Article: 491 of sgi.talk.ratical
From: (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63:  Taylor/McNamara Report (doc. #167)
Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 1992 19:32:47 GMT
Lines: 565


    This is the complete "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South 
    Vietnam".  It was fundamental to National Security Action Memorandum 
    (NSAM) #263, approved by JFK on October 5, 1963.  Kennedy approved the 
    military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3), below.  NSAM
    #263 was the the culmination of many months of seeking a solution to
    the yawning quagmire of Vietnam that Kennedy had concluded must not
    be solved militarily by committing U.S. combat troops.

    Kennedy had a great deal to do with the creation of this report.  There
    had been many months of work already completed before he ever even sent 
    McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam in late September to bring back the 
    "report" which had already been created from the visit Major General 
    Victor H. Krulak and a senior Foreign Service officer, Joseph 
    Mendenhall, made to Vietnam in early September under Kennedy's 
    direction.  JFK knew exactly what he wanted it to say, and dispatched
    Krulak knowing that he would come home with all the current data 
    essential for final decision-making.  But Kennedy wanted to move the
    decision level up to the top and so sent McNamara and Taylor.  With
    the McNamara/Taylor report--which Krulak's office wrote--that they 
    publically gave to JFK upon their return, Kennedy had effectively laid 
    the groundwork for the enunciation of his intended plans, formalized
    three days later in NSAM #263.

      __________________________________________________________________

      167.  Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
            Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
            to the President [1]


                                            Washington, October 2, 1963.

      SUBJECT

          Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam

          Your memorandum of 21 September 1963[2] directed that General
      Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise
      the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and
      to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related
      political and social questions.  You further directed that, if the
      prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our
      views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government
      and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese
      to that action.
          Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA,
      and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits
      to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S.
      officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the
      GVN and third countries.
          We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador
      Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt.
          The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of
      the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted.

                   I.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

      A.  Conclusions.

          1.  The military campaign has made great progress and
      continues to progress.
          2.  There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and
      perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government
      is becoming increasingly unpopular.
          3.  There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a
      successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a
      possibility.
          4.  Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN
      military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are
      more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least
      for the near future they will continue to perform their military
      duties.
          5.  Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change
      the present favorable military trends.  On the other hand, a
      return to more moderate methods of control and administration,
      unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the
      political crisis.
          6.  It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will
      move Diem and Nhu toward moderation.  Indeed, pressures may
      increase their obduracy.  But unless such pressures are exerted,
      they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.

      B.  Recommendations.

          We recommend that:
          1.  General Harkins review with Diem the military changes
      necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and
      Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in
      the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965.  This review would
      consider the need for such changes as:

          a.  A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the
      Delta (IV Corps).
          b.  An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so
      that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out
      of 30 and static missions are ended.
          c.  Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain
      sweeps which have little permanent value.
          d.  The expansion of personnel in combat units to full
      authorized strength.
          e.  The training and arming of hamlet militia to an
      accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
          f.  A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program,
      especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future
      strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and
      until civic action programs can be introduced.

          2.  A program be established to train Vietnamese so that
      essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can
      be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965.  It should be
      possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
          3.  In accordance with the program to train progressively
      Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department
      should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans
      to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.  This
      action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a
      long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained
      Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
          4.  The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our
      disapproval of his political program.

          a.  Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity
      import program, but avoid a formal announcement.  The potential
      significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964
      military budget should be brought home to the top military
      officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the
      Joint General Staff;  up to now we have stated $95 million may be
      used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity
      import program for 1964.  Henceforth we could make clear that this
      is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by
      the Congress and because of executive policy.
          b.  Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon-
      Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project.  We should
      state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy.
          c.  Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units,
      now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the
      Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these
      units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint
      General Staff and transferred to the field.
          d.  Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the
      top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem.
      Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary
      Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as
      this remains an important channel of advice.  USOM and USIA should
      also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push
      forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while
      taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S.
      disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions.  We should
      work with the Diem government but not support it.[3]

      As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be
      closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce
      repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the
      military effort.  We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize
      that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether to move to more
      drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not
      taken significant steps.

          5.  At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage
      actively a change in government.  Our policy should be to seek
      urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative
      leadership if and when it appears.
          6.  The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy
      toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the
      government position to be presented both in Congressional
      testimony and in public statements.

          a.  The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United
      States security.  For this reason, we adhere to the overriding
      objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing
      the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible.  (By suppressing
      the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by
      the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the
      presence of U.S. military forces.)  We believe the U.S. part of
      the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date
      which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency
      programs.
          b.  The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is
      sound in principle.
          c.  The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious.
      It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but
      could do so at some time in the future.  If the result is a GVN
      ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its
      attitude toward support for the government.  Although we are
      deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in
      the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our
      relations with the GVN.
          d.  The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions
      of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required.  Our
      policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression
      because of its effect on the popular will to resist.  Our means
      consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of
      support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to
      the war effort.  We will use these means as required to assure an
      effective military program.

          [Here follow Sections II, "Military Situation and Trends,"
      III, "Economic Situation and Trends," IV, "Political Situation and
      Trends," and V, "Effect on Political Tension."]

                        VI.  OVERALL EVALUATION

          From the above analysis it is clear that the situation
      requires a constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of
      political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese
      Government.  We cannot say with assurance whether the effort
      against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major
      political improvements.  However, it does seem clear that after
      another period of repressive action progress may be reduced and
      indeed reversed.  Although the present momentum might conceivably
      continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power
      and political tensions continue, any significant slowing in the
      rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S.
      popular support for the U.S. effort.

            VII.  U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE 
                                DIEM REGIME

      A.  Conduct of U.S. Representatives.

          U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness
      toward their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those
      contacts and communications which are necessary for the actual
      conduct of operations in the field.  To some extent this is the
      attitude already adopted by the Ambassador himself, but it could
      be extended to the civilian and military agencies located in
      Saigon.  The effect of such action would be largely psychological.

      B.  Economic Leverage.

          Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the PL 480
      program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into
      Vietnam.  The commitment of funds under the CIP has already been
      suspended.  CIP deliveries result in the generation of piastres,
      most of which go to the support of the defense budget.  It is
      estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some
      five or six months, and within this time period there would not be
      a serious material effect.  Even within this period, however, the
      flow of piastres to support the defense budget will gradually
      begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its
      foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures.
          Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would
      mean that there would be no material reason for inflation to begin
      in the short term period.  However, the psychological effect of
      growing realization that the CIP program has been suspended might
      be substantial in 2-4 months.  Saigon has a large number of
      speculative traders, and although there is considerable police
      effort to control prices, this might not be able to contain a
      general trend of speculation and hoarding.  Once inflation did
      develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the
      conduct of the war.
          Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final
      approval--the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon
      Electric Power Project ($4 million).  Suspension of these projects
      would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress and the
      world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not providing
      additional aid not directly essential to the war effort.

      C.  Paramilitary and Other Assistance.

          (1)  USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS
      assistance to the Director General of Information and the ARVN
      PsyWar Program could be suspended.  These projects involve a
      relatively small amount of local currency but their suspension,
      particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs
      which the U.S.  wishes to see progress.
          (2)  However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at
      Colonel Tung, the Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or
      near Saigon played a conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are
      a continuing support for Diem.  Colonel Tung commands a mixed
      complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others
      presently through CIA.  All of those now in or near Saigon were
      trained either for combat missions or for special operations into
      North Vietnam and Laos.  Purely on grounds of their not being used
      for their proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we
      would cut off MAP and CIA support unless they were placed directly
      under Joint General Staff and were committed to field operations.
          The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small.
      The equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and
      the pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN
      budget.  Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture
      might be greater.  At the least it would remove one target of
      press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed
      by the high military officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the
      disaffected groups in Saigon.
          At the same time, support should continue, but through General
      Harkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar
      field operations that are contributing to the war effort.
          We have weighed this cut-off action carefully.  It runs a risk
      that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations
      against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam. It might also limit
      CIA's access to the military.  However, U.S. liaison with high
      military officers could probably be fully maintained through the
      U.S. military advisors.  On balance, we conclude that these
      possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in
      this action.
          (3)  Consideration has been given both by USOM and the
      military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility of
      redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as
      to bypass the central government in Saigon.  Military studies have
      shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and
      cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of
      communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that
      the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the filed
      under the rural strategic hamlet program.  However, there is a
      consensus among U.S. agencies in Saigon that such an effort is not
      practical in the face of determined opposition by the GVN unless,
      of course, a situation had developed where the central government
      was no longer in control of some areas of the country.  Nor is it
      at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up the
      position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position.

      D.  Propaganda.

          Although the capability of USIS to support the United States
      campaign of pressure against the regime would be small, the
      Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the content and
      timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country.
      He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in
      stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of
      democratic political philosophies.  This medium could be used to
      exploit a wide range of ascending political pressure.  In
      addition, a phased program of United States official
      pronouncements could be developed for use in conjunction with the
      other leverages as they are applied.  We must recognize the
      possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong
      countermeasures.

      E.  The Leverage of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory
      Progress.

          Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage
      embodied in our constantly making it plain to Diem and other that
      the long term continuation of military aid is conditioned upon the
      Vietnamese Government demonstrating a satisfactory level of
      progress toward defeat of the insurgency.

      F.  Conclusions.

          A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension,
      will not have large material effects on the GVN or the war effort,
      at least for 2-4 months.  The psychological effects could be
      greater, and there is some evidence that the suspension is already
      causing concern to Diem.  However, the effect of pressures that
      can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to
      the war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility
      of Diem making necessary changes.
          We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a
      far more intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP
      deliveries or long continued suspension of the commodity import
      program.  If the Diem government should fail to make major
      improvements, serious consideration would have to be given to this
      possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war
      effort would be so serious--in psychological if not in immediate
      material terms--that it should not be undertaken at the present
      time.

                         VIII.  COUP POSSIBILITIES

      A.  Prospects of a Spontaneous Coup.

          The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem
      Regime are not high.  The two principal sources of such an
      attempt, the senior military officers and the students, have both
      been neutralized by a combination of their own inability and the
      regime's effective countermeasures of control.  The student
      organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves have
      displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently
      being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an
      explosion.
          The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult
      job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to
      upset the Regime.
          Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to
      take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested
      in the military forces.  They, therefore, concentrate their
      manipulative talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by
      controls over key units and their locations.  They are aware that
      these actions may reduce efficiency, but they tolerate it rather
      than risk the prospect that they be overthrown and their social
      revolution frustrated.  They have established a praetorian guard
      to guarantee considerable bloodshed if any attack is made.  The
      generals have seen slim hope of surmounting these difficulties
      without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of the Army and
      the Establishment itself.
          Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short
      term, new factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem
      or an unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a
      junior officer group, which would call urgently for U.S. support
      or counteraction.  In such a case, the best alternative would
      appear to be the support of constitutional continuity in the
      person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be
      developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional
      period.

      B.  Prospects for Improvement under an Alternative Government.

          The prospects that a replacement regime would be an
      improvement appear to be about 50-50.[4]  Initially, only a
      strongly authoritarian regime would be able to pull the government
      together and maintain order.  In view of the pre-eminent role of
      the military in Vietnam today, it is probable that this role would
      be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking power after the
      selective process of a junta dispute.  Such an authoritarian
      military regime, perhaps after an initial period of euphoria at
      the departure of Diem/Nhu, would be apt to entail a resumption of
      the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese
      Establishment before Diem, and an emphasis on conventional
      military rather than social, economic and political
      considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of xenophobic
      nationalism.
          These features must be weighed, however, against the possible
      results of growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would
      continue and even magnify the present dissension, unhappiness and
      unrest.

      C.  Possible U.S. Actions.

          Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great
      difference to the chances of a coup.  However, at the present time
      we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be
      brought to the point of action, or what kind of government might
      emerge.  We therefore need an intensive clandestine effort, under
      the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to
      allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects.
          If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still
      remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a
      spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would
      trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show
      with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative
      government.  Any regime that was identified from the outset as a
      U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam
      and in significant areas of the world, including other
      underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role.
          In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a
      coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a
      spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an
      intensive basis.

                  IX.  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

          Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative
      policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and
      military objectives:
          1.  Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to
      obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a
      posture of "reconciliation."  This would not mean any expression
      of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply
      that we would go back in practice to business as usual.
          2.  Follow a policy of selective pressures:  "purely correct"
      relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold
      further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear
      our disapproval of the regime.  A further element in this policy
      is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be
      averse to a change of Government--although we would not take any
      immediate actions to initiate a coup.
          3.  Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking
      military officers.  This policy might involve more extended
      suspensions of aid and sharp denunciations of the regime's actions
      so timed as to fit with coup prospects and planning.
          Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows:
          1.  Reconciliation.
          We believe that this course of action would be ineffective
      from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would
      also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying the present
      U.S. support effort both to the Congress and generally to
      significant third nations.  We are most unlikely, after recent
      events, to get Diem to make the necessary changes; on the
      contrary, he would almost certainly regard our reconciliation as
      an evidence that the U.S. would sit still for just about anything
      he did.  The result would probably be not only a continuation of
      the destructive elements in the Regime's policies but a return to
      larger scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they
      were necessary.  The result would probably be sharp deterioration
      in the military situation in a fairly short period.
          2.  Selective Pressures.
          We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures
      to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our policies.
      The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of
      military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals
      the double-edged nature of its effects.  Any long-term reduction
      of aid cannot but have an eventual adverse effect on the military
      campaign since both the military and the economic programs have
      been consciously designed and justified in terms of their
      contribution to the war effort.  Hence, immediate reductions must
      be selected carefully and be left in effect only for short
      periods.
          We believe that the present level of pressures is causing, and
      will cause, Diem some concern, while at the same time not
      significantly impairing the military effort.  We are not hopeful
      that this level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually
      induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely.  However,
      there is a better chance that Diem will at least be deterred from
      resuming large scale oppressions.
          At the same time, there are various factors that set a time
      limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form.
      Within 2-4 months we have to make critical decisions with the GVN
      about its 1964 budget and our economic support level.  In
      addition, there is a significant and growing possibility that even
      the present limited actions in the economic field--more for
      psychological than for economic reasons--would start a wave of
      speculation and inflation that would be difficult to control or
      bring back into proper shape.  As to when we would reverse our
      present course, the resumption of the full program of economic and
      military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government.
          As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic
      and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to
      develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed
      schedule.  The extent to which such objectives are met, in
      conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's political
      performance, would determine the level of aid for the following
      period.
          3.  Organizing a Coup.
          For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course of
      action should not be undertaken at the present time.
          On balance we consider that the most promising course of
      action to adopt at this time is an application of selective
      short-term pressures, principally economic, and the conditioning
      of long-term aid on the satisfactory performance by the Diem
      government in meeting military and political objectives which in
      the aggregate equate to the requirements of final victory.  The
      specific actions recommended in Section I of this report are
      consistent with this policy.

                                         Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

                                                Secretary of Defense [5]

 ___________

 [1] Source:  Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country
     Series, Memos and Miscellaneous.  Top Secret.  Also printed in
     "United States-Vietnam Relations," 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 554-573.

 [2] Document 142.

 [3] Mr. Colby believes that the official "correct" relationship should
     be supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal
     relationships with individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador,
     where persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of the official
     U.S. posture. [Footnote in the source text.]

 [4] Mr. Sullivan (State) believes that a replacement regime which does
     not suffer from the overriding danger of Nhu's ambition to establish
     a totalitarian state (the control of which he might easily lose to
     the Communists in the course of his flirtations) would be inevitably
     better than the current regime even if the former did have the
     deficiencies described.  [Footnote in the source text.]

 [5] The source text bears no signatures.




--
                                             daveus rattus   

                                   yer friendly neighborhood ratman

                               KOYAANISQATSI

   ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
       in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.  
         5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.