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		John	F. Blake	e - DDA				DATE FIZ JAM 1079
TO	: (Cffci ding)	er designa	lion, ream nu	mbar, and	RECEIVED	ATE	OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1		DDCT			APCCIVED			
2.								agreement of the Acting Director of Public Affairs and the Office
3.		DCI						of the General Counsel, I recom- mended that you take no further action with respect to the Bill
1								Richards' article about Congres- sional testimony in last Friday's Washington Post. At that time we
5.								were thinking of action such as a letter to the editor and considered that inappropriate.
6-								After further discussion, we have now agreed that letters to
7.								Senator Bayh and Senator Kennedy would be desirable. Neither of the Senators has inquired about the
8.								Richards' article, but we believe it preferable to take the initiative rather than wait for an inquiry and
9.								react. We also believe it would be advantageous to present them with a progress report on the noti- fication programThis, too, may
0-								head off an inquiry and it may tend to offset any adverse reaction likely to be generated by the ABC
11.								network special due to be aired later this month.
2-								Your signature on the lotters to Senator Bayh and Sena-
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4.								
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18 JAN 1979

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research Committee on Human Resources United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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The Washington Post issue of Friday, 5 January 1979, carried a report under the by-line of Bill Richards that recently released CIA documents contradict my testimony and the testimony of another CIA officer before the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research in September 1977. I have reviewed that testimony in relation to the documents cited in the Richards' article and I want to assure you that I find no such contradiction. Taken out of the context of the total record on Project OFTEN it is possible to attribute to the documents cited by Mr. Richards the interpretation he has given them. Other documents that are a part of the total record, however, support the testimony as given.

I am reminded by this incident of the commitment I made to you in September of 1977 to make every effort to seek out and notify individuals who may have suffered some harm as a result of having been used as unwitting subjects of drug experimentation sponsored by CIA. While I am not in a position to report to you finally on the outcome of this effort, I feel, nevertheless, that it is appropriate to bring you up to date on actions that have been taken and where we stand generally with our progress in the notification program.

In my letter of 14 September 1978 I advised you that I had directed a thorough review of the information available to the Agency to determine the most efficient and appropriate means of implementing the opinion of the Attorney General, a copy of which I furnished to you at the time. That opinion reached the conclusion that the Agency may be under an obligation to identify, locate and notify any unwitting subjects of NAULTRA drug testing activities where it can reasonably be determined that their health may continue to be adversely affected by their involvement in that program. Since early September 1978 a senior officer of the Agency has devoted his full time to that effort and I am pleased to report his very preliminary findings encourage us to believe that there were very few, if any, individuals who may have been used by CIA as subjects of drug research without their knowledge or consent. Moreover, there appear to be very few, if any, substances used that might have had a potential for causing harmful long term aftereffects.

Despite the encouragement we derive from our progress thus far there remains a nagging uncertainty growing out of the fact that all of the returns are not yet in. I regret that I am not able to state unequivocally that we have all the facts. Of course, we recognize the reality that documents can and will continue to be selected out of the voluminous materials released to members of the public under the Freedom of Information Act which could reflect adversely on the Agency. We realize this can occur if individuals do not have the benefit of all relevant information; it can occur out of careless research; and it can occur out of deliberate, malicious intent to cause damage to the national intelligence effort. Nevertheless, you continue to have my assurances that I will report all relevant facts as objectively as possible. I look forward to the time when I can submit to you my final report on this phase of the CIA history. Meanwhile, an interim report is enclosed.

Yours sincerely,

/s/Stansfield Turner STANSFIELD TURNER

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18 JAN 1979

The Honorable Birch Bayh Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

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THE NAULIRA DRUG NOTIFICATION PROGRAM A Status Report 15 January 1979

We have found that substances used in the BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE projects were of a kind commonly used by physicians as anesthetics and were not likely to have caused harmful aftereffects. They were used in moderate quantities to determine whether they had utility as supplements to interrogations in search of intelligence information from prisoners of war and defectors. Because the substances used were not likely to have caused harmful aftereffects we have determined that no further action is required with respect to the BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE project. Records pertaining to these projects were not among those destroyed in 1973; they are reasonably complete and we are quite confident that our conclusion is justifiable.

The OFTEN/CHICKWIT projects were undertaken jointly with the Department of the Army at Edgewood Arsenal. CHICKWIT was concerned with the collection of intelligence information about foreign pharmaceuticals. No human testing was involved, hence no further action is required. Project OFTEN involved CIA funding of research conducted at the Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories. Volunteer human subjects were involved. While there has been some difference of opinion between the Agency and the Department of Defense about whether human subjects were involved while the research was being funded by CIA, that issue bears no relationship to the question of whether notification of the subjects is appropriate. Because the subjects were witting volunteers, it may be that no further action is required. But, because any tests conducted using human subjects were conducted by Army personnel under Anmy procedures and protocols at an Army installation using a substance developed in an Army Research and Development program, I have addressed a letter to the Sccretary of the Army requesting that the subjects be included in the Army notification program if they have not already been included, and if notification is deemed to be appropriate. As in the case of BLUEBIRD/ARTI-CHOKE, records pertaining to OFTEN/CHICKN'IT were not among those destroyed in 1973. They are reasonably complete, and we are quite confident that our conclusion is justifiable.

We are left, then with NKULTRA, NKSEARCH and some follow-on grants. The magnitude and scope of these programs has been somewhat misunderstood and misrepresented. While there were a large number of subprojects, we find that, rather than continue a subproject from one year to the next, many times new subprojects were created. For example, subproject 149 was a continuation of 132; 132 was a continuation of 42, and so on. In some cases as many as six or eight subprojects may have been created when one subproject could simply have been extended from year to year. We have not been able to le 1 why this was done, but it de tend to distort

In any case, we have found that 85 of the NKULTRA, NKSEARCH and followon research grants did not involve human experimentation, and no further action is required. Forty of the NKULTRA/NKSEARCH/Grants where humans were involved require no further action: 18 of these require no action because no drugs were involved; 22 require no further action because the drugs used would not have caused harmful aftereffects. Subjects were witting volunteers, usually paid; research was conducted under the management and substantive control of the institution conducting the research such that there is no CIA liability; or some combination of these factors.

The remainder of the NKULTRA/NKSEARCH and research Grants where human involvement is known or suspected is divided, for the sake of convenience, between those involved with institutions and those involved with the safehouses in New York City and San Francisco.

As nearly as we can determine so far, the safehouses were jointly operated in some sort of cooperative effort between the former Bureau of Narcotics and CIA. During testimony taken by the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research in September 1977 former employees of the Bureau of Narcotics and CIA were questioned rather extensively about the uses to which the safehouses were put by CIA. The answers were less than satisfactory, but the question of what uses were made of the facilities by the Bureau of Narcotics was never asked. Yet, testimony given by a former Bureau of Narcotics employee seems to carry a clear implication that the Bureau was the primary user and CIA's use of the safehouses was secondary.

I have addressed a letter to the Attorney General soliciting his assistance in seeking to interview, or obtain written information from, former employees of the Bureau of Narcotics. We also are attempting to locate former CIA employees who were associated with MKULTRA in one way or another and may have some recollections that would be helpful. Letters addressed to several of these individuals are ready for dispatch as soon as we are able, within the constraints of the Privacy Act, to verify current mailing addresses. We are seeking, first of all, to determine whether experimentation using unwitting subjects was done at these facilities. Our surviving records show clearly that such experimentation was proposed; whether it was actually carried out is much less certain. If we find that such experiments were, in fact, conducted, we will pursue with the same people the question of identifying subjects. Finally, we have addressed letters to private physicians who acted as medical advisers to the operators of the safehouses requesting any information they may be able to furnish.

Other than the subprojects relating to the safehouses, only fifteen subprojects involving only four researchers and possibly one institution require action. Action is required in these cases to seek further information, not because there is any suggestion that anyone might have been harmed. The files simply are too incomplete to permit confident conclusive judgments to be made. Further, three or the four investigators were at a time employed by the Agency id were involved in fourteen of the fifteen subprojects requiring action. They may have some knowledge beyond the scope of the particular projects with which they were directly involved that might be helpful. Letters have been sent to three of these individuals and a letter to the fourth will be sent as soon as we have a current address.

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Finally, I have addressed a letter to Secretary Califano requesting his assistance in obtaining an authoritative pharmacological evaluation of substances used to determine which, if any, may have had a potential for causing harmful long term aftereffects.

Early responses to preliminary inquiries have been most heartening. One private researcher writes, with reference to prospective experiments with drugs, "I was told that I would have absolute discretion of refusal and that I would have final authority on experimental design and informed consent ... All of this research was open and above board ... Never, never was I asked to do anything which violated medical ethics or the principles of informed consent ... With reference to the matters of unwitting administration of drugs, psychotropic or other, I can state categorically that no CIA person ever asked me to administer such drugs, _ wittingly or unwittingly. No such drugs were over administered by me or under my direction ... From the press, I have the impression that there has been an effort to caricature certain CIA individuals as pranksters. I would like to note that everything I have seen of professional CIA personnel has represented the top level of serious, dedicated, informed business ... The people who undertook this investigation were able scientists, and they selected advisors and researchers who seemed to be the individuals most able to contribute ... From a long experience with this project, I can say that I never saw a single case of experimental drug administration without informed consent."

The president of one prominent university wrote: "If I had been at the time individually aware of such a research project and had been called upon to pass judgment on it, I would have judged it by the merit of the particular project and not by which governmental agency was directly or indirectly sponsoring the research. As far as I am concerned the CIA is just as respectable as any other governmental agency or private foundation ... I wonder whether most of this concern about these research projects arises not out of any ethical considerations but out of hostility in certain circles toward anything done by CIA whether openly or covertly."

In sum, if there was any unwitting drug testing sponsored directly by CIA, it seems to have been limited almost exclusively to the safehouse operations. Whether CIA or the Eureau of Narcotics was most directly involved remains to be determined. Apart from the activities in the safehouses we have found for the most part that CIA was interested in the results of research initiated and sponsored by other organizations and conducted in accordance with professional and ethical standards applicable to the particular circumstances at the time. We have found no evidence that CIA excrted undue influence or attempted in any way to coerce individuals or institutions to undertake research they might not otherwise have undertaken nor did the Agency attempt to cause any compromise of professional and ethical standards under which the research was conducted. Insofar as we are able to tell from our records, none of the research conducted by private institutions was clandestine in any way; studies were carried out openly and the results in many cases were published. As a matter of fact, it can even be reported that some significant contributions were made to the advancement of psychiatry, pharmacology, and medicine.

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