¹ See [Document 232](#).

² See [footnotes 2](#) and [3, Document 232](#).

³ Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

979. Policy. Khrushchev–Kohler—Part IV—U-2; Cuban fishing port; nuclear test-ban; US elections. [Here follows discussion of President Kennedy's political talents, U-2 incidents, and a Cuban fishing port.]

Khrushchev said there were other basic problems still confronting our two countries. One was nuclear-test-ban. We are now very close on this issue. Only problem is that of underground tests. Soviets didn't want these to continue since they were source of arms race. USSR is on even basis with us on underground testing. We should agree on proposals of English scientists. But President wants inspection, which Soviets will never accept. This is invention of American imperialists and monopolists. Soviets had arranged underground tests which US had detected and announced next day. So national means are clearly enough to detect underground tests.

I said I was familiar with recent exchanges on this subject, but wished to read to Chairman what I had written down after talking to President. (I then read applicable section instructions.)¹ I said I might just add that we on our side, President, Secretary, Foster, and all concerned, had done our best to recognize their sensibilities and to reduce possibility they might view inspection as espionage. While unmanned seismic stations had greatly improved chances of detecting explosions or what seemed like explosions, there was nothing of which we knew that would replace a certain measure of inspection to determine whether certain events in particular were tests or natural events.

Khrushchev said statement by American scientists published two days ago admitted there were means to verify this.²

I said I thought this was an inaccurate statement. We had looked at all possibilities and were convinced no means existed to determine nature of event. Fact that event has occurred can be determined, but inspection is

needed to establish what kind of event it was. Number of cases in which inspection would be necessary would probably be infinitesimally small, but in those cases it would be necessary. Such inspection would also be helpful to USSR, since our scientists say there must be inspection to establish nature of event. I personally had no doubt that, if USSR said it would not test, then it would not. But there must be provision for objective observers to determine whether events were natural or not, or doubts would remain in rest of world.

Khrushchev said there were various points of view on that question and that is why there is no agreement. But Soviets had found out that there are means to determine nature of event without inspection. It was situation in Congress which prevented President from moving on this subject; he can't convince Congress to agree and consequently holds on to argument about inspection.

I said Congress represents public opinion. Difference between us is now so small, President hopes we can come to agreement. But agreement must be ratified by Congress and Congressional opinion represents US public opinion. We had made every effort to reduce this so it would not be a problem for Soviets and President really hopes for agreement.

[Here follows discussion of the upcoming Congressional elections.]

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The telegram is one of seven that Kohler transmitted to the Department of State that reported on his 3-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev on the morning of October 16. This was Kohler's first formal meeting as Ambassador. Their lengthy conversation was a tour d'horizon of U.S.-Soviet relations. Telegrams 970, 973, 974, and 982, as well as the full text of telegram 979 are printed in [vol. V, Documents 146-150](#). Telegram 978 on Cuba is printed in [volume XI](#); telegram 981 on Berlin is printed in [vol. XV, pp. 359-362](#).

¹ The fourth point of Kohler's instructions, dated September 6, read as follows:

“(4) The President continues to regard an effective nuclear test ban as a matter of the greatest importance, and would like Ambassador Kohler to emphasize these two basic points: first, there is simply no way in which the President can bring the United States Senate to agreement on a comprehensive treaty without inspection; second, as the President sees it, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have three great common interests in a workable agreement:

“(a) the fallout problem

“(b) the hazard of high energy electrons contaminating outer space

“(c) and, perhaps most important of all, the common interest in discouraging other powers from acquiring nuclear weapons.”

(Department of State, Central Files, 123-Kohler, Foy) Attached to these instructions is a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Kohler, September 6, that reads: “The President has approved these instructions as rewritten after his discussion with you.”

² Not further identified.

238. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Test Ban

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev

Continuing to read from his prepared text.

Mr. Gromyko said he was sure the President was familiar with the Soviet Government's and Mr. Khrushchev's views on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. He said he wished now to call the President's attention to one specific aspect of this problem. Underground tests, in addition to the objections that any nuclear tests aroused, were very costly. Apparently the US Government did not attach any significance to this fact and was willing to have US tax payers pay for them. However, frankly speaking, this path was tantamount to continuing the nuclear arms race and was leading to ever greater expenditures of the funds of the population. The Soviet Union knew what this meant, because it has tested underground. The question was why should the Soviet Union formulate its policy with respect to nuclear tests on the basis of what was convenient to the United States, which did not wish to abandon underground testing. US representatives in Geneva had tried to justify the US position by alleging that the Soviet Union had violated some moratorium. However, it was well known that a moratorium did not constitute an agreement containing obligations which states must fulfill. Furthermore, what was most important, there had not been any moratorium

in existence and consequently no violation could have taken place. Indeed when the Soviet Union had ended its tests in accordance with its unilateral decision, President Eisenhower had stated that the United States was free to resume tests and to choose the moment for doing so. How then could one speak of a violation of moratorium? Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union regretted that no agreement had been reached on the test ban. The views of Mr. Khrushchev on this question, which were known to the President, were designed to facilitate agreement. The USSR understood the situation as indicating that the US wanted to continue testing. The US was seeking ways and means of continuing the build-up of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was against such a build-up; it was firmly in favor of reaching agreement and terminating all tests. However, since the US did not wish to come to an agreement and did not wish to end all tests, the Soviet Union would have to draw the necessary conclusions with respect to its security. No state or government in the world was more earnestly seeking agreement on the prohibition of all tests than was the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union was fully aware of the fact that a test ban would constitute a big step in improving international relations and in improving the prospects for disarmament. If the United States also desired to achieve agreement on a test ban, then it was difficult to understand why it was placing obstacles in the path toward such an agreement.

The President responded that it was difficult to recognize the US policy on most matters discussed today, including the test ban, from the description Mr. Gromyko had given it. The US had sought a test ban agreement for a long time and it wished to end tests. Thus any suggestion that the US was not interested in an agreement was inaccurate. We assumed that if the Soviet Union were not interested in ending tests it would not have continued to negotiate on a test ban. The US was also negotiating and we were interested in reaching agreements. We assumed Soviet good faith and the Soviet Union should not question ours. The problem today was a technical one, because there was no assurance that underground tests would not be carried out while the treaty was in force unless there were some means of verification. We had made some technical progress but no analysis he, the President, had seen had indicated there was a way of distinguishing underground nuclear tests from earthquakes on the basis of instrumentation alone. The Soviet Union had made claims to the contrary, but it had not

given us any relevant scientific information. The President continued that he believed that neither of the two sides wanted to test in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space; he also believed that neither side wanted underground tests because there was no need for such tests. He thought there must be some way of providing assurance against espionage and at the same time against underground tests. The Soviet Union had stated that it could not agree to inspection, and we had stated that we could not accept an agreement without assurances concerning underground tests. The President said he understood that there were many areas in the Soviet Union where there were no earthquakes, so he believed some satisfactory arrangements could be worked out for seismic areas, while in other areas there might be no need for inspection. Both sides should continue their efforts in good faith and seek a solution on a scientific basis.

Mr. Gromyko said he took note of the President's statement that the United States was really desirous of achieving agreement on the test ban. It was good that both governments were seeking this objective. He said that he wished to take this opportunity to state again that the Soviet Union was convinced that national means were sufficient to detect any violation of a treaty with respect to underground tests, and the Soviet Union based its conviction on technical data. He also wished to point out that continuing underground tests would be of the same importance from the standpoint of nuclear arms protection and development as atmospheric, under water, and outer space tests. The Soviet Union believed that neither side was interested in the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Moreover, agreement on a ban in three environments only would not promote nondiffusion, since many states could say that they could not be asked not to acquire nuclear weapons when the present nuclear powers would not reach agreement even on a test ban.

The President said that the two sides seem to be in disagreement concerning the scientific facts relating to distinguishing earthquakes from underground tests. He wondered why the Soviet Union could not present its scientific evaluation of this problem, and if agreement could be reached on this matter then early progress toward a test ban could be expected. It was in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to find agreement on a test ban and thus to prevent proliferation. If the Soviet Union could give

us adequate scientific data so that a treaty could be presented to the Senate which would give adequate assurances against underground tests, then progress could be expected. The President said he wished to invite the Soviet Union to send its scientists and to show us how a ten KT nuclear explosion in soft ground could be distinguished from an earthquake. If that could be done, agreement would come very quickly.

Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union had repeatedly stated its views on this point to US representatives, including the Secretary himself, and especially to Lord Home, who had raised this point on a number of occasions. He said he did not wish to take the President's time, but wanted to point out there had been a scientific meeting in London, in which both US and Soviet scientists had participated.¹ The President was surely familiar with this. Frankly speaking, Soviet and British scientists had agreed that a mutually acceptable arrangement was possible regarding surveillance of over the observance of a test ban treaty. US scientists in London differed with that point of view, but only slightly. It would be good if the views expressed in London could be used to reach agreement on this matter.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 23. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is labeled "Part III." Part I on Berlin is printed in [vol. XV, pp. 370-376](#); Part II on Cuba is printed in [volume XI](#); Part IV on U.S.-Soviet relations is printed in [vol. V, Document 151](#). Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

¹ See [footnotes 3](#) and 4, Document 232.

239. Editorial Note

In the last weeks of October 1962, President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged several messages in their efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Once Khrushchev agreed to the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba and other concessions, the two leaders began to consider other outstanding issues between the two nations. Concerning disarmament, Khrushchev wrote in his message to President Kennedy on October 28: “We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tensions.” (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, volume II, page 997; the letter is also printed in [volume VI, Document 67](#) ) President Kennedy immediately responded with a message to Khrushchev on October 28. In the final paragraph of this message, the President wrote: “I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.” (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, volume II, page 1001; the letter is also printed in [volume VI, Document 68](#) ) Extensive documentation on the Cuban missile crisis is printed in [volume XI](#) .

240. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, October 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

Denuclearized Zones

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA

Herve Alphand, French Ambassador

At dinner last night, Ambassador Alphand expressed great concern about the resolution being offered in the General Assembly by Brazil in favor of denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa.¹ He felt that Western support of this resolution, and particularly any form of US identification with it, would be misunderstood and would provoke a profound reaction in Western Europe and especially France since it might be interpreted as opening the way for a Rapacki type plan of denuclearization and disengagement. Ambassador Alphand suggested the US make an urgent and high level approach to the French Government reassuring the latter that no such intentions existed.

(Upon being informed of the above, Mr. Beam of ACDA and Mr. Tyler of EUR believe that Ambassador Alphand may have been exaggerating his Government's possible reaction with a view to later establishing for the record that he had put Washington on notice. It may be pointed out that USUN was instructed by telegram 1127² to brief Western Delegates, including the French, on our views with respect to the Brazilian resolution. Furthermore the same telegram repeated to Paris as Topol 576 suggested an NAC briefing on the Brazilian resolution, to which Ambassador Finletter agreed in his reply Polto 518.³ Consequently, it is felt no special steps vis-à-vis the French are required.)

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10-3062.
¹ Confidential. Drafted by Beam and initialed by Foster.

¹ Brazil introduced a draft resolution on denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.312) in the First Committee on September 20. For text of a later revised version of this draft (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) introduced in the First Committee on November 15 by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057.

² Dated October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-2962)

³ Dated October 28. (Ibid.)

241. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 3, 1962.

The claim continues to be advanced in a number of quarters that the use of unmanned seismic stations in conjunction with the proposed system would so improve our ability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests that the requirement for on-site inspections could be eliminated from our nuclear test ban treaty proposals. While a properly designed system of such unmanned stations could substantially improve the capabilities of our presently proposed monitoring system, and thereby reduce the number of on-site inspections required to accomplish a given level of surveillance, such a system would not eliminate the need for on-site inspection. In fact, such a system, if designed in a technically acceptable fashion, might require greater overall access to the Soviet Union than our present proposals.

It is certainly possible to design an unmanned seismic station that will record or transmit information on seismic events. Although such stations would be much less sensitive than the elaborate manned stations that are proposed as part of the present monitoring system, the close proximity of these stations to events in a seismic area would permit the collection of sufficient close-in data to permit the identification of many events that would only have been detected by the large distant stations. For example, in a recent review of the problem, it was concluded that a properly located network of 100 unmanned stations would reduce the number of unidentified events above magnitude 4.0 (2 kilotons in Nevada Tuff) in the Soviet Union from 75 to perhaps 20 per year. The estimated remaining 20 unidentified events should be recognized as simply a best guess as to the number of natural events whose characteristics would be essentially the same as nuclear explosions. This number of events would remain unidentified more or less independent of the number of additional unmanned stations added to the system. There is, however, inadequate information on the close-in characteristics of earthquakes in the Soviet Union (or elsewhere) so that this number could be considerably larger or smaller. It should be noted that a much smaller number of unmanned stations, possibly only 6 or 10 properly

located, could probably accomplish about half the improvement estimated for the larger system.

In addition to its inability to eliminate entirely the need for inspections, the unmanned stations themselves would probably need to be inspected to prevent them from becoming a source of suspicion as to the validity of the entire system. While tamper-proof devices can almost certainly be devised as well as reporting techniques, it would appear that the installation and maintenance of those devices would have to be subject to inspection. If this were not done, there appear to be a number of obvious methods that the Soviet Union could employ in installing the "tamper-proof" equipment provided by this country so that signals from a nuclear explosion would be distorted in such a way as to appear to be from a natural event. This possibility would certainly be pointed out by opponents to a treaty and would at a minimum be a confidence-destroying factor.

Full inspection of the installation and maintenance of a system of 100 unmanned stations would appear to involve a greater degree of inspection of the Soviet Union than is involved in our presently discussed inspection quotas. It is true, however, that these inspections would be at specific locations picked by the Soviets and not over a 200 to 500 square kilometer region whose location could not be predicted in advance. In addition, it would probably be possible to achieve adequate confidence by a periodic random inspection of a small fraction of the unmanned stations. For example, if the Soviets were to install improperly only one out of ten of the unmanned stations to cover areas where clandestine testing might occur, a total of ten annual random inspections would have about two chances out of three, the first year alone, to determine that the equipment was installed with clandestine testing in mind. Nevertheless, even this degree of station inspection when coupled with the continued need for some on-site inspections would on balance appear to rule out this approach as an answer to the inspection problem. We have previously indicated that a small number of inspections, i.e. 10 or possibly fewer, would be acceptable to the United States. I cannot imagine a number less than three being reasonable whatever the seismic detection system.

I would recommend, therefore, that we should not include this proposal in any modifications of our position on the nuclear test ban treaty. At the same time, I would recommend that we be prepared to discuss this proposal with the Soviets if they advance it and to include it in a treaty proposal if they are willing to allow the necessary inspection of the equipment.

JBW

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.

242. Editorial Note

In early November 1962, the U.N. General Assembly considered resolutions calling for the suspension of nuclear testing. On November 5, Committee One debated and voted on a two-part resolution. Section A was a 37-nation proposal, which was revised and approved in Committee One. Section B, introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, urged, among other things, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee “to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time.” A summary of the proceedings and voting on these resolutions in Committee One is in a memorandum from Harlan Cleveland to Secretary of State Rusk, November 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/11-562)

On November 6, the U.N. General Assembly voted separately on the preamble and on each of the seven paragraphs of Section A. The preamble and all but two paragraphs were adopted unanimously, although many nations abstained on several of the votes. The United Kingdom and the United States were among 10 nations voting against paragraph 2, which asked that all nuclear tests “should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963.” The Soviet bloc constituted the 10 nations voting against paragraph 6, which recommended that in the absence of a test ban agreement by January 1, 1963, the nuclear weapons states should agree immediately to prohibit testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, accompanied by an “interim arrangement” suspending all underground tests, “such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.” Section A as a whole was adopted by a vote of 75-0, with 21 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted Section B by a 51-10 vote, with 40 abstentions. The Soviet bloc constituted the 10 negative votes.

For text of Resolution 1762 (XVII) and additional details on the voting on each section in Committee One and the General Assembly, see *Documents*

on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 1029-1033; and *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1962, pages 9-13 and 20-26.

243. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

Test Ban: Black Boxes, Khrushchev, and China

A.

We are taking the following four actions to straighten out the record on the black boxes:

- (1) Through technical channels to Zuckerman, we are asking the British scientists to make clear publicly their privately expressed conviction that the black boxes can reduce, but cannot eliminate, the requirement of on-site inspection of unidentified events.
- (2) I have spoken to David Ormsby Gore to ask that the British Government give attention to the same problem, if possible in the immediate future—in any event, during the disarmament discussions at Geneva now likely to resume November 19th.^{[1](#)}
- (3) We are asking ACDA to do some press education on this same point, and of course to be ready with public argument in Geneva.
- (4) We have an opportunity to argue on the technicalities of this with the most knowledgeable of the Russian scientists, who is likely to be here informally in the near^{[2](#)} future, and arrangements are being made to try to brainwash him.

Meanwhile Kuznetsov yesterday made a black box offer in New York: three on Soviet territory, *and* a right to place them and remove them under international supervision. This does not meet the main point, but it does help a little and ACDA is sending experts to talk directly to him on the issue.

B.

Our last message from Khrushchev is absolutely categorical in its “unequivocal and frank” rejection of any inspection.³ This leaves us in a logical box, because there is no way that we can get Senate consent to a treaty covering underground tests that does not provide for inspection; obviously events in Cuba make this point more compelling than ever. Thus, on the surface I see no alternative to a heavy and direct argument to Khrushchev that a very modest amount of inspection is a worthy price to pay. We could certainly indicate in such a discussion that you yourself would expect to exercise the right of inspection in a minimal way—because indeed it is the right of inspection and not the fact of many inspections which is essential to our position.

There is one other slightly hopeful possibility in the inspection issue. The Soviets have partly agreed to what the neutrals call “invitational” inspection. We insist on what we call “obligational” inspection. If there were a quiet agreement that some small amount of inspection would in fact occur, we might be able to find language to cover both our points of view (though the Senate would be very wary); I think we need time before we can press this discussion.

C. One other possibility, which we have not explored in the past, is to raise with Khrushchev directly the question of Chinese Communist agreement to a test ban. Without the Chicoms, after all, the agreement is not going to mean much, and there may be advantage in pressing with Khrushchev the inescapable relevance of this problem; he has never hesitated to press with us the parallel and lesser problem of France. We might say that for us any agreement would be valuable, and concessions worth considering, only if there could be some assurance about Red China. My own impression is that the Russians would reply first with self-righteous surface answers: “these are peace-loving people with whom you need normal relations before you can ask about their intentions,” but we might also get interesting hints that only a test ban would give leverage for both of us against Peking. It’s worth asking about, and at your level, I think—but again not immediately.

D.

To put it another way, is it really worthwhile for us or the Russians to go around and around the test ban issue without facing squarely up to the

question of Chinese Communist participation? A Red China nuclear presence is the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.

And in passing let me say that our uncertainty of Chicom rates of progress is an urgent reason for *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*.

E. An alternative means of dealing with the Chicoms is *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. This in my view deserves real study, with all its obvious hazards. But we need information first.

McG.B.⁴_—

_—^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Secret.

_—¹ Because of prolongation of discussions on non-diffusion and general and complete disarmament in the U.N. General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reconvene in Geneva until November 26.

_—² The word “near” has been added by hand.

_—³ The quotation is from Khrushchev’s long message to President Kennedy of October 30, in which he discussed disarmament and nuclear testing, among other matters. It is printed in [vol. VI, Document 70](#) .

_—⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typewritten initials.

244. Editorial Note

With the conclusion of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests in early November 1962 and the Soviet announcement in early November that their test series would end shortly, Kennedy administration officials began to discuss the need for an internal assessment of these tests on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities. Glenn Seaborg noted in his journal some of this thinking in a telephone conversation with Carl Kaysen on November 8:

“Kaysen called and said, now that the U.S. tests are completed and the USSR tests are drawing to a close, the President is interested in an evaluation of the results. In conversation with Bundy, the thought was generated that perhaps a committee should be organized, consisting of one representative from AEC, DOD, CIA, plus Jerry Wiesner. This committee would not take over the functions of existing groups, such as the Bethe Panel, but rather would pull together inputs from all these sources to produce one comprehensive report for the President which would answer the questions: what have we learned from our tests, what have the Russians learned, the significance, etc. I asked whether the committee would be asked to address itself to the necessity of further tests. He said that this would be a very important input for consideration, but the committee itself would not be charged with this responsibility. I asked whether there would be any representation from the White House. Kaysen said that, except for Wiesner, they would not come into the picture until it is time to see what should be done with the document. He has already talked with Gilpatric (in McNamara’s absence) and with McCone, and both agreed this committee would be a good idea, and they named as their representatives Harold Brown and Dr. Herbert Scoville, respectively. He asked my opinion, and, if I agree, whom I would designate to represent the AEC. He hoped it would be Dr. Haworth. I agreed that such a committee could provide a very useful function and said that Dr. Haworth would be my choice too; however, I would check to be sure he could take on this project. He emphasized that the job is *not* to supersede the existing machinery but to draw together the output of all sources and consolidate it so that the President will have only one report containing all the views. As to the timing, this will not be a crash

program, but, on the other hand, neither is it expected to proceed at a leisurely pace. The committee should be organized immediately, should start functioning and should present its report to the President at the earliest appropriate time. Kaysen said that shortly there will be a NSAM addressed to McNamara, McCone, and me, putting all this in writing.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 4, page 425)

On the following day, November 9, President Kennedy signed NSAM No. 205 on nuclear testing. Addressed to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and Wiesner, NSAM No. 205 stated:

- “1. Our 1962 atmospheric test series has come to an end. The Soviets have announced that their test series will end shortly. It is a matter of first importance to review carefully the effect of these two test series on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities.
- “2. In order that we arrive at the best possible evaluation, I think all information and assessments should be brought together and examined in a single channel. Accordingly, each addressee should select a single technically qualified officer of his agency to sit on an inter-departmental committee to make the evaluation. I should like the representative of the CIA to chair the committee, and my Scientific Advisor, Dr. Wiesner, to sit as a member.
- “3. Each member agency will continue to use such internal processes of evaluation and advisory panels as it thinks appropriate. However, all such reports and evaluations should be funneled through the central committee, which alone should be responsible for a final evaluation.
- “4. The committee should address itself not only to the specific question of what has been learned by testing in terms of the design of nuclear weapons, their effects, and defense against them, but also to the broader question of the military significance of what has been learned and its probable effects on the present and prospective military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
- “5. All the material which this committee handles should be treated as sensitive, and every member agency should take fullest precautions against unauthorized disclosure of either information or evaluation. If any such disclosure occurs, I would like the head of the responsible agency to report to me personally on it.

“6. The target date for the report is 20 December 1962. Examination of information not now available may require addenda at a later date.”
(Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 205)

The committee members were Herbert Scoville, Jr. (CIA) (Chairman), Harold Brown (DOD), Leland J. Haworth (AEC), and Jerome B. Wiesner (White House). The report has not been found, but in a December 20 memorandum transmitting the report to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, the committee members explained their methodology in preparing the report and “emphasized that much of the information on these tests is still quite preliminary.” (Ibid.) In a December 24 memorandum to the President, Carl Kaysen summarized several features of the report and concluded, “The best crude one-sentence summary statement is: The information learned from the tests has been of moderate importance, but it has little prospect of affecting the strategic balance one way or the other.” (Ibid.) An addendum to this report, dated February 27, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, February 27. (Ibid.) A second addendum, dated August 15, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, August 19. (Ibid.) Both addenda are in the Supplement.

245. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, November 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Committee of Principals, November 10, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list [1](#)

The Secretary asked if there were any recent developments regarding the Soviet ships en route from Cuba. Mr. McNamara said that 42 missiles had been counted out. It had been thought the total was 43 on the basis of initial Soviet reports that 6 were aboard one of the ships which subsequently proved to be carrying only 5. The Secretary asked if the photos were convincing. Mr. McNamara said he thought so; they just showed long cylindrical tubes but he was personally convinced they were missiles.

The Secretary said that on the matter of resuming the disarmament discussions, any arrangements were contingent on developments in Cuba. If the IL 28's and inspection should become major issues and the situation heated up again, he would agree that we should not talk about disarmament while the temperature was so high. On the other hand, if there were progress on the Cuban situation, the President in his public statements has committed the United States to explore possibilities in disarmament. He personally saw no change in the Soviet attitude on inspection and in this sense the outlook for fruitful disarmament discussions was somewhat gloomy. But if progress can be made on Cuba there are two major issues to be explored. First, the President is determined to see if there is any way to move ahead on the test ban and second, the question of non-dissemination might be worth going into to the point of eliciting a Chinese rejection. The question of whether to attempt this depends primarily on the Germans and whether they would accept the simplified formula we have been discussing with Gromyko. The British and the French are prepared to go ahead if the Germans are agreeable. From our standpoint there would be some advantage either in getting the Chinese Communists into a non-dissemination agreement or in eliciting a rejection from them. As to the

relationship of disarmament matters to Cuba, the Secretary said he was not sure whether or not Mr. McNamara had seen the communication in which the President had instructed USUN firmly not to get into other matters until the Cuban matter was under control.^{[2](#)}

Mr. McNamara said that two issues relating to Cuba remained open, first, that of the IL 28's and second, safeguarding against the presence of offensive weapons. He saw no prospect of progress on verification and safeguard procedures. The Soviets say nothing of a check on nuclear warheads, nor of assurances as to whether they have been there or have been removed. There is no evidence of Soviet acceptance of safeguards on these matters and this indicates there is little basis for disarmament discussion.

The Secretary inquired as to the date on which negotiations would be resumed at Geneva. Mr. Foster related Ambassador Dean's discussion with Mr. Zorin in which Zorin had suggested November 26 as the reconvening date.^{[3](#)} Mr. Foster said that we recognized that whether or not we can go forward now with the actual presentation of proposals, there is a need to arrive at decisions regarding possibilities to be used at an appropriate time. Mr. Foster said that Gromyko had expressed a significant change in the Soviet position at the General Assembly in his proposal to retain certain nuclear delivery vehicles to the end of Stage II.^{[4](#)} We did not know what it means; we need to search this meaning out. At least an intellectual case can be made for disproportionate reductions, at least as a possibility to be suggested in ascertaining the Soviet attitude. The meeting has before it this and other proposals which ACDA considers to be in the national interest.^{[5](#)}

The Secretary inquired whether we assumed the Russians were aware of the figures on strategic delivery vehicles published in the newspapers a few days ago by the Institute of Strategic Studies.^{[6](#)}

The consensus was that the Soviets had been aware of this information and that the figures themselves were highly questionable in certain respects.

General Taylor said that as a newcomer to this table, he would like to inquire if we had decided how to verify the initial inventory of arms against

which a 30% reduction would be calculated. The Secretary commented that underlying any of our disarmament proposals there was a need for their verification. Dr. Wiesner said that initial declarations would be required but that our unilateral intelligence was sufficient for seeing whether or not these declarations were in the ball park. Mr. Foster said that the United States is believed to have, through unilateral intelligence, a good approximation of inventories on major items such as bombers, launchers, ICBM's and IRBM's which are the subject of the proposal before us. Dr. Wiesner said that inspection increases as the amount of disarmament progresses, and that many of us still think the United States is asking too much verification in the first stage. Mr. Foster said that increasing verification proportionate to risk is the basic philosophy of the U.S. approach. The Soviets do not accept this approach and do not want any inspection until after everything is destroyed. This, of course, is completely unacceptable.

The Secretary said that he assumed that ACDA's first proposal is to find out what the Soviets mean by their proposal. He asked Mr. Foster whether he envisaged large or small variations from the 30% norm. Mr. Foster said we had prepared an earlier paper which included percentages⁷ but they had been subject to strong objection, and accordingly, had been deleted from the present proposal. On the basis of our internal studies, however, it seems logical to think of disparities as great as 50% to 10% in some categories. Mr. Fisher said our effort, as pointed out on page 7 of the paper before the meeting, is basically to ask the Soviets for their ideas on this subject. Our recommendation asks for no percentage. Mr. Nitze had disagreed with specific proposals and we had revised the paper accordingly. We must, however, recognize that merely asking the question as to the acceptability of asymmetrical reductions carries the implication that we are ourselves prepared to consider acceptance of reductions on that basis. Mr. Nitze asked why we should make a distinction between ICBM's and MRBM's. He could not see the logic in our reducing more ICBM's in relation to Soviet reduction of more MRBM's. It was the reverse of what ought to be done. The ICBM's are the thing we want to protect. The Secretary said that the present proposal is for reductions of 30% in each category. He did not think the Soviets would be interested but he considered that a variation to a 40% reduction for us as compared to a 30% reduction for them would not change the present balance to an unfavorable one for us. Mr. McNamara said that

he agreed, but asymmetries in the range of 50% to 10% were a different matter.

Mr. Foster said that projections show we are likely to move toward a smaller margin of superiority in the larger categories of nuclear delivery vehicles if no agreement is reached. Mr. Kaysen said this is a reasonable interpretation of the information available, but not the only possible one. Dr. Wiesner said the Soviets may be laying their production plans on a different basis from those reflected in the figures upon which we are building our projections.

Mr. Foster said that it is our belief that the Soviets are not satisfied with their present forces, and will build up in the places where they are weakest. The Secretary said a 30% reduction already means that we would destroy a larger number of ICBM's and that the Soviets would reduce a larger number of MRBM's. Thus there is a certain amount of asymmetry even in the single ratio. The question is whether we can accept some modification of that ratio. He could not see how we could accept equivalence or parity until we see a different basic pattern of Soviet behavior from that displayed over the past 15 years.

Mr. McNamara reiterated that we might accept variations of the order of 40 to 30, but not of 50 to 10, and certainly not to parity. Mr. Foster said looking at the projections for 1967 one might conclude that disproportionate cuts could be in the United States interest. Dr. Wiesner said if you take the present proposal for reduction percentage wise, the Russians and some others think the side that is weakest is placed at a disadvantage. Our thesis is that proportionate reductions will have a stabilizing effect in maintaining the balance. The Soviets argue that the smaller force suffers more. The Secretary said he thought the smaller force might in fact suffer more. Dr. Wiesner said if we want an agreement we cannot offer one that increases our advantage to their disadvantage. Mr. Foster said the fundamental thing is whether it is in the United States interest for both sides to continue to build up nuclear delivery vehicles. If it is not, we need to look at ways of securing an agreement to reduce them.

Mr. McNamara said he fully agreed that it is not in the interest of the United States to build up nuclear vehicles all over the world, but it is also not in our

interest to weaken ourselves vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Secretary said perhaps we can agree that we need not adhere invariably to the 30% formula, but that we can't go very far toward asymmetry. We can, however, indicate enough flexibility to see what the Soviets have in mind.

Mr. McNamara asked whether we can ask these questions without committing ourselves to move from our present position. Mr. Kaysen said we should include an ad referendum element in the instructions as regards any change in position or discussion of any specific ratios. Mr. Foster said that is always understood.

The question arose as to what Gromyko is in effect offering in his new proposal. Dr. Wiesner said that Gromyko appears to be suggesting an approach to parity in nuclear delivery vehicles at a low level. One might say he seems to be offering the Foster Plan at a lower level. Mr. Nitze said Gromyko may be leaning not toward differential reductions so much as to a definition of the end product of disarmament, namely the balance of deterrence which would remain. Mr. Foster said he thought we could ask questions without compromising our position and at the same time indicate some willingness to discuss differentials. Dr. Wiesner said that asking what they mean to aim for and how they expect to get there are two separate questions. Mr. Foster said that what we are asking is to be able to indicate some change in Stage I that shows we have taken into account looking down the gun barrel in the Cuban situation and want to explore means of moving toward a more stable world. The Secretary said we have to distinguish between good countries and bad countries in the light of the past 15 years of history. We cannot consider parity with the USSR.

General Taylor asked if we could trade off future weapons instead of present ones. Both the US and USSR are about to enter into extensive and costly anti-missile programs. Maintaining the present balance would serve the interest of stability. Mr. Foster said preventive disarmament of this kind is the thing we are trying to do already in outer space. Mr. McNamara said we have already agreed in the total treaty to do just what General Taylor had proposed and recalled that the decision to do so had not been viewed favorably by the Joint Chiefs. Dr. Wiesner said it is also conceivable that we can increase our own reductions above 30% instead of just limiting the

reductions of the Soviet Union to lesser amounts. The Secretary said we have to take Red China into account in making any increase in United States reductions.

Dr. Wiesner said there are other dimensions we can explore, for example, whether we can shorten the three-year period of Stage I. The Secretary said he was afraid it would take three years to get the treaty through the Senate.

The Secretary said in conclusion that we can contemplate a modest shift in percentages in certain broad categories in the direction of greater proportional cuts in categories where the U.S. is strong. We can do enough to find out what the Soviets have in mind, but the negotiators should realize that Washington would be extremely nervous if the disproportions should exceed a 30 to 40 ratio.

Turning to the next proposal for reduction in nuclear weapons, the Secretary commented that the world thinks we have a larger amount of fissionable material, while the Soviets will not admit they have a smaller amount. Again, as in the case with nuclear delivery vehicles, maybe we should see whether the Soviets are opposed categorically to the idea of limited reductions or whether it is the ratio of reductions that is bothering them. Mr. Foster said this is the purpose of our proposal. The two-for-one proposal does not call for an admission of weakness on their part, since we are no longer asking them to suggest a ratio. Mr. McNamara asked if this is associated with the cut-off of production of fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said this proposal would be added to the cut-off and inspection proposals already contained in Stage I. We were not proposing it now as a separable measure. Similar proposals had, however, been separable in the past and might be again. The proposal takes into account our best estimates of Soviet stockpiles and the margins of error associated with those estimates. If this were advanced as a separable measure at some later date, it would nevertheless be associated with the cut-off and with the verification requirements for the cut-off.

The Secretary said that page 8 of the paper before the meeting seems to make this clear. He asked, however, whether from a negotiating standpoint it would be desirable to begin with a two to one offer. If we start that way the Soviets would insist on four to one, whereas if we start with a 60-40

ratio, they might come back with a proposal of two to one. Mr. Foster stated that we should consider this possibility as a matter of negotiating tactics. He also stated that the Joint Chiefs had opposed the suggestion of a 60 to 40 ratio at an earlier date. Mr. McNamara said the proposal looks like a gimmick. The Department of Defense could, however, support this amount and this ratio for reductions if it was deemed useful in negotiations. General Taylor said it seemed to him we might be giving away important resources. Mr. Foster said part of it could be given to IAEA and could be useful in various development programs. The Secretary said he thought it was worthwhile to try to find out whether the Soviets were interested in this subject.

Mr. Barber asked whether there would be a public or a private discussion of ratios. Mr. Foster said he envisaged a private discussion. The Secretary said he would be reluctant to put forward this proposal publicly because it might cause domestic repercussions with no offsetting gain if the Soviets were not really interested. Dr. Wiesner asked why the Soviets should be interested in a proposal which we are told privately is unbalanced. Mr. Foster said they might be interested because the alternative for them is greater imbalance. The Secretary said even the smallest beginning is worthwhile in avoiding a 100 billion dollar defense budget. Mr. McNamara said he was willing to go even to 100,000 vs. 50,000 kilograms if we can get a stop on production. He was one hundred percent in favor of the proposal but the important part of it is the cut-off. The Soviets will otherwise expand production enormously while ours remain frozen at present levels.

Turning to the question of bases, the Secretary said the important consideration is one of geography. He asked whether this contemplates cuts in bases within the USSR. Mr. Foster said the base structure is an integrated structure, and cuts in armaments would result in base reductions. We cannot, however, accept the validity of a distinction requiring reduction of foreign bases while excluding domestic installations. Mr. McNamara said we had never used the authorization we had to discuss bases, so why go further? Mr. Foster said we did not in our view have authorization to discuss bases. General Taylor said that until we define a base it would be difficult to evaluate the proposal. We would, of course, have to close a lot of installations if forces were reduced by several hundred thousands. But the

Soviets are not worried about military concentration of men. They are interested in bases from which they might be struck. Mr. Barber asked if the present position were not adequate. We can, under the present instructions, discuss bases after progress has been achieved on other aspects of Stage I. Mr. Fisher said we would shortly be reaching this point on the agreed agenda and asked what in the view of the group our negotiators should be instructed to say at that point.

Dr. Wiesner said he thought the proposal before us was desirable. If the Soviets, for example, should say they were willing to discuss a 30% reduction in arms provided we were willing to discuss a reduction in bases, we should be able to say we would be willing to make concomitant reduction in bases. Mr. Barber said it seemed to him we cannot in fact discuss bases except in the light of previously agreed reductions. Mr. Foster said he thought discussions of the two matters should proceed in parallel and that was what we were recommending. We would not accept the proposal of the Soviets that we discuss foreign bases apart from domestic ones. Mr. McNamara said that the United States Government has not developed a plan that we would be willing to discuss for reduction of bases. It concerned many of us that we should be opening discussions in the absence of such a plan. General Taylor again asked what is the definition of a base and how can we discuss the matter in the absence of such a definition. Dr. Wiesner said that we must force ourselves to face this question if we are interested in disarmament.

The Secretary said the difficulty is that our last forces to be reduced would probably be those overseas. General Taylor said the reduction process doesn't work quite that way. We need men at home too. We need a 60 to 40 or not less than a 50-50 ratio between men at home or abroad. Mr. Kaysen said the question is whether we are worse off in raising the base question when we are not prepared to pursue it fully or in letting the Russians hammer at us for not being willing to discuss it at all. The Secretary said we can't avoid talking about bases and that the other side would certainly hammer it. The question is only what we say about them. Mr. McNamara said we could hold to existing instructions for 90 days while the U.S. Government works on the question of dismantling bases, how, what, when and where. Mr. Fisher said he did not consider it in the U.S. interest to have

a forbidden subject for even 90 days. Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could have an intermediate position. Could the U.S. respond on the question of the bases without proposing reductions as suggested on page 8 of the paper under consideration? The Secretary said we should get a fuller expression of what we have in mind. There was an apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and (2) of the proposal as described on page 8. He said he was convinced that we could not avoid the subject, but we can bring the wording of the present instruction into conformity with the views expressed at the meeting.

Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could sharpen up the decision on a previous topic as it regards dismantling weapons in connection with reduction in fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said he believed it would be useful to be able to dismantle weapons, not merely to make offers of fissionable materials as we had done in the past. Dr. Seaborg said that he would prefer to stay with the idea of reductions in fissionable material as such. The Secretary asked if it would not be easier to inspect a cut-off of production of fissionable materials than to inspect a cut-off of weapons production. Mr. Foster said this would be the case. He believed, however, our proposal in the form recommended had more persuasive value than if it were confined to fissionable material alone. The Secretary asked if we had not already put forward estimates as to equivalent destructive power of 50,000 kilograms of fissionable material in terms of weapons. He thought we might take this question up privately with the Soviets to see whether they contemplate a cut-off and reduction of fissionable materials in any form. We need to know whether the problem is one of the ratio, or whether it is more fundamental.

Turning to the topic of military expenditures, the Secretary asked whether it was possible to check military expenditures in the Soviet system. Mr. Foster said this can be done to a satisfactory extent. We have consulted with Mr. Marengo in CIA on this problem. There are differences in accounting and in the price basis of the respective budgets, but we do believe it is practical to verify reductions if we have sufficient access. A high degree of access would certainly be required. A proposal for reductions in military expenditures was one of eight partial measures proposed by Gromyko in a memorandum of 1961⁸ and we think it would be useful to be able to respond to this proposal. The Secretary said unless this is merely a resultant

of other reductions, its impact may be specific upon matters we are handling in another way under the agreement. Mr. McNamara said he thought the budget limitation could simply be a translation into financial terms of proposed reductions. Mr. Foster said that a budget limitation could also have a separate limiting effect, since we do envisage agreement on a percentage reduction of the budget. Dr. Wiesner said that our expenditures under a 30% reduction of armaments might easily drop even faster than 30%. The Secretary commented that this proposal had value in verification of agreed disarmament measures. Mr. McNamara said he did not think it could do much harm, and he would be willing to see it advanced if it would help our negotiators.

Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the desirability of a provision for an agreed proportion of funds to be released for development purposes. Mr. Foster said the recommendation on this point was consistent with statements of U.S. intentions made over a period of years in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Secretary said that we are concerned as to whether for example a 30% reduction in budgets might by cross action necessitate a 40% reduction in some types of armaments contrary to treaty requirements. Mr. McNamara said that, as a part of verification procedure an exchange of information on budget would appear to be useful. Mr. Marengo said it would require a great deal of access. Mr. Barber said if we intend the proposal as essentially a verification measure, we may be asking for more access than it is practicable to obtain. Mr. McNamara said he would like very much to get as much access as possible. The Secretary said he was not sure to what extent the proposal as formulated at the top of page 9 goes beyond a truism, and asked whether it does envisage going beyond merely consequential reductions. Mr. Foster said it would be handy in verification to have this kind of access, that it would not impose restrictions beyond those agreed upon as regards armaments, and, that in his opinion, it could do nothing but help us. Dr. Wiesner said that we should seek economic data in connection with any disarmament agreement as an aid to verification, and a provision of this kind in the treaty would help us to obtain such data. The Secretary said we did not want to be unable, for example, to put in an Army pay bill because under our budget ceiling in the treaty we needed the money for bombs. He would like to be clear that we were talking only about result-ant reductions in budget. Mr. Foster said this

understanding was correct. It was a measure which comes along behind disarmament, and permits us to see more clearly what the other side is doing. He read Mr. Gromyko's proposal of September 1961, indicating we were not agreeing to do this as a separate measure, as Mr. Gromyko had proposed, but rather as a Stage I measure along with verification. The Secretary said on that basis he could see no objection to it, but it does not turn out to be a very significant proposal. Mr. Foster agreed, saying he had already indicated that none of these proposals were considered to be major ones.

Returning to the question of bases, Dr. Wiesner read a draft he had formulated which he hoped might reconcile the views that had been previously expressed.⁹ Mr. McNamara said the draft still seemed to say that we would reduce bases in Stage I. He was not willing to say that we will reduce bases, but is willing to discuss the matter. A treaty may well be unacceptable to the Soviets if it does not contain provisions for base reductions, but a treaty will be unacceptable to us if it requires such reductions. The Secretary reminded Mr. McNamara to give us plenty of notice before getting out of any bases or destroying any bombers while these matters were subject to negotiation. Mr. Foster said that, in his view, we have to discuss bases. We should be able to sound intelligent in doing so. He also believed we would, regardless of any treaty requirement, be reducing military installations in conjunction with any widespread arms reductions. Mr. McNamara said he was not sure we would decrease our bases at all. We had not increased bases proportionately as we had built up armaments and armed forces. Mr. Foster said if the problem is that of a definition of base or that of a plan for reduction, we should bend every effort to arrive at such a definition and such a plan as quickly as possible. Mr. Nitze said the problem is even deeper. If Mr. Gromyko wants to define a minimal nuclear deterrent in an agreement, we might want to increase conventional forces and the bases upon which they depend in order to defuse the nuclear threat. Mr. McNamara reaffirmed that he was perfectly willing to discuss base reductions but not to propose their reduction.

Turning to the question of proposed reductions in jet bombers, Mr. Foster said we think at some point, if there is progress in the negotiation, this proposal might be useful. We had previously been authorized to offer 15

bombers per month. Now that a certain amount of time had elapsed, he believed the figure might be raised to 30, in view of our plans to deactivate a number of these bombers in any event. Mr. McNamara said that he could accept a reduction of 30 a month. Again, it seemed to him to be a gimmick, but it was acceptable if it would help the negotiators. The Secretary said he saw another advantage in the proposal—it helps get these bombers out of circulation.

As the meeting concluded, the Secretary said that it might be desirable to rewrite the covering paper for presentation to the President in light of the discussion here.¹⁰ Mr. Kaysen said that no major revision would be required. Mr. McNamara said he wanted to be sure we were clear on the first proposal. He was in accord with our desire to probe and find out what Gromyko meant. He did not want to initiate a proposal on numbers or even a proposal for asymmetry in reductions. The Secretary said it was very hard to draw this kind of a line. It is hard to inquire about a proposition without hinting that it is not obnoxious. Mr. McNamara said he realized that, but he urged that we ask the questions with the least possible implication of acceptability of the idea. Mr. McNamara asked whether we can propose that the base reduction study be completed within 90 days. The Secretary said that instead of postponing authorization of the ACDA proposal for 90 days, let us agree to work out the study within 90 days. Dr. Wiesner asked whether the meeting had decided that the percentage reduction could go above 30%. The Secretary said we could think in terms of 30 or 40% in certain categories but a large percentage such as 50% would certainly raise the question of whether we could proceed without China.

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Baker.

¹ The list of the 19 participants is not printed.

² Not further identified.

³ Telegram 1728 from USUN, November 9, reported that Zorin told Dean that the "USSR would not object to reconvening at Geneva Nov 22 or 23," but because of the ongoing disarmament discussions in the U.N. General

Assembly, he thought November 26 was a “reasonable” compromise. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-962)

⁴ In the course of his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, Gromyko remarked: “Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.” (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 904-905)

⁵ For this meeting, ACDA drafted and forwarded to the Committee of Principals, under cover of a November 6 memorandum, a general paper and five attachments (A-E), detailing ACDA’s proposals for U.S. positions to be taken at the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The general paper outlined the approach to be taken by the U.S. Delegation at Geneva and also listed recommendations regarding modifications in the U.S. position. Attachment A concerned reductions of armaments in Stage I, Attachment B covered nuclear weapons and fissionable materials, Attachment C treated military bases, Attachment D treated military expenditures, and Attachment E concerned pre-treaty bonfires. A sixth enclosure, Attachment F, consisted of the minutes of the meeting of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals on November 1, at which these papers were first discussed. None of these papers is printed. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171)

⁶ The estimates of the Institute of Strategic Studies were summarized in *The New York Times*, November 9, 1962.

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Reference is to the eight-part Soviet memorandum submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1961. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, pp. 496-504.

⁹ Not found.

¹⁰ See [Document 246](#).

246. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

Recommendations regarding Resumption of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations

Background

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your approval of a series of recommendations regarding modifications and elaborations of the United States position on its program for general and complete disarmament and on a pre-stage disarmament treaty proposal. The Committee of Principals discussed the recommendations outlined below at a meeting, Saturday, November 10, 1962.¹ Although there were differences expressed with respect to the details and tactics of handling the various recommendations, there was agreement as to the fundamental elements of the United States position.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which has been in recess since September 8, is expected to reconvene in Geneva on November 26. The four Western delegations (U.S., U.K., Italy, and Canada) plan to meet in Geneva prior to the resumption to coordinate Western positions and tactics. The ENDC will probably continue its meetings until approximately December 21 and then recess again until January 8, 1963.

The Geneva negotiations provide an opportunity for both sides to determine over a period of time whether arms control offers a realistic alternative to the arms race and they give evidence of the willingness of both sides to explore the possibilities of meaningful accords. When the Geneva negotiations resume we should give a signal to the Soviets and to the world which is consistent with our general foreign policy posture as it has developed out of the Cuban affair. This would mean that no changes in position should be introduced in Geneva in the case of a turn for the worse in Cuba or a failure to live up to the agreement contained in your exchange

of letters with Chairman Khrushchev, but that the United States should be prepared to make moves to advance our basic objective in the negotiations when they are appropriate. This basic objective has been, and will continue to be, to determine what constitutes the widest area of agreement in the disarmament-arms control field that might be agreed to even though short of general and complete; whether first or limited steps, such as a non-proliferation, test ban, or outer space agreement can be negotiated; and whether such limited measures represent the outer limits of what can be accomplished. We are not yet in a position to know specifically what might be included in “a widest area of agreement” package, although we can now understand some of the limiting factors of such an area of agreement.

In order to pursue this course successfully, we must not abandon the goal of general and complete disarmament or seek to renegotiate the framework for negotiations represented by the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

The measures outlined below are designed to proceed with the objective discussed above. Although the policy modifications proposed in this paper are relatively slight when compared with the differences that exist and will certainly not produce a disarmament agreement, they will be important in signaling to the Soviets and others that the United States is prepared to follow through positively and constructively on the promises implicit in the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and you. Furthermore, the talks at Geneva may facilitate possible later bilateral discussions at a summit or elsewhere which might include disarmament questions.

The papers submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the various agencies on November 6 to be used as guidelines by the Geneva negotiators,² will be modified in the light of the discussion at the meeting of the Committee of Principals and in the light of action taken by you on this paper.

Recommendations

- 1.

Substantive modifications of United States proposals for general and complete disarmament.

a.

Possible modifications concerning reductions of armaments in Stage I.

(1) The United States should continue to defend the basic equity of the 30 percent across-the-board approach. It should point out that the U.S.S.R. has now accepted this approach for many categories of armaments, but departs from this approach by requiring much larger reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, which constitute the most important category to the West.

(2) The United States should indicate that the recent Soviet proposal—on retaining “an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the 'ground-to-air' category until the end of Stage II ... ,” —implies a cut in United States strategic vehicles, such as ICBM’s and long-range bombers, by a greater percentage than for the Soviet Union. The United States should know whether the U.S.S.R. is prepared to take larger percentage cuts than does the United States in other categories of armaments, such as IRBM’s, tanks and artillery, where the Soviet Union has the larger number of armaments, before the United States can consider a proposal involving even a modest difference in the percentages. The U.S. negotiators should take appropriate probing action to ascertain the Soviet intentions.

(*Comment*): The United States would expect to probe the Soviets on what numbers they have in mind as to the amount and types of weapons that would be retained. The United States would also ask the Soviet Union about verification of its proposal. In probing the Soviets regarding their proposal, the United States would not specify any numbers or variations in percentages. Our probing would be an indication we are interested to know what the Soviets have in mind. The probing of Soviet intentions would take place privately, although the United States might outline its position at the conference along the lines of points (1) and (2) if this seems appropriate. Studies will be undertaken within the U.S. Government to evaluate the possibility of reductions

greater than 30 percent, especially as they would affect the United States posture vis-à-vis Communist China.

b.

Stage I reduction of nuclear weapons.

- (1) The United States should be prepared to agree to transfer [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of weapons grade U-235 to peaceful purposes if the Soviet Union would make an equivalent transfer of 25,000 kg of weapons grade U-235.
- (2) The foregoing proposal should be presented in the context of Stage I and as an alternative to the present United States proposal respecting the transfer of fissionable materials from past production.
- (3) The United States should express willingness to consider, within limits, larger numbers at the same ratio if the Soviet Union is interested. The upper limit for the United States [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of weapons grade U-235. This figure could not be mentioned in negotiations without subsequent specific authorization in the light of additional technical studies which are required.
- (4) The United States should be prepared to accept an arrangement along the foregoing lines as a separate measure associated with a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials and appropriately verified.

(Comment): Any discussion of ratio other than one-to-one or numbers higher than [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of weapons grade U-235 would take place privately with the Soviet Union, although it might be made public at a later date. The initial approach should not be on the basis of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] but should involve a ratio such as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] as an attempt to probe the Soviets as to whether it is the ratio problem that is concerning them. The initial approach should be private. The delegation should seek to determine in the first instance whether the Soviets are fundamentally opposed to the idea of transfer of fissionable materials before discussing specific amounts and ratios.

c.

Discussion of reduction of military bases in Stage I.

- (1) The United States should indicate its willingness to discuss bases by indicating that as regards Stage I, specified countries, including at least the United States and the Soviet Union, would be willing to discuss arrangements for dismantling or converting to peaceful uses some agreed military bases, wherever they might be located, to the extent that this might follow from the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.
- (2) The United States should indicate that a detailed discussion is not appropriate at this phase of negotiations.

(*Comment*): The United States would assert its view that it does not recognize any distinction in terms of reductions between foreign and domestic bases. Within 90 days the Department of Defense expects to deliver a base study to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which will evaluate various possible United States positions.

d.

Reduction of military expenditures.

- (1) The United States should propose the following approach to the reduction of military expenditures:
 - (a) From the beginning of Stage I, military expenditures should be reduced by percentages from base-period expenditures in such a fashion as to reflect the disarmament process. It follows that these percentages would become progressively larger as disarmament moved forward but they would be so calculated as to reflect the disarmament process, not to act as pressure on it.
 - (b) Such a measure would be subject to verification by an agreed procedure, including the reporting to the IDO of expenditure, price, and other relevant data and appropriate inspection by IDO personnel.
 - (c) The parties would allocate to world development, through the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, such proportions of the funds released by the reduction of military expenditures as would be agreed, taking account of the actual development needs,

of the contributions of both developing and developed countries, and of other relevant factors.

- (2) The United States should also propose the convening of a committee of experts to examine the means of implementing the foregoing proposals, but should first give careful study within the government to the problems involved.
- (3) If the progress in the negotiations warrants, it might be possible to work out with the Congress an interim ceiling, effective upon the signing of the treaty but prior to its entry into force, under which military expenditures would be held at the levels then prevailing, if the Soviet Union would also accept such a ceiling and were willing to initiate the exchange of appropriate data.

(*Comment*): This proposal would permit a positive response to a long-stated Soviet position, namely, that there should be some reductions in military expenditures during Stage I of a disarmament agreement. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has now given sufficient attention and study to this possibility that it feels that we can now proceed to discuss a formula for reductions in expenditures along the lines recommended. ACDA also believes that with a specific proposal on reductions in military expenditures the verification for such a measure will provide information which will be helpful as a supplement to other verification techniques for other disarmament measures.

2.

Initiation of destruction of medium jet bombers.

- a. At an appropriate time during the next session of the Geneva Conference, the United States should state that while negotiations are proceeding, it is prepared to initiate the destruction of medium jet bombers on the following basis:
 - (1) Each month, beginning possibly on July 1, 1963, the United States and Soviet Union would each fly 30 medium jet bombers (B-47's and Badgers) to designated depots in the territory of third (neutral) countries.
 - (2) Upon confirmation that 30 bombers of each country had arrived at the respective depots, the bombers would be destroyed, and their

- destruction would be verified by an agreed international group.
- (3) The foregoing process would be continued for a period of two years to a total of 720 bombers.
 - (4) Should a disarmament agreement enter into effect prior to the expiration of this period, the destruction of bombers designated for the foregoing arrangement would be continued in the manner prescribed in the agreement.
- b. In presenting the foregoing proposal, the United States should make clear that its implementation would result in a more rapid phasing out of our medium bombers than is currently contemplated.

(*Comment*): The recommendation outlined above suggests that July 1, 1963 might be an appropriate starting date, but if the Soviets are interested in this proposal our negotiators at Geneva would be prepared to discuss a starting date earlier than July 1, if this can be worked out, not only at the negotiations but at the domestic level as well. The rate of destruction has been increased from what was previously agreed to as a United States position, from 15 to 30 a month.

Other Measures

The subject of this paper has been limited to United States modifications in its program for general and complete disarmament and to a proposal for the destruction of medium jet bombers. Other limited measures which have been and will continue to be the subject of negotiations at Geneva or elsewhere will be handled in subsequent memoranda.^{[3](#)}

William C. Foster^{[4](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 20 memorandum by Foster, presumably sent to the Committee of Principals, which states that the paper was a final revision and reflected the discussion by the Committee of Principals on November 10 and comments received by the interested agencies in response to ACDA's November 13 and November 15

memoranda. A copy of the November 13 memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals. The November 15 memorandum and the agencies' responses have not been found.

¹ See [Document 245](#).

² See [footnote 3](#), [Document 245](#).

³ In a November 21 memorandum to Foster, Carl Kaysen wrote that the President had approved this memorandum with the understanding that the first recommendation went “no further than inviting exploration of possible Soviet willingness to bargain seriously on terms other than uniform across-the-board reduction.” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62) Four position papers (“Reduction of Armaments in Stage I,” “Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in Stage I,” “Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I,” and “Reduction of Military Expenditures”) representing the final and cleared backup papers regarding modifications of the U.S. position on general and complete disarmament are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current. Copies of these papers were pouched to the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and the changes in the U.S. position were interpreted and explained in Todis 731 to Geneva, December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-562)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, November 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

You are aware of the conversations which I have been having with the Soviet Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on the question of restricting the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities.

At the last meeting, August 23, a potentially important shift occurred in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider reaching an agreement on non-diffusion couched in more general terms than its previous position which had specified that a prior agreement had to be reached separately concerning the specific problem of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the East German regime. In addition, although the language is ambiguous, the Soviets have not apparently precluded considering an understanding which would not rule out international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multilateral nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework.

In view of these potential shifts in the Soviet position, I have, as you know, consulted with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Federal Republic of Germany. The response of the British Foreign Minister was entirely favorable. The French Foreign Minister stated that France would accept if the terms of the agreement were acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Foreign Minister has only recently advised me that the Federal Republic could accept a non-proliferation agreement of the kind we have in mind, provided that Communist China adhered to the terms of the arrangement.¹ I made it clear in all of my consultations that we did not propose to give up our right to work out a truly multinational NATO nuclear force, with appropriate safeguards to

assure that nuclear weapons assigned to that force could not be used on the basis of a national decision alone.

I believe we are now in a position again to approach the Soviet Union. I propose that we do so promptly in order to accomplish two objectives. The first is to determine whether the Soviet Union is in a position to state that its allies, including Communist China, will adhere to the terms of a non-proliferation agreement. I believe we are now in a position to inform the Soviet Union that our allies can be expected to adhere to such an agreement if the allies of the Soviet Union adhere. The second objective is to give the Soviet Union a somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons. We should, of course, make it clear that we reserve the right to cooperate in the establishment of a multinational nuclear weapons force within the NATO alliance.

I am attaching a talking paper which would form the basis for the exploration of whether the allies of the Soviet Union can be expected to sign a non-proliferation agreement. There is also attached an oral statement containing the relevant portions of a draft declaration. Both of these papers would be used in our next approach to the Soviet Government. Finally, there is attached the actual text of a Draft Declaration and Minute.² I would recommend they not be used at the forthcoming meeting with the Soviet Union but am transmitting them so you can see what we have in mind.

I am advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the measure on the grounds that it contains no provisions for inspection; that it may have a very bad effect on our defensive alliance within NATO; and that the measure prohibits transfers which the U.S. itself may wish to make. I am advised that the Department of Defense does not oppose the measure but rather thinks it might be in our long-term interest.³

Accordingly, I request your approval for carrying out the necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in order to pursue the objectives discussed in this memorandum.⁴

Dean Rusk

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Agencies and Departments Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. For an earlier memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy on this subject, see [Document 230](#).

¹ No record of these responses has been found.

² None of the attachments is printed.

³ See [footnote 6](#), [Document 230](#).

⁴ In a November 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy noted that the President had approved this memorandum on non-diffusion “and authorizes the necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in the terms set forth in that memorandum with its attachments.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/C-R Files: FRC 77 A 8, State Department, Memoranda to the Secretary)

248. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, December 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

Nontransfer of nuclear weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary

Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson

The Secretary informed Ambassador Dobrynin that he was leaving today for the NATO meeting in Paris where he would expect to discuss with his NATO colleagues the problem of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, he could informally tell the Ambassador his thinking on what the central part of an agreement might be, according to his present thinking. He regretted that he was not in a position to give him an exact text. The Secretary then read the following paragraph:

“The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons.”

The Secretary said it was important that there be no misunderstanding as to what was meant by indirect transfer, and he thought that there should be a written minute or record of some sort explaining our understanding of what was meant. He then read to Mr. Dobrynin the four points that might go into such a minute and, at the Ambassador's request, gave him these four points in writing, on the understanding that this represented his present thinking and was not a definitive text.^{[1](#)}

The Secretary went on to explain that with regard to the adherence of potential nuclear states or authorities, he realized it might be necessary to

have a conference at which Peiping might be represented. The Secretary made clear that in our view the agreement would not be implemented until both the Soviet Union and the United States were satisfied that all potential nuclear powers had adhered. He thought that we both had a common interest in adherence by Germany and Peiping, but it was probably not important to either of us whether a country like *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* agreed.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on December 10.

¹ The written minute has not been found, but a 5-point minute of interpretation, which the Secretary gave the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers in Paris on December 12, is quoted in [Document 249](#). The five points were derived from the Minute attached to the Secretary's memorandum to the President, [Document 247](#).

249. Editorial Note

On December 12, 1962, Secretary Rusk arrived in Paris in preparation for the NATO Ministerial Meeting to be held December 13-15. In the course of deliberations on Alliance matters of mutual concern, the Secretary explored with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers prospects for promoting an agreement with the Soviet Union on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. The Secretary submitted a draft non-transfer declaration to Lord Home on December 12. The declaration was intended to make more precise the Soviet concerns about the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to states that did not possess them. The first paragraph of this 3-paragraph draft is identical to the paragraph, quoted in [Document 248](#), that Rusk read to Dobrynin on December 10. The second was a declaration by the other signatory governments that they would not manufacture nuclear weapons, would refrain from acquiring them directly or indirectly, and would “not ask or receive assistance from the other states in the manufacture of any such weapons.” The third paragraph outlined conditions for implementation and abrogation of the agreement. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) For text of the declaration, see the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk also forwarded the draft declaration under cover of a December 12 letter to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. The Secretary’s letter explained that the United States had three main objectives in promoting the declaration: First, there was the remote chance that a four-power agreement on non-diffusion might “throw some obstacles across the path of a Chinese nuclear development.” The letter noted that “the Soviets might be able to use the proposal as pressure on Peiping, disagreement between them on the subject could benefit the West, and, as a minimum, Peiping would have to bear the responsibility for no progress.” The second goal was “to devise a means for diverting the Soviets away from special arrangements with regard to Germany,” and third, it was in the interest of nuclear weapons states to take some such action to try to prevent the likely spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The Secretary hoped that if he, Home, and Couve de Murville could agree on the declaration, they would consult the Germans and then the Soviets and other governments.

“Paragraph two,” he concluded, “would need the adherence of many governments if the declaration is to achieve its purpose. Certainly we would not be interested in a formal agreement which did not include Peiping.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) The letter is in the Supplement.

During the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Secretary Rusk also shared with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers a minute of interpretation as guidance respecting the disposition of a nuclear weapon in connection with a regional arrangement. “Such actions,” the minute stated, “are prohibited if they would give to any state which is a member of the regional arrangement and which does not possess nuclear weapons the ability to make a determination to use these weapons on the basis of its national decision alone.” The minute then listed five illustrative points, as follows:

- “1. The draft declaration would prohibit the four powers possessing nuclear weapons from placing nuclear weapons under the control of units of national forces of nations in the NATO or Warsaw Pact which do not now possess nuclear weapons.
- “2. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from deploying nuclear weapons in support of the forces of member nations which are assigned to the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively, even though these members do not themselves have such weapons. The arrangements would be such that the four nuclear signatories retain control over the weapons so that they could not be deployed or used solely on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
- “3. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of a multinational defense force within the framework of NATO, or Warsaw Pact defense forces, respectively, if weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
- “4. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from entering into multinational consultative procedures with respect to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons with countries not now possessing such weapons.

“5. The draft declaration assures adherence to the declaration by all potential nuclear states or authorities. It would not become operative until the four nuclear signatories were satisfied that such adherences had been obtained, and until both had ratified it pursuant to their constitutional processes.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200)

In a cable to Acting Secretary Ball and the President at the end of the NATO meeting, Secretary Rusk noted, among other things, that on the non-transfer declaration “British fully agree. Germans will agree if Peiping’s adherence is required. French are studying and will let us know. Am slightly encouraged that we have not had oracular rejection from Paris.” (Secto 22 from Paris, December 15; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1562)

250. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)

Washington, December 20, 1962.

[Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Oct-Dec 1962. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

251. Editorial Note

On December 19, 1962, Chairman Khrushchev wrote President Kennedy a letter expressing his views on nuclear testing. After asserting that the Soviet Union believed that national means of detection were adequate for the verification of underground nuclear shots, he said that his government would accept automatic seismological stations, which had been discussed by Soviet and U.S. scientists at the Pugwash meeting in London in early September. While he thought the sealed devices could be transported to the Soviet Union in Soviet planes and monitored by Soviet personnel, he would agree to the participation of foreign personnel, if required, thus accepting “elements of international control.” He also conceded that because of U.S. insistence on on-site inspections, he was prepared to accept the statement of Ambassador Dean who allegedly said in a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov in New York on October 30 that “in the opinion of the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient.”

President Kennedy responded to Khrushchev on December 28 that he was “encouraged that you are prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspections.” He noted, however, that Ambassador Dean had advised him “that the only number which he mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuznetsov was a number between eight and ten,” and that this range “represented a substantial decrease in the request of the United States as we had previously been insisting upon a number between twelve and twenty.” The President also expressed other reservations concerning Khrushchev’s proposals. Regarding the U.S. scientists who signed the Pugwash statement, he pointed out that “none represented the United States Government or had discussed the matter with responsible officials. All were speaking as individuals and none were seismologists. Their agreement does not signify anything other than that this area was an area which justified further study.”

For the full texts of Khrushchev’s letter and President Kennedy’s reply, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, volume II, pages 1239-1242 and 1277-1279, and [volume VI, Documents 84](#) and [86](#).

No record of Dean's conversation with Kuznetsov on October 30 referred to in this exchange of correspondence has been found. Because Soviet negotiators continued to refer to Dean's supposed offer of two to four on-site inspections per year even after the President's disclaimer to Khrushchev, Kennedy administration officials considered additional responses to the Soviet claims. In an account of the President's meeting with Cabinet officers and White House officials on February 8, 1963, Seaborg noted:

"In the recent discussions, the USSR has been rigid on its insistence on no more than two to three on-site inspections. They claim that the U.S. has said that two to four would be adequate. There is apparently some feeling by them that Wiesner has said this, and that Dean said it to Kuznetsov. (Dean denies this and points out that no interpreter was present during this informal conversation.) Dobrynin has apparently told columnist Walter Lippmann that the U.S. has changed its position and had earlier suggested that two to four on-site inspections would be adequate. The President suggested that we might get for the record a letter from Dean to Rusk, pointing out that he never suggested so small a number of on-site inspections. Foster said that Akalovsky confirms Dean's claims on this matter." (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 5, page 140)

Regarding Wiesner's role in this matter, Seaborg much later talked with Wiesner, who explained how a Soviet scientist with whom he had discussed the inspection issue might have misunderstood him. (*Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*, pages 180-181)

Ultimately Dean wrote Foster a long account of his October 30 and November 7 meetings with Kuznetsov, February 23, 1963. (Telegram 3127 from USUN, February 25; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE)) See the Supplement. Moreover, in plenary session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 1, 1963, Foster pointed out that on October 30 Dean had mentioned to Kuznetsov a "small number" of inspections but did not cite a specific figure. At their November 7 meeting, Dean had said the United States might be prepared to accept eight to ten on-site inspections, only two of which might have to be in aseismic areas. Akalovsky, who accompanied Dean to both meetings,

confirmed Dean's figures after the November 7 meeting when Timerbaev, Kuznetsov's aide, questioned him further about them. Foster regretted if the Soviets misunderstood Dean's statements at these meetings. (Disto 1129 from Geneva, March 1, 1963; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE)) See the Supplement.

Foster's account of the two meetings was probably derived from Dean's February 23 letter. He may also have gained information on the November 7 meeting from an earlier summary of it. (Telegram 1678 from USUN, November 7, 1962; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/11-762)

252. Editorial Note

In a letter to President Kennedy, December 27, 1962, Arthur H. Dean submitted his resignation as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva and as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventeenth U.N. General Assembly. Both resignations were to be effective on December 31. Dean emphasized that he had decided to retire for personal reasons. On January 4, 1963, President Kennedy wrote Dean accepting his resignations “reluctantly” and “with great regret.” He went on to praise Dean for his “personal sacrifices” and the “key role you have played in this vital endeavor” of disarmament. The texts of Dean’s letter and the President’s reply were released to the press, but only the President’s letter is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, page 3.

253. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, January 5, 1963.

T.9/63. Message begins.

Dear Friend

I am most grateful to you for sending me a copy of your reply to Khrushchev's letter.¹ It may be something of real value that he is now prepared to admit the possibility of on site inspections in the Soviet Union, even though the number he proposes is no more than the three inspections suggested by the Soviet delegate at the Geneva nuclear tests conference in July 1960.² But I share your hope that these suggestions by Khrushchev will prove to be helpful in taking us down the road to an agreement. I welcome your proposal that Foster should have bilateral talks with the Russians and I certainly hope that Khrushchev will respond to it. I look forward to hearing from you how he reacts.

A number of points in Mr. Khrushchev's offer need further exploration, and I think that you have put a number of most pertinent questions to him. One or two further points occur to me, which no doubt Foster already will have in mind.

We shall for example need to explore whether Khrushchev accepts our views about who is to make the choice of events to be inspected. His letter to you refers to inspection "in those cases when it would be considered necessary", a formula which is no doubt deliberately vague. It might be possible also to use the idea of a reverse quota to satisfy the Russian fear of inspection in a particularly sensitive area.

On the question of black boxes, our scientists agree that their best use is for improving our capability to identify seismic events and that for this purpose there should be effective arrays to cover seismic areas. Part of this network, as you suggest, might spill over into Afghanistan, Pakistan and Japan. But I

think we should reckon with the possibility that, in making a similar suggestion, Khrushchev may have something rather different in mind, since his concept of the use of black boxes is clearly different from ours. He may, for example, be trying to imply that black boxes in countries neighboring the Soviet Union might be a substitute for manned detection posts in those countries. The penultimate paragraph of his message proposes that the basis of control over underground tests would be “the national means of detection in combination with automatic seismic stations”. Whatever this means, it seems to me clear that the use of black boxes should not be intended to retard or invalidate the establishment of an effective international coordination, as proposed by us at Geneva.

I will not say more here about the technical aspects and have only mentioned a few that strike me as important. But I should like to suggest that advantage be taken of Zuckerman’s forthcoming visit to Washington for talks with Wiesner (on January 11) to go over these questions together.

Yours ever

Harold Macmillan

Message ends.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1963. Top Secret. The time of transmission is illegible.

¹ See [Document 251](#).

² On July 26, 1960, Semen K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, stated that the Soviet Union would accept up to three visits per year by teams dispatched by the control commission for on-site inspection of events suspected of being nuclear explosions. For Tsarapkin’s statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 172-180.

254. Editorial Note

On January 7, 1963, Chairman Khrushchev sent another message to President Kennedy on the question of nuclear testing. Khrushchev noted that the President's December 28 message did not object to Khrushchev's emphasis in his December 19 letter to the President "that the basis for control over the implementation of an agreement to ban underground nuclear tests should be national means of detection in conjunction with automatic seismic stations," and he further elaborated on his earlier suggestion on the locations for the placement of automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union. He also reaffirmed his willingness to accept two or three annual inspections in aseismic as well as seismic areas. Taking up the President's suggestion that the two nations' disarmament representatives should meet to conduct a technical review of the problems the President raised in his message, Khrushchev indicated that he had designated Nikolay T. Fedorenko, Soviet Representative to the United Nations, and Semen K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to meet with ACDA Director Foster in New York. For text of Khrushchev's letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pages 1-5, and volume VI, [Document 91](#) .

255. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, January 9, 1963.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

USSR

Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Mr. Kuznetsov
Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

Kuznetsov said that with regard to a nuclear test ban treaty, the Soviet Government agrees that an exchange of views on remaining details may take place in New York. The Soviet United Nations representative, Fedorenko, would represent the U.S.S.R. in these talks. Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev has expressed a sincere hope that now all conditions have been provided for the cessation of tests as soon as possible. The Soviets have moved another step forward by agreeing to two or three on-site inspections per year. He hoped that the United States Government will respond with understanding. The points of view of the two countries are now closer together and the Soviet proposal on inspection meets the U.S. position. Thus, conditions are ripe for the solution of all details. Kuznetsov said he had observed in the course of negotiations seeking a test ban treaty that the main obstacle arose from the United States position of insisting on on-site inspection. In Soviet opinion, national systems and devices are so good now that it is possible to detect and define seismic events. However, the United States has always insisted on inspection so the U.S.S.R. hopes it has now removed the last obstacle to an agreement.

The President said that the United States wished to go ahead on nuclear test ban talks but that the matter was complicated with many technical

problems. There was no use in his seeking to get Congress to approve a treaty if following its approval some undefined event took place which could not be looked into because it was outside an agreed inspection area. However, testing is now of diminishing value because both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have enough bombs. The proliferation of these weapons should be stopped. Within the next 10 years there will be 15 or 20 nuclear powers unless this is stopped. The President went on to express concern over Communist China, noting that there was no evidence that it would be governed by any treaty the United States and the U.S.S.R. might make. He said that he would hope the Chinese Communist political outlook, as expressed in recent editorials, would change as currently their attitude is a danger for all.

Kuznetsov replied that while he had not been authorized to speak on this point he wished to set forth the position of the Soviet Government concerning China. The Soviet Government cannot speak for other socialist countries. China is not a member of the United Nations for reasons well known to the President; the United States is responsible for this unhappy situation. Even so, all countries have a right to be heard. A four power agreement banning nuclear testing will play an important role and other countries would have to take this agreement into consideration. Peoples all over the world expect and await this agreement and if we can solve this problem it may create an atmosphere conducive to the solution of other, especially disarmament, problems.

The President said he agreed and that the head of the Disarmament Agency, Mr. Foster, understood that we are anxious to reach agreement on this problem of nuclear testing. Such agreement would increase the security of both our countries. If a four power agreement assisted other countries to reach similar agreement, then everything would be fine. However, if any power tests, then all agreement becomes meaningless.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-963. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by John C. Guthrie (EUR/SOV) on January 10 and approved in draft by Thompson and by the White House on January 14. A memorandum of their conversation on Cuba is printed in [volume XI](#).

A telegraphic summary of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations is printed in [vol. V, Document 170](#).

256. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, January 10, 1963, noon.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

U.S.S.R.

Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov
Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

The Secretary said that he wished to report on a matter of general common interest, to wit, the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom and France, he said, have not reacted to discussions which he had in Europe in December on this subject, having had their attention somewhat diverted by the Nassau meeting.¹ However, he expected to talk soon with the Ambassadors of these two countries. The Secretary observed that it was almost axiomatic that no nuclear power has any interest in seeing others become nuclear powers. We were no less interested in this subject despite some delay. The Secretary went on to say that disarmament is a problem which should be objectively considered. A man from Mars would regard both the USSR and the United States as crazy for devoting so much to the arms race. Both countries have great unfinished tasks at home and the arms race was a diversion from these tasks. We hope for early headway on the problem of testing, which is a key to unlock some of these larger problems.

Over-simplifying, the Secretary said, we understand the Soviet problem concerning secrecy and espionage. We do not accept the basis for this Soviet attitude but we do understand that this is a serious problem for the Soviets. On our side, he said, you should try to understand the problem of suspicion and ignorance. The USSR occupies a vast area in the Eurasian heartland. The rest of us must have a reasonable assurance of what is going

on in your country. This is not so much a problem for the USSR owing to the nature of our society, so that it looks to you as though our insistence on inspection means a unilateral concession to the West. Kuznetsov interjected that the Secretary exaggerated this point. The Secretary continued that the management of the waves of suspicion which would develop in the wake of ignorance constituted a real political problem. On testing, it should be possible to work out arrangements whereby we get the necessary assurances. We are willing to take some risks since after all the arms race itself is a risk. But the Secretary was hopeful that we could get what we want without raising the espionage problem for the Soviets.

Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament indicated Soviet willingness to permit inspection. According to these proposals, during the first stage of disarmament the Soviets would allow foreigners to visit factories manufacturing nuclear weapons, areas where armaments were being dismantled and armed units were being disarmed. He said that Ambassador Dean had agreed that the Soviet proposal would open the door to the Soviet Union to a very wide extent. However, Kuznetsov said, the USSR is against control without disarmament. Regarding the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet position is that modern technology has given us the means by use of national detection systems to detect and verify seismic events. But wishing to meet the United States objection, we have agreed to on-site inspections in the number of 2, 3 or 4 a year.

The Secretary said that there must have been a misunderstanding regarding the number of on-site inspections required by the United States.

Kuznetsov rejoined that there was no misunderstanding and that the records would show the United States had talked in terms of two to four per annum. The figure of 8 or 10 had come up only in connection with black boxes. In general, he observed, at Geneva the United States Delegation had been extremely vague on the number of inspections they would insist upon, talking usually of "just a few".

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1063. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie on January 11 and approved in S on January 16. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Memoranda of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations are printed in [vol. V, Documents 171](#) and [172](#), and one on Germany and Berlin is printed in [vol. XV, pp. 474-475](#). Foster also met with Kuznetsov and Dobrynin; a memorandum of their conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Secretary of State.

¹ Regarding the discussions in Paris, see [Document 249](#). Documentation on the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau December 18-21, 1962, is printed in [volume XIII](#).

257. Editorial Note

Immediately following the meeting between Secretary Rusk and Kuznetsov on January 10, 1963 (see [Document 256](#)), the Secretary hosted a luncheon for the Soviet visitor. Following lunch, Ambassador Dobrynin handed the Secretary a paper, which Dobrynin called an “oral presentation,” on the subject of the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. (Memorandum for the files by Guthrie, February 26; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) The paper, dated January 10, outlined the Soviet Government’s agreement in principle with the goal of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the interest of reducing the risk of nuclear war but raised several reservations to the U.S. position on the issue. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, More Pen Pals 63) See the Supplement.

Much in the Soviet paper was a response to an earlier U.S. draft declaration on the subject, which Secretary Rusk had given to Dobrynin on December 10, 1962. Regarding this U.S. draft, see [Document 248](#). Secretary Rusk forwarded the Soviet paper under cover of a January 10 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. The Secretary wrote: “The President will be interested in seeing the enclosed paper which represents an 'oral presentation' made by Ambassador Dobrynin to me today on the subject of the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Thompson and I have kept him informed about our attitude and the fact that we were taking the matter up with the British and the French.

“On its face, the enclosed communication sounds somewhat negative but I am inclined to believe that if we get agreement from the British, French and Germans, the obstacles raised by the Soviets are due to misunderstanding about details. Hence, I am not too discouraged by what is said here.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, More Pen Pals 63)

258. Editorial Note

When Prime Minister Macmillan learned about the upcoming meetings between Foster and Soviet envoys Tsarapkin and Fedorenko, he sent a message to President Kennedy on January 13, 1963, approving of these “private talks” and requesting British participation, “if that is agreeable.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan’s Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962-63, Vol. II) President Kennedy responded later the same day, “I entirely agree that we should stick together on the test ban and I am asking Rusk and Foster to concert most effective way of arranging this at first meeting tomorrow.” (Ibid., Kennedy’s Correspondence with Macmillan, 1962-63, Vol. II) Both letters are in the Supplement. From the outset of these U.S.-Soviet discussions on January 14, Foster sought the inclusion of British representatives, but the Soviet Union did not formally accept their participation until after the fourth meeting on January 18. Thereafter, British Ambassador Ormsby Gore or Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary of the British Embassy, took part in these talks.

The two sides held 10 meetings on January 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, and 31. The four meetings between January 22 and 25 were held in Washington; the others took place in New York.

During the meetings, the U.S., U.K., and Soviet representatives expounded on their positions on on-site inspection procedures, national seismic detention networks, and automatic seismic detection stations. Some specific information was exchanged. At the January 16 meeting, for instance, Fedorenko handed Foster a list of 73 permanent seismic stations in the Soviet Union, and Foster read a statement entitled “Suggestions for Automatic Recording Seismic Stations Within the USA.” A copy of the Soviet list and the U.S. statement, which Foster gave the Soviet side the next day, are attached to a memorandum of conversation of the January 16 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1663) On January 22, Foster also gave the Soviet representatives a list of proposed locations for automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union and data on noise levels at sites for automatic seismic stations suggested by the United States. A

copy of the list and the noise level data are attached to the memorandum of conversation of the January 22 meeting. (Ibid., 700.5611/1-2263) Moreover, at their meeting on January 31, Tsarapkin gave Foster and Ormsby Gore a paper specifying the noise levels at the three seismic stations proposed by the Soviet Union on Soviet territory. The Soviet paper is attached to the memorandum of conversation of the meeting. (Ibid., 700.5611/1-3163) These memoranda of conversation and attachments are in the Supplement.

Memoranda of conversation of all 10 meetings are in Department of State, Central File 700.5611, or *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Substantive differences remained between the two sides, however. On January 18 in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed his disappointment to Ambassador Kohler at the U.S. approach in the initial meetings. (Telegrams 1765 and 1766 from Moscow, January 18; *ibid.*, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/1-1863) Finally, at the January 31 meeting, Fedorenko stated that the Soviet Government was terminating the talks and intended to continue the test ban negotiations at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was scheduled to resume in Geneva on February 12. Likewise, the U.K. and U.S. representatives complained during the talks about Soviet unwillingness to clarify views on a verification system and maintained that they had shown flexibility on the several dimensions of the subject. A briefing note, forwarded under cover of a February 1 memorandum from Clement Conger (ACDA/D) to David Howe Henry, II (EUR/SOV) "for possible inclusion in the Secretary's briefing materials for his meeting today with the President," briefly analyzed the Soviet position:

"Our preliminary assessment of Soviet motivations is that their latest move [of ending the private meetings] is a tactical one designed to bring pressure upon the U.S. by transferring the talks to a large forum in which the USSR hopes other members will exert pressure upon the U.S. to alter its present position on verification requirements. We do not consider it reflects a change in the basic desire of the USSR to reach a test ban agreement, but rather an effort to secure agreement on more favorable terms." (Ibid., DEF 18-4)

Secretary Rusk, Kohler, Thompson, and Tyler met with the President at the White House from 12:25 to 12:50 p.m. on February 1 (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book), but no record of their conversation has been found.

259. Editorial Note

NSAM No. 210, December 12, 1962, established an interagency working group on underground nuclear tests, which would be chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and would be comprised of representatives from the White House Office of Science and Technology, Department of State (including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. The purpose of the group was "to review the schedule of tests for the remainder of FY 1963 and for FY 1964, and the policy and technical justifications therefor, and to determine if the schedule is consistent with the requirements of national security and with foreign policy." It would send its conclusions and recommendations to the President "as soon as possible and no later than March 4, 1963." (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 210)

The first two meetings of the working group took place on January 3 and March 21, 1963. At the January 3 meeting, the working group considered the AEC proposal for 19 underground nuclear tests as part of Operation Storax at the Nevada Test Site for the first 3 months of 1963. The first two phases of this test series, which began in early July 1962, were completed by the end of 1962; those for the first quarter of 1963 were called Storax III. In formulating its recommendations for Storax III, the members of the group agreed that the major factors guiding their review would be "the President's stringent budget policy; the need for maintaining a level of testing sufficient to keep the laboratories viable; an adequate rate of testing in relation to weapons development requirements as viewed in the context of the general military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and finally, consistency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in testing and its public posture with respect to other major international issues, including the forthcoming disarmament negotiations." Because the President had imposed a budgetary ceiling for FY 1964, beginning July 1, 1963, that would allow only about 25 tests per year, the working group agreed to reduce the rate of testing for the first 6 months of 1963 to the level authorized for FY 1964. The group also agreed that the AEC should submit a request to the President for domestic tests for the next month and present

to the working group a proposal for the testing program for the rest of FY 1963. (Record of meeting by Carl Kaysen, January 4; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jan.-Mar. 1963)

Several memoranda from Glenn Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy from January to early March 1963, requesting the President's approval for specific tests and the expenditure of certain nuclear materials for the testing program, and memoranda from the President or Bundy to Seaborg approving these requests are *ibid*.

Before Storax III began, President Kennedy raised the prospect of a postponement of the shots for the duration of the private discussions with British and Soviet officials on testing in New York and Washington (see [Document 258](#)). McGeorge Bundy raised the possibility of a 2-week postponement with Seaborg in a telephone conversation on January 21. Seaborg told Bundy that he preferred no delay while the talks continued but agreed that 2 weeks would do no harm. (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 5, page 74) At the NSC meeting the following day, the President stressed the importance of a test ban. "He said," Seaborg recorded in his journal, "a test ban involving only the Russians and the United States wouldn't be worth very much; but, if it affects China, it will be worth very much indeed. It is, therefore, much more important than it was a year or two ago. He indicated that McCone agreed with this point of view."

Following the NSC meeting, the President met in his office with Secretary Rusk, Bundy, Foster, Kaysen, Seaborg, and Wiesner: "The President indicated that he would like the AEC to defer underground testing for two or three weeks while the possibility of a test ban on the basis of the exchange of Kennedy-Khrushchev letters is explored by Foster and his group. I indicated that this would have an adverse effect on the laboratories, and possibly on some Commissioners because of the feeling that this might be the first step toward an unpoliced moratorium. I indicated that it might be better if an actual length of time for this deferral not be designated. Foster indicated that he might learn the prospects for a test ban before two or three weeks' time. It was recognized that the AEC had not been testing during the last week or two because of labor troubles; thus, a month has passed since the last test, and the announcement of a test at this time would

be particularly unfortunate so far as the negotiations are concerned. There was general agreement that the AEC should defer its next underground test until an assessment could be made of the prospects for successful negotiations.” (ibid., page 78)

On January 26, President Kennedy announced the postponement of the Nevada underground tests during the private talks but indicated that the United States was prepared to resume testing at any time. For the President’s statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, page 104. After the Soviet Union broke off the talks, U.S. underground testing resumed in early February.

At its March 21 meeting, the working group reviewed the proposed AEC list for 27 AEC and DOD tests for the balance of FY 1963. It decided to limit the number of tests to 20 but to allow the agencies to select them from the list of 27. The working group also agreed to an intensive review of proposed tests for FY 1964, chaired by Jerome Wiesner, before presentation to the President. (Record of meeting by Kaysen, March 21 (revised on March 26); Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jan.-Mar. 1963) In a March 27 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Foster forwarded Kaysen’s record of the meeting, which he called “an accurate report of the conclusions reached.” He added that although he had little to contribute to the working group on technical matters, on the question of the political impact of an intensified test series “it was my belief that this would aggravate the situation at the Geneva test ban discussions, whereas a series including fewer tests per month could be explained as a continuation of the series started after the Soviets began their new tests in the fall of 1961.” He noted that it was on this basis as well as budgetary considerations and the practical question of how many tests per month could be conducted effectively that the decision of 20 tests was made. Further, “It was also stated that in planning for tests to be run in 1964, the rate would be further reduced to total between 25 and 36 for 12 months of FY 1964.” (Ibid.) In a March 26 memorandum to Seaborg, President Kennedy approved the 20 tests and the expenditure of specific amounts of nuclear materials for them. (Ibid.)

Storax III and IV (for the second quarter) consisted of 29 tests, from February 8 to June 25. Of these, 9 took place before the March 21 meeting; the remaining 20 after it. (*Announced United States Nuclear Tests*, pages 25-27)

260. Memorandum for the File [Source](#)

Washington, February 6, 1963.

Memorandum of discussion with William Foster on Wednesday, February 6, 1963.

Mr. Foster came at the direction of the President to discuss his program for further discussions in Geneva on a nuclear test ban.

After summarizing his present appraisal of the number of earthquakes expected in the Soviet Union in a year, the improvements in seismology and the ability to analyze seismic readings as a result of project Vela, Foster concluded that we could expect in the order of 40 or 50 unidentified and suspect events per year. I made no attempt to evaluate this conclusion from a technical standpoint.

Foster then indicated that a certain percentage, perhaps as many as half of these unidentified events, could be eliminated by information developed from United States intelligence resources.

He then explained that the Soviet's position was about as follows: They would see their 70 national stations (in universities and elsewhere) for detection and monitoring purposes and would turn the "tapes" over to an international team of analysts and this process would be on a current basis.

In addition the tapes from the three "black boxes" would be handled by an international team and analyzed periodically by the international analysts.

The United States would use its national stations (universities, the five Vela stations, and others) under the same procedure, transmitting the tapes to the international analysts. The same procedure would be followed for the AEDS stations. However, the surfacing of these stations might involve complications and hence duplicate stations might be required in various locations throughout the world. This is because the presence and purpose of AEDS stations in many countries is not known publicly.

It was proposed by the Soviets that these arrangements, coupled with an agreement for two or three on-site inspections annually, would provide a satisfactory detection system for underground testing.

Foster indicated that the U.S. position called for 10 black boxes, this had not been agreed to by the Soviets, and no reduction in this figure had been established by U.S. policy makers.

The present U.S. policy calls for ten on-site inspections annually, Foster indicated to Kuznetsov an indication of willingness to compromise this figure, and that in his, Foster's, opinion six inspections annually would be an acceptable figure.

The agreement would provide for the immediate suspension of all testing in all environments. Foster and his staff are advocating the pursuit of a treaty on these modified lines although they have no indication of the Soviet's intention to increase their proposed number of black boxes or annual on-site inspections.

I then asked Foster what in his opinion was the threshold of the system which he proposed, and by that meaning the size of underground explosion which could be conducted in the Soviet Union without reasonable prospect of detection. Foster replied that the threshold was one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in limestone and ten to twenty kilotons in tuff. With respect to the latter Foster stated that our experience in Nevada had proven a test of such size at 1000 feet would cause a sinking of the surface which would give a surface indication which might be picked up by aerial surveillance.

With respect to the intelligence contribution to the system Foster was depending very largely on communications intelligence and I pointed out that the construction of land lines would eliminate this entirely.

We then discussed the fusion bomb. Livermore believe they have proven this to be feasible; they now have a device of limited effectiveness, that six or eight tests would be required to develop it as a weapon of limited effectiveness but that a substantial program would be required for improvements and further developments. In response to my question, Foster

said that further testing of this device would be prohibited under the agreement.

With respect to China and France, Foster recognized that neither country was “manageable” at present but that any signator to the treaty could abrogate it unilaterally if other countries in the world pursued testing.

With respect to “cheating” Foster felt it was the opinion of his staff that the Soviets could probably cheat under the threshold for a single test or maybe a few tests but that a meaningful series of tests would be subject to discovery.

No means are provided for the inspection of laboratories, testing areas, etc., to expose new clandestinely planned development work in anticipation of a future test series.

I have reviewed the AEC letter to the Joint Committee of February 4th,^{[1](#)} and it is apparent there are a number of areas of development which if we are to pursue them will require both underground and atmospheric testing.

It appears to me that the treaty would stop nuclear weapon improvement in this country without guarantee that the Soviets would likewise stop (in spite of their promise) and would not control the “proliferation problem” as both the French and the Chinese Communists and others that they might work with, such as the Israelis or the Indians, would be outside of the treaty restrictions. Against this must be balanced the advantages of a “step forward” in the field of disarmament and the attendant lessening of tensions between the two world powers.

John A. McCone^{[2](#)}
Director

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 1/1/63-2/9/63. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on February 8. A note on the source text indicates the memorandum was handcarried to Gilpatric.

^{[1](#)} Not found.

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

261. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, February 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Dobrynin (USSR)

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had been instructed by his government to raise two questions with the Secretary, the first dealing with the Franco-German Treaty (see separate memcon)¹ and the second with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador then proceeded to deliver an oral *démarche* on the latter subject, the text of which is attached.

In commenting on the Ambassador's statement, the Secretary said that he wished to underline again the difference between proliferation of national nuclear capabilities and multilateral arrangements which did not increase national capabilities either to produce or to control nuclear weapons. In his press conference today, the President has said that we intend to find a way by which Europe will take more interest in the political direction of NATO without increasing national nuclear capabilities.² It is not possible now, the Secretary continued, to be exactly precise regarding the arrangements we have in mind for a multilateral force since this arrangement will depend to some extent on discussions within NATO. However, he could say that it was a basic interest of the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As for Canadian forces and discussions with Canada to which the Ambassador alluded, the Secretary pointed out that Canada is part of NATO and of North America. The Soviets have weapons capable of striking North America and our arrangements for the defense of this area are no different from arrangements which we have with many other countries. These arrangements are, furthermore, long-standing and well-known. As for the concern expressed by the Soviet Government over the Franco-German

Treaty, the Secretary noted that the French Government has already called public attention to the agreement of 1954 wherein the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to renounce the right to manufacture nuclear weapons.³ Such reference was made by the French Foreign Minister speaking before the National Assembly on January 24 of this year. The President also referred to this question today.⁴

As for the Soviet contention that the multilateral arrangements in NATO will provide the Federal Republic of Germany with access to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said this is not what we are talking about. He told the Ambassador he completely rejected the notion that the United States on the one hand professes interest in non-proliferation to the Soviets while on the other hand it is taking steps which actually lead to proliferation. He assured the Ambassador that there was no deception on our part and again noted the fundamental difference between national nuclear forces and multilateral arrangements. As he had already told the Soviet Foreign Minister, if the Soviets wished to make arrangements with their allies similar to those which we hope to make with ours, the United States will not object. After protestations from Dobrynin that the Soviet Government did not like any such arrangements, the Secretary pointed out that since Western arrangements have yet to be made, the Soviet Government does not really know what it is protesting about and at the moment is “boxing shadows”. The Secretary also pointed out that the United States is not the only Western nation possessing nuclear weapons and that the United States could not guarantee control over weapons possessed by the United Kingdom and France. He assured the Ambassador that the statement of the Soviet Government which had just been made to him would be studied and that he hoped to talk further with the Ambassador on the subject of non-proliferation. He reiterated that what we were seeking in our multilateral arrangements was not just a legal formula but an arrangement which would exclude the possibility of those not now possessing nuclear weapons from firing such weapons. Finally, the Secretary said that it would be better not to tell the press that he and the Ambassador had discussed this subject since in the Secretary’s view the differences between the two governments were not so great as the Ambassador professed and we should not complicate the problem by bringing it to public attention.

Attachment⁵

ORAL STATEMENT MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO SECRETARY RUSK

February 7, 1963

In the course of exchange of opinion between the USSR and the U.S. on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons both sides stated that they are interested in reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result of the negotiations the positions of the USSR and the U.S. have come somewhat closer although there still remains differences in approach to the question of not allowing transfer of nuclear weapons to the countries not possessing such weapons by indirect means—through military alliances. The considerations of the Soviet Government on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons were most recently set forth in detail to Secretary Rusk on January 10 this year.⁶ Up till now we have not received a reply from the U.S. Government.

Meanwhile, events have occurred recently which are directly related to the subject of the exchange of opinion between the U.S. and the USSR. The Government of the United States is speeding up the implementation of its plan of creating multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which in fact provides for access to nuclear weapons of armed forces of all countries—members of NATO including also the FRG. American representatives are conducting talks with representatives of those countries concerning the place and role of each of them in the question of managing rocket-nuclear weapons. Judging by reports a considerable role in this matter is being assigned to military units of West Germany.

We are told that West Germany although it will be a participant of the multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which are being planned will not become a full and equal master of rocket-nuclear weapons and that the U.S. will ultimately retain in its hands control over the use of these weapons.

The Soviet Government cannot agree by any means that such kind of “limitations” with regard to access of the FRG to rocket-nuclear weapons

allegedly exclude the possibility of use of nuclear weapons by the West German revenge-seekers for their own purposes with all the dangerous consequences which ensue from this.

In obvious contradiction with the task of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the treaty concluded recently between France and the FRG which provides in particular for a comprehensive military cooperation between these two countries and does not exclude the possibility of direct transfer of nuclear weapons to the FRG. Appraisal of the consequences of this treaty dangerous for the cause of peace was given in the notes of the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and the FRG the contents of which were brought to the attention of the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare again that transfer of nuclear weapons to the West German armed forces irrespective of the manner in which this is carried out would greatly complicate and aggravate the situation in Europe. The world would be confronted with a new danger and the Soviet Union naturally would be compelled to take all the ensuing measures.

I have been instructed to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that the situation which has now developed cannot be regarded as normal. It turns out that, on the one hand, the U.S. tells us that it is interested in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and is having talks with us concerning an agreement on this question while, on the other hand, it takes practical steps directed one way or another to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, it is also necessary to mention a recent statement by the Canadian Minister of Defense to the effect that negotiations have been going on for the last two or three months between the U.S. and Canada with regard to supplying American nuclear warheads to Canadian Air Force units placed at the disposal of the joint Canadian-American command—North American Air Defense (NORAD).

It is quite obvious that all these plans and actions of the U.S. and other nuclear powers—whether it is creation of multilateral nuclear forces of

NATO or bilateral agreements on nuclear armaments—lead in the long run to one end—to proliferation of nuclear weapons which not only does not facilitate but, on the contrary, hampers, if not makes altogether impossible, reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government would not like to face the situation when the U.S. Government would have confronted us with the fact of a deal within NATO saying: here is our position agreed upon with our NATO allies, let us discuss an agreement on this basis.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state that if the U.S. Government actually proceeds with proliferating nuclear weapons to other states participating in NATO and the number of states possessing nuclear weapons is increased the Government of the Soviet Union will be compelled to draw from this necessary conclusions and will respond in kind, that is, will see to it that appropriate countries friendly towards the USSR will receive nuclear weapons.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear: we conduct negotiations guided by the desire to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and we will not agree with any proposals which do not ensure actual solution of this task.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 10.

¹ The Franco-German treaty was signed on January 22. The memorandum of conversation is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I.

² For text of the President's remarks at his press conference on February 7, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1963, pp. 152-154.

³ Under Protocol No. III (and annexes), October 23, 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany agreed not to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons in its territory. For text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979-984.

⁴ In his press conference.

⁵ Secret. The source text is a condensed version of Dobrynin's statement. In a February 8 memorandum to the Secretary, William R. Tyler noted that his staff had prepared "a slightly condensed version" of Dobrynin's oral démarche at the Secretary's request. "The condensation," he noted, "consists primarily of elimination of reference to a Soviet statement of January 10 this year and to 'negotiations'," presumably to head off possible criticism in case the Secretary decided to give the French Ambassador and the British Chargé copies. On February 9, the Secretary gave copies of the condensed text to French Ambassador Alphand and British Chargé Greenhill and asked for their governments' comments. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) See the Supplement. Copies of the marked-up longer version as well as Tyler's memorandum are attached to this memorandum of conversation. Also attached is a February 11 note from Swank to Tyler, stating that Secretary Rusk commented that both the oral statement and the revision thereof should be classified "confidential."

⁶ See [Document 257](#).

262. Editorial Note

On February 8, 1963, from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m., President Kennedy presided over a meeting on U.S. test ban policy in the Cabinet Room of the White House, attended by Vice President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, Gilpatric, Nitze, Foster, Fisher, McCone, Wiesner, and McGeorge Bundy. Seaborg recorded the following account of the discussion: “At the beginning of the meeting I informed the President that the four underground tests today, that is, the two pairs of tests, took place without apparent incident. In response to questions by the President, I explained the timing of the tests and the purpose of such timing, including the study of the capability for detection of simultaneous tests.

“Foster then began to discuss the U.S. position in the test ban negotiations, for which he is going to Geneva tomorrow. He said that the U.S.-USSR test series had not upset the balance, and that the key to any test ban is underground tests because the detection of the other types is easy and not at issue. The only way in which some imbalance might be introduced through testing is in the yield-to-weight ratio and in the development of pure fusion weapons.”

Dean then described his talks with Kuznetsov on on-site inspections; see [Document 251](#). The meeting continued:

“Foster said that the number of automatic seismic recording stations is another issue. He said he would like to have authority to go eventually to six on-site inspections as a fall-back position. He traced the reasoning by which 450 seismic events in the USSR can be reduced to 45 or 50 suspicious events, and thus we would be inspecting one out of six or seven. He thinks that this number can be further reduced to 25 or 30 by unilateral intelligence.

“Nitze said that the people in DOD regard the number of suspicious events as being larger than that stated by Foster. McNamara felt that this matter ought to be studied by a group to examine the range of numbers, and that he would like to be a member of that group.

“I pointed out that the conditions for the on-site inspections are important. I said that the people in AEC feel that 500 to 700 square kilometers of area should be subject to inspection, rather than 300-500. I also mentioned the concept of an elliptical area for inspection, which could allow a smaller area to be adequate than is the case for a circular area.

“Foster said he feels that five to ten automatic recording stations at the right locations might be adequate. He pointed out that the USSR is offering to furnish data from their 73 seismic stations daily, and that we would offer daily data from our 76 seismic stations. These do not include, in either case, the classified seismic stations.

“The President asked whether McNamara would agree to six on-site inspections, with about a 500 square kilometer area of the shape that I suggested. McNamara said that he would support the six, but he needs to go into the matter in more details.

“Rusk said that we should get other matters, such as the shapes of the areas, etc., nailed down before we go into the numbers. The President said he thinks six should be the rock-bottom position and that it should be left to Foster how to present it, and as to when to bring out the number six. He asked whether this could all be worked out in the next few days. McNamara thought it could, with representatives of DOD, plus Wiesner's, McCone's, Foster's and my people working on it.

“The President said we should proceed on the assumption that the USSR will cheat, and then work out the advantages, that is, compare what they might gain by cheating with the advantages that banning tests would have with respect to the Chinese situation. He thought that a government briefing book should be prepared, which we could all stand on. Wiesner raised the question whether the automatic stations in the USSR would be good or bad. He said he understands that Nitze thinks they would be bad from our point of view.

“Foster indicated that he thinks we should declassify the AFTAC work because the American people don't know how good this is. It would then be possible to refute Hosmer's arguments. He also said that he, personally, thinks we need stations in the USSR.

“Rusk said he thinks they are a technical necessity and he is surprised that some think they are not. He has been basing his public statements on his understanding that they are a technical necessity.

“Nitze indicated it would be much better to have some U.S. personnel in the Soviet stations. McCone said that the USSR at one time had agreed to such stations which would include U.S. personnel. The question was merely whether the number should be 17 or 21. He pointed out that the people on the Hill are concerned about the continual lowering of our numbers. He recalled that at one time Killian argued that 100 on-site inspections per year was the absolute minimum.

“The President said that, in his opinion, the whole reason for having a test ban is related to the Chinese situation. Otherwise, it wouldn't be worth the disruption and fighting with Congress, etc.

“Nitze said that, if the French kept testing during a period of a test ban treaty, the Russians would abrogate anyway. The President raised the question whether we could give information on weapons to the French and hence encourage them to stop testing. Nitze said he feels the Russians would then worry about Germany's getting the information, and this would lead to a bad situation. Perhaps it would be better to get the Russians to agree ahead of time to accept the French testing situation.

“The President then asked about the procedure for getting material ready in the next few days. Bundy said there are materials on hand which he thinks could be circulated tomorrow. Then we should sit down with a minimum number of people and this could be worked out after the President leaves the meeting.

“The President felt that we shouldn't discuss the number six on-site inspections with the JCAE at this time. The President asked what the neutral nations prefer in this regard, and Foster said that they are pushing for three to eight on-site inspections.

“Rusk again said that we should work on all aspects of the treaty, except the numbers, at the start.

“After the President and Vice President left, the group met further. It was decided to work up in the next few days a briefing book, along the lines discussed at the meeting. This book, for example, would trace in detail how the 450 seismic events per year are reduced to some 45 or 50 suspicious events.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 5, pages 140-142)

Neither the briefing book mentioned in Seaborg’s account nor later references to it have been found.

Seaborg, Fisher, Long, Scoville, Nitze, Keeny, Wiesner, and others attended follow-on meetings on February 9 and 15 to define the U.S. positions at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, including the number of unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union each year, the number of on-site inspections, and the kind of inspections required. (ibid., pages 142 and 156) These meetings were preparatory for a meeting of the Committee of Principals with the President on February 18; see [Document 264](#).

263. Memorandum of Conversation Source

Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

The Secretary expressed the hope that it might be possible to agree at Geneva not only on a nuclear test ban but on other aspects of disarmament as well.¹ He had spoken to the President this morning concerning the Ambassador's call on February 7 at which time non-proliferation had been discussed² and he wished to repeat that at this stage the Soviets are still "boxing shadows" on this issue. The Soviets are concerned about something which is not yet in being. Furthermore, we make a real distinction between a multilateral force and national nuclear forces. This idea of extending national capabilities is not United States policy and is contrary to our own interests.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked when the Soviet Government might expect an official reply to their approaches on United States attempts to establish a multilateral force.

The Secretary replied that there were many complex questions involved and that it would be some time before there was an official reply. With regard to the Nassau Agreement, the United Kingdom and United States will assign some national forces to NATO but these assignments did not involve the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Ambassador said that speaking personally it appeared as though the United States Government was asking the Soviet Government to sit still while the United States completed a long negotiation with its allies on a multilateral nuclear force. Only then did the United States intend to deal with the Soviet concerns.

The Secretary said he thought he could clarify our position on this matter. We are now waiting to hear from the French Government on the subject of the multilateral force. We also believe that it is important for France to be a signatory to the first part of our proposed treaty on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons since the French have an atomic capability. When we get the French answer and assuming that it is positive, then we can talk with the Soviets and work out a treaty on non-proliferation in detail. We do not need to wait for the multilateral force agreement to be completed before reaching agreement on non-transfer with the Soviets. Indeed, a Four Power agreement on this subject could, in the Secretary's opinion, be reached before the conclusion of an agreement with our allies on a multilateral force.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

¹ Reference is to the talks at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which were to resume in Geneva on February 12.

² Regarding Dobrynin's February 7 meeting with the Secretary, see [Document 261](#). Secretary Rusk met with the President from 11 to 11:30 a.m. on February 9 (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book), but no account of their conversation has been found.

264. Editorial Note

Following discussions between concerned agency principals and the President on February 8, 1963, and among agency representatives on February 9 and 15 (see [Document 262](#)), ACDA developed a revised paper containing recommended U.S. positions at the Geneva test ban talks. Fisher, Acting Director of ACDA, circulated this 30-page paper, which included Annexes A-D, under cover of a February 17 memorandum to the Committee of Principals, for discussion at a meeting with the President the following day. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 2/15-28/63) Fisher also forwarded a copy of the ACDA paper to the President, under cover of a February 17 memorandum. His memorandum summarized the recommendations of the paper as follows:

- “1. The U.S. should be prepared to accept a number of on-site inspections which would serve as a reasonable deterrent to clandestine underground testing. In view of the total assessment of the probable number of events of real interest for on-site inspections, the U.S. should be prepared to accept a quota of six on-site inspections annually.
- “2. The U.S. should propose an on-site inspection procedure under which the U.S.-U.K. and the U.S.S.R. inspect each other on the basis of agreed criteria, rather than relying on an international commission for the inspection. The agreed criteria should include scientific criteria for the location of a seismic event on the basis of U.S.-U.K. data and an agreed area surrounding this location. The proposed area is a circle of 500 square kilometers, or alternatively a 300 square kilometer ellipse with specified orientation and with a maximum length of semi-major axis of not over 15 kilometers. The agreed criteria would permit both the U.S.-U.K. and the U.S.S.R. to exclude from inspection a building in the area if they justified this exclusion in a report explaining that it was a sensitive defense installation. An abuse of this provision would be stated to be a violation of the treaty.
- “3. The U.S. should continue to propose that 7 automatic recording seismic stations should be installed in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. as a supplement to the national systems of the U.S.-U.K. and the U.S.S.R., respectively,

but should be prepared to accept 5. This is a question on which opinions differ and it is recommended that you consider the argument set forth on pages 19-22 of the attached paper. The U.S. should not regard these stations as playing a major role in the inspection system and should not reduce its minimum needs for on-site inspections in return for concessions with respect to automatic recording seismic stations.

“4. The U.S. would not insist that France or Communist China be part of the treaty but the U.S. would include a withdrawal clause (for testing by a non-party) that would permit withdrawal only after two years from notice which would have to be given no later than six months after a test of a non-party. A recommended fall-back would be a withdrawal clause similar to that in the August 27, 1962 comprehensive test ban treaty which permits withdrawal after 60 days by a party if it judges that a test by a non-party has jeopardized its national security and calls a conference to present its case.”

Fisher added that following the President’s decision on these proposals, ACDA would promptly circulate a draft treaty. (Ibid.)

The only record found of the meeting between the Committee of Principals and the President on February 18 is McCone’s 1-page memorandum for the record of February 19, which he prepared from handwritten notes. This memorandum provided only an outline of the major points of discussion on intelligence capabilities, threshold levels, test areas, black boxes, and the withdrawal clause. Attached to this memorandum for the record is a 2-page memorandum by McCone, February 18, which is critical of ACDA’s February 17 position paper. Among other criticisms, McCone believed that the Soviets could conduct a series of underground tests without detection by available intelligence sources. McCone may have used this paper in his report on intelligence at the February 18 meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, McCone Files, Meetings with President, 1/1/63-3/31/63) See the Supplement.

As a result of this February 18 meeting, instructions mainly covering the question of inspection were transmitted to the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (TODIS 806 to Geneva, February 18; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE)) See the

Supplement. According to Seaborg (who did not attend the February 18 meeting but was represented by Haworth), the Committee of Principals accepted the ACDA proposals on inspection procedures at this meeting, and these procedures were formally submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 1. (Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, pages 189-190) For text of this U.S.-U.K. memorandum (U.N. doc. ENDC/78), see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pages 141-145.

265. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, February 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy

Mr. William E. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE

Among the subjects discussed was non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that the U.S., several weeks ago, had asked for French comments on a draft proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.^{[1](#)} We had received no reply and did not know how to interpret French silence. He said that this case typified what he considered a lack of communication. Ambassador Alphand said that Ambassador Bohlen had seen Couve de Murville today on that subject. He read from a telegram and said that the French position was that the French had no objection to our discussing this proposal with the Soviets but that they could not give us a commitment that they approved in principle. It was not “their” negotiation, but “ours”. The French could not give their formal consent in advance to a negotiation in which they are not taking part.^{[2](#)}

The Secretary said that there was no plan on our part to keep this a bilateral negotiation. We were not asking to act as France’s agent. Ambassador Alphand suggested that we should undertake discussions with the Soviets on this subject; if the Soviets asked about the French position we should ask about the Soviet position. The Secretary said that we would not act as go-between Moscow and Paris. He pointed out that we would be in an impossible situation if, in discussing this problem with the Soviets, we were completely uncertain about the position of one of our allies. We had received substantive comments on the proposal from the British and from the Germans. We had received no substantive comment from the French.

Ambassador Alphand gave his opinion that the French saw the following difficulties: 1) if Sino-Soviet relations do not improve, the Chinese Communists would not sign the proposal and there would be no agreement; on the other hand if these relations were to improve the agreement risked to be merely a piece of paper without much value. 2) The Soviet interpretation about non-proliferation differed from that of the U.S. The Soviets were opposed to nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries no matter where ultimate control rested. Consequently, the Soviets would insist on not stationing nuclear forces outside the territorial limits of the nuclear powers. For example, the Soviets have already said that they are opposed to the concept of the multilateral force.

The Secretary noted that this was a substantive comment. Ambassador Alphand said that these views had been expressed to the Secretary by Couve when he saw him last December. The Secretary said the Soviets might be prepared to withhold nuclear cooperation from the Chinese if the West withheld nuclear cooperation from the Germans. Ambassador Alphand asked whether the Soviets had said so. The Secretary said that the Soviets had not specifically said so but that there was a strong implication that this would be their position.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether the non-proliferation proposal was linked to the Berlin talks. The Secretary said that it was precisely in order to avoid such a link that we proposed to take up non-proliferation in a wider framework. Obviously, we certainly did not wish to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Soviets on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany.

Ambassador Alphand noted that the subjects that could be discussed with the Soviets were Berlin, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the problem of frontiers. He wondered which of these subjects would be discussed at this stage. The Secretary said perhaps eventually there could be exploration on other subjects than Berlin but only after considerable progress had been made on Berlin and then only after closest consultations with our allies. For example, we could hardly be expected to undertake exploratory talks on arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO without having first

obtained the full consent of NATO. Our purpose was to see what the Soviets had to propose with regard to access to Berlin and Western troop presence.

* Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on March 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. A memorandum of their discussion on U.S.-French relations is printed in [vol. XIII, pp. 760-761](#).

¹ Regarding this U.S. draft declaration, see [Document 249](#).

² In telegram 3447 from Paris, February 28, Ambassador Bohlen reported on his conversation that day with Couve de Murville. On non-proliferation, Couve took the same position as Ambassador Alphand. Bohlen "pointed out that you [Rusk] had discussed this matter with him last autumn following a conversation with Gromyko at the UN and had given him the document last December since which time we had had no French reaction. Couve merely repeated what he had said earlier but did say that if the Soviets reacted toward this document favorably and the Chinese seem disposed to join, the French Government would then be before a decision whereas now they were before a hypothesis. This was as much of a French position as I could get from Couve and he showed no disposition to take it up with de Gaulle or the French Government, which indicated to me that this had been the established French position." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) Bohlen's telegram arrived in the Department at 4:25 p.m. on February 28, but the Secretary apparently did not see it before this meeting with Ambassador Alphand.

266. Memorandum for the File [Source](#)

Washington, March 5, 1963.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

1. Over the past two weeks I have had several discussions concerning nuclear test ban agreement. The purpose of this memorandum is to record the position that I have taken:
 - a. In discussions with Mr. Foster and the Executive Committee¹ I have stated that the intelligence input which is referred to in the Disarmament Position Paper² is based very largely on special intelligence which has to do with the travels of individuals and the movement of equipment related to Soviet nuclear testing. I pointed out that these intelligence sources might readily be lost by the establishment of land lines and the taking of other precautionary steps on the part of the Soviets which would lose these intelligence sources to us.
 - b. In my talks with Foster I asked him the specific question as to how far the Soviets could go in underground testing and be free of detection and identification under his proposed system of utilizing national seismic resources plus black boxes, plus 8 to 10 on-site inspections per year. He responded that the upper limit would be one kiloton in granite, 2 kiloton in tuff, and 10 to 20 kiloton in alluvium. He then added that under the theory of probabilities that it was probably unrealistic to assume the Soviets could conduct a series of tests at these limits without getting caught; however they could conduct a single test and probably get away with it in Foster's opinion. I then told Foster that under those circumstances, I could not support the treaty and while I would not oppose it, since doing so would not be consistent with my position on the part of the President's organization, nevertheless I wanted him to understand that my position before Committees of Congress in both closed and open hearings, in a number of public speeches, in press conferences and in TV appearances such as "Meet the Press," I have taken a position which

called for the suspension of only those tests which could be reasonably verified and since the thresholds he mentioned were sufficiently high to permit Soviet nuclear weapon development, when we would be foreclosed from doing so, my subscribing to the proposed treaty would be inconsistent with what I thought was the right thing to do and what I had consistently advocated publicly. Foster said he thought I should talk to the President.

2. I did meet with the President on 20 February 1963 and I did review this matter substantially as outlined above for I wished him to understand my position. The President made no particular comment although he did recognize my position. I went on to say that I doubted if such a treaty would be approved by the Senate and the President concurred in this view.³
3. At a reception given by President Betancourt for President Kennedy,⁴ Secretary McNamara came to me, reviewed his difficulties with this subject before the Senate Armed Services Committee and proposed a most dynamic action on the Hill in the interests of getting the treaty, which he felt imminent, approved by the Senate. I told Secretary McNamara my position as outlined above and this resulted in an exchange of views as to the relative US/USSR position in nuclear weapon technology with, or without, testing. Secretary McNamara seemed to feel that we were better off with a test ban treaty even though the Soviets cheated a little bit than we would be otherwise. I disagreed with this viewpoint.
4. At a dinner on Wednesday, February 27th, Senator Symington queried me and I told him that for the reasons which are outlined above, I could not support the treaty, that I would not oppose it, that the Soviets could make important advances by clandestine testing under the threshold, and that these advances would be significant and important but probably would not affect the relative US/USSR balance of power, although the USSR would make advances in the nuclear weapon field by clandestine testing which we would be deprived from making. On Friday, March 1, in flying south, Senator George Smathers asked me my ideas and I expressed the same concern as I did to Senator Symington.

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers—Nuclear Test Ban, 3/1/63-1/21/64. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

¹ See [Documents 260](#) and [264](#).

² See [Document 264](#).

³ McCone's memorandum of this February 20 meeting with the President contained ten points covering many subjects. Points 6 and 7 summarized their discussion on the test ban issue:

“6. I told the President that I was concerned over the concessions in the test ban treaty; we had gone far past my public position and that I felt the treaty if negotiated would encounter great difficulty on the Hill. The President said he felt the treaty would not be worked out, and if it was, he concurred that the securing of a two-thirds vote was almost an impossibility.

“7. The President questioned the need for further nuclear development except in the field of anti-ballistic missiles, and I suggested, and he agreed, to meet with the laboratory directors, indicating that they felt their particular points of view had not reached those in a policy making position. The President then stated that the China problem was the only reason for pursuing this negotiation.” (Central Intelligence Agency, McCone Files, Meetings with President, 1/1/63-3/31/63)

⁴ The reception was held on February 20. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books)

267. Editorial Note

On March 16, 1963, Prime Minister Macmillan sent a 13-page letter to President Kennedy. Following a brief account of the status of a multilateral nuclear force for NATO, Macmillan provided a 10-page review of the test ban negotiations. This review included extensive summaries of the Soviet resumption of testing in the fall of 1961, the Bermuda announcement in December 1961, and several letters between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan and Khrushchev. He also described the “considerable progress” in the most recent negotiations, especially the Soviets' public acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection and narrowing the differences on numbers per year to three by the Soviet Union and seven on the U.S. side, but cited the continuing “deadlock based upon the question of number.” Macmillan also included his analyses of Khrushchev’s thinking on the test ban issue, the dangers of proliferation, and the urgent need to seek simultaneously a non-dissemination agreement. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Correspondence, Vol. IV) See the Supplement.

In the last part of the letter, Macmillan suggested various options for pushing the negotiations forward toward an agreement.

“So we come to the problem of how we are to renew the negotiations with a view to bringing them to a satisfactory conclusion. Looking back to our declaration in 1962 I am bound to say that I feel myself under an obligation to act in accordance with what I then said. Certainly in my statement, which perhaps went further than yours, I undertook to do something about it in either of two situations, one of which is now approaching.

“There are various possibilities;

“(a) I can see the disadvantage in merely offering five inspections through the Geneva negotiators with no certainty that this would be accepted. A rejection would be very bad politically for you, although not so much for me.

“(b) I can see the dangers involved, although I think the advantages might well outweigh them, in simply suggesting that we all three should meet and try to settle the matter. If the West then offered five and Khrushchev stood out, our position might not be very dignified, but it would not be ignoble.

“(c) We could summon a Conference on the understanding that the conditions of the inspections were first brought near to a conclusion, so that we should only have to settle the final steps to be taken on these together with the question of numbers. But it would still be a risk.

“(d) Or, if it was better for you, I could write to you and Khrushchev either privately or publicly or both, suggesting that we should all meet at Geneva. If he refused, it would be a great disappointment and we should not get the agreement, but again it would not be discreditable.

“(e) Before suggesting either jointly or separately a conference of the Heads of Governments, we might make some further soundings.

“In this connection, I still feel there is something queer about Khrushchev’s move towards accepting the principle of inspection. There may have been some genuine misunderstanding in his mind, or perhaps some misunderstanding or misrepresentation by those Russians who reported to him what they picked up in Geneva. Possibly therefore you could send some personal message to Khrushchev on this matter or perhaps some emissary such as Averell or even your brother Bobby who would both clear up any misunderstanding and find out whether there was a chance of settling round about five or by some juggling with the numbers, including the conception of bisques and the limit for any one year, coupled of course with what I think could be made very attractive to Khrushchev, the non-dissemination aspect.

“Some of my telegrams report that he is supposed to have lost interest in the nuclear test ban but if that is so, it may well be because he has not had the non-dissemination aspect sufficiently impressed upon him.

“I am sorry to inflict so long a letter on you, but I feel this very deep personal obligation upon me and it is one which in some form or another, I must discharge, before it is too late. I do not, as you know, want to trouble you on the telephone but I would be very glad to hear first from you either

through David Gore or by teleprinter message, and then perhaps we could have a talk to clarify any outstanding points.”

Macmillan’s reference to “our declaration of 1962” presumably is to the joint statement from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev, April 9, 1962. His recollection of “my statement” presumably refers to Macmillan’s message to Khrushchev, April 10, 1962. See [Document 170](#).

Macmillan’s letter was sent to Ambassador David Ormsby Gore for delivery to the President. Ormsby Gore presumably left the letter at the White House with Carl Kaysen in the absence of the President and McGeorge Bundy, who were away from the White House March 15-20. Kaysen forwarded a copy of this letter under cover of a March 19 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Ball. According to this memorandum, Ormsby Gore intended to deliver some additional oral comments on this letter personally to the President and was tentatively scheduled to meet with him on the morning of March 21. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Correspondence, Vol. IV) The Ambassador met off the record with the President on March 21 from 12:07 to 12:40 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books)

268. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, March 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

Letter to the President from the Prime Minister, dated March 16, 1963^{[1](#)}

I cannot help but be very suspicious of the Prime Minister's letter. His letter was written the day the British, American, and Soviet scientists were meeting in London,^{[2](#)} and I wonder if the British did not have an approach similar to the one made to Kistiakowsky.^{[3](#)} Moreover, although Macmillan proposes a meeting solely on the test ban, he cannot but be aware of the effect which such a meeting would have on de Gaulle and Adenauer.

I suggest that in reply, the President should express the opinion that the timing is wrong and point out that Mr. Khrushchev appears to be having both internal problems and a bitter quarrel with the Chicom, which is coming to a head, both of which factors make it unlikely that he would, at this time, be disposed to make the necessary concessions.

The Chinese angle can, of course, be argued both ways. On the one hand, Khrushchev's strategy appears to be to put the blame for any break upon the Chinese, and his agreement to a test ban would spoil that strategy. On the other hand, it could be argued that a test ban agreement would prove that it is possible to reach meaningful agreements with the West.^{[4](#)} In view of the importance to Khrushchev of the Chinese problem, and his repeated statements that a test ban is not disarmament and therefore not really of great importance, I think his struggle with the Chinese would take precedence in his mind.

I suggest the President could point out that we may get some reading of Soviet intentions from the Berlin talks which start next week, and from the proposals which the eight non-aligned countries are preparing to put forward in Geneva. Khrushchev's primary interest in a test ban relates to Communist China and West Germany. If he anticipates a break with Red

China, as now appears to be the case, and if he really thinks as he professes to do that the West Germans are on the way to getting an atomic capability either through the Franco-German Treaty or the multilateral force, there is little reason for him to pay the price of inspection for something which would not meet his principal objectives.

Although Macmillan does not actually suggest that he go to Moscow himself, it seems to me that the letter is designed either to bring this possibility to the President's mind or prepare the way for a subsequent proposal on his part to do just that.

While I can see considerable advantage to a meeting between the President and Khrushchev by way of clearing up misunderstandings, in view of the slight prospects of success on any one subject and the further strain which such a meeting is likely to put upon the Alliance, I think a meeting at this time would be most unwise.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Top Secret. Also addressed to Under Secretary Ball.

¹ See [Document 267](#).

² Reference is to a group of U.S., Soviet, and U.K. scientists who met in London March 16-18 under the auspices of the Pugwash Continuing Committee to discuss nuclear testing. Three of the U.S. attendees and several Soviet and British participants signed a statement indicating that because of marked progress in methods for identifying underground nuclear tests and the narrowing of differences on the number of on-site inspections, the issues were no longer technical but political. (Telegram 3604 from London, March 18; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) Another U.S. scientist, Frank Press, dissented from the statement in a March 20 letter to the three U.S. signatories. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/RIC/R Files: FRC 77 A 10, Conferences, Pugwash (COSWA)) Additional documentation on this London meeting is *ibid*.

³ In the left margin opposite the second clause of this sentence is the following handwritten notation by Rusk: "Yes tell LET[hompson] DR". A note from Emory Swank (S/S) to Thompson, March 22, attached to the

source text, calls this notation to Thompson's attention. The approach to George Kistiakowsky presumably refers to a message the Soviet physicist L. Artsimovich gave to Kistiakowsky in London to convey to U.S. authorities. (Kistiakowsky had earlier served as President Eisenhower's science adviser.) In a March 25 memorandum to Fisher, Goodby wrote in part: "we were treating the message with caution and with reserve, but we were taking it seriously and were acting on the assumption that the message might indeed foreshadow a change in official Soviet policy." (Ibid.) The message has not been further identified.

⁴ A handwritten notation in the margin next to the sentence, presumably by Secretary Rusk, reads: "none".

269. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, March 28, 1963.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER, I should like to think that through action by our two governments we could move the Soviet Union promptly to accept a reasonable quota of on-site inspections and an adequate system for making these inspections meaningful. I studied your suggestions carefully with this in mind.^{[1](#)}

It seems to me that we have to consider the chances of our successfully engaging the Soviet Union in serious negotiations against the background of what is now evidently going on in Moscow. Khrushchev appears to be maneuvering either to realign the policies of Communist China and the Soviet Union or to place the blame on Peiping if Soviet-Chinese relations cannot be repaired. At the same time, Khrushchev has had to confront the Soviet people with the prospect of no improvement in their material well-being because of continuing heavy expenditures resulting from military requirements. In addition, there seems to be another internal bureaucratic reorganization in process.

Khrushchev probably has too many problems on his hands right now to give the test ban the attention it deserves. In any case, it seems likely that Khrushchev is not yet ready to make the definite move towards the West which a further Soviet concession on the test ban would represent. Given this situation, I am inclined to think that an abrupt Western initiative concerning the quota number might only serve to precipitate a Soviet decision unfavorable to our interests. I suspect that Khrushchev will have to bide his time before he can make a further move.

This does not mean we should drop all conversations with the Soviets on the test ban question. The recent discussions between American and British scientists and Soviet scientists in London produced some suggestions of possible interest.^{[2](#)} I tend to regard the Soviet side of the conversation as a scouting expedition designed to give the Soviet Government a basis for

deciding whether any further movement by Moscow would be worthwhile. I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Government must have a reasonably good idea that the United States is ready to negotiate and that the last word on our position has not been said.

Your idea of making a test ban more appealing to the Soviet Government by a parallel agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is one which I would like to think more about. As a general principle, I dislike the thought of tying one difficult problem to another, lest neither one be solved. I am inclined to think that a test ban treaty must stand or fall on its own merits.

You are familiar with our hopes, after Dean Rusk's very informal conversation with Gromyko, that we might get somewhere on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.³ You and we see that question in the same way. The Germans are a bit nervous but would probably come along but the French have thus far been unwilling to become involved or to give us a clear answer as to their position.⁴ The Soviet attitude towards the multilateral force has stiffened to the point now where the Soviet Union gives evidence of unwillingness to adhere to a non-dissemination declaration of the type which we have been proposing. This attitude may very well be dictated by tactical considerations but I think we need to have further discussions with the Soviet Union before we can assume that a non-dissemination agreement is negotiable. You will be hearing from David Bruce if you have not already done so about our thought of inviting the French to join in Four Power talks with the Soviet Union on a possible non-dissemination agreement. If they decline, I would think that we ought to explore further with the Russians the possibility of a practicable agreement aimed at national nuclear capability, in connection with which I think we could satisfy them on the realities of the multilateral arrangements we have in mind.

On the question of a meeting with Chairman Khrushchev, I do not think that we should seek such a meeting simply to settle the on-site inspection quota number and I take it you also see difficulties in this. I would find it quite awkward to agree on a number in a meeting with Khrushchev before I had any idea as to whether the other issues related to a test ban verification

system could be satisfactorily settled. If, on the other hand, there was reason to believe that all the issues but the quota number could be satisfactorily resolved and if a discussion of other important issues could be usefully discussed with Khrushchev, then I would be prepared to consider such a meeting. Perhaps we should now consider sending a joint letter to Khrushchev, at a suitable time, to see what the prospects are for real progress in the immediate future. I should like to know what you think about the enclosed draft.⁵

You mentioned the idea of departing from the annual quota concept in favor of a more flexible plan for using on-site inspections. I think this is a good idea and is an area where early negotiation might be possible. I could accept either a quota covering a period of several years or an annual quota from which inspections could be “borrowed” for application in succeeding years. As you know, the eight new delegations in the disarmament talks have advanced an idea along these lines and apparently intend to submit this proposal formally to the Conference. Unfortunately, there has also been talk of a range of numbers which would be included in the Eight-Nation proposal. As you are aware, your people and ours have been attempting to persuade the Eight to refrain from including numbers in their plan. My thought has been that we should wait until the Eight have submitted their proposal before accepting or proposing a variation in the quota idea. We could then accept at least that part of their plan. If the Eight have not submitted their proposal by the time of the Easter recess, however, I believe we should then consider putting the idea to the Soviet Government officially.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy⁶

⁵ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan Correspondence, Vol. II. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the message was sent by the White House channel. A draft of this message, identical to the source text, is attached to a March 27 memorandum from Foster to McGeorge Bundy,

which indicates that the draft was approved by Secretary Rusk after review by Thompson and Tyler. (Ibid.)

¹ Reference is to Macmillan's March 16 letter; see [Document 267](#).

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 268](#).

³ Reference presumably is to Secretary Rusk's dinner conversation with Gromyko in Geneva on July 22, 1962; see [footnote 3](#), [Document 198](#) and [footnote 6](#), [Document 201](#).

⁴ See [Document 265](#).

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Kennedy's signature appears in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.

270. Editorial Note

In a memorandum to the President of April 3, 1963, Robert Kennedy stated that he had that afternoon received from Ambassador Dobrynin a message of about 25 pages that was “ostensibly to me from the Ambassador” but in fact “from Khrushchev to the President.” Kennedy returned the document to Dobrynin because “it was so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it or transmit its message” and told Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union had a message “of that kind to deliver it should be delivered formally through the State Department and not through me.”

The Attorney General did, however, summarize the message in his memorandum. The portion of the summary dealing with the test ban reads:

“Mr. Khrushchev knew that President Kennedy has children and is concerned about the future. He, Mr. Khrushchev, has children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. He is also concerned about the future. It should be clearly understood, however, that the Soviet Union will not go above their offer of two or three inspection sites. There was absolutely no need to go above that figure as our scientists had clearly demonstrated.

“There could not be a secret testing without the other country knowing about it. We knew every time the Soviet Union tested as they knew every time we tested.

“As for obtaining the approval of the United States Senate for a treaty which contained provisions for only two or three sites, if President Kennedy wanted to put his prestige on the line and make the necessary effort, ratification could be obtained. Mr. Khrushchev was tired of hearing first about objections from the Senator from Connecticut and then objections from the Senator from Arizona.

“The United States is run by capitalists who are interested only in war profits. They are the ones that were dictating policy. If President Kennedy

was not as concerned about the Rockefellers and these capitalists then he would take this step for world peace.

“Further, who did we think we were in the United States trying to dictate to the Soviet Union? All that was needed were two or three inspection sites and we were trying to obtain a greater number in order to commit espionage. In these efforts we were treating the Soviet Union as inferiors—as if we could dictate to them. The United States had better learn that the Soviet Union was as strong as the United States and did not enjoy being treated as a second class power. (Virtually, these same words were repeated later on in the letter. This was the thread or theme that ran through the whole document.)”

Other topics treated in the summary were alleged U.S. harassment of Soviet shipping, U.S. policy toward Cuba, and deployment of U.S. Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean. Text of this portion of the summary is printed in [volume XI](#). “At the end of the document it said that Mr. Khrushchev had felt in the past that this confidential exchange had been helpful but he said it had not been used lately because of the provocative statements that had been made by representatives of the United States Government which were offensive to the Soviet Union. However, if President Kennedy wanted to reopen this area of contact he would be glad to accept it. He also said that as far as a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy he thought that that might be helpful. This was, however, left in rather enigmatic terms.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963)

In an April 5 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson speculated on possible causes and motives for Khrushchev’s message in a context depicting Khrushchev as being under strong pressure from the Soviet military after a series of foreign policy setbacks. A possible cause relating to disarmament was that “Soviet military may have reluctantly agreed to three atomic test inspections under pressure from Khrushchev who may really have believed this would achieve agreement.” As one of many possible motives, Thompson stated: “He may be using this message to bring about a Summit or high-level meeting to deal with the points listed above as well as other

issues such as a test ban in order to decide how to handle his Chicom problem.” (Ibid.)

271. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy [Source](#)

London, April 3, 1963.

DEAR FRIEND, Thank you for your message of March 28¹ about Nuclear Tests, which I have carefully studied.

I quite agree that we are in a period of some uncertainty and that Khrushchev is preoccupied with his Chinese problem. This may make him unwilling to move unless he can see the possibility of substantial progress in the policy of peaceful co-existence with the West to which he is committed. At the same time, if he is convinced that we are making a serious attempt at least to solve the nuclear test question, he may be attracted by the idea of making a start here. He might hope that an agreement on one subject might lead on to the solution of others, thereby leaving him a freer hand inside the Sino-Soviet bloc. At any rate I do not see how we can be sure what his reactions will be unless we make an approach to him; even if he turns it down we shall be in a better position than if we just do nothing. I agree, therefore, that it would be worth now trying the effect of a joint letter from us to Khrushchev on the nuclear tests issue. At the same time I doubt if an approach on the lines which you suggested will be sufficiently attractive to move Khrushchev, and if our initiative is to have any chance of success we must, in my view, phrase our letter somewhat differently. I have tried my hand at the sort of letter which might be sent and I enclose my draft for your consideration.

There are various considerations which I have taken into account in my re-draft of the message to Khrushchev. First of all, I feel that if we are to attract him at all we ought not to write a letter of a character which Khrushchev might interpret as an attempt to involve him in technical arguments; in other words, we should not give the impression that we are trying to get him to concede to us in advance points which his negotiators have not agreed. I do not, therefore, think that it is wise to concentrate on the content of the test ban treaty; it seems better to speak in more general terms. Secondly, I doubt if Khrushchev regards the Geneva 18-nation

conference with much more reverence than de Gaulle has shown, and I do not think that he will take our joint letter seriously if we propose in it that the 18-nation meeting should be the forum for discussion between us. Finally, I am afraid that Khrushchev does not have the same respect as we do for Foreign Ministers. You will remember that last year Khrushchev seemed to lose interest in the Geneva conference when we suggested meeting at Foreign Ministers' level, and we know how little importance he attaches to Gromyko. So I do not think that he will be intrinsically attracted to the idea of a Foreign Ministers' meeting. In addition, it seems to me that in present circumstances a Foreign Ministers' meeting has all the disadvantages of arousing publicity and expectations, so that, in fact, it would be almost impossible to keep discussions at such a meeting really confidential for long. So it seems likely to fall between two stools; it would neither be secret nor decisive. I think, therefore, that it is better not to mention it at all.

I have thought a great deal about your point of not mixing up two ideas. Of course to speak of nuclear tests and non-dissemination agreement in the same breath is not quite the same, for example, as bargaining Cuba against Berlin, for after all tests and non-dissemination are closely related aspects of the same subject which is the control of nuclear power in the world. At the same time I quite see that a non-dissemination agreement at the moment may present great difficulties with the French as well as with the Chinese. I do believe, however, that it must have considerable attractions for Khrushchev as well as for ourselves. So as you will see, I have inserted the idea in my draft of keeping a link between the two subjects, but without giving any very precise formula.

If you are able to agree something on the lines of my suggestions, two other points arise; the timing of the letter and the method of its delivery. As regards timing, the position may be complicated by the proposed Memorandum which the eight neutral nations in Geneva have been thinking of putting forward. It may be that they will agree on their proposal by about the end of this week, and in that case I think that we should time our letter to arrive a day or two after the neutrals have made their move. I understand, however, that there is some disagreement among the neutrals and that they may after all either not put in a Memorandum at all or delay it until after

Easter. If by about April 8 or 9 we know that the neutral Memorandum will be delayed, then I think that we should put in our letter anyway.

The method of presentation also needs careful thought. I must say that I am still attracted by the idea of our sending some personal emissary or emissaries to Khrushchev to explain our joint position and to emphasize the genuine seriousness with which we are approaching this question. If you thought this a good idea the best course might perhaps be to mention at the end of our letter, or in a separate oral communication to be made at the time of its delivery by our Ambassadors that a named individual or individuals will be in Moscow in a few days' time and would be able to discuss and elaborate on the letter if Khrushchev would be available.

I await your thoughts with keen anticipation.

With warm regards,

Harold Macmillan²

Enclosure

Draft Message to Mr. Khrushchev

Dear Mr. Chairman, You will recall that in February and March 1962, we had some correspondence about the Geneva disarmament conference, and in particular about the possibility of reaching agreement on the text of a treaty to ban nuclear tests. Both President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I pledged ourselves to take a personal interest in the progress of this conference on which so many of the hopes of mankind have been fixed. Last October we both indicated in messages to you our intention to devote renewed efforts to the problem of disarmament with particular reference to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the banning of nuclear tests.

Since then the Geneva meeting has continued but it has not reached the point of definite agreement. Nevertheless, some encouraging advance has been made. For example, your acceptance of the principle of on-the-spot verification of unidentified events has been of great value. Equally, the

Western countries have been able to reduce the number of annual inspections for which they felt it essential to ask, from about twenty down to seven. The difference remaining is of course real and substantial, if only because it presents in practical form the effects of two different lines of reasoning. At the same time the actual difference between the three inspections which you have proposed and the seven for which we are asking, important though this is, should not be impossible to resolve. As regards the automatic seismic stations, the difference between us appears to be fairly narrow.

We all have a duty to consider what are the needs of security; but we also have a duty to humanity. President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I therefore believe that we ought to make a further serious attempt by the best available means to see if we cannot bring this matter to a conclusion with your help.

We know that it is argued that a nuclear tests agreement, although valuable and welcome especially in respect of atmospheric tests, will not by itself make a decisive contribution to the peace and security of the world. There are, of course, other questions between us which are also of great importance; but the question of nuclear tests does seem to be one on which agreement might now be reached. The mere fact of an agreement on one question will inevitably help to create confidence and so facilitate other settlements. In addition, it is surely possible that from agreement on a treaty to end nuclear tests we might be able to proceed rapidly to specific and fruitful discussions about the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This would involve an undertaking from non-nuclear countries not to accept nuclear weapons from others for their independent use, and from nuclear powers not to give nuclear weapons or information for the independent use of non-nuclear countries. Such an agreement, if it was reasonably well supported by other countries, would seem to us likely to have a profound effect upon the present state of tension in the world. If it proved possible these two matters might even, if desired, be brought to a conclusion simultaneously. Thereafter an advance to broader agreements might open up.

The practical question is how best to proceed. It may be that further discussions would reveal new possibilities from both sides as regards the

arrangements for the quota of inspections. But if we attempted to reach this point by the present methods both sides may feel unable to make an advance because this would appear to be surrendering some point of substance without obtaining a final agreement on a definite treaty in exchange. At the moment it is not only the question of numbers which holds us up, but we also have to agree on the final content of the draft treaty and in particular to decide certain important questions as to how inspection is to be carried out. You have taken the view that once the quota is agreed the other matters can easily be settled, whereas we feel that the final agreement about the number of inspections is unlikely to be possible unless most of the other matters have been first disposed of. Thus we have reached an impasse.

We should be interested to hear your suggestions as to how we are to break out of this. For our part we would be quite prepared now to arrange a private tripartite discussion. In order to emphasize the serious spirit in which we wish to talk and to facilitate agreement we suggest that this discussion should be held in secret. It might perhaps best be conducted at Geneva by our chief representatives. Could not the questions which remain to be settled be further examined so that we who bear the ultimate responsibility for decisions on this matter will have clearly before us all the major problems which remain to be settled? If we could make progress here we might then be able to envisage a meeting of the three of us in order to try to settle finally any outstanding points of a general kind dealing with the way in which a test ban verification system would operate as well as to determine the numbers of inspections which would be permitted. This seems to us to be the most practical method of proceeding. It is certainly likely, indeed probable, that a meeting of the three of us would be necessary in order to reach a final decision; but for obvious reasons it would be wise first to advance the preliminary work which would ensure that there would be no purely technical reasons why we should not be able to decide the final points in a meeting together. It is of course obvious that a meeting which resulted in a test ban treaty would open a new chapter in our relations, as well as providing an opportunity for wider discussions.

We sincerely trust that you will give serious consideration to this proposal. We believe that the nuclear tests agreement and what may follow from it is the most hopeful area in which to try for agreement between us. The

procedure which we have suggested seems to us the most practical way of achieving a result which would be welcomed all over the world.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1963. Top Secret. Attached to a note from Ormsby Gore to the President.

¹ [Document 269](#).

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

272. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence

McCone [Source](#)

Washington, April 8, 1963.

With respect to the test ban treaty, I have not gone over the last draft.¹ However, it is my understanding that the present negotiating position provides for seven on-site inspections, seven black boxes within the USSR, and an inspection area of 500 square kilometers, and that the treaty deals with all the other issues which have been developed through the years. Some consideration is being given to reducing the seven on-site inspections to six, or even to five. There is also a difference of opinion as to the value of the black boxes.

One would have to make a penetrating study of the results of the Vela experiments to make a final judgment as to the adequacy of the verification provisions of the treaty. However, Mr. Foster, at a recent Executive Committee meeting,² stated that the threshold is on the order of one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in tuff, and 10 to 20 kilotons (and possibly 30 kilotons) in alluvium. He added that this was the threshold for a single test. Based on a theory of probabilities, he further concluded that a series of tests which included a meaningful number of underground shots in a single location would, with a small number of inspections, undoubtedly be detected and identified as nuclear rather than natural.

On the basis of these threshold figures, I have expressed the view to Mr. Foster and to the President³ that the degree of verification is not sufficient, as it cannot prove adherence to a suspension of testing in an important area of yields. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S., USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the "proliferation" problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French.

As for the advantages to the United States of further testing, doing so would yield a continuing improvement in our technology through the further development of small weapons, improvement of weight/yield ratios and increased knowledge of weapons effects. With respect to the first two of these items, improvements are important. Our failure to pursue them while the Soviets do so (clandestinely) would probably deprive us of our superior nuclear position. However, this would not necessarily affect the military balance as the improvements are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although important information would be provided. With respect to effects of testing, more study would be necessary before I would have an opinion.

There is a great danger of engaging in a treaty, living under it for a number of years, and permitting our laboratories to go downhill (which they undoubtedly would do) while the Soviets covertly pursue developments in their laboratories. The Soviets could then abrogate the treaty for some reason they claim provocative, and confront us with a situation under which they had made a significant forward step in their technology. This, as will be recalled, was exactly what they did in 1961. I do not see how we can avoid this risk if we engage in a treaty unless the treaty is subscribed to by all world powers and contains substantial penalties for such abrogation.

The Plowshare problem must be considered. Meaningful Plowshare experiments involve our most advanced weapons technology and, if the inspection arrangements outlined in the treaty are undertaken, it would mean exposing to the Soviets our most advanced weapons technology. This might mean abandoning Plowshare and therefore one must consider whether Plowshare is important to our national interest.

Intelligence will make some contribution to the verification of a test ban. Some indicators which have been meaningful in the past are now lost to us, some useful indicators are still available but they, too, could be lost. Aerial surveillance might help in some circumstances, and clandestine penetrations might also help. Soviet fear of the latter might also serve as a deterrent. No useful figure can be placed on the contribution of intelligence.

It seems to me that there has been an overemphasis on the importance of the test ban treaty and the whole issue of testing for many years, and most

particularly, during the last two or three years. The issue at first centered around fallout. The most responsible scientific judgment seems to indicate that the effects of fallout were vastly overemphasized by the test ban advocates. I feel the whole issue should be brought into proper perspective and question whether much is to be gained by an agreement to stop testing so long as the United States, Soviet Union, and the British continue the production of fissionable material, nuclear weapons, and delivery systems at a high rate, and in addition, the French and the Chinese Communists pursue an independent and uncontrolled program, and rumor has it that the Israelis are now doing likewise. Hence, stopping testing does not slow down the arms race, does not remove the dangers of a nuclear holocaust, and does not end the proliferation problem.

One important consideration is that if we reach an agreement with the Soviets, we have “broken through” in our effort to negotiate with the USSR on an issue of disarmament, and this might lead to other more meaningful agreements. This consideration is important and we could sacrifice a great deal to accomplish such a “break through”. However, this consideration is of value only if the test suspension agreement provides reasonable means of verification and reasonable guarantee for conformance with all treaty terms, including some protection against unilateral revocation or abrogation of the treaty. If, however, we are reckless on the question of verification, then the “break through” will be a decided disservice to the United States' security interests because it will establish a precedent for further steps in disarmament without adequate means of verification.

I have not personally studied the most recent developments in detection and identification techniques and cannot render a judgment on the proposed treaty. However, Mr. Foster's disclosure of the threshold set forth in the second paragraph of this memorandum represents a drastic departure from US policy so often stated, i.e. we will only agree to a suspension of tests which can, in the opinion of responsible and informed people, be verified with reasonable assurance.

* Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy.

¹ Reference is to a March 23 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59, Basic Policy, Pol 3-3, Proposals to President)

² Not identified; the test ban was not discussed in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 1963.

³ In a memorandum for the record, April 4, McCone wrote he had told the President that day that former President Eisenhower had expressed opposition to the present draft treaty “because of inadequate verification, the threshold, etc.,” and that he, McCone, agreed with this position and also opposed it because “the Russians could no longer handle the Chinese situation and we and the British could no longer handle the de Gaulle situation, and hence the proliferation problem. The President seemed to agree, and restated that he did not think we were going to get a treaty anyway.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63) McCone’s memorandum of April 4 of a meeting held with Eisenhower on March 30 is *ibid*.

273. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, April 11, 1963.

As I said on the telephone,¹ I accept nearly all of your draft.² There is only one place that troubles me seriously, and that is on your page 5.³ I suggest the following alternative language to replace the three sentences which now begin “If we could make progress here”: “If our chief representatives can make some progress in clarifying the issues which remain between us, then Prime Minister Macmillan/President Kennedy and I would propose to send in due course a very senior representative who would be empowered to speak for both of us and to talk in Moscow directly with you. It is our hope that such a senior representative might be able to bring the matter close enough to a final decision so that it might then be proper to think in terms of a meeting of the three of us at which a definite agreement on a test ban could be reached.” We would then pick up your text beginning with the sentence “It is of course obvious.”

The one other part of the State Department draft⁴ which may be worth including is the reference to the neutrals' idea of a quota covering a period of several years. If this were to be included, it might go on your page 4 at line 6⁵ after the words “definite treaty in exchange,” and the language might run as follows: “It may be that we could make some progress on this question of numbers by exploring an idea which has been mentioned by the neutral nations in Geneva—the idea that a quota of on-site inspections might be agreed upon to cover a period of several years, from which inspections could be drawn under more flexible conditions than an annual quota would permit.” If this sentence were included the letter might continue: “But at the moment,” and perhaps with a new paragraph at that point.

Any message from you on this will be relayed to me most promptly at Palm Beach.⁶

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1962-1963. Secret. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Copies sent Secret Eyes Only to Amb. Thompson & ACDA/Foster."

¹ No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

² See the Enclosure to [Document 271](#).

³ In the paragraph beginning "We should be interested to hear".

⁴ This undated draft was circulated informally to the British Embassy under cover of an April 10 memorandum from Bundy to de Zulueta. The draft differed from Macmillan's April 3 draft principally in its almost total de-emphasis of the summit proposal, its avoidance of a connection between the issues of the test ban and nuclear proliferation, and its suggestion that the United States and the United Kingdom might take up with Khrushchev the proposal of the neutral nations at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for a larger number of inspections spread over a longer time period. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1962-1963)

⁵ In the paragraph beginning "The practical question is now best to proceed".

⁶ The President was in Palm Beach from midday April 11 to April 17.

274. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev [Source](#)

Washington, April 11, 1963.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel. As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.

On the negotiations for a nuclear test ban, I fear that there may have been an honest misunderstanding between us. You and your representatives, on a number of occasions, have made clear your belief that on our side there had been some indication last year of a readiness to accept the number of inspections which you proposed in your message of December 19.¹ I know that the United States Government never adopted any such position, and I have the most direct assurances from all my senior representatives that no such American position was ever indicated by them. But I have respect for your representatives, too, and so believe that there was an honest misunderstanding on this point. I can assure you that we are not engaged in any effort to impose a one-sided or arbitrary view on this matter. We continue to believe that an agreement to end nuclear testing is deeply in the interest of our two countries. Prime Minister Macmillan and I hope to be able to make new suggestions to you on this matter very soon.

A closely connected question is the spread of nuclear weapons, and on this question the American position remains as it has been. We are strongly against the development of additional national nuclear capabilities, and the plans and proposals which we are considering for the future management of the nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are all based upon this principle. I regret that the formal communication which Mr. Gromyko passed to Ambassador Kohler a few days ago² reaches quite different conclusions as to the meaning of these events. I shall not reply to

that paper here, but let me say clearly that you can rely upon our continued and determined opposition to the spread of national nuclear forces.

Neither the multinational nor the multilateral forces we are considering will increase the dangers of diffusion. Both are intended to reduce those dangers. The plan for a *multinational* nuclear force implies no change in present arrangements for the ultimate political control of existing nuclear weapons systems, and it is a fundamental principle in our support for a new *multilateral* force *that no such force could ever be used without the consent of the United States*. The concept of this force is therefore exactly opposite to that of independent national nuclear forces, and the opposition to it in the West comes precisely from those who would prefer the expansion of independent nuclear forces.³

[Here follows discussion of Cuba and Laos.]

There are other issues and problems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if sometime in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible.⁴ If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.⁵

In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great—but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace.⁶

³ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963. Top Secret. Attached to an April 11 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, in

which Thompson wrote that he had delivered the note to Dobrynin that afternoon and had told Dobrynin that no decision had been made as to who the “senior personal representative” mentioned in the message might be. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets would therefore probably make no comment other than on the timing of the visit until they learned more. For the full text of this letter, see [vol. VI, Document 92](#) .

¹ See [Document 251](#).

² This note, dated April 8, was transmitted in telegram 2527 from Moscow, April 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF MLF 6)

³ Documentation on the U.S. proposal for a multilateral force is in [volume XIII](#) .

⁴ Thompson had raised this idea with Dobrynin in a conversation on April 6. “Dobrynin said, without hesitation, that he thought it would be a very good idea.” Pressed by Dobrynin, Thompson had mentioned Rusk, Robert Kennedy, and Harriman as possible emissaries and stated that he “understood” that the President would send Chairman Khrushchev a letter the following week. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963)

⁵ Khrushchev replied on April 30. Since by this time he had received the joint Kennedy/Macmillan letter (see [Document 276](#)), he stated that he would defer discussion of test ban issues to his reply to that letter. In his April 30 message, Khrushchev argued against deployment of nuclear weapons to the territory of NATO countries and discussed Cuba and Laos. He accepted the proposal for a personal representative to come to Moscow and suggested the dates of June 10-12. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963) This message is printed in [volume VI, Document 95](#) .

In a May 1 memorandum to Rusk, Ball stated that when Dobrynin delivered the April 30 letter to Thompson, he “made it clear that you were the preferred nominee for the task.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963) After further exchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the date of Rusk’s arrival in Moscow was fixed for July 28. (Messages from Kennedy to Khrushchev, May 13 and 29; message from Khrushchev to Kennedy, May 15; all *ibid.*) These messages are all printed in [vol. VI, Documents 97](#) , [98](#) , and [101](#) .

6 Printed from an unsigned copy.

275. Telegram From President Kennedy to Prime Minister

Macmillan [Source](#)

Washington, April 15, 1963.

CAP 63181. To the Prime Minister from the President. Thank you for your message of April 13.¹ I agree to your proposal for delivery by the Ambassadors acting jointly, and to the indications which you suggest that they should give. Unless the revisions I propose below give you real trouble, I think we should be able to meet the delivery schedule you suggest.

On the language of the message, I agree that we are close, but there are two points on which I think we still need to be careful with the language. The one which is of immediate concern to me is paragraph 6 on the possibility of a summit.

I feel there is still some difference between us on the conditions in which a summit meeting would be useful,² and I do not want to leave a misunderstanding that might trouble us at a later point. I continue to believe that the two of us should meet with Khrushchev on this matter only if enough progress is made at other levels so that a meeting would seem very likely to result in an agreement. I believe it may be your feeling that a summit meeting on the test ban might be useful also if major problems have been clearly identified, and apparent deadlock reached, at lower levels. But memories of the meeting of May 1960 are very strong in this country and in my own mind, and I believe that on the historic evidence it is not likely that Khrushchev would make major changes at a summit from positions put forward under his direction at lower levels. Like you and me, he is quite capable of making policy decisions at the end of a telegraph wire, as well as in person. So my present view is that we would want something better than clarification of major issues before it would be wise to go to the summit. As paragraph 6 now stands in your proposed draft, I think it might be subject to some misunderstanding on this score because of the order of the thoughts,

and still more because of the thrust of the next to last sentence. So I would suggest instead still another version of paragraph 6, as follows:³

[Here follows language used in the message transmitted to Moscow on April 15; see [Document 276](#).]

There is one other point which has arisen since we first exchanged drafts which now might require small revisions in paragraph 4. When Dean Rusk was in Paris with Lord Home and Couve de Murville, he discussed with them the draft declaration on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons which he had furnished to them and to the Germans last December.⁴ Rusk felt that he was encouraged by Couve de Murville to find out whether the Soviets would accept that draft as a basis for negotiation; if so, France would consider this a very important development and “would not be antagonistic.” For complete clarity, however, I should caution that France has not yet made a final commitment to participate in negotiations on that subject. In Rusk’s discussion with Home, he pointed out that it would be unfortunate for us to link nuclear agreements on nuclear testing and non-proliferation because it might become possible to move on one without the other and, in any event, it might be possible to get France to join in non-proliferation but not on nuclear testing. In any event, after his talks in Paris, Rusk did take up with Dobrynin the non-transfer point.⁵

To adjust our draft letter to Khrushchev to this new circumstance, we might simply strike out the words “from agreement on a treaty to end nuclear tests” from the fourth sentence of paragraph 4. Further, the final two sentences of paragraph 4 might be revised to read “if it proved possible to move promptly to an agreement on nuclear weapons and on the proliferation of national nuclear capability, an advance to broader agreements might then open up.”

For convenience, I transmit next the full text of the message as it would stand on this basis.⁶

[Here follows text of the message to Khrushchev.]

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 3/63-6/63. Secret. The time of transmission is 5:19 Zulu time. Although the message was sent from Washington, Kennedy was consulted about final wording while in Palm Beach. (Telegram CAP 63177, April 14, from the White House to Palm Beach, repeated to the Department of State; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1962-1963)

¹ Attached to an April 13 note from Bromley Smith to Rusk. (Ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy 1963) See the Supplement.

² In his April 13 message, Macmillan agreed to the inclusion of reference to a quota in paragraph 6 of the draft letter to Khrushchev and stated that he “accepted the substance” of Kennedy’s draft of paragraph 6, but suggested further changes. His version expressed the hope that meetings among the three countries’ representatives in Geneva, or between senior U.S. and U.K. representatives and Khrushchev in Moscow, would “by one method or another” get “to the point at which we, who bear the ultimate responsibility for decisions on this matter, would have clearly before us the major problems which remain to be settled.”

³ Telephone calls between Rusk and McGeorge Bundy the morning of April 14 indicate that both men believed, in Bundy’s words, that Macmillan’s latest draft of paragraph 6 contained “a little more summitry than the original language.” Bundy drafted the final version which Rusk approved. (Memoranda of telephone conversations; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

⁴ Rusk was in Paris April 7-11 for the SEATO Council Meeting. Memoranda of his separate discussions of disarmament matters with Lord Home and Couve de Murville on April 7, and with President de Gaulle on April 8, are in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

⁵ A memorandum of Rusk’s conversation with Dobrynin on April 12 is *ibid.* See the Supplement. Two telephone conversations between Rusk and McGeorge Bundy on nuclear non-diffusion held the late afternoon of April 11 are in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. See the Supplement.

⁶ Macmillan accepted Kennedy's draft in a message of April 15: "I quite see the force of your arguments and understand your preoccupations."
(Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1963)

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, April 15, 1963, 9 p.m.

2191. For Ambassador. Following is text of joint letter from President and Prime Minister Macmillan: [1](#)

Begin verbatim text.

“Dear Mr. Chairman,

1. You will recall that in February and March, 1962, we had some correspondence about the Geneva disarmament conference, and in particular about the possibility of reaching agreement on the text of a treaty to ban nuclear tests. Both President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I pledged ourselves to take a personal interest in the progress of this conference on which so many of the hopes of mankind have been fixed. Last October we both indicated in messages to you our intention to devote renewed efforts to the problem of disarmament with particular reference to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the banning of nuclear tests.
2. Since then the Geneva meeting has continued but it has not reached the point of definite agreement. Nevertheless, some encouraging advance has been made. For example, your acceptance of the principle of on-the-spot verification of unidentified events has been of great value. Equally, the Western countries have been able to reduce the number of annual inspections for which they felt it essential to ask, from about twenty down to seven. The difference remaining is of course real and substantial, if only because it presents in practical form the effects of two different lines of reasoning. At the same time the actual difference between the three inspections which you have proposed and the seven for which we are asking, important though this is, should not be impossible to resolve. As regards the automatic seismic stations, the difference between us appears to be fairly narrow.

3. We all have a duty to consider what are the needs of security; but we also have a duty to humanity. President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I therefore believe that we ought to make a further serious attempt by the best available means to see if we cannot bring this matter to a conclusion with your help.
4. We know that it is argued that a nuclear tests agreement, although valuable and welcome especially in respect of atmospheric tests, will not by itself make a decisive contribution to the peace and security of the world. There are, of course, other questions between us which are also of great importance; but the question of nuclear tests does seem to be one on which agreement might now be reached. The mere fact of an agreement on one question will inevitably help to create confidence and so facilitate other settlements. In addition, it is surely possible that we might be able to proceed rapidly to specific and fruitful discussions about the non-dissemination of nuclear power, leading to an agreement on this subject. Such an agreement, if it was reasonably well supported by other countries, would seem to us likely to have a profound effect upon the present state of tension in the world. If it proved possible to move promptly to an agreement on nuclear weapons and on the proliferation of national nuclear capability, an advance to broader agreements might then open up.
5. The practical question is how best to proceed. It may be that further discussions would reveal new possibilities from both sides as regards the arrangements for the quota of inspections. But if we attempted to reach this point by the present methods both sides may feel unable to make an advance because this would appear to be surrendering some point of substance without obtaining a final agreement on a definite treaty in exchange. It may be that we could make some progress on this question of numbers by exploring an idea which has been mentioned by the neutral nations in Geneva—the idea that a quota of on-site inspections might be agreed upon to cover a period of several years, from which inspections could be drawn under more flexible conditions than an annual quota would permit.
- 5.(a) But at the moment it is not only the question of numbers which holds us up, we also have to agree on the final content of the draft treaty and in particular to decide certain important questions as to how inspection is to be carried out. You have taken the view that once the quota is agreed the

other matters can easily be settled, whereas we feel that the final agreement about the number of inspections is unlikely to be possible unless most of the other matters have been first disposed of. Thus we have reached an impasse.

6. We should be interested to hear your suggestions as to how we are to break out of this. For our part we should be quite prepared now to arrange private tripartite discussions in whatever seemed the most practical way. For example, our chief representatives at Geneva could conduct discussions on the questions which remain to be settled. Alternatively, or at a later stage, President Kennedy/Prime Minister Macmillan and I would be ready to send in due course very senior representatives who would be empowered to speak for us and talk in Moscow directly with you. It would be our hope that either in Geneva or through such senior representatives in Moscow we might bring the matter close enough to a final decision so that it might then be proper to think in terms of a meeting of the three of us at which a definite agreement on a test ban could be made final. It is of course obvious that a meeting of the three of us which resulted in a test ban treaty would open a new chapter in our relations as well as providing an opportunity for wider discussions.
7. We sincerely trust that you will give serious consideration to this proposal. We believe that the nuclear tests agreement and what may follow from it is the most hopeful area in which to try for agreement between us. The procedure which we have suggested seems to us the most practical way of achieving a result which would be welcomed all over the world.²

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

Harold Macmillan

End verbatim text.

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE). Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. Drafted and approved by Goodby and cleared by Bundy, Foster, and Davis (EUR). Repeated to London for the Ambassador and to Geneva for Ambassador Stelle. The letter is also printed in Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp. 466-468.

¹ In telegram 2190 to Moscow, April 15, the Department asked Kohler to concert with U.K. Ambassador Sir Humphrey Trevelyan in delivering this joint letter personally to Khrushchev within 3 days. They were to emphasize that the aim was to promote serious negotiations, that the “senior representatives” could be either special envoys or Rusk and Lord Home, that the quota idea had also figured in recent talks between U.S. and Soviet scientists, and, should the question arise, that the United States had never intended to give the impression it would accept only two to four on-site inspections. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

² In telegram 2618 from Moscow, April 17, Kohler reported that he and Trevelyan had met with Gromyko and asked for an opportunity to deliver the letter but that Gromyko had not indicated where “Khrushchev would be in the next few days or what might be involved in arranging meeting.” Gromyko had “said it was to be hoped US and British govts were now prepared to sign agreement. It was high time this matter was settled.” (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR) The letter was delivered on April 24; see [Document 280](#).

277. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, April 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Principals—4:00 p.m.—17 April, 1963^{[1](#)}
Sec/State Conference Room

ATTENDING

Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Mr. Nitze, General Taylor, Mr. Wiesner, Mr. Kaysen, Mr. McCone
and others

[Here follows a brief discussion of East Germany.]

2. Foster opened discussion of the new treaty.^{[2](#)} He explained that no important modifications had been made.
3. Rusk reported the following policy questions:
 1. Is a satisfactory test ban treaty in the best interests of the United States from a security and political point of view?
 2. Is it true that there is no reason to believe that the Soviets really want a treaty? There is no evidence of Soviet flexibility nor are the Soviets keenly interested in the test ban treaty negotiations.
 4. McNamara answered he believes a test ban is in our interests. He stated however there is too much discussion of the subject and urged we avoid public statements and not engage in controversial discussions. Foster said these could not be avoided.
 5. General Taylor, speaking for the Chiefs, stated that a test ban was not in our national interests and they opposed the test ban. The fact there was no threshold was a bad feature in the Chiefs' view. Also there was not adequate safeguard provisions.^{[3](#)}
 6. There followed a long exchange of views regarding publicity. Rusk insisted that we stand on our present position and stop making changes and giving the appearance that we are trying hard to reach an agreement. McNamara stated that recent publicity had hardened opposition on the Hill but he felt it was not very strong.
 7. There was an exchange of views on who was appearing before the Stennis Committee.^{[4](#)} Apparently several representatives from ACDA

and DOD have been called up and had discussed the test suspension with the staff in preparations to the Committee hearings. It was agreed these appearances should be carefully coordinated. Bundy undertook this task.

8. Throughout the discussions Bundy, Seaborg and McCone did not express themselves, either for or against the test ban treaty. Neither did anyone else. The only ones who stated their positions were McNamara and Taylor and Rusk, who was less positive than McNamara, and appeared somewhat lukewarm to the treaty.
9. McCone asked if the 205 report⁵ could be sanitized and released. The answer was “no”. Kaysen then asked if I would discuss with the 205 Committee the possibility of their preparing a declassified memorandum and also a confidential memorandum to set forth the relative positions of the U.S. and the USSR in the field of nuclear weaponry. I agreed to examine this but stated I was afraid any such memorandum would lead to probing questions which would necessitate further disclosures of military Secret or Restricted Data information.
10. There followed a detailed discussion of the treaty Annex having to do with Plowshare.
11. Dr. Seaborg stated that Plowshare was more important than formerly thought in that great progress had been made in the last two years and there were a vast number of active projects under study. He stated that the treaty provided revelation and that this was not possible because it would involve revealing advanced weapon technology and therefore urged modification to the treaty Annex by elimination of the revelation plan. He suggested that each signator of the treaty be given authority for 5 or 6 peaceful shots per year to prove out methods but that there be no revelation of these devices, which would run about 50 kilotons, and about 5 years hence when we are ready to proceed with an active project, treaty terms could be reconsidered. There was great objection to this and a long discussion ensued.
12. McCone observed that this was an old argument [text obscured—and should?] be resolved. I stated that we must choose between a test ban or our Plowshare program and that we cannot have both. This was agreed by most present although Seaborg took some exception.

13. Secretary Rusk then stated that we either are in a race or we are to have a treaty. He seemed to feel, although he did not express it, that a treaty was unobtainable and that we are probably in a race. He said he felt our last series of tests were mediocre and furthermore that we are now inhibited by a feeling that we are approaching a test ban agreement and therefore we were not aggressively pursuing the new and expanding scientific horizons to be developed in further testing. He urged Defense and AEC to pursue this more energetically. McNamara agreed and said he thought we should develop a program, establish a date, and apply all possible energy and imagination to a future test program. He seemed to agree with Rusk that this had not been done in the past. At this point I explained that most recent intelligence indicated the Soviets were expanding their nuclear capability and stated that CIA was to put out a report on this subject in the next few days.

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/15-6/4/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 18.

¹ For Seaborg's account of this meeting, see [Document 278](#). Goodby's memorandum of this meeting and a summary of actions taken are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Both are in the Supplement.

² Reference is to the draft comprehensive test ban treaty dated March 23; see [footnote 1](#), [Document 272](#).

³ According to Goodby's memorandum, Taylor stated that the Chiefs "believed that a treaty without a seismic threshold would be unsatisfactory and would not be conducive to the promotion of the national interest. He was not certain whether the President had taken a final decision on these matters and, of course, did not intend to take issue with decisions already made."

⁴ The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose Chairman was John Stennis of Mississippi.

⁵ See [Document 250](#). The final report has not been found.

278. Editorial Note

The Committee of Principals met on April 17, 1963. Seaborg's journal entry reads as follows:

"From 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in the Conference Room of the Secretary of State. Present were: Rusk, George Bunn, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, Nitze, Haworth, Kaysen, Keeny, Wiesner, Foster, McCone, Murrow, and Bundy, as well as Kavanagh, Kelly and others.

"Rusk opened the discussion by requesting an expression of feelings as to the value of a test ban treaty in today's context; that is, he wanted to find out whether there were any recent developments which might lead to a change in view that such a treaty would be in the national interest. The consensus was that a test ban treaty is still in the national interest and that the danger to the U.S. from unlimited testing and an unlimited arms race is greater than the danger due to any inadequacies in the test ban treaty.

"However, McNamara and others indicated that they think there is an increasing resistance to a test ban treaty in Congress. McNamara felt that part of the trouble is that congressional committees are summoning staff people from various agencies and departments of the Executive Branch and interrogating them in such a way as to get one-sided views. He feels that representatives of the Executive Branch should be better coordinated to counteract this movement and should testify only in the presence of a legal advocate to help keep them in balance. It was decided that there should be a coordinating group for this purpose and that Bundy's office should arrange this.

"The discussion then went on to the Annex II, i.e., the provisions for Plowshare in the present draft treaty. I presented my views on this in some detail. I said that my reasons for calling this to the attention of the Principals are: 1. Much progress had been made in the uses of peaceful explosives in recent years, and 2. It has been called to my attention recently that we can't do much in this area under the present treaty. I said that,

therefore, I have looked for modifications in the Plowshare article on the assumption that we would want to make progress in the Plowshare program. This led to the idea of a quota system of some five or six Plowshare experiments per year, with a limit on the yield, such as 50 kilotons. In the limit, this approach could be the same as the present Annex II (copy attached) except for the deletion of the one sentence on the internal and the external disclosure of the devices. I read excerpts from Annex II and said that it could be strengthened even further by having limitations on instrumentation and international manning of the instrumentation. I also read from Kelly's memorandum that a number of the proposals have been received for uses of Plowshare in building harbors, canals, excavations, mining, oil recovery, scientific experiments, etc. I mentioned, in connection with scientific experiments, that we have recently learned from a Russian scientist, that they have conducted an underground experiment for the production of new transuranium elements and that this scientist hopes that a test ban treaty could make such experiments possible.

"I said I see the difficulties in my suggested approach because the possibilities for weapons testing under the guise of Plowshare would be inconsistent with the concern about cheating through clandestine underground testing. I said that there would be an adverse reaction to the elimination of Plowshare and that my suggested approach has the advantage that it wouldn't be necessary to go to Congress to obtain authorization to reveal weapons designs, which would be difficult even for obsolete weapons.

"After a great deal of discussion, in which the inconsistency of adopting this Plowshare approach from the standpoint of opening the door to weapons testing was emphasized by McNamara, Bundy, Wiesner, Foster and McCone, it was suggested by Rusk that, nevertheless, another look at the wording of Annex II be made to see whether it would be possible to devise a scheme whereby Plowshare could go forward. After this has been done, the matter will be considered further at another meeting of the Principals." (Seaborg, *Journal*, volume 5, pages 431 and 434)

For McCone's account of the meeting, see [Document 277](#). Goodby's memorandum of this meeting and a summary of actions taken are in the

Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Both are in the Supplement.

Regarding Annex II of the March 23 draft treaty, see [footnote 1](#), [Document 272](#).

279. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, April 20, 1963.

JCSM-327-63

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Issue (U)

1.

A basic issue currently receiving wide attention is whether the US proposal for a nuclear test ban is, at this time, in the national interest. Those favoring a test ban claim that it is in the interest of the United States because they estimate that:

- a. A test ban treaty would enable the United States to hold its nuclear technological superiority over the USSR.
- b. A test ban treaty would bring about a net reduction of the risks faced by the United States and its Free World partners through a reduction of the dangers of proliferation and the continuance of the arms race.

Now that the provisions of the proposed test ban treaty appear to be crystallized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem it appropriate to summarize their position thereon.

2. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not opposed to the concept of a fully effective test ban, they have, in the absence of provisions for effective verification of Soviet compliance, frequently expressed their concern with regard to the test ban issue. By JCSM-241-63, dated 21 March 1963, in commenting on an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) draft paper, "US/USSR Weapons Capabilities Related to Possible Nuclear Test Ban Situations,"¹ they recommended that more comprehensive examination be given to the many critical factors discussed therein before further commitments were made on a nuclear test ban treaty. To the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no such

examination has ever been made and its omission constitutes a gap in test ban considerations.

3. *[4 lines of source text not declassified]* Most of these weapons components, particularly important for tactical uses on land and under water as well as for effective AICBMs, can be developed through underground tests that the Soviet Union could conduct clandestinely below our detection threshold. They will constitute a significant increase in military capability. *[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* weapons are among many promising weapons developments discussed in JCSM-262-63, dated 3 April 1963, and JCSM-298-63, dated 16 April 1963.1 Effective AICBMs could make important targets much less vulnerable. If the United States is first to develop and deploy an effective AICBM, the likelihood of nuclear war, and destruction to the United States in the event of nuclear war, will be substantially reduced. Conversely, should the Soviets gain sole possession of an AICBM, they could increase substantially their military pressures on the Free World.
4. The Soviets have a substantial lead in very high-yield weapons because of their tests in ranges higher than those in which the United States has tested. US high-yield has been *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* USSR about 58 MT. The United States has conducted only *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* the USSR tested 34 large-yield devices in its last series alone. The Soviets also have more advanced knowledge of high altitude effects because of their recent more sophisticated tests. The United States is uncertain of Soviet capabilities in the low-yield range, principally because of our inability to detect and analyze low-yield tests. US inability fully to interpret data from Soviet tests, moreover, has caused some leading US scientists to believe the Soviets may have developed nuclear techniques beyond our knowledge. There is no reason to believe the Soviet Union could not, or would not, develop fusion and clean weapons clandestinely under the proposed nuclear test ban treaty. At this time, it is unlikely that any control system acceptable to the USSR can be expected to prevent such development. Only through an energetic test program in all environments can the United States achieve or maintain superiority in all areas of nuclear weapons technology.
5. It is apparent the Soviets will not agree to a test ban providing essential guarantees of verification and inspection to insure that clandestine testing

cannot take place. The presently proposed US draft test ban treaty would provide a loophole for clandestine testing below the detection threshold and thus would permit the Soviets to achieve significant weapons developments. In view of the significant and imminent weapons developments that would be denied the United States but could not be denied the Soviet Union under the proposed nuclear test ban treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proposed test ban treaty, or any treaty without a detection threshold under which the United States might legally test, would not, at this time, be in the national interest.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor²
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Comp Nuc Test Ban I, T-368-69. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ Neither printed.

² Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, April 24, 1963, 7 p.m.

2719. Deptel 2244.¹ We were notified just before 3 P.M. we would be received by Khrushchev at 4 P.M. Trevelyan was accompanied by D. Murrell, I by Richard Davies, Political Counselor. Interview lasted one and half hours. Khrushchev was accompanied by Gromyko and interpreter Victor Sukhodrev.

Khrushchev looked relatively restored to health by vacation. During interview he was not unfriendly but firm in reaction which was almost entirely negative. Following short introductory remarks by me, supplemented by Trevelyan, we presented letters.² Khrushchev's reception was almost one of disinterest. He promptly asked question as to whether letters accepted Sov proposal of three inspections. After Gromyko, who had taken copy of note, said "no", Khrushchev promptly launched into long negative discourse. It became major effort on part of Trevelyan and myself to make him read the messages at all. After he did so he reiterated negative position, saying there was nothing new in letters, nothing positive or constructive and that they provided "no basis for agreement". I argued case at considerable length, repeating points in letter and in Deptel 2190³ and Trevelyan supplemented my efforts. Khrushchev did not really budge. He commented that Foreign Ministers had already met many times. Perhaps it would be useful for three Heads of Govt to meet but not under such conditions as those contained in these letters. At one point he reiterated that Germany was key to everything and that the nuclear test ban really had no importance. It would not be helpful to US and USSR who had tested sufficiently, would not deter others from testing and developing nuclear capabilities and would not relieve tensions. He was angry with himself—and he was the one who was responsible—for having made mistake of offering three inspections. However, he finally said govt would consider letters and decide whether to stick to offer of three which they certainly could not extend or go back to position of no inspections at all which was

their real position and which he personally favored. It was possible others in govt would have different views.

At end of conversation, we told him no intention publish letter for time being or mention fact of its existence and delivery. We then agreed press line containing reference to Khrushchev's having received us at our request, naming participants and stating only: "Questions related to the banning of nuclear weapons tests were discussed".

Full report follows.⁴

Dept repeat as desired.

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only.

¹ Not printed. (Ibid.) ² See [Document 276](#).

³ See [footnote 1](#), [Document 276](#).

⁴ Telegram 2720 from Moscow, April 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR) See the Supplement.

281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)

Washington, April 24, 1963.

It seems clear from the Cousins interview^{[1](#)} and Khrushchev's remarks to Kohler and the British Ambassador^{[2](#)} that Khrushchev is not going to move on the test ban issue at this time. This and other evidence suggests that Khrushchev has probably given his agreement to further tests by the Soviet Union. This would be consistent with his indication that the Soviet Union was going in for a new generation of weapons.

Khrushchev's remark to Cousins that he could not meet the President at this time could, as you suggest, indicate that the "egg he is hatching" is of such nature that he knows it would make a meeting with the President impossible. It may, however, mean that the quarrel with the ChiComs is taking precedence at the present time over other issues. An agreement to meet the President, or an agreement on a test ban would both be provocative to the Chinese. I suspect that this, in itself, would not bother Khrushchev, but that it is important to him at this juncture not to do anything which exposes him to further Chinese attack, both for internal reasons and in connection with the struggle for control of other communist parties.

It is too early to tell whether under pressure from the Chinese and his internal and external problems, Khrushchev is embarking on a major change of policy or whether these are maneuvers of a transitory nature.

It is interesting that speeches by Soviet officials during the past week have fairly consistently stuck to Khrushchev's old line on most questions at issue with the Chinese.

^{*} [Source](#): Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 USSR. Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by Thompson. Copies were sent to Ball and McGeorge

Bundy.

¹ Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature* and disarmament activist, interviewed Khrushchev at Putsunda on April 12. His account of the interview appears in the *Saturday Review of Literature* of November 7, 1964. Before his trip, Cousins had a brief telephone conversation with Rusk on April 6 on test ban issues. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Cousins stated in his account of the interview that President Kennedy “had asked me to try to clarify the Soviet misunderstanding of the American position on the test ban.” No memorandum of conversation between Cousins and Kennedy before or after the meeting has been found.

² See [Document 280](#).

282. Editorial Note

During a conversation with Chairman Khrushchev in Moscow on April 26, 1963, Under Secretary Harriman raised the test ban issue:

“In response to Khrushchev’s request for Harriman’s ‘advice,’ the Governor suggested that the USSR come to an agreement on a nuclear test ban. This would enable them to devote more of their resources to civilian production. He assured Mr. Khrushchev that the President wanted this very much.” Khrushchev responded that the President could expect an answer in the near future.

Later in the conversation, “Harriman said that since the Soviets were satisfied with the current situation in Berlin, why do they not wish to get on with other important ‘things such as a test ban agreement? Khrushchev replied: ‘We’ll sign one right away, but, with no espionage inspections, ever.’

“Harriman said he wished to raise one aspect of nuclear proliferation which concerned him and, he assumed, was of concern to Chairman Khrushchev. He said Khrushchev had expressed his worry about the Germans. Why hadn’t he said anything about the Chinese and the possibility that they may have nuclear weapons in the near future. Khrushchev suggested Harriman take that up with the Chinese. The Soviets and the United States could talk about Germany because we were mutual victors in the war against Germany, but China was one of the Soviet’s allies and Harriman should treat them as equals. Harriman said he had personally wanted to go to talk with the Chinese a few years ago but that Mikoyan would not cooperate. Khrushchev replied that Mikoyan was not the Foreign Minister of China and could not get Harriman into China.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-8)

The full text of this memorandum of conversation, which also concerned Berlin, is printed in [volume XV, pages 510-511](#). The memorandum of conversation on Laos is printed in [volume XXIV, pages 1000-1005](#). Harriman was in Moscow to discuss Laos with Khrushchev.

In an April 29 letter to Kennedy, Macmillan stated that he gathered from a conversation with Harriman, who stopped in London on his return to Washington, that “Khrushchev was in a friendly mood with Averell.” Macmillan supposed that nothing could be done on a test ban pending Khrushchev’s reply to the April 15 letter, but thought “that he does not want to continue tests, either in the air or underground, although no doubt his soldiers and scientists, like all experts, would prefer to go on. But he does not want to have what he calls espionage inspections. On this point I do not think that if we get into serious discussion we can maintain the elaborate type of inspection which some of our people have envisaged.” (Text in telegram 5749 to London, May 1; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman)

283. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, April 29, 1963.

JCSM-343-63

SUBJECT

Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 February 1963,¹ in which he requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their views on the steps which might be applied in order to persuade or compel Communist China to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement.
2. The acts of persuasion, pressure, or coercion which might be applied in an effort to gain Chicom acceptance of a nuclear test ban or arms control treaty run a wide gamut within the diplomatic, political, economic, and military spheres. The United States should seek the cooperation of other nations in any of the actions listed in paragraph 5 below. The courses of action involving direct application of force should not be resorted to until all other actions have been exhausted. If direct action is required the United States should consider the effects not only on the ChiComs but also on the Sino-Soviet relationship.
3. Although the position of the USSR in specific cases cannot be predetermined with any degree of assurance, the Soviets might be expected to cooperate in the indirect or nonviolent actions listed in paragraph 5 below. They might not participate or intervene where mild economic and military pressures are applied but probably would intervene if the integrity of China or the general cause of Communism were threatened.
4. Although current intelligence estimates indicate that the ChiComs are not expected to have a significant military nuclear capability until after 1970, they conceivably could detonate a nuclear device by 1963-64. The United States and the USSR have a common interest in insuring that China does not attain a nuclear capability. It should be noted that, even if the

ChiComs are forced to agree to a nuclear test ban treaty, there could be no expectation of their continued adherence to such a treaty.

5.

The following actions have been considered as steps that might be taken to persuade or coerce Communist China into accepting the terms of a nuclear test ban, or other arms control agreement, but would not assure Chicom adherence. The details of each are discussed in the Appendix.²

a. Indirect actions could include the following:

- (1) Coordinate diplomatic action on as wide a scale as possible to try to convince the ChiComs that it is in their national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control arrangement.
- (2) Intensify propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.
- (3) Encourage other countries to sever diplomatic relations with the ChiComs.
- (4) Encourage other countries to place an embargo on all trade with the ChiComs including denial of the use of foreign bottoms.

b. Direct actions could include the following:

- (1) *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- (2) *[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- (3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.
- (4) *[1 line of source text not declassified]*
- (5) *[1 line of source text not declassified]*
- (6) *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- (7) *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

Active Soviet support of these proposed actions would of course render them far more effective than unilateral US action or than multilateral action without Soviet overt participation.

6. The measure or measures selected to compel agreement would have to be determined on the basis of the circumstances at the time. Many of the actions above *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* should be initiated only after all other means have been exhausted, and then only after full and careful consideration of the implications of such action at the time. The advisability of the United States carrying out limited

maritime control measures, full blockade, or other military actions would have to be considered in the light of its other world-wide commitments at the time.

7. The United States has sufficient naval power to impose an effective blockade against Communist China which would exert serious economic pressure on the ChiComs. Allied and/or USSR assistance would be desirable but not mandatory. The United States also has the capability of *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best means of effectively bringing about Chinese adherence to a nuclear test ban treaty lies in joint US/Soviet measures, since the Soviets are in the better position to exercise the leverage on Communist China. They recognize the difficulties inherent in such a cooperative approach but believe this has the major potential for success.
9. The ChiComs are capable of responding to any actions taken against them in a variety of ways ranging from propaganda, psychological warfare, and threats *[1 line of source text not declassified]* as indicated in the Appendix. Under most circumstances, the United States has the military forces and capability to counter quickly any military action which may be initiated by the ChiComs. This assumes timely decisions by the United States and a determination to use requisite force as may be determined by the situation.
10. In summary, the foregoing list of actions is illustrative of the various actions which could be taken to bring about Chicom adherence to a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement. In every case joint US/USSR action would make the measures more effective. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that it is unrealistic to use overt military force to obtain Chicom acceptance of any agreement. As noted previously, there is no guarantee that the actions listed would assure continued Chicom adherence to any such agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Curtis E. LeMay³
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Harriman Trip, Briefing Book I, Tab H. Top Secret.

¹ Not found.

² Not found attached.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates LeMay signed the original.

284. National Security Action Memorandum No. 239 [Source](#)

Washington, May 6, 1963.

TO

The Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Committee of Principals

SUBJECT

U.S. Disarmament Proposals

1. Discussions in the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva on both general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban treaty have unfortunately resulted in almost no progress. There has been no serious discussion of general and complete disarmament for some time. While discussions of a test ban treaty have shown important developments since the beginning of the 18 Nation Conference, they are now stalled.
2. I have in no way changed my views of the desirability of a test ban treaty or the value of our proposals on general and complete disarmament. Further, the events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an un-checked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc.
3. We now expect the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to recess shortly for six weeks to two months. I should like the interval to be used for an urgent re-examination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament which it would be in the interest of the United States to propose in the resumed session of the Geneva Conference. ACDA will, in accordance with its statutory responsibilities, take the leadership in this effort and coordinate with the other agencies concerned through the usual procedures of the Committee of Principals. I should like to review the results at an appropriate time in the process.¹

John Kennedy

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_ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Policy Review. Secret. This NSAM was apparently occasioned by a request made by Nitze to McGeorge Bundy in a May 2 memorandum. Nitze pointed out that the U.S.-Soviet dialog had been almost exclusively on the test ban and on general and complete disarmament and that the United States had not responded to Soviet initiatives regarding potential agreed force levels. The “present possibility of changes in the Soviet leadership” made it essential to make the U.S. position clear to the Soviets, but before that, “we must make our measures clear to ourselves.” (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 4/15-5/31/63) ¹ In a May 18 memorandum that set up working groups to implement NSAM No. 239, Foster stated that they should have in mind proposals for the U.N. General Assembly as well as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE))

285. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Moscow, May 8, 1963.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have carefully studied your message on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, which was transmitted to me by Ambassador Kohler on April 24.¹ You stated in this message that you consider how—from your standpoint—action should be taken for the achievement of the earliest possible understanding, and you offer proposals concerning procedures for further negotiations.

We have considered all this, consulted one another in the government, held consultation once again with specialists, and I want to tell you our considerations in reply to your message. I shall also communicate these considerations to Mr. Macmillan in reply to his message which is identical with yours.

I think that at present it is not necessary to delve deeper into the history of negotiations on the cessation of tests or present in all details our position and our proposals, which have already been stated more than once. You know them well and we have also learned almost by heart the proposals of the Western powers, just as we used to learn “Pater Noster.” I merely wish to touch upon some of the main questions and basic differences between our positions.

What is the approach of the Soviet Government to the question of the cessation of nuclear tests? It is very simple: we stand for the cessation of all tests for all time, wherever they may be carried out: in the atmosphere, the cosmos, underground, and under water.

We take such a position first of all because the question regarding the cessation of nuclear weapons tests has an indisputable significance from the moral and humane viewpoint. Its solution would put an end to the contamination of air, water, the bowels and surface of the earth by radioactive substances, harmful to the health of the people now living and

for future generations. As it seems to us, this already appears to be a sufficient incentive for coming to an understanding regarding the prohibition of tests.

It appears that the achievement of such an understanding could also exert a definite and positive influence on the international situation. To be sure, the conclusion of an understanding regarding the cessation of tests would not stop the arms race, would not diminish by one charge the stocks of nuclear weapons accumulated by states; it would not even slow down further accumulation of these stocks. The prohibition of tests does not appear to be the key problem for lessening international tension. The roots of this tension lie entirely elsewhere, above all in the fact that the German peace settlement has not yet been reached. And yet the conclusion of an agreement regarding the prohibition of nuclear tests could somewhat clear up the atmosphere in the relations between nuclear powers and would be evaluated everywhere as an expression of their readiness to seek a solution to the questions affecting the interests of both sides. I understood that you also attach significance to this.

We are convinced that it is not difficult to solve the question regarding the cessation of nuclear tests if one manifests a desire to achieve this. Right now, when both sides have completed important series of tests and when your and our scientists are in agreement that for further improvement of nuclear weapons there is no special necessity for new tests, then it seems that it should be even easier than before to come to an agreement on this subject.

On our part we also see no difficulties whatever in the question of control over the carrying out by the states of their obligations under the agreement for prohibition of nuclear tests. We know that national means now available for discovering nuclear explosions, including also underground explosions, are amply sufficient to unmask any state which might try to conduct nuclear weapons tests under cover of secrecy.

If it is necessary to have new confirmation of the fact that even underground nuclear explosions cannot be conducted in such a way that they would not become known, then new proof of this lies in the fact that our seismic stations unerringly caught the vibrations of the earth crust

produced by the recent French nuclear tests in the Sahara. I do not doubt that seismologists in the USA also have recorded these vibrations.

But if the Soviet Union is prepared to rely wholly on the national means for verification of the cessation of underground nuclear tests, then there is no reason why the USA could not do the same.

Such, Mr. President, is our approach to the solution of the problem of prohibition of nuclear tests. This is an honest and equitable approach. If an agreement is concluded on this basis, then everybody will gain and no side will lose.

Then why do the Western powers not accept this approach? Why do they continue to insist on international inspection of the discontinuance of underground nuclear explosions? In the interest of such a cause there is no need of inspection of the cessation of underground tests just as there is no need for international control of the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water with which the Western powers now agree. But if no inspection is needed for the control of the cessation of underground tests, and yet the Western powers continue to insist on it, then we are compelled to draw our own conclusions in regard to the reason why such a demand is put forth.

Please, understand me, Mr. President, that under these conditions we cannot regard the demand of the Western powers for international inspection otherwise than as a policy to charge the Soviet Union for the cessation of the nuclear weapons tests a certain additional price in the form of the admission of NATO's intelligence men to Soviet territory, where, of course, there are many objects of interest to the military intelligence of the states of this bloc. Sometimes, however, the matter is presented in such a way as if equality is ensured by the fact that espionage would be carried out, so to speak, on the basis of reciprocity. But such "reciprocity" would not result in anything good; it could only intensify mistrust in our relations. We do not want to enter on such a path and we have no desire to send our intelligence men to the United States of America.

We wish to make everything quite clear: the Soviet Union would not consent to an agreement which would be detrimental to its security. We are

firmly convinced that lasting peace can be founded only on such agreements as would strengthen the security of states and not undermine it.

Well known to the entire world and certainly to you, Mr. President, is our sincere desire to reach as soon as possible an agreement among all states on the matter of disarmament. Such an act would really ensure full security for all nations inhabiting our planet. But heretofore we have not been able to reach such an agreement and, furthermore, we do not see any clear prospects in this direction. Under such conditions the decisive factor is the problem of security of every country, and we, of course, are concerned about the security of our country, and we cannot in this regard permit any concession which military intelligence services may exploit to conduct espionage in our country.

If an agreement for universal and complete disarmament under international control is reached, such control we would not regard as espionage because it would be actually carried out on a reciprocal basis under the stipulation that all states liquidate their armed forces and armaments, and such control would be in the interest of all countries and nations of the world.

You might ask me why, if the Soviet Union considers international inspections for the discontinuance of nuclear tests as a means of espionage, it consented to the conducting of such inspections on Soviet territory four months ago? You know what motivated such a step, because at that time we explained our motives and thoughts on this point. However, since it can be seen from your letter that you interpret them in a somewhat different way, I feel that it would be better if we clarify our position once more.

We consented to inspections not because we came to the conclusion that they were necessary for verification of the states' carrying out their obligations under a treaty for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. No, we agreed to this only because we ascribed a definite meaning to your statements, Mr. President, that without a minimum number of on-site inspections you would not be able to succeed in persuading the United States Senate to ratify an agreement for the cessation of tests. And though there was nothing that obligated the Soviet Union to consider the fine points of such purely internal matters as the disposition of forces in the U.S.

Senate, we decided to meet you half-way and to agree to a minimum number of inspections on Soviet territory.

I shall not conceal the fact that it was not easy for us to adopt the decision to agree to the number of inspections indicated by us. But we proceed from the premise that they are not relevant to the problem and technically not justified, and so why should we agree to them? For a long time I deliberated as to whether I should take such initiative with our government or not. On the one hand I, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, felt the responsibility for solving questions of disarmament and discontinuance of tests which, as was recognized one year ago, rests with the heads of governments and states participating in negotiations on these questions. On the other hand I, in my position, bear the highest responsibility for guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union and must not forget this for a moment. And still I have come to the conclusion that it is probably worth while in this case to take a step forward now to meet the Western powers in order to ensure the swift achievement of an agreement on stopping tests. In proceeding in this manner, we, of course, had counted on the fact that as a result of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean Sea area on an international basis, as was hoped at that time, the germs of confidence might begin to sprout. We had hoped that our new step in the direction of stopping tests might help these sprouts burst forth and grow strong.

But this did not mean at all that, as you write, we had accepted the “principle of verifying on the spot undetermined phenomena.” Not at all! We have not accepted and do not accept this principle in the sense that there is any necessity for verification on the spot; there is no need for that.

That is how our agreement arose concerning inspection. This decision was dictated by purely political considerations, by the desire to achieve more quickly the cessation of all nuclear tests, but in no case did this mean any revision of our opinion concerning the futility of inspections from a scientific and technical standpoint.

After we had taken this great step toward meeting the Western powers, it was directly up to them and solely up to them as to whether the subsequent obstacles on the road to agreement would be removed. We had hoped that the Western powers, in their turn, would likewise take an equally important

step forward, and the only remaining step would be to prepare a treaty text for the cessation of tests and sign it.

One can only be sorry that in reality this did not come to pass. Instead of a positive reply to our initiative the Western powers began to haggle concerning the number of inspections and the conditions for conducting them, and this cannot be construed otherwise than meaning that they are really not prepared to conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests on such a basis as would give nobody an advantage and would inflict no damage on anyone. But on any other basis there can be no agreement at all between the powers during our era. When we are requested to make some new concessions in the matter of inspections, this can merely mean that an agreement is becoming more and more remote, that its attainment is becoming less and less likely. Thus the negotiations being conducted lose all sense of direction and cannot get out of the doldrums.

And now I come to that which, apparently, constitutes the very essence of the messages which I received from you and Mr. Macmillan. To summarize briefly what is stated in these messages, their main thought, as I have understood it, reduces itself to the proposal to continue haggling over inspections, but at a higher level. Please pardon me for my straightforwardness, but I could draw no other conclusion, however much I read the messages. Considerations are expressed therein as to how to carry forward the movement as to the figures of annual inspections; reference is made to the possibility of establishing a quota for several years; there is brought up the question of how these inspections should be conducted, etc.

All this merely confirms that the sense and significance of our concession in the matter of inspections have not only not been duly appreciated, but there is a desire to use this concession as some kind of springboard for achieving other objectives and not at all for settling the problem of stopping nuclear tests.

The Soviet Government sincerely desires to reach an agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests, but it cannot and will not approach an understanding on the conditions proposed by the Western powers. Our people would have every right to severely question their government if it entered into negotiations as to how many intelligence agents we would

admit annually to our territory and what conditions we would grant to such intelligence agents. But the Western powers in their proposals, which they have advanced in negotiation for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, insist that in the implementation of any inspection they have the right to check the territory to the extent of 500 square km. Just imagine what an enormous area would be covered by these inspections, if there were seven or eight of them, as the Western powers insist on. And is it possible for you to think that we can seriously regard such a proposal, the unserious character of which is obvious to us.

When we agreed on two or three inspections we thought that these inspections would be very symbolic, and that the question would never arise concerning the inspection of such vast areas—all the more so with the use of various methods of boring, flying about, etc. No, we will not accept that, because there is absolutely no need for that. Thus, if the position of the Western powers is judged by their proposals, then one comes to the conclusion that they really have no serious attitude toward negotiation. And it seems to me that if the Western powers would seriously consider their own proposals and realistically evaluate their partner's position, then they themselves would come to understand that these proposals are unacceptable to us.

If the question is now approached in a businesslike manner, then it must be admitted that the establishment of automatic seismic stations, the so-called "black boxes," is fully sufficient, and to this, as before, we consent. Nothing else is required.

As soon as I had studied your message for the first time, I said to Ambassador F. Kohler² that it was evidently based on the old positions of the Western powers and for that reason cannot provide a basis on which to reach an agreement. This impression of mine has now become even stronger, and I even wonder whether the dispatching of the messages by you and Mr. Macmillan is not connected with some additional internal policy consideration.

In any case we took note of the fact that although the messages of the President of the United States and of the Prime Minister of Great Britain

addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR were in this case strictly confidential, the content of these messages was announced by the press of some of the Western countries several days before they were handed to the addressee. It is as if someone wanted especially to show who is the initiator of this “constructive” step. We, however, will not participate in these schemes and will not be drawn into them.

What will the further course of developments be on the question of stopping nuclear tests? To tell the truth, I do not know; it depends on the Western powers whether there will be an agreement. The explosions of American nuclear devices in Nevada and of French nuclear devices in the Sahara cannot but cause us to wonder whether there are any prospects at present of reaching an agreement on the banning of tests, or whether we shall not again have to turn our attention in another direction, that of taking measures which would ensure a still more reliable guarantee of the security of the Soviet Union and other Socialist states. This, obviously, is also made imperative for us because of the measures of the Western powers in establishing a joint nuclear force in NATO.

Is such a development, Mr. President, in harmony with the interests of our two countries? It seems to me that it is not. But this depends not so much on the Soviet Union as on the other side, and on the future actions of the other side.

It gives me no satisfaction to say this. I repeat that we were anticipating something quite different in the question of stopping nuclear tests—the conclusion of an agreement. And we are now, as before, prepared to seek an agreement, provided that our negotiating partners are also prepared to do so. It would be even more important to approach a decision on the main problems—disarmament and a peaceful German settlement. But in the disarmament discussions at Geneva there has been, as before, no evidence of any accomplishments except the multiplication of the number of minutes. Such a situation cannot but give rise to anxiety.

In your and Mr. Macmillan’s messages you propose sending to Moscow high-ranking representatives who would have full powers to carry on, in your name, discussions about the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. So be it; we are even prepared to try this method of discussion too, and in general

we consider it right to use every opportunity in order to effect a rapprochement of the positions of the respective sides. For that reason we shall be happy to receive in Moscow the high-level representatives of the United States and Great Britain. It is important, however, that they be empowered to negotiate on the question of stopping nuclear weapons tests on the same realistic and equitable basis which life itself suggests, i.e., without spying inspections in foreign territories. This is the crux of the whole problem.

We would, of course, also welcome a meeting at the highest level, the possibility of holding which, for the purpose of reaching a definitive understanding on the agreement for banning tests, is mentioned in your message. I should gladly take part in such a meeting, provided that there is hope of its being successful; for that, one thing is now necessary—namely, that the Western powers, too, show a desire to negotiate and come to an agreement.

These are my ideas as regards the thoughts which were set forth by you and Mr. Macmillan in your messages.

With my respects,

N. Khrushchev³

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Khrushchev. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. Another English text is in telegram 2839 from Moscow, May 8. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-4) Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 96](#) .

¹ See [Documents 276](#) and [280](#).

² See [Document 280](#).

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original. A bracketed note indicates his signature was illegible.

286. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, May 16, 1963.

We appear to have reached a complete impasse on the size of the quota for on-site inspections in the nuclear test ban negotiations. The Soviet Union has taken an adamant position that there can be no more than 3 annual inspections, and we are insisting that there be at least 7 annual inspections. While we have considered a fall-back position of 5 or 6 annual on-site inspections, there is no evidence that this compromise would be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that the Soviet objective in the test ban negotiations is clear at this point. On the one hand, the Soviet Union may not want a test ban now. On the other hand, Khrushchev may be pursuing his present line either simply to drive a hard bargain or because he is actually unable to go above 3 inspections for internal political reasons.

If the Soviets do desire a test ban, I believe that, by properly exploiting the fact that there is an unusual concentration of seismicity in the Soviet Union, we can find a formula for the number of on-site inspections that will resolve our present differences.

As you will recall, we have on several occasions indicated to the Soviets our willingness to take this factor into consideration in the allocation of inspections. So far, however, neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves have followed up this offer with specific proposals.

The most recent statistics on Soviet seismicity, which have been submitted to both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee are summarized on the attached map.¹ You will note that on the average 38 per cent of Soviet earthquakes occur in the Kurile Islands and 35 per cent in Kamchatka. These two small, remote areas therefore account for about three quarters of all Soviet earthquakes. Since internal security is presumably a major Soviet concern in the on-site

inspection problem, these areas have the special advantage of apparently containing very little of real security interest to the Soviet Union. There are no important military installations on the Kurile Islands. It is true that the Soviet ICBM impact area is off Klyuchi on northern Kamchatka; however, practically all of the earthquakes on Kamchatka take place south of Klyuchi. Therefore, it would be possible, for example, to define the Kamchatka seismic area as lying south of latitude 55°, which is some 100 miles south of Klyuchi and still include most of the earthquakes in this area. The only remaining important military facility in the area is the Petropavlovski-Kamchatskiy Naval Base. This base could even be specifically excluded from the seismic zone if desired.

Taking advantage of the fortuitously concentrated Soviet seismicity, one could accept Khrushchev's annual quota of 3 for the entire Soviet Union and couple to it a separate annual quota of 2 for use only in the Kurile Islands or alternatively 3 for use only in the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka south of latitude 55°. The first alternative would provide essentially the same deterrent to clandestine testing as a single quota of 5 and the second alternative would provide essentially the same deterrent as a single annual quota of 6. The effectiveness of these quotas could be further improved by taking advantage of the concept of cumulative quotas over a period of years. For example, one could have a cumulative five-year quota of 15 on-site inspections for all of the Soviet Union and a separate five-year quota of 10 for the Kurile Islands or alternatively 15 for the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka. Recognizing the Soviet argument that this would permit us to use all of our inspections in one year and then break the treaty, one could also place a separate ceiling of 4 on the maximum number of inspections in any one year in the Soviet Union and a separate ceiling of 3 for the Kurile Islands (or 4 for the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka if this alternative were chosen). This procedure would, therefore, permit us to have up to 7 annual inspections in the case of the five-year cumulative quota of 15 for the entire Soviet Union and 10 for the Kurile Islands area (or up to 8 annual inspections under the other alternative).

Considering the above alternatives, I recommend that you consider a new proposal to the Soviet Union based on the concept of a five-year cumulative quota of 15 for the entire Soviet Union with a separate five-year quota of 10

for the Kurile Islands area with the proviso that no more than 4 of the quota of 15 or 3 of the quota of 10 could be used in any single year.

The so-called “black boxes” or automatic seismic stations in our present proposals offer another possible area of compromise. The Soviets have indicated that they would accept 3 of these stations and we have asked for 7. As I have indicated previously, these stations will add relatively little to the capability of our system and will considerably complicate its operation. We could, therefore, either accept the Soviet offer of 3 or even eliminate these facilities entirely without significantly reducing the deterrent value of our national detection system on which the treaty is now based.²

Jerry

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Energy, Test Ban Negotiations 7/62-7/63. Secret.

¹ Not found attached.

² On June 19, Wiesner submitted to Harriman a longer version of this proposal in which the position regarding the automatic stations was set forth at greater length. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Treaty, 8)

287. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) [Source](#)

Washington, May 18, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

During a two hour visit with Ambassador Dobrynin on board the "Patrick J" the following points emerged. They are not recorded in exact sequence but topically, since the conversation ranged back and forth.

Reappraisal in Moscow

I started by asking Dobrynin what he thought the principal questions are which would be asked of him when he reaches Moscow. He said that the overriding question was whether it is possible to reach any agreement with the United States on any subject. He said there was a dispute on this point going on among the leadership in Moscow and that they were indeed in the middle of a reappraisal. He said he thought it was of great importance that some point be found on which agreement could be reached. He emphasized the psychology of an agreement on something rather than the importance of the subject of agreement itself. For example, although he said he was not speaking on instructions and that the matter was one in which Khrushchev had no interest, he personally thought that even a Civil Air Transport Agreement would be advantageous. The remainder of our conversation was taken up with further exploration of points on which some agreement might be possible.

Nuclear testing

I told Dobrynin that, contrary to what some in Moscow might think, the President is very serious indeed about pursuing the possibilities of a nuclear test ban. We believe that a nuclear test ban is in the basic interest of both countries and that it could be an important step in turning down an arms race which will inevitably become more burdensome and dangerous to both. I noted that Mr. Khrushchev's recent reply to the Prime Minister and the President¹ seemed to rest upon two points of *fact* which it ought to be possible to clarify. First, there is the assertion as a fact that national

detection means are adequate to do the job and that inspections are therefore unnecessary. I said that we could not be certain that Mr. Khrushchev was not speaking the truth about his own capabilities. They may have instruments which we do not have; that technical problems of looking at the United States might be simpler than those of looking at the Soviet Union. But what we can say is that we do not have a national detection system capable of detecting and verifying underground tests in the Soviet Union without inspections. As far as we are concerned, this is a scientific and technical problem. I pointed out that we were prepared to adjust policy to technical and scientific developments as exemplified by the fact that we are now prepared to enter into an atmospheric test ban without inspection. But this factual question as to the capability of existing detection systems is one which we ought to explore further on both sides. Their scientists and ours ought to be able to sit down and look at existing instruments and capabilities and come to joint conclusions as to what the facts are.

A second “fact” underlying Mr. Khrushchev’s reply was his repetition of the view that inspections mean espionage. I said that we did not expect the Soviet Union to accept and trust our determination in good faith not to mix up espionage and international inspections of seismic events. I said that we could, however, recognize that the Soviet general staff looks upon secrecy as an important strategic asset in their closed society and could work out inspection techniques which could not possibly involve espionage.

I cited the President’s reference to our willingness to make some arrangement to cover a situation where instrumentation pointed to the need for an inspection at a point which happened to contain a highly sensitive Soviet military installation. When Dobrynin referred to an area of 500 square miles to be inspected, I pointed out that the area to be inspected could be reduced by a larger number of automatic seismic stations, but that this was a technical problem of accurately locating the event itself through triangulation and other well known means.

In the course of our discussion I said that it ought to be possible for us to have a continuing negotiation on nuclear testing, that a first result of such a negotiation might be to report back to governments an atmospheric test ban

which could be promptly ratified and put into effect while negotiations proceeded on underground testing. He asked if that could be accompanied by a moratorium on underground tests. I said that it would be difficult for us to agree to a moratorium because the underlying difficulty is whether in fact tests are occurring. On the other hand, I said that it would not be our purpose to engage in any massive program of underground testing during such negotiations. We would not attempt to keep secret any underground tests conducted during such a period, but I saw no reason why the situation could not be one with which both sides could live pending a serious effort to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

He asked whether it was not possible for President Kennedy to obtain consent to a treaty based upon two or three inspections if the President were to throw his full personal prestige behind the matter and present it forcefully to the Congress and to the country. I said that this was a question which was not merely "political" in the terms in which he had presented it but was also involved with the merits of the arrangements and their consistency with the national security interests of the United States. The President himself could not in good conscience urge upon the country a test ban treaty with two or three inspections because he is convinced that such a treaty could not meet our essential requirements for reasonable assurance. I added that I myself, on the basis of what I now know about the capabilities of instrumentation and other available means, would be forced to oppose a treaty involving only two or three inspections.

In concluding this subject I emphasized again the seriousness of our interest in a nuclear test ban, our desire to clarify our differences about the factual aspects, and our hope that we could find a means for moving ahead at least with an atmospheric test ban while the underground problem was under serious and urgent discussion. I told him that he should know that there is some question in our minds about whether interest in a test ban on the Soviet side has not diminished since December possibly because of the Soviet decision to step up its nuclear effort and engage in further testing and possibly because it is their view that it is untimely to move ahead on a nuclear test ban during their discussions with the Chinese since every indication is that the Chinese would not take part in a test ban treaty. He offered no comment on the latter points.

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

I told Dobrynin that I thought the Soviet Union ought not to let the MLF discussion in NATO get in the way of a prompt agreement along the lines of the paper we submitted on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.² I said I could understand why the Soviets might be nervous about arrangements which have not yet been concluded and the details of which cannot therefore be known. I told him that I thought that when such arrangements were known that the Soviets would be much more relaxed about them because it would be clear that they would reflect our own fundamental policy against the proliferation of national nuclear forces. I said that it would help the atmosphere of our discussions if the Soviets were to bear in mind that they themselves have gone much further in contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons than we have done or intend to do—namely, in furnishing China with a plutonium plant. I said this put the Chinese in a position to produce nuclear weapons regardless of the attitude of the Soviet Union itself. I said to Dobrynin that “you have already lost your virginity on this point and we are still trying to preserve ours”. He laughed and said that I should say that to Mr. Khrushchev, who would greatly appreciate it.

When he emphasized that their concern is that the MLF is only a first step toward full proliferation, I said that nothing could better insure that any such first step would be the last step than a solemn international agreement of just the sort we had proposed. Indeed looking ahead for the next ten or twenty years, I said that the possibilities of proliferation are in no sense limited to NATO countries but exist in the Near East and among unaligned countries who would not take guidance from this matter from either the Soviet Union or the United States.³ We ourselves believe, therefore, that we need the help of the Soviet Union in halting proliferation, help which could be provided by the kind of agreement we have proposed. He commented that he thought it would be helpful if we were in a position, say by late July, to offer somewhat more detail about the MLF arrangements which would prevent their resulting in additional national nuclear capabilities.⁴

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact, NATO, Cuba, and Laos.]

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. The conversation was held on board the Patrick J. This memorandum of conversation is printed in full in [vol. V, Document 195](#).

¹ [Document 285](#).

² This paper is attached to the April 12 memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin; see [footnote 5, Document 275](#). The Soviet reply of May 11 is summarized in Topol 1712 to Paris, May 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)

³ In a conversation on May 11, Dobrynin asked Rusk “if we wanted the Chinese to be a member of a multilateral force. The Secretary said that if it were on the same basis as we had in mind, we would be quite relaxed about it.” (Memorandum by Thompson; *ibid.*, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

⁴ In a postscript to this memorandum, Rusk stated that in response to Dobrynin’s question regarding a Latin American nuclear free zone, he had said that the United States had encouraged Brazil to pursue it and that while the United States would not include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in such a zone, it would include Guantanamo.

288. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, May 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

Discussion on the Development of a High-Yield Nuclear Weapon, attended by The President, Gilpatric, Taylor, Ball, Johnson, Fisher, Haworth, and Betts (from AEC), Bundy, and McCone

21 May, 11:00 a.m. [1](#)

1. Gilpatric and Taylor explained that the JCS had developed a need for a high-yield weapon for use against particular targets and for availability in about four years or more. They explained that the weapon was to be delivered by a B-52, would be a lay-down bomb, and would be more effective against certain Soviet targets than existing weapons.
2. Commissioner Haworth explained that the AEC would develop a lay-down bomb of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that would weigh 35,000 pounds, could be carried in a B-52, would utilize known technology, no testing would be necessary, the cost would be \$20 million, the development period about four years. [2](#)
3. The President immediately asked McCone's views.
4. I opposed the development, said that I would not proceed with it because we would end up with an obsolete weapon far inferior to the Soviets, it could only be delivered in a B-52, and with the rise in Soviet defense which we had observed and reported on, I questioned very much whether a B-52 could be depended upon for penetration four to six years from now. I therefore said that if we were to go forward we should develop the most sophisticated and lightest high-yield weapon giving a yield of maximum value from a military point of view. This would require testing, and we should be prepared to test such a weapon both during its developmental and in its final version. I pointed out that if they went to a 100 megaton weapon it would require, among other things, the development of a new weapons system and this should be looked at in addition to the question of developing the bomb itself. I again questioned the ability of the B-52 to penetrate with reasonable dependability into the Soviet heartland in the late '60s at which time this large bomb would become available.

5. Mr. Fisher questioned the development because we had deplored Soviet development of 100 megaton “horror” weapon which had no military application. I took issue, pointing out to Mr. Fisher that a large yield weapon did, indeed, have significant military value.
- 6.

The President, supported by Mr. Bundy and others, agreed with the position I advanced and instructed AEC to give consideration to the development of a sophisticated high-yield bomb, rather than one based on present technology, and also instructed Defense to look into the question of a delivery system.³

Action: There is no action required on the part of CIA. However, I would like our technical staff to further refine figures presented to me today.

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

¹ According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting began at 11:15 and lasted until 11:55 a.m. Gerald Johnson, U. Alexis Johnson, Harold Brown, and Carl Kaysen also attended. (Kennedy Library)

² Prior to the meeting, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had prepared a joint briefing paper for the President. (Undated paper attached to a note from Kaysen to Kennedy, May 20; *ibid.*, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, High Yield)

³ On May 21, McGeorge Bundy issued NSAM No. 245, which stated that the President had reviewed the problem of developing a high-yield nuclear weapon and had requested that the problem be re-examined, with attention to be “directed also to the question of developing a high-yield warhead to be delivered by presently programmed missile systems.” (*Ibid.*, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 245)

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, May 30, 1963, 5:56 p.m.

2590. Following is final revised text to which we have agreed with the British.¹ Request you compare it with text which Trevelyan receiving separately, and concert with him on immediate delivery to Khrushchev or highest available official.² Request you work out with Soviets timing and wording of announcement if they so desire.

Begin verbatim text

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

1. Since we received your letter of May 8³ about the question of the treaty to ban nuclear tests, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have been carefully considering it and we have now jointly agreed to send you letters in similar terms.
2. Let me say first of all that Prime Minister Macmillan and I are glad that you feel able to accept our suggestion that we should send highly placed representatives to Moscow who would be empowered to carry this question further and would be able to discuss the matter with you. We should be glad to send our representatives to Moscow at a time convenient to you either during the last half of June or, if you would prefer this, in the first half of July. We would hope that our representatives might have the advantage of a personal discussion with you.
3. We realize that our positions are still different, especially on the nature of the problem of inspections, but we agree with you that it is important 'to use every opportunity in order to effect a rapprochement of the positions of the respective sides.' It is in this spirit that we think a visit of high-level representatives to Moscow would be good, so that both sides can talk fully and freely about ways of bridging the gap between us.

4. If you can accept this proposal, we suggest that the present correspondence should remain confidential but that in view of the world-wide interest an announcement should be made straightaway to the effect that as a result of our correspondence on the subject of a nuclear test ban treaty, it has been agreed that you will receive highly placed representatives of the Prime Minister and me in Moscow during the month of June/July in order to carry forward the discussion of possibilities.
5. There are, however, two points that you have made in your letter to which we think we should reply in advance of detailed discussions. In the first place, you state that 'national means now available for discovering nuclear explosions, including also underground explosions, are amply sufficient to unmask any state which might try to conduct nuclear weapons tests under cover of secrecy.' You cite the example of recent French tests in the Sahara, point out that your seismologists detected the vibrations in the earth produced by these tests and state that you have no doubt that our seismologists 'also have recorded these vibrations.'
6. While we agree that developments in seismological techniques have made it possible now to detect most of the earth tremors produced by subterranean disturbances of significant size, we do not agree that it is possible by these techniques alone to ascertain in many important cases whether these tremors were caused by natural earthquakes or man-made explosions. For such identification on-site inspection is still necessary in many cases. This was, of course, the position agreed by the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 in which Soviet scientists participated; and at recent private conferences between scientists of our three countries there had been general agreement that there are underground events which occur in both of our countries whose origin could not be identified with certainty without an on-site inspection.
7. To return to the recent French test in the Sahara, the earth tremors produced by the most recent French test were certainly detected, but prior to the French test it was generally known that it was going to take place in the fairly near future as well as where it would be. The detection of the earth tremors from the French underground nuclear explosion therefore does not, in our view, prove that all nuclear explosions can be identified by national detection systems alone. This is, of course, the central point in our argument in favor of a reasonable number of on-site inspections

for underground tests as part of a treaty to ban all nuclear tests, and we sincerely believe this argument to be well founded on scientific fact.

8.

The second point to which we feel we must refer is your suggestion that the purpose of our requirement for a system of on-site inspections is to send intelligence agents on to the Soviet territory so as to carry out espionage. We most sincerely and categorically affirm that we have no such purpose. We had thought that this was made clear by the proposals we have made which in our view would prevent on-site inspections being misused for espionage purposes. If you are still in doubt on this matter, our representatives are prepared to discuss in detail the safeguards which could be arranged in this matter so that we can satisfy each other that we are both prepared to enter into a test ban in good faith. We think that reasonable provisions for on-site inspections will make it possible for us to work out a treaty which will endure and not be liable to break down because of unfounded suspicions which could easily have been dispelled by reasonable provisions for verification.⁴ We believe that given good will it should be possible to reach agreement on a method of inspection and on a number which would satisfy both of us.⁵

Mr. Macmillan and I wish in conclusion to express our pleasure at your belief that the signing of a treaty to end nuclear weapons tests would have value both in itself and because of its positive effect on the international situation. It is in this belief, which we share, that we hope that the high level discussions we are proposing can take place in Moscow. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy.” *End verbatim text.*

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Khrushchev. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and cleared by McGeorge Bundy. Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 102](#) .

¹ The first draft of this letter is attached to a May 20 letter from Macmillan to Kennedy. Macmillan commented: “I have formed the view that although Khrushchev’s letter is not very hopeful on substance we ought to take up his acceptance of our proposal to send emissaries to Moscow.” Subsequent drafts are attached to a memorandum from Foster to Rusk, May 27, and a letter from Kennedy to Macmillan, May 28. All are *ibid.*; Kennedy-Macmillan 1963.

² Macmillan’s letter to Khrushchev of the same date is identical in substance. The Embassy, in concert with the British, delivered the message on May 31.

³ [Document 285](#).

⁴ Macmillan’s May 20 draft included this language: “While, however, we accept that the inspections which are proposed are symbols or samples of the total number of unidentified underground disturbances which might be expected to occur, we cannot accept that such symbolic or sampling inspections should be of a quite perfunctory character since in such circumstances they would have no value.” Although this sentence was dropped from Kennedy’s draft of May 28, Macmillan asked for its restoration. Bundy replied for the President that “we think it dangerous to appear to accept the word ‘symbolic,’ both as a negotiating point and as a matter of possible eventual public discussion. The core of our position is that the inspections must be real.” (Enclosed in communication from de Zulueta to Bundy; message from Bundy to de Zulueta, both May 29; both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence Kennedy-Khrushchev-Macmillan 3/63-6/63) ⁵ Foster’s ACDA draft of May 27 closed with a bracketed paragraph suggesting immediate signature of a treaty banning tests in space, under the high seas, and in the atmosphere, without slackening efforts to obtain a comprehensive treaty. The paragraph appeared in no subsequent version.

290. Memorandum for the Record Source

Washington, June 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation with Mr. Kaysen on 8 June

1. Mr. Kaysen, working at Mr. McGeorge Bundy's desk in the White House, called General Taylor on 8 June. He wanted to give General Taylor a piece of information, which was that the President was, at the moment (i.e., 8 June), planning on Monday (10 June) in his commencement speech at the American University to announce that he does not intend to be the first to resume atmospheric testing.¹ Mr. Kaysen said that the President may think about this again—that it was very much a personal view of his (the President's)—that the President had discussed it with almost no one, only discussion was in writing the speech.² Mr. Kaysen said that the people who knew about this were the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, Bill Foster, and McNamara (Kaysen, at this time, had placed a call to "Bob" but had not yet talked to him).³ Mr. Kaysen said that if General Taylor had a reaction to transmit to the President that he would be glad to transmit it.⁴
2. General Taylor asked if this was atmospheric testing—no implication of a ban on underground testing.
3. Mr. Kaysen said they were; the United States does not now propose to conduct testing in the atmosphere as long as someone else does not do so, the United States will not be the first.
4. General Taylor said that he would suspect that "his corporation"⁵ would feel that any unilateral abstention [abstention] is bad; that his personal reaction is not particularly that way unless it should indeed be a deterrent to underground testing.
5. Mr. Kaysen said the President's speech went on to say what efforts we are making to conclude a treaty. He (the President) just feels very strongly on it, and that the President had decided that this is a good time to do this. Mr. Kaysen had learned this for the first time yesterday (7 June).

6. General Taylor said that he did not think he should rush in and advise the President on this, but he would like to plant the thought that this is likely to be a psychological deterrent to underground testing. General Taylor asked if he could mention this to Gilpatric.
7. Mr. Kaysen said he would rather call Gilpatric—although there was no problem in talking to him if General Taylor wanted to—but he wanted to call him.⁶ Mr. Kaysen mentioned that this was “secret” until the President made his speech.⁷

CWO Proctor⁸

^{*} Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda. Confidential. Drafted on June 27 by Chief Warrant Officer Proctor of Taylor’s personal staff.

¹ For text of the speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1963, pp. 459-464.

² In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting held the morning of June 10, Legere stated that it was not clear whether Kaysen had written the original draft of the speech, but that it was “clear that he worked and reworked it over the weekend. Bundy noted that this projected speech is unusual in that there has been absolutely no leak of its content to the press.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, June 1963, T-223-69) ³ No record of this telephone call has been found.

⁴ The President left Washington the morning of June 5 for a trip to the Southwest, California, and Hawaii. He arrived back in Washington around 9 a.m. on June 10.

⁵ The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁶ No record of either telephone call has been found.

⁷ In a conversation held on June 11, French Ambassador Herve Alphand asked Rusk if the timing of the speech was “tactical or fundamental.” Rusk replied that there was no information from the Soviets pointing toward a detente or a change in their position on nuclear testing, but that “the timing was somewhat influenced by the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese meetings.” If

Khrushchev attempted to “close the gap” with the Chinese by adopting unreasonable positions on East-West issues such as Laos, the record would show that the West had been reasonable. (Memorandum by Johannes V. Imhof; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) ⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**291. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Taylor)** [Source](#)

Washington, undated.

Atmospheric Testing Moratorium

Mr. Carl Kaysen of the White House Staff called me on June 8th to inform me that the President was planning to announce on June 10th in his speech at the American University that the United States does not intend to be the first to resume atmospheric testing. Mr. Kaysen indicated that if I had any strong feelings against this action I should communicate them to the President, either directly or through Mr. Kaysen.

I replied that I felt sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be opposed to any unilateral abstention from testing since they were on record as to the requirement to test—preferably in 1963. My principal personal concern would be that the proposed atmospheric moratorium might act as a psychological deterrent to underground testing. I indicated that I would not attempt to contact the President, but would like his intention [*attention*] invited to the possible effect on underground testing.

I did not feel inclined to make a special appeal to the President because the Chiefs' views on the requirement for testing were well known and presumably had been taken into account. Since the United States did not intend to be prepared for atmospheric testing until spring 1964, and since there was considerable evidence that the Soviets were about to resume testing, we stood to lose nothing by the declaration, and indeed might gain some advantage by an announcement which might have the effect of holding back the Soviets.

* [Source](#): National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda.
Secret.

**292. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
Secretary of State Rusk and the Deputy Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)** [Source](#)

Washington, June 8, 1963, 2:06 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. FISHER

F replied he had seen the Pres' American U speech¹ and thinks it is quite good. The decision with punch line is reasonably daring. Also replied he does not think there will be too much of a reaction. Sec said it is only practical way to bring about now what 32 Senators said they were in favor of.² F said on the whole he thinks it is a good thing. Sec asked about French aspect of this. F does not think their conducting tests in the atmosphere will make this much difference. If we and the Soviets are serious, it won't. Otherwise he thinks they have made up their mind to be argumentative etc. F would not have thought of this as an area of major pronouncement—but Sec said it is all right. Sec wondered if he should telephone Senate leaders before he makes it. F's feeling has been he is a little bit gunshy about going up to them and have them say no. F suggested Sec tell Bundy or Kaysen we assume this has been thought of. Sec said he has not found a word given the policy. F said Kaysen had a couple of little things. Mentioned something on page 12. F does not disagree with policy and given it this is a fairly good articulation of it. The fact Sorensen can do this without not knowing much about it surprises him. Sec said it is very good.³ F mentioned something on page 2. F also unsuccessfully passed on that 32 Senators did not go for outer space and Pres has made up his mind to say they did more than they did and see if they will argue with him. Sec said here he is only talking about in the atmosphere. F said not in point 2. Discussed this and F said while his personal relations with Dodd are good, they aren't on this and he would not be able to find out what is in his mind. Sec thought he should try to get Humphrey⁴ to see what is on their mind on this.⁵

* Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau.

¹ See [footnotes 2](#) and [3](#), [Document 290](#).

² On May 27, 32 Senators, including Thomas Dodd of Connecticut and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, offered a resolution calling for the United States to offer to the Soviet Union an accord to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere and under water. If the Soviets rejected the accord, the United States would refrain from testing in these environments as long as the Soviets did. The letter was published in *The New York Times*, May 28, 1963.

³ Rusk called Sorensen on June 10, following delivery of the speech, “to offer S his warm congratulations on the Pres' speech. If we were short on suggestions, it was because the first draft was so good.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) ⁴ A postscript notes that Rusk intended to call Humphrey that evening. No record of this call has been found.

⁵ On June 9, Rusk and Kaysen discussed other aspects of the speech, principally who might go to Moscow for the test ban talks. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, June 8, 1963, 9 p.m.

3104. Embassy's translation of Khrushchev's June 8 letter to President [1](#) follows:

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President: I have received your message of May 31 [2](#) on question of cessation nuclear tests and, it goes without saying, have studied it with due attention. I received an analogous message from Prime Minister H. Macmillan.

In your letters, you and Mr. H. Macmillan repeat your proposal to send to Moscow high-ranking representatives of USA and Great Britain, who would be empowered "to discuss ways of overcoming existing differences between us" regarding conditions of agreement on cessation nuclear tests. Well, in my previous letter I already expressed my readiness to try even such a method of negotiations. Whole question is where and in what direction to search for way of overcoming those differences between our positions, which really exist.

It is our profound conviction that success of any further negotiations on cessation of tests, wherever these negotiations may be conducted—in Moscow, in Geneva, or in any other place—depends completely, as I wrote to you, on whether both parties are ready to agree on that realistic and equal basis which is prompted by life itself. And that basis is well known. In resolving question of cessation of tests, as well as any other international question, it consists in necessity of strictly following principle of equality of parties and of taking into account interests of each of them. This means that attainment of agreement on cessation of nuclear tests can only be arrived at if neither of parties attempts to receive any special advantages at expense of other party, and, consequently, does not insist on demands which are unacceptable to other party.

Moreover, we have recently become more and more convinced that those with whom we are negotiating are not inclined to conduct negotiations by proceeding from principle of equality of parties, and still want to receive from us some kind of bonus for cessation of nuclear-weapons tests. It is not possible otherwise to understand their stubborn attempt to obtain from us agreement on conducting inspections which would open up possibility of peeping into places at which stranger's eye should not look.

The fact that Soviet Union will not agree to conducting of espionage inspections has been mentioned in nearly every one of our documents on question of cessation of tests, and this question, it would seem, should be clear to the utmost degree. For, under present conditions, when problem of disarmament has not only not been solved, but nuclear-armaments race is taking on ever greater proportions and, day-in, day-out, is being spurred on more and more by the leading NATO powers, we are compelled to display particular concern in order in no way to endanger security of our country. And permit me to note, Mr. President, that steps recently undertaken on creation of NATO nuclear fist in Western Europe with participation of West German revanchists, can in no way stimulate us to relax our vigilance; the opposite is rather the case.

You write that goal of espionage is not being pursued by Western powers in question of inspections of cessation of nuclear tests. But, unfortunately, facts of most recent time, which have been scrupulously verified and have become public knowledge, have shown with all possible certainty how strong is interest of intelligence services of some powers in secrets of our defense and, at the same time, how unscrupulous they are in choice of methods. One would have to have an exceptional share of naivete to rely on the possibility that appropriate agencies in NATO countries, which, it can be said, day and night devote themselves to study of, and as they themselves put it, selection of, targets on territory of Soviet Union and other peaceloving states for nuclear strikes, would shrink from using for these same purposes the channels which would be opened up if we were to agree to demands of Western powers on inspection. If we displayed such naivete, it would not be difficult to imagine what attitude Soviet people would take towards such leaders.

Therefore, when you say that representatives of USA and Great Britain would be prepared to discuss with us in detail guarantees which should remove our doubts concerning inspections, I do not think, to tell the truth, that this would settle the matter. Root of everything is not in guarantees with which inspections might be surrounded, but in why such insistence is displayed by Western powers on question of inspections, when actually there is no need for them, when, indeed, there is in fact no need for them at all, if one bears in mind only interests of control in fulfillment by states of their obligations under agreement on cessation of nuclear tests.

In your message of May 31, you seem to wish again to urge us into starting discussion on whether national means of detection of underground nuclear explosions are sufficient or insufficient for controlling fulfillment of such an agreement. But what is there here to argue about, what is there to discuss? Facts, which confirm complete sufficiency of national means, are at hand. And you, too, it seems, have no doubts about, for example, fact mentioned in my message—namely, that seismic tremors from French underground nuclear tests in Sahara were registered by national means of states at distance of many thousands of kilometers. And nevertheless, for some reason, you do not consider it possible to accept as proof even such indisputable data.

As I recall, Mr. President, in one of your press conferences you stressed that treaty on cessation of nuclear tests must give assurance that, if any country carries out series of secret underground tests, these tests will be detected. Recently, I had occasion to become acquainted with statement on question of cessation of tests, made by group of well-known American scientists, representing scientific centers and universities of USA known the world over. I think that you read it too. What did these American scientists have to say, what ideas did they come out with, these scientists who, as they say, know what they're talking about, if one takes into account that it is precisely USA which has great experience in carrying out of underground nuclear explosions? They declare that, given contemporary means of detection, it is impossible to conceal series of underground nuclear explosions, even one of small yield. Consequently, those means of detection already in existence satisfy principal demand which you make for a treaty.

If one considers that national means of detection can be supplemented by automatic seismic stations, how can one fail to admit that all this is more than sufficient for most reliable control over cessation of all nuclear tests? Under these conditions no state would undertake secretly to violate agreement, since such a step would be fraught for it with risk of being exposed and of receiving such a blow to its prestige on international scene from which it would be difficult for any state to recover. National means of detection, combined with automatic seismic stations—this, certainly, is fully reliable guarantee against any attempts to produce secret nuclear explosions in circumvention of agreement on cessation of tests. And we are agreeable to installation of automatic seismic stations; you know this.

In light of all this, is it necessary for me to repeat once more that, if in December last year we agreed to conducting of certain minimum number of inspections on cessation of underground tests, we did so only and exclusively out of political considerations, with view to making easier for you, Mr. President, ratification of treaty on cessation of tests by Senate of USA? From point of view of essence of matter, however, resolution of question of tests could be handled perfectly well without any inspections. That was true in December, 1962, and is all the more true now as well.

Thus, it is completely possible to conclude agreement on cessation of nuclear tests on basis of equality, if only all the participants want this. We are, of course, prepared to discuss this, too, with high-ranking representatives of USA and Great Britain, whom you and Mr. H. Macmillan propose to send to Moscow. You express desire that these representatives should have opportunity to talk with me personally. I agree to this too, if it can be hoped that such meetings would prove useful. With regard to time of arrival in Moscow of representatives of USA and Great Britain, it would be most convenient for us, taking into account other, earlier planned, arrangements of foreign-political character, for them to come, if this is suitable for you as well, let us say, on July 15, 1963. Question of publication of appropriate announcement in this regard can be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

We should like to count upon success of projected exchange of opinions in Moscow on question of cessation of nuclear tests. Soviet Union sincerely

wishes to reach agreement as quickly as possible on conducting of any and all tests of nuclear weapons for all time. People throughout world desire conclusion of such agreement. Consequently, I cannot be silent about fact that heavy responsibility would be assumed by those who might continue to impede achievement of agreement and, at same time, in connection with forthcoming exchange of opinions in Moscow, might sow deceptive illusions among peoples to effect that matter was now already approaching a resolution of question of cessation of tests.

Quite recently, we have already had an experience on this score which cannot be called anything else but painful. You recall, Mr. President, that, after Soviet Union in December last year had made important step to meet Western powers, in that it agreed to a certain number of inspections, a proposal ensued from Government of USA to send representatives of USSR to United States for talks, with goal of most rapid achievement of agreement. We immediately responded to that proposal and sent our representatives to USA. Whole world expected that, under the favorable conditions which had developed as result of our December step, talks in USA would be final step before signing of treaty on cessation of tests.

But it turned out quite differently. Western powers did not wish, as it is your custom to say, "to go their half of the way", remained on old, notoriously unacceptable, positions, and, instead of serious, political talks, attempted to draw our representatives into discussions of technical details, which could not fail to remain pointless until political questions of principle had been agreed upon. What is more, your representative declared to our representatives that he would have no occasion at all to cross the ocean if Soviet Union did not intend to accept demands of Western powers. It was this sort of position on part of those with whom we were negotiating which led at that time to break-down of talks, which consequently left nothing but disillusionment behind them.

Repetition of this sort of experience would only damage the matter and I should like to express hope that you are aware of this also. Success now depends only upon question of what baggage representatives of Western powers bring with them to Moscow.

I am sending analogous message to Prime Minister H. Macmillan.

Sincerely, N. Khrushchev.

End text.

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Received at 4:48 a.m. on June 9. Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 103](#) .

¹ Gromyko handed Ambassador Kohler this letter at 4 p.m. Moscow time. (Telegram 3101 from Moscow, June 8; *ibid.*, POL US-USSR)

² See [Document 289](#).

294. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, June 14, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list [1](#)

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by asking Mr. Foster to suggest the points to be discussed. Mr. Foster summarized the last meeting. [2](#) He indicated that the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes had been left open and that Secretary McNamara had requested another meeting to discuss the treaty generally.

Mr. Foster also said that the negotiating situation had changed considerably since the last meeting. A mission to Moscow was now planned. He thought that the treaty should be available for use on that mission if necessary. The draft was generally agreed to among agencies except for the peaceful uses annex. [3](#)

Secretary Rusk said that the Harriman mission was not based on indications that the Soviets were prepared to move toward the kind of treaty we wanted. Khrushchev has recently reiterated that national systems are adequate and that inspection is a form of espionage. The President feels the mission should be made because this may be our last chance to avoid a larger and more difficult arms race. In 10 or 20 years it will be important that the U.S. made as great an effort as possible to achieve a test ban. Secretary Rusk said that failure of the mission would be unfortunate but that it would also be wrong not to make the effort. He was under no illusions as to the prospects. He said that the mission should go prepared to move on the test ban treaty which we could in good faith accept. The Soviets were worried by bloc problems and there was some possibility of change in their position. Our mission should have a treaty in hand for use if necessary.

Secretary McNamara said he had mixed feelings about achieving a firm Government position on the draft treaty. He said that if we had a fixed position before Congress and the people, we might develop arguments which would restrict negotiations on alternatives. He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs would testify before the Stennis Committee in the latter part of this month. He hoped that their testimony would not have to be related to a specific treaty draft. If the draft treaty became an approved Government position, the Chiefs would have to testify against that position. If the draft treaty was left as one alternative, they might be able to say that they supported a test ban provided it was effective in detecting clandestine violations.

General Taylor summarized the Joint Chiefs' comments on the May 24 draft test ban treaty as follows: (1) the Soviets could conduct clandestine tests if the treaty were adopted; (2) the draft treaty did not provide adequate opportunity to fix responsibility for evasion; and (3) the treaty as now drafted was not in the national security interest of the United States.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs did not look forward to appearing before the Stennis Committee because that would bring out the conflict within the Government. He thought that Secretary McNamara's alternative would be better than approving the draft treaty as written.

Secretary McNamara said that the Chiefs saw two major defects in the draft treaty: (1) testing could be conducted below a threshold without detection; and (2) testing might be conducted above the threshold without detection or without the fixing of responsibility for the tests. The Chiefs, he said, believe that the tactical and strategic balance of power might be shifted in favor of the Soviet Union if the present draft treaty were adopted. Secretary McNamara felt it would take a long series of technical discussions before these issues could be resolved. He would hate to see the draft treaty approved before it was really necessary to do so.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the Chiefs had ever expressed themselves on a ban on atmospheric tests. General Taylor said they had not done so formally. However, he thought such a ban would be better than an inadequate comprehensive test ban treaty.

Mr. Foster said that the test ban position had been discussed for months and agreed factual and Governmental positions reached last summer and again in February.⁴ Secretary McNamara replied that the issues really hadn't been joined; the technical groups had not reached agreement; the tactical and strategic considerations had not been agreed upon. Mr. Foster felt that the kind of review suggested by Secretary McNamara would cause considerable undue delay. Secretary McNamara said that a great deal of progress had been made in the technical meetings preparing testimony for the Stennis Committee hearings. He had been trying to find out why people take the positions they do and, if they were wrong on their facts, to destroy their positions. Mr. Fisher said that the April 1 US-UK memorandum⁵ given to the Soviet Union reflected a Governmental position approved by the President. It followed a White House meeting on February 18⁶ and a cable of instructions to Geneva dated February 19.⁷ The treaty was simply an elaboration of these positions. He asked what was in the draft treaty that had not been covered by the April 1 memorandum which, he pointed out, had been approved by the Department of Defense. Secretary McNamara said he fully supported the draft treaty in its present form but other segments of the Government disagreed. Mr. McCone said he had never heard the Joint Chiefs take a position on the treaty at the Committee of Principals meetings.⁸ He pointed out that the Stennis Committee would pin them down as to their position on the treaty. Mr. Chayes agreed with Mr. McCone. The staff of the Committee has a draft of the treaty he pointed out. In presentations to the Committee we have attempted to de-emphasize the details of the treaty. However, they have the April 1 memorandum. They will ask every witness what he thinks of the present U.S. position, and whether he thinks 7, 6 or 5 annual inspections are adequate.

General Taylor said the Chiefs had been asked by the Stennis Committee the following questions: (1) The extent to which the Chiefs were consulted by ACDA and DOD on test ban problems; (2) The extent to which the Chiefs' views were reflected in the U.S. position on the test ban; (3) The judgment of the Chiefs on the military consequences of specific proposals; and (4) The military implications of a test ban treaty.

Secretary McNamara asked again that a head-on collision be avoided if at all possible. He said he supported the draft treaty because he felt the U.S.

was ahead of the Soviets and that continued testing would produce equality. The Chiefs, however, disagree. The facts are very technical. It is essential that the experts supporting the conflicting views sit down together in the same room and reach, if possible, an agreed position. He pointed out that the AEC lab directors had made statements concerning the technical facts which made it impossible for the Chiefs to take opposing views since they relied heavily on the lab directors. Secretary Rusk agreed that we should avoid a controversy if possible. He didn't quite understand the Chiefs' position however. He said he would not feel free to take a foreign policy position that disagreed from that of the President. Secretary McNamara replied that there was a clause in the law which said the Chiefs had the right to appear before Congress to give their own views. He indicated that this law had been interpreted by the Congress as meaning that the Chiefs are required to give their personal opinions when asked.

General Taylor said he would be happy if the President said that the Chiefs' views were privileged because the Chiefs were his personal advisers. General Taylor felt that this was not practical however. Mr. Fisher referred again to the April 1 memorandum and to the agreed positions taken then and earlier. Secretary McNamara felt that we had to deal with today and tomorrow, and with our position before Congress, and not with positions agreed to in the past. Dr. Wiesner agreed. He also pointed out that the laboratory directors are not in a position to judge the overall policy considerations.

Mr. Fisher asked whether we were going to withdraw the positions we had taken at Geneva and elsewhere. Mr. McCone said he saw no purpose in discussing the draft treaty and that he hadn't realized that this was the purpose of the meeting. General Taylor asked whether it was possible to reopen past positions in view of the Harriman mission. He said he would hate to see the newspapers reporting that the Chiefs opposed a test ban treaty while Governor Harriman was in Moscow. Dr. Wiesner indicated that Harriman had to be able to have a maximum of flexibility.

Secretary Rusk doubted that further discussion could resolve these issues. He thought that the technical people would never come to agreement. Mr. Nitze said that a great deal of progress had been made in the four

committees preparing testimony for the Stennis Committee. Secretary McNamara said he did not want to be faced again with statements from the laboratory directors saying our warheads could not penetrate Soviet targets unless further tests could be conducted to ascertain and correct defects. He referred to statements by Mr. Henderson of Sandia and Dr. Foster of Livermore. Since the Chiefs relied on them for technical advice, it was difficult to expect the Chiefs to take a different position. General Taylor indicated that one of the AEC laboratories had said that 80% of the testing which would be desirable for the Soviet Union to conduct could be done clandestinely without detection by us. Mr. Nitze felt that some of these statements were true.

Secretary McNamara referred to the Twining Report⁹ which had been requested by Senator Symington. Teller, John Foster, Twining, Doolittle and others had signed the report which was full of this kind of technical argument. Secretary Rusk said that he didn't think Teller was talking as a technical man when he talked about the test ban.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs were conscientious men who were sincerely concerned about our national security. He would welcome Mr. Foster and his experts to a meeting with the Chiefs and to tell them why they were wrong. Mr. Foster accepted the invitation.¹⁰

Secretary McNamara said again that a great many things had to be thrashed out and he hoped we could avoid recertifying this draft. Secretary Rusk asked whether there was anything in the draft which had not been approved in substance by the President except for the Plowshare Annex. Mr. Fisher said there was nothing and he referred again to the February 18 meeting and the April 1 memorandum. Secretary McNamara said there was no question about the President's position or the support of the Department of Defense but the JCS did have reservations. Secretary Rusk felt that the basic position on the test ban had been approved by the President and that Governor Harriman could enter into talks on the basis of this position. If this position was to be changed, the initiative to seek such a change had better be taken by those who wanted the change. Secretary McNamara replied that he hoped that Harriman could avoid taking the treaty to Moscow for tabling.

Secretary Rusk said the treaty simply reflects the present U.S. position. Unless this position is changed by the President, it would be the position taken by Harriman. He thought it consistent with all the interests of the United States, including the national security interest. In his view, it was not a question of having an approved position. The question being discussed was how best to handle discussions with the Congress on the U.S. position.

Secretary McNamara expressed again the hope that the Committee of Principals would not be asked again to recertify the treaty at this time. Mr. Foster said that it might well be advantageous to have an approved treaty draft for Governor Harriman's use. Secretary McNamara asked whether there was any intention to table the draft treaty before July 15, to which Mr. Foster replied in the negative. Secretary McNamara hoped the Committee could leave it at that. Next week, he said, he would like to see the lab directors, the White House experts, and the other experts in the Government all get together in the same room to resolve issues and bring the past agreed positions up to date.

Mr. Kaysen felt that Secretary McNamara was raising a tactical question: Is it necessary to table a draft now? In view of the Congressional problem, Secretary McNamara felt that it was better not to do so. Mr. Kaysen concluded that discussion with the Congress of the basis for the Harriman negotiations should be avoided if possible.

Mr. Foster said that, in an attempt to put off the hearings, he had told Senator Stennis that no treaty had been agreed to with the Soviets and that if one was, the issue before the Senate would be quite different. Senator Stennis had said that it was, nevertheless, impossible to stop the hearings but that he would try to slow down the pace.¹¹ Mr. Nitze stated that an argument in support of the test ban treaty on national security grounds alone was very difficult to sustain. However, there were good foreign policy grounds to support the treaty. Secretary Rusk replied that the Members of the Committee had all agreed, he thought, that the risks to national security from an unlimited arms race outweighed the risks inherent in a test ban treaty. Dr. Wiesner suggested that this general discussion be followed up next week and thereafter with technical discussions.

Secretary Rusk opened the discussion of the Peaceful Uses Annex by asking whether the choice was not between a test ban and Plowshare, assuming a treaty could be secured. He did not see how you could do both peaceful uses explosions and have a significant test ban treaty. He wondered whether it would be practical to have the Soviets conduct our Plowshare experiments while we conducted theirs.

Chairman Seaborg said that if Plowshare experiments could only be conducted by revelation of the device then few experiments would be carried out. He thought, however, that it was possible to devise ways of doing both.

Secretary McNamara asked whether the AEC proposal was unacceptable to the Soviets or to the United States. Secretary Rusk asked how much information could be gotten about weapons tests from debris. Chairman Seaborg said not as much as with disclosure of device. Dr. Wiesner said not as much but enough. Chairman Seaborg agreed you could learn something about weapons from debris. Dr. Wiesner indicated that the AEC proposal would permit the testing of any kind of weapon. Mr. Fisher answered Secretary McNamara's earlier question by saying that the AEC proposal was unacceptable to both the U.S. and the Soviets.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there was no clearcut distinction between experiments leading to better weapons and experiments leading to better explosives for peaceful uses. Mr. Nitze thought the risk to the United States was not greater from the AEC proposal than from existing U.S. position. Secretary Rusk asked how much testing was necessary before Plowshare explosives could be developed. Chairman Seaborg said some tests would be necessary to develop these clean weapons.

Secretary Rusk asked whether it was possible to use a new clean device developed just for Plowshare. Chairman Seaborg replied that the clean device needed for Plowshare would have in it much of the weapons information that the weaponeers didn't want to reveal. Secretary McNamara pointed out that under the AEC proposal we would be informed of each Plowshare test. However, he said, we don't know about clandestine cheating by the Soviets. Dr. Wiesner pointed out that the AEC proposal was really an acceptance of Congressman Hosmer's suggestion that 12 free tests be

permitted on each side each year. Mr. Fisher thought it would be equally as difficult to negotiate the AEC proposal as the Hosmer suggestion.

Mr. Nitze said that the main purpose of a test ban treaty was as a first step in inhibiting the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other countries. If the test ban treaty had the AEC proposal in it, there would be good reason to have it coupled with a non-diffusion agreement.

Mr. Keeny asked whether the small AEC quota and limit on yield would allow full Plowshare development. Chairman Seaborg indicated that these limits would slow the program down but, nevertheless, permit its continued growth. He felt that it might be possible to put Plowshare devices in a central depository in five years but it was not possible to do so now.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the Plowshare program was based on the proposition that certain tasks could be done more cheaply by nuclear explosions. Chairman Seaborg replied that this was so but in some cases the cost was so high without nuclear explosives as to be prohibitive. Secretary Rusk said that if Plowshare was the only obstacle to a test ban treaty, the cost would probably be negligible in comparison with the millions which would otherwise go into the competitive arms race. Chairman Seaborg said that if this was the one thing that prevented the treaty, he might agree with Secretary Rusk.

Mr. Keeny pointed out that the Soviets had in the past been adamant against any other position than disclosure of the device. Mr. Foster referred to the Soviet agreement to the present U.S. position calling for such disclosure which was reflected in the April 18, 1961 draft treaty. Mr. Keeny said that the U.S. had proposed limits on instrumentations in the past but the Soviet had not agreed. Dr. Wiesner thought it would be very disturbing to the negotiations to take a new position on this problem.

Chairman Seaborg believed that this would not become an issue in the negotiations for some time. Secretary Rusk asked whether there weren't explosive devices which could be used for Plowshare and which could be revealed without danger to our security. Chairman Seaborg said no. Dr. Long¹² indicated that four years ago there were thought to be such devices.

Chairman Seaborg said this was not true today. The fallout, the cost, and a more realistic and careful look had changed his views of the matter.

Secretary Rusk asked again how much additional testing would be necessary before the Plowshare program could begin carrying out the tasks for which it was intended. Chairman Seaborg said that there was a four-year program to develop devices to build a new canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Mr. Kelly thought these devices would be ready in two years. Mr. Keeny thought that building a Panama Canal, which would require dozens or hundreds of shots, would be wholly inconsistent with a test ban treaty if one were in effect then. Chairman Seaborg thought that perhaps even the Soviets would not object if the development goes as the AEC hopes.

Mr. Foster thought that the Committee would not gain much by further discussion on this point at this time.^{[13](#)}

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Secret. Drafted by George Bunn, General Counsel of ACDA.

¹ The list of 24 participants is not printed.

² See [Documents 277](#) and [278](#).

³ At the time of this meeting, the current U.S. working draft test ban treaty was dated May 24. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 2/15-5/31/63) A covering note states that in accordance with decisions reached at the April 17 Principals' meeting, the May 24 draft included revisions of the articles on privileges and immunities and explosions for peaceful purposes, but lacked the annex on peaceful explosions. (Ibid.)

⁴ According to a memorandum of this meeting prepared by McCone, a "sharp exchange" occurred at this point when Foster claimed that the Chiefs had "in effect approved the treaty in February and March meetings." (Memorandum for the record by McCone, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, EA/DCI Chron, 2/1/62-12/31/62)

⁵ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pp. 141-145.

⁶ See [Document 264](#).

⁷ Instructions were sent in Todis 806, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE))

⁸ According to McCone's memorandum for the record, he stated at this point that "he felt that Foster was wrong, he had attended a number of Meetings of Principals since he had returned to Government, and he had observed that the Chiefs had always opposed the treaty and had never endorsed the treaty as asserted by Foster."

⁹ Reference is to "Military Implications of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Testing," prepared by a Committee headed by former JCS Chairman General Nathan Twining and submitted to General LeMay on March 4. It implied that the United States no longer led the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Second Twining Report) In a memorandum addressed to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, May 13, Scoville reported reasons the Twining Report had not caused the 205 Panel to alter its conclusions. (Ibid.) Regarding the 205 Panel's Report, see [Document 250](#). The final report has not been found.

¹⁰ No memorandum of this meeting, which took place on July 2, has been found.

¹¹ On June 26, Admiral Anderson and General LeMay presented to the Stennis Committee statements setting forth the reasons for JCS opposition to the draft comprehensive test ban treaty. See *Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session*, Part 1 (Washington, 1964), pp. 302-390. A draft version of the statement dated June 20 includes portions deleted in the published hearings. (Enclosure to memorandum from JCS to McNamara, June 22; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban I, T-368-69) Additional information on the rationale for the JCS position is in memorandum SAACM-183-63, June 22, from General Dale O. Smith, Special Assistant to the JCS for Arms Control, to Taylor. (Ibid.)

¹² Dr. Franklin Long, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Science and Technology, ACDA.

¹³ The summary of actions taken at this meeting states that the Committee did not resolve differences among the members on explosions for peaceful

purposes, outlines the JCS objections to the treaty, and records McNamara's request that the Committee not give final approval to the draft treaty at the meeting. "It was agreed the text of the draft treaty was not needed for tabling before July 15th at the earliest. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster expressed the view that the text might be necessary for the Harriman mission." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63)

295. Editorial Note

Telegram 5959 to Paris, June 14, 1963, drafted by McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler, instructed Ambassador Bohlen to see Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in order to invite President de Gaulle to the United States and to discuss with Couve “the President’s thinking about his American University speech” and the Harriman mission to Moscow. Regarding the testing question, Bohlen was to note “disturbing indications” that a new Soviet test series was about to begin and to tell Couve that Kennedy recognized that the French view of testing and the technique of negotiation with the Soviets was different from the American. “But the President wishes de Gaulle to know that if any test ban agreement should come into near prospect, he would think it essential to engage in close and careful discussion among the three Western nuclear powers to see if ways could be found to reconcile their positions in the face of any such prospective agreement. The President’s view is that in such case it would be necessary to take account of the needs of France if she were to join in a test ban agreement.”

Bohlen reported in telegram 5194 from Paris, June 15, that he had seen Couve and outlined the President’s thinking as instructed. Couve “found interesting the reference to taking into account the needs of France” if it joined a test ban agreement. “I told him that while I was speaking only personally, I thought that this meant in the event she decided to join any test ban agreement which might be reached and that if in so doing she were to forego certain technical advances to her nuclear program, then the US would be prepared to discuss what the US might do to help in those circumstances.” (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US)

296. Paper by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) [Source](#)

Washington, June 20, 1963.

ACDA-921

POINTS TO BE COVERED IN PREPARATION OF FORTHCOMING JULY 15 MISSION OF GOVERNOR HARRIMAN TO MOSCOW

In his discussions in Moscow, Governor Harriman will doubtless have to deal with the following four general subjects. There follows the suggested positions which should be taken:

I

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The initial part of the discussion should deal with a comprehensive test ban treaty. As part of that discussion an attempt should be made to resolve the differences which exist between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as to the ability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests by seismic means alone. The difference relates to what is solely a scientific question—the ability to make a distinction on the basis of seismic signals between underground nuclear tests and earthquakes, both of which produce seismic signals which often have similar characteristics.

In view of the U.S., events in the Soviet Union producing seismic signals in the range of 4.75-5.00 or below do not produce seismic signals which permit them to be identified as tests rather than as earthquakes. The seismic signals produced by some of these events do have signals which permit them to be identified—with varying degrees of confidence—as earthquakes. The process of identification to determine whether there has been a violation of a test ban by an underground nuclear test, therefore, starts with a process of elimination in which there is eliminated from the total number

of events producing seismic signals emanating from the Soviet Union those events which can be identified as earthquakes.

This process of elimination involves not only an analysis of the nature of the seismic signal but a judgment as to the likelihood of a test being conducted in an area where the seismic signals locate the event. This process of elimination is not a definitive one—there are varying degrees of certainty as to the extent to which an event can be identified as natural in cause and there are roughly 25-45 events a year as to which there is no evidence, without an on-site inspection, as to whether any one of them was an earthquake or an underground nuclear test.

The Soviet view is that it is possible, by scientific means alone, to identify all underground nuclear tests. Their statements tend to gloss over the differences between detecting an event and identifying it as either an earthquake or a nuclear test but the references to the French tests clearly imply that they profess to believe we can identify tests as tests by scientific means alone. Under their view an on-site inspection is not necessary and they state that they have agreed to two or three only because of U.S. domestic political considerations.

The current mission may give an opportunity which has not existed in meetings between scientists to point out to the Soviet political leaders the full political significance of the scientific facts as we understand them. It should be pointed out that it makes a great difference in the approach to on-site inspections whether, as the U.S. believes, meaningful on-site inspections are necessary to verify a test ban treaty or whether, as the Soviets contend, they are merely a concession to the U.S. domestic political situation. Although the U.S. delegation should be staffed and prepared to enable it to engage in such technical discussion as may be required with Soviet scientists, its first objective should be to translate the scientific case into terms understandable and convincing to the political representatives of Soviet leadership.

The discussion of the scientific basis of the requirement for on-site inspections will naturally lead to the Soviets raising their objection to such inspections, based on their claim of espionage. The U.S. delegation should use this aspect of the discussion as an opportunity to discuss the form of

inspection proposed by them. This might begin with an exposition of the U.S. approach based on national systems and an explanation of specific means along the lines of the April 1 memorandum,¹ to ascertain Soviet reaction to specifics. The Soviets could be asked for their suggestions as to additional measures to give them assurance against espionage without impairing the efficacy of the inspection operations.

In discussing the comprehensive test ban treaty there might be two additional elements which could be injected into the discussions, coupled with an understanding on the way an inspection should be carried out. The first relates to the distinction between seismic and aseismic areas. In March of 1962, Ambassador Dean proposed to Ambassador Tsarapkin that the inspections be divided between the seismic and aseismic areas of the Soviet Union. Provisions to this effect were contained in the comprehensive test ban treaty which was tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962.² Nothing came of this exploration because it was made at a time when the Soviet position was that there should be no on-site inspections. There have also been informal indications that the Soviets felt that the distinction might be meaningless because increased sensitivity of instrumentation might turn all of the U.S.S.R. into a seismic area.

The proposal of seven on-site inspections which was made by Mr. Foster to Mr. Kuznetsov on February 11, 1963 and which was included in the memorandum tabled on April 1, 1963, contained no reference to a division between the seismic and aseismic areas. The analyses of seismicity in the U.S.S.R. points to the conclusion that 70% of all the seismic events detected in the U.S.S.R. occur either in the Kamchatka Peninsula or on or around the Kurile Islands. Another 20-25% of events occur along the southern periphery of the Soviet Union. If the base upon which the percentage is computed is composed of only the most suspicious seismic events (those where there is no confidence based on either seismic or geographic factors) then 33% of the events occur in the Kamchatka-Kurile area and 27% occur in a relatively small area in the vicinity of Tashkent composed of the Kirgiz S.S.R., the Tadzhik S.S.R. and a portion of the Uzbek S.S.R. east of East Longitude 65 degrees.

On the basis of these figures, it is possible that, for purposes of agreement, the inspection quota could be divided into two parts—the first for the entire Soviet Union and the second limited to the Kamchatka-Kurile and Tashkent areas. The inspection quota for the first of these areas might be three inspections per year with the second possibly being four inspections per year. In both cases, of course, the treaty criteria would have to be satisfied.

If there are doubts as to whether making such an offer will do any good, a good means of exploration will be presented by the inevitable Soviet references to the alleged assurances that a number in the range from two to four would produce an agreement. This can be explained by pointing out that what Mr. Dean was discussing was the probable breakdown of his then number of eight into the aseismic and seismic regions of the Soviet Union. In explaining the misunderstanding on this basis, it might be possible to ascertain whether a treaty assurance on this point would be of any value to the U.S.S.R. A decision could be made as to whether to make a proposal in the light of the Soviet attitude.

A second possible variant which might be introduced is the concept of a carry-over of on-site inspections which are not used in one year being used in a succeeding year up to a given number. This concept, it is true, was touched on in the most recent Presidential letter to Khrushchev and was not treated very kindly by him in his response, but it probably should be introduced again in a somewhat more formal context if the talks on a comprehensive test ban are making any progress.

II

Atmospheric, Outer Space and Underwater Test Ban Treaty With Some Limitation on Underground Tests

The U.S. offer to sign a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in space remains open. Although the preference is for a comprehensive treaty, if the Soviet Union still cannot be persuaded to agree on the number and role of inspections for underground tests, then a partial treaty may be the best solution obtainable in the present international climate.

The problem which is presented by a treaty banning all but underground tests is that it points up a basic asymmetry between the positions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The U.S. knows a great deal more about conducting underground tests but is generally ahead in the type of weapons that can be developed by underground testing. The U.S.S.R. has had relatively little experience in underground testing—and would be harder hit by the added expense of underground testing—but continued underground testing would permit the U.S.S.R. to make progress in an area in which they are behind (but in which their interest is not quite clear). One way of decreasing this asymmetry might be to place a limitation on the underground tests which are permitted—both as to number and as to size of the seismic magnitude.

A possible combination would be to establish a quota of 12 underground tests a year of explosions which would produce a seismic event of not greater than 4.75 and which would not vent radioactivity beyond the borders of the country. A treaty of this kind would permit the U.S. to relax its insistence on compulsory on-site inspections, in view of the fact that the effects of a violation would be much less critical. Under such a treaty it would probably still be advisable to have a provision for exchange of data from strengthened national seismic stations, and to have the national stations supplemented by automatic recording stations. It would probably be necessary to have a provision entitling the parties to demand data concerning events which were suspicious and the right to abrogate the treaty if it were to determine that its requests for data were not being complied with in a satisfactory manner or if it concluded that there had been a violation.

III

Relationship of a Test Ban to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

One of the principal interests of the United States in a test ban agreement is an interest in it as one of a series of steps designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It is probable that the U.S.S.R. has a similar interest. It might be advisable to discuss this interest with the Soviet Union with relation to the interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in a test ban. In the first instance the U.S. should point out that the signing of a test ban treaty would mean that there would be no

additional nuclear powers in our camp. We should point out that we would attempt to obtain adherence by the French and as a result a reduction of the intensity of the French nuclear development program. We could then point to the draft declaration on non-dissemination and point out that we would expect the French to sign not only the test ban treaty but the non-dissemination declaration as well.

The discussion of the non-dissemination will, of course, raise the question of the future of the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. We should point out that the multilateral nuclear force is a proposed substitute for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by individual NATO countries. We should point out that in view of the continued Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, the MLF offered our European allies a substitute to the acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities and to that extent it was designed to prevent proliferation. We should point out, however, that if we could work out an understanding that there would be no more nuclear powers in either the Western camp or in the Socialist camp perhaps the Western powers would not feel the need for an MLF but could work out some other arrangements for European security.

As to actual steps to be taken to prevent the Chinese from becoming a nuclear power we certainly cannot expect the Chinese to sign any non-dissemination declaration as a non-nuclear power although it is not clear that we should indicate this to the Soviets. We possibly should also not expect any formal adherence to either a comprehensive or limited test ban agreement but should expect that there would be no testing by the Chinese. We should indicate to the Soviets that we would not expect to make any public announcement of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. campaign to prevent the Chinese from acquiring a nuclear capability but would consider that a tacit understanding that we would do so as part of the understanding between us. It should be noted then, in this context, the limited ban is preferable to the comprehensive ban because its limited enforcement machinery makes de facto adherence possible.

As to what we were prepared to consider as a possible incentive to the Chinese, which would make it easier for the U.S.S.R. to obtain de facto adherence to a test ban, various possibilities should be considered.

IV

NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact

The Soviet Union's interest in a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact is likely to be raised at the Moscow meeting. It was agreed at Ottawa that the various participants in the Ambassadorial group should study the situation in the Soviet Union and in the Communist bloc and in the light of their conclusions decide whether a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact is something which is worth exploring. No decision has been reached on this point and it is unlikely that by July 15 the matter will have progressed to a point where there can be an affirmative response to any Soviet suggestions. The U.S. response should not be one of a totally negative nature, however, but rather we should be prepared to identify those areas in which the pact would be inimical to our interests, would be superfluous or might be the basis for future negotiations.

It might be indicated, for example, that to have any chance of favorable consideration a pact would have to be worded to the effect that nothing in the situation in Berlin and Germany could be changed without agreement.

V

Other Measures of Arms Control and Disarmament

If it appears to be appropriate, the U.S. Delegation can discuss the measures which have been authorized for presentation at the Geneva conference but which either have not yet been presented or fully developed there. These include such measures as:

- a. Production stoppage of fissionable material for use in weapons.
- b. Transfer of given amounts of fissionable material from stockpiles to peaceful uses including different ratios for U.S. and U.S.S.R.
- c. Agreement not to place in orbit weapons of mass destruction.
- d. Agreement, as part of a first stage disarmament measure, to place certain limitations on military expenditures as part of other disarmament activities.

In addition, if it seems appropriate, the Delegation should be in a position to ask questions designed to elicit the Soviet attitudes on such matters as substantial reduction of strategic nuclear vehicles, production stoppage of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, together with the verification machinery necessary for such measures. The purpose of these questions should be to aid the U.S. Government in arriving at a position in those areas in which active work developing possible measures is now in progress.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions. Top Secret. In a June 20 memorandum to the President, Kaysen stated that the paper was “Fisher’s report on the line of thought that has evolved from several discussions among Harriman, Foster, Fisher, Nitze, Haworth, Bundy and myself.” (Ibid.)

¹ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pp 141-145.

² See *ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 792-804.

297. Editorial Note

Glenn Seaborg's journal entry for June 21, 1963, reads in part as follows:

"From 11:35 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. I attended a meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Present were: the President, Foster, Rusk, Ball, Harriman, McCone, Wiesner, Thompson, Fisher, Haworth, Bundy, Kaysen, Nitze, Gilpatric, McNamara and I. Rusk opened the meeting, calling on Foster who summarized the contents of his memorandum ACDA-921. The President referred to an article in the Economist and inquired whether the British had changed their mind on the need for onsite inspections. Foster said that the best British scientists agree on the necessity for these. The President asked whether we have an agreed-upon paper with the U.K. on this matter, and McNamara replied that we don't have an agreed-upon paper in the U.S. on our position, including what can be accomplished by clandestine testing. Bundy said that this problem will be somewhat clarified as the result of Frank Long's forthcoming meeting with UK scientists. McNamara said that position papers should be available soon.

"The President asked whether Harriman and Hailsham, the British Minister, would be getting together, and Harriman said they would meet a day or two before they leave for Moscow.

"The President said we should have a summary of what the Russians could accomplish in about five to seven years in clandestine underground testing. Bundy said that Penney has written a paper on the subject and concludes that this could not lead to a change in the strategic balance. McNamara said that their position papers will be ready by the middle of next week. Nitze said that the degree of importance of clandestine testing depends upon what you mean by the term 'strategic balance.' Harriman made the observation that this whole question is a major political problem for Khrushchev and one of his (Harriman's) objectives should be to try to identify that problem.

"Foster raised the question of whether Harriman shouldn't introduce the idea of a limit on the number and yield of underground tests. Bundy pointed out that Hosmer favors this and that this has political appeal in the U.S.

“The President asked how we might handle the discussion with respect to the Chinese. Foster indicated that if we could get together with the USSR, the Chinese could be handled [DELETED] Bundy agreed that the Russians may insist to the Chinese that they desist from their nuclear weapons development.

“The President asked whether Frank Long would be available for consultations with him (the President) when he arrives in England, and he was assured that Long would be.

“Foster then went on to talk about non-proliferation of weapons. The President raised the possibility of the US giving up the MLF concept. Bundy felt that this should be kept alive as a bargaining point, and Rusk pointed out that this involves the Allies so deeply that it shouldn't be considered as a possible position at this time. He, therefore, made some changes in the draft ACDA-921 to reflect this.

“The President inquired as to what the objection to the non-aggression pact sought by the Russians might be, and Rusk replied that we would need the assurance that the Berlin situation remain status quo before we could consider such an approach. I called attention to the very significant and important vote of the Soviets for safeguards for nuclear power reactors at the meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna yesterday. I said that this reverses the position that they previously had against safeguards, which was a very strong one.” (Seaborg, *Journal*, Supplement, volume 26, pages 223-225; Seaborg's record is a sanitized text.)

This meeting was held as preparation for Kennedy's meeting in the United Kingdom with Macmillan, which took place June 29-30 (see [Documents 304-306](#)). Kaysen's handwritten notes of the meeting are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions. For ACDA-921, see [Document 296](#). Lord Hailsham was British Minister of Science. Representative Craig Hosmer of California was Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The section on China in McCone's memorandum of this meeting reads as follows:

“The President raised the Chinese Communist question, stating that he felt we could take considerable risk in the treaty with assurance that the Chinese Communists would not proceed with their nuclear weapon development. McCone raised the question as to how the treaty would accomplish this. Others answered that 70 or 80 countries would be party to the treaty and that we would have to work out some arrangement with the French and the Soviets with the Chinese, and Harriman would have to develop this. The President then stated that we might want to discuss this in depth with Macmillan and suggested that Harriman and Foster might join him in London.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63)

298. National Security Action Memorandum No. 250 [Source](#)

Washington, June 22, 1963.

TO

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

Contingency Plan for Dealing with Possible Low-Yield Soviet Atmospheric Tests [1](#)

The President has approved the following procedures for dealing with the current evidence of low-yield Soviet tests. [2](#)

1. At present there should be no announcement and every effort should be made to prevent leaks with respect to the current evidence.
- 2.

In the event of a leak, the Atomic Energy Commission would promptly issue the following statement, with any amendment made necessary by the specific circumstances of the situation at the time:

“The Commission’s attention has been called to press reports of Soviet nuclear testing. The Commission reports that in recent weeks there has been evidence of events in the Soviet Union which may be nuclear tests of very low yield. The evidence remains inconclusive, and it is expected that more definite conclusions must await further evidence and analysis.”

At the same time, the Department of State would announce that there is no change in the plans for the Harriman-Hailsham mission.

Throughout the Government senior officials would be authorized to inform the press on a background basis of the following relevant facts:

- a. The phrase “very low yield” means what it says and refers to evidence in the range of 1 KT.

- b. The U.S., in its underground series, is currently conducting tests much more numerous than anything of which we have any signal from the Soviet Union and the yields of some of the U.S. tests are substantially higher than those of which there is a question now in the Soviet Union.
 - c. The President is of course fully informed and does not consider that this inconclusive evidence of very low-yield tests should be regarded as invalidating his American University position against resumption of atmospheric tests until others do the same.
 - d. Even if the U.S. atmospheric testing were approved,³ the forward planning of AEC and DOD would not call for a major series of tests until 1964.
 - e. The reason for avoiding any earlier public announcement was the fact that there was still genuine uncertainty as to whether the evidence justifies a final conclusion as to just what the Soviet Government is doing. For example, evidence to date is consistent with very large non-nuclear explosions.
- 3.

In the event that there is more conclusive evidence on the nature of these or later events, the AEC would issue the following statement, adjusted to fit the exact situation:

“The AEC announces that analysis of evidence recently received shows that the Soviet Government has resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere, with explosions of (very low) (low) yield.”

The State Department would then announce that these events did not change the plans for the Harriman-Hailsham mission, but merely made that mission more urgent and its prospects more uncertain.

Officials of the U.S. Government would inform the press on a background basis of the following position:

- a. We are disappointed that the Soviets are resuming atmospheric testing. Of course, the tests in question are very small and are more nearly comparable, both in technical purpose and in fallout effects, to our underground tests and certain cratering tests we have conducted in Nevada than to the large atmospheric test series that the Soviets and

we conducted last year. Nonetheless, we may wish to review the President's American University position. Even if the President were to decide to resume atmospheric testing, on technical grounds, it is unlikely that we would wish to test before 1964.

- b. Some information on the current level of U.S. underground tests, in terms of numbers and size, should be offered as a comparison for interpreting the Soviet level of testing.
4. If we receive evidence of Soviet testing in the atmosphere on a larger scale, we will need to reconsider our position urgently. A large scale will mean tests of 100 KT or over or several tests of 20 KT or over.⁴

McGeorge Bundy

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 250. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ A telephone call from Kaysen to Harriman on June 13 indicates that Kaysen had learned about one of these possible tests on June 12. "Harriman said it was a direct slap. He said it was quite startling; the [American University] speech was two days before." The two men agreed to wait to see if there was another test. Another call to Harriman on June 21 indicates that Kaysen had learned of another test. They discussed the possibility of U.S. disclosure of the tests or a possible inquiry to the Soviets. (Both memoranda in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July Telephone Conversations)

In a talk with Seaborg on June 14, Kennedy asked if the indication of Soviet "atmospheric tests of one kt. was valid" or "an underground shot that vented." Seaborg said that "the acoustic and electromagnetic signals that were used in a case like this can only come from an atmospheric event, and there is no indication of debris as yet." Seaborg "expressed some doubt that this could be a real atmospheric test" because of its small size and its occurrence soon after the American University speech. Kennedy also indicated that the United States should not make preparations for atmospheric testing that would attract attention until after Harriman's Moscow trip. (Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 5, pp. 630-631)

² In a June 22 memorandum titled “Possible Recent Soviet Nuclear Tests,” McCone stated that there were a number of indicators that a Soviet test program of low-yield devices was taking place, but that many indicators were inconclusive and that final proof depended on securing radioactive debris from the atmosphere. A note on that memorandum states that McCone handcarried it to a meeting with the President and Bundy on June 22. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 6/5-7/20/63) Kennedy’s Appointment Book has no record of this meeting. (Kennedy Library)

³ A June 19 memorandum of decisions taken at a White House meeting held June 18 states that no underground event with a yield of over 50 kilotons was to be scheduled prior to September 1, and that the “scheduled work” could continue through July. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1/63-7/63) See the Supplement.

⁴ Kennedy wrote Macmillan on this subject, although it is not certain Macmillan’s reply reached Kennedy prior to issuance of NSAM No. 250. (Unnumbered White House telegram, June 21; British telegram PMUK 1248 Zulu received 1:11 p.m. June 22; both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence Kennedy-Khrushchev-Macmillan) Both are in the Supplement.

299. Proposed Interagency Briefing Paper [Source](#)

Washington, June 22, 1963.

INSPECTION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

In your forthcoming discussion with Prime Minister Macmillan on the nuclear test ban,¹ the question will undoubtedly be raised as to whether there is a real justification for insisting on a quota of at least 5 inspections instead of accepting the Soviet offer of 3 inspections. The question may also be raised as to whether the complete elimination of the inspection requirement would actually pose a threat to the existing balance of power between the U.S.-U.K. and the Soviet Union.

Aside from domestic political considerations, the argument for a quota of 5 instead of 3 inspections can be reduced to two points. First, is the simple fact that a quota of 5 will approximately double the actual chance of finding a clandestine test or test series and probably contribute more than a doubling to the deterrence against testing for purely psychological considerations. Second, with a quota of only three inspections there is danger that undue caution would be exercised in their use, particularly early in a given year. The increased deterrence provided by the larger quota is important since the level of deterrence of the system is not very high even with 5 inspections; therefore, a further 50 per cent or more reduction in the danger of being found out might provide the necessary confidence for the Soviets to undertake clandestine testing.

In comparing these two quotas one must recognize that a quota of 5 is only equivalent to 4 inspections since one inspection would always have to be held in reserve for use against a very suspicious event at the end of the year, and a quota of 3 is actually equivalent to only 2 inspections, since in this case one inspection would also always have to be held in reserve. (This difficulty would be overcome by the proposal to permit drawing upon inspections from future years. However, in the rest of this paper the calculations are based upon an annual quota with no carry-over, so that the last inspection is not used.) These inspections would have to be allocated

among the approximately 75 seismic events which it is estimated would on the average remain unidentified out of the 170 seismic events detected annually in the Soviet Union by the system. To evaluate the effectiveness of the system, it is necessary to assume that the Soviets undertake a significant number of tests since only in this manner could any real progress in weapons development be accomplished. To consider a specific example, if the Soviets undertook a clandestine series of 10 nuclear tests with detectable yields and if we assume no unilateral intelligence is available to assist in selecting events for inspection, a quota of 3 inspections would give a probability of only 22% that at least one of the events inspected would in fact be one of the nuclear tests. A quota of 5 inspections would increase the probability of inspecting at least one test to 40%.

Similarly, against a clandestine series of only 5 tests, the probabilities of selecting at least one test would be 12% and 22% for quotas of 3 and 5 inspections respectively. Actually, the probabilities of finding and identifying a clandestine test in the above examples would be less than half as great as the figures indicated since, even if the inspection method itself were highly effective, it is estimated that there is only a 50% probability that a nuclear test would in fact fall within the region designated for inspection because of the uncertainties in the seismic data used to determine the location of the suspicious event.

It will probably be argued by the British that the number of suspicious events will actually be significantly less than 75, which is now quoted in our interagency position paper, since one can use additional seismic information, judgments on the location of seismic events and intelligence to reduce the number of unidentified events to numbers such as 20-30. If the unresolved residual were as low as 20 events, the probability of selecting at least one test in a series of 5 would be 36% for 3 inspections and 60% for 5. Nevertheless, considering the uncertainties as to whether an event actually falls within the area specified for inspection and the unknown probability that an inspection, if undertaken, would in fact be successful in locating the test site, the probability of detecting an actual event in even a series of clandestine tests would still not be sufficiently high to contradict the basic argument that doubling of the probability of detection would substantially improve the deterrent value of a quota of 5 over 3 inspections.

In addition to the numerical considerations, there is an additional difficulty with a quota of 3 as compared with 5 that is impossible to assess quantitatively, and that is the fact that fear of wasting our assets early in the year would result in our having less flexibility in exploiting the 2 inspections available under a quota of 3 than we would in the case of 4 inspections available in the quota of 5.

Turning to the questions of the implications of the complete elimination of the inspection requirement from a test ban treaty, it is correct that this would almost certainly not change the existing balance of power between the U.S.-U.K. and the Soviet Union. It is a mistake, however, to analyze the requirement for inspection in so narrow a context. The elimination of inspection would permit the Soviets to carry on a much more significant clandestine program than they could reasonably do in the face of even limited inspection. Moreover, of equal or greater significance would be the adverse effects of the elimination of inspection on the confidence-building and precedence-forming aspects of the treaty.

As a consequence of the nature of earthquakes, the inspections under our proposed treaty would in fact be applied against a relatively narrow yield range of potential clandestine nuclear tests. The *detection* threshold of the proposed external detection system would vary between 1/4 and 10 KT, depending on the medium in which the test occurred. We believe it is generally agreed that a prudent violator would probably have to test below about 3 KT in order to be confident of evading detection. While the number of detected but unidentified events is relatively large (estimated at about 75 in the present interdepartmental position paper), the number of unidentified events falls off very rapidly with increasing seismic magnitude. The principal reason for this effect is that the number of seismic events decreases very rapidly with increasing size. For example, the existing U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System, which has a threshold of magnitude 4.0 (equivalent of about 1.5 KT in tuff) detected some 260 seismic events in the Soviet Union in the year beginning mid-1961, and only 37 of these events were of magnitude 4.7 (about 20 KT in tuff) or above. Above magnitude 5.4 (roughly 100 KT in tuff) there would probably be only in the range of 10-20 seismic events in an average year. In addition, the ability to identify a given seismic event as an earthquake increases rapidly with increasing magnitude

or equivalent yield. While confidence of identification is poor in the neighborhood of the detection threshold of the detection system, it is estimated that it would be possible to identify practically all events above magnitude 5 (approximately 40 KT in tuff) by the proposed external detection system. Combining all these factors, it can be argued that a monitoring system without inspection would identify with fairly high confidence by a purely technical means a significant clandestine series above a threshold of some 50 to 100 KT, taking into account possible adverse environmental factors. In addition, such a system would undoubtedly provide important but nonconclusive technical inputs for the identification of clandestine tests above 20 KT or possibly even lower. On the basis of these considerations, the British may argue that, since the Soviets can test clandestinely under 3 KT in any event and since the external detection system would deter them from testing above 50-100 KT, the only value of the entire inspection process is to eliminate the possibility that the Soviets will test in the relatively narrow yield range between 3 and 100 KT.

The possibility of testing in the range between 3 and 100 KT would give the Soviets the opportunity to carry out a number of reasonably significant weapons development and effects programs that cannot be successfully conducted below 3 KT. However, it is very difficult to argue that any of these developments would, in fact, change substantially the existing balance of power with the U.S.-U.K. and the Soviet Union. In the strategic area, the Soviets could, by testing at a fraction of full yield, probably develop an improved family of low-yield thermonuclear devices [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. This would permit the Soviets to develop multiple warheads for existing missile systems and possibly new smaller strategic missile systems. Such multiple warheads would be of value as a penetration aid against a future AICBM system. Given the large payload of existing Soviet rockets, the Soviets will be able to use decoys and nuclear blackout as well as multiple warheads as penetration aids against an AICBM system. However, a low altitude AICBM system such as Nike X could probably be made to discriminate between heavy warheads and decoys weighing appreciably less than the actual warhead. This situation would place a major premium on the reduction of the size of warheads either to permit closer matching of decoys and warheads or the use of multiple warheads instead

of decoys. If we decide to deploy Nike X, the possibility that the Soviets might be able to develop much smaller warheads than they now possess would require us to deploy our Nike X batteries on a larger scale to achieve a given level of defense than would otherwise be the case. Similarly, in this yield range important work could be undertaken by the Soviets to reduce the vulnerability of their thermonuclear weapons to nuclear explosions against potential U.S. AICBM systems. However, this will probably not be a critical factor in determining the effectiveness of an AICBM system in view of the very close miss distances anticipated. Obviously, none of these penetration aids or reductions in vulnerability are even relevant to the balance of power situation unless we do in fact undertake a massive deployment of an AICBM system. With respect to very high yield strategic weapons, the Soviets [*1 line of source text not declassified*] would advance the state of their weapon technology in the event the treaty were broken and high yield atmospheric tests were resumed. The Soviets could not, however, by testing in the 3 to 100 KT range, actually develop new high yield weapons that would be suitable for stockpile. The ability to conduct clandestine tests with relative impunity in the 3 to 100 KT range would allow the Soviets to maintain their laboratories in a higher state of readiness for large-scale testing, including more substantial continuing development and test experience for the scientific staff.

With regard to AICBM capabilities, the Soviets could by testing in the 3 to 100 KT range develop a better designed AICBM warhead than is now available to them or could be developed in yields below 3 KT. This probably would not affect the Soviet Union's decision on whether or not to deploy an AICBM system but, if they do so, could reduce the drain of the system on their stockpile of fissionable material and might thereby speed the rate at which the AICBM system could be deployed. Testing in this range would also permit more elaborate effects tests to determine the vulnerability of AICBM warheads to neutron heating and X-ray effects. While certainly not critical, this information would be very useful in supplementing data that could be obtained by theoretical calculations and lower yield tests. Additional information on radar blackout, which is the most important effect influencing AICBM system design and which cannot be easily calculated, could not be obtained by testing underground since

useful data can be obtained only by high altitude testing and cannot be simulated underground.

With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, it is recognized that the Soviets could undertake a considerable amount of work on very small yield weapons, including enhanced radiation and pure fusion devices, [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Nevertheless, in view of our existing capabilities in the field of tactical nuclear weapons, it has been generally agreed that such clandestine activities by the Soviets would not significantly change the balance of power. In fact, since they could develop such weapons at a rapid rate in the absence of a test ban, a test ban would undoubtedly prolong the time of our advantage even if the Soviets tested clandestinely. Testing in the 3 to 100 KT range would certainly make it easier for the Soviets to improve the quality of their intermediate yield tactical weapons. However, this is a yield range in which the Soviets already have a significant capability. It would be possible for the Soviets to develop a family of clean tactical weapons such as those in which the Livermore Laboratory at present has considerable interest. However, it is not clear what motivation the Soviets would have to do this or that any adverse effects would result from such an action.

The argument against complete elimination of the inspection requirement goes much further than the simple fact it would allow the Soviets to carry out important, though admittedly not critical, nuclear tests. One important objective of a test ban treaty is to create confidence between this country and the Soviet Union by reducing tension and suspicion and to provide a first step to more substantive measures. The external monitoring system that we propose will detect a large number of unidentified events which could in fact be nuclear tests in the range from a fraction of a KT to 100 KT. Unless the inspection process is retained, there will be no mechanism whereby the uncertainty associated with these unidentified events can be resolved. This problem will exist whether there are 75 unidentified events annually as we have concluded on purely technical grounds or whether in fact the number can be reduced to only some 20 really suspicious unidentified events, as the British maintain, by employing other information in the identification process. Moreover, it is probable there will always be a few events which

because of location and associated circumstances will appear particularly suspicious whether or not the Soviets are in fact testing.

The inspection procedure also provides a clear mechanism whereby the treaty can be terminated if the Soviet Union does in fact undertake clandestine testing. While it is true that we always have the option to denounce the treaty if we are satisfied that there is good evidence that the Soviet Union is cheating, the denunciation of such a treaty would in fact not be easy as long as the evidence was ambiguous in the eyes of the world. The fact that an actual test was discovered in the course of an inspection, or more probably that the Soviet Union would refuse to permit an inspection because we had selected an event for inspection that was in fact a clandestine test, would provide a clearcut issue on which we could terminate the treaty if we so desired.

It is not possible to predict at what threshold, if any, the Soviet Government will feel that the pressures and opportunities of testing are sufficiently great to cause them to undertake clandestine tests. Clearly, the higher the threshold below which tests can be conducted without danger of detection, the wider the spectrum of possible weapon developments and the greater the pressure to attempt to exploit them. Since the fact of such clandestine testing, which we would probably ultimately learn of in any event through unilateral intelligence, would have bad effect on the relations between this country and the Soviet Union, it is important for us to minimize the Soviet incentive to undertake such testing. To this end, the inspection process contributes substantially to holding down the threshold below which clandestine testing could be attempted.

Finally, one of the reasons for undertaking a nuclear test ban is to establish the principle of inspection as part of an arms limitation and control agreement. While we should never ask for more inspection than we really need, if we abandon the requirement entirely in this case where the need for at least some level of inspection exists on technical grounds, we will seriously jeopardize our argument for reasonable inspection in connection with any more substantive disarmament and arms limitation agreements that we hope to negotiate in the future with the Soviet Union.²

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, Status of US/USSR Nuclear Technology 6/63. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text. The paper printed here contains material modified or inserted after June 22. A June 25 White House telegram from Kaysen to Bundy (who was traveling with the President in Germany), which was drafted by Harold Brown, Wiesner, and AEC Commissioner Leland Haworth, proposed a change which is incorporated in the text printed here. The telegram concludes: “At present, McNamara proposes that after we have gone through the formal process of getting an agreed memorandum on this subject, he would be glad to have a Brown-Haworth-Wiesner comment and interpretation of it as a document bearing his endorsement for the President’s advice.” (Telegram Sitto No. 12; *ibid.*, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions) No further information has been found on the use made of this paper.

¹ In a June 20 memorandum to the President, Kaysen stated that it was dear that one of the President’s problems during the talks with Macmillan would be “to prevent the British from undermining our position on the number of inspections for a test ban treaty.” (*Ibid.*)

² With a brief note dated June 21, Macmillan forwarded to Kennedy a memorandum by “our scientists” on underground testing, which Macmillan believed made “a pretty powerful case.” The 6-page memorandum concluded that underground tests were “not a consideration which, in themselves, should prevent agreement on a test ban treaty.” (*Ibid.*, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, Kennedy-Khrushchev-Macmillan, 3/63-6/63)

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [Source](#)

London, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.

Secto 15. Eyes only for Harriman and Foster. Secretary reviewed position on test ban and forthcoming mission to Moscow with Foreign Secretary June 27. Home was attended by Heath, Caccia, Godber, Trevelyan and others; Secretary by Franklin Long and Raymond Courtney.¹ Uncleared memcon, subject to revision, follows:

Secretary stressed importance of making strongest effort to obtain agreement with Soviets on comprehensive test ban even though Soviets have given us no reason for encouragement. He noted discussions with Soviets might be initiated by focusing on two points which Soviets alleged are technical but which in fact involve important points of policy—namely, whether existing national detection systems are adequate to detect and identify all significant seismic events and whether inspection would constitute espionage. We hoped to open up a thorough examination of Soviet claims. Possibly we might enter some new terrain if we introduced (1) distinction between seismic and aseismic areas and (2) spreading inspection quota over period of years. Home agreed to importance of making real try to get comprehensive ban. It was agreed that tactically it would be best to avoid debate on numbers of inspection until last and try first to find where understanding on modalities might be possible.

British raised number of points which, although not new nor seeming seriously to question key aspects of Western position, suggested re-examination. Secretary assured him that US had none at all and that it was essential there be a reasonable relation between number of suspicious events and inspections. It was pointed out that small underground tests could have military significance for Soviets. British asked if there were any real risk in some technical advances being made by underground tests since really significant weapons developments would eventually have to be tested in atmosphere before being put into production. Secretary and Dr. Long pointed out this was not necessarily true. Godber suggested we should look

again very carefully at size of inspection areas, number of inspectors, composition of teams, number of automatic recording boxes, etc. It was agreed that US and UK experts should make further thorough examination of modalities; Home suggested that Lord Hailsham probably would like to join in such preparatory effort.

Secretary said if it became clear that agreement on comprehensive ban was not possible we might proceed to several alternatives which have been considered, including three environments ban with continued effort on underground ban. Variation of this might include some kind of limitation on underground tests. There was some reason to hope we might be able to get somewhere in this way. British spokesmen expressed doubt. Secretary reaffirmed US could not accept unpoliced moratorium: any agreement to cessation of underground testing for extended period must be accompanied with adequate assurances.

With respect non-proliferation agreement, Secretary pointed out we should be fully prepared to discuss this (and present some comprehensive papers to Soviets both on this and on the test ban) but not try to go too far toward non-proliferation agreement without bringing French in. He also noted we questioned whether Russian assertion that MLF would be obstacle to non-proliferation was as genuine as they made out; probably, rather, their Chinese problem was more important. He also pointed out Soviets probably don't really understand German unilateral control would be impossible in MLF and that MLF would be measure inhibiting development of further independent nuclear capabilities. With respect non-aggression arrangement or NATO-Warsaw declaration, US felt if we got in sight of test ban or no-transfer arrangement French and German attitudes might change and their veto need not be considered certain.

In summary, it was agreed that although we could not expect to come away from Moscow with anything finished and signed, it was of greatest importance to make most serious try to find whether there could be basis for agreement. If Khrushchev really did not want agreement (and there were indications that this might be the case and that Soviets were intending to resume atmospheric testing) that might come clear. If he did want agreement, the outstanding points of difference probably were not

insuperable. In any event, US and UK points of view were very close together. By way of further preparation for mission, experts would proceed with further examination of modalities, and secretaries would prepare joint paper for their principals.²

Bruce

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL/7 US/Harriman. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

¹ First Secretary of the Embassy in the Political Section.

² In Secto 19 from London, June 28, marked “Eyes Only for President from Secretary,” Rusk stated that because of the “wide range of agreement” reached on the Hailsham-Harriman mission and because further discussions were needed “only on deep technical details of modes of inspection,” he had told Harriman and Foster that they would not need to attend Kennedy’s forthcoming meeting with Macmillan. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy)

301. National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, June 28, 1963.

NIE 4-63

LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS

The Problem

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.

Conclusions

- A. With the increasing availability of uranium, and nuclear technology and technicians, the development of a minimal nuclear weapons capability has come increasingly within the reach of nonnuclear states. A program for one or two low-yield fission weapons a year would cost, through the first detonation, about \$140-\$180 million and some \$20-\$30 million a year thereafter. However, costs rise steeply for more than a minimal program and become very large when advanced delivery systems and compatible weapons are required. Political and military considerations are likely to prove more important in determining the pace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences in national wealth and technical skill. Where the motivation is strong enough, a country might attempt to overcome a lack of native resources by importing materials, technology, and technicians, or even weapons themselves. (Paras. 1-6)
- B. We believe that eight countries, in addition to France, have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) over the next decade. However, we believe that only Communist China has actually started a weapons program. The Chinese may be able to detonate a first nuclear device by early 1964, but a more likely date is late 1964 or beyond. Approximately

two years after a test the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Thus far the remaining countries—India, Japan, Sweden, Canada, Italy, and West Germany—have limited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of their peaceful nuclear programs, some to a point which would significantly reduce the time required to carry through a weapons program. (Paras. 7-21)

- C. We do not believe that the explosion of a first device, or even the acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese would adopt a general policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. It would, however, increase Chinese self-confidence and prestige and reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and the indirect support of local "wars of liberation." India probably would not embark on a nuclear weapons program on the basis of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device, but is likely to continue its present nuclear program to a point where a crash weapons program could be developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feel an increased sense of pressure, but would be more reluctant than most other countries to develop a weapons capability. We believe the Israelis would probably employ a nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. The Arab States would probably blame the West, particularly the US, and the Soviets would probably find ways of exploiting the situation. (Paras. 25-31)
- D. The French force has as its primary purpose heightening French prestige and assisting France to assume leadership of a Europe less dependent on the US and with a voice in the management and control of Western nuclear power. While many Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives, they also fear that the French program will stimulate further nuclear proliferation, erode the NATO concept, and perhaps most important, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves to peaceful nuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the

defense of the Federal Republic, German interest in a national capability would rise. (Paras. 32-37)

E. We believe that the USSR desires to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude nondiffusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude that West Germany was moving toward a nuclear status, they would probably not make radical changes in their policy, but employ instead a mixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament. (Paras. 38-41)

F. Even if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree on terms of a nondiffusion agreement, Communist China would almost certainly refuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherence would be doubtful.

Nevertheless, the very existence of such an agreement would inhibit other nonsignatories and reinforce internal opposition where it already existed. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would impose serious limitations on the development of nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories but would be subject to many of the same difficulties as a nondiffusion agreement. (Paras. 44-46)

G. In strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the next 10 years will almost certainly not upset global power relations nor do we believe it will produce major realignments in the relations of states. The impact will be in the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, the greater unpredictability of relations within and between alliance systems, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a serious confrontation involving the major powers. (Paras. 47-48)

H. The possession of nuclear weapons may encourage a new nuclear power to pursue policies which might result in a local crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainly introduce a strong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood of accidental detonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in some circumstances might even touch off a nuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such an accident. A serious nuclear

reactor accident or a nuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governments considering a weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. (Paras. 50-54)

[Here follow the Discussion section of the paper and an annex, totaling 21 pages.]

* Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the title page states: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board." A note on the following page indicates that the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.

302. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) [Source](#)

Washington, June 28, 1963, 2:40 p.m.

H called K.

H—I think we better call it off. And then there is another message here which says in light of the wide range of agreement I was just as glad not to go but the idea that they had a great idea about this. If you want to do this, send Foster over. You and I stay home. I put it to the Secy—I said is this a propaganda stunt, in which case I'll go along with it, or do you want to reach some kind of an agreement. And the strange thing is that John McCone and particularly Bob McNamara is keen to have us explore the widest range of this. But if we are to ... then the hell with it.

K—I am going to call Mac's attention to these two cables¹ and give him the flavor of our reaction.²

H—The point is that so far we haven't yet hit the right chord. To go over the same arguments—all they are doing is going over the same arguments.

K—I couldn't agree with you more. I wanted to flag it for Mac so he can manage the situation on Sunday.

H ... I am not worried about the President's own view. I think it would be very important if you and I and perhaps Mac could have a private talk with the President.

K—Mac has this very much in mind.

H—Without the entire group, without chaperones. I am very disciplined. I want to know what the objective is and I will conform completely. I really ought to find out what he would like to try to achieve. Certainly we are not

going to get anywhere on any of the points of this conversation in this telegram.

K—Did you read the record of Foster and Kuznetsov?³ An opportunity was present twice, in my judgment.

H—I will get Adrian⁴ to pick it out.

^{*} Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July 1963 Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed note: “No Distribution Except to Sullivan.” Sullivan was Harriman’s Special Assistant.

¹ Apparently Secto 15 and Secto 19; see [Document 300](#) and [footnote 3](#) thereto.

² See [Document 303](#).

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Adrian Fisher.

303. Telegram From the White House to the President's Party in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, June 28, 1963.

To Mr. Bundy from Mr. Kaysen. Deliver at opening of business on Saturday.

Ref: Secto 15 (Eyes Only for Harriman and Foster); Secto 19 (Eyes Only for President).

Harriman and I feel most strongly that if these messages reflect the state of affairs as U.S. sees them, we might as well stay home and send Bill Foster to Moscow to repeat his performance of this past winter in New York and Washington. In recent discussion with Harriman, McNamara has shown he too believes that there is something to be gained by serious and wide-ranging exploration of Soviet interest in test ban and broader security and disarmament measures which might follow from it. If what we bring "in our luggage" is what Secto 15 describes, we will hardly be in a position to raise these wider questions.

At the minimum, we should be in a position to indicate early in the discussion that we are flexible on numbers. Tactically speaking, this seems to me necessary to make progress. If, as Secto 15 suggests, we again begin with modalities, we are in danger of reminding the Soviets painfully of previous round. Lack of suggestion of what we have in mind on Chinese problem also an example of overcaution, unless directed at British rather than Soviets. Finally, to suggest in advance that our explorations may be limited by anticipated attitudes French, Germans is also not conducive to a forthcoming response.

I know this message tells you nothing now but even Jove nods, and Harriman and I think it important to remind you of the stage management problem all this poses for you and the President.^{[1](#)}

* Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 5TS, Test Ban 2, Background. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The communications channel and delivery point are not indicated. By Saturday morning, the President was at Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence, Birch Grove.

¹ In Tosit 2 to the White House, June 29 (routed through CIA channels), Bundy stated that "none of three concerns in your telegram poses problem of persuading UK, so I do not think that Birch Grove is the place to settle them. Moreover, conversation here suggests Secto 15 and 20 [19] represent minimum, not maximum, US position. Therefore suggest you and Averell continue to prepare your own packages for Moscow to be discussed on President's return. Jove often nods, but in this case the moment of truth has not yet come." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Cables 6/13-7/15/63)

304. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Birch Grove, England, June 29, 1963, 10:15–11:30 a.m.

PET/MC/16

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 1963

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Lord Hailsham
Mr. Philip de Zulueta

SUBJECT

Nuclear Matters, including forthcoming test ban discussions with the USSR

The Prime Minister began with a discussion of the importance of the test ban. It was our one great hope for progress toward peace and we ought to make a really big try. All the rest was really nonsense. We should discuss this problem, and trivial problems of weapons and internal organization of the alliance should be put aside as having really no comparable significance. The Russians may or may not be ready for a real agreement, and they might or might not be really ready to trust us, but we must try—and here the Prime Minister complimented the President upon his success in preventing American generals from making the threatening noises which they frequently made in General Eisenhower's time.

As the Prime Minister saw it, there were three arguments to be pressed with the Russians:

- (1) If we could not get an agreement now, both sides would have to go forward with the effort to develop an anti-missile missile. This would require more and more effort and expense on unproductive weapons, in an endless competition of emptiness. Surely this matter of cost and irrelevant effort was important to Khrushchev.
- (2) While the great nuclear powers were in this endless competition to the clouds, other small but dangerous forces would be growing up from the earth. We could offer to keep such small powers out of the game.
- (3) We might be able to get 60-70 nations to join in a test ban treaty, and this would create a big pull against further nuclear efforts. China? France? Surely somehow the United States and United Kingdom could deal with France so that it would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union—and indeed the Prime Minister doubted if the Russians were frightened of the French (later in the evening the Prime Minister remarked that he had always wanted to bring France into the exercise, but that General Eisenhower had not agreed with him, in the light of the requirements of the McMahon Act).

China? China was more of a problem for the Russians, but it was conceivable that it would be impressive if there could be a joint note with the Russians to the Chinese.

The Prime Minister then remarked that nearly every time anyone got near to a test ban agreement, someone who wanted testing would invent a new reason to prevent such an agreement. The Prime Minister referred bitterly to the effect of the idea of decoupling in this connection.

So the question arose of the instructions to Hailsham and Harriman—the Prime Minister remarked on the outstanding qualities of both emissaries, and said that he thought the problem of what we could propose was purely political—what can we get away with? The difficulty is to know what really is worthwhile. We must have no more dreary Geneva discussions of technical details—we must somehow get a different vista of the future. Khrushchev was a practical, hard, and brutal man. He might be happy with the current balance and fearful of change through further competition, so

that it might be to his advantage to get a settlement now. Great powers were jealous and critical of small powers, and that it was in their interest for smaller powers to conform.

So our problem was to work out the line of instructions. The negotiators should play by ear, quick or slow as circumstances suggest, and not hampered too much by technical advice—which changed in any event every six months.

The President said he felt indeed that this was the summer for an agreement. He also agreed that the experts were often unreliable, and remarked that we had not learned as much from our atmospheric tests as had been predicted. However, the U.S. Government was not unanimous; there were serious divisions within it on the nature of the test ban problem.

Moreover, American opinion was much affected by previous Soviet behavior in such matters as the broken test-ban moratorium and the attempt to introduce missiles in Cuba. The President did not wish to make basic technical judgments this evening. And as he faced the broad political problem he must consider whether it would be better not to have a treaty than to have one which might be badly beaten in the Senate—a close contest might move us forward, but a bad defeat might be destructive.

The President wondered whether in fact a series of underground tests could be conducted without detection. There was a difference of view here, as there was on the question of how much could be learned from clandestine underground testing of any sort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had one opinion and the President another which was on the whole that clandestine testing would not be decisive. This was a matter on which he would address himself to the Prime Minister later, and in two respects. (1) Could the Soviets run a series of clandestine tests? (2) How much could such tests alter the balance of power? The balance of power of course was a subtle thing. The President was inclined to share the Prime Minister's view that we have much too much nuclear strength, but it has had a part to play in international psychology. The French will have "enough" in 4 or 5 years; the U.K. has "enough" now. But we have more, and it has some political importance. If the USSR should seem to make gains, it might be helped

psychologically. But if we can get a new view of the technical considerations involved, we might well give instructions to our negotiators.

The third question which seemed to the President central was China. A Chinese bomb would be important, especially psychologically, and the question would arise whether China could be bound by an agreement and, if so, how?

The Prime Minister wondered how new tests on our side would affect Chinese behavior. He also wondered whether the Soviets would gain anything by underground testing or whether they must go to atmospheric testing for any serious results. (This theme recurred several times later in the discussion, on the British side.)

The President remarked that we would have to test if the Chinese tested. On the other hand, if the Chinese could be restrained, that would be the most powerful argument in favor of a test ban. That subject we must try to discuss with the Russians.

A next question was the relation of the French to a test ban. How could they be worked in? We think this is a workable problem.

And, third, was the relation of the MLF to a test ban—and the President indicated his feeling that if in fact a test ban agreement came in sight, it would be desirable and possible to modify our planning for the multilateral force.

The President said that the Chinese are now testing missile systems. From what information we have, these are rather primitive.

Macmillan said that Cuba showed that the important things today “are the pawns and not the queens.” Small countries and highly localized acute problems can endanger the peace of the world by bringing the powerful countries into competition and conflict with each other. He said that one of the curious results of Cuba was that both Cuba and Berlin were now equally vulnerable and tended to cancel each other out. The President said that the Russians may have undertaken their desperate gamble in Cuba in order to try to give the world the appearance of having changed the balance of

power between the Soviet Union and the United States, had their plan succeeded.

Lord Home said he thought that nondissemination of nuclear weapons was of very great importance as an appeal to the Soviets in relation to Germany.

The President said we really had to come to a decision on two points with regard to the test ban talks: (1) What do we say? (2) What are the means at our disposal?

There was a question of whether the Russians would be able to test if we limited ourselves to national means of detection. We would have to ask ourselves three questions: (1) What kind of tests would they be able to get away with? (2) Just how much additional knowledge would such tests be likely to provide them with? (3) Would the Russians then be in a position to apply this knowledge so as to increase significantly their nuclear potential?

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Top Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on July 12. Birch Grove was Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence.

305. Paper Prepared for the Kennedy-Macmillan Talks [Source](#)

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963.

Question One. What is the maximum size of underground nuclear tests which the USSR could repeatedly carry out without significant fear of detection?

Answer. By testing in carefully chosen soft media, the USSR could test up to perhaps 3 KT and risk only a 10% chance of detection of individual tests by seismic means. The risk by detection by physical means would be larger if a series of tests were carried out, and the risk of detection by other kinds of intelligence would also increase. Substantially larger tests, up to perhaps 25¹ KT, could be carried out with small risk of seismic detection by accomplishing them in spherical underground cavities of a few hundred feet in diameter. But the construction of such a cavity would run the risk of being detected by other means.

Question Two. What can be learned technically from such small underground tests and what will be the military significance of the increased knowledge?

Answer. Increases of several fold in the yield-to-weight ratio could be accomplished for weapons in the low kiloton range. The fraction of fissionable material in thermonuclear weapons could be reduced. Weapons could be developed with enhanced radiation yield and also with deliberately suppressed radiation yield. Some weapons effects tests could be carried out, specifically on the effects of radiation on warhead components and some studies of hardened structure response. The following weapons effects cannot be studied² underground: Electro-magnetic pulse, blackout, megaton-range ground shock, and full-scale interactions of re-entry vehicles.

The necessity of carrying out these tests clandestinely would substantially increase both the time scale and the cost of the program.

Studies of these sorts would permit development of a wide range of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Underground tests could also lead to improvements in the warheads of anti-ballistic missiles. However, the warhead is only one component in the necessarily complex ABM system, and the offensive forces have enough retaliatory means at their disposal that the possible improvements of ABM warheads do not appear to be of great military importance. Underground testing cannot be expected to lead to operationally meaningful improvements in strategic warheads.³

Question Three. Will atmospheric tests be required to prove out developments made by underground testing?

Answer. Atmospheric tests will not be required for development of tactical nuclear weapons. Nor are they necessary for improving some components of strategic weapons. However, atmospheric testing would be required: (1) For proving out significant new designs of strategic weapons which might be based on developments made by underground tests; (2) to test the operational effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems; (3) for a range of significant weapons effects tests.

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. No classification marking. Prepared by a U.S.-U.K. team consisting of McNaughton, Sir Solly Zuckerman, Frank Long, and Archibald Duncan Wilson, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

¹ A handwritten marginal note reads “50.”

² A handwritten marginal insertion reads: “to any significant extent.”

³ An additional handwritten sentence in the margin reads: “JCS says extrapolated ideas could be tested in outer space (!)”

306. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963, 11:45 a.m.–1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

President-Prime Minister Test Ban Conversations, June 30, 1963

The President and the Prime Minister with their advisers discussed test ban matters during a meeting at Birch Grove from 11:45 a.m. until 1:15 p.m., Sunday, June 30, 1963. Present at the discussions assisting the President were Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Bruce, and Messrs. Tyler, McNaughton, and Long. Assisting the Prime Minister, in addition to his personal secretary, were Lord Home (in and out), Minister Thorneycroft,¹ Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Lord Hailsham, and Messrs. Caccia, Zuckerman and Wilson.

The Prime Minister asked “the scientists” to provide the answers to the three questions put to them the night before. I read to them the questions and in each case the answers which had been prepared by the team of Zuckerman-Wilson-Long-McNaughton.² There was discussion after each answer. (The questions and answers appear elsewhere in the form of the informal talking paper used by the group.)

The President then read from the JCS June 18 “Comments on the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”³ He read extensively from Parts II, III and IV of the JCS statement. In some cases he asked me for fuller explanation of the Chiefs' meaning, and in all cases there was discussion of the points made by the Chiefs. The President stated that it will be important for us to “get back home and talk this over.”

It was stated that it would be advisable for Mr. Harriman to spend perhaps two days in London before going on to Moscow. It was understood that the US-UK liaison at the working level was going on already.

Lord Home suggested that, in the Moscow negotiations, we should not permit the debate to focus on *number* of inspections. Rather, he preferred to

have the emphasis put on *kinds* of inspection.

There was some discussion of what inducements the Soviets might have to agree to a test ban. In response to a question from Lord Hailsham, I said that the interest on the part of the Soviets might flow (1) from a different strategic outlook (one in which superiority in very large weapons appeared sufficient), and (2) from a desire to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The Prime Minister added two reasons: (3) That the Soviets may wish to save the resources now being diverted to the arms race, and (4) that they may be interested in taking a step toward disarmament. He doubted very much that the Soviets would enter a treaty intending to cheat; he believed that the question in their minds would be “Do we want this deal or don't we?” The questions would be how much each side had to give to reach agreement.

The President raised the question of a partial test ban—one which had no meaningful on-site inspections but which allowed a given number (possibly 7 to 10) of underground tests each year. He doubted that the Soviets would be interested in such a proposal. Secretary Rusk emphasized the importance for pressing for a comprehensive ban for quite some time before falling back to a partial ban. The President observed that such a partial ban would meet some of the Soviet needs while at the same time making a ban more consistent with US military and political requirements.

The problem of China was raised. It was observed that it might be hard to get a treaty ratified by the Senate if the Chinese tested prior to that time and, in any event, that the Senate ratification might provide that the treaty terminate if the Chinese conducted a test. There were some references to methods which might be used to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

JTMcN

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. Secret. Drafted by John McNaughton, General Counsel of

the Department of Defense, on July 1. Copies were sent to William R. Tyler and Franklin Long.

¹ Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defense.

² [Document 305](#).

³ Not found, but presumably an earlier draft of the paper cited in [footnote 12, Document 294](#).

307. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, July 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

Comments on Conclusions of the White Papers (Draft) on Nuclear Testing Problems [1](#)

1. A forceful test ban would freeze the present status of nuclear weapons except for modest refinements which can be accomplished in the laboratories without testing, or improvements which can be accomplished by clandestine testing under the threshold which will be discussed later.
2. This will mean that the Soviets will preserve their lead in weapons ranging from 6,000# to 25,000# in weight and in yields from 13 to 100 megatons. Our estimates lead to the conclusions that the Soviets now possess missile delivery warheads of about 25 megatons and are in the process of developing a missile which can deliver a 100-megaton warhead. It is apparent that these large warheads can destroy vast areas from thermo effect if the large megaton warheads are exploded at high altitude. It does not appear that weapons of this type would be useful against our hardened missile sites and it does not appear to me that the Soviets will plan such uses, as they will have several hundred ICBMs capable of delivering warheads of about 10 megatons. These, I believe, would be used against our missile sites.
3. It is true that during the period of which I am speaking we will build many more ICBMs and Polaris missiles and will outnumber the Soviets by 3 or 4. It is also true that during this period the Soviets will be hardening their ICBM sites as they now appear to be doing and these will be less vulnerable to our comparatively low yield warheads.
4. I therefore conclude that in the field of strategic weapons we will be at a disadvantage under a test ban. The technology proven in our last test series can be fully developed and weaponized to produce warheads at yields 3 to 5 times as great as those we now have with no increase in weight. While this will not equal the very large warheads of the Soviets, it will give us a far more effective offensive capability than we would otherwise possess.

^{*} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers: Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/21/64. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate whether a final version of this memorandum was sent.

¹ A series of draft white papers on the strengths and weaknesses of a nuclear test ban was prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June and July of 1963. None appears to have reached final form. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Testimony, and *ibid.*, DOD, Vol. IV, 1/63-6/63)

308. National Intelligence Estimate [Source](#)

Washington, July 2, 1963.

NIE 11-2-63

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

The Problem

To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program to mid-1968.

Principal Conclusions

Nuclear Testing and Technology

1. The Soviets have a highly developed nuclear weapon technology which differs in design philosophy and emphasis from that of the West. They have tested thermonuclear devices in very high yields (up to 63 megatons) well above any in Western experience, and in this range have achieved an outstanding yield-to-weight performance. They have also shown an excellent performance in thermonuclear devices of lower yields, down to about two megatons. In the submegaton thermonuclear class, [2 lines of source text not declassified] and they have not yet demonstrated a thermonuclear capability in weights below about 600 pounds.

2. The Soviets have conducted many tests below 50 kilotons, some of which may not have been fission devices. Debris from a number of tests in 1961-1962 was not obtained and analysis of those 1962 tests for which debris was obtained has not been completed. In general, data from the 1961-1962 devices analyzed to date do not permit any definitive judgment as to their progress in fission weapon technology, particularly in the very low yield category where evidence of testing may have been missed. They have continued to show interest in unboosted fission devices, although they have also tested many well-boosted devices.

Weapon Stockpiles

3. A small number of individually produced weapons for interim use could be fabricated within a few months after device testing. Thus, a few weapons with very high yields of up to 100 MT could now be available. However, we believe that the Soviet time lag between nuclear tests of a device and initial stockpile entry of a serially produced weaponized version is about two years at a minimum. On this basis, some of the new devices tested in 1961 could be entering stockpile during the latter part of 1963 if a priority development is assumed. It is estimated, however, that this could be done only on a limited scale, and that, in general, the devices tested in 1961-1962 would be stockpiled in 1964 and 1965. We believe that weapons currently stockpiled are derived primarily from devices tested in 1958 or earlier; these weapons range in yield from a few kilotons up to 6 megatons.

Requirements for Further Testing

4. Soviet nuclear weapon technology appears to be highly sophisticated and adequate for present delivery systems, but significant advancements can still be made through further development and testing. Probably one of the strongest requirements is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. The Soviets conducted several such tests in 1961-1962, but probably need additional tests to obtain weapon effects data pertinent to antimissile development and countermeasures. They also lack direct information on effects of high-yield weapons on hardened ground targets and on the effects of lower-yield weapons on deep underwater targets. The Soviets probably also have requirements to conduct further tests to improve yield-to-weight ratios particularly in the lower weight range and to develop new weapon capabilities such as light-weight thermonuclear warheads for smaller missile systems, very small weapons for tactical employment, weapons with enhanced radiation output, and weapons with minimal residual radiation.

5. We believe that the Soviets are continuing a vigorous weapons research and development program, and that they are maintaining a posture to resume nuclear testing promptly if a decision is made.

Fissionable Materials Production

6. We estimate the mid-1963 cumulative Soviet production of fissionable materials at about 15,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 130,000 kilograms of U-235.¹ These quantities are somewhat lower than previously estimated for mid-1963, as the result of further analysis and additional evidence. The Soviets are continuing to expand their fissionable material production capability at a significant rate. We estimate that by mid-1968 cumulative production will amount to about 35,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 380,000 kilograms of U-235.

Reactor Development

7. Soviet research reactor development continues to be competent in most areas and is unique in a few. However, the original, unrealistic Soviet nuclear electric program has been abandoned and they are now proceeding with one which is more commensurate with their economic requirements and the state of their reactor technology. Moreover, the Soviets have encountered numerous difficulties with the nuclear propulsion of the icebreaker Lenin, and there is considerable evidence of similar difficulties with Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Soviet work on ion propulsion and nuclear auxiliary power supplied for space applications is continuing, and we believe that they have a program to develop materials suitable for nuclear rocket motors. The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion program appears to have been delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled.

[Here follow a 44-page summary, a 33-page Discussion section, and an evaluation of Soviet nuclear tests from August 1949 to December 1962.]

^{*} Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63, USSR. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the cover sheet reads: "This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, NSA, and FBI." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdictions.

¹ See page 35 for the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence). [Footnote in the source text.]

309. Editorial Note

On July 2, 1963, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev spoke on the test ban question in East Berlin. After emphasizing the Soviet preference for a comprehensive agreement without inspections, he stated that “since the Western Powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to include an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.” Later in the speech, Khrushchev stated “that it would be advisable straightaway, when an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is concluded, to take also another big step towards the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two main military groupings of states—the NATO countries and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty.” He noted that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, “together with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between those two groupings of States, will create a new international atmosphere more favorable to the solution of the most important problems of the modern world, including the problem of disarmament.” For text of this speech, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pages 244-246.

At 5:15 p.m. on July 2 in Washington, Kaysen telephoned Harriman, who said he “looked on” a summary he had of Khrushchev’s speech as “mighty interesting and that he had [not?] said this before.” Harriman also asked “if it looked pretty good. Kaysen said it looks like something to me. There is a lot about the German Peace Treaty.” In a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop at 1:20 p.m. on July 3, Harriman stated that the Soviets “never agreed to testing in this manner before. We have proposed it—the three elements, three environments. The question is whether he ties that in definitely to Warsaw-NATO agreement. It isn't clear whether he ties [them?] together or whether he thinks they should be one after another.” (Both memoranda of conversation in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July Telephone Conversations) On July 3, the President held two meetings at the White House with senior officials including McNamara, Ball, Harriman, Foster,

Bundy, and Kaysen. Rusk was at the second meeting, held at 4:10 p.m., but not at the first, apparently held some time between 9 and 11 a.m. Kaysen's handwritten notes of the meetings indicate that the President was searching for some means of seeing whether the United States could meet the Soviet desire for a non-aggression pact without jeopardizing the Western position in Berlin and without antagonizing Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle. Kennedy in the 4 p.m. meeting pointed out the difficulty of getting de Gaulle involved in the test ban, given his "natural" opposition to any U.S. initiative, and wondered how to make him "a larger figure in this matter."

At both meetings, Harriman spoke of the difficulty of having frank discussions in Moscow if the French joined the talks. With Adenauer, the major issue was the non-aggression pact. Kennedy is reported as saying at the second meeting that "we don't mind, poor grounds for refusing it, how do we convince *Germans*." The President decided that he should write Adenauer and "reserve position," apparently on the non-aggression pact, and that Rusk should write Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. Regarding France, the resolution of the meetings was less clear, seeming to depend on soundings to be taken by Ambassador Bohlen over the next few days. (Both memoranda of conversation in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions) For Kennedy's letter to Adenauer, see [Document 310](#); for Rusk's letter to Schroeder, see [Document 311](#).

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany [Source](#)

Washington, July 3, 1963, 9:46 p.m.

39. The following letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer should be delivered to the Chancellor's office in the course of business Thursday but without giving an impression that it is being delivered with special haste in connection with the meeting between the Chancellor and de Gaulle.¹ Text of letter follows:

"Dear Mr. Chancellor:

On my return to Washington, I write to thank you once again—and most heartily—for all your kindness and courtesy during my visit to the Federal Republic.² I shall not soon forget the welcome which you and your people gave to us.

I particularly value the intimate private conversations which you and I were able to have, and I was grateful to you for your exposition of certain soundings which you have thought it useful to undertake. We on our side will also keep you fully informed. In that spirit, I have asked Mr. Rusk to give to Mr. Schroeder a complete account of our preliminary thinking about the possible meaning of the new language on nuclear tests which has appeared quite unexpectedly in Khrushchev's Berlin speech.³

It is far from clear what the linkage may be between this apparently new position on a limited test ban and the question of a non-aggression agreement, but it seems to me at least possible that we can work out a bargain which in effect produces the kind of standstill agreement that you spoke of to me.⁴ It is essential to us, of course, that any such arrangement protect all our interests, but it may be, as you suggested that Khrushchev is becoming ready to accept this kind of standstill, instead of the one-sided agreements he has sought in the past.

In any event, this is what we must now find out, and I doubt if we shall know much more until after Harriman has been to Moscow. Meanwhile, my people will be in close consultation with yours, and I will be sure to get in touch with you personally if there is any important new development. In the meantime, I have asked Mr. Rusk to make sure that all our people avoid any public statements which might seem to prejudge the matter one way or another, and if you should think it useful, I hope you may be able to take a similar line with your people.

I am particularly conscious that General de Gaulle may have reservations about any possible standstill, and I should be glad to have your own advice as to how the matter might best be discussed with him after your talks with him are over. I persist in my conviction that the real interests of all our nations are the same and that we must find ways of pursuing them in increasing unity.”

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

¹ This meeting was held in Bonn July 4-5.

² Kennedy was in Germany June 23-26.

³ See [Document 309](#).

⁴ No record has been found of the President's private meeting with the Chancellor the morning of June 24. That afternoon, Kennedy and Adenauer discussed the test ban briefly with others present. (Memorandum by Creel; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy) See the Supplement.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany [Source](#)

Washington, July 3, 1963, 7:10 p.m.

31. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Schroeder as soon as possible, hopefully before start of Adenauer-deGaulle talks.

“Dear Gerhard:

Since returning to Washington last night the President and I have had a first look at the text of Chairman Khrushchev’s speech delivered yesterday in East Berlin. We had no previous intimation of this Soviet proposal. It seems interesting particularly in view of its timing, coming just before the meeting with the Chinese on Friday¹ and the Harriman-Hailsham mission on July 15.

While, as you know, we have always preferred a comprehensive test ban with adequate inspection, we could nevertheless foresee real advantages to the West in even a three-environment test ban particularly as it might affect the Chinese nuclear development.

It is too early to say whether Chairman Khrushchev’s speech can lead to an agreement on any form of test ban. But if such agreement appears possible and if the Soviet Union is to be put in position to make a maximum effort to obtain Chinese compliance, then it seems essential that the French Government join in the agreement. We have been giving some thought as to what President de Gaulle might feel he would need if he is to participate in a test ban. In fact, Ambassador Bohlen has indicated to Couve de Murville that this is an area which we might be prepared to explore.² We recognize, of course, the many complications of this question and we shall wish to keep in close touch with you about it.

We are not clear from Khrushchev’s speech regarding the extent to which he is linking the conclusion of a test ban agreement with a nonaggression

pact. This will probably emerge only during the course of the Harriman-Hailsham talks. However, as we are informing the quadripartite ambassadorial group this afternoon, we could not of course make any commitments in a matter on which the NATO Alliance as a whole must move together. As it now seems certain that Khrushchev will raise the question, Harriman will plan to listen and ascertain the Soviet intentions in this regard.

Our own views on this remain the same as I discussed at Ottawa. We believe that a nonaggression pact is worth exploring if, in fact, it could be so designed as to give greater security to Berlin. Pending whatever we may learn as the result of Harriman's talks, the President and I feel that we should not foreclose full exploration of these possibilities and am hopeful that our governments will keep the question open and not take public positions until this can be done.³

[Here follows discussion of the MLF.]

With every good wish."⁴

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Ball; cleared by Rusk (in substance), Richard Davis (EUR), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.

¹ That is, the Soviet-PRC meeting on July 5.

² Telegram 97 to Paris, July 3, instructed Bohlen to "recognize of course that primary purpose of letter to Schroeder was to inform Germans in general terms of your recent conversation with Couve de Murville re nuclear matters before French informed them." The Department recognized that there was "little incentive for de Gaulle to go along on test ban or NAP," and stated that while it was inclined to doubt the value of Harriman seeing de Gaulle before the Moscow visit, it wished Bohlen's opinion in the matter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) In telegram 78 from Paris, July 5, Bohlen stated that he agreed with the Department since "we in

effect have nothing new to take up” with de Gaulle. (Ibid., POL 7 Harriman)

³ Circular telegram 25, July 3, indicated that many of the same points were made by Ball in a briefing of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington the evening of July 3, and that this material was also circulated for NATO briefing purposes. (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR)

⁴ In telegram 47 from Bonn, July 4, McGhee reported that Schroeder had stated in a preliminary comment on Rusk’s letter that he would try to work discussion of a limited test ban into his talks with de Gaulle although he had “little hope de Gaulle would be responsive. He questioned whether it was realistic to expect that the Soviets would be able to obtain Chinese agreement to a test ban.” (Ibid., DEF 18-4)

312. Telegram From Prime Minister Macmillan's Personal Secretary (de Zulueta) to President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) [Source](#)

London, July 4, 1963.

T. 295/63. Following from de Zulueta for Bundy. Your CAP 63369. Great men think alike. The President's message has crossed a letter which the Prime Minister has sent by the bag. I cannot get the Prime Minister this evening and so I am sending you now the text of his letter of which the original will reach you in due course.

Text of letter from Prime Minister to the President:—

Personal

Dear friend,

[Here follow two paragraphs primarily of a social nature.]

I don't know how you feel about Khrushchev's speech in Berlin. No doubt your people will analyse it and so will ours. We shall have to agree the vital point which is how to play the hand on this. We are looking forward to having preliminary talks with Harriman here. My inclination is to do what I said in the House of Commons—press on in the first instance to see whether accommodation can be reached to get the full ban. But at the same time we must be practical. If Khrushchev really drops the offer of inspection and we cannot meet him by any form of accommodation, then I feel we should not let slip the very big prize of the modified ban, which of course may be possible if it is true that he will not now try to insist on the unpoliced moratorium on underground tests. Alternatively there may be alternative proposals about underground tests such as you mentioned at Birch Grove.¹ At any rate we must get agreement if we can. For then we may be able to approach much more effectively the problems that we have with France, Germany, etc. And Khrushchev also may be able to do

something with China. So even the second prize may turn out well worth having and would certainly be fatal to lose.

These, however, are only my first thoughts.

Yours very sincerely

End of message.

Harold Macmillan²

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Telegrams 7/1/63-7/6/63. Secret; Personal. The time of transmission is 1904 Zulu.

¹ See [Documents 304-306](#).

² This letter crossed a letter from Kennedy to Macmillan, also dated July 4, in which the President stated that he agreed with “what you said in the House yesterday,” particularly “that the most important thing at the moment is try to keep our French and German friends from throwing any cold water in public.” Kennedy asked for Macmillan’s thoughts on possible ways of leading de Gaulle to a “less negative attitude.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1963, Vol. III)

313. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) [Source](#)

Washington, July 5, 1963.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN SPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

The purposes of your mission are three:

1. To negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.
2. To explore what other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking.
3. To probe Soviet intentions in related areas, including those mentioned in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. Test Ban

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.
2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.^{[1](#)}

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. You should therefore initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. You may also explore other possible means of extending the scope of the treaty such as limiting the number of underground tests to an agreed quota.²
4. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and control of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin.³

II. Other Measures of Disarmament

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal⁴ which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. You should accordingly explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages.
- 2.

In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures not necessarily part of a general disarmament treaty. These include:

- a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
- b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards.
- c. In combination with (b.), the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.
- d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.

In exploring these and other possibilities, you will be guided by the paper, _____, recommended by the Committee of Principals and approved by the President.

III. Other Measures

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:
 - a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression pact from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of the non-aggression pact. We would prefer to conclude the three environment test ban treaty first, get the discussion on other measures of disarmament under way, and discuss the Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact in the context of our discussions of further disarmament measures.
 - b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, “non-aggression pact,” has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Within these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.⁵
2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶

* Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. Attached to a July 5 letter from Kaysen to Harriman.

¹ Harriman wrote a marginal note next to this paragraph: “Should we sign if possible or wait for Secretary’s meeting?”

² Beside this sentence Harriman wrote: “I don't want to do this particularly as it would be more difficult to sell Congress.”

³ At the end of this sentence Harriman wrote: “Read this.” Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks, see [Document 287](#).

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ At the end of this paragraph Harriman wrote: “Also safeguards our position in West Berlin.”

⁶ Harriman wrote below this paragraph: “Discuss Laos in depth.”

314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) [Source](#)

Washington, July 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

What the Soviets Must be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability—Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

1. I have long felt that the Soviet leaders must harbor the profoundest apprehension of the Chinese attainment of an early nuclear capability.
2. The Soviets must appreciate that, upon the attainment of a primitive capability, the Chinese will require perhaps decades before this could be expanded to a meaningful deterrent of the US. The Soviets must also realize that when the Chinese have such a capability, it might be directed westward against the USSR as well as eastward against the US.
3. Worrisome as the prospect of the achievement of this capability may be, its attainment is obviously a long way off. But the period between the moment of an initial operational capability with crude weapons and delivery systems, and this later time, should cause the Soviets almost equal alarm. For during this period they will perceive that the Chinese are possessed of the means of starting a nuclear war in the Far East which they cannot finish.
4. Should the Chinese be so misguided as to attack Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Southeast Asia, and thus throw down the nuclear gage to the US, Soviet leaders must see themselves facing up to a most trying decision: whether to stand by and see China as a base for the Far Eastern Communist movement knocked into a cocked hat, or whether to come to China's defense, thus finding themselves in a nuclear war with the US for reasons not of their own choosing.

Sherman Kent

* Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret.

315. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, July 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 8 July 1963

1. Mr. Foster opened the meeting by explaining that its purpose was to consider two measures prepared in response to NSAM 239.¹ The first, a separable first stage measure, proposed 50% or 75% destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and limitations on production, but included inspection of residuals only with the 75% cut and not with the 50% cut. The other, a gradual approach measure, stretched out the steps contained in Stage I of the present US proposal for GCD.² Mr. Foster said that he was not seeking a decision on these specific proposals today, but wanted to focus on the direction in which they led.
2. Secretary McNamara said that he favored the gradual approach because the more extreme separable measure was unlikely to lead to agreement and had the following disadvantages: 1) It destroyed the West's nuclear deterrent against conventional aggression. 2) It gave up the West's superior nuclear power without reductions in Soviet conventional forces. 3) The inspection procedures were too loose, particularly for the 50% cut, but even for the 75% cut. 4) It had no advantage to the West as compared with the present US Stage I—it would not reduce the risk of strategic nuclear war and could increase it. Mr. McNamara preferred gradual steps to develop confidence which, in turn, might produce more substantial agreements.
3. Mr. McCone said that the separable first stage plan concerned him because of its reliance on intelligence as a substitute for inspection of residuals.³ (50% cut) He noted that our intelligence inventory is made up principally of photographic intelligence, SIGINT, and, to a small degree, clandestine intelligence. These have improved over a few years ago but are not sufficient for us to determine residuals. Photography can be deceived by camouflage, satellites can be intercepted, SIGINT is perishable, and clandestine sources are not dependable. Furthermore, photography can tell us nothing about the number of missiles or reload

capabilities, and we know very little about manufacturing complexes for missiles. In Mr. McCone's view, in brief, there was very serious danger in depending on intelligence to verify residuals because intelligence was 1) perishable, and 2) capable of being deceived. He noted, moreover, that differences would arise between the US and the Soviets over the number of arms in existence and the US could prove its case only by revealing intelligence. Furthermore, Congress and the public would want to know how good our intelligence was and it would have to be revealed. Mr. McCone felt that it was hard to overestimate the consequences of exposing our intelligence. Finally, he noted that dependence on intelligence would leave us in an uneasy position as we are now in Cuba, where the photography is of better quality. Mr. McCone concluded that we could not safely proceed on the basis of using intelligence to determine the quantity of residual arms. He felt that we would have to inspect residuals as well as the quantities destroyed. We had always taken this approach, and he felt that we should continue to do so.

4. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone said we had no evidence of camouflage, but pointed out that Khrushchev had said in 1959 at Camp David that he could hide missiles in canyons. The difficulty regarding camouflage was that one could not prove a negative.
5. General Taylor said that he agreed with Secretary McNamara and could add nothing; he said that he preferred the gradual approach. Mr. McCone said that this was his preference too.
6. Dr. Wiesner said that many comments might be made similar to those of Secretary McNamara. There was no need to abandon our present treaty without good reason; however, we now know things about intelligence capabilities that we did not know when the present treaty was tabled, so we might consider changes in the inspection provisions of Stage I. He said that our intelligence was good enough for this but agreed with Mr. McCone that we should be very careful about larger cuts—30% might be supported and maybe 50%. He added that it might be better to negotiate absolute numbers rather than percentages.
7. Dr. Seaborg said that he had nothing to add to the discussion.
8. After these statements of basic position by the key Principals, there was discussion of details and of related matters. Secretary McNamara reported that the Department of Defense was looking ahead for 10 years, that it might be possible to stabilize nuclear stockpiles, and if so, there

could be some reduction in AEC production of weapons (perhaps \$800 million per year). Secretary Rusk suggested that instead of formal agreements, it might be possible for the U.S. and USSR to report to each other what they plan to do unilaterally, e.g. the U.S. weapons production cut, with the hope that the other side would react to this news by cuts of its own. Mr. McNamara doubted, however, that the other side would react similarly, but instead would try to maximize its own program.

9. Mr. McCone confirmed that it was true that as of July 1st, 1963, the Soviets were at the lower end of the range of ICBMs which had been estimated by the intelligence community. He added that there was another problem which disturbed him. The Soviets had three types of long range surface-to-surface missiles—the SS-6, the SS-7 and the SS-8. There was a sharp difference as to whether the SS-8 is large—some believe it will lift 50-100 megatons. So when cutting by categories, the Soviets could retain a few missiles with enormous destructive power greater than that of the U.S. with its larger number of missiles retained. This should be kept in mind.
10. Mr. Foster said that he could not agree that the 50% or 75% cuts would not reduce the risk or destructiveness of war. He was also astonished because he thought we had enjoyed greater success than Secretary McNamara had indicated in balancing off our own conventional forces vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union. He was also puzzled by Mr. McCone's lack of confidence in intelligence. He said that we build our forces based on intelligence so why could we not disarm on this basis? Before Mr. McCone could answer, Secretary McNamara supplied the answer—in our planning we put in a 100% safety factor.
11. Mr. McCone asked why we followed one procedure for inspection with 50% cuts and another for 75% cuts. Mr. Foster said that ACDA felt that the Soviets would accept more inspection if the cuts were deeper. Secretary McNamara reiterated his concern that we were cutting in the strategic delivery area and not in the conventional area. He wanted to retain a balance, roughly like the present balance. Mr. Fisher said that at the meetings of the Deputies, the Defense representatives had seemingly wanted to focus on strategic vehicles.
12. Secretary Rusk said there were two great obstacles to disarmament. One, the Soviets could not or would not back off regarding South Vietnam, Laos, Berlin, and military personnel in Cuba. Two, they refused

to accept inspection. He felt that if the Soviets were seriously interested in disarmament, these things were not a great deal to ask.

13. There was then some conversation about the possibility of combining Stages I and II of the U.S. GCD proposal, which was inconclusive. General Taylor suggested the possibility of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact rather than U.S. vs. USSR, and Mr. Foster said that this was open. In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Foster said we were already authorized to discuss medium bomber bonfires, cessation of fissionable materials production, transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, exchange of military missions, notification of major maneuvers, controls over military expenditures, no bombs in orbit, and certain nuclear free zones. Secretary Rusk commented that Governor Harriman had plenty to discuss. He asked if we could conceivably go to 50% across the board (including conventional). Secretary McNamara said yes, but did not answer when asked if we could do so without Communist China. Mr. Kaysen asked whether Secretary McNamara would still be concerned if there were 50% cuts in strategic delivery vehicles and 30% elsewhere. Secretary McNamara answered yes, and then made a plea for practical as against propagandistic proposals.
14. Mr. McCone expressed his concern about the continuing long-term plans of the Soviets for further increases in their arms. He referred specifically to the continuing buildup of facilities for producing fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk asked if there could be a study of damage to the U.S. from 15-20 large nuclear warheads. Secretary McNamara said this was being done.⁴
15. Secretary Rusk concluded the meeting by saying that some instructions would be drafted for Governor Harriman.⁵ The idea of the separable measure would be kept in play, but not specific large cuts such as 75%. Governor Harriman would be authorized to explore this idea with the Soviets, and to find out, for example, how they would propose to relate strategic cuts to conventional cuts.⁶

Louis Marengo

* Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412) (1963). Top Secret. Drafted by Louis Marengo on July 9. An attached list of the 24 participants is not printed. Among those attending but not reported as speaking were Harriman, Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Another, lengthier memorandum of this meeting prepared by George Rathjens of ACDA is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.

¹ [Document 284](#). The proposals have not been found.

² Reference is to the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, presented at Geneva on April 18, 1962. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 351-382.

³ McCone commented at greater length on intelligence implications of the separable first stage plan in two memoranda dated July 8. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412)(1963)) ⁴ The study has not been found.

⁵ [Document 319](#).

⁶ A memorandum by Rathjens, also dated July 8, of action taken at this meeting indicates that McNamara, Taylor, and McCone preferred the gradual approach as compared with the separable first-stage proposal, but that no action was recommended even on the gradual approach. The memorandum also noted “a consensus that Mr. Harriman had enough other items to discuss” in Moscow “so that there should be no US initiative relating to changes in our position relating to strategic delivery vehicles.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Documents, Volume I)

316. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, July 8, 1963, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of Defense McNamara
W. Averell Harriman

The conversation, lasting 45 minutes, was relaxed, covered a wide field.

Secretary McNamara expressed his desire to have me explore any aspects of our problems with the Soviet Union. I asked him what might be proposed which would help reduce our mutual military costs, a subject in which I knew Khrushchev was interested. He mentioned the ABM program, which would be increasingly expensive as time went on, with no end in sight. (14 billion for 20 cities—Alex Johnson thinks it is 20 billion for 14 cities.)

I commented that that was a saving for the future, but what about a cutback? He mentioned first ending production of nuclear material. He would approve 50% conversion of stocks without tactical reduction; if it went beyond that, he would expect reduction in the tactical field. He mentioned particularly equipment such as aircraft, attack submarines, and tanks. He put greater emphasis on this than on number of men in the military.

He suggested further reduction in the temp [*tempo*?] of competition in outer-space exploration, and proposed the possibility of cooperation.

He was prepared to liberalize trade, particularly if it is part of a bargain in which we gain.

He will fully support a comprehensive test ban treaty, although he recognizes it will be more difficult with the Senate now that an offer has been made for the three environments. He feels a test ban is of grave importance.

W. Averell Harriman^{[1](#)}

^{*} Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Background. Secret; Personal; No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Secretary McNamara's office.

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

317. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 9, 1963.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your letter of July 4,^{[1](#)} and for the confidence you have thus shown me. I have gained, I believe, useful impulses for our policy from your visit to the Federal Republic and to West Berlin as from the talks with you, I am particularly grateful for your statement that you will get in personal contact with me if there is any new development.

I have for the moment stopped my steps towards a contact which I had mentioned to you,^{[2](#)} because I deem it suitable for the time being to await the outcome of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Red China. I shall continue to inform you as soon as something happens.

In the meanwhile, President de Gaulle was here. The talks with him —the confidential talks as well as the other talks—took a good course. *The New York Times* as well as BBC-London and anti-de Gaullist papers in Paris are publishing inaccurate reports. I have confidentially spoken to President de Gaulle in downright earnest about the community of interests of all Allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, telling him in particular that, whatever I do, I always ask myself: is hereby Moscow's hope of a split in the West to be strengthened or not. I suppose, President de Gaulle deems fair such a question with respect to every Ally. I have not gained the impression that he is in any way biased vis-à-vis the United States of America.^{[3](#)}

With sincere regards

Yours

K. Adenauer^{[4](#)}

* Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Chancellor Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy & Johnson, 1963-1964, Vol. II. Secret. The source text is an unofficial translation apparently provided by the German Embassy.

¹ See [Document 310](#).

² See [footnote 4](#), [Document 310](#).

³ On July 8, Schroeder replied to Rusk's July 3 letter (see [Document 311](#)), stating that a potential non-aggression pact must not have the effect of further stabilizing the status quo, including the division of Germany and Berlin, and should be considered only in connection with measures leading to an improvement of the German and Berlin situation. Schroeder agreed that it "would be useful to explore thoroughly the Soviet position in the forthcoming talks." (Unofficial translation supplied by the German Embassy attached to German text; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials' Correspondence with Secretary Rusk, 1961-1964) An amplification of Schroeder's letter is contained in a note from the German Embassy, July 9, attached to a memorandum of conversation held July 8 between Tyler and Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister of Embassy, by F.E. Cash of BTF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Adenauer signed the original.

318. Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council [Source](#)

Washington, July 9, 1963, 6:25–6:55 p.m.

Harriman Instructions for Mission to Moscow

Secretary Rusk initiated the discussion of the draft instructions for the Harriman mission¹ by calling attention to a sentence in the test ban section of the draft which authorized Governor Harriman, if the Soviets propose a moratorium on underground tests, to explore the usefulness of responding by suggesting a limited quota of underground tests. The Secretary said that he did not think the mission should mention specific numbers unless so authorized by further instructions from Washington. The mission should be authorized to do no more than to explore the idea of a quota for underground tests.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Foster said he believed we could accept a quota of twelve underground tests without inspection. However, he pointed out that if the treaty provided for a fixed number of underground tests, other States would feel free to conduct tests and we would thereby lose the benefit of restricting proliferation of nuclear weapons. He agreed that we should accept a treaty with a quota of underground tests if that was all we could get from the Russians. He believed the Soviets could gain an advantage out of an arrangement permitting them a number of underground tests because the Russians stand to gain more from testing than we do.

Secretary Rusk said our objective is to continue to try for a comprehensive test ban treaty, accepting a three-environment treaty only as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive treaty. He repeated his concern about proposing any quota of underground tests to the Russians prior to consultation with our allies and appropriate Congressional leaders.

Mr. Harriman said his understanding of the instructions was that he was limited to exploring the idea of a quota of underground tests.

General Taylor asked whether the Government as a whole had considered a proposal to accept a limited quota of underground tests. He acknowledged that such a proposal had some good and some bad points, but he urged that, before approving any offer, the entire idea of a quota should be examined in detail.

The President responded by acknowledging that there might not be much for us in a quota of underground tests. He asked whether within the next week we could give detailed consideration to this idea.

In response to a question, Mr. Foster said our present test program involved twenty-five to thirty underground tests.

Secretary Rusk mentioned a second point, i.e. how we define underground tests and atmospheric tests in such a way as to make clear when an underground test becomes an atmospheric test. He said we must define precisely the cut-off point between the two types of tests.

Mr. Foster said definitions of these tests are contained in the draft treaty,^{[2](#)} and he read the following:

Article I, Section 1—Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control ... in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

Chairman Seaborg replied that our present underground tests would be legal under this definition. Little radioactive debris from our underground tests falls outside the test area and none outside the State in which the test site is located. He said it would be feasible for us to continue our underground test program under such a limitation.

Secretary Rusk said the acceptance of this definition would mean that we were prepared to limit ourselves to weapons tests which produce no fallout outside the U.S.

Secretary Rusk mentioned the third point which he suggested should be incorporated in the revision of the instructions, i.e. in a discussion of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Harriman mission should maintain our position that our multilateral force (MLF) proposal is not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement. If we did not maintain this position, we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO. He said the mission should point out that our MLF proposal actually means greater control of nuclear weapons and therefore is consistent with our effort to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The President suggested that the pertinent sentence in the non-dissemination section of the instructions be revised to reflect Secretary Rusk's point. He asked what our position would be on a proposal to ban dissemination of nuclear weapons to powers which are now nuclear powers. He wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.

Secretary Rusk responded by saying that the draft treaty covered this point and that the Russians had accepted our definition of the nuclear powers as being the U.S., U.K., France and the USSR. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Rusk had obtained Soviet acknowledgment that the four named States were nuclear powers. Mr. Bundy added that in our discussions with the Russians we should continue to take for granted that we are agreed on the four nations as being the only nuclear powers.

Secretary Rusk raised the fourth point. He asked that the instructions be revised so that there was no link between discussion of a non-aggression pact and progress in other disarmament missions. He believed that we should not now limit our discussion as to a non-aggression pact. At a later time, we may wish to tie it to Soviet acceptance of other proposals such as a settlement of the Berlin question.

Mr. Harriman asked that the phrase in his instructions be changed from "non-aggression pact" to "non-aggression arrangements." The President suggested that the present wording of the sentence on non-aggression arrangements should be revised to clarify its meaning. Mr. Bundy pointed

out that Governor Harriman should make clear that all discussions about non-aggression arrangements would be ad referendum to our allies.

The President suggested that the sentence referring to the desirability of an agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be strengthened. He thought that such an agreement would be useful to us. Secretary McNamara agreed with the President's observation.

In response to Secretary Dillon's question as to what areas we were referring to in the sentence mentioning nuclear-free zones, Secretary Rusk said we were thinking of Latin America and Africa—not the Far East.

The President raised the question as to our dealings with the British on matters arising from the Harriman mission. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that there was considerable suspicion of British motivation. He said many believed that Macmillan wanted a tripartite summit conference, even if there was very little substance for the three principals to discuss and agree upon. He said we should discuss with the British and reach a procedural agreement with them in an effort to hold to an absolute minimum the amount of information made available to the press about the Moscow negotiations. He suggested a procedure whereby each day a joint statement would be made about the developments in Moscow.

The President recalled a conversation with Lord Hailsham who took the position that the British could sign what the Russians proposed and they could sign what the Americans proposed.³ The President concluded that Hailsham clearly envisages himself as a mediator between us and the Russians. Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Bruce's nervousness about the personal attitude of Hailsham.⁴

The President said the reports of the negotiations should be held to a minimum distribution. He agreed that we should limit ourselves to press guidance once a day. He suggested that a personal letter be drafted for him to send to Prime Minister Macmillan calling attention to the importance of keeping the negotiations out of the press. (Copy of the letter is attached.)⁵

Secretary Rusk agreed that Harriman's reports should be held very closely. He suggested that a special category of "Eyes Only" messages be established which would result in his receiving reports in a single copy. Further distribution in the State Department would be his decision.

The President raised the question as to whether a test ban agreement would be signed in Moscow or at a summit meeting. He expressed the view that the Russians might make a summit a condition to signing the test ban agreement.

Secretary Rusk said we should conclude an atmospheric test ban treaty if the Soviets agreed and sign it in Moscow if they wished. He shared the President's view that the Soviets would not sign at any meeting other than a summit conference.

Mr. Bundy raised the question of how we deal with the French in connection with an atmospheric test ban. Secretary Rusk said we would keep the French informed. Mr. Bundy felt that de Gaulle would find it almost impossible to sign any agreement which had been reached by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR at a summit conference.

Secretary Rusk stated he believed that it might be necessary to hold a general conference at which other States would sign the test ban treaty. The President agreed that it might be necessary to hold such a conference in order to get other States to sign. Secretary Rusk said we should not permit the French to have a procedural veto on such arrangements.

The President asked how we thought the Russians would discuss a test ban treaty with the Chinese.⁶ Mr. Harriman replied that he would try to raise this subject with the Russians but he was personally doubtful that they would discuss this subject with us.⁷

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said he accepted the Harriman instructions and had no comment to make. He added that he felt General Taylor had some views which he wished to express as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs individually had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty, as well as a limited test ban treaty with a quota of underground tests, was not in the national interest.⁸ Two of the Chiefs, General LeMay and Admiral Anderson, had already expressed their personal views to the Stennis Committee.⁹ General Taylor asked that a governmental review be made of the atmospheric test ban treaty to determine now whether it was in the national interest. He asked that the Committee of Principals review the entire proposal again in the light of developments during the past year. Such a review would include a review by the Chiefs as well as by other agencies of the Government.

Secretary McNamara said that each Chief will express his opinion on the treaty to the Stennis Committee.

This testimony will be the personal views of the individual Chiefs of Staff. He opposed a formal review by the Chiefs or by the Government as a whole because it would record again a difference of view. He hoped we could avoid a formal statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body of its view of a test ban treaty.

The President agreed that we should not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their formal position because we wished to avoid a statement of their collective judgment becoming public and resulting in press speculation as to differences within the government. He felt that if the Russians accept our treaty, we will have to fight for it in the Senate, win, lose or draw.

General Taylor repeated his request for a review of the test ban treaty in order to take into account developments during the past year.

Secretary McNamara again stated his opposition to such a review on the grounds that there was wider diversity as to the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year. He feared that any such review would leak to the press while Harriman was en route to Moscow.

Secretary Rusk said we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest. He said the time to review such a decision is behind us and that we have not [*sic*] based all our actions on the decision that we wanted to have an atmospheric test ban treaty. If we are not ready to

try our best to get an atmospheric test ban treaty, then we should turn Harriman around.

The President suggested that following the meeting Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor discuss this point further with him in his office.^{[10](#)}

The President then asked what we would do if China exploded a nuclear bomb a year after the treaty came into effect. He acknowledged that the Soviets could be properly concerned if France explodes a nuclear bomb following signature of a test ban treaty.

Mr. Foster read from the draft treaty the provisions covering the explosion of a nuclear weapon by a non-treaty power. (Article III states that if a nuclear explosion has been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining parties' national security or if a nuclear explosion has occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions, a State may request a conference of the treaty parties. At the conclusion of this conference, or after sixty days after the request for a conference, a treaty power can withdraw from the treaty by giving notice. The withdrawal takes place sixty days after notification of intent to withdraw.) Mr. Foster added that one advantage of the treaty was to advance toward our goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said our signature to a proposed draft treaty created no threat to the existing military balance. He believed that opinion within the Government was heavily in favor of going ahead with the effort to get a test ban treaty.

In response to the President's request to Mr. McCone for comment, Mr. McCone said he had none.^{[11](#)}

Bromley Smith^{[12](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is from the President's

Appointment Book (Kennedy Library); the source text indicates it began at 6 p.m. Taylor and McCone also prepared memoranda of this meeting, and Seaborg wrote a journal entry. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memos for Record, T-236-69; Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President; and Seaborg, *Journal*, vol. 6, pp. 33-34, respectively)

¹ Apparent reference to a version dated July 9, drafter not indicated. (Johnson Library, Vice President's National Security File, NSC 62-63) The next previous draft, dated July 8, was prepared by Kaysen. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Instructions) The July 9 draft differs from that of July 8 in omitting some subjects from the list of disarmament measures to be explored in Moscow and contains new language stating that a non-aggression pact could reduce the possibility of another Berlin crisis. A July 5 draft is printed as [Document 313](#).

² Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 804-819.

³ This conversation has not been identified.

⁴ In telegram 5148 from London, June 19, Bruce described Hailsham as a "brilliant, honorable, somewhat impatient man. For considerable time to come, as a potential Prime Minister, he will, I suspect be fully occupied with domestic politics, until a successor to Macmillan is selected." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman)

⁵ Dated July 10, not found attached. The text was transmitted in telegram 273 to London, July 11. (Ibid.)

⁶ In a conversation with Australian Prime Minister Menzies on July 8, Kennedy noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute was "the key and the negotiations in Moscow very much depended upon developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute." (Memorandum by Roger Hilsman; *ibid.*, DEF 18-3 USSR(MO))

⁷ During a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Marquis Childs on July 4, Harriman stated that "he felt the big thing on Khrushchev's mind [is] relations with the Chinese." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)

⁸ See [footnote 13](#), [Document 294](#).

⁹ See [footnote 11](#), [Document 294](#).

¹⁰ In his record of this meeting, Taylor wrote that at the meeting in his office the President expressed dissatisfaction with the Stennis Committee for having the JCS testify on a “test ban proposal which might never be seriously considered by the government,” expressed “understanding” of the JCS position on both the comprehensive and atmospheric test ban proposals, and said that the JCS would have their “full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal treaty proposal” got that far. Meanwhile, Kennedy hoped that the JCS “would express their personal views as required by Congress but avoid doing anything capable of affecting adversely the Harriman discussions.”

¹¹ Wiesner called Harriman at 11:30 a.m. on July 10 and said that while he did not wish to raise the issue at the NSC meeting, he thought Harriman’s instructions “on the comprehensive test ban” were “unduly restrictive.” Harriman “said to talk it over with Carl. He was the drafter. Harriman said he was never inhibited by instructions.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)

¹² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

319. Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) [Source](#)

Washington, July 10, 1963.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Your mission involves both negotiating and exploratory aspects.

On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

On the exploratory side, you should canvass, in so far as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:

1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;
2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. Test Ban

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.
2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach

agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. You are authorized to carry such negotiations as far as you can.

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. If the Soviets show an interest in pursuing the topic, you should initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the other, on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. The Soviets may, in one way or another, raise the issue of a moratorium on underground tests. If the Soviets do this, you may explore the usefulness of responding to such an initiative by means of a limited quota of underground tests in addition to the total prohibition of testing in other environments, but without discussing specific numbers, unless on further instructions.^{[1](#)}

II. Non-Dissemination 1. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and our desire to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin. You may indicate that the United States will endeavor to secure adherence to or observation of any non-dissemination agreement by those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to undertake a parallel responsibility for those powers associated with it.^{[2](#)} In this connection, you should maintain our position that the MLF proposals now under discussion are not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement.^{[3](#)}

III. Other Measures of Disarmament

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious

first-stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. Gromyko's proposal still presents serious problems, including the question of the extent of reduction of strategic nuclear forces in relation to the reduction of other forces. Nonetheless, you should explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages, on terms to which we can respond.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures previously authorized as separable measures. These include, but need not be limited to:
 - a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This is a matter of particular interest to the United States.⁴
 - b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards, and in combination with the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.
 - c. An agreement to establish nuclear free zones in areas where nuclear weapons do not form an integral part of the security arrangements upon which the countries in the areas rely. (This refers to Latin America and Africa.)⁵
 - d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.
 - e. Measures on the reduction of risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

IV. Other Measures

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:

- a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression arrangements⁶ from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of non-aggression arrangements. We would prefer to go as far as possible in discussing the three environment test ban treaty first, and then explore other measures of disarmament, as well as the Soviet proposals for non-aggression arrangements.⁷
 - b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, “non-aggression pact”, has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which is inconsistent with the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal.⁸ Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints a non-aggression arrangement could be advantageous to the West by reducing the possibility of further Berlin crises. Accordingly, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.
2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of improving relations⁹ between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to raise the problem of enforcing the Geneva Agreements in Laos.

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Secret. Another copy is attached to NSC Action No. 2468, July 9, which states that the President approved the revised text after the 9:30 a.m. meeting; see [Document 320](#). (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,

Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding earlier drafts of the instructions, see [footnote 1](#), [Document 318](#).

¹ The part of this sentence beginning with “but” is new.

² In the July 9 draft this sentence reads: “You may indicate that the U.S. is willing to take some responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated.”

³ This sentence is new.

⁴ This subparagraph is new.

⁵ The parenthetical sentence is new.

⁶ “Arrangements” replaces “pact.”

⁷ The phrase “go as far as possible in discussing” replaces “conclude.”

⁸ In the July 9 draft, the latter part of this sentence reads: “or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal.”

⁹ “Improving relations” replaces “reducing tensions.”

320. Memorandum for the Record Source

Washington, July 10, 1963, 9:30 a.m.

The President met with W. Averell Harriman in his office at 9:30 A.M. on July 10 for a final discussion of Governor Harriman's mission to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Bundy and Kaysen were also present.

The President opened the discussion by remarking on the relation of the Harriman exploration to U.S.-German ties. He felt that as a result of his visit the Germans and we had come to a better understanding, and they were less anxious about us. Further, this was reflected strongly in popular feeling, as well as on a governmental level. He was willing to draw on this feeling as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it. On the other hand, he thought it was futile to repeat the experience of the '61 discussions on Berlin. These lengthy talks with the Soviet Union had achieved nothing tangible, and aroused great suspicion in Germany.

The President then raised the question of whether or not he wished to meet at the summit with Khrushchev. He recognized that Macmillan would push strongly in this direction. He quoted Lord Hailsham's remarks to him, observed that Hailsham wanted to play the role of mediator between Khrushchev and Kennedy as F.D. Roosevelt had between Stalin and Churchill. For his part, the President thought a summit, especially a summit involving Macmillan as well as himself, would create difficulties in the U.S., in Germany and France. A bilateral meeting between himself and Khrushchev, such as the one in Vienna, would be less troublesome in this respect. However, in spite of the troubles, the President would be willing to pay the price if it proved necessary. In response to Governor Harriman's question, he said, if necessary, he would go to a summit meeting just to sign the test ban treaty covering three environments, although he was concerned about the effect such an action would have on our relations with France.

Governor Harriman mentioned China¹ and Cuba as problems he might explore. In response, the President indicated that it remained his desire to see all the Russian troops out of Cuba by the end of the year; the advantages

of having a restraining Soviet hand on the SAMs seemed to him outweighed by the advantages of liquidating the problem.

Governor Harriman observed that there was an important question as to how could we give Khrushchev something that got him off the hook in Germany. He mentioned Khrushchev's approving quotation of Walter Lippmann's view that the Berlin wall gave the Soviets what they would have gotten from a peace treaty. Harriman went on to quote Khrushchev's phrase, "the acceptance of the two Germanies as they now exist."² The President said that one of his impressions from his German trip was that the strength of feeling in Germany on reunification was great, while the immediate concern about the security of Berlin has lessened. It is clear that a recognition of the permanent division of Germany was not now acceptable to the Germans. The President observed the desirability of getting something along the lines of Brandt's suggestion which would help ease the human situation.

Governor Harriman raised the question of our trade with the Soviet Union, and pointed out that Khrushchev would like to increase it further. The European nations supply much of what they want anyway, but it was a matter of pride with Khrushchev. The President agreed that we should be forthcoming on this issue if it came up.

Our position on the MLF then came up. The President said that our first response to this issue should be to repeat our argument that it was consistent with the purposes of non-dissemination, in accordance with the agreed instruction. If, however, there seemed to be some purpose in going beyond this in terms of the China problem or otherwise, Harriman should be guided by his judgment of how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition. But in no event should Governor Harriman give any specific assurances on the MLF.

Governor Harriman reported Secretary McNamara's views on how far McNamara thought it would be wise to go on a first stage disarmament proposal. The President thought it was rather unlikely that there would be any serious discussion on this point.

The President raised the question of Laos and indicated the importance of repeating our dissatisfaction with the present situation and our desire for the Soviets to live up to their commitments there. Governor Harriman responded that this of course brought up all the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations, and whether or not the Soviets were able to influence the situation in Laos. Again the President said that Governor Harriman's judgment should govern his action.

Carl Kaysen³

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Harriman Trip to Moscow. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaysen. A copy was sent to Bundy and Harriman.

¹ In a July 9 paper prepared for Harriman entitled "Points to be Explored with the Russians," William H. Sullivan, Harriman's Special Assistant, listed as the first two points "an indication of the degree of Soviet concern over the Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program" and "an exchange of estimates concerning the problem of the Chinese Communist ability to detonate a nuclear device." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Background III) See the Supplement.

² This formula had been used by Khrushchev on a number of occasions since 1958.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

321. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, July 10, 1963, 3:45–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Harriman Talks in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy

Mr. Pierre Pelen, Counselor, French Embassy

Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Edgar J. Beigel, WE

Ambassador Alphand called at his request to say that the personal views he had given to Under Secretary B all on this subject had now been confirmed as the views of the French Government. He summarized these views as follows:

1. The French position is well known that a nuclear test ban agreement is not a disarmament measure and in fact would consolidate the position of countries that have already developed nuclear arsenals. The agreement would not be of interest to France, which must consider its own requirements, although it would not object to the agreement reached by others.
2. A further non-aggression agreement that Khrushchev suggested would seem to be useless and to be merely one element out of the general program presented at Geneva in 1959. The French Government believes that such an agreement: (a) would merely reiterate commitments under the U.N. Charter; (b) is dangerous because one way or another it would constitute recognition of the GDR; and (c) would bless the political status quo in Europe. Ambassador Alphand said that France fears the political and psychological effects of such an agreement. He said that the French Government understands that Khrushchev would want such an agreement in order to represent it as a victory to the Soviet people as well as to the satellites, to gain the “legalization” of the satellites.
3. Any future moves by the West to counter Soviet moves in Berlin or elsewhere might be considered as violating the non-aggression

agreement.

4. A non-aggression agreement would give rise to a false illusion in France as well as serious problems were the French Government later to ask for greater sacrifices from the French Parliament and people.

Ambassador Alphant said that France has always wanted something fundamental from the Soviets, something that would contribute to a real *détente*.

Ambassador Alphant then referred to a telegram from the French Embassy in London summarizing a UPI dispatch of July 8 which quoted a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that the Western delegations in Moscow will be authorized to discuss a number of questions: a non-proliferation plan, measures to avoid war by accident, and general problems of disarmament including a non-aggression agreement. He said that he did not know whether this was also U.S. policy for these talks. He thought that the discussions should be limited to the nuclear test ban agreement, and that no gestures should be made toward Khrushchev.

The Secretary said that we do not know the real Soviet attitude on the test ban question, and that we have no information beyond the Khrushchev speech in East Germany. The Ambassador interjected that Khrushchev did not speak of a moratorium on underground testing although this had indeed been part of the earlier Soviet proposal. The Secretary went on to say that we are prepared to discover that the Khrushchev speech is not the entire Soviet position. He said that we could accept an agreement to end tests in all three environments. He said that unless the Soviets are willing to accept considerable inspection arrangements we would not agree to stop underground testing, and we would certainly not accept an uninspected underground test moratorium. He said that we do not know what the fine print will say on the Soviet side.

The Secretary said that on other disarmament questions there will be no change from the positions we have been taking at Geneva. He said that if the Soviets raise these issues, Mr. Harriman would stick to the Geneva positions.

The Secretary said that we do not know whether the test ban question will be linked to a non-aggression agreement,¹ that this has been obscure in the Soviet public statements, although it is likely that the Soviets will raise the subject. He said that in this event Mr. Harriman will listen, and will point out that this is a matter for the NATO Alliance to consider. The Secretary said that we have already expressed our own concern about a non-aggression agreement along much the same lines as outlined by Alphand. He said that any suggestion of recognition of the GDR is important to us and we must be extremely careful about this. He noted that Ambassador Dobrynin had in conversation said that the Soviet Union would be flexible with regard to the form of such an arrangement, but may have been speaking only personally on this point. He said that we are also concerned about illusions should any non-aggression agreement be followed by a Berlin crisis, and he had emphasized this to Dobrynin.

The Secretary felt that the Alliance should not close the door on this question until we can see more clearly what develops within the Sino-Soviet bloc. He noted that there are those in Paris who have said that the Soviet position may change due to relations with China. He believed we should keep things open to see how the situation develops as well within the satellites and between the satellites and the Soviet Union. He noted that Kadar may ask for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and that difficulties are developing with Rumania.

The Secretary reiterated that Mr. Harriman is only going to hold a "listening brief" at Moscow. He noted that M. Spaak would be reporting to the NAC on July 12² and said that we will report the Harriman discussions promptly to the Alliance.

Ambassador Alphand said that there are many ways to conduct a listening brief. The Secretary responded that Mr. Harriman will only want to find out what the Soviets are talking about. Ambassador Alphand went on to illustrate his remark by saying that we might ask about unilateral declarations in lieu of a non-aggression agreement. The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman may probe on the question of form, that we are already studying questions of substance. He pointed out that it would be very

difficult to expect U.S. ratification of any agreement with members of the Warsaw Pact.

The Secretary repeated that he had warned the Soviet Ambassador regarding any Berlin crisis that might follow any kind of non-aggression agreement.

Ambassador Alphand said that in the French view they prefer not to link the test ban and non-aggression agreement, that it would in fact be impossible to link the two subjects.

The Secretary said that we must consider this subject against the context of the Berlin situation, and that an illusory non-aggression agreement would be both wrong and dangerous. He went on to say that if a significant change in the situation is in the offing, if the captive nations turn out not to be so captive, then the entire context would be reviewed.

Ambassador Alphand said that in his view a Soviet commitment not to make a Berlin crisis would not be a very worthwhile exchange for a non-aggression agreement.

The Secretary then turned to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that our question in Moscow will be whether the Soviets accept the U.S. proposals as a basis for negotiation. He said that if they do, we will report this development to the Alliance. He recalled that Couve de Murville had indicated that France would have to study this carefully if the Soviets accept our proposals. He noted that we are not in an apologetic mood on this since the Soviets have already assisted the Chinese in this field.

The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman would also be prepared to take up again with the Soviets the situation in Laos.

Ambassador Alphand said that he had further word from Paris on this subject, indicating that France would agree to reinforcement if Phoumi would be more cooperative with them.

The Secretary said that there were no other subjects that Mr. Harriman intended to raise in Moscow.

Mr. Tyler noted that we expect a member of the Belgian delegation to Moscow will go to London to brief Mr. Harriman on the Spaak-Khrushchev talks.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR(MO). Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on August 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.

¹ According to a memorandum by John C. Guthrie, Director of EUR/SOV, of his conversation on July 5 with Alexander J. Zinchuk, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, the latter stated that the linkage "had not been explicit but in view of the fact that there would be no moratorium on underground testing under the partial test ban agreement, a non-aggression pact was necessary to add 'reassurance' to those concerned by continued testing underground." Zinchuk "indicated that his reading of the Khrushchev speech was that the linkage was clear." (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)

² Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, was in the Soviet Union part of the second week of July. In a letter to Kennedy dated July 11, Spaak described a conversation, apparently on July 9, in which Khrushchev stated that he thought an accord on a partial test ban treaty could be reached. While Khrushchev did not link such an agreement with a non-aggression pact, "it seemed" to Spaak that "he considered that no accord on disarmament was possible if the German situation was not clarified." (Text in telegram 58 from Brussels, July 11; *ibid.*)

322. Position Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Source](#)

Washington, July 12, 1963.

ACDA POSITION ON U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF VERY HIGH YIELD WEAPONS

Abstract

ACDA considers that the proposed development of a very high yield lay-down weapon by the U.S. for B-52 delivery would, when publicly known, have adverse effects on arms control negotiations, on acceptance of U.S. strategic doctrine and on the credibility of past U.S. statements that Soviet testing of very high yield nuclear weapons did not result in a change in the military balance. Moreover, such a development appears to contemplate continued retention of the manned bomber in the U.S. force structure for a period extending indefinitely into the future. From the arms control standpoint, ACDA believes there is a serious question as to the desirability of accepting indefinitely the manned bomber's destabilizing effects on the strategic situation.

ACDA views with even greater concern the likelihood that, in effect, approval of the present proposal would commit the U.S. to a broader program for the development of very high yield nuclear weapons for delivery by missile. Such a program would entail atmospheric nuclear testing, initiation of a new missile development program, and large political and economic costs and would result in a weapon system inherently destabilizing in nature.

From the arms control standpoint, the course represented by these proposals would represent a major escalation of the arms race, would seriously jeopardize present and future efforts to bring the arms race under control, and would severely increase international tensions.

ACDA is not aware of military considerations which would justify acceptance of these disadvantages.^{[1](#)}

[Here follows a 10-page analysis.]

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 245. Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 12 note from Foster to Bundy.

^{[1](#)} The U.S. Government did not reach a decision on a very high-yield weapon during 1963.

323. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [Source](#)

London, July 12, 1963, 8 p.m.

232. From Harriman.¹ After lunch by Prime Minister for principals in both US and UK teams,² he asked me to stay on for discussion alone.

1. Although he obviously would like a summit meeting, provided an agreement on some subject could be reached, he understands disadvantage of delaying agreement on test ban if it is obtainable. He specifically agreed that we should attempt to conclude test ban if it could be done untied to other issues. On the other hand, he strongly urges a summit meeting if that is only way an agreement can be reached on test ban or other desired objectives. He suggested possibility of Western summit meeting, with Adenauer and de Gaulle, to thrash out subjects other than test ban.
2. He understands that to satisfy France, some special arrangement must be made in order to obtain France's adherence to test ban and non-dissemination. He volunteered to do the job.
3. He suggested we drop word "pact" and develop new term for non-aggression arrangements which might be more palatable to Germans.
4. He agreed to instruct Hailsham to support our position on any points of disagreement, specifically, as example, our unwillingness to accept any Soviet proposal on moratorium on underground testing.
5. He agreed that since subject of Red China is so sensitive, I should raise it with Khrushchev alone. He also volunteered that it would be better for me to discuss Laos and Cuba without Hailsham.
6. We discussed press arrangements covered by exchange of letters with the President, and indicated that he personally would see that understandings would be carried out on British side.³

Bruce

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret.

¹ Harriman and his party left Washington on July 11. He was accompanied by Fisher; Kaysen; Tyler; McNaughton; Long; Frank E. Cash, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs; Alexander Akalovsky, Political Affairs Division, International Relations Bureau, ACDA; Neville E. Nordness, Public Affairs Adviser, ACDA; and Frank Press, a consultant with ACDA.

² The meeting with British officials the morning of July 12 is reported in telegrams 233 and 234 from London, July 12, marked “Eyes Only—Ban from Harriman.” Hailsham raised questions about the draft limited test ban treaty of August 27, 1962, which Harriman insisted on presenting to Khrushchev. Hailsham acknowledged, however, that his instruction was to agree to whatever the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a three-element ban. In a separate talk among Harriman, Bruce, and Home, it was agreed that every effort should be made to obtain a test ban untied to a non-aggression arrangement and that the United States and the United Kingdom would in Moscow make the test ban the first order of business, followed by nuclear non-dissemination and a non-aggression pact, in that order. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement. “Ban” was a handling indicator for the test ban talks and denoted special restricted handling and distribution procedures.

³ At the afternoon meeting between the U.S. and British groups, the United States obtained British agreement that any non-aggression arrangement would have to include a guarantee of Western access to Berlin. The groups also considered measures ensuring against a surprise attack, a cut-off of fissionable materials production, and a ban on bombs in orbit as possible items for discussion in Moscow. (Telegram 236 from London, July 12, marked “Eyes Only—Ban from Harriman”; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [Source](#)

Washington, July 12, 1963, 8:11 p.m.

306. For Harriman from Bundy.

1. The President is informing Prime Minister directly that we are not enthusiastic about his “volunteering” to do the job in paragraph 2 of your 232.^{[1](#)}
2. The President wants you to know that expressions of strong French and German opposition to non-aggression arrangement increased and that it is greatly to our advantage not to link limited test ban to such arrangements if at all possible. You may wish to argue with Khrushchev that such a link would merely strengthen hands of those who are against improvement in relations in all countries, while nevertheless it is a fact that test ban agreement in itself would make it easier for good sense to prevail on other issues of which non-aggression arrangement is one.
3. Presidential letter to Khrushchev follows and is for your delivery in any way you see fit. Message open for amendment if you wish to recommend any.^{[2](#)}

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending this message by the hand of Averell Harriman, whose visit to Moscow with Lord Hailsham is one that I hope may have important positive consequences for peace.

I am sure you know, but I want to say again, that Mr. Harriman comes with my full personal confidence and is in a position to give you my thinking not only about the problems of disarmament but about other issues as well. I have chosen him also because of his clear record of sympathetic understanding of the Russian people and his service to our common cause in the critical days of World War 2.

As Governor Harriman will explain to you, we continue to believe that it will be best if we can get a comprehensive agreement on the end of all nuclear testing, and we regret the continuing difference between us on the question of the nature and number of the inspections which would be necessary to give confidence in such a comprehensive agreement. I can only repeat again that there simply is not any interest in using such inspections for espionage of any sort, but I know from your recent statements that you have not accepted this explanation. In these circumstances, I believe that we should continue with our efforts to resolve this difference, but in the meantime I share the view which you have put forward in your important statement in Berlin that it is sensible to reach agreement where agreement is now possible, in the area of testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. Governor Harriman will explain that we continue to be in favor of such a more limited agreement and that we are encouraged by your statement in Berlin to believe that it is now possible.

I will not take your time in this letter to go into greater detail on this and other questions, but will merely repeat my conviction that we are at a moment in which it is important to make progress together. For this reason we attach great importance to Mr. Harriman's visit.

My wife joins me in sending our good wishes to you, to Mrs. Khrushchev, and to all your family.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

Ball

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted in the White House by McGeorge Bundy. Also printed in [vol. VI, Document 108](#).

¹ [Document 323](#). White House telegram CAP 63382 from Bundy to de Zulueta, July 12, states that the President was glad that Macmillan agreed that if a limited test ban (or a non-dissemination agreement) was obtained it would be necessary to “take steps” to obtain French agreement. “The

President believes that it would be necessary for our two Governments to consult closely about any such discussions, and he believes that it would be essential to act in concert on this matter which is so near the center of our whole problem with General de Gaulle.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 7/12/63-8/7/63) This telegram was repeated as telegram 173 to London, July 13, marked “Eyes Only—Ban” and “For Harriman from Bundy.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) [2](#) Harriman and Kaysen requested this letter in an undated and unnumbered telegram to Bundy in order “to ensure Harriman reception in right mood and to keep discussion at top level. Understand Hailsham will be delivering message to Khrushchev from PM.” (Communication channel not indicated; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Mission Cables 7/12-7/18/63)

325. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 15, 1963, 10 p.m.

151. From Harriman. Hailsham and I had discussion with Khrushchev this afternoon lasting over three hours.^{[1](#)}

Conversation opened with general remarks on desirability of relaxation of tensions and protection against risk of nuclear war.

Khrushchev stated that he would not permit any inspection in connection with test ban, and withdrew the two or three inspections which he had previously proposed. He added, however, that he would permit an increased number of black boxes. Since there was obviously no use arguing point, Hailsham and I recorded that both our governments would prefer comprehensive test ban but that we would be prepared to agree to test ban in three environments without inspection, as a first step towards the comprehensive agreement.

Khrushchev tabled two draft treaties, one covering the three environment test ban,^{[2](#)} and one covering NAP.^{[3](#)} In order to divert attention from NAP, I inquired about non-dissemination. Khrushchev indicated his willingness to discuss it along the lines of Soviet previous proposals.

He then suggested a series of other steps:

First, freezing of military budgets at 1963 levels.

Second, return to earlier proposal to protect against surprise attack, i.e., establishment of fixed control posts within certain specified zones, at rail junctions, major roads, airfields and ports.

Third, agreement on level of armed forces now located in the FRG and GDR.

I asked whether he wanted to discuss reducing his military budget or rather taking steps which would have that effect. He indicated a readiness to do so

but maintained that he was going to reduce his military budget anyway, since Soviets now had enough missiles and he wished to increase his investment in chemical industry and agriculture. He paid his compliments to the insatiable demands of his Generals which he claimed he was resisting.

We then came back to the test ban and I gave him a copy of the three environment test ban treaty we tabled in Geneva.⁴ Hailsham and I insisted that France be eliminated from Soviet draft. Although we accepted Khrushchev's contention that it was important to get France to join after the three of us had concluded agreement, he agreed that France could be dropped from Soviet draft as original signatory.

This gave me opportunity to open up problems with China and although considerable time was spent on the subject we got very little info. Khrushchev maintains that it will be some years off before China is a nuclear power and did not indicate particular concern. He commented that only US and USSR can "accumulate nuclear weapons." UK and France can't and China wouldn't be able to.

It was thereupon agreed that we would study the Soviet draft and the Soviets would study our draft over night and that we would meet with Gromyko tomorrow to discuss them. There was no further discussion of NAP. Gromyko, however, tried to get into the communiqué consideration of documents, which we suspected was an attempt to include NAP in our next conference. However, it was made quite clear by Hailsham and myself that we would meet with Gromyko tomorrow in attempt to reach an agreement on text test ban and treaty and nothing else. It seems quite clear to me that Khrushchev is ready to go ahead with three environment test ban without NAP, but I feel sure Gromyko will make another attempt tomorrow to link the two.

Soviet test ban draft unsatisfactory in form but not in intent. We will probably run into heavy weather in attempting to get reasonable treaty language, but it is our impression that Khrushchev wants an agreement and will accept the three environment test ban without commitment on other subjects.

A good half of the time was spent in listening to Khrushchev's plans for economic development, particularly in agriculture and chemical industry, and a certain amount of levity, some in good nature and some with barbs attached, particularly when referring to trade and pipe.

Khrushchev was in good mood. Although anxious to impress us with his desire to make progress in the fields under discussion, he seemed to prefer not to get into details. Other points of particular interest were:

1. He accepted France without question as a nuclear power.
2. Regarding NAP he said lawyers ought to be able to find language to avoid Western recognition of East Germany which was not his aim.
3. He reaffirmed his strong interest in German peace treaty along lines of July second speech.
4. He warmly praised President's June tenth speech which he thought required courage to make.

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 5:45 p.m. Another set of the telegrams documenting the Moscow test ban negotiations is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2284-2286.

¹ Telegram 154 from Moscow, July 16, is a 20-page account of this meeting, which began at 3 p.m. and ended at 6:20 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement. Kaysen's handwritten notes of this conversation are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Records/Actions. Telegram 154 states that before the conversation began, Harriman handed Khrushchev Kennedy's letter transmitted in [Document 324](#).

² A partial text is in telegram 153 from Moscow, July 15. The preamble includes France as a sponsor and signatory. The first article states that "each party to this agreement undertakes to discontinue the carrying out, in any locality, of all kinds of test explosions of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, in territorial waters or on the high seas." The second states that the treaty shall enter into force upon signature, and invites

adherence by all nations. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))

³ Not found.

⁴ See [footnote 2, Document 318](#).

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 15, 1963, 9:01 p.m.

191. For Governor Harriman from the President. Your report¹ is encouraging on limited test ban and you are right to press for that without link to NAP. You are also right to keep French out of initial treaty, though I continue to be prepared to work on French² if Soviets will work on Chinese, and you should make this clear as occasion offers.

I remain convinced that Chinese problem is more serious than Khrushchev comments in first meeting suggest, and believe you should press question in private meeting with him. I agree that large stockpiles are characteristic of US and USSR only, but consider that relatively small forces in hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all. Further believe even limited test ban can and should be means to limit diffusion.

You should try to elicit Khrushchev's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action aimed in this direction.

Rusk

* [Source](#): Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret. Drafted by President Kennedy and cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State.

¹ [Document 325](#).

² In telegram 205 to Moscow, July 16, marked "Eyes Only—Ban" and "For Kaysen from Bundy," stated that Kennedy asked Bundy "to be sure that Harriman understands his intent to discuss test ban agreement with French in terms outlined by Bohlen to Couve. I have assured him that this is well understood, but you may wish to repeat to Averell the President's concern on this point and his desire that negotiations leave path open for such

discussion and possible resulting arrangements.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) Regarding Bohlen’s conversation with Couve de Murville, see [Document 295](#).

327. Editorial Note

In his memorandum of the White House staff meeting held July 16, 1963, Bromley Smith stated that the “latest version” of JCS views on a limited test ban was “probably the most comprehensive” paper on the subject in the government. He noted that it “would be useful” to show the paper to Bundy. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, July 1963, T-203-69) Smith’s reference may be to the undated draft paper JCSM-543-63, a proposed memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, which stated that while a limited test ban treaty had fewer disadvantages than a comprehensive one, “it could continue the USSR lead in high-yield technology,” and allow significant opportunities for Soviet cheating. A limited test ban treaty would also deny the United States the opportunity to conduct important atmospheric effects tests; to eliminate “some uncertainties” in the survival of a hardened, fixed-base second-strike force; and to conduct training exercises with tactical weapons. The paper concluded that a three-element test ban “would be militarily disadvantageous” and that “there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations favoring such a treaty for it to be in the national interest.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, U.S. Military Views) See the Supplement.

The language “overriding non-military considerations” was suggested by the Joint Staff on July 10. Taylor favored instead the phrase “there must be compensating non-military considerations.” Generals Wheeler and LeMay both wanted the original language, which was approved at a JCS meeting held July 16. The JCS did not, however, forward the draft to McNamara. (Walker S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, volume VIII: 1961-1964, Part 1, *The Structure of National Defense* (Washington, 1983), pages 399-400)

328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 16, 1963, 10 p.m.

166. From Harriman.

- 1) At meeting¹ in friendly atmosphere with Gromyko, Zorin, Tsarapkin, main points three element test ban treaty including each point in Article I² and much of US-UK language accepted by Gromyko. Although NAP raised briefly, not pressed at this point, and further discussion NAP postponed until next or later meetings.
- 2) Two significant points of difference arose, on peaceful uses (Art. II) and withdrawal (Art. III).
- 3)

Soviets objected to peaceful uses clause on two arguments: (a) as further exception to comprehensiveness of treaty, in addition to exception of underground tests, would detract from political value, worldwide appeal of treaty, and (b) underground testing already provides for possibility peaceful uses and experiments directed thereto.

Harriman urged need for peaceful uses provision, suggested US would find it easier to give up II(2) if Soviets could take II(1) seriously.³

- 4) Soviets objected to withdrawal clause on grounds casts doubt on seriousness of intentions contracting parties, and unnecessary. Gromyko repeated remarks on France Khrushchev made yesterday.⁴ Harriman and Hailsham argued importance withdrawal clause as protection to parties, and Harriman underlined importance China to US.⁵ Gromyko remained unmoved. Harriman made clear US would not dispense with adequate withdrawal clause.
- 5) Our present thought is to sacrifice peaceful uses clause for trade against withdrawal clause. Since Soviets have accepted US-UK amendment clause (IV)⁶ in principle, possibility of peaceful uses via amendment still

open. In our judgment, satisfactory withdrawal method clearly necessary, peaceful uses not essential.

- 6) Alternative language of achieving effect present withdrawal clause under consideration. Soviets suggest each side make desired reservation instead of withdrawal clause. Soviets will make reservation which would by inference cover France.

7)

Three-party drafting session tomorrow morning covering as much as has been agreed and whatever else seems useful.

Plenary session with Gromyko again tomorrow afternoon. It is likely we cannot then avoid discussion NAP. If it arises we plan to bring up non-dissemination and other matters raised at yesterday's meeting.

- 8) Need your reactions peaceful uses and withdrawal problems, welcome other advice.

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret. No time of receipt is indicated.

¹ Apparently held the afternoon of July 16. A full account of this meeting, at which the principals were accompanied by their advisers, is in telegram 186 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

² Of the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty that Harriman had presented the previous day; see [Document 325](#).

³ Article II reads: "The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only: (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original parties; or (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty." Concerning Article I, see [Document 318](#).

⁴ Telegram 186 states that Gromyko "wished point out that in agreeing, for reasons indicated by Khrushchev, to having no specific reference to France

USSR proceeded from premise that if France should continue testing after agreement signed Sov Govt would have to examine situation resulting therefrom.”

⁵ According to telegram 186, Harriman commented that the United States would “feel differently re withdrawal provision if Sovs could assure us that CPR would adhere in some reasonable time or that it would not become danger to mankind, which might necessitate” a resumption of U.S. testing.

⁶ This article provided that any party to the treaty could propose amendments to the treaty and that the amendments would enter into force upon ratification by two-thirds of the parties.

329. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 17, 1963, midnight.

182. From Harriman. This message contains more detailed summary of day's transactions promised Embtel 180.¹ Further details on test ban negotiations with texts of articles agreed so far follows septel,² as does much more detail [garble—plenary?] session in another septel.³

1. Only business at dinner was Harriman's suggestion to Gromyko he wished see Khrushchev privately as soon as convenient. Was not pressing, since he knew Kadar⁴ was here and Khrushchev busy.
2. Progress on test ban was good. Article I was agreed by working party. After much fencing, and with reference at close of discussion to Harriman argument on importance withdrawal clause to assist President in winning consent of Senate to treaty, Gromyko appeared to accept withdrawal clause in trade for our abandoning peaceful uses clause. Had already tried tactic suggested Deptel 207⁵ para (2) and failed. Deal was not consummated, but tone in which Gromyko said he would consider matter further left little doubt in our minds. Further details except for disputed articles referred drafting committee, including preambulatory language. On this was considerable wrangling in plenary on merits of Soviet draft and language drawn from McCloy/Zorin statement of agreed principles on disarmament.
3. Gromyko then raised non-aggression question, using Harriman proposal language of today's communiqué as springboard. Gromyko pointed out "in passing" that extent to which this and future communiqués could reflect progress will depend on progress made in discussion non-aggression pact.⁶
4. US and UK agreed that useful move to discuss non-aggression arrangements and other matters that Chairman Khrushchev and they had raised Monday. Both made point these matters involve Allies, require their agreement. We could only explore and not commit them.

5. Harriman then commented on Soviet document⁷ as follows: accepted Khrushchev's statement that form could be such as to avoid issue of recognition of GDR, and recognizing that this was matter for consultation with allies, now considered substance. Preamble and paras (1) and (2) of Soviet draft appear constructive and acceptable, except that language reflecting form of arrangement must be changed suitably. Consider it appropriate to add article after para (2) on fixed control points, along lines discussed by Khrushchev Monday.⁸ This could give substance and concreteness to non-aggression arrangements, by providing against surprise attack. Further, another additional article needed to refer to West Berlin. Make clear interference with access would be covered by agreement. Suggested something along lines of following might be useful:

“In order to create conditions favorable to achievement of purpose this declaration, parties agree there will be no interference with access to West Berlin and no change in present situation West Berlin without prior agreement.” (Note: This read, not given to Sovs as text.)

6. Hailsham, without commitment to language, accepted principle involved.
7. Gromyko responded in strong negative fashion, beginning with statement he was greatly disappointed. Clear US/UK remarks did not promote progress in discussion of non-aggression pact, to which USSR attaches great importance. He repeated Khrushchev's remarks on form of treaty, but attacked US/UK attempts to broaden its content. To add items on control posts and Berlin would go beyond boundaries of non-aggression pact, lead to danger of losing concept by moving to different subjects, even though important in themselves. Characterized raising these additional questions as inappropriate; reminded us that our non-dissemination proposals did not refer to great many extraneous subjects. Discussion free access to West Berlin leads to extending discussion to free city of West Berlin, GDR sovereignty, and German peace treaty. Also failed to understand so much discussion of consultation allies. This obvious, could be done, and representatives were competent to speak for own governments. [garble] his first response by remarking signing of test

- ban and simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact would produce great changes in world and be in interest of three powers represented.
8. Response by US and UK repeated essential nature of dealing with West Berlin situation. Soviet draft did not define aggression as covering interference with Berlin access; therefore clause bringing such possibility within agreement necessary. While other items added because Khrushchev had suggested them, this item had different and vital status. Harriman pointed out that while stoppage of access might not be defined as aggression, US and NATO would consider it so and would react violently. Accordingly we must have clause dealing with this problem. However, we desired no one-way arrangement, the interests of all are involved, and we came prepared also to include language on boundary lines and demarcation lines which would be of interest to USSR allies, if USSR so desired. Harriman then suggested adjournment and further consideration.
 9. After discussion of communiqué, already reported, meeting adjourned, to reconvene 3 PM tomorrow July 18, drafting session on test ban 12 noon tomorrow.
 10. *Comment:* Tomorrow, when Gromyko's attitude reveals Khrushchev's reactions, we will know where we stand. As of tonight, it looks as if we are in for some long arguments. Soviets may hold up agreement test ban as pressure on us for non-aggression pact.

Kohler

 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Eyes Only; Ban, Received at 10:29 p.m.

 ¹ Telegram 180, July 17, contained a text of the daily joint tripartite press statement on the test ban talks and gave an extremely brief statement of developments in the negotiations. (Ibid.) ² Telegram 183 from Moscow, July 18, (Ibid.) ³ Telegram 184 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) Telegrams 183 and 184 are in the Supplement.

 ⁴ Janos Kadar, Prime Minister of Hungary.

 ⁵ Telegram 207, July 17, referred to telegram 206 to Moscow, July 16, which had concurred with Harriman's intention to "seek a deal in which

peaceful uses clause might be traded against adequate withdrawal provision with understanding that peaceful uses might be restored via amendment either on ad hoc or general basis.” If Article II were dropped entirely, Harriman was to make it understood that “Article I language on nuclear weapon test explosions included peaceful uses explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects.” Telegram 207 amended this instruction by suggesting Harriman try to get Soviet approval of clause (1) of Article II, in order to get additional Congressional support. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Regarding Article II, see [footnote 3, Document 328](#).

⁶ According to telegram 184, Harriman “expressed desire to get communiqué to President in time for Wednesday press conference,” whereupon Gromyko noted “in passing” that “degree of optimism which could be expressed in this communiqué and future ones depended on progress which could be made on NAP.” For text of Kennedy’s statement on the test ban negotiations made at his press conference held on Wednesday, July 17, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 566.

⁷ See [footnote 2, Document 325](#).

⁸ July 15; see [Document 325](#).

330. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 18, 1963, 3 p.m.

193. From Harriman and Kaysen.

1. Question arises how hard to play continuing discussion of comprehensive treaty. Should we make best efforts to highlight it or have it at low key. Sov disposition appears to be along latter lines.
2. Something to be said on both sides. On one hand, President has repeatedly stated our goal is comprehensive treaty. Prime Minister has echoed this. Further, it is clear comprehensive ban more effective in relation to non-diffusion problem.
3. On other side, emphasis on comprehensive at this moment appears to diminish value of three environment treaty. This undesirable both internationally and at home. Further, at least theoretical problem arises that undue emphasis on continuing effort toward comprehensive might lead to argument in Senate that ratification should be postponed to await comprehensive.
4. Our own instincts go in direction of low key treatment. This issue will become operational problem when we get to discussion communiqué language. Also may arise earlier, especially with you in relation to press.

Await your reaction. [1](#)

Kohler

[*](#) Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 10:55 a.m.

[1](#) In telegram 221 to Moscow, July 18, midnight, the Department agreed that “low key treatment comprehensive treaty desirable at this time” but stated that it was important that “ultimate desirability of comprehensive ban be

supported in negotiations and in public discussion even though in low key.”
(Ibid., DEF 18-4)

331. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 18, 1963, 5 p.m.

195. From Harriman. Have decided unless instructed otherwise to play down further discussions nondissemination and to request Hailsham do the same. My reasons are:

- (1) Sovs including both Khrushchev and Gromyko have shown no interest and in fact brushed subject off on several occasions. I have used it, of course, as one approach to hammer away at China.
- (2) If we do pursue it, Soviets will in all probability interject MLF and our nuclear weapons in Europe, which would compel me to retreat from this subject.
- (3) I am beginning to piece together a logical theory on why Khrushchev is interested in test ban at this time.

Obviously, his first preoccupation is his battle with ChiComs and particularly effect on Soviet leadership of international Communist movement. Khrushchev wants to use the test ban treaty in this connection. Since he is unable to get the ChiComs to agree to join the test ban, he will attempt to isolate them. He will attempt to get the maximum number of nations to adhere to test ban treaty, thus leaving the Chinese isolated if possible as the only nation refusing to cooperate on this highly emotional subject to the underdeveloped nations. This explains his particular emphasis on France's adherence.

This theory was substantiated by talk I had about Red China with Yuri Zhukov¹ at Spaso House. When Zhukov was in Washington last year he told me that test ban agreement was imminent. When I asked him about the participation of Red China, he replied that if the US and USSR agree, world opinion would force Red China to adhere. I referred to this conversation yesterday and asked him whether his opinion had changed, and whether there was some other way of getting China to agree, since I doubted world public opinion would affect Peiping. He then explained in some detail that

“all 130 countries” should be induced to adhere to test ban treaty and then the pressure of the underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa, would be extremely great.

Since ChiComs want to make headway in gaining the support of these countries in competition with Soviet Union, such a situation as Zhukov described would obviously give Moscow a trump card to play against ChiComs.

I will of course do everything I can to explore this theory in further conversations. So far there is some accumulation of evidence to substantiate it. The theory, however, is still too nebulous to accept or to let it affect our negotiating tactics. I have pressed subject of China whenever possible, both in my talk with Khrushchev and Gromyko, so far without anything to show for it, but will continue to raise subject.

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. Received at 12:43 p.m.

¹ Foreign editor of *Pravda*.

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 18, 1963, 9:29 p.m.

237. Following is President's guidance as of 8:00 pm, July 18:

1. *Test Ban Agreement*

(a)

Withdrawal Provisions. We cannot accept withdrawal clause unrelated to occurrence of nuclear tests and therefore find Soviet version contained Embtel 208¹ unacceptable. Language of Soviet version would allow any party to withdraw at any time by merely declaring that, in its unilateral judgment, extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized its supreme interests. This is dangerously similar to what happened when Soviets resumed testing in 1961. Alleged extraordinary circumstances could be a mere pretext. The Senate and the American public would almost certainly reject treaty on ground commitments illusory.²

Believe you should hold firmly to withdrawal clause along lines of that set forth in Embtel 183,³ adopting as a fall-back language in Deptel 218.⁴ The defect in Deptel 218 is that it does not provide either notification period or statute of limitation for renunciation. Therefore, if you have to fall back on Deptel 218 language you should insert those two additional conditions.

(b) *Article I.* We agree to Article I as set forth in Embtel 183⁵ eliminating phrase in brackets. However, text as drafted contains possible ambiguity since repetition of phrase "the carrying out" might indicate that limitation of qualifying clause listing environments applies only to "other nuclear explosion." To remove ambiguity we suggest that article be reworded to read either: "To prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear explosion including weapons tests" or "the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

- (c) *Peaceful Uses*. We agree to drop Article 2 on peaceful uses as requested Embtel 208.
- (d) *Formalizing Agreement*. If three-environment test ban discussions go well, you will be required at some point to indicate view as to how agreement should be formalized. As President made clear in his press conference Wednesday, such agreement must be submitted for Senate ratification. If Soviets raise point you are authorized to state that President's June 10 statement that U.S. would not be first to test again in atmosphere will continue to apply pending ratification, and assume that Soviets would adopt same policy. If satisfactory draft agreed, our current thought is that you and Hailsham should return to capitals to report, without signing. Within a week of your return to Washington you would go back to Moscow with high-ranking U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State and including Senators of both parties for official signing. All our soundings indicate great importance of maximum Senate consultation and involvement. Moreover, President does not wish to come to Moscow at this time, and we believe that Moscow as locus for signing is important to Soviets and is a concession against which this next to summit level can be bargained. However, if Khrushchev and Hailsham both press hard President might be prepared to meet Khrushchev and Macmillan at some neutral point outside of Soviet Union for signature, but you should not agree to any summit meeting without further instructions.
- (e) *Depository Arrangements*. We would prefer to have UN as depository but recognize this raises question of Communist China and others. We would therefore be agreeable to a neutral depository, preferably Switzerland or Austria. Alternatively we would be prepared to have each of three original signatories act as a depository notifying the other two of the receipt of new signatures.
- (f) *Approaching Additional Signatories*. You should explore how Soviets contemplate approaches to other potential signatory parties. Our preference is that this be covered by language in final communiqué urging adherence by all other states, to be followed up through diplomatic channels by original signatories.
- (g) *Adherence of East Germany, North Korea, etc.* To permit adherence of entities that we do not recognize as states would suggest treaty language be modified to permit adherence by "all states or

governmental authorities recognized by any of the original signatories.” Thus in accepting adherence we would not raise question of recognition.⁶

2.

Static Observation Posts. While we understand your tactic of pushing for inclusion of this subject in NAP, we think that long-range objective should be to deal with static observation posts proposal independently. Whether or not NAP fails, we see value in achieving satisfactory static observation post agreement. Suggest you draw out Soviets on nature of zones they have in mind. FYI and for use in your discretion, we would favor inclusion of all of Soviet Union and United States. End FYI.

Would be desirable to end up with agreement that each side consult their Allies, leaving open how matter would be further pursued. We would be prepared, however, to transfer further discussions to Geneva.

3. *Nonaggression Arrangement.*

(a) *Avoiding Tie to NAP.* President remains deeply concerned that any tie to NAP be avoided both to prevent trouble with French and Germans and to avoid criticism from influential supporters of test-ban at home.

(b) *Need for Broad Agreement.* You should, of course, maintain position that we could not contemplate nonaggression arrangement unless it were broadened to include provisions relating to the security and stability of Berlin.

(c) *Communiqué.* Believe language reference communiqué your 191⁷ would unduly alarm Germans and French. We could, however, agree to following text: “The Three principals discussed the Soviet proposals for nonaggression arrangements under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would confirm their intention to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations with one another. It was agreed that the three Governments would inform their respective Allies in the two organizations fully about these talks and consult them with a view to further consideration of this subject.”

4. *Freezing Present Level of Forces in GDR and West Germany.* Obviously this is unsatisfactory if limited merely to the two Germanies. Soviets

could build up forces in other satellites and USSR, while US would have difficulty building up additional US forces outside of Germany. Even if Soviets prepared to broaden this proposal to include stabilization of force levels in all satellites, we do not feel this is a profitable subject to pursue at this time.

5. *Proposal for Freezing Budgets.* Experience shows that our ability to increase our defense budget in the face of threatened Soviet aggression is one of the most effective sanctions we command. Moreover, we do not believe it feasible to develop effective system of restraint through a budget-freezing in view of the special character of the Soviet economic system and the ability of the Soviet State to control costing and conceal expenditures. You should, therefore, make it clear, if Soviets seriously advance a proposal along this line, that we do not believe this is fruitful course to pursue. As a means of heading off serious consideration this question you might emphasize that any arms control through budgets would necessarily entail highly elaborate inspection arrangements.
6. With respect to both budgets and levels of forces, however, you should say—but not in communiqué—that US does not seek any increase in arms race—but rather the reverse—and if there can be growing confidence and genuine relaxation of tensions we would hope that force levels and budgets on both sides would begin to come down both by agreed measures of disarmament and by other actions which each side could take by its own decision. Unless international tensions increase, it is our current expectation that our 1964 military budget will be in the same general range as that submitted for 1963.
7. *Nondissemination.* Agree your recommendation in Embtel 195⁸ that you play down further discussions and request Hailsham to do the same.
8. *Trade.* If Soviets again inject issue of increased trade, you might reply that the US also is sympathetic to the idea of improving commercial relations and developing trade between our two countries. As the Soviets know, this involves complex technical questions on US side but we are making a fresh review of the possibilities in this field and it may be possible to work out some solutions of these technical problems. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets seem primarily interested in the purchase of prototypes of our sophisticated machinery and thus in obtaining our technology at low expense to themselves. We could take much more forthcoming attitude toward expansion of trade between our

countries if we could work out ground rules between us that would include provision for the protection of industrial property (patents, copyrights, etc.) and protection against dumping. This seems necessary in order to facilitate trade between capitalists and state trading systems. We would be interested in their reaction to the possibility of working out such ground rules.

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only—Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared in draft and substance with the President, Thompson, Ball, Bundy, and Read; and approved by Rusk. All those officials participated in a meeting on the test ban negotiations held at the White House from 6:30 to 7 p.m. that day. At the outset, “the comment was made that the Moscow delegation had ‘pact fever’ and needed to be slowed down.” In the course of the meeting, agreement was reached on several of the instructions contained in telegram 237. (Memorandum by Bromley Smith; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations, Harriman Trip) See the Supplement.

¹ In telegram 208, July 18 (received at 3:20 p.m.), Harriman reported that at the plenary meeting that day, Gromyko “made a strong pitch” on the importance of the NAP and also tabled a version of the withdrawal article to be adopted if the others dropped the peaceful uses article. The Soviet text reads: “This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance.” Harriman recommended acceptance of this text and removal of the peaceful uses article. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) A longer account of this meeting is in telegram 211 from Moscow, July 18. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

² This point was made by Ball at the 6:30 p.m. meeting at the White House. “He added that when the Soviets resumed testing in 1961, their justification

for their action was approximately the same as proposed in the withdrawal clause.”

³ See [footnote 2, Document 329](#). This U.S.-U.K. proposal reads: “It is the anticipation of the parties that this treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely and shall be adhered to by all states, particularly those states that could be in a position to carry out an explosion prohibited by this treaty. If a party determines either that another party has failed to observe the terms of this treaty or that any other state has taken action which the parties have bound themselves herein not to take, the party will be free to reconsider its position. It is hereby understood and agreed, however, that the party may not withdraw from the treaty without first both consulting the other parties to the treaty and giving notice of at least 60 days. Such notice is effective only if given no sooner than 60 days and no later than 120 days after the determined date of the failure or action upon which the withdrawal is based.”

⁴ In telegram 218 to Moscow, July 17 (drafted by Rusk and cleared with McGeorge Bundy and Foster), Rusk emphasized Senate insistence on a withdrawal provision and suggested this text: “This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty (and its Annexes) are not being fulfilled and observed or if any party to this treaty determines that nuclear explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party’s national security.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁵ Paragraph 1 of the text of Article I in telegram 183 reads: “Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes (except as provided in Article II) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion and the carrying out of any other nuclear explosion at any other place under its jurisdiction or control: A. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, in outer space, or in the territorial high seas; or B. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.” Article II was the withdrawal article.

⁶ This instruction was superseded by telegram 263 to Moscow, July 21 (drafted by Foster, cleared by the President and Bundy, and approved by

Read). The language “states or governmental authorities” was not necessary because of “legal advice that this [existing language] does not constitute recognition of any unrecognized country signing subsequently because of multiple depositories.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁷ Dated July 18. (Ibid., DEF 4 Warsaw Pact)

⁸ [Document 331](#).

333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 19, 1963, 8 p.m.

222. From Harriman.

1. Today's meeting (July 19) lasting little over two hours centered on discussion of the withdrawal clause. Harriman proposed new language in accordance with instructions Deptel 237,¹ as follows:

“This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decided that any nuclear explosion has occurred in the prohibited environments which has jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance, such notice to be given within nine months of the date of the explosion referred to.”

2. Gromyko rejected the article rather brusquely. His arguments pointed to elements unacceptable to Sovs: objected to mention of violation of treaty and to limitation on inherent right of sovereign to withdraw treaty in its own supreme interests. Latter, of course, principle of Sov draft withdrawal clause.

3.

Harriman reacted sharply, reiterated importance of elements our draft to US. Said Gromyko's immediate rejection failed to show serious consideration of important US position and intimated that issue was a breaking point. By end of meeting, temperature had dropped but issue remained as sharp as ever. It was agreed to discuss matter further at eleven a.m. tomorrow.

Flavor of proceedings given by Gromyko's response to Hailsham's question at end of meeting, summing up his position. It is undesirable to have

direct reference to violation or to nuclear explosions. It is better to use broader language, which would cover explosions. Of course, all of us would understand that this is what is referred to, although it goes without saying any state could exercise sovereign right to withdraw. We have no intention of carrying out nuclear explosion and we believe you have no such intention. (While this language not direct quotation, approximately repeats Gromyko's words.)

4. It is not clear to us why Sovs are so firm on this point. Character of discussion showed this not simply the means of tying further progress on test ban treaty to discussion non-aggression pact. Although some have suggested that derogation of Sov theory on state sovereignty in relation to treaty limitations on right to withdraw is explanation, Harriman and others believe it is related to China which is today Soviet overriding preoccupation. Acceptance of our draft would constitute open admission US pressure on Sovs to do something about Chinese nuclear threat. Sovs unwilling make such admission.
5. At close of meeting, Gromyko repeated Sov desire to have simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact and called it main difficulty in these negotiations. This was his second mention of this subject; the other was in the course of his first remarks.
6. Hailsham supported us in meeting although his instructions allowed him to accept Sov draft. We were not surprised that he argued strongly to accept, pointing out how unhappy PM and British public would be if negotiations broke down.
7. Unless otherwise instructed, plan to sit tight. Welcome advice soonest. If we can think of any redraft that seems to offer hope, will send it for instructions.
8. Full report of meeting including some discussion preamble follows soonest.^{[2](#)}

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Flash; Ban. Received at 4 p.m.

¹ [Document 332](#).

² A full report of the plenary session is in telegram 223 from Moscow, July 19. It does not include discussion of the preamble. Telegram 224 from Moscow, also July 19, contains a U.S. draft of the preamble, submitted at the drafting committee meeting that morning, and U.S. language submitted at the plenary session to meet the instructions in telegram 237 to Moscow regarding Article I. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Both are in the Supplement.

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:13 p.m.

248. Your cable reporting July 19 discussion and providing text new US Del withdrawal clause¹ relayed to Hyannisport. This message provides Department guidance. If further guidance indicated will forward Saturday.

1.

Withdrawal Clause

Agree you should sit tight because Soviet version withdrawal clause would produce totally illusory arrangement subject to cancellation on 90 day notice for any reason whatever. Senate would undoubtedly reject. Draft language you suggest is satisfactory.

Suggest temperature might be lowered by informal and discursive discussion of reasons for clause you have proposed and Western concept difference between power to abrogate treaty and right to withdraw under terms of treaty. Confident Fisher-McNaughton can provide orchestration. Theme is that state always has power to withdraw from treaty if supreme national interest jeopardized. However, if treaties are to have dignity which we and Sovs seek to give them, there can be no right to withdraw unless some other party violates, unless events occur which constitute exception recognized by international law, or unless treaty itself provides for withdrawal. Does not reduce dignity of treaty to provide for withdrawal. On contrary, if withdrawal occurred under circumstances on which both sides now agree, but no provision existed in treaty giving withdrawal right, dignity of treaties in general reduced. Neither power to abrogate nor state sovereignty diminished by treaty provision giving right of withdrawal.

2.

Press

Press reports here from Moscow are insistent that US delegation is proposing simultaneous unilateral declarations regarding nonaggression as means of going forward with NAP discussion. Since any suggestion that we are seriously negotiating NAP can create problems with our allies, Mission should make clear to Hightower of AP or others that these stories do not reflect actual situation.^{[2](#)}

Rusk

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Foster, cleared by Rusk and Ball, and approved by Read.

^{[1](#)} [Document 333](#).

^{[2](#)} In telegram 229 from Moscow, July 20, the delegation replied that it had constantly drawn a line between negotiation of the test ban and exploratory discussion of other topics, that the distinction was understood by the American press. The telegram reported that John Hightower of AP and Seymour Topping of *The New York Times* had stated that their cable desks had “dropped or rewritten part of their file, thus distorting or coming forth with incomplete views on points they discussed.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))

335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 20, 1963, 4 p.m.

233. From Harriman.

1. Today's plenary meeting (lasting little more than one and a half hours) focused entirely on test ban matters. Non-aggression pact was not mentioned in meeting although communiqué bears usual reference to "other matters of mutual concern."
- 2.

Major point of discussion was withdrawal article. Gromyko, commenting on Harriman's description of Sov formulation as broader than the US could accept, said this matter had been given particular consideration, as a result of which he had some new language which he thought would meet US needs. Revised Sov draft he then handed us is as follows: (informal translation from Russian draft.)

"This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

"Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, related to the contents of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all others parties to the treaty three months in advance."

In our judgment, this is as far as Sovs will go in specifying tests by others as the basis for withdrawal. With added clause, treaty less subject to criticism that agreement is illusory. On this point, our best judgment is that pressures on Soviets to stick with treaty will not in fact be substantially affected by exact phrasing of the clause, although we appreciate that congressional and public reaction will be sensitive to every word of the article.

Re possibility that new clause may go too far, discussions show that both Khrushchev and Gromyko are perfectly clear in their minds that this clause covers the cases of particular concern: France to them, and China to us.

Our judgment reported Embtel 195¹ as to reasons for Sov position is strengthened by report to us from Washington of editorial from ChiCom *People's Daily* 19 July:

“ChiCom *People's Daily* 19 July editorial 'Expose US Nuclear Fraud' states more explicitly than past propaganda reasons for ChiCom opposition to test ban. While indicating ChiComs would not be deterred from nuclear-weapons development by test-ban agreement, editorial clearly shows concern that such agreement would receive wide approval from peoples and 'peace partisans' throughout world. Says given people's struggle against nuclear weapons, 'it is only natural' they will pin hopes on tripartite Moscow talks. Editorial also says while US goes on manufacturing nuclear weapons, it can use test agreement to 'create pressure of public opinion to prevent socialist countries other than USSR from conducting tests.’”

CAS Washington comments as follows “Editorial's expression of hope that Soviets will not fall into trap of partial test ban accord is preceded by blatant jab that USSR alone is keeping nuclear weapons from its allies.”

3. Fisher and McNaughton agree the Soviet language covers the major part of our problem adequately if not perfectly. The word “contents” is the translation given to us [for?] the Russian “soderzhaniye.” We could translate this word also as “subject matter” although this not normal translation from Russian. (Smirnitsky's Russian-English dictionary gives “subject matter” among possible alternate translations.) Fisher-McNaughton judgment “subject matter” preferable term for congressional and public use, but not much in it. Perhaps could get this as agreed English text since there is no separate Russian word which translates “subject matter” directly.
4. Soviet draft gives no peg on which to hang statute of limitations element in our draft since it difficult to date on “extraordinary circumstance” in

the same way that nuclear explosion or other specific event can be dated. In our judgment it would not be possible to insist on statute of limitations element in any event since it was not in our August 27, 1962, draft, which tabled at outset of these talks. In any event, long-past event can hardly be reasonably argued to create circumstances which “have jeopardized the supreme interests” of the complaining party. Accordingly, recommend we drop this as necessary element of withdrawal clause.

5. Harriman requests authority to accept Soviet draft on withdrawal with whatever translation of “soderzhaniye” we can get. Delegation concurs.²
6. Drafting problems other articles reported separately.³ Full record of meeting follows soonest.⁴ Next meeting 3 P.M. 22 July: Drafting committee 11 A.M.

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Eyes Only; Ban. Received at 11:19 a.m.

¹ [Document 331](#).

² In a July 21 message to Kennedy, Macmillan stated that the new Soviet language met “the real point,” which was that “withdrawal should be related to the contents of the treaty. So I hope that you will have been able to authorize Harriman to accept it.” (Unnumbered telegraphic message received through White House channels; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy, 1963-1964, vol. V)

³ See [Document 336](#).

⁴ In telegram 239 from Moscow, July 20. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement.

336. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 20, 1963, 7 p.m.

238. From Harriman and Fisher. At the plenary today agreement was reached on the proposal to settle the preamble along the lines proposed by the US in the drafting committee.¹ The text reads as follows:

Verbatim text begins. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the “original parties,”

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows: *end verbatim text.*

At the plenary Harriman called attention to fact that Article I of treaty draft circulated by Soviets at prior meeting contained differences in language from that previously agreed by drafting committee and adopted by plenary. He stated that US wish to stand upon revised language submitted July 19 involving changes reported Embtel 224.¹ English translation of Article I contained in Soviet draft reads as follows:

Begin verbatim text. 1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other

nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (A) in the atmosphere, and beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or (B) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted on the understanding that upon the achievement of an agreement to ban all nuclear tests, all such tests shall be prohibited also in the environments referred to in this subparagraph.

2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of this article. *End verbatim text.*

Discussion of this new text focused primarily on last three lines Soviets added to paragraph 1(B), Gromyko arguing that this was necessary because this treaty had, in effect, created a new environment, the underground test which resulted in radioactive debris outside the territory, and Soviets wanted to be sure that a treaty banning underground tests did not result in tests in this new environment not being banned. Despite some general indications of non-objection by Hailsham, Harriman indicated that the preamble referred to our desire to negotiate comprehensive ban, that subsequent treaty would stand on its own two feet, and that it was unwise to refer, in a treaty, to another treaty that had not been negotiated. He also pointed out prior US language had a long history of study. Gromyko argued no intention to prejudge separate treaty. After meeting Sov Del sent to US Del new language of (B) which they said would clarify questions raised.

Begin verbatim text. B. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted, bearing in mind that the matter of prohibiting nuclear tests in the environments referred to in this subparagraph shall be settled by an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests. *End verbatim text.*

This Soviet suggested Article I, coming at this stage, raises a variety of problems which will be discussed at a meeting of the drafting committee

Monday morning. Specifically, we hope at that time to find out what the Sovs driving at in their proposed para 1(B).

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 2:30 p.m.

¹ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 333](#).

337. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, July 22, 1963.

SUBJECT

Special Meeting at State Dept.—21 July—re Test Ban Agreement

ATTENDING

Secty. Rusk, Secty. Ball, Mr. Bundy, Secty. McNamara
Secty. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

A special meeting was held at State Department on Sunday, 21 July, at 10:00 o'clock to consider the Congressional problems in connection with the test ban agreement being worked out by Gov. Harriman in Moscow.

1. There was general agreement the test ban negotiations were reasonably satisfactory.¹ I took the position that withdrawal clause related to the content of the treaty with 60 to 90 day's notice was all right. I favored a shorter rather than a longer notification. Also I urged that any reference to underground tests be stricken from the text of the treaty inasmuch as the treaty was limited to 3 environments. This was agreed. I also advised that I felt there would be some problems in connection with the outlawing of peaceful uses and this would almost certainly cause the Atomic Energy Commission to oppose the treaty. I urged that some organ be included in the treaty to permit reopening of this subject at a later date.
2. McNamara suggested that we now develop a White Paper on the pros and cons of the test ban, i.e. whether such a ban would be in the interest of the United States or not. This subject was debated at some length. I took the position that such an appraisal should not be made, we had passed the point of decision in this regard, that we must recognize that the Chiefs and, to a lesser extent the laboratory directors and such men as Edward Teller, would protest the treaty, that I did not think the protest would be particularly well received by either the public or the Congress; stated I thought to try to reappraise the situation now would leak to the Press and would cause a rash of criticism that the Administration was trying to find out if a certain move was in our best interest long after we had publicly endorsed the idea. I therefore urged that a paper be developed giving the

rationale and the arguments supporting the treaty and let opposition and criticism fall where it may. This approach was generally accepted and McNamara withdrew his proposal.

3. I was asked to determine the attitudes of Senator Pastore and Senator Anderson. Following the meeting I talked to Anderson. He endorsed the proposed treaty and stated that he had discussed it with Senator Jackson, Senator Symington and Senator Russell and they, too, would support the treaty. This I reported to Bundy.
4. At dinner Sunday night Jackson refused to indicate his support of the treaty although he did not say he would not support it. He engaged in a very serious condemnation of McNamara and Gilpatric over the TFX, and his distress over this issue might cause him to oppose a test ban treaty. He indicated that "he, Symington and Russell would have to get together and make up their minds what to do." This I reported to Bundy.
- 5.

On Monday morning, 22 July, I phoned Senator Pastore who indicated support of the test ban. His position is outlined in the attached memo.² This was reported to Bundy.

[Here follows discussion of Venezuela.]

7. I then told Rusk³ that I felt we must explore an area of agreement with deGaulle and that we simply could not permit deGaulle relationships to further deteriorate. I said that normal diplomatic channels are unproductive and suggested we use the Atomic Energy channel, going through Palewski⁴ directly to deGaulle. I urged that this be done prior to deGaulle's July 29th Press Conference as I felt it highly probable that he would take a position which would be irrevocable without great embarrassment and the consequences would be that the test ban negotiations would go out the window. Rusk was unresponsive although I proposed that Dwight Ink, Assistant General Manager of the AEC who is now in Europe talking to the French on weapons safety, might open up the subject in sufficient detail to give DeGaulle an indicator which would be useful in stopping him from taking an irrevocable position on July 29th.⁵ Mr. Bundy was in on part of this discussion.

8. During the earlier meeting the deGaulle problem was discussed off and on. It was obvious that George Ball has a pretty stiff neck on this whole deGaulle-French problem and is not inclined to offer any concessions. Throughout the meeting I urged the approach discussed privately with Rusk. No one seemed inclined to feel that it was possible to do anything with deGaulle at the present time. The meetings were inconclusive.

* Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 6/5-7/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

¹ In a memorandum of a telephone conversation with Lewis Strauss on July 22, McCone stated that Strauss had indicated his unhappiness with the prospect of a limited test ban treaty. McCone had “responded that I could not now oppose the atmospheric ban in view of my consistent position favoring such a ban since March 1959 when the idea was first proposed by President Eisenhower.” McCone also stated his belief that missile system testing could be valid without explosion of the nuclear components. (Ibid., DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65) ² Not printed. In the conversation, McCone indicated his approval of the projected limited test ban treaty. Pastore then indicated his tentative support, based partly on his hope that the existence of the treaty might instill in the Chinese a “moral inhibition” against testing and acquisition of nuclear weapons. (Ibid., DCI Memos for Record 6/5-7/20/63) ³ The omitted section indicates that this conversation took place following the meeting.

⁴ Gaston Palewski, French Atomic Energy Minister.

⁵ The date of de Gaulle’s projected press conference, at which he did in fact announce French rejection of the treaty. Additional information regarding the initiative proposed by McCone has not been found.

338. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Source

Moscow, July 22, 1963, 8 p.m.

268. From Harriman. Ref Deptel 263.¹ In ref to omission Article Two on peaceful uses, I have already spoken rather fully on this subject to Khrushchev, while watching Soviet/American track meet. He told me of the various long range plans Sovs had in mind, building canals and diverting Pechora River, to flow south to Kazakhstan, instead of to the north. This gave me opportunity to express surprise that he had thrown out our article on peaceful uses, since we had understood Soviet Union had big plans for use of nuclear explosions to divert rivers. He denied any immediate plans, but admitted that nuclear explosions for such purposes might be useful in the future. He opposed inclusion today since this reservation would be disappointing to world opinion and arouse suspicions. He readily offered the view that we should have no difficulty in agreeing on such matter when the subject has been more carefully explored, and there were special projects where such explosions would be useful. I mentioned the possibility of another canal paralleling Panama Canal, as a possibility. I pointed to the article on amendments as a means of reaching agreement. He said that when tensions were relieved by a test ban, and reduced by other understandings, would be a better time to raise question of peaceful uses. It would then meet popular approval.

Since dictating the above, I brought subject up with Gromyko in this afternoon's session² and made clear record on our position. He accepted my statement and thereupon approved majority including original three signatories, rather than two thirds for amendment procedure.

Kohler

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
² Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. A longer account of this conversation

is in telegram 280 from Moscow, July 23. (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman) ¹
Telegram 263, July 21, reads in part: “We accept omission Article II on peaceful uses. You should make clear, however, that as later operational phase of peaceful uses may develop, we reserve right to reopen question for discussion under the amendment clause or by separate treaty. Point out possibility both sides may wish to conduct such operations under appropriate safeguards for important peaceful purposes. Make clear also we have no present plans for this, but we expect to continue permitted research in this field.” (Ibid., DEF 18-3) See also [footnotes 3](#) and [6, Document 339](#).

² See [Document 339](#).

339. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Source

Moscow, July 22, 1963, 9 p.m.

269. From Harriman.

1. Today's plenary lasted three hours, during which agreement on all substantive points on test ban treaty reached in accordance with your instructions, with exception item discussed para three below. Nonaggression pact was also discussed for last quarter of session.
2. The English text of withdrawal clause (sent Embtel 233)¹ but with words "events" and "subject matter" in accordance with Deptel 263,² was accepted as agreed translation of Russian text. Harriman explained that "subject matter" read better in English than "contents" and "events" conveyed sense we wished more precisely than "circumstances." After some discussion with translators and colleagues, Gromyko accepted. Our rationale this procedure being sent septel.³
- 3.

Gromyko refused suggestion new final qualifying clause Soviet draft Article I-1-B⁴ be dropped and substance put in preamble. Insisted Soviet draft required to make clear that first of two new categories of tests introduced by US language, namely, venting underground explosions which did not, and those which did, distribute debris outside national boundaries, would be prohibited in future comprehensive treaty, however drafted or related to present treaty. After some discussion in which UK took neutral position, there was ten minute recess. US, UK then submitted following language as substitute Soviet language final phrases Article I-1-B, with understanding it was ad referendum. The language was referred to drafting committee, with understanding it was for possible improvement in word order.

(This language follows immediately after end of original US text.)

“It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.”

4. US accepted deletion of Article II in US draft, but Harriman stated strong US interest possibility re-opening matter under appropriate circumstances by amendment procedure.⁵ He referred in this connection to his conversation with Khrushchev yesterday, reported septel.⁶ Gromyko agreed that withdrawal of Article II was without prejudice to future discussion. In later discussion, Gromyko accepted US proposal change voting procedure governing amendments to majority.

5.

Gromyko, at close of test ban discussion, referred to France, citing Khrushchev's remarks at opening meeting with him on importance Soviets attach to French observance of treaty. If France tested, would create new situation, which required Soviets to reconsider its position. On other hand, if US/UK succeeded in persuading France sign treaty, would be important positive achievement, enhancing significance of treaty.

In brief private conversation after meeting among Hailsham, Harriman and Gromyko, Harriman replied that he expected to have instructions from the President in time to discuss this subject with Khrushchev.

6. Other drafting problems practically all solved. Drafting committee meets 10:00 AM 23 July to prepare final draft text. Will send as soon as available.

7. Gromyko turned to nonaggression pact and repeated his and Khrushchev's earlier remarks on its importance to Soviet Union and general detente that would follow from simultaneous signatures. Harriman and Hailsham repeated inability to negotiate before consultation with allies. Pointed to original basis for test ban negotiation to which Khrushchev had agreed. Nonaggression pact was new subject introduced by Khrushchev July 2 speech. US/UK attempt to discuss now would probably preclude allied acceptance. On being handed US draft

communiqué language (Deptel 237)⁷ by Hailsham,⁸ Gromyko reacted coldly describing it as negative in tone. Gromyko said he would consult his government and advise position tomorrow.

8. Request authority to accept changed wording Article I-1-B, para 3 above. Also request authority to use proposed UK communiqué language sent Embtel 248,⁹ if necessary to achieve agreement early signing treaty.
9. Plenary meeting 3:00 July 23. Full report follows soonest.¹⁰

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Flash. Received at 4:22 p.m.

¹ [Document 335](#).

² Telegram 263 to Moscow, July 21 (cleared by Bundy and President Kennedy), instructed Harriman to seek the change from “circumstances” to “events” as a substantive alteration, apparently requiring alteration of the Russian text as well, and change from “contents” to “subject matter” as an interpretive one in the English version. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))

³ In telegram 270 from Moscow, July 22, the delegation explained the linguistic problems that prevented it from proposing any changes in the Russian text to parallel the change in the English text from “circumstances” to “events.” (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)

⁴ Contained in [Document 336](#).

⁵ As instructed by telegram 263 to Moscow.

⁶ [Document 338](#).

⁷ [Document 332](#).

⁸ The extended report of this meeting states that at this point Hailsham handed Gromyko the text of the U.K. draft communique and that Gromyko reacted to it as described here. Although the extended report describes Harriman outlining the U.S. position to Gromyko, it does not record him handing Gromyko a document on the subject. (Telegram 271 from Moscow, July 22; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement. Much of the U.K. draft is in [footnote 10](#) below.

⁹ Dated July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) The language reads: “The three principals solemnly reaffirm the intention of their respective governments to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations between one another. They discussed the Soviet proposal for nonaggression arrangements” under which NATO and the Warsaw Pact “would give similar confirmation of their intentions. The three governments agreed to inform” their allies “fully about these talks and consult with them on the desirability and manner of continuing discussions on this subject.”

¹⁰ Telegram 248; see [footnote 10](#) above. Harriman, Hailsham, and Gromyko met privately following the plenary meeting. Most of the discussion concerned the proposed non-aggression pact. (Telegram 274 from Moscow, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.

340. Memorandum of Conference With President

Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 22, 1963, 6–6:45 p.m.

Harriman Mission

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Smith

The President asked about the details of formalizing the draft test ban treaty. Following a discussion of these formalities, it was decided that Ambassador Harriman would initial the agreement in Moscow, return to Washington, and then go again to Moscow as part of a delegation to be headed by Secretary Rusk and including several Senators. Secretary Rusk would expect to sign the agreement a week after the initialing ceremony. The purpose of the Senate delegation is to interest them as well as to provide additional opportunities to direct public attention to the benefits of a test ban treaty. The week's delay also provides time for consultation with allies. The plan to send a delegation to Moscow is to be put to Prime Minister Macmillan in the hope that he would agree and name a comparable level British delegation. Ambassador Harriman is to be instructed to suggest the procedure to Gromyko.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Ball said that to "initial" an agreement means no more than that the negotiators accept as accurate the text of the agreement.

There followed a discussion as to whether it would be better to initial the agreement before de Gaulle has his press conference next Monday. The President decided that de Gaulle's actions would probably not be influenced by the initialing of the test ban treaty.

Consideration was then given to the draft letter to de Gaulle.¹ The President suggested several revisions. He asked that the sentence dealing with the non-aggression pact² make clear to de Gaulle that we have told the Russians that any non-aggression proposals would require not only consultation but also agreement among the Western allies before any action at all could be taken. In order to avoid appearing to be condescending, the President suggested that the words “protect the interests of our allies”³ be changed to read “to make clear” so that the sentence would read: “We would take pains in any communiqué on the present discussions to make clear the interest which our allies, especially France and the Federal Republic, have in this matter.” (The sentence was later revised to delete reference to France and the Federal Republic.)

There was a discussion of the following sentence: “As we have already indicated through Ambassador Bohlen, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternatives which might make French testing in these three environments unnecessary.”⁴ Ambassador Thompson suggested deleting the reference to Ambassador Bohlen on the grounds that the British Prime Minister, in an earlier letter to the President,⁵ had said he did not know what we had told Ambassador Bohlen to tell the French. Mr. Ball commented that we were not certain whether the conversation between Bohlen and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville⁶ had actually been reported to de Gaulle. Therefore, we did not know whether the offer Bohlen made to Couve was actually known to de Gaulle. The President agreed to delete the reference to Bohlen.

In this connection, the President [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. Several other anti-U.S. statements by the French to other officials were noted, leading the President to comment on the major campaign which de Gaulle is carrying on against us.

The President suggested changing the word “believe” to “hope” in the sentence which reads: “While there are both political and technical problems here, we hope they are capable of solution.”⁷

There was no discussion of the following sentence which was bracketed in the President's reading copy: "We must not take any course that would dismay our allies since it is the strength and unity of the alliance as a whole that matters most."⁸ (This sentence was later deleted by the President who feels that mention of our allies in the initial communication will only be a red rag to the General. We obviously will have to talk about their views at some stage, but he thinks it is a matter which need not be mentioned explicitly now.)

The discussion turned to the situation which would exist if the French refused to sign the treaty and announced that they would continue testing. The President suggested that instructions to Harriman⁸ prepare the Russians for what de Gaulle might say at his press conference next Monday. Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President agreed, that Harriman make the point to the Russians that we were looking at what the French would do rather than paying too much attention to what they said. Secretary Rusk suggested that the Russians be told that while we did not react sharply to the Chinese statement that they would not sign the treaty, we would reconsider our situation if the Chinese actually tested a nuclear weapon.

A suggestion was made that Harriman ask the Russians whether they had a preference as between French testing and our giving limited nuclear assistance to France. Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson all opposed this suggestion as being too dangerous to raise with the USSR.

No one was prepared to say exactly what Gromyko meant when he commented that French refusal to sign the treaty would create a new situation which the Russians would have to examine.⁹ Ambassador Thompson doubted that the Russians would withdraw from the treaty if de Gaulle said flatly he was not going to sign the ban agreement.

The President was concerned about what we would do if, having announced that Secretary Rusk and the Senators would go to Moscow to sign the agreement, de Gaulle, on Monday, flatly refused to associate himself with the treaty and the Russians thereupon said they would reconsider their agreement to the test ban. Later, it was agreed to allow a week to elapse between Harriman's initialling the agreement in Moscow and the signature.

This provides an interval after de Gaulle's press conference during which we would re-examine the situation, if necessary. With the publication of the text of the agreement, we would be in a position to know French reaction.

The President commended Mr. Ball for his memorandum¹⁰ explaining his opposition to offering nuclear weapons assistance to France in return for French cooperation on the test ban treaty. In response to the President's question, Mr. Ball said French insistence on developing its own nuclear capability was not based on its desire to join the nuclear club, but arose out of de Gaulle's aim to make France nothing less than top dog in Europe.

Two letters to the Prime Minister were approved.¹¹ The first transmitted a copy of the letter to de Gaulle. It also covered the point raised by the President, namely, our instruction to Harriman to forewarn the Russians about the possible French attitude toward the test ban agreement, calling special attention to the difference between what the French say they are going to do and any actual French testing, which is some time off in the future.¹²

The second letter to the Prime Minister urged him to accept our proposed language for the communiqué dealing with the Russian proposal for a non-aggression pact. In our view, the language proposed by Hailsham would, in effect, be a non-aggression declaration by the U.S., U.K. and USSR.¹³

In response to Mr. Foster's question, the President said he had talked to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. He said General LeMay was solidly opposed to the test ban treaty while the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shoup, saw in the test ban treaty a major turning point. General Taylor's view takes into account considerations other than purely military ones.

There followed a discussion as to the prospects of obtaining Senate approval for the treaty. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster reported increasing Senate opinion favoring the treaty. Lewis Strauss is now in favor of an environmental test ban. Mr. McCone was praised by both Mr. Ball and Mr. Foster for the support which he is developing in favor of the treaty.

There was discussion of the Senators who would be asked to go to Moscow to sign the agreement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Foster said there was a problem arising out of the scheduled reconvening of the Geneva arms conference this summer. He said that the Moscow negotiations would not be completed in time to convene this conference as scheduled. The Russians had indicated that they would prefer not to reopen the Geneva talks but to discuss disarmament in the fall in connection with the General Assembly meeting. Mr. Foster favored a short session in Geneva during which we could discuss the details of several of the disarmament suggestions made by Khrushchev to Harriman in Moscow.

The President's view was that we should ask Harriman to ask the Russians whether they favored holding the session. If the Russians insisted on postponing the session, the President saw little profit in our trying to force them into a meeting because we would be unable to draw them out if they did not choose to be drawn.

Bromley Smith¹⁴

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

¹ What is apparently an earlier draft than the one discussed here is in telegram 247 to Moscow, July 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) This earlier draft was written after consultation between Kennedy and Macmillan in a series of personal messages that began with the President's July 16 letter to the Prime Minister. This correspondence is *ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan, 1963, and *ibid.*, Macmillan-Kennedy, 1963; other copies are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, JFK-MacM, Test Ban Correspondence 7/63. The draft sent to Harriman also went to Macmillan for comment.

² On this subject the draft cited in [footnote 2](#) above reads: “We of course have made it plain [to the Soviets] that any proposals of this sort would require consultation among the Western allies before any action at all could be taken, and we do not accept the notion of a necessary link between a test ban and this quite separate topic. Only if the Russians drop the notion of a necessary link can the test ban agreement become real. It goes without saying that we recognize your special interest in this aspect of the matter.”

³ Not in the text cited in [footnote 2](#) above.

⁴ The pertinent passage in the draft cited in [footnote 2](#) states that de Gaulle would, in adhering to the treaty, cut himself off from “one means” of acquiring nuclear weapons technology. “As we have also indicated through Ambassador Bohlen, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternative means by which the necessary technical information would be made available for your program. We believe that if our experts can discuss these matters carefully together, means can be found which would meet your requirements and allow France to join in the effort to prevent further contamination of the atmosphere.” In a July 21 letter to Kennedy, Macmillan recommended omission of the last sentence because of the “danger of going too far in the first communication.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 1963)

⁵ Reference is to Macmillan’s July 21 letter.

⁶ See [Document 295](#).

⁷ Not in the text cited in [footnote 1](#) above.

⁸ Not in the text cited in [footnote 1](#) above.

⁸ See [Document 341](#).

⁹ See [Document 339](#).

¹⁰ Dated July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-8) See the Supplement.

¹¹ Both dated July 22; transmitted on July 23 through White House channels as CAP 63400. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 1963)

¹² McCone had briefed Kennedy on the French testing program on July 19. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, with briefing memorandum

attached, both dated July 19; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President)

¹³ Kennedy stated that the Hailsham language “seems to me to go too far. His formulation would, in effect, constitute a non-aggression declaration by the three principals. It would accordingly be resented by the Germans and the French since it would prejudice their position in any future negotiations.” In this letter, Kennedy also outlined the procedures for conclusion of the test ban agreement set forth in the first paragraph of this memorandum. Regarding the Hailsham language, see [footnote 8, Document 339](#).

¹⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 22, 1963, 10:27 p.m.

277. Re Embtel 269 July 22 9:00 p.m.¹ Your draft for article I-1-B contained in paragraph 3 Reftel approved.

We cannot accept U.K. communiqué language (Embtel 248)² since that in effect constitutes non-aggression declaration by the three principals and would create resentment on part of Germans and French since it would prejudice their position in any further negotiations and would point the finger at them for failure to enter into a non-aggression pact. You should therefore hold firmly to the sense of our proposed communiqué language on NAP contained in Deptel 237.³ President is sending letter to Prime Minister explaining our position on this question.⁴ This letter is being repeated to you.⁵

Believe essential that you try as soon as possible to reach agreement with Gromyko regarding arrangements for signing along lines Deptel 237 as modified in the letter of explanation the President is sending the Prime Minister and which is being repeated to you. You will note that this contemplates your initialing treaty before leaving Moscow.

The President is tonight forwarding letter to de Gaulle for transmission by Bohlen when we give him word that treaty will definitely be initialed. Final version of letter, seen by you in draft, being repeated to you in separate telegram.⁶ As you will note final version is largely informative and offer of assistance to de Gaulle is carefully and rather vaguely phrased.

FYI. Indications are that the French are mounting a covert propaganda campaign against the test ban and that de Gaulle in his press conference on July 29 may openly attack and attempt to discredit the treaty. Under these circumstances I think it essential that you carefully prepare Soviets against this possibility. You might say to Gromyko that our indications are that de

Gaulle will probably refuse to sign and may even make a public statement against the treaty. This is something out of our control and, while we deplore it, we cannot believe that de Gaulle will have much influence on the other nations of the world. In fact we are persuaded that most nations are looking forward to this treaty and that most nations are prepared to sign, with the probable exceptions of the French and Chinese. You might at this point indicate that the Chinese have already made clear that they will not sign.

Neither side should lose sight, however, of the significant distinction between words and deeds. The important thing is not what the French or Chinese say but what they do. And you would hope that world public opinion mobilized behind the test ban treaty would have a compelling effect on both nations. In any event, so far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to concentrate on actions rather than words. We will not be deterred by what the Chinese say, although certainly a Chinese nuclear explosion will create a situation which we will have to examine carefully. End FYI.

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, S, and Foster in substance and by Bromley Smith in draft; and approved by Read.

¹ [Document 339](#).

² See [footnote 9](#), [Document 339](#).

³ [Document 332](#).

⁴ See [footnotes 12](#) and [14](#), [Document 340](#).

⁵ In telegram 279 to Moscow, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁶ Telegram 433 to Paris, July 22, repeated to Moscow as telegram 278. (Ibid.)

342. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 23, 1963, noon.

277. From Harriman. It is becoming crystal clear that Soviets have as objective as described in Embtel 195¹ attempt to isolate ChiComs. Therefore, they place maximum importance on France's adherence to test ban treaty. Also they will press all other countries to adhere. They want pressure to appear to come on ChiComs from other countries, particularly the underdeveloped, and therefore insisted on avoiding language in withdrawal clause which would appear as pressure on China directly by them. This primary objective will affect other positions they will take. In addition, atmosphere of relaxing of tensions in Europe will have double purpose of showing value of coexistence policies and avoiding battling on two fronts at same time.

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret. Received at 8:50 a.m.

¹ [Document 331](#).

343. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 23, 1963, 8 p.m.

292. From Harriman. In private talk with Hailsham and myself, Gromyko pressed us as hard as he could for a commitment on our attitude towards NAP. I carefully stated that we understood Soviet Government's interest in this subject, that I would report our discussions fully on my return to Washington, and that I was sure we would consult our allies. I knew that my government was interested in extending the good will that had been created by the present talks to include all of Europe both the members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, and that my government hoped that the test ban agreement, although having great psychological importance in itself, would lead to further understandings. Hailsham made a similar statement, perhaps a bit more definite.

Thereupon Gromyko said he understood from our statements that our respective governments were ready to make every effort regarding NAP and intended to consult allies. Taking this into account, Soviet Government was prepared not to link directly the signing of test ban with NAP. He hoped this would be duly appreciated by both governments. However, Gromyko said language of the communiqué proposed by Hailsham was not fully satisfactory,¹ and handed us his proposed draft.

We agreed to consult our respective governments and advise him tomorrow. At his request, I explained to him the details of the procedures we proposed for signing test ban treaty. He said he would consult his government since this question involved "the level and the timing." It was agreed that we would initial the treaty tomorrow, or as soon thereafter as we could agree on communiqué. Communiqué and text of treaty should be given out simultaneously in three capitals promptly after initialing. Advise if this procedure satisfactory.

Gromyko's suggested reference to NAP in communiqué follows:

“The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks (peregovory, translated by Sukhodrev as 'talks'; it could also be translated as 'negotiations') and to consult with them about the manner of continuing discussions (obsuzhdeniya) on this question with the object of achieving agreement.

An exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, leading to a relaxation of tension, affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty.”

Gromyko stated that if we wished to we could list some or all of the subjects raised in the discussions. Neither Hailsham nor I commented, and I would recommend against it.

Our comments on communiqué follow septel. Also full account of conversation.²

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret. Received at 3:57 p.m.

¹ See [Document 339](#) and [footnote 10](#) thereto.

² Telegram 295 from Moscow, July 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.

344. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 23, 1963, 5:15–5:50 p.m.

Instructions to Ambassador Harriman

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Rusk
Mr. McCone
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Foster
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Sorensen
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Smith

The first item concerned the wording of that part of the communiqué to be released at the conclusion of the Moscow discussions which dealt with the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty powers and the NATO powers. The President approved a telegram¹ which told Harriman that he must insist on acceptable wording lest it appear that we had committed ourselves to achieve a non-aggression pact when all we had done in Moscow was to discuss the suggestion and agree to discuss it further with our allies. Harriman was reminded that the Washington assessment of the situation in Moscow prompted us to insist on our wording in view of our belief that the Russians wanted the test ban treaty and would not break off the negotiations if we refused to accept their wording of the communiqué. Harriman's reports reveal that he felt we had to meet the Russians on their wording of the non-aggression pact communiqué paragraph because they had agreed to drop their insistence on linking a test ban treaty to a non-aggression pact.

There followed discussion of the composition of the Senatorial delegation which would accompany Secretary Rusk to Moscow to sign the test ban treaty. The President's view was that if Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper did not go, the entire plan should be abandoned.

Secretary Rusk, accompanied by Mr. Foster, joined the group after having testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Rusk said there was a good chance that all of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee members except Senator Lausche would vote to approve the test ban treaty as now drafted.

A telegram to Ambassador Bohlen was discussed. The President shared the view of those present that the wording in the President's letter to de Gaulle referring to possible U.S. nuclear assistance to France should not be made more precise as Bohlen had suggested.² The draft de Gaulle letter was modified slightly.³ Ambassador Bohlen is to deliver it shortly before the announcement of the initialing of the test ban treaty.

Another telegram to Harriman instructed him to urge the Russians not to comment if de Gaulle, in his Monday press conference, announced his refusal to sign the test ban agreement.⁴ The President suggested that Harriman urge the Russians not to comment on any French statement about testing which was not related to an actual French nuclear weapons test. We will not withdraw from the treaty on the basis of a Chinese announcement that they will not sign the treaty. However, if it appears that the Chinese are actually about to test a weapon, we will reconsider the situation at that time.

There was a long discussion of a phrase in Article I: "or any other nuclear explosion" which might be misinterpreted to mean that in a war situation we could not use nuclear weapons without violating the test ban treaty. Even though the treaty title refers to a ban on nuclear weapons tests, Mr. Ball felt that some Americans, possibly even some Germans, would conclude that we had limited our use of nuclear weapons in self-defense. Several ways of proceeding were discussed. One was to ask the Russians to revise the treaty to clarify this point even though the wording of the treaty is now agreed. We could add a protocol to the treaty, making clear that the clause in no way affected our right to use nuclear weapons for self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. We could instruct Harriman to discuss this question with the Russians and make clear to them that at an appropriate time we would state publicly that the test ban treaty in no way affected our use of nuclear weapons to oppose aggression and that we assumed this was also their view.

Secretary Rusk and Mr. Sorensen felt the point was so far-fetched that we should not raise this question with the Russians. Mr. Ball and the others felt that this point should be dealt with in one way or another. A telegram was drafted to Harriman asking him to raise this with the Russians and tell them that we would state our views on this matter in public at a later time. (When the telegram was shown to the President following the meeting, he asked that an additional sentence be added giving Harriman the authority not to raise the subject if he felt that the result of his doing so would complicate seriously his task.)⁵

Following a presentation by Mr. Foster, the President agreed we should inform the Russians that we thought the disarmament committee of eighteen should resume its sessions in Geneva this summer as scheduled. The Russians had indicated a desire to postpone this session. However, many of the eighteen States, especially Canada, have told us they wish to resume the disarmament talks to discuss developments since their last meeting and to prepare a report for the UN General Assembly. In view of the strong desires of the others, except the Russians, the President accepted the recommendation favoring resumption of the Geneva talks.

Bromley Smith⁶

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

¹ [Document 346](#).

² In telegram 373 from Paris, July 23, Bohlen had stated his concern at the "fuzziness," which he was aware might be intentional, in the existing text "of willingness to discuss providing France with nuclear information which may arise to plague us in the future." He was "somewhat concerned lest French use this statement against us" at some point "in event these limitations turn out to be somewhat narrow." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) Regarding the existing text, see [footnote 4](#) below.

³ Text of the draft letter is in telegram 433 to Paris, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) It was sent after the July 22 meeting; see [Document 340](#). The change removed one sentence from a passage urging de Gaulle to keep the French position on a possible test ban agreement open: “We must not take any course that would dismay our Allies, since it is the strength and unity of the Alliance as a whole that matters most.” (Telegram 550 to London, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Bundy stated in a message to de Zulueta that Kennedy believed “mention of our allies in the initial communication will only be a red rag to the General.” (Unnumbered telegram, July 23; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 7/63) Both Bundy’s message and telegram 550 were sent before the 5:15 p.m. meeting.

⁴ Telegram 301 to Moscow, July 23 (drafted by Thompson, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and approved by Ball), instructed Harriman as described and added that he “should inform Soviets that if they do make such a statement re France, we would be obliged to make similar statement concerning Communist China which is known to be endeavoring to acquire an atomic capability and which has already indicated that it would not become party to a test ban.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁵ Telegram 304 on this subject, July 23, was drafted by Rusk and cleared with Ball, Foster, Thompson, and Bundy, and approved by Read. It asked Harriman, with the qualification noted, to tell Gromyko that while the United States regarded the test ban treaty as an important step toward the prevention of war, it was “obviously not intended to apply, and, in fact, does not apply to the situation of self-defense, which continues to be governed by commitments under UN Charter.” (Ibid.)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

345. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 23, 1963, 9 p.m.

279. Today's session started 3 PM with same participants as yesterday.

Meeting began with Tsarapkin report of drafting committee session this morning decision of which reflected our tel 279.^{[1](#)}

Tsarapkin said remaining outstanding point was title which left for principals to decide (see septel).^{[2](#)}

At Harriman's request Fisher discussed US concern re Article 3, para 2, with regard deposits by unrecognized regimes. US preferred arrangement whereby deposit could be with one of three original parties which would notify other two in few cases of unrecognized regimes. Pointed out Khrushchev had said did not wish force us recognize regime against our will.

Gromyko said wished leave text as agreed.

Harriman stated US had no problem with language if could reach understanding as to interpretation. All of us want as many states as possible to adhere to treaty, therefore acceptance of ratification should be easy as possible. Should be sufficient if deposit were with one of three original parties which would then inform other two. Need be no deposit with other two. For example, Outer Mongolia might deposit with USSR which would then notify US and UK and send copy. On this understanding language could be left as is.

Hailsham said language suited UK, which often received without undue embarrassment communications for authorities not recognized as governments.

After somewhat lengthy discussion in which each of three reiterated position, Gromyko said each party would be free to set forth its point of view on this question.

Harriman pointed out this one of last items raised by Washington which would wonder why matter could not be settled now.

Gromyko stated had nothing more say on subject which could be left over until tomorrow.

Harriman agreed but said agreement on procedure to be adopted should be reached before departure. Reiterated was not requesting change in language merely accepting understanding as to what intended.

Gromyko then asked if text could now be considered agreed. Both Harriman and Hailsham said yes.

Gromyko then said quite certain both Harriman and Hailsham understood that Sovs do not consider matter ended for obvious reasons. Suggested three principals have private exchange which began [*to begin?*] after communiqué agreed and Hailsham suggested initialing text tomorrow and releasing within 24 hours. This suggestion to be discussed further in private exchange.³

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 7:15 p.m.

¹ Telegram 279, July 23, contains the complete draft text of the test ban treaty. (Ibid.)

² In the brief initial account of this meeting, Harriman reported that the principals agreed on the title as “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.” (Telegram 288 from Moscow, July 23; *ibid.*)

³ See [Document 347](#).

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 23, 1963, 9:05 p.m.

296. To Harriman. Ref: Embtel 292.¹ We could agree to Soviet communiqué language on non-aggression pact provided following changes are made:

First, eliminate “the manner of” before “continuing discussions.”

Second, eliminate “with the object of achieving agreement” following word “question.”

Third, try to eliminate second paragraph beginning “an exchange of views.”

Alternatively, attempt substitute words “a brief exchange of views,” and change words “leading to” to words “directed at” and eliminate clause “affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty.”

In arguing this position you should point out that if we are to be able to continue progress toward further agreements, we must demonstrate by our actions that we are faithful to the commitments we have given our allies. Gromyko’s language implies a commitment on our side to agree to non-aggression arrangements and this commitment would take effect before consultation with our allies. This position impossible not only with allies but also with important sectors of American opinion.

FYI. We read Soviet position readiness to accept test ban treaty as clear and definite, and do not believe you need to be concerned about communiqué which necessarily registers our view as well as theirs. End FYI.

However, if after you have taken an emphatic position along lines indicated, Soviets prove unwilling to accept language as modified, you should continue to insist upon first and third modifications listed at start of this message, but you may, as a fall-back for second modification, offer to substitute for “with the object of achieving agreement” the phrase “in the hope that agreement satisfactory to all may be achieved.”

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, Rusk, Foster, and Thompson; and approved by Read.

¹ [Document 343](#).

347. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 24, 1963, 9 p.m.

311. From Harriman. Hailsham and I had two and one-half hour discussion with Gromyko today July 24.

After lengthy argument, Gromyko accepted our fallback position¹ for paragraph in communiqué on nonaggression, with the exception of one word “hope”. He insisted that there must be indication of “purpose” in holding the discussions. He pointed out that there have been so many years of discussion that a communiqué would be meaningless without an indication of a purpose. I am satisfied that we should agree on this point. I have gone so far in the argument that I am convinced we would lose more in our relations with Soviet Union than the value of possible gain we might make with our allies by carrying argument further. With the deletion of the words “the manner of” we are in no way committing our allies.

In any event, Gromyko gave in reluctantly on other points. He accepted our changes in second paragraph, which incidentally we agreed should be a sentence at the end of a single paragraph.

Nonaggression paragraph in communiqué will accordingly read as follows and I request authority accept it. All here agree. You will notice that in substituting “purpose” for “hope”, subsequent words have been rearranged because of problem in Russian translation.

“The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all.

A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, directed at a relaxation of tension.”

Gromyko agreed with our proposal for signing in Moscow by SecState with a number of Senators. He made an argument for the President’s presence which I explained away in accordance with instructions. He also asked whether President would come to some other place in Europe. This I explained in a friendly way would not be in our mutual interests.

We are meeting at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon July 25 and if your approval nonaggression paragraph given,² and as soon as details settled, we will initial treaty.

We agreed that communiqué and text treaty would then be distributed, embargoed for release 10:00 PM Moscow time, in three capitals.

Septels on balance communiqué and test ban matters.³

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Flash. Received at 4 p.m.

¹ See [Document 346](#).

² This authorization came in telegram 322 to Moscow, July 24, 9:44 p.m., drafted by Rusk and cleared by Ball, Foster, Thompson, and Bundy. The authorization applied also to the portion of the communiqué included in telegram 313, cited in footnote 4 below.

³ The balance of the draft communiqué is in telegram 313 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:40 p.m. The other telegram mentioned is telegram 316, [Document 348](#).

348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 25, 1963, 1 a.m.

316. From Harriman. Harriman and Hailsham private meeting with Gromyko 3 PM today.

[Here follows an extended account of the portion of the meeting summarized in telegram 311, [Document 347.](#)]

Harriman then said he had been requested¹ raise another point. Recalled Gromyko's remark that Sov Government would make statement re France and said that while we did not know what Sovs would say we hoped nothing would be said which would make our mutual problems more difficult. Gromyko had not indicated what and when Sovs would say, but this had raised concern in Washington. Observed Hailsham was authorized say something on this matter.

Hailsham said only thing he could say was that UK possessed information French would not have their Pacific test site ready for another year and that Sahara could be excluded as French testing site for political reasons. Taking this into account Sovs may feel it not necessary make statement at the present time.

Gromyko said could not add anything substantive re France to what Khrushchev and himself had said in course these talks. Sovs had not yet decided when official statement would be made, but evidently it would not be made during stay of US and UK reps here. Rather statement would be made at some future date, and Sovs would expound position they had reserved re France. Stressed great importance Sovs attach to problem of France as latter was nuclear power.

Harriman said obviously Sovs had right make statement, but we believed they might wish postpone it. Noted de Gaulle had announced he would have TV interview on July 29 and if Sov statement were made just before that

interview, he might say something hastily just as he had done in January with respect UK. Therefore we asked that Sov statement be postponed, and give us chance to talk to him. If Sovs spoke about France, we would have to speak about China as Chinese problem was very important in our public's mind. Although China in different position than France, it known China attempting develop nuclear device. There was public information that China might achieve that end this year or next year. China was only country that was known to be developing nuclear device and seeking eventually to become nuclear power.

Gromyko said statement would not be made before July 29 but could not say when since no decision had been made yet.

Harriman hoped Sovs would consult with us so that we could give them friendly advice re situation and effect of their possible statement. We were now in doubt as to what Sovs intended say.

Gromyko said would be glad receive information we might have re French attitude and mood and quite possibly would take it into account. Stressed however Sovs reserved right make statement.

Harriman noted we did not wish make statement re China but would have to if Sovs made statement re France.

IV

Gromyko commented US free to do so but wished note France was nuclear power whereas China was not. Reiterated would be useful receive infor re French mood.

Harriman believed he could be affirmative on this latter point.

Hailsham expressed similar view.

Harriman pointed out we and Sovs had common objective of getting French adherence. Did not see why we should not consult to achieve this end.

Gromyko reverted to text of communiqué and said would study other parts thereof. Inquired whether question of place of signing TB treaty was settled.

Harriman replied in affirmative.

Gromyko said that as to reference to date, he prepared accept “in near future” but Sovs preferred no statement be made, either informally or publicly, spelling out this reference in terms of days or weeks. Schedules of participants would have to be checked and date could be specified later.

Gromyko then referred to problem of interpretation para two Article Three, dealing with deposit of instruments of ratification. Did not believe agreed interpretation could be arrived at. Noted US had one approach to Chiang Kai-shek and Sovs another. To Sovs, Chiang was not a government; he was empty space to them and was illegally in UN. Therefore Sovs could not accept or recognize any document or instrument of ratification from him, whatever the form. Signature of Chiang Kai-shek’s representative would not appear on Sov copy of treaty. Gromyko said he trusted we did not expect any different answer from Sovs on this point. Therefore we should have no illusion that agreed interpretation para two Article Three could be arrived at; suggested we should live with our differences and noted this would not damage treaty.

Harriman said while we did not use same language we had similar attitude towards East Germany. Wondered whether Gromyko’s statement meant we should not accept Chiang Kai-shek’s or East Germany’s adherence. Inquired whether Sovs would want them adhere. Asked what situation would be in practice: should ratification be accepted only by one depositary govt, or should it be sent back?

Gromyko said US would be reasonable if it rejected Chiang’s ratification and accepted GDR’s. Said no analogy between Chiang and GDR, but there was analogy between GDR and FRG.

Harriman suggested that if we were to live with our differences, we should not argue, and inquired again how Gromyko envisaged arrangement in practice.

Gromyko replied he sure we did not expect any other view from Sovs re Chiang. We knew Sov position re Taiwan.

Harriman asked whether this would lead to a situation where none of nonrecognized countries could adhere.

Gromyko replied in negative, noting Sovs attitude toward Franco was well known, and Sov Govt did not recognize him. Said he was speaking only of Chiang.

Harriman said it appeared each case would have to be treated individually.

Gromyko recalled Indochina and Laos conferences, and pointed out USSR had sat there next to South Vietnam and South Korea, Sov attitude toward which was well known. Reiterated he was speaking of Chiang.

Harriman said it thus appeared Sovs did not want Chiang to accede. Observed we in different position; although we did not recognize CPR, we wished see it adhere, and hoped Sovs would use their good offices. Asked whether Sovs would object to CPR's adherence.

Gromyko wondered why they should, pointing out Sovs regarded CPR as lawful govt.

Harriman asked whether Sovs would encourage CPR to adhere.

Gromyko said the broader the participation the better.

Harriman then asked whether Sovs object to Senators participation in signing.

Gromyko said absolutely not. Said had seen Khrushchev today and reported to him. Sovs accepted this and would greet such powerful group as would be composed of SecState, Harriman and Senators. This also went for UK group, although its composition was not known.

After some further discussion it was agreed there would be a meeting at 3:00 PM tomorrow (July 25) to discuss and hopefully agree on communiqué and then initial TB treaty. Pictures would not be allowed

during initialing but only after. Communiqué and text would be given to press simultaneously but embargoed for release until 10:00 PM Moscow time.

No business was transacted in subsequent larger meeting except to confirm agreement re place of signing and to hear report from drafting committee that all texts had been compared and were ready for initialing.

Kohler

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 9 p.m.

¹ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 344](#).

349. Memorandum of Conference With President

Kennedy [Source](#)

Washington, July 24, 1963, 6–6:50 p.m.

Harriman Instructions

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Alexis Johnson
Director Murrow
Mr. Benjamin Read
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Bromley Smith

The President was handed a copy of a cable reporting Mrs. Gromyko's comment on the test ban treaty made during a dinner in Moscow (copy attached).¹ The President lightly expressed his hope that the views of Mrs. Kennedy given at social occasions did not receive comparable circulation in government reports.

There was a discussion of the problem created by the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion" in Article I of the treaty. The phrase might be misconstrued by opponents of the treaty to mean that in war we could not use nuclear weapons without violating the test ban treaty.²

Under Secretary Ball said it would be hard for the U.S. delegation to ask now for a change in the treaty language. Secretary McNamara felt that even if the treaty negotiations had to be extended by two days, this time would be well spent if we could get the wording changed to avoid the ambiguity of the phrase. Mr. Ball replied that he thought an exchange of notes with the Russians on this point would be satisfactory, or, alternatively, we could state our understanding of this wording in the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the test ban treaty negotiations.

The President left for his office to give the contents of the treaty to former President Truman on the telephone. A copy of the draft treaty had already been sent to Independence, Missouri.

Mr. Ball expressed his fear that some on the Hill will point to the ambiguity of the “or any other nuclear explosion” phrase and conclude that the Administration had agreed to a poorly drafted treaty, and, therefore, could not be trusted to draft any treaty. Their argument would be that the title of the treaty, as well as the preamble, could be interpreted to mean that the treaty provisions applied even in the case of war.

Secretary Rusk said we could either decide to ride through the Congressional criticism or explain our interpretation in the communiqué. He said we could say in the communiqué that nothing in the test ban treaty limited the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. He suggested that we make this proposal to the Russians and get their response. If they oppose inclusion of this idea in the communiqué, we would go no farther. If they agree to accept inclusion of this idea, we would go along. He felt that the point, however, had to be raised with the Soviets.

The President agreed that we should so proceed. He said we could explain to the Hill that we had chosen to include the explanation in the communiqué in preference to drafting a separate protocol to the treaty which would cover this point.

Mr. Ball said that he did not believe oral agreement with the Russians on this point was sufficient. The President said he felt, however, that it was adequate.

Secretary Rusk read the draft communiqué³ which he acknowledged was not ideal from our point of view.

The President then raised the question of sending a letter to de Gaulle.⁴ He thought we should send this letter now and let the British Prime Minister know of our decision because the time for his press conference was getting near. He said at the time we announced the initialling in Moscow we should release a statement from the White House saying that we welcomed the

successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Shortly thereafter he should make a formal speech which would include all our arguments in favor of the test ban treaty.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that several Senators had a let-down feeling because they had been fighting a comprehensive test ban treaty and now are confronted with a three-environment test ban which permitted the continuance of underground testing. Many of the arguments against a comprehensive treaty fall to the ground under the limited test ban treaty because the problem of inspecting underground tests does not arise.

Mr. Murrow felt that public opinion was somewhat confused and urged that the President's speech be made as early as possible.

The President said if the test ban treaty was initialled tomorrow, he could make his speech on Friday or hold over until Monday. No press conference is scheduled before Wednesday. Mr. Bundy suggested that there be a brief statement at the time of initialling to be followed by a longer speech.

Mr. Murrow urged that the Administration set the tone for the public at once by emphasizing that the limited test ban treaty was the result of our initiative.

Secretary Rusk said he felt the bipartisan leaders should be brought in for a briefing promptly. He also suggested that policy guidance on the test ban treaty be sent to the field.

At this point Mr. Bundy reported on a telephone call he had from Mr. Kaysen from Moscow.⁵ With respect to the phrase discussed earlier, the delegation felt the cure was worse than the disease. The delegation had been over this point with the British delegation and together they had decided not to raise it with the Russians. The negotiators were in session but the U.S. delegation had asked for a delay in order to obtain additional instructions.

The President said he felt that the language to be included in the communiqué is regarded more seriously here than in Moscow. If Mr. Harriman still doesn't want the language which we have suggested to him, then we will face the problem of what Mr. Harriman should do. Secretary

Rusk said that the President, in his speech and again before signing the treaty, could explain the entire problem.

Mr. Bundy said that Mr. Harriman would be returning to Washington on Saturday or Sunday. Mr. Murrow urged the President not to await Harriman's return before making a speech. The President agreed that he would speak on Friday and would want a draft by tomorrow. Mr. Harriman is to be asked for suggestions to be included in the speech.

Secretary Rusk cautioned that Mr. Harriman, in his talk with Khrushchev on Saturday, might encounter very rough going.⁶ Mr. Harriman might be in the position of returning to Washington with a limited test ban treaty in one pocket and a Soviet ultimatum in the other. Ambassador Thompson said that the Russians have pushed Mr. Harriman hard on their proposal for a non-aggression pact.

The President wanted to be sure that the French, Italians and Germans were informed of the negotiations. He thought Secretary Rusk should send a personal message to German Foreign Minister Schroeder.⁷

Mr. Bundy read to the group the most recent Harriman cable on the draft communiqué.⁸

The President responded by suggesting that Mr. Harriman discuss the point in his conversation with Khrushchev. He felt it would be hard to deal with it in the wording of the communiqué. He said we might be asked in the Senate about this point and we should be in a position so that Secretary Rusk could say we have dealt with the point. The record of the Moscow meetings should be such as to prove that the point had been discussed with the Russians.

Secretary Rusk agreed that we must discuss this with the Russians. If they respond and reveal that they had in mind an effort to limit our use of nuclear weapons in war by means of the limited test ban treaty, then we will indeed have a major problem on our hands.

The President said that if we are ever asked about the point, we will answer by saying we have discussed it with the Russians. It is important to tell Mr.

Harriman so that he will understand why it is necessary to have raised this question during his meeting in Moscow.^{[9](#)}

Bromley Smith^{[10](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

^{[1](#)} Telegram 303 from Moscow, July 24, not printed. It reported that during a reception at the Polish Embassy 2 days previously, Mrs. Gromyko had said to Kohler: "You tell Mr. Harriman that he has to do everything that is necessary to get this (test ban) treaty. We have to have this so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion, we will have a basis on which to call them to account." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

^{[2](#)} According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation at 5 p.m. that day between Rusk and Chayes, the latter stated that his problem with the language was not its international consequences, but that it would give the opposition talking points and would almost certainly cause the Senate to attach a reservation to the treaty. Rusk said that in going over the treaty with three different Senate committees the question had not come up. Chayes said that he himself had been slow to recognize the problem. "He would hate to feel that we had not tried them [the Soviets] out on it." (Drafted by Bernau; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

^{[3](#)} It is not clear which draft is referred to here; see [footnote 9](#) below.

^{[4](#)} For text as delivered on July 25, see [Document 352](#).

^{[5](#)} No memorandum of this telephone conversation has been found.

^{[6](#)} July 27. Harriman actually met with Khrushchev on July 26; see [Document 354](#).

^{[7](#)} In telegram 232 to Bonn, July 24, Rusk instructed McGhee to tell Schroeder that while the United States considered it "of highest importance" that China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and

East Germany all adhere to the test ban treaty, it was “well-established in the post-war period that adherence to multilateral agreements does not imply recognition among signatories who do not otherwise recognize each other.” After citing examples, Rusk concluded that he hoped that Schroeder would find his comments a “basis for removing any anxieties about GDR adherence.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁸ Apparent reference to telegram 311 or 313; see [Document 347](#) and [footnote 4](#) thereto.

⁹ See [Document 350](#).

¹⁰ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:43 p.m.

320. To Harriman. Regret that we must return to Deptel 304¹ on subject of non-application of test ban treaty to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. On basis Secretary's appearance in preliminary consultation with three Senate Committees, it is already clear that text will be given the most minute examination and any point of ambiguity will be critically examined. Further, it would be of the most far-reaching consequence if there is in fact a disagreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union on this point. Therefore, you should tell Gromyko in the casual, informative fashion suggested in Deptel 304 that if this question is raised in the US, either in public discussion or in the course of Senate consideration, it would be our intention to respond by simply saying that the treaty on a nuclear test ban does not affect the right of self-defense against armed attack under Article 51 of UN Charter. We are confident that this is also Soviet Union's attitude. If he should reflect any different view and disclose that Soviets would claim that this treaty bars the use of nuclear weapons in defense against attack, then procedures presently scheduled should be delayed pending clarification of that point. We are not insisting upon formal changes in the draft treaty or even calling attention to the possibility of a problem in the communiqué. But we must be clear that no effort will be made to pretend later that this treaty attempts to do something which never arose in the course of discussion, namely, to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense.

We hope that in fact there will be no difference on the merits on this question and that you can establish the necessary record quite informally. It is after all no more than a matter of saying to Gromyko, without significant dissent from him, that this treaty and self-defense are in fact two very different subjects.

Suggest you report results by guarded telephone call as soon as feasible.

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.

¹ See [footnote 5, Document 344](#). In telegram 312 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:30 p.m., Harriman stated that the delegation had considered the problem of a literal interpretation of Article I before recommending the revised text, but had been unable to find any appropriate language to avoid the possibility of such a “highly legalistic” construction. Fisher, McNaughton, and a British legal expert had agreed that the provisions in Article I were not legally applicable to use of nuclear weapons in hostilities. “I do believe that raising subject would substantially complicate our task. Therefore, in accordance authority Deptel 304, I have not raised it.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) In an interview with George Bunn on November 21, 1964, McNaughton gave an extended account of the delegation’s consideration of this problem. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Classified Series, John T. McNaughton)

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [Source](#)

Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:44 p.m.

321. You must continue to press with regard to the matter raised in Deptel 305¹ concerning Paragraph 2 of Article III, especially as Gromyko's comments² raise a question we cannot ignore. As treaty language now reads, instruments of accession must be deposited with all the Governments of the original parties. We cannot adopt a different position toward Nationalist China than the USSR adopts toward Red China. Yet under the present treaty language it is not clear that if one of the depositary states refuses to recognize the signature of an acceding state, the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article III are complied with so as to make the accession of the depositing state effective.

Under these circumstances, the best solution would be for the insertion of the words "any of" between the words "of" and "the" in the second sentence of Paragraph 2. However, we need not insist upon that if there can be a written understanding by all original parties that if a state which one or more does not recognize deposits its instrument of accession with at least one original party, that will be sufficient to register accession. Such a written understanding could also record agreement that accession in no way affects degree of recognition granted by any party to another. FYI. This understanding would be most helpful to us with Bonn which is already raising question whether GDR accession is consistent with Hallstein doctrine. End FYI.

In raising this question with Gromyko you should make it clear to him that if he denies the accession of Nationalist China as a party upon deposit of an instrument of accession with the US, then we must deny the accession of Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by us if they deposit instruments of accession with the Soviet Union. In that event Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by the US could take the position that their desire to join was frustrated, and, thus, they had no responsibility

for any inhibitions on testing. If your analysis is correct that the Soviet Union is seeking in the test ban treaty to obtain leverage on Peking, then this argument should be sufficient to persuade Gromyko to adopt a more acceptable position on this question. You might also point out that if the problem of non-recognition is injected as an impediment to accession, then many states will have problems since there will be many instances where a party does not recognize one or more other states. This would greatly diminish the scope and effectiveness of the treaty.

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.

1 In telegram 305, July 23, 10 p.m. (drafted by Thompson; cleared by Bundy, Foster, Ball, and Read; and approved by Rusk), the Department stated its continuing concern over the ratification issue and inquired whether it was “contemplated” that each party would deposit its ratification with all three depositories. If so, the Department suggested insertion of language in Article II that would explicitly allow any acceding nation to deposit the ratification with any or all of the three original parties. This procedure “might take care of the Soviet problem if their concern is that there would be a disproportionate number of signatures or accessions deposited with Western parties.” (Ibid.)

2 Reference is to Gromyko’s comments on the ratification issue reported in telegram 312 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:30 p.m., and telegram 316 from Moscow, July 25. (Both *ibid.*, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))

352. Letter From President Kennedy to President de Gaulle [Source](#)

Washington, July 25, 1963.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sure you have been watching the signs of movement within the Communist Bloc. There is accumulating evidence that the Sino-Soviet rift is definite. This could lead to major developments along lines that you have long foreseen. The speed and direction of these developments may shortly be clarified.

During fluid periods such as the present, we all face particularly heavy burdens of decision. We must be on guard not to mistake transient signs of movement for long-range trends. But we must be equally alert to seize the opportunities that may be presented by great historic changes.

This is the dilemma that has confronted us in our current discussions with the Soviet Union. Chairman Khrushchev has put forward in Moscow several suggestions that may indicate a serious interest in making progress toward the control of armaments. He has mentioned the establishment of static observation posts to provide safeguards against surprise attack through early information on unusual troop movements and concentrations. He has also suggested the possibility of limitations on force levels and the level of military budget expenditures.

The Soviet Government has also stressed its desire for a non-aggression pact. We of course have made it plain that any proposals of this sort will require consultation and agreement among the Western allies before any action at all can be taken, and we rejected the notion of a necessary link between a test ban and this quite separate topic. We will take pains in any communiqué on the present discussion to make clear the interest which our allies have in this matter.

I am not at all sure how far any of this can be pursued, but it is possible that some of these proposals can be usefully considered in later discussion.

The one field in which Governor Harriman and Lord Hailsham have been authorized to negotiate is the field of a test ban treaty, and in this area they appear near agreement on a draft of a treaty which will commit its signers to an ending of nuclear testing in three environments—the atmosphere, outer space, and under the sea. In my judgment this is a limited but important accomplishment.

My view of this limited agreement is governed by the possibility that we may be at an important turning point and that the ability of the leading Western nations to show a common front to the Communist Bloc can make a vital difference in the outcome. I hope, therefore, that you will not feel it necessary to make an early final decision with regard to the policy of France toward this treaty. I hope that you may decide to reserve judgment until after there is an opportunity for full discussion among your Government, the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the United States. We have always hoped to have the participation of France in banning tests, and French participation, after due consideration and discussion, could have great positive effects.

I recognize that in considering whether to sign this treaty, you will have to weigh the fact that adherence to a treaty would end your use of one means of acquiring information relevant to nuclear weapons. As we have already indicated, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternatives which might make French testing in these three environments unnecessary. While there are both political and technical problems here, we hope they are capable of solution.

These are most complex topics, and I am sure that effective and productive understandings will require most careful discussion among us. All that I am urging now is that it would be to our common advantage for our three Governments to explore these questions. Such exploration will obviously be much more likely of success if the French position on a possible test ban agreement can be kept open while the problems involved are examined.

Our Governments have had different approaches to this set of problems for many years, and if we are to work out a new level of understanding, we shall need time and patience. But I cannot avoid the conclusion that we shall gain more than we lose if we are able to begin a serious

reconsideration in the light of the possibility that the world may be able to put a stop to further nuclear testing in the air, underwater, and in space.

Sincerely,^{[1](#)}

^{[*](#)} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with de Gaulle 1961-1964. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text reads: "Original delivered to Elysee on 25 Jul 63." Concerning the delivery of this letter, see [Document 349](#).

^{[1](#)} Printed from an unsigned copy.

353. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 25, 1963, 10 p.m.

328. 1. Initialing took place 7:15 p.m.¹ This was only general business following private meeting of over two hours with Harriman, Gromyko and Hailsham discussing problem of unrecognized regimes dealt with in Deptel 305² and problem of interpretation of Article One dealt with in Deptel 304,³ and telephone conversation Kaysen/Bundy at 7 p.m.⁴

2. With respect to unrecognized regimes, an explicit oral understanding was reached as follows: any such regime could deposit with any depositary or depositaries which would take it and this depositary in turn could send notice to other depositaries. If this notice is accepted by the other depositaries, there is a full, binding accession all around. But no depositary is bound to accept either directly or indirectly through notice, accession by a regime which it did not recognize. If notice is not accepted the obligation between the depositor and the receiving depositary is nonetheless valid, although the refusing party recognizes no relation. If notice is refused, no further comment will be made either by the party refusing notice or any other party.⁵

Gromyko made it clear that with respect to a regime which they did not recognize whose accession they would not accept, they would consider any action by that regime to adhere to the treaty illegal, but was aware that the US would have different views and would accept the accession. Gromyko was explicitly referring to the GDR. The Soviet Union would not object to our action, unless we made some statement to insist that the Soviet position was incorrect. Gromyko indicated that he recognized that the US would have the same rights. He gave as hypothetical case, US refusal to recognize adherence of GDR: US would not recognize the legality of a deposit by GDR; but USSR would accept adherence and GDR would be regarded by USSR as party to treaty.

Gromyko indicated that both countries might well accept notification of accession of regimes which they did not recognize and did not propose to recognize. He hoped that we would in the case of the GDR and similar cases and stated the USSR would in all cases except one.

Gromyko said that if we attempted to write anything on the subject he would have to include a reference to the one country he had in mind and thought it was best that the matter remain on the basis of the explicit oral understanding we had reached. Harriman explained we must pre-sent this matter to Senate, and it was agreed that Harriman and other US officials were free to present the understanding and explain it in any appropriate way to Senate in presentation of treaty. Gromyko further stated he did not want to write our testimony to the Senate for us, nor did he want to edit it; we were free to say whatever we wished to about the understanding; as long as we stuck to the facts then Soviets would remain silent. Soviet Government would of course have to correct any incorrect statement. In course of discussion, it was agreed that Harriman-Gromyko letter referred to in Embtel 321⁶ should be treated as memorandum already overtaken by events.⁷

3. In the private session, I made the statement contained in Embtel 320⁸ regarding possibility that Article One might be read to outlaw use of nuclear weapons in war. Gromyko looked baffled.⁹ He said “this treaty deals with the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments. Of course it is not a prohibition of nuclear weapons or weapons in general, although the USSR is in favor of general and complete disarmament. The scope of the treaty is self-explanatory.”¹⁰

4. Full report follows soonest.¹¹

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO).
Secret. Received at 6:28 p.m.

¹ For text of the tripartite communiqué, dated July 25, which was released with the text of the treaty simultaneously in Moscow, London, and Paris, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1963, p. 239. Text of President Kennedy's radio and television address delivered July 26 is *ibid.*, pp. 234-238.

² See [footnote 1](#), [Document 351](#).

³ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 344](#).

⁴ See [footnote 11](#) below.

⁵ In a telephone call to Rusk at 11:45 a.m. on July 25, Bundy stated that Macmillan, acting on a message from Hailsham received before that day's meetings in Moscow, thought that the United States should not insist on pursuit of either the depository or the wartime explosion issue. Bundy pointed out that the White House, however, thought both could be pursued for another 24 hours. "Sec agrees. If we seem to agree when we don't we are in trouble." (Memorandum by Bernau; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

⁶ Telegram 321 from Moscow, July 25, reported in part on the presentation to the Soviets on the morning of July 25 of a letter from Harriman to Gromyko that embodied the instructions in telegram 321, [Document 351](#). Hailsham disassociated himself from the U.S. position on this matter. Text of the letter, marked "Returned," is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 8, Miscellaneous.

⁷ Gromyko gave Harriman a letter in reply. It purportedly stated that the Soviets would "under no circumstances" recognize "as legitimate the deposit of ratification instruments by the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which represents no one, or accession by that regime to the said treaty." A reconstructed text, marked "restored from memory by Akalovsky," is *ibid.* After Harriman at the private session pointed out that this letter would force him to write a similar letter to Gromyko with reference to the PRC, despite U.S. desire that the PRC would adhere to the treaty, the two agreed to take back their letters and went on to reach the agreement described here. (Telegram 333 from Moscow, July 25; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) See the Supplement.

⁸ The statement actually was contained in telegram 322 from Moscow, July 25. Harriman first mentioned Khrushchev's remark in the opening meeting. He then said that the test ban would not remove the risk of nuclear war but

that “some people” might say that Article I made illegal the use of nuclear weapons in war, in which case the United States might have to “explain” that the test ban treaty did not prevent a country from using any weapons, including nuclear weapons, in self defense as permitted under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Regarding the opening meeting, see [Document 325](#).

⁹ In his interview with Bunn, McNaughton stated that Harriman was “upset” by the instruction to raise the issue of use of nuclear weapons in war. “He felt that it was insane to think that anyone would construe Article I as barring the use of nuclear weapons in anger.” In reporting to Washington, the delegation “spent 30 minutes trying to think of a word” to describe Gromyko’s reaction. “We ended up with ‘baffled.’ Harriman cherished this word. It pleased him very much. He read this sentence over and over to himself.” See [footnote 1](#), [Document 350](#).

¹⁰ In a telephone call to Bundy after the private meeting, at approximately 7 p.m. Moscow time, Kaysen described the terms of the understanding on depositories and indicated that the Soviets had made no objection to the statement on nuclear explosions in time of war. Bundy obtained approval of these actions by consulting the President while Kaysen was on the line, and while Kennedy apparently was on the telephone with Macmillan. The principals in Moscow then initialed the treaty in plenary session. While no record of Kennedy’s conversation with Macmillan has been found, there are two of the Kaysen-Bundy conversation. One is part of Kaysen’s memorandum on the private meeting. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 12, Post-trip) The other is a partial transcript, drafter not indicated. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Records/Action) Both are in the Supplement.

¹¹ Telegram 321; see [footnote 7](#) above. Telegram 347 from Moscow, July 26, gives details of the plenary session. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement.

354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Source](#)

Moscow, July 27, 1963, noon.

365. From Harriman. Harriman, accompanied by Kohler, Kaysen and Akalovsky, met with Khrushchev in latter's Kremlin office from 3 to 5:45 p.m., July 26. Khrushchev accompanied by Gromyko and Dobrynin.

After exchange of amenities, Harriman opened by congratulating Gromyko on his constructive work in making agreement on TB treaty possible. Said whenever problems had arisen Gromyko tried help find solution.

Khrushchev congratulated Harriman and his associates on flexible and skillful work in making it possible reach a good agreement, which Sovs believed was very good beginning. Accepted Harriman's congratulations to Gromyko and expressed his own.

Harriman believed we had good agreement; treaty was clear and no one could misunderstand it.

Khrushchev commented it would be difficult for anyone to object to it.

Harriman believed whole world would hail treaty as good effort on part of three parties. In broader context it would be regarded as first step toward further cooperation in achieving even greater results. Observed he had visited West Africa in 1960 and Africans had been very indignant with French tests impending in Sahara. They had been told they would lose their manhood if wind were to blow south and bring radioactive debris; however, when tests occurred they had found out wind was blowing east. Africans would be very happy about our treaty provided France adhered to agreement. Said UK had info, which he had no reason to believe incorrect, that French could not conduct tests for year. Thus we had time to work on de Gaulle. Wondered whether Khrushchev had any suggestions or advice this respect. In any event, believed the less said publicly the better.

Khrushchev said could give no advice, but Sov desire to see France accede to treaty had been stated. In their statements Sovs would not stress or accentuate French problem; in other words they would not say “If France, etc.” Thus Sovs would provide calm situation and give de Gaulle chance consider this problem calmly and take positive stand on it.

Harriman recalled his statement to Gromyko that President had written to de Gaulle. Letter had been delivered yesterday afternoon because President wanted de Gaulle receive letter before he had seen communiqué and treaty. President had indicated in letter importance we place on end of testing and indicated readiness discuss this with de Gaulle. While we did not know what outcome would be, this was at least an opener. de Gaulle would visit US early next year, in January or February.

Khrushchev said that was good.

Harriman said did not know whether Khrushchev knew about agreement we had with UK¹ which was outcome of US/UK pooling their scientific knowledge in nuclear field during war. Under this agreement UK got information from us but could not pass it on without our consent. Harriman continued did not know what discussion with de Gaulle would be. However, whatever influence we had would attempt ensure that no additional country became nuclear power. Harriman expressed hope US and Sovs could work together to that end.

At this point Harriman noticed on Khrushchev’s desk model of early vintage car. Khrushchev said he had been given this model by Italian industrialist who had visited him; it was model of first Fiat, produced 1899. Harriman wondered whether this industrialist was capitalist or imperialist. Khrushchev replied this was matter of qualitative change, but essence was same.

Khrushchev then pointed at slab of ore on his desk, saying it was specimen containing nickel, copper and gold. Harriman commented perhaps Sovs could give us some gold.

Khrushchev seized this opportunity to say Sovs all in favor of trade; they were not like US Congress. Sovs were now about to start large-scale

development chemical fertilizer industry, and if it were not for obstacles raised by US Congress they could place orders for equipment in US.

Harriman hoped that as relations between our two countries improved trade relations could also be improved. Noted Khrushchev had said in one of his statements that Sov trade with China had been reduced by 60 per cent.

Khrushchev confirmed this. Said Sov trade with China had been reduced to minimum and Sovs could not understand Chinese position on this matter. Commented however that position would not harm USSR.

Harriman said had thought reduction of trade had been at Sov initiative but Khrushchev's remark implied this had been at China's initiative.

Khrushchev denied it had been Sov initiative but noted Sovs had been giving credits to Chinese for their trade with USSR.

Harriman commented that Sovs had cut out credits to China.

Khrushchev said Chinese had cancelled orders in USSR and refused use Sov credit.

Harriman wondered whether Khrushchev wanted say anything re China's progress toward a nuclear explosion, so that he could pass this info on to President.

Khrushchev replied could only say Sovs had no info whatsoever on this matter. Sovs had none of their people there and there was no Sov-Chinese mutual exchange of info, particularly on this question. Sovs knew nothing about this matter except what they saw in the press; however, Khrushchev believed press reports were more inventions than reflection of facts.

Harriman observed Sovs had apparently helped Chinese in this area until 1960.

Khrushchev confirmed this, saying this had been done at initial stage but had not been comprehensive assistance. Chinese scientists and engineers had had access to Sov secrets but this had been at very early stage and he

did not believe they had mastered necessary knowledge; he thought Chinese were developing very slowly in this respect.

Harriman said there was impression among public that Chinese would explode nuclear device before end this year or next year.

Khrushchev commented such reports had been appearing in press over past two years. But US and USSR knew it quite insufficient to hand over secrets of bomb design because for development of nuclear capability it was also necessary to have necessary industry to back up such project.

Harriman asked whether Khrushchev was not concerned that China would explode nuclear device soon.

Khrushchev said he was not concerned at all, even if Chinese were to do it soon. UK and France had also exploded nuclear bombs but who was concerned? There were only two countries which could, because of economic might, solve fully problem of nuclear weapons, and those countries were US and USSR. Khrushchev continued US had developed nuclear weapons earlier than USSR but had developed delivery vehicles only later. US had had considerable difficulties in developing delivery vehicles and Sovs believed it had not overcome those difficulties even now, in spite of fact that US possessed excellent industry. US had emphasized bombers too long. He believed US bases in Europe had played dirty trick on US because US had believed it could keep USSR in fear with bombers stationed at those bases. On other hand, USSR had no bases and had therefore concentrated on rockets and thus overtaken US. McNamara has expressed similar thoughts in one of his speeches, and he, Khrushchev, agreed with him.

Harriman said could agree with what Khrushchev had said provided Khrushchev took out reference to US wanting keep USSR in fear. US did not wish frighten USSR.

Khrushchev wondered what other purpose US bases and bombers had been designed for.

Harriman recalled a conversation he had had with Malinovski² 4 years ago in which latter had also said US had made mistake by concentrating on long-range bombers. In response to his, Harriman's, question how many bombers Sovs had, Malinovski had said too many. Harriman agreed with Khrushchev US had not gone into ICBM's soon enough and was still behind Sovs with respect power rocket fuel. Reverting to China, said it would certainly take long time for China to catch up, but many people US took seriously Sov accusations re China's recklessness, and even few missiles in Chinese hands could create great difficulties.

Khrushchev said this of course correct. However, Sovs believed US had realized as far back as 7 years ago that it should concentrate on missiles. US would of course catch up, although he did not know when, because no special wisdom was required in this field, and science was making progress everywhere. Noted, however, that this would not be easy to do. He could recall that when he had made statement re obsolescence of bombers under present conditions, his speech had been attacked by Generals and others in US, who denied accuracy of that statement. Said although those denials must have been made by reasonable people they were unwise. Thought those people simply had not wished to admit what everyone knew, i.e., that US did not have missiles, because that would have meant US was disarmed. Of course, when Chinese developed nuclear weapons and rockets, that would ease situation for USSR because strength of socialist camp in juxtaposition to imperialism would be enhanced and thus lesser effort would be required on part USSR. Such development would be directed against US and other imperialists.

Harriman asked Khrushchev if he was sure it would not be directed against Sovs one day.

Khrushchev asked whether US was distressed about UK and French nuclear capability, noting US also had differences with UK and France but basically was in agreement with them. Same situation applied to USSR and China; USSR had common basic Communist concepts with China. If sometimes irresponsible or militant statements were made, that was only natural because whenever someone lacked means he was one who shouted loudest. On other hand, when one possessed means he was more restrained because

he knew that his adversary was aware of what he had for defense and even for attack. (Gromyko interjected attacked should be understood as retaliation, and Khrushchev agreed he had meant attack in return for aggression.)

Khrushchev continued when US would have more sense and would leave Taiwan, which would help cause of peace. However, most reasonable thing to do would be not wait until China possessed nuclear weapons and do it in advance. US should recognize China and allow it to take its rightful place in UN. As to Chiang, that was Chinese problem which they should solve. Khrushchev then commented he had digressed; Chinese question was special question and Sovs had no authority speak on Chinese behalf. Suggested conversation return to matters relating to US-USSR relations.

Harriman said before subject nuclear capability dropped he wished note that while US behind in power rocket propellents, it had surpassed long time since in lighter weight nuclear weapons. Said willing drop matter here. Also, said wished point out US relations with UK were different than those with France, because US had pooled its scientific knowledge with UK during war. As to France, we had never been enthusiastic about the de Gaulle's activities which we believed were wasteful and were step in wrong direction. We believed world would be safer if no more nuclear powers develop, and certainly if China did not develop nuclear capability. Hoped Sovs could get Chinese adhere to treaty before they became nuclear power. Also, hoped by time China acquired the ability develop nuclear powers, more comprehensive control of armaments could be had.

Khrushchev agreed and said Sovs making effort prevent increase in number nuclear powers. However, these efforts would of necessity be weak until agreement on disarmament had been reached, because in absence such agreement China and de Gaulle would say why US, UK and USSR may have nuclear weapons and they may not. Therefore, we should concentrate our efforts on reaching agreement on disarmament. This was cardinal problem which would solve this problem.

Harriman inquired what next important steps should be taken in Khrushchev's view.

Khrushchev said perhaps we should move from particular to general. Of course, it would be better if we solved general problem because in such case particulars would fall in place. However, great efforts would be required to resolve general problem and apparently we unable do it now. Yet, particular, or individual measures would also mean progress towards disarmament and they were easier to achieve. Noted we were celebrating today agreement on what was also a partial disarmament measure. At this point Gromyko whispered in Khrushchev's ear.

[Here follows discussion of the proposed non-aggression pact and of Germany.]

Harriman referred to further steps that could be taken. Said some people were thinking of what was called in technical terms separable first stage. Such stage could include cut-off of production fissionable materials for weapons uses and perhaps dismantling certain percentage nuclear weapons on each side and making fissionable materials thus derived available for peaceful uses. Wondered whether Khrushchev had any interest in this and commented such steps might reduce Sov military expenditures.

Khrushchev replied he had no interest whatsoever; moreover, he could say Sovs would never agree to this. US position on this matter was well known and had been stated over many years. Sovs had also stated their position, and still held that position. No results could be derived from such an approach. After all, why should Sovs destroy their bombs in which they put so much money; why should Sovs destroy some bombs and build others. Bombs could be destroyed only under a disarmament arrangement. Sovs could not squander their money, particularly as their money was people's money. Sovs were no capitalists, and to capitalists such an arrangement would of course mean no loss. US should not waste its time developing such proposals; they were totally unrealistic.

Harriman noted Khrushchev had neglected his reference to cut-off.

Khrushchev said such arrangement would be of no use. Other people would say cut-off could yield no result in a situation where US and USSR had accumulated enough bombs to blow up whole world. Others would say they did not possess such material and therefore must produce it. Thus this too

was waste of time. As for USSR, it had stopped expanding its production fissionable materials and now producing such materials at same rate as before. Although he did not know when precisely this would happen, it very possible Sovs would stop production fissionable materials in near future; however, that would be without any agreement and Sovs would not tell anybody about it. Sovs had enough such materials and US was probably in same position. What Sovs were now engaged in was refabrication all bombs on basis results latest tests.

Harriman referred to press reports Khrushchev might have seen re cutback US production nuclear weapons. Those reports were premature, although he did not know what would happen in future. Wondered whether Khrushchev did not really believe it would be useful to come to agreement as between our two countries, to stop production and commented world would regard this as useful step.

Khrushchev said no. World would assess such arrangement properly because it would yield nothing and would in effect mean deceiving hopes of world.

[Here follows discussion of Germany, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba.]

Harriman said President very interested in pursuing other questions. Khrushchev had noted President's June 10 speech.

Khrushchev interjected June 10 speech was best statement made by any President since Roosevelt.

Harriman said sure President would appreciate this comment. TB treaty gratifying and good step in right direction. We hoped other steps could also be made but that would of course require give and take. Commented Sovs would soon experience invasion by US Senate.

Khrushchev asked whether those Senators would be clean or unclean. Wondered whether President had pulled them out of Noah's Ark, but said would welcome both kinds.

Harriman remarked President had his political difficulties in open, whereas Khrushchev has his political difficulties behind these walls here.

Khrushchev denied this, saying he now saw Harriman more useful as his adviser when serving as adviser President rather than himself. Harriman had convinced himself USSR society, but Harriman wrong as USSR most open society. Said he never used casuistry in talking to other people, whereas Molotov had always done so and only confused issue. Did not agree with dictum ascribed to Talleyrand that diplomats should [use] their words only to conceal their thoughts.

Harriman reiterated President would be happy hear Khrushchev comment on June 10 speech. Hoped Khrushchev took President's words seriously so that progress could be achieved toward peaceful world.

Khrushchev wished President would consolidate his position on basis that speech. Positions expounded in that speech were good and strong but should be made even stronger; those positions promised yield good dividends both for President personally and for US in general. Concluded here was concrete proof that Sovs did not always use bad words about capitalists, they also used good words about some capitalists if those capitalists deserved them. As it was now dinner time the party walked together to palace.³

Kohler

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 8:30 a.m. and passed to the White House. The portions of this telegram concerning Germany are printed in [vol. XV, pp. 539-544](#).

¹ Agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes; signed at Washington on July 3, 1958. (9 UST (Pt. 1) 1028)

² Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defense.

³ In a brief memorandum Harriman told the following story to illustrate the contrast between Khrushchev and Stalin: as the party crossed Kremlin

Square on the way to dinner, Khrushchev “shook hands with some of the bystanders who applauded him. He introduced me as 'Gaspodin Garriman,' saying, 'He has just signed a test ban treaty and I am going to take him to dinner. Do you think he deserves dinner?' They applauded loudly and cheered.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

355. Editorial Note

In a letter to Secretary Rusk dated July 29, 1963, German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder asked that the United States negotiate an explanatory protocol to the limited test ban treaty stating that ratification of the treaty or accession to it by territories or authorities “not generally recognized as states” constituted contractual relations only to parties that had already recognized such entities. In his reply of July 30, Rusk stated that Harriman had specifically stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29 that adherence of the “Soviet Zone of Occupation” to the treaty would not affect any question of recognition, that it was not feasible to add to the treaty as already negotiated, and that he (Rusk) did not think the proposed language would add to the understanding on the subject reached at Moscow. In formal hearings after signature of the treaty and in communications with other governments, the United States would make its interpretation on the recognition issue more generally known; however, it was the U.S. view that it was in the interest of the “free world” that the treaty should be binding on as many “governments, regimes and authorities as possible.” (Telegrams 292 and 298 to Bonn, both July 30; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

Schroeder reiterated his proposal in slightly different form in an August 1 letter to Rusk, this time requesting that it be issued as a declaration by the two Western powers upon signature of the treaty in Moscow. Rusk replied on August 2 and again refused, referring to the President’s statement at his news conference the preceding day and stating the view that it wasn’t in the interest of the “free world to declare abstractly that such deposits created no obligations on an unrecognized regime—having in mind, for example, Communist China—vis-à-vis a non-recognizing depositary. It is our conclusion that any such questions should be reserved for such time as a practical issue might arise.” (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials’ Correspondence with Rusk, 1961-1964, and Rusk’s Correspondence with German Officials, 1961-1964, respectively)

For text of the President’s statement regarding East Germany and the test ban treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 2, 1963, page 354.

The Department's statement on the subject issued on August 2 is *ibid.*, page 355.

356. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence

McCone [Source](#)

Washington, July 30, 1963.

Question: What does the Director think of the test ban agreement?

Answer: In appraising the question of whether the proposed test ban agreement would meet the best interests of the United States one must consider the measurable advantages of continuing testing, which are of particular interest to the Military and to the AEC and its laboratories, and the broader questions of national policy of interest to the President.

It is obvious that by continued testing, we can improve our weapon technology and the quality and dependability of our nuclear weapons. On the other hand, continuation of testing would bring us up against the imponderables of world opinions, intensification of the arms race, dangers inherent in the proliferation question, and finally, fear on the part of that segment of people in the United States and, for that matter the world, whether exaggerated or not, of the consequences of radioactive fallout.

On consideration, our present weapons seem adequate for our military needs, so that further atmospheric testing is unnecessary. To be sure, we could develop larger weapons, but the case for the military effectiveness of larger weapons is not very good in contrast to the case which can be made for a larger number of low-megaton weapons deliverable with greater accuracy of improved weapons systems. In the anti-ballistic missile field, it appears that an ABM system can be built from present technology but it probably will not be the most economical nor the best system. Moreover, significant gains can be made in ABM warhead development by underground testing. In the tactical field, any desired development can be pursued in the underground. Important strides can be made in the underground and many, though not all, weapons effects can be developed in the underground.

On balance, it appears to me our national interest is served by the test ban treaty for two reasons: First, the proliferation question can be partially though not totally resolved; and secondly, a step, though a small one, will be made in reaching an understanding between the two opposing nuclear powers.

This judgment is valid on the assumption that the United States will be resolute in preserving the vitality of its laboratories, in pursuing satisfactory underground test programs to add to the knowledge and the state of the art of the development of our nuclear weapons, and finally, to maintain a high state of readiness our Pacific proving grounds so that a test program could be resumed promptly if the Soviets abrogate the treaty.

* Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65. Secret. A typewritten note after the drafting line reads: "Noted by Dr. Chamberlain, whose changes are incorporated." This memorandum was possibly prepared in anticipation of the briefing described in [Document 357](#).

357. Editorial Note

On July 30, 1963, John McCone briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to questions raised by them concerning a test ban agreement. The Chiefs first asked what was the present position of the Soviet Union in relation to the United States in the fields of strategic nuclear weapons, anti-missile missile defense, and tactical nuclear weapons. According to McCone's briefing paper, his response was that the Soviet Union [*text not declassified*]. The United States had more strategic weapons deployed. The Soviets did not exceed the United States in knowledge of the effects of multimegaton warheads on hardened missile sites.

In ABMs, neither side could be confident of the effectiveness of any ABM system chosen on the basis of present data, and hence any system widely deployed by either side was likely to be overdesigned to compensate for uncertainties, and hence more costly than one which would be attained through continued testing in the atmosphere and in space. The United States was presently superior in design, diversity, and numbers of nuclear weapons in most tactical systems. With unlimited underground testing, the Soviets would "over a period of years be able" to overcome the U.S. lead in weapons for tactical deployment and draw even. The briefing paper then detailed error rates in these estimates for different categories of weapons.

With regard to a question on U.S. detection capabilities for clandestine testing, the briefing paper stated that the United States could detect atmospheric tests of 5 KT or more. High yield tests could not escape detection except in deep space. A Soviet attempt to test underwater was unlikely.

Regarding Soviet motives in signing the limited test ban treaty, the most important, according to the paper, was the Soviet desire to achieve political gains in Europe by bringing about a general relaxation of tensions. The briefing paper also stressed a general Soviet desire to avoid proliferation, although not in China. The Soviets recognized that the treaty would not prevent China from attaining nuclear weapons and were unlikely to mount any preemptive strike against its future nuclear capability. They did wish,

however, to demonstrate as part of their ideological competition with China that a Communist state could advantageously negotiate an agreement with a capitalist one. Another possible motive was an economic incentive to check the arms race and bring about a reduction of Soviet forces. (Memorandum from McCone to Bundy dated July 30, which covers two-section briefing paper of same date; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban, U.S. Military Views)

358. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in France [Source](#)

Washington, August 4, 1963, 8:48 p.m.^{[1](#)}

CAP 63421. From Bundy to Bohlen. For opening of business Monday AM.^{[2](#)}

Following is message received from de Gaulle today; our comment follows message.

Message follows: (de Gaulle letter)

Mr. President:

On the eve of the agreement that the United States and Great Britain concluded on July 26 with the Soviet Union you gave me in your message of July 25^{[3](#)} some indications concerning the negotiations in Moscow.

I have not failed to pay great attention to the fact that in your opinion certain indications would permit one to think that the Soviets would not be opposed completely to taking some steps on the road to disarmament. If on their side, as well as on yours, some measures were envisaged to bring about the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, France, as you know, would be very willing to discuss the matter. But it does not seem to me that we have reached that point. Nevertheless the French Government believes that the problem of the prohibition of delivery could be studied. It is ready to do so in common with the Government of United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

I must tell you Mr. President that certain other proposals which were made in Moscow by the Soviet Union could not obtain French acceptance. This is the case in particular regarding the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between on the one hand the members of NATO and on the other the Soviet Union and the countries which she holds under her yoke. Entirely apart from the fact that this kind of assimilation between the two sides could not be accepted by France, the Soviet proposal obviously tends to the

recognition, that is to say reinforcement, by the West of the situation that they have created, and which they maintain by force, in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the fiction of a German Democratic Republic. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that the Soviet Government would not fail in this event to renew its demands concerning the treaty, that is to say the fate of Berlin. The difficulty which would result in Europe and primarily in Germany from the acceptance, even partial, of these claims would react directly on the security and on the policy of France, so that she would be obliged to examine with particular care anything that eventually might be negotiated in Moscow on this subject.

Your message, Mr. President, informed me in the first place of the treaty which was about to be concluded by your negotiations with those of the USSR on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the sea. In that respect, please be assured of my complete understanding of the decision which you have made. It is quite natural that the United States which has in the last twenty years made a very large number of atomic experiments of every kind and which is equipped with an enormous stock of very powerful and very varied weapons should now consider that new tests would no longer be useful and should undertake to make no more tests, it being understood that the Soviets would also abstain. France is, as you know, in a quite different situation. With her own means she has undertaken, later than the other nuclear powers, a program which will give her, in her turn, atomic armament, not as massive no doubt but of the same order. She could not therefore stop the necessary tests before attaining the goal.

You told me, without giving any precise details, that there exist methods of exchange which would permit the French Government to attain, by other means, the result which she is seeking. But over and above the fact that, no matter what hypothesis one bases oneself on, France would have to make tests; one cannot see how France could receive in this field the assistance of another state without conditions which would limit right to use of these weapons. This, France would regard as incompatible with sovereignty.⁴

de Gaulle

Our comment: Obviously delivery of this message invalidates preceding instructions⁵ and you should use only those parts of such instructions as are helpful in light of what follows.

President believes you should concentrate discussion on two aspects of de Gaulle's letter. First you should express interest in knowing why de Gaulle says that "under any circumstances, France would have to make tests". President is interested to know what view of technology and of partnership underlies this categorical statement.

Second question interesting to us is de Gaulle assertion that all assistance must imply unacceptable conditions. President has carefully stated desire to cooperate without stating any conditions. FYI: Object remains to put monkey of non-co-operation on General de Gaulle's back, since in fact we remain willing to co-operate.⁶ End FYI.⁷

* ¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President de Gaulle's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-1964 Vol. I. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text does not indicate whether the telegram went directly from the White House to the Embassy or whether it was relayed to the Department for transmission to Paris. The Department received the telegram at 12:11 a.m. on August 5.

² The source text bears Greenwich Mean Time and date of 050248Z August.

³ August 5.

⁴ [Document 352](#).

⁵ In telegram 475 from Paris, July 30, Bohlen stated that he had spoken to de Gaulle during a luncheon that day. de Gaulle "told me definitely there was no chance of France adhering to the test ban treaty." Regarding nuclear information, de Gaulle stated that he did not believe Kennedy could, even if he wished, make it available to France; that he doubted whether Kennedy did seriously wish to make it available; and that, even if France received the information, it would have to test in order to verify the workability of its hydrogen bomb. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁵ In telegram 661 to Paris, August 4, the White House instructed Bohlen to emphasize to Couve de Murville the serious desire of the United States for a discussion on nuclear cooperation, and that the United States was awaiting de Gaulle's reply to the President's letter to see if a dialog could begin. (Telegram drafted by Bundy and transmitted to the Department for transmission to Paris; *ibid.*, POL FR-US)

⁶ In an August 5 letter to Macmillan, Kennedy stated that he thought de Gaulle not only did not want U.S. nuclear help but was unwilling to discuss the matter seriously. The President wanted to send de Gaulle another message to make it plain that it was not the United States that was unwilling to explore the issue. In a message to Bundy received in the White House on August 7, de Zulueta reported that Macmillan was "doubtful about the wisdom of going too fast" with de Gaulle, on the ground that de Gaulle's language on sovereignty would seem to preclude any agreement. (Both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 7/12-8/7/63)

⁷ On August 8, Ball opened a lengthy memorandum to the President by noting that "particularly since last January, whenever the hand of friendship has been stretched across the sea, General de Gaulle has put a dead fish in it." He went on to give arguments as to why a further nuclear offer to France would disrupt the Atlantic Alliance, isolate Germany, and confirm de Gaulle "in the rightness of his own obduracy." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 FR)

359. Editorial Note

On August 5, 1963, in Moscow, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. For text, see 14 UST (Pt. 2) 1313, or *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pages 291-293.

Secretary Rusk arrived in the Soviet Union for talks with Soviet leaders on August 3 and departed on August 10. Documentation regarding preparations for and talks during this visit, which included some tripartite discussion of the proposed non-aggression pact, non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, and control posts to monitor troop movements in Europe, is in [volume V](#) and [volume XV](#). A summary of the talks is in Topol 184 to Paris, August 10. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) A compendium of telegrams, briefing papers, memoranda of conversation, and other documents relating to Rusk's trip is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2288-2295.

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany [Source](#)

Washington, August 6, 1963, 9:58 p.m.

374. Eyes only for Ambassador. The following message from the President should be delivered to the Chancellor's office as soon as possible. Unless rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara have spread, there should be no other distribution or discussion of this letter. If rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara or of contents of this letter should begin to spread outside Chancellor's office, you should make recommendation and seek instruction.

"Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Secretary McNamara has just come back and reported to me his long conversation with you.¹ He has suggested that it might be useful for me to send you a letter commenting on some of the things which you and he talked about, and I think his suggestion is a good one. As he reports the conversation, you talked about two major topics. The larger of them is the question of the basic policy of the West toward the Soviet Union, in which, as I understand it, your worry is that the U.S. may be too easily beguiled by the smiles and tricks of the Soviet Government.

I understand this concern, but I must tell you in all frankness that I do not think it is justified. It seems to me, in fact, as far from the mark as the kind of thing I sometimes hear from political groups in this country who say that it is wrong to trust the democratic commitment and the loyalty to the Alliance of the Federal Republic. The truth is, in my judgment, that one of the wisest things our two countries have done the last fifteen years is to trust each other, and I think the record of the United States Government as a whole, and of this Administration in particular, makes it pretty clear that we are not disposed to be taken in by Soviet duplicity.

I myself believe that it is much too soon to throw our hats in the air because of a single agreement on a single subject, the limited test ban—important as

that subject is. I believe that we have reached even this small understanding as much through our strength and resolution as through the process of negotiation, and I recognize, as you do, that we are dealing still with a government which has repeatedly posed threats to the freedom of West Berlin and which, as late as October of last year, undertook a peculiarly dangerous and reckless act of duplicity in Cuba. So we are not under illusions about the Soviet Government, and you may be quite sure that Secretary McNamara, who has pressed so hard and so successfully for a strengthening of Western defenses in the last three years, is not a man who is likely to be lulled into forgetfulness or neglect of his duty by a single limited agreement. It is Secretary McNamara, after all, who has been my chief lieutenant in a process of reinforcement which has added nine billion dollars a year to our defense budget, and has increased the number of our battle-ready divisions by forty per cent. It was with Secretary McNamara that I called up 150,000 Reserves at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1961. And he and I feel, just as you do, that this is no time to let down our guard.

It may be, as you say, that there is some danger of relaxation in Europe, and you can count on us to work energetically against any such tendency. That is one reason why Secretary McNamara has pressed so hard in Bonn to find ways and means of meeting the overseas cost of the great forces which we have placed in Germany for the common defense.

Our own commitment and alertness, of course, have to be world- wide. If the Chinese should break out into new acts of aggression, it is only the United States among Western countries that will have the necessary means and determination for reply. We are the only Western power fully engaged in a two-front struggle in the cold war, and I think there is little reason for any feeling that we are blind to its dangers and demands.

Let me repeat that I do understand and respect your honest concern here, for I recognize also that in a large and varied country like this one there will always be people who can bring you reports that this or that individual or group is spreading dangerous opinions. But such rumors deserve to be set against the reality of what our Governments have done together for fifteen years.

As to the particular question of the limited test ban treaty, I am glad to see both in Secretary McNamara's and in William Tyler's reports² that you do regard it as a success, although you have some specific questions about its possible impact on the status of the regime in East Germany. I too think it a success, for reasons which I stated at length last week and with which I will not bother you again now. I do not think it matters much where a treaty of this kind is signed or who claims the credit for it. The point about the treaty is that it makes sense for the world and that it does not jeopardize the essential security of either side. That is what makes it possible and useful.

The problem of the status of the East German regime is an important one, and I fully recognize your special concern with it. In our judgment, fully adequate precautions have been taken on this point. We do not think that either as a whole or in its separate parts does the treaty create any danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime. The use of the term "states," which goes back a year, and the reference to sovereign rights, which is a product of the more recent negotiations, are both of them standard phrases which do not confer any new standing upon any regime which adheres to the treaty, and this solid legal judgment is one which we are prepared to make clear as often as is necessary. Moreover, we believe that the new process of accession is distinctly advantageous to us from this point of view, in that the Federal Republic, which is recognized by all three depositary governments, has an opportunity to deposit its accession without challenge from any of them, while the Pankow regime will obviously have to confine its accession to the USSR. Thus the process of adherence itself will make it clear which regime is recognized by all, and which is a puppet of one.

Having heard Secretary McNamara's report, I have asked Dean Rusk to follow up with a visit in Bonn over this weekend,³ particularly so that you may be able to talk with him about the wider problems of our dealings with the Soviet Union. You will find him both careful and determined. You may be sure that he commands my full confidence. He won his diplomatic spurs in the first hard months of the Korean war, and you may speak to him in full assurance that neither he nor the Government for which he speaks is less deserving of your trust than any with which you have dealt in the past.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy

His Excellency

Dr. Konrad Adenauer

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bonn”

Ball

^{*} Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964 Vol. II. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted in the White House.

¹ In a meeting with Adenauer on July 31, McNamara learned that the Chancellor “did not believe the Moscow agreement was a great success for the United States” and that Adenauer “recommended the greatest possible caution in future negotiations” with the Soviets. Adenauer also repeated German concerns about adherence of East Germany to the treaty and said the treaty would encourage Western complacency. (Memorandum of conversation by McGhee enclosed with airgram A-20 from Bonn, August 2; *ibid.*, Central Files, DEF 18-4) McNamara and Chancellor Adenauer met again on August 5, when the Chancellor voiced the same concerns. A report on the meeting is in telegram 475 from Bonn, August 5, printed in [vol. XV, pp. 546-552](#).

² Tyler’s meeting with Adenauer on July 30 is reported in telegram 394 from Bonn, July 30. The Chancellor stated that initialling of the test ban treaty was a certain success, but that success should not be exaggerated. (*Ibid.*)

³ August 10-11.

361. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State [Source](#)

Bonn, August 10, 1963.

Secto 59. Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.^{[1](#)}

After Secretary and Chancellor had conferred privately for more than an hour late in afternoon, they joined larger group for discussion of Test Ban Treaty which lasted another hour and a half. At conclusion of frank series of exchanges, Chancellor expressed his satisfaction with clarification of US position which he had received and said he thought that, on this basis, he could probably carry through German adherence to treaty.

Chancellor began by lengthy exposition of German concerns about Test Ban Treaty. He pointed out that:

1. In this new treaty provision had been made for three depositary states rather than one as in 1962 draft tabled at Geneva.
2. In Article 4 there was specific language “in exercising national sovereignty”, whereas 1962 text withdrawal article contained no such language. These four words were superfluous. Quite clearly Soviets had put them in the treaty, as well as providing for three depositaries, in order to take care of Soviet Zone. If in “exercising national sovereignty”, Soviet zone could in a year withdraw from treaty, then by implication it now had such “national sovereignty”. Acceptance of these words would have very bad effect on reunification prospects, and ran counter to repeated assurances received from US that Federal Republic alone entitled to speak for German people as a whole.
3. Therefore German Government had great hesitation re adherence to treaty though, in view of US leadership in achieving treaty, government would like very much to be able to adhere. Bundestag and Bundesrat approval would be necessary. Chancellor estimated that four-fifths of CDU/CSU faction in Bundestag was against adherence. He also referred to evidence from SPD refugee leader that SPD also had serious

objections. Thus chances of getting a decent majority, or even a majority, for adherence in Bundestag were not favorable.

Secretary responded by stressing:

1. US believes very strongly that human survival depended on finding some way, step by step, to bring nuclear weapons under control. We signed treaty because we thought it was in US interests. We were not trying to dictate to Federal Republic which had to make its own decision regarding adherence to treaty. We also believed signature of treaty was in interest of general community of states, and hoped Federal Republic would find itself able to join many states which would sign or adhere to it.
2. One factor which moved us toward more general type of disarmament arrangement, such as Test Ban Treaty, was desire to avoid anything that would discriminate specifically against Germany. That is why we would want world-wide agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. As Chancellor aware, Soviets had pressed us on this later point repeatedly within German and Berlin context.
3. Another aspect of particular importance to us was Mainland China. We looked to day when country of 700 million people would acquire own nuclear weapons. We were practically only power which has existing commitments to neighboring countries and would have to deal with this problem when it arises. Therefore we had strong incentive to try to bring all possible pressure on Red China to try to avoid its development of nuclear weapons. This had, however, confronted us with certain complexities which also had bearing on GDR problem. We did not recognize Peiping, but would not want formal considerations to give Red China an excuse for not adhering to test ban. We believed that international law and practice is clear on point that adherence to multilateral treaty does not involve recognition of signers who are not recognized.
4. We are and have been concerned with problem of Soviet Zone, not just because of Federal Republic but on our own account. Of all NATO members, we had least to do with GDR and have done least to give it status. We do not believe its status would be changed by this treaty or by deposit of signature only in Moscow.

5. Re point on Article 4, this was a shortened substitute for Article 3 of earlier draft. Actually Soviets had objected strongly to any clause in treaty on withdrawal, claiming that any signatory could exercise its national sovereignty and simply denounce treaty. We wanted to put some limit on such exercise of sovereignty and felt ability to withdraw from treaty should be qualified in advance. Therefore we valued some withdrawal procedure. If Soviets resumed testing, we would not limit our action to withdrawal but would regard treaty as so injured in central point that we would not be bound by it. Words “in exercising national sovereignty” thus were remnant of Soviet argument that sovereignty itself gives right of withdrawal. These words did not come up in any way in connection with East German problem. We made clear throughout discussion that nothing in this treaty could affect our nonrecognition policy towards GDR. Soviets on their part had some harsh things to say re Nationalist China.
6. We expected to make our attitude on these matters clear in presentation to Senate.

Adenauer said there seemed to be agreement that four words “in exercising national sovereignty” were fully superfluous in text. Their inclusion was good example of Soviet mastery of dialectics, which should be studied by all officers of Foreign Ministries.

At this point the Secretary asked Chayes to read portions of statement to be made before Senate in article-by-article review of provisions of treaty. After Chayes had concluded, Chancellor commented that mental acrobatics involved in formulations which he had just heard were excellent. Whoever had written them did not need any further study of dialectics. Chancellor questioned specifically what US would do if Soviets transmitted GDR adherence. Chayes quoted text of proposed statement to Senate that we would not accept such notification. Adenauer queried as to what specific reply to Soviets would be. After some discussion, Chayes pointed out that our thinking was that it would be along line of reply which we had given Swiss at time of transmission of GDR adherence to Geneva prisoners of war convention.² We said that we did not recognize GDR but, because of kind of agreement it was, we took note of fact that GDR had stated

intention to abide by provisions of convention. Federal Republic, he pointed out, had sent practically identical note to Swiss at that time.

Carstens then summarized for Chancellor conclusions which Chayes and German Foreign Office legal experts had arrived at earlier in afternoon as follows:

1. GDR subscription to treaty in Moscow would create no contractual relationship between US and GDR. Thus GDR would not be recognized and would not be a treaty partner with respect to US.
2. GDR takes only a unilateral commitment to abide by provisions of treaty.
3. GDR therefore has no right to participate in procedures envisaged in treaty.
4. US will send back notification of GDR adherence received from Soviets with appropriate statement.³

Adenauer was obviously impressed by clear US position. He asked whether we believed UK held same views. Chayes responded that all these points had not been discussed specifically with British, since in talks with German legal experts penetration into problem had been much deeper. However, he supposed British would not have any objections to this analysis as the logical consequence of three-depositaries arrangement. Secretary observed that UK had participated in Moscow discussions on recognition which foreshadowed this result.

Carstens added that US would also transmit position which he had explained to third countries to help influence their attitudes analogously.

Chancellor commented that, on basis of this analysis, he thought he could carry through German adherence with his people. Secretary said he was happy to hear this. We were prepared to work further on points that might arise. We would keep in close touch with Federal Government. Although we tried to anticipate all questions, Senate committee hearings might bring out a few we had not thought of. He urged complete secrecy as to his intended remarks to Senate, since it would be highly embarrassing to have members of committee read what he was going to say to them beforehand in press. Chancellor concluded discussion by remarking that Secretary had not come to Bonn in vain.

Comment: At dinner this evening, Chancellor during toast noted that visit had been successful in producing a basis for positive German action on adherence. Foreign Office officials present were obviously elated. Some were talking in terms of German signature of treaty before it went into effect rather than mere adherence. German Cabinet meets on Monday,⁴ and they hope definitive decision will be taken then. Foreign Affairs Committee of Bundestag will convene on Friday.⁵

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. The source text does not indicate a transmission time; the telegram was received at 10:56 p.m. and relayed to White House at 11:30 p.m.

¹ The memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

² The German Democratic Republic had adhered on November 30, 1956, to the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva on August 12, 1949. For text, see 6 UST 3316.

³ This the United States did in a note dated August 16, 1963. For partial text, see *Treaties in Force*, 1964, p. 264.

⁴ August 13.

⁵ In an August 17 letter to Kennedy, Adenauer stated that his Cabinet had that day decided to accede to the treaty. The Federal Republic welcomed cessation of nuclear tests as much as any country, and had to that extent welcomed the treaty from the outset, but had had misgivings rising from its need to "keep alive the hope of those who are still forced to live under Communist coercion." The Chancellor asked that in future East-West negotiations the Federal Republic be consulted "sufficiently early" so as to avoid situations "such as the one we have just overcome." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1963-1964 vol. II) In his August 19 reply, Kennedy acknowledged the need to "maintain the closest contacts on future problems of mutual interest." (*Ibid.*, President

Kennedy and Johnson's Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964
Vol. II)

362. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, August 13, 1963.

SUBJECT

Meeting with JCS on Test Ban

At their request, the Secretary met with the JCS at 11:00 a.m. on August 13 to follow up on the Secretary's letter of August 2 in reply to General Taylor's letter of July 27¹ on certain questions of the JCS with respect to the test ban treaty. All members of the JCS, including General Shoup, were present as well as General Ingelido, secretary to the JCS. In addition to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, and William Foster, Director of ACDA, were present.

In reply to a question on the subject, the Secretary categorically stated that Article I of the treaty in no way inhibited our ability to use nuclear weapons in either general or limited hostilities and pointed out that this had been made categorically clear in the President's speech,² the Secretary's speech at the time of signing the treaty,³ the President's message transmitting the treaty to the Senate,⁴ and the Secretary's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee.⁵ It was not a "ban the bomb" treaty. Mr. Harriman stated that, when he had raised the subject with Gromyko, the latter had appeared to be baffled as to our reason for raising the question.⁶

In reply to questions with respect to Plowshare, the Secretary stated that we were entitled under the treaty to go ahead with underground experimentation for Plowshare and that Plowshare operations would not be prohibited if the dispersal of fission products downwind did not contravene the terms of the treaty. He understood that one of the objectives of the AEC with respect to Plowshare was to minimize and direct fission products from Plowshare explosions downward into the earth. He thought, for example, that under the treaty we and Panama could probably agree to the use of nuclear explosions to dig a new canal as long as the fission products did not extend beyond Panama. However, Orion would clearly be prohibited.

In response to questions from General LeMay as to whether the explosion of a device placed “one foot underground” would constitute an atmospheric explosion prohibited under the treaty or would be classed as an underground explosion, particularly if it was a “clean” weapon without fission products, the Secretary said that the answer was not foreclosed but he felt it would not be wise to attempt to codify all the many possible contingencies and he would prefer to leave this question open as he had attempted to do in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. However, it was quite clear that one could not put a little dirt over a weapon and call it an underground test as a pretext for what was in fact an atmospheric test. One foot was probably too shallow, but he was not willing at this time to attempt to define what would be “deep enough”.

In response to a question by General Taylor on the definition of “extraordinary events”, the Secretary stated that the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union would clearly be such an event. A single explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists would not necessarily be such an event but he did not feel there would be “much life left in the treaty” if the Chinese Communists undertook extensive testing. On the other hand, a massive conventional aggression such as a Chinese Communist attack on Korea might well be considered such an event if we so desired. The Secretary pointed out that, against Soviet opposition, we had held firm for a very flexible withdrawal provision such as the present clause, and he felt that it was imperative that we maintain a high state of readiness for resuming testing in the atmosphere in the event the treaty was abrogated. The Secretary did not feel that the Soviets would automatically abrogate the treaty in the event of a French atmospheric test and, in any event, he understood that it would probably be a year or two before the French would engage in such tests. However, it would of course be up to the Soviet Union what it did in the face of French testing.

Mr. Ball pointed out that, under the treaty, the test was not only whether it was an “extraordinary event” but also whether it jeopardized national security.

Mr. Harriman pointed out that the Soviets regard the French problem as being different from that of Communist China and that the Soviets are very

anxious to bring maximum pressure on Communist China.

The Secretary emphasized that he had tried to warn people not to read too much into the treaty and that, while the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets now appear to be very deep, such totalitarian regimes are capable of reversing course overnight, and again emphasized the importance of our maintaining a high state of readiness to resume tests if the necessity should arise.

In reply to a question from General LeMay on what the Secretary saw as the political advantages of the treaty, the Secretary stated that it could contribute to what appears to be a split between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists and that it may lead to further favorable developments in our relations with the Soviets. Khrushchev was in trouble at home over the allocation of Soviet resources as between military and civilian needs and may be attempting to hold back the pace of nuclear developments which are making heavy resource demands on the Soviet economy. However, the worst thing possible would be to regard this treaty as ending the cold war and becoming euphoric about it. At best, it is only a step. It remains to be seen whether there can be other steps. The Secretary remarked parenthetically that Khrushchev had told him he was planning to reduce the Soviet military budget but of course it is very difficult to know whether he in fact does so.

The Secretary said that it was likely the question would be raised as to whether the JCS were consulted with respect to the treaty and noted that he had been asked why a representative of the JCS was not present at the Moscow negotiations. In this connection the Secretary noted that the substance of the Moscow negotiations was very tightly controlled from Washington and that the job in Moscow was largely one of negotiating the draft. Thus, the substantive decisions were being made in Washington. In this connection, General Taylor noted that he had been given access to the communications from our negotiating delegation in Moscow, had briefed the other members of the JCS on them, and there had been opportunity to enter objections if anyone desired. The Secretary noted that we had tabled essential elements of this treaty a year ago in Geneva, that it would be understandable if during the interim the Joint Staff had not focused on the

subject in the belief that nothing was really going to come of the proposal, and also during the past year attention had been focused on the inspection provisions of a comprehensive treaty as well as on the problems of a super-bomb. He suggested that it would be well for ACDA and the JCS to arrange a review of the proposals that are now on the table at Geneva. Mr. Foster said he would arrange this and noted that Khrushchev had expressed interest in the control of military budgets and a proposal for a study of this under appropriate conditions was ready to be tabled at Geneva.

General Taylor made available to the Secretary the agreed JCS views on the treaty⁷ and stated that in general they have no problem except with the statement, as contained in the President's message of transmittal to the Senate, to the effect that the United States will be better off security-wise under this treaty than under a condition of unlimited testing.⁸ He said that, speaking in a strict military sense, they have some trouble with this, while recognizing that in a wider political sense it may be correct.

After a quick perusal, the Secretary indicated satisfaction with the JCS statement of their views and said he felt that their concerns had been covered in the positions being taken by the Administration.⁹

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson on August 15.

¹ Rusk's August 2 letter has not been found. Taylor's July 27 letter is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, Congressional Relations I, 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.

² See [footnote 2](#), [Document 353](#).

³ Text transmitted in Secto 39 from Moscow, August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)

⁴ Dated August 8; printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 622-624.

⁵ Given on August 12; printed in *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, pp. 10-25.

⁶ See paragraph 3, [Document 353](#).

⁷ The unclassified version of this statement forms part of Taylor's testimony given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 15; see *ibid.*, pp. 272-276. A classified version dated August 12 is enclosure A to JCS 1731/711-30, JMF 3050 (26 July 63) Sec 3. A copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 15, Post Trip.

⁸ An analysis of this aspect of the President's message is in an August 13 memorandum from Major Smith to General Taylor. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File)

⁹ Other information given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the administration includes the enclosures to two letters from Wiesner to Taylor dated August 6 and 8. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban and the U.S. Military) With a letter to Senator Pastore dated August 14, Bundy enclosed a memorandum setting forth the White House view on "the relation of the anti-ballistic-missile problem to the limited test ban treaty." (*Ibid.*, Test Ban, Congressional)

363. Memorandum for the Record [Source](#)

Washington, August 13, 1963.

On August 13, at 4:30, the President and Dr. Seaborg discussed a number of matters relating to future policy under the limited test ban treaty.

1. The President made it clear that the U.S. will maintain an active program of underground testing; total yields of such testing are expected to be greater than in recent years. The President stated that he expects to approve all underground tests which have substantial value for the national security, and that the underground testing program as a whole will be such as to ensure continued vitality in the two great laboratories.
2. Dr. Seaborg presented a number of alternative levels of readiness for resumed testing in the environments prohibited by the test ban in the event of violation by others, or U.S. withdrawal. The President decided that the U.S. ought to maintain a readiness for very prompt proof testing in the event of violation by others, and a readiness for development and effects testing in all three environments, beginning not more than three months after a decision to resume such testing.
3. The President decided that existing and planned preparations for the maintenance of Johnston Island as a base for such test readiness should be made public promptly.
4. The President and Dr. Seaborg agreed that the French nuclear weapons program satisfies the technical criteria for cooperation in this field under the McMahon Act.
5. The President and Dr. Seaborg agreed that Dr. Seaborg could draw fully on these decisions and conclusions in his public testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the limited test ban treaty.^{[1](#)} It was further agreed that Dr. Seaborg would refer all questions relating to political aspects of our relations with France to the Department of State.

McG. B.^{[2](#)}

* Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 8/63. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.

¹ For Seaborg's testimony before this Committee on August 14, see *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, pp. 205-269.

² Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

364. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Russell) [Source](#)

Washington, August 23, 1963.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Set forth below is the Top Secret annex to my letter to you of this date.^{[1](#)}

In addition to the assurances and standards concerning Safeguard (a),^{[2](#)} which I set out in my unclassified letter, the following can be said about existing plans to maintain a vigorous underground test program:^{[3](#)}

The fiscal year 1964 underground test program was [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] tests. (The monies to fund this testing program are provided for in the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission appropriation bills, at present awaiting action by the Congress.) This figure of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] somewhat low in view of the addition of the requirements which flow from the new restrictions on atmospheric tests to the requirements that already exist for the underground program. Although it is the quality rather than the number of tests which is of primary importance, the requirements for testing in the immediate future will probably average [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] tests per month. As a result of changing needs, added experience, and improved techniques, this estimate may change in either direction.

Actions are now being taken preparatory to augmenting the current (Niblick) underground test program and future programs to include additional underground tests of higher yield as well as more elaborate and complex effects tests. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] The Niblick underground program will also be continued in the area of nuclear weapons research, and in the development of [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

The AEC, in conjunction with the DOD, will develop new techniques for effects testing underground. Current techniques for warhead vulnerability testing will be improved. Continuous study will seek to develop methods of conducting meaningful effects tests beyond those associated with the warhead itself. In addition, component and precursor tests directed at strengthening our readiness to resume atmospheric testing on short notice will be carried out.

With respect to Safeguard (d), I state in my unclassified letter that the intelligence community has increased its activities and will continue to increase its activities to cope with the new conditions under the treaty. I state also that the Administration has under consideration proposals by which our present Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) resources can be augmented to enhance our capabilities. The proposals now being reviewed, placed in the context of present and programmed capabilities of the AEDS, can be summarized as follows:

Meaning of "Threshold." It is necessary to realize, in the first instance, that there are no sharp "thresholds" marking the limits of the capability to detect and identify nuclear events. A country might make the judgment that it would consider a detection and identification system to be good if it could identify events with $3/4$ probability. This would give a potential violator a $1/4$ chance of getting by with a violation and a $3/4$ chance of getting caught. Whether a potential violator would be deterred by a $3/4$ chance of getting caught requires a separate judgment, which depends on many factors—political, military, etc.—and would involve an assessment of the incentives he has to cheat, as well as the risks attendant to discovery of the violation. If, for a given set of conditions, a shot could be identified as such with a $3/4$ probability, then a shot would have to be of substantially lower yield to have a $3/4$ probability of evading identification. One could call the latter the "threshold of evasion," and it is clearly substantially lower than the former, the "threshold of identification."

The estimated thresholds given in this letter, except where clearly labeled otherwise, are "thresholds of identification." That is, they reflect a requirement for a high probability of identification. For a high probability of evasion, all thresholds would be substantially reduced.

Tests in the Atmosphere, at High Altitude, and in Space. The AEDS has a current capability of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions between the surface and 10 km altitude with a 60-90% probability for 5 KT within the USSR and China and for 200-500 KT in the least favorable remote areas of the world. At other altitude ranges, by the end of FY 64 the programmed AEDS will include essentially all of the facilities needed to detect and identify with that same confidence nuclear tests of the yields indicated in columns (2) and (4) of the table which appears on the next page.⁴

As can be seen from the table, the threshold of the programmed system for detection and identification of nuclear tests at various altitudes varies from as small as 1 KT to as large as 100 KT at some altitudes over the USSR and China. And, since the programmed AEDS has been oriented primarily toward detection of tests in the USSR and China, its programmed capabilities for tests from the low atmosphere to as high as 10,000 km in remote areas of the Southern Hemisphere show thresholds as large as a megaton or more for high confidence of detection and identification.

The system will be improved as necessary, taking into account the considerable difficulties for the USSR and China in successfully carrying out useful clandestine tests in remote areas. The improvement can be made by programming additional ground-based detection stations, utilizing a variety of geophysical detection methods with which AEDS has had experience. The AEDS can be augmented to produce the detection and identification thresholds indicated under columns (3) and (5) of the table on page 4. With such detection and identification thresholds applicable, tests throughout the altitude ranges and geophysical areas indicated would have to be conducted at yields in the very low kiloton range in order to have high confidence in escaping detection.

Also, as indicated by Secretary McNamara in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 13, it is within the capability of US technology to supplement this ground-based detection network by satellite-based sensors. No decision has been made with respect to satellites, and their possible contribution is not reflected in the table. Such satellites would detect radiations from nuclear tests in the atmosphere and space. The combined system would force a violator to even lower

yields to escape detection between the surface of the earth and 1 million km and, with the extreme sensitivity considered possible with satellite-based detectors, would force him to test at 10s or even 100s of millions of kilometers from the earth to avoid detection by the combined system. A simplified system of satellites, if found to be necessary, could provide a substantial enhancement to the identification capability of the ground-based system. A satellite designed to provide information essential to such a system is scheduled for launch in September or October.

Underwater

The seismic element of the AEDS can detect underwater tests of about 0.5 KT in the territorial waters and seas adjacent to the USSR and China, and of about 0.5-10 KT in ocean areas remote from the USSR and China. This capability could be improved by installation of a hydroacoustic system. This system would provide capability for detecting tests as low as a small fraction of 1 KT throughout most of the open oceans of the world down to depths of about 3,000 feet. The addition of a water sampling capability would permit identification of nuclear tests in the oceans through identifying radioactive debris obtained by sampling the waters.

Underground

The existing seismic component of the AEDS has a detection threshold for fully tamped underground explosions in the USSR of about 1 KT for explosions in hard rock such as granite, with the threshold yield increasing in less consolidated rocks until it rises to about 10-20 KT in dry alluvium. The system can determine the location of the explosion site within 5-50 kilometers in the USSR. The lower number corresponds to those areas where previous data have provided a calibration. The capability of the seismic system to distinguish between underground nuclear tests and many earthquakes is limited. During a period when all tests but those underground are banned, the likelihood is that the USSR will accelerate its underground testing program. It is important therefore that the AEDS be capable of providing improved intelligence on the number and yields of Soviet tests being conducted underground. Since these tests would be permitted under the Treaty, it is reasonable to assume that, for reasons of economy, these

tests would take place at the known Soviet testing sites. Such tests would be reported by the AEDS as having occurred at a particular known test site.

Study of the problem indicates that the seismic portion of the AEDS can be augmented to improve the detection threshold by about a factor of two and to improve the precision of epicenter location. Improvement in this direction will be made. A proposal for accomplishing it is to accelerate the change-over from existing equipment to improved equipment, to install three additional high-class stations, to incorporate one existing research station with the AEDS, and to construct one new station with somewhat simpler instrumentation.

I hope that the details in this letter, together with the assurances and standards in the unclassified letter, provide you with the information you desired.

Sincerely,

Roswell Gilpatric

^{*} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban and the U.S. Military. Top Secret.

¹ For text of the letter, see *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, pp. 977-981.

² For enumeration of the safeguards, see *ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

³ In his unclassified letter, Gilpatric stated that the “standards established governing the type and magnitude of tests to be conducted will not be more restrictive than the spirit of the treaty limitations.” In Major Smith’s memorandum of the White House daily staff meeting on August 21, Bundy was reported as saying, with regard to a proposed definition of what constituted an underground test, that “we should keep our position [on the definition of an underground test] indefinite because we do not know what the needs for testing will be 10 years from now. He said the success of treaties depended on their ‘artful interpretation’ and made it clear that we

will leave as many things as open-ended as we can.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-204-69, Chairman’s Staff Group August 1963)

⁴ For text of the table, entitled “Programmed and Augmented Capabilities of AEDS to Detect and Identify Nuclear Tests with 60-90% Probability,” see the Supplement.

365. Editorial Note

In a conversation held at the White House on August 26, 1963, President Kennedy discussed a number of issues with Ambassador Dobrynin. Regarding possible atmospheric testing by other powers, Llewellyn Thompson's memorandum of the conversation reads as follows: "Dobrynin said that when Harriman was in Moscow, he had mentioned an exchange of letters between the President and General de Gaulle. He asked whether the President thought the French would continue tests.

"The President replied that he thought that for the next year or so the French would only test under ground. He said he had written to General de Gaulle to see if there was some way he could assist him in being able to subscribe to the Test Ban. The General had replied that he thought any assistance we could give would only be under limitations that were unacceptable to him. The President expressed the opinion he did not think General de Gaulle wanted assistance. He then asked Dobrynin what China would do about testing.

"Dobrynin said he did not know, but that the Soviets were not worried. He said how many bombs could the Chinese acquire?

"The President pointed out that they would not need many, and thought their position would be somewhat like that of the French.

"Dobrynin admitted that the Chinese felt entitled to have some bombs of their own, but that this would not affect the balance of power. He thought that when they had acquired some bombs and saw the effects of them, they would be more cautious.

"The President observed that the Soviets appeared to be worried about the Germans five or ten years from now and said that we had to think about the Chinese over a similar period of time." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) The full text of this memorandum is printed in [volume V, Document 213](#) . For the exchange of correspondence between Kennedy and de Gaulle, see [Documents 352](#) and [358](#).

366. Editorial Note

On September 24, 1963, the U.S. Senate gave its consent to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, with no reservations, by a vote of 80 to 19. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had previously approved the treaty by a vote of 16 to 1 on August 29 and reported it out on September 4. President Kennedy signed the instruments of ratification on October 7, and the treaty entered into force on October 10 when the instruments of ratification were exchanged in similar ceremonies in Washington, Moscow, and London. (14 UST 1313)

Concerning the ratification process, see *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, on Executive M* (Washington, 1963) and *The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1963), which was issued on September 3.

Although it did not have formal jurisdiction in the matter, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services also heard testimony on the treaty and issued a negative report on September 3. See *Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, Parts 1 and 2* (Washington, 1964) and *Investigation of the Preparedness Program: Interim Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Under the Authority of S. Res. 75 (88th Cong., 1st Sess.) on the Military Implications of the Proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (Washington, 1963).

367. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the White House[Source](#)

Washington, October 4, 1963.

Following is a summary of the meeting yesterday evening, 6-8 p.m., between the Secretary of State, Gromyko, and Lord Home.^{[1](#)}

They first discussed the banning of nuclear weapons in outer space and rapidly agreed to tell the press that agreement on this had been reached in principle and that the appropriate form of the agreement^{[2](#)} would be worked out later. Gromyko then asked that an agreement on a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers be concluded “in the spirit of the Moscow treaty.” Home pressed Gromyko on the possibility of the Soviet Government making a parallel declaration guaranteeing the security of West Berlin but Gromyko reacted strongly against this. He said Berlin was part of a bigger problem and that it was totally unacceptable to the Soviet Government to specify West Berlin, or any other individual problem. Gromyko then said “under any circumstances, whether an NAP is concluded or not, we insist that we must move forward with the task of signing a peace treaty for Germany.” He repeated that signing a nonaggression pact would create a more favorable atmosphere for the solution of other problems which had not yet been solved, and he mentioned specifically Laos. The Secretary and Lord Home continued to press Gromyko on connecting Berlin with an NAP, without success. It was then agreed to leave the matter for the time being.

Gromyko then raised his proposal for the reduction of military budgets. The Secretary of State and Lord Home pointed out the major difficulty of establishing a basis for a realistic comparison of items listed in different budgets. This would need an elaborate system of checks and inspection. Gromyko continued to insist that there should be proportionate reduction. Home suggested to Gromyko that further studies might be made to see if it were possible to find a basis for comparison of budgets. Gromyko said that if the questions of verification and control were introduced this would

complicate matters hopelessly. The Secretary suggested that the best way of bringing about the reduction of military budgets was to make a real progress in disarmament and hoped that Gromyko would give some thought to the US proposal for the mutual destruction of certain weapons, e.g.: bombers. Gromyko objected that this was a different subject and came under the heading of “reduction of armaments.” The Secretary said that he was prepared to ask Mr. Foster to come to New York to have confidential talks with Soviet officials to see whether progress might be made on finding a basis for comparison of budgets. He said the US could not just agree to a percentage reduction, such as Gromyko had suggested.

The Secretary then referred to observation posts and said these were being considered carefully in NATO. He asked Gromyko what he had meant by saying that these should be “coordinated with other measures.” Gromyko said flatly that observation posts would only be useful if accompanied by certain practical measures: (1) reduction of forces, and (2) denuclearized zones. Altogether, he said, these measures would be effective in promoting confidence. Otherwise it would not be useful to have observation posts. To have observation posts separately would just create suspicion, and “this would be one-sided and not objective.” Lord Home maintained that observation posts would have value by themselves but Gromyko said that to maintain great concentrations of troops at the same time would not be statesmanlike. The Secretary spoke on nuclear-free zones and said that there were two areas, Latin America and Africa, which could be considered to meet the criteria for genuinely free zones: (1) no launching sites for nuclear weapons, and (2) the zone would not be a likely target for nuclear weapons. He said that for Germany to be really nuclear-free we must first solve those very problems which make Germany a likely target area.

Nondissemination was briefly discussed. Gromyko said it was a serious problem and that the MLF was a serious obstacle, so it was not possible to say anything publicly which would make it seem as though agreement had been reached on nondissemination, whereas in reality there was disagreement.

Gromyko said he regretted that the United States and the UK had not advanced any new proposals on Germany which would facilitate their task.

As for disarmament, “the general state of this problem could not be worse.” He said that sometimes the Soviet Government wondered whether it was worthwhile continuing discussions in Geneva. He said there were nothing but speeches there and that everybody went round in a circle. He asked that his remarks not be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Union intended to withdraw from the Geneva talks. He said Western powers were not approaching the problem of disarmament seriously. Even when the Soviet Union raised the possibility of a reduction of military budgets, Western powers immediately raised objections.

The discussion concluded with arrangements as to what the press should be told.

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates Ball saw this memorandum.

¹ A 15-page memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Akalovsky, is *ibid.*, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

² According to Akalovsky’s memorandum, Rusk told Gromyko that while there was agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not to put “weapons of mass destruction” on the moon or in outer space, the United States had “the problem of form” because it had “just gone through the test ban debate in Congress.”

368. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara [Source](#)

Washington, October 8, 1963.

JCSM-776-63

SUBJECT

Criteria for Militarily Acceptable Comprehensive Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals (U)

1. In April and May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed provisions of the US “Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World,” the treaty outline which was tabled by the United States at Geneva on 18 April 1962.¹ In JCSM-389-62, dated 19 May 1962,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff delineated certain deficiencies in the treaty which made it contrary to US interests. In August 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered their previous positions and observed that, although subsequent studies might cause them to alter these views, the positions remained valid. Concurrently, they considered criteria for determining the military acceptability of any disarmament proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it is timely to correlate these actions and state their current views on the tabled draft treaty outline.
2. In addressing arms control and disarmament proposals in the past, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have found that certain carefully considered criteria have proved useful when applied to specific proposals. Such criteria which pertain to a comprehensive disarmament treaty are listed in the Appendix.³ (These criteria would not necessarily apply unmodified to a limited disarmament treaty.) When the principal provisions of the US treaty outline are evaluated against these criteria, they are found deficient in supporting the national interest in the following respects:
 - a. There is no specific provision for participation in Stage I by Communist China or all other militarily significant states.
 - b. There is no provision for an effective control organization to be operational prior to start of Stage I reductions or limitations.

- c. The treaty outline describes a verification system (Zonal Inspection Concept) which has not been tested, evaluated, and proved reliable even on a limited test basis.
 - d. Armaments are listed by categories in a manner which could be disadvantageous to the United States; that is, the categories highlight strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (Cat. 1 and 2) and AICBM's (Cat. 5).
 - e. Stage I limitations on armaments production preclude modernization of authorized retained armaments and the testing of prototypes of new armaments.
 - f. The treaty outline does not contain a withdrawal clause which would permit US withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay.
3. It is noted that at the end of Stage III, the United States would be dependent upon the United Nations for defense against aggression. The extent of this treaty far exceeds any measures the United States has been willing to take in the past in its relations with other nations of the world. The negotiations conducted to date suggest that General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), with its very serious limitations on sovereignty, is not attainable within the foreseeable future and should not be the objective of a proposed treaty text at the present time. It appears rather that GCD should stand as an ultimate goal and that we should turn our attention toward the achievement of more feasible agreements. In the present state of the world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to entrusting the defense of the United States to the United Nations or any outside agency.
4. As interest in GCD has waned, the interest in negotiating separate measures has grown. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have long advocated that disarmament should progress by phased and safeguarded measures designed to approach disarmament gradually, and to provide the USSR an opportunity to display its sincerity. Such partial steps would be conducive to the decline which must precede substantial disarmament. Any effective arms control measure must have a verification system capable of insuring compliance with the provisions of the agreement, and this system must be in operation at the time the agreement becomes effective. Risk of war (ROW) measures which might be acceptable to both sides could constitute the beginning of an inspection system, one which could later be extended to the verification of disarmament measures.

5.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that arms control proposals could be planned which would meet their criteria, be acceptable to our Allies, provide a basis for subsequent agreement on an arms control program, and be more negotiable than the treaties now dormant in Geneva. Such proposals could commence with an agreement on an observation post plan. If this plan could not be negotiated in its entirety, other ROW measures could also be considered. The following list might be suitable subjects for negotiation with the Soviets:

- a. Observation posts with limited mobility.
- b. Partial aerial surveillance.
- c. Mobile observation teams.
- d. Full aerial surveillance.

After these measures had been in effect and tested for a sufficient period, both sides would have the nucleus of an inspection system for arms control agreements. If verification is accomplished in small steps through the successful implementation of the ROW measures then other arms control measures could be considered.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in its totality, the US treaty outline presents unwarranted risk to the security of the United States because of the vague, incomplete, and untested safeguards described therein, and consider that entering into such a treaty would be detrimental to US interests. They suggest that some limited disarmament measures could be undertaken after a framework for verification has been established and preferably after ROW agreements have proved effective.⁴

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor⁵

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁴ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament. Secret.

¹ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.

² [Document 185](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ In a November 7 letter to Foster, McNamara agreed that general and complete disarmament was not attainable within the foreseeable future and that the United States should turn its attention toward the achievement of more feasible arrangements. He also supported the JCS arguments that controls needed additional study, that the proposed zonal inspection system was inadequate, and that the treaty outline should contain a withdrawal clause that would permit U.S. withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament)

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates General Taylor signed the original.

369. Editorial Note

The Committee of Principals considered the “bombs in orbit” proposal on October 8, 1963. The memorandum of the meeting indicates that the United States had introduced the term “weapons of mass destruction” in preference to “nuclear weapons” because there was concern, apparently in the Department of Defense, to leave the way open for orbiting nuclear anti-satellite systems, even though Rusk pointed out and the JCS acknowledged that putting some nuclear weapons in orbit would involve withdrawing from the arrangement. According to the memorandum, Nitze stated that while no one had a clear idea “of why we needed to leave the interpretation open,” the main concern was weapons of mass destruction and “there seemed to be no reason to tie our hands on other weapons.” Rusk “said that the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ would be generally understood to include all nuclear weapons. If we were asked whether this were the case and if we said anything but ‘yes,’ we had better not go into the arrangement at all.” The JCS representative then agreed with this position. On this point, a memorandum of the meeting’s conclusion reads: “‘Weapons of mass destruction’ would have to be interpreted as including all nuclear weapons. The U.S. could accept specific reference to nuclear weapons should the Soviet Union prefer that approach.”

At the meeting, Under Secretary Ball reported that President Kennedy thought that the agreement should not take the form of an executive agreement and that a General Assembly resolution “would avoid Congressional problems.” It was then agreed that the United States would make an accompanying statement which would take the place of any withdrawal clause such as would appear in a more formal agreement. (Memorandum of meeting and memorandum of conclusions, both October 8 and both drafted by W.E. Cathright of ACDA/IR; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals) Both are in the Supplement. A packet of materials embodying these recommendations was subsequently forwarded to the White House. (Memorandum with attachments from Foster to Rusk, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)

Regarding decisions reached by Kennedy and Gromyko at a meeting held on October 10, see the source note, [Document 370](#).

For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), “Stationing Weapons of Mass Destruction in Outer Space,” adopted by acclamation on October 17, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, page 538. Ambassador Stevenson’s accompanying statement dated October 16 is *ibid.*, pages 535-537. See [also Document 371](#).

370. Memorandum of Conversation [Source](#)

Washington, October 10, 1963, 4–6:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to make some comments on the problem of disarmament. Noting that disarmament negotiations had been going on for years on end, he said that the Soviet Government sometimes wondered whether there was any use discussing disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. However, he pointed out that this remark should not be interpreted as meaning that the USSR would not continue to participate in the work of that Committee. He said he had raised the disarmament problem not in order to start arguing about, but because the USSR believed the situation in this field could not be worse. As to the arguments used by both sides in discussing this problem, these were well known to both of them and indeed could be referred to by number. He wondered what the President's view was as to what could be done in this area. Although perhaps not all the problems in disarmament field could be resolved right away, the Soviet Union believed that the approach of general and complete disarmament was realistic, because if disarmament were to be taken up in pieces many difficulties would arise, such as change in the correlation of forces, etc.

The President agreed that since both our countries had subscribed to the concept of general and complete disarmament, they ought to stay at it in Geneva, although not much progress had been made so far. He hoped the Soviet Union would stay. He said he was not very optimistic that we would disarm totally in one or even three stages, but he believed that it was psychologically good to keep working at this problem because this did have some influence on the levels of arms.

Mr. Gromyko asked whether there was any chance of France's participating in the discussion.

The President observed that de Gaulle had made some proposals, with the details of which we were not familiar. He said he did not know what chance there was of the French joining in the discussion.

The Secretary said he wished to make two comments on this point: first, he believed that Geneva was a convenient forum for us to talk. Some of our allies were there and we could make preparations for our discussions more easily. Thus the Geneva arrangement could help us to move ahead. The second comment he wanted to make was that in spite of this we were not committed to any particular forum. In other words, while we had not heard anything from them on this score, if the French were to say that they would join, but not in Geneva, we should see what other useful arrangement could be made. However, now we should go ahead in Geneva unless something better should come along.¹

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by S on October 16 and by the White House on October 21. The ending time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) Separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on the subjects of Cuba, Berlin, steps to be taken after the Test Ban Treaty, U.S.-USSR relations, U.S.-USSR trade relations, nuclear non-dissemination, observation posts, the proposed non-aggression pact, military budgets, and bombs in orbit. Regarding the last, the President and Gromyko agreed that it should be handled in the form of an agreed U.S.-

Soviet draft U.N. resolution, perhaps to be cosponsored by other members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The memoranda of conversation on U.S.-USSR relations and U.S.-USSR trade relations are printed in [vol. V, Documents 222](#) and [223](#). The memorandum of conversation on Cuba is printed in [Volume XI](#); that on Berlin in [vol. XV, pp. 591-594](#).

¹ Rusk discussed disarmament again with Gromyko on the evening of October 10. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. See the Supplement. Rusk also discussed disarmament with Mikoyan in the course of a general conversation held the afternoon of November 26. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) A telegraphic report of the meeting is printed in [vol. V, Document 238](#).

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reconvene in 1963. For U.N. Resolution 1908 (XVIII) of November 27, regarding General and Complete Disarmament, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 624-625.

371. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions [Source](#)

Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:57 p.m.

691. Paris deliver Durbrow 8:00 a.m. October 16. General Assembly resolution being introduced probably sponsored by 17 active members ENDC, which would, in effect, call upon states to refrain from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons mass destruction in orbit around earth, from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, and from stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner.¹ In connection consideration of matter by General Assembly both U.S. and Soviet Union will make statements supporting resolution.

As appropriate and emphasizing such points as may be most useful locally, addressees may draw on following points in such public and private explanations of our approach this matter as may be considered necessary:

1. Resolution does not represent new policy for U.S. Our intention not to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit was first made clear in statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric September 5, 1962,² and has been confirmed by President and other U.S. spokesmen on number of occasions.
2. Our policy reflects our assessment that for foreseeable future placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction would not give military advantage to either side and that both sides have a mutual interest in avoiding race for such weapons. Following considerations are pertinent:
 - a. Chief problem presented by orbital vehicles carrying weapons mass destruction would for some time to come be psychological. Such weapons might be “terror” weapons but more costly and less effective militarily than ballistic missiles. We have neither need nor desire this type weapon and can safely rely on deterrent strength afforded by hardened and dispersed ICBM’s and mobile systems such as Polaris.
 - b. In building our deterrent forces, we have emphasized importance of eliminating any possibility of accident. Earth-based delivery systems

are more reliable and are more readily controlled than would be case with orbital systems. Accordingly, deployment of latter might increase risk of accidental war. All countries have interest in avoiding this.

3. Although we made our own intentions clear some time ago, Gromyko's statement of September 19 before the General Assembly³ (a year after Gilpatric's statement) was first clear indication Soviet intentions and of their willingness separate matter from other aspects arms control and disarmament. Since we not going to place bombs in orbit, it is in our interest and that of other countries to get Soviet Union clearly on record. While resolution would be a recommendation only and would not be legally binding, it would express view of GA that placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit undesirable. Since impact of such weapons would be primarily psychological rather than military, we think resolution will be useful political barrier to such a Soviet extension of arms race.
4. If the Soviet Union should, in violation of its declared intent, place bombs in orbit for psychological purposes, they would have to reveal presence of such weapons and would, of course, have to pay political price. Therefore, resolution is to some extent self-policing. We have capabilities for detecting presence of objects in orbit although without inspection it is not possible to be certain whether a particular object is carrying a weapon of mass destruction. We could detect any suspicious build-up of vehicles in orbits which might be suitable for deploying weapons mass destruction. Accordingly since threat is low, we prepared at present to rely on own capabilities.
5. It should be recognized that in rapidly advancing field such as exploration and use of outer space, unforeseen events might make it desirable have additional assurance at a future time. We would feel free seek such assurance as might be necessary and would, of course, retain freedom of action if satisfactory assurance were not forthcoming. FYI. In this connection, if asked why U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World calls for inspection of space vehicles whereas inspection not provided in resolution, you should point out that if deterrent forces were being substantially reduced under disarmament program, it would be important have full assurance weapons of mass destruction were not being placed in orbit. End FYI.

6. Since we did not plan to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit, resolution would not cause any alteration of our space activities. Nor would resolution relieve us of necessity of taking such precautions as may be necessary from standpoint our security, such as research and development on possible orbital systems which other side might at some time deploy and on appropriate countermeasures. Although we do not, therefore, intend let down our guard, we expect resolution will be a useful step in avoiding extension of arms race to outer space.

Rusk

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cathright and cleared in the Department by G/PM, ACDA, UNP, EUR, RPM, and P and by DOD/ISA, AEC, and the White House. Approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to the capitals of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Geneva, and USUN.

¹ See [Document 369](#).

² See [Document 226](#).

³ See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pp. 509-524.

372. National Security Action Memorandum No. 269 [Source](#)

Washington, October 31, 1963.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

SUBJECT

Procedure for Approval of Certain Nuclear Tests [1](#)

The President has directed that the following procedure be instituted for the review and approval of nuclear tests that might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test that is intended to be fully contained underground will be included in this category if there is a significant possibility that the test will place measurable amounts of radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the United States under circumstances in which the debris could be credibly related to the test. Any other nuclear test which by its nature could reasonably give rise to domestic or foreign charges of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency believes that the charges would prove to be unfounded.

1. In planning the nuclear test program, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense will make every effort to avoid tests that might be regarded as being a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is recognized that this will be a matter of judgment since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria as to the nature of prohibited tests.
2. If the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary of Defense believes after careful study that a particular test should remain in the program despite the possibility that it might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sponsoring agency will submit the test for review by a committee, under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs, composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, or their designated representatives.^{[2](#)}

3. In support of the proposals for each nuclear test of this type, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the reviewing committee a detailed study of the importance of the proposed test and the possible direct or indirect effects associated with the test that might be regarded as evidence of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The study of effects associated with the test will include an analysis of a) the anticipated distribution of particulate and gaseous radioactive debris under the full range of possible meteorological conditions; b) the extent to which blast, electromagnetic, and other direct radiation phenomena associated with the test will occur in the atmosphere; c) the possibility that various foreign countries would be able to detect the anticipated level of radioactive debris and other phenomena associated with the tests with their detection instrumentation; d) visible phenomena in the vicinity of the test site; and e) planned or expected publicity.
4. The reviewing committee will be given sufficient notice of proposals for nuclear tests of this type to permit adequate consideration by the committee and any necessary action with minimum impact on the program in question.
5. If the committee finds that the proposed test is acceptable under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the committee will submit its recommendation to the President for his approval. No test of this type will be conducted without the approval of the President after the procedure prescribed in this memorandum.^{[3](#)}

McGeorge Bundy

^{*}
² Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 269. Secret.

¹ In a May 15 memorandum to holders of NSAM No. 210, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had approved [*text not declassified*] for FY 1964. In an August 30 memorandum to the same group, however, Bundy stated that Kennedy had requested a review of that program. (Both *ibid.*, NSAM 210) Regarding NSAM No. 210, see [Document 259](#).

² In a November 6 memorandum to holders of NSAMs No. 210 and 269, McGeorge Bundy stated that because of the close similarity of the composition and functions of the committees established under those NSAMs, they would be combined into one “Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests.” Members were to be the same as those designated above, with the addition of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

³ [*text not declassified*] The paper describes at length measures taken to make the underground tests conform with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. (“AEC Actions To Insure Weapons Tests Will Be Conducted Within the Terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty”; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, General, Volume I)

373. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals [Source](#)

Washington, December 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

Draft U.S. Proposal for a Separable First Stage Disarmament Plan [1](#)

On January 21 the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) will be resumed. ACDA is currently up-dating a number of existing position papers. In some instances minor modifications or elaborations with respect to individual topics may be recommended. ACDA is also preparing a new paper dealing with proposals to establish observation posts to reduce the danger of surprise conventional attack. Within the next few days ACDA will forward the first of these position papers to the interested agencies.

The April 18, 1962 Treaty Outline [2](#) was submitted to the ENDC for the purpose of stimulating an informed discussion of the problems implicit in reaching the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This purpose has largely been achieved, with the result that the sense of the members of the ENDC is that while most of them still retain general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world as an ultimate goal, their primary interest is in discussing measures of arms control and disarmament which they hope can be accomplished in the foreseeable future; in a very real sense there is now general acceptance of the U.S. objective set forth at the time of the opening of the ENDC in President Kennedy's letter to the Secretary of State: [3](#) "The objective should be to define in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can be implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those other aspects which present more difficulty."

We should therefore begin an examination within the Government of a disarmament proposal that would enable us to take the initiative in this new focus for negotiations and which would at the same time facilitate a more realistic exploration of Soviet attitudes than is possible either within the

ambitious context of present GCD discussions or the very limited context of individual “confidence-building” measures. The attached draft of a separable first step plan is submitted for the purpose of initiating a policy review which would meet these requirements.

The proposal, for the reasons set forth in the attached draft, is limited to major armaments used for the delivery of nuclear weapons. ACDA does not believe, however, that either during our forthcoming governmental considerations or in subsequent negotiations, the possibility of enlarging the plan to cover other elements of national military capability should be excluded. It would be helpful to have the views of others on this point.

The most significant act in implementing the proposal would of course be the production cut-off rather than the reductions themselves. Here again, while the reasons set forth in the paper argue for not limiting a proposal to a production cut-off, this is a matter that should be considered in full in interagency consultations.

A further significant element of this proposal is the focus of formal inspection (aside from unilateral national capabilities) on production facilities and armaments that are to be destroyed. If this focus can be made safely—and in the context of this proposal on major nuclear delivery vehicles ACDA believes this to be the case—it offers the possibility of a major breakthrough in negotiations.

It is recognized that there are many arguments that can be raised against a proposal of this nature, or against any proposal that is apt to offer possibilities for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union within the context of the present world scene. From a strategic standpoint, the basic argument for this proposal would appear to be as follows:

The U.S. already has a strong, invulnerable strategic force. The build-up on this force is beginning to level off, and probably would be near its end by the time agreement could be reached. The Soviets, on the other hand, are apparently on an earlier portion of their build-up. To allow them to continue would result in a degradation of our present strategic advantage. If we can arrest their building program even at the expense of a percentage reduction of strategic forces on both sides, we will be much better off and they will

save the economic resources involved. Far from decreasing our ability or willingness to use nuclears if need be, this should help to preserve it.

It is anticipated that following discussion by Deputies in the near future, the proposal, with suitable modifications, would be discussed by the Committee of Principals.

William C. Foster

^{*} Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2. Secret. Lyndon B. Johnson became President following the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22 in Dallas, Texas.

¹ Attached but not printed.

² For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.

³ Dated March 13, 1962; for text, see *ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

374. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Senator John Stennis [Source](#)

Washington, December 17, 1963.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of December 6, 1963,^{[1](#)} I am pleased to provide the following information on the Defense Department's portion of the "safeguards" program. The attached table provides a comparison of the FY-1964 effort to our proposed program for FY-1965.^{[2](#)}

In support of the first safeguard, underground testing, we are planning or preparing for a series [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] and in depth from near surface down to 1500 feet. Preparations are continuing for the deep (1500') underground test which is designed to help us learn more about the design of very hard structures. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] could be conducted during FY-64 and FY-65, provided they fall within the final definition of allowable underground testing. These tests are being designed to obtain the maximum possible weapons effects information. The FY-1965 budget includes \$22.6 million for underground testing.

In support of the second safeguard, maintenance of laboratory facilities and programs, FY-1965 Defense budget includes \$49.3 million for nuclear weapons effects research and the DOD portion of RDT&E associated with nuclear weapons development. The effects research program includes laboratory and theoretical investigation of air blast and ground shock, water blast and shock effects, thermal and nuclear radiation, electro-magnetic phenomenon and biomedical effects. The weapons development includes fuzing and firing systems, retardation systems, ballistic cases, aircraft compatibility testing, and vulnerability tests.

With regard to the third safeguard, maintenance of a stand-by atmospheric test capability, we have budgeted approximately \$77 million in FY-1965. Improvement of the test facility at Johnston Island was mostly financed in FY-1963-64 at a cost of about \$37 million. Other preparations will include research, development and procurement of long lead time instrumentation

and instrument carriers; the maintenance of all this equipment and a joint task force in being.

Specific preparations are being made for the following high altitude atmospheric and underwater tests: Seven shots ranging from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] at altitudes from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to study reentry and blackout effects; two near-surface bursts [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for studying electromagnetic pulse effects; and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] shots at various depths underwater plus [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] air burst to study underwater effects and air blast damage to ships.

By 1 January 1965 we should have a capability to begin atmospheric and underwater effects tests within six months of notice, stockpile proof tests within about two months, operational systems tests within about two to three months and weapons development in about three months.

In support of the fourth safeguard, we are augmenting the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). About \$34 million has already been invested in this system and operating costs currently run about \$25 million per year. We now propose to invest another \$100 million during the period FY-1964 to 1969. During the same period, the operating cost will increase to about \$40 million annually. To continue development of seismic and other ground-based detection systems, and particularly to further develop a satellite-based system, the Vela program would be increased to \$62 million in FY-65 as compared to \$51 million in FY-64. This would provide for the launching of another experimental detection satellite in addition to the two launched this fiscal year.

I trust that this information will be of help to you, and I will be pleased to provide more detailed data as the program progresses.

Sincerely,

Roswell L. Gilpatric³

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 388.3, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965). Secret; Restricted Data. John Stennis of Mississippi chaired the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

¹ Not found.

² For text, see the Supplement.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

**375. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large
(Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk [Source](#)**

Washington, December 19, 1963.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Arms Control Issues, 14-15 December 1963, Executive Office Building

On Saturday and Sunday, all-day meetings were held on disarmament problems and particularly on a draft ACDA separable first stage disarmament proposal¹ which has not yet been put in the mill for clearance. The meeting included, in addition to ACDA, representatives of the Defense Department and Armed Services, the White House, CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, and others interested in the field. The Department was represented by Mr. Rostow and Mr. Garthoff and myself, and Mr. Johnson participated in the closing session.

In brief, the proposal provides for a thirty percent cut in strategic weapons and delivery systems with no cut in conventional armaments. Submarines would not be included. ACDA will re-examine its proposal in the light of the discussion, on which there was considerable criticism, or at least difficulties, which were brought out in the discussion.

One of the most interesting points made on the ACDA proposal itself was a statement by John McNaughton of the Defense Department that one reason Defense favored an across-the-board cut, including conventional arms, was that it was otherwise impossible to equalize the effect among the three Armed Services.

So far as the Department is concerned, and possible actions on our part, the most significant point which evolved from the discussion was that repeatedly it was brought out that we need to have discussions with the Germans in greater depth on these matters. [In?] Several of the papers prepared,² and in my own contribution to the discussion, the view was expressed that it was highly unlikely that any significant cut in armaments could be made without prior, or simultaneous, progress in political

settlements, most important of which is the German problem. Even in discussing straight disarmament measures, the attitude of the German Government is a key one. I mentioned that through the Pugwash and other meetings of this type, we had done a great deal to educate the Soviets in the realities of disarmament problems and it seemed strange that we had not done so with the Germans. One of the difficulties is, of course, that the Germans tend to be so suspicious of our intentions, or at least were under Adenauer, that it is difficult to have a frank and open discussion of all the factors involved. Another, and related point, is that any such discussion is handicapped because of the limited extent to which we have disclosed our intelligence about the Soviet Union and the reliability of our estimates, which, in turn, involves some disclosure of our methods. It was agreed that Alexis Johnson would have another look at this latter problem to see whether further disclosures are advisable.

I raised the problem of the difficulty of having discussions of this nature with the Germans without bringing in at least the British and French. It would probably be impossible to set up with the Germans a Pugwash type of discussion, although, to some extent, this might be considered. Since at the recent NATO meeting it was suggested that the Ambassadorial group look into the possibility of developing further proposals on the German problem, this might be a useful peg for starting such discussions. In any event, it was brought out in the meeting that it would be best to approach this problem from the point of view of seeing how we could bring about German reunification or progress toward this goal rather than to approach it from the straight disarmament point of view, which the Germans might interpret as our trying to find a way to withdraw from Europe.

It is suggested that consideration might be given to having the President prepare the ground for discussions of this type with the Germans without being specific about how this would be handled. A suggested briefing paper for the President is attached.³

^{*} Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret.

¹ See [Document 373](#).

² A number of papers prepared for this meeting, largely of ACDA and DOD origin, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2)

³ Not printed. A December 21 memorandum from Wiesner to President Johnson reflects the same general conclusions and recommendations. (Ibid.)

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