Article: 491 of sgi.talk.ratical
From: (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: Taylor/McNamara Report (doc. #167)
Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 1992 19:32:47 GMT
Lines: 565
This is the complete "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South
Vietnam". It was fundamental to National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM) #263, approved by JFK on October 5, 1963. Kennedy approved the
military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3), below. NSAM
#263 was the the culmination of many months of seeking a solution to
the yawning quagmire of Vietnam that Kennedy had concluded must not
be solved militarily by committing U.S. combat troops.
Kennedy had a great deal to do with the creation of this report. There
had been many months of work already completed before he ever even sent
McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam in late September to bring back the
"report" which had already been created from the visit Major General
Victor H. Krulak and a senior Foreign Service officer, Joseph
Mendenhall, made to Vietnam in early September under Kennedy's
direction. JFK knew exactly what he wanted it to say, and dispatched
Krulak knowing that he would come home with all the current data
essential for final decision-making. But Kennedy wanted to move the
decision level up to the top and so sent McNamara and Taylor. With
the McNamara/Taylor report--which Krulak's office wrote--that they
publically gave to JFK upon their return, Kennedy had effectively laid
the groundwork for the enunciation of his intended plans, formalized
three days later in NSAM #263.
__________________________________________________________________
167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
to the President [1]
Washington, October 2, 1963.
SUBJECT
Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam
Your memorandum of 21 September 1963[2] directed that General
Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise
the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and
to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related
political and social questions. You further directed that, if the
prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our
views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government
and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese
to that action.
Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA,
and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits
to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S.
officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the
GVN and third countries.
We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador
Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt.
The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of
the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted.
I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions.
1. The military campaign has made great progress and
continues to progress.
2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and
perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government
is becoming increasingly unpopular.
3. There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a
successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a
possibility.
4. Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN
military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are
more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least
for the near future they will continue to perform their military
duties.
5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change
the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a
return to more moderate methods of control and administration,
unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the
political crisis.
6. It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will
move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed, pressures may
increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted,
they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.
B. Recommendations.
We recommend that:
1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes
necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and
Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in
the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would
consider the need for such changes as:
a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the
Delta (IV Corps).
b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so
that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out
of 30 and static missions are ended.
c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain
sweeps which have little permanent value.
d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full
authorized strength.
e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an
accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program,
especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future
strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and
until civic action programs can be introduced.
2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that
essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can
be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be
possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
3. In accordance with the program to train progressively
Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department
should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans
to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This
action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a
long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained
Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
4. The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our
disapproval of his political program.
a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity
import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential
significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964
military budget should be brought home to the top military
officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the
Joint General Staff; up to now we have stated $95 million may be
used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity
import program for 1964. Henceforth we could make clear that this
is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by
the Congress and because of executive policy.
b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon-
Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project. We should
state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy.
c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units,
now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the
Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these
units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint
General Staff and transferred to the field.
d. Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the
top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem.
Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary
Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as
this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should
also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push
forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while
taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S.
disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should
work with the Diem government but not support it.[3]
As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be
closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce
repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the
military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize
that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether to move to more
drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not
taken significant steps.
5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage
actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek
urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative
leadership if and when it appears.
6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy
toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the
government position to be presented both in Congressional
testimony and in public statements.
a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United
States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding
objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing
the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing
the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by
the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the
presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of
the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date
which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency
programs.
b. The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is
sound in principle.
c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious.
It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but
could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN
ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its
attitude toward support for the government. Although we are
deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in
the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our
relations with the GVN.
d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions
of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our
policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression
because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means
consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of
support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to
the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an
effective military program.
[Here follow Sections II, "Military Situation and Trends,"
III, "Economic Situation and Trends," IV, "Political Situation and
Trends," and V, "Effect on Political Tension."]
VI. OVERALL EVALUATION
From the above analysis it is clear that the situation
requires a constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of
political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese
Government. We cannot say with assurance whether the effort
against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major
political improvements. However, it does seem clear that after
another period of repressive action progress may be reduced and
indeed reversed. Although the present momentum might conceivably
continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power
and political tensions continue, any significant slowing in the
rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S.
popular support for the U.S. effort.
VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE
DIEM REGIME
A. Conduct of U.S. Representatives.
U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness
toward their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those
contacts and communications which are necessary for the actual
conduct of operations in the field. To some extent this is the
attitude already adopted by the Ambassador himself, but it could
be extended to the civilian and military agencies located in
Saigon. The effect of such action would be largely psychological.
B. Economic Leverage.
Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the PL 480
program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into
Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the CIP has already been
suspended. CIP deliveries result in the generation of piastres,
most of which go to the support of the defense budget. It is
estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some
five or six months, and within this time period there would not be
a serious material effect. Even within this period, however, the
flow of piastres to support the defense budget will gradually
begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its
foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures.
Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would
mean that there would be no material reason for inflation to begin
in the short term period. However, the psychological effect of
growing realization that the CIP program has been suspended might
be substantial in 2-4 months. Saigon has a large number of
speculative traders, and although there is considerable police
effort to control prices, this might not be able to contain a
general trend of speculation and hoarding. Once inflation did
develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the
conduct of the war.
Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final
approval--the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon
Electric Power Project ($4 million). Suspension of these projects
would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress and the
world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not providing
additional aid not directly essential to the war effort.
C. Paramilitary and Other Assistance.
(1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS
assistance to the Director General of Information and the ARVN
PsyWar Program could be suspended. These projects involve a
relatively small amount of local currency but their suspension,
particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs
which the U.S. wishes to see progress.
(2) However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at
Colonel Tung, the Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or
near Saigon played a conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are
a continuing support for Diem. Colonel Tung commands a mixed
complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others
presently through CIA. All of those now in or near Saigon were
trained either for combat missions or for special operations into
North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on grounds of their not being used
for their proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we
would cut off MAP and CIA support unless they were placed directly
under Joint General Staff and were committed to field operations.
The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small.
The equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and
the pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN
budget. Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture
might be greater. At the least it would remove one target of
press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed
by the high military officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the
disaffected groups in Saigon.
At the same time, support should continue, but through General
Harkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar
field operations that are contributing to the war effort.
We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk
that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations
against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam. It might also limit
CIA's access to the military. However, U.S. liaison with high
military officers could probably be fully maintained through the
U.S. military advisors. On balance, we conclude that these
possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in
this action.
(3) Consideration has been given both by USOM and the
military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility of
redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as
to bypass the central government in Saigon. Military studies have
shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and
cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of
communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that
the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the filed
under the rural strategic hamlet program. However, there is a
consensus among U.S. agencies in Saigon that such an effort is not
practical in the face of determined opposition by the GVN unless,
of course, a situation had developed where the central government
was no longer in control of some areas of the country. Nor is it
at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up the
position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position.
D. Propaganda.
Although the capability of USIS to support the United States
campaign of pressure against the regime would be small, the
Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the content and
timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country.
He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in
stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of
democratic political philosophies. This medium could be used to
exploit a wide range of ascending political pressure. In
addition, a phased program of United States official
pronouncements could be developed for use in conjunction with the
other leverages as they are applied. We must recognize the
possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong
countermeasures.
E. The Leverage of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory
Progress.
Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage
embodied in our constantly making it plain to Diem and other that
the long term continuation of military aid is conditioned upon the
Vietnamese Government demonstrating a satisfactory level of
progress toward defeat of the insurgency.
F. Conclusions.
A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension,
will not have large material effects on the GVN or the war effort,
at least for 2-4 months. The psychological effects could be
greater, and there is some evidence that the suspension is already
causing concern to Diem. However, the effect of pressures that
can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to
the war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility
of Diem making necessary changes.
We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a
far more intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP
deliveries or long continued suspension of the commodity import
program. If the Diem government should fail to make major
improvements, serious consideration would have to be given to this
possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war
effort would be so serious--in psychological if not in immediate
material terms--that it should not be undertaken at the present
time.
VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES
A. Prospects of a Spontaneous Coup.
The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem
Regime are not high. The two principal sources of such an
attempt, the senior military officers and the students, have both
been neutralized by a combination of their own inability and the
regime's effective countermeasures of control. The student
organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves have
displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently
being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an
explosion.
The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult
job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to
upset the Regime.
Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to
take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested
in the military forces. They, therefore, concentrate their
manipulative talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by
controls over key units and their locations. They are aware that
these actions may reduce efficiency, but they tolerate it rather
than risk the prospect that they be overthrown and their social
revolution frustrated. They have established a praetorian guard
to guarantee considerable bloodshed if any attack is made. The
generals have seen slim hope of surmounting these difficulties
without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of the Army and
the Establishment itself.
Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short
term, new factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem
or an unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a
junior officer group, which would call urgently for U.S. support
or counteraction. In such a case, the best alternative would
appear to be the support of constitutional continuity in the
person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be
developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional
period.
B. Prospects for Improvement under an Alternative Government.
The prospects that a replacement regime would be an
improvement appear to be about 50-50.[4] Initially, only a
strongly authoritarian regime would be able to pull the government
together and maintain order. In view of the pre-eminent role of
the military in Vietnam today, it is probable that this role would
be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking power after the
selective process of a junta dispute. Such an authoritarian
military regime, perhaps after an initial period of euphoria at
the departure of Diem/Nhu, would be apt to entail a resumption of
the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese
Establishment before Diem, and an emphasis on conventional
military rather than social, economic and political
considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of xenophobic
nationalism.
These features must be weighed, however, against the possible
results of growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would
continue and even magnify the present dissension, unhappiness and
unrest.
C. Possible U.S. Actions.
Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great
difference to the chances of a coup. However, at the present time
we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be
brought to the point of action, or what kind of government might
emerge. We therefore need an intensive clandestine effort, under
the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to
allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects.
If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still
remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a
spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would
trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show
with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative
government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a
U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam
and in significant areas of the world, including other
underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role.
In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a
coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a
spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an
intensive basis.
IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative
policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and
military objectives:
1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to
obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a
posture of "reconciliation." This would not mean any expression
of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply
that we would go back in practice to business as usual.
2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct"
relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold
further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear
our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy
is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be
averse to a change of Government--although we would not take any
immediate actions to initiate a coup.
3. Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking
military officers. This policy might involve more extended
suspensions of aid and sharp denunciations of the regime's actions
so timed as to fit with coup prospects and planning.
Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows:
1. Reconciliation.
We believe that this course of action would be ineffective
from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would
also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying the present
U.S. support effort both to the Congress and generally to
significant third nations. We are most unlikely, after recent
events, to get Diem to make the necessary changes; on the
contrary, he would almost certainly regard our reconciliation as
an evidence that the U.S. would sit still for just about anything
he did. The result would probably be not only a continuation of
the destructive elements in the Regime's policies but a return to
larger scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they
were necessary. The result would probably be sharp deterioration
in the military situation in a fairly short period.
2. Selective Pressures.
We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures
to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our policies.
The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of
military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals
the double-edged nature of its effects. Any long-term reduction
of aid cannot but have an eventual adverse effect on the military
campaign since both the military and the economic programs have
been consciously designed and justified in terms of their
contribution to the war effort. Hence, immediate reductions must
be selected carefully and be left in effect only for short
periods.
We believe that the present level of pressures is causing, and
will cause, Diem some concern, while at the same time not
significantly impairing the military effort. We are not hopeful
that this level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually
induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely. However,
there is a better chance that Diem will at least be deterred from
resuming large scale oppressions.
At the same time, there are various factors that set a time
limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form.
Within 2-4 months we have to make critical decisions with the GVN
about its 1964 budget and our economic support level. In
addition, there is a significant and growing possibility that even
the present limited actions in the economic field--more for
psychological than for economic reasons--would start a wave of
speculation and inflation that would be difficult to control or
bring back into proper shape. As to when we would reverse our
present course, the resumption of the full program of economic and
military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government.
As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic
and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to
develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed
schedule. The extent to which such objectives are met, in
conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's political
performance, would determine the level of aid for the following
period.
3. Organizing a Coup.
For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course of
action should not be undertaken at the present time.
On balance we consider that the most promising course of
action to adopt at this time is an application of selective
short-term pressures, principally economic, and the conditioning
of long-term aid on the satisfactory performance by the Diem
government in meeting military and political objectives which in
the aggregate equate to the requirements of final victory. The
specific actions recommended in Section I of this report are
consistent with this policy.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of Defense [5]
___________
[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country
Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Top Secret. Also printed in
"United States-Vietnam Relations," 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 554-573.
[2] Document 142.
[3] Mr. Colby believes that the official "correct" relationship should
be supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal
relationships with individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador,
where persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of the official
U.S. posture. [Footnote in the source text.]
[4] Mr. Sullivan (State) believes that a replacement regime which does
not suffer from the overriding danger of Nhu's ambition to establish
a totalitarian state (the control of which he might easily lose to
the Communists in the course of his flirtations) would be inevitably
better than the current regime even if the former did have the
deficiencies described. [Footnote in the source text.]
[5] The source text bears no signatures.
--
daveus rattus
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
KOYAANISQATSI
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.