

May 6, 1963

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 239

TO: The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Committee of Principals

SUBJECT: U. S. Disarmament Proposals

1. Discussions in the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva on both general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban treaty have unfortunately resulted in almost no progress. There has been no serious discussion of general and complete disarmament for some time. While discussions of a test ban treaty have shown important developments since the beginning of the 18 Nation Conference, they are now stalled.

2. I have in no way changed my views of the desirability of a test ban treaty or the value of our proposals on general and complete disarmament. Further, the events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an un-checked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc.

3. We now expect the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to recess shortly for six weeks to two months. I should like the interval to be used for an urgent re-examination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament which it would be in the interest of the United States to propose in the resumed session of the Geneva Conference. ACDA will, in accordance with its statutory responsibilities,

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BY *mgm* NARS, DATE *9/8/77*

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take the leadership in this effort and coordinate with the other agencies concerned through the usual procedures of the Committee of Principals. I should like to review the results at an appropriate time in the process.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

Copies furnished:

Director, ACDA
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, AEC
Dr. Wiesner
Mr. Bundy
Director, USIA
Amb. Llewelyn Thompson

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Chas. Johnson
WH Files
NSC Files
Mr. Kaysen

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FILE COPY

May 6, 1963

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BY hjh NARS, DATE 9/8/77

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McGuire

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Mr. Smith:

Mr. Kaysen took the other copy and
the attachment.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

May 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee of Principals

Subject: Response to National Security Action
Memorandum 239

Attached is a memorandum outlining a procedure and time schedule in response to NSAM 239 dated May 6, 1963. This memorandum was discussed at a meeting of the Subcommittee of Deputies held May 21, 1963. The Subcommittee agreed generally with the suggested procedures and time schedule. The work is proceeding immediately in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and in other agencies.

The purpose of this memorandum is to insure that all Members of the Committee of Principals and their appropriate staffs are apprised of the work schedule.

I am also attaching terms of reference for Working Groups numbers 3 and 4. (annex B and C).

William C. Foster

William C. Foster
Director

GROUP 5

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declassified following
removal of enclosure.

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Group 5

By MFO, NARS Date 11/24/76

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ANNEX A

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Office of
the Director

May 18, 1963

MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Response to National Security Memorandum of
the President

This memorandum deals with the National Security Memorandum 239, May 6, 1963, on preparations for introduction of new disarmament measures at the Geneva Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In order to provide the appropriate policy coordination, there is planned the formation of a subcommittee of the Committee of Deputies to review proposals of various ACDA working groups. Both the subcommittee and the various ACDA working groups will include persons from the Departments of State and Defense and, where appropriate, other agencies, as well as from ACDA. The function of the subcommittee will be to prepare papers for the Committee of Principals, and it will be expected to maintain a close liaison with the members of the Committee of Principals.

I suggest the following as members of the subcommittee of Deputies:

ACDA - Mr. Fisher, Chairman, plus chairman of
appropriate ACDA working group

State - Under Secretary Harriman
Ambassador Thompson

Defense - Assistant Secretary Nitze
Dr. Brown

JCS - (to be designated)

White House - Dr. Kaysen
Dr. Wiesner

CIA - (to be designated)

Group 4
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MFB
NARS Date 11/24/76

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First Report of Working Groups	June 3
Consideration by Subcommittee of Deputies	June 7
Discussion by Committee of Principals	June 14
Final Report of Working Groups to Subcommittee of Deputies	June 21
Consideration by Subcommittee of Deputies	June 24
Consideration by Committee of Principals	July 1
Meeting with President	July 3
NATO consultation including Western members ENDC	July 5-10
Presentation before ENDC	July 15

All of the working groups should have in mind proposals which might be presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations this fall as well as the ENDC. This is particularly true of the working group on nuclear containment and non-proliferation which should consider broader approaches to the problem of non-proliferation for possible presentation to the General Assembly.

William C. Foster

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5/23/63

ANNEX B

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF WORKING GROUP III ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The primary responsibility of this group should be to study European security arrangements involving arms control and disarmament, particularly as they might relate to the portion of an arms control and disarmament program which includes possible reductions in conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. The input of this working group should, however, be part of a total plan which considered all aspects of disarmament, including strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In this context, approaches to European security should now be studied seriously in addition to those that have been receiving attention over the last few months; i.e., on the one hand the effort to provide Europe with an MLF and the effort to move toward parity in conventional strength by acquiring more conventional armaments; and on the other, the suggestions of some that we accept the inevitability of German and other acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Serious consideration is needed of a third alternative in which substantial arms control and disarmament would play a major part. Such a study ought not to be an attempt to develop arms control measures within the constraints of existing policy, but should rather start with the assumption that changes in policy can be examined.

In this context, the study should consider such questions as:

- (a) The political, security and military implications of agreements between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.
- (b) The role of escalation as a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression.
- (c) The acceptability of European arms control and disarmament in light of the Berlin problem.
- (d) Limitations on deployment of armaments.
- (e) The relationship between the MLF problem and proposed arms control and disarmament measures.

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By MFD, NARS Date 11/24/76

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ANNEX C

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF WORKING GROUP IV ON
NUCLEAR CONTAINMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

The Working Group should examine the broad problem of halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities, taking into account both (a) the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles by additional countries, and (b) the possible deployment of nuclear capabilities of existing nuclear powers into areas where such weapons are not now deployed, including certain of the developing areas and outer space.

The Working Group should then identify and examine the potential effectiveness of various approaches to limiting further proliferation. In this regard the Working Group should consider both:

(a) current arms control efforts of the U.S. or other countries directed at various aspects of this problem including: a nuclear test ban; a non-dissemination agreement; a cut-off of fissionable material production and related transfer of material to peaceful uses; a ban on placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit; and denuclearized zones; and

(b) collateral approaches, including the IAEA safeguards program and other approaches to safeguarding the use of fissionable materials; approaches to limiting the possible effects of the spread of space technology on the acquisition of missile systems; and such other collateral approaches as may be identified during the course of the study. Particular emphasis should be given to the question of collateral approaches.

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Group 4
By MFO, NARS Date 11/24/76

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The Working Group should prepare a comprehensive study of the various elements of the problem and develop recommendations concerning an over-all U.S. approach which might include a number of different elements such as the foregoing. The Working Group should identify the interrelationships of the various elements and should take into consideration the problem of maintaining consistency between the approach taken to non-proliferation and possible arrangements for a NATO Multilateral Force.

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of

A GRADUAL APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

In response to NSAM 239, "A Gradual Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament" was developed by ACDA. As a result of two reviews by the Subcommittee of Deputies, a current basic paper on the Gradual Approach has been prepared for consideration by the Committee of Principals. To provide the reader with a summation of the salient points of this approach, the following resume is presented. For the sake of economy and brevity, distribution of all annexes to the current basic paper was withheld pending this review by the Committee of Principals.

I. Purpose of the Approach

To enunciate a philosophy and concept for a gradual approach to arms control and disarmament, together with an illustrative program, which would make a meaningful contribution to world security by promoting practical measures which lead to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

II. Rationale for A Gradual Approach

1. The United States and the Soviet Union are both on record as agreeing on the necessity for a turn-down in the arms race because of the dangers for world peace.

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2. The importance of bringing the arms race under control, and of attempting to establish an international environment in which war can no longer be an instrument for settling international problems, is self-evident.

3. An impasse does exist between the US and the USSR in the ENDC negotiations. The absence of mutual trust, the problems of verification, and the conflict of national goals present a formidable barrier to progress.

4. The objective of GCD remains attractive, but realistically it is unlikely to be achieved in the immediate future.

5. The above problems clearly underscore the desirability of a more gradual approach to arms control and disarmament.

III. Objectives

The "Gradual Approach" is designed to build mutual trust, contribute to experience in verification and lead to a decreasing level of armaments by achieving a sequence of objectives which deal with armaments, environment and legal machinery:

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| Armaments | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Overcome inertia, demonstrate good faith and establish a precedent for inspection.- Provide transition from token to more comprehensive types of inspection.- Halt the arms race. |
|-----------|---|

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- 3 -

- Turn down the arms race.
- Secure participation of all militarily significant states, enhance peace through control of force levels and armaments not required by allowed forces.

Environment - Reduce tension and risk of war.

Machinery - Establish appropriate legal instruments for peacekeeping and verification.

IV. Concept of A Gradual Approach

The objectives of the new approach might be achieved by a gradual approach embodying the following concept:

- . Provide a flexible outline, not a rigid plan.
- . Present a sequence of steps which are based on specific objectives and which can be separately negotiated.
- . The sum of the steps to approximate Stage I of the current US Treaty Outline.
- . Progressively increase inspection to keep pace with rate of reduction.
- . Specify duration of each step, yet allow compression of maximum duration of total program.
- . Program includes illustrative examples of measures designed to achieve objectives. (See Attachment 1)
- . Later steps are specific suggestions but omit detail to preclude inflexibility resulting from unsupported extrapolation.
- . Program may be terminated, turned back or progress forward without deleterious effect on participants.

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V. Tempo

The example measures in the illustrative program, if followed consecutively, would require a total of 8 years before entering the final step. However, the fundamental aim of the Gradual Approach is to get arms control and disarmament started, the philosophy being that the tempo, while starting slowly, will increase as confidence and experience are gained. Thus, it is indeed possible that the last step of this program could begin 3 years after initiation of the first step.

It should be noted that the US would be willing to negotiate its GCD program at any time agreement could be reached.

Attachment:

Attachment 1 - Illustrative Program

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ATTACHMENT 1

ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM

Step 1

OBJECTIVE

TO OVERCOME INERTIA BY INITIATING ARMS REDUCTION USING OBSOLESCENT OR NON-CRITICAL MILITARY HARDWARE, THUS DEMONSTRATING GOOD FAITH, ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT OF VERIFIED ARMS REDUCTION, AND TO PROVIDE A TRANSITION FROM TOKEN TO MORE COMPREHENSIVE TYPES OF INSPECTION BY EXTENDING REDUCTIONS TO MORE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY HARDWARE IN SUCH A WAY THAT INSPECTION OF DESTRUCTION WILL BE REQUIRED AT MULTIPLE LOCATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

Example Measure: 1/ Destruction of medium jet bombers and/or MRBMs with concurrent reduction of quota of long-range delivery vehicles. In addition, prohibit the production and deployment of ABMs. Parties would agree not to transfer to other nations affected armaments.

Parties: US and USSR.

Duration: Three (3) years.

Verification: Adversary inspection of destruction and declared facilities. Third party observers allowed. The organization and responsibilities of an IDO would be developed.

As an associated element: Production limitations on fissionable material and measures dealing with the environment. Resident inspectors at declared fissionable material production facilities.

1/ If the Soviet Union would agree to more extensive verification and inspection early in the disarmament process, it might also be feasible to limit in Step 1 the production of those armaments scheduled for reduction.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Step 2OBJECTIVE

TO HALT THE ARMS RACE BY LIMITING THE PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS FOR WHICH
* VERIFICATION OF PRODUCTION LIMITATIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A VERY
LARGE INSPECTION EFFORT.

Example Measure:

One-for-one production limitation in
categories ^{2/}1,2,3,4 and 10 with restric-
tion on new development.

Parties:

US and USSR.

Duration:

Two (2) years.

Verification:

Adversary inspection of declared
facilities and mobile inspection teams.
Third party participation authorized.

As an associated element: Extend production limitation to NATO/Warsaw
Pact and measures dealing with tension reduction and risk of war.

2/ Categories referred to contain long-range nuclear delivery
vehicles (heavy bombers and land based missiles), submarine
launched missiles, air-to-surface missiles, tactical aircraft
and missiles, and combatant naval ships.

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Step 3

OBJECTIVE

TO TURN DOWN THE ARMS RACE THROUGH A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND AN EXPANDED PRODUCTION LIMITATION. AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO INCLUDE ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND RED CHINA. SECURITY WOULD REQUIRE INSPECTION OF SOME RETAINED ARMAMENTS.

Example Measure:

Extend one-for-one production limitation to all categories 1 through 10.
Reduce armaments by 30%.

Parties:

US and NATO; USSR and Warsaw Pact, and Red China.

Duration:

Three (3) years.

Verification:

Inspection by IDO except by adversary for NATO and Warsaw Pact. Inspection includes destruction, facilities, mobile teams and retained levels of some armaments.

As an associated element: Measures dealing with tension reduction, risk of war and outstanding political disputes.

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Step 4

OBJECTIVE

TO SECURE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES AND
TO FURTHER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEFUL WORLD THROUGH CONTROL OF
MILITARY FORCE LEVELS AND ARMAMENTS NOT REQUIRED FOR ALLOWED MILITARY
FORCES.

Example Measure:

Establish force levels, reduce armaments
not required by forces.

Control of chemical-biological (CB)
weapons.

Parties:

All militarily significant states.

Duration:

Three (3) years.

Verification:

Inspection by IDO to include retained
levels.

As an associated element: Measures dealing with tension reduction, risk
of war and outstanding political disputes.


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APPENDIX B

A GRADUAL APPROACH
TO
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT



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APPENDIX B

A GRADUAL APPROACH
to
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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US Strategy and Tactics

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Categories of Armaments

Measures to Reduce Tension and the Risk of War

Machinery for Verification and Peacekeeping

Reduction of Armaments

Verification

Production Limitations

Other Example Measures

Annex

A (not included)

B

C

D (not included)

E (not included)

F (not included)

G (not included)

H (not included)

I (not included)

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BY hfm NARS, DATE 8/10/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~A GRADUAL APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

27 June 1963

A. PURPOSE

To enunciate a philosophy and concept for a gradual approach to arms control and disarmament, together with an illustrative program, which would make a meaningful contribution to world security by promoting practical measures which lead to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

B. BACKGROUND1. The Necessity for Progress in Arms Control

The United States and the Soviet Union are both on record^{1/} as agreeing on the necessity for a turn-down in the arms race, because of the dangers for world peace. From the US viewpoint, the unfavorable prospects for Free World security if the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear capabilities are unchecked have provided, during the last several years, the impetus for a greatly intensified effort to reach agreements with the USSR on measures promising increased security to both sides.

Under a strategy of deterrence, the security of the Free

1/ Sept. 20, 1961, Joint (US-USSR) Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations

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World is dependent upon the rationality of Soviet leaders. The emergence of additional nuclear powers will compound the dangers resulting from reliance on moderation and rationality of human beings. From this perspective, the importance of bringing the arms race under control, and for attempting to establish an international climate and world order in which war can no longer be an instrument for settling international problems, is evident.

2. The Extent of Progress in Arms Control Negotiations

Despite the importance of progress in arms control negotiations, concrete advances have so far been disappointingly few. At the one extreme are proposals for separate initial measures, which either were thought to be negotiable from a practical viewpoint (such as a nuclear test ban), or are of a relatively non-provocative nature (such as measures to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of unintended nuclear war). The agreement that Antarctica would not be used for military purposes, and the Soviet acceptance of the "hot line" proposal are the only recent examples of concrete progress in the arms control field.

At the other extreme are the US and Soviet draft programs for general and complete disarmament. The current GCD negotiations are at a seeming impasse due to disagreement on means for preserving the balance of power and providing adequate verification during

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the disarmament process. The major point at issue in arms control negotiations between the United States and the USSR has long been the nature of requirements for verification. The absence of any early basis for mutual trust, natural caution and conservatism, lack of experience with inspection, concepts of sovereignty and distrust of world government schemes, and the Soviet tradition of secrecy together constitute a formidable barrier to significant agreement on verification requirements. Thus, while the objective of GCD remains attractive, realistically it is unlikely to be achieved in the immediate future.

3. The Desirability of a Gradual Approach to Arms Control

The above considerations underscore the importance of clearly enunciating, at least within the framework of the US Government, a more gradual approach to arms control and disarmament. A series of objectives should be identified which, if achieved, could be counted upon to build mutual trust among the major powers, contribute to experience in verification and lead to an increasing level of disarmament.

It is impossible to predict the precise measures which might turn out to be acceptable to both sides. It is useful, however, to examine a number of measures which if adopted could achieve the

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desired objectives. These measures, together with an estimated time scale, form an illustrative program which can be expected to lead to substantial safeguarded disarmament and facilitate later achievement of GCD. The program is not a substitute for GCD but is a gradual approach for realization of that goal.

This paper will discuss the philosophy and concept for a gradual approach to arms control and disarmament and then present by way of an illustrative program an example of measures which might bring the objectives to fruition.

C. A GRADUAL APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

The review of problems associated with disarmament negotiations clearly suggests that there are three basic components of a program for a more gradual approach to arms control: (a) criteria for a program; (b) the objectives of a gradual approach; and (c) the concept of a gradual approach emphasizing its structure and phasing.

1. Criteria for a Program

The criteria for a program are dictated by considerations of existing US policy, negotiability, and acceptability to the Congress and public. These include:

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a. The continuing dedication of the United States to the disarmament objectives embodied in the US-USSR 20 September 1961 "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations", and the continuing validity of the US Treaty Outline of 18 April 1962.

b. US recognition that early attainment of the objective of GCD is very unlikely in the context of present political realities, and that therefore a more intermediate, gradual series of objectives will be useful in giving both sides the experience necessary for generating confidence that further steps could later be taken without unacceptable security risk to either side.

c. Measures proposed should be compatible with the security interests of all parties.

d. Measures proposed should include those verification requirements which are related to the amount of reduction taking place and to the degree of risk involved. Both sides must be given an opportunity to develop a more accurate and realistic evaluation of their inspection requirements through actual experience in carrying out limited arms control measures.

e. Measures proposed should not require the development and operation of international peacekeeping machinery for those steps

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involving only NATO or Warsaw Pact powers. (The organizational structure adopted during the early steps of the program must possess the inherent ability to evolve into a form of international control acceptable to the United States.)

f. Measures proposed should be capable of implementation without the necessity of concomitant agreement to complete GCD within a specified time period.

2. Objectives of a Gradual Approach

The objectives for any program fall into three different categories -- those which deal with armaments, those which deal with the environment, i.e., reduce international tension, and those which deal with machinery for ensuring compliance with measures affecting the other two.

a. Objectives dealing with armaments. To proceed at a reasonable pace to a point where meaningful disarmament, with adequate verification, is realized will require intermediate objectives. These must ensure a reasonable advance toward disarmament but should not be of such a magnitude that they would be inherently frustrating. The following objectives offer an adequate progression and appear attainable:

(1) Overcome inertia, demonstrate good faith, and establish a precedent for inspection,

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(2) Provide a transition from token to more comprehensive types of inspection,

(3) Halt the arms race,

(4) Turn down the arms race, and

(5) Secure the participation of all militarily significant states, enhance peace through the control of force levels and armaments not required by allowed forces.

b. Objectives for reducing tension. On the premise that international tensions lead to the arms race more than the reverse, the objective is to improve the international environment. This should be accomplished through a series of measures designed to reduce tensions; reduce the risk of war; enhance international cooperation; establish separate nuclear measures; and exchange military liaison information.

c. Objectives for establishing more effective instruments for peacekeeping. During the course of this program, planning should begin for the development of the kind of organizations that will ultimately be required to: (a) supervise and conduct verification; and (b) coordinate and supervise peacekeeping operations including a peace force. By the end of the program an approved international disarmament organization should be in being and conducting verification procedures.

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3. Concept of a Gradual Approach

The program should be designed so that:

- a. It is not a rigid plan, but rather an outline of a program.
- b. It consists of a series of steps each of which is considered negotiable. (The United States would prefer that they be negotiated and implemented one at a time, without a commitment to proceed to GCD, and without any prior agreement on the nature of succeeding steps, in order that implementation of first steps not be delayed pending agreement on later steps. Thus this program would serve as a guide to the negotiator rather than a plan to be tabled in its entirety.) (Annex A)
- c. The sequence of steps could carry the program to a point approximately equivalent to the conclusion of Stage I of the present US GCD Treaty Outline.
- d. The first steps require only those types of inspection least objectionable to the USSR, and the associated limitations on armaments are restricted to those which might be made with the type of inspection which the USSR has evidenced a willingness to accept.
- e. Succeeding steps are designed to provide some practical experience with various types of inspection before more substantial arms control measures are introduced.

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f. Each step has a specified duration, after which obligations assumed would terminate unless renegotiated or unless progress has been achieved on succeeding steps. (The purpose of this is twofold: first, to provide impetus to the negotiations, and second, to ensure that the burden of abrogation because of insincerity of a party would not be on the innocent.) While the termination date would be specified for each step, there would be no arbitrary limitation on when the parties could progress to the next step. (In practice, this would require that both sides be satisfied with the experience gained in the preceding steps to justify further progress.)

g. Specific suggestions for later steps are necessary in order to keep the disarmament goal clearly in view and to meet the requirement for well-defined objectives. However, the details of the structure of the later steps, particularly with respect to inspection requirements, would have to be negotiated on the basis of the experience of both sides with earlier steps.

h. The program established can be terminated, turned back or progress forward from any point without a deleterious effect on participating states.

D. AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM

1. General

This discussion is presented from the point of view of US interests.

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It is intended that the strategy for presenting the program to our allies and to a disarmament conference be developed separately (Annex A).

The program is not a substitute for GCD nor is it intended to replace the 18 April 1962 Treaty Outline. It constitutes a series of proposals whose scope approximates that of Stage I of the Treaty Outline but whose overall rate of achievement is somewhat slower and offers a greater possibility for early implementation. It is felt that through such a program a number of complex negotiating problems can be overcome. The program should build confidence that safeguarded disarmament is possible by allowing the world to move gradually toward GCD.

The program as outlined is believed to be sound and feasible, and above all, it is flexible. It is not considered necessary or desirable to have the entire sequence of measures rigidly planned or detailed in advance. However, it is useful to have the objectives well defined and to include, for illustrative purposes, an example of a measure for achieving each. This, then, is the purpose of the program. In other words, these measures are illustrative and are not to be interpreted as a rigid package but an outline -- one of perhaps several that could achieve the objectives desired. The

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passages of time, the changing environment and the negotiation itself may alter the exact parameters of a measure ultimately discussed or adopted. With this in mind and on the assumption that negotiations would aim toward an implementation date prior to mid-1964, the measure for Step 1 should be considered as the recommended measure for achieving the initial objective.

a. The method of presentation. The program is divided into steps which form a logical sequence for advancing to the final objective. Each step has a primary and an associated element. The basis for discussing this program is centered on the primary element.

The primary element of a step is a measure designed to achieve an objective that deals with armaments. For each objective an appropriate illustrative measure is specified and analyzed. The initial measure is comparatively modest, but as the program progresses measures become more comprehensive and complex since it is felt that confidence gained through previous experience with the program will warrant such advancement.

The associated element specified for each step is a measure designed to reduce tension and the risk of war or achieve some other desirable objective which is not essential to satisfying the primary

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objective of the step. Measures included as associated elements should be negotiated in addition to the primary element but the success or failure of the negotiation of the associated element is not intended to affect the implementation of the step.

Verification is an integral part of any reduction or limitation measure. Throughout, the amount of verification required is tailored to the amount of reduction taking place and the risk involved. While this is the paramount factor, the program is designed to as to overcome Soviet objections to the inspection issue yet assure a high confidence of compliance with the measure. The initial measure is one whose overall risk will require only an inspection of "bonfires". As more complex measures which involve a greater risk are undertaken, the degree of inspection required will increase accordingly.

In sum, measures are designed to achieve the objective of each step and improve the stability of the existing military environment by:

- (1) Beginning early in the program the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles;
- (2) Encouraging the reduction of soft and therefore vulnerable strategic delivery vehicles rather than hardened and dispersed armaments;

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(3) Initiating meaningful armaments reduction in both the tactical nuclear and conventional armaments inventories as well as strategic nuclear armaments;

(4) Materially assisting in reducing the prospect of war resulting from accident, miscalculation, the failure of communications or dangers arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology to nations not possessing such capability; and

(5) Initiating procedures and arrangements for peacekeeping simultaneously with the program to initiate arms reduction (Annex B).

b. Participants. The initial measures of this program are designed to be negotiable on a bilateral basis by the US and the USSR. However, as the program progresses, participation by a larger number of militarily significant states will be encouraged and in due course become a prerequisite to further progress.

c. The tempo of progression. Time duration for various measures, as the measures themselves, are illustrative and may be compressed or expanded as the confidence of the participants warrant. Thus even though a time duration is specified, it is intended that measures of a succeeding step may be undertaken whenever participants are agreed that the provisions of the preceding step are being met. However, it is not intended that the duration

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of a step or transition to another step be dependent upon measures included as an associated element. Thus even though it is conceivable that it could be eight years before entering the final step of this program it is possible that the time span may be compressed to as few as three years or some variant in between. Furthermore the US would be ready to set aside this program at any time the USSR is willing to enter into a GCD treaty along the lines of our Outline Treaty (Enclosure 1 to Annex B).

d. Measures for reducing tension. Measures in this category are included as associated elements of the steps. They are those measures whose implementation by at least the US and the USSR would do much for reducing the risk of war and easing world tensions. It is probable that Soviet reaction to this category of measures will reveal whether the USSR desires to make progress toward the settlement of outstanding differences and move toward more extensive arms control and disarmament. As such, these measures should provide evidence to the American people and the world of any real mutual interest in arms control agreements. Thus, though they are not always dramatic, they will provide the foundation upon which meaningful disarmament can be achieved.

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These measures are first considered as the associated element of Step 1; however, they should not be tied to any specific step. They should be negotiated without regard to a particular step and should be implemented as soon as agreement can be reached. The following are illustrative measures but are not to be considered all-inclusive or limiting (Annex D).

- (1) Advance notification of military movements and maneuvers.
- (2) Non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-possessing states.
- (3) Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
- (4) Nuclear test ban.
- (5) Transfer of specific quantities of weapons grade material.

- (6) Limitation on the production of fissionable materials.

e. Establishment of more effective instruments for peace-keeping. The long-range requirement to develop a workable International Disarmament Organization to supervise and conduct verification of disarmament is approached initially through the establishment of a simplified IDO whose structure and mission expands only in consonance with expanding responsibilities reflected in the progression of the steps as they move from adversary inspection in Step 1, to NATO and Warsaw Pact involvement in Step 2, and to

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additional countries in Steps 3 and 4. In order to ensure that a truly international verification organization will be operating during the latter steps of the program a Disarmament Commission could be established during Step 1, composed of parties to the treaty and other interested nations, whose responsibility will be to develop the structure and functions of a viable verification organization. The requirement for strengthening procedures and instrumentalities for peacekeeping is approached through the inclusion of provisions, in the associated elements of each step, for progressively more substantive actions pointed toward increasing the possibility of peaceful settlement of disputes (Annex E).

2. Step 1

a. The objective. TO OVERCOME INERTIA, DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH AND ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR INSPECTION BY INITIATING ARMS REDUCTION USING NON-CRITICAL MILITARY HARDWARE. THEN, BY EXTENDING REDUCTIONS TO A GRADUALLY INCREASING NUMBER OF MORE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS, PROVIDE A TRANSITION FROM TOKEN TO MORE COMPREHENSIVE TYPES OF INSPECTION.

b. An example measure.^{2/}

^{2/}On the assumption that negotiations would aim toward an implementation date prior to mid-1964, the primary element should be considered as the recommended measure for achieving the Step 1 objective.

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(1) Primary element.^{3/}

(a) The US and USSR will destroy 360 missiles having a range between 300 and 1500 kilometers and/or medium jet bombers (empty weight between 15,000 and 40,000 kilograms) per year for three years. Concurrently each party will destroy long-range nuclear delivery vehicles (i.e., missiles having a range greater than 1500 kilometers together with their associated launchers, and heavy bomber aircraft having an empty weight greater than 40,000 kilograms) at the rate of 50 the first year, 100 the second year and 150 the third year.

(b) In addition, parties will agree to halt the production and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. Verification of the above reduction and production measures will be by inspection of "bonfires" and declared facilities, respectively, conducted on an adversary basis. Third party observers will be allowed.

(c) Further, parties will agree not to transfer affected types of armaments to other states.

^{3/} Consideration of possibly introducing into Step 1 some other measures limiting production on a "one-for-one" basis should not be disregarded. Such a limitation could be applied to the armaments defined in subparagraph 2.b(1)(a) above. However, before such measures are seriously contemplated, one must judge the effect on the overall objective of Step 1 and the concept of the Gradual Approach. A "quid pro quo" relationship might profitably be established in this area, if the Soviets were willing to accept broader verification requirements in exchange for an earlier limitation on production.

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(2) Associated element. Implementation by at least the US and the USSR of a variety of measures designed to reduce tension and the risk of war. Multinational participation in study programs to develop a skeletal form of an international disarmament organization.

c. Discussion. The reduction of 360 missiles and/or medium jet bombers per year is a particularly appropriate beginning because the numbers involved can be drawn from armaments that are approaching obsolescence and will be phased out rather soon. However, their destruction would demonstrate a willingness to undertake disarmament measures, yet have no deleterious effect on national security. As such, this portion of the measure is reasonable when considered in the light of the world environment, and it would accomplish the objective of overcoming inertia and demonstrating good faith (Annex F).

Although, from a strategic point of view, the destruction of this number of medium range delivery vehicles per year is a comparatively small commitment by both nations, its magnitude is such that it will serve usefully to stimulate world opinion and focus attention on some meaningful and safeguarded disarmament. Therefore, its actual implementation over a period of many months should serve to keep the disarmament problem in the public eye and perhaps foster greater understanding and interest in the problem.

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Furthermore, destruction would preclude these obsolescent armaments being transferred to other states and thereby help control the proliferation of arms. This coupled with a non-proliferation declaration should tend to stabilize the military environment.

The actual destruction would probably take place on the soil of the respective countries at depots selected by the host nations. Therefore, it should provide a precedent for, and some first experience with, on-site inspection for arms control agreements.

The inclusion of long-range nuclear delivery vehicles for concurrent reduction is intended to provide a transition between token on-site inspection and the kind of inspection that would be required in connection with a limitation on the production of armaments.

The requirement for significantly more inspection arises from the need to inspect for the destruction of the launching facilities.^{4/}

The graduated destruction of LRNVs (i.e., 50 the first year, 100 the second year and 150 the third year) is designed to allow each side to gain experience in verification techniques and to overcome

^{4/} It is probable that the USSR would prefer to destroy medium range bombers rather than MRBMs under the first portion of this step. Thus the emphasis on verification of launching facilities in the second portion.

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Soviet reluctance to inspection. It is anticipated that first year destruction, involving only 50 LRDVs, will not necessarily involve launching facilities; thus experience gained during this year would facilitate inspection at multiple sites which would be required as destruction of launching facilities became mandatory in later years. Inspection would be conducted on an adversary basis; however, toward the end of the step, third party observers on the inspection teams could be authorized (Annex G).

It is believed that in carrying out the destruction of LRDVs both parties will be induced to get rid of those kinds of armaments which are "soft". Since there would be no ban on production (except ABMs) the parties could continue producing second strike armaments. Thus the defensive posture of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States could actually improve, although the overall strategic balance should be maintained by the straight numerical reduction (Annex F).

Restrictions on the production and deployment of ABMs are included in this step for two principal reasons: (a) if this were not done, the possibility would exist that the strategic balance could be upset by defensive developments; (b) heavy R&D expenditures on ABM weapons to date measured against very modest success would indicate grounds for mutuality of interest between the US and the Soviet Union.

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Types of armaments to be reduced are not specified in this measure. It is envisaged that selection of types would remain the option of the affected power with the list of armaments to be destroyed, revised and exchanged every six months. The authority to revise periodically the list of armaments to be destroyed would decrease the probability of creating an imbalance and should encourage sincerity on the part of participants.

Reductions of the magnitude required would represent a modest beginning of effective disarmament since the armaments involved toward the end of the three year period are significant and generally would involve more than just those armaments scheduled for immediate phase-out. However, the reductions required at the beginning of the measure involve armaments which are non-critical or are approaching obsolescence (Annex F).

The associated element should add stability in the military and political environment and enhance agreement on later measures. Implementation of Step 1 would not be dependent on agreement on any of the associated measures. Those measures on which agreement was obtained would be implemented during the course of Step 1 as soon as agreement was obtained. Negotiation to reach agreement on the other measures would be continued in succeeding steps (Annex D).

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Early in Step 1 the US and USSR would agree to the establishment of a Disarmament Commission empowered to develop and recommend the structure and responsibilities of an international disarmament organization, which would assume the verification responsibilities of the adversary inspection authority during a later step of the program. If desired, other nations demonstrating interest in participating in the planning commission could be invited.

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On balance, this measure would achieve the objective of overcoming inertia, demonstrating good faith and establishing a precedent for inspection, by gradually increasing the significance and quantity of armaments. It would provide a transition from token to more comprehensive types of inspection. It would meet the often enunciated Soviet preference for minimum inspection strictly related to the amount of the reductions taking place and would be in keeping with their professed preference to begin the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles at the outset of any disarmament agreement. Finally, this measure would truly represent a modest beginning of effective disarmament, yet have no deleterious effect on national security -- thus it is not premature when considered in the light of world environment.

d. Other Production Limitations in Step 1. Although in Step 1 the reduction of long-range nuclear delivery vehicles is initiated, no limitation on production of these vehicles is concurrently specified. This circumstance does open the question of not controlling the arms race in Step 1, for obviously a nation could replace -- through new production -- those armaments destroyed with equivalent or improved armaments. However, if one reviews the sequence of objectives of the Gradual Approach, halting and turning down the arms race are scheduled for Steps 2 and 3 respectively. This is not to say, though, that if

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negotiations on Step 1 were seriously blocked because of this issue, consideration of either specifying limited production controls on LRNDVs in Step 1 or initiating the production measures of Step 2 earlier might prove to be of mutual interest to both the US and the USSR.

3. Step 2

a. The objective. TO HALT THE ARMS RACE BY LIMITING THE PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS FOR WHICH VERIFICATION OF PRODUCTION LIMITATIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A VERY LARGE INSPECTION EFFORT.

b. An example measure.

(1) Primary element. During a period of two years, the US and USSR and other parties to the agreement will adopt a one-for-one production limitation for all armed combat aircraft, missiles with

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associated launchers, submarines and aircraft carriers in categories 1,2,3,4, and 10 (Annex C). Additionally, parties will stop the production and testing of new types of armaments in the categories limited. Verification will be by inspection of declared facilities conducted on an adversary basis by resident teams and employment of an agreed number of adversary mobile inspection teams to deter clandestine production.

(2) Associated element. The production limitations required as a primary element will be extended to NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Verification will be as described for the primary element except that teams will be composed of members of the NATO Alliance for inspection of Warsaw Pact production and of Warsaw Pact members for inspection of NATO production.

c. Discussion. The one-for-one production limitation would place a quantitative restraint on major armaments. A qualitative restraint would be imposed by the provision to halt the production and testing of new types of armaments in the categories limited. Parties would also agree not to expand production facilities for prohibited armaments (Annex H).

The rationale for this measure is, first, that it limits the production of only those armaments which are comparatively easy to

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inspect and, second, it introduces inspection measures requiring increased access to Soviet territory only after significant reductions have taken place. Thus the proposal would not be open to criticism that the US and its allies are proposing control over retained armaments disproportionate to the amount of armaments being destroyed.

While their participation would not be required to reach agreement on this step, an effort would be made to extend the production limitation on selected armaments to the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This would not be pressed unless the current politico-military conditions in the NATO Alliance had improved. Furthermore, some thought must be given to exempting a Warsaw Pact country, probably Czechoslovakia, if France chose not to participate.

The declared production facilities would be inspected as agreed by resident on-site inspection teams composed of members of the NATO Alliance for inspection of Warsaw Pact production facilities and of the Warsaw Pact members for inspection of NATO production facilities. If NATO and Warsaw Pact countries do not participate, inspection would be conducted by adversaries. The employment of limited numbers of mobile inspection teams having free access to highways, railroads, waterways and transportation

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will extend the one-for-one production limitation to all categories of armaments listed in Annex C. Additionally, parties will reduce affected armaments about 10% per year so that at the end of three years a net reduction of approximately 30% of armaments existing at the beginning of this step will have been achieved. Verification will be by inspection of declared facilities, "bonfires" and inspection of some retained levels of armaments conducted by an international organization -- but with operations in the Warsaw Pact countries controlled by the NATO Alliance and operations in the NATO countries controlled by the Warsaw Pact.

(2) Associated element. Parties to the agreement will consider any other measures which meet the objectives of this program and which have not been adopted.

c. Discussion. This measure would begin the turndown of the arms race since, for the first time, both production limitations and reduction would be extended to all ten categories of major armaments listed in Annex C. The limitation on the production would provide a distinct brake to the arms race while the reductions required would cause a definite downturn. At the end of three years (or less if agreed) participants would have reduced their declared major armaments by approximately 30% (Annex F). This measure would

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require a declaration of armaments levels. Therefore, any reductions begun under the provisions of a previous measure would cease upon entry into this step.

The amount and intensity of verification required during this step would increase because of the extent of both production limitations and reductions. In addition to increasing the number of plants and facilities open to inspection and the number of inspectors involved, it will be necessary to increase the number of inspectors who have general freedom of movement to deter clandestine production. Furthermore, inspection of some retained levels of armaments will be essential. It would be hoped that by the end of this step a purely adversary inspection system would have evolved into a truly international organization (Annex G).

By the end of this step the amount of reduction, production controls and verification would approximate that presently required by Stage I of the US Treaty Outline, and thus an appropriate basis would have been established for expansion of the program into a more comprehensive treaty on general and complete disarmament.

5. Step 4

a. The objective. TO SECURE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES AND TO FURTHER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEFUL WORLD THROUGH CONTROL OF MILITARY FORCE LEVELS AND ARMAMENTS NOT REQUIRED FOR ALLOWED MILITARY FORCES.

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b. An example measure.

(1) Primary element. Over a period of three years, parties to the agreement, which must include all militarily significant states, will eliminate all reserve forces and reserve armaments in categories 1 through 10 (Annex C); reduce active full-time forces to agreed specified levels; and stop the production and testing of chemical and biological weapons. New parties to the agreement will, in addition, accomplish the measures specified for Step 3. Verification will be by inspection of declared facilities and "bonfires" and for retained levels of armaments and forces. Inspections will be conducted by an international inspection organization.

(2) Associated element. Parties to the agreement will consider any other measures which meet the objectives of this program and which have not been adopted.

b. Discussion. During this step it is proposed that all armaments be destroyed except those that are required to meet the normal authorized levels for active military forces manned at combat strength. Participants would agree as to those forces and armaments which were being maintained strictly for reserve forces or mobilization purposes and thus subject to reduction or destruction. These reserve armaments would be gradually phased out over the three years duration of this step. During this step the major participants would reduce active

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forces to agreed upon levels. These reductions would necessitate that all militarily significant states become participants (Annex F).

In addition to undertaking the provisions of this measure, new nations entering into the agreement at this point would be required to undertake reductions required by previous measures and to abide by production limitations still in effect.

It is proposed that all participants agree to the cessation of the production and testing of chemical and biological weapons, and that all production facilities be declared and made eligible for inspection (Annex H).

Verification procedures applicable to Step 3 would be applicable to this step. They would be conducted by an international inspection organization (Annex G).

By the end of this step a firm basis should have been developed to proceed with a full-scale international disarmament program under adequate supervision and control. Successive steps or stages beyond this could probably be Stages II and III of the US Treaty Outline or simple percentage reductions based on declared and verified levels of retained armaments. The issue most likely to determine the success or failure of efforts to expand the program into a

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wider agreement for general and complete disarmament would be effective evolution of an international disarmament organization with an adequate enforcement capability.

ATTACHMENTS:

- Annex A - US Strategy and Tactics (not included)
- Annex B - Tabular Portrayal
- Annex C - Categories of Armaments
- Annex D - Measures to Reduce Tension and the Risk of War ((not included)
- Annex E - Machinery for Verification and Peacekeeping (not included)
- Annex F - Reduction of Armaments (not included)
- Annex G - Verification (not included)
- Annex H - Production Limitations (not included)
- Annex I - Other Example Measures (not included)

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Annex B (Tabular Portrayal) to A Gradual Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament

Step	Parties	Duration Years (See Inclosure 1)	Subject	Rate	Total	Primary Element		Verification	Associated Element		Transition Requirements
						Reduction	Production Limitation				
1		OBJECTIVE: Overcome inertia, demonstrate good faith, establish a precedent for inspection, and provide a transition from token to more comprehensive types of inspection.									
	US & USSR	three or until Step 3 begins	Missiles w/range 300-1500 km; and med. jet bombers.	360/ year	1080	None 1/		Adversary 2/ inspect bonfires.	Measures to reduce tension.		Not applicable.
			Long-range nuclear delivery vehicles	50,100, 150/year	300	None 1/					
			Anti- ballistic missile defense systems				Production and deployment prohibited				

^{1/} One-for-one production limitation might be included for these armaments if broader verification requirements were accepted.

^{2/} Formulation of a skeletal IDO could be added.

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
2 Step	Parties	Duration Years (See Inclosure 1)	Subject	Primary Element				Annex B	
				Rate	Total	Production Limitation	Verification	Associated Element	Transition Requirements
	US & USSR with others	Two	None	OBJECTIVE: N.A.	<u>Halt the arms race.</u> N.A.	One-for- one limi- tation on aircraft, missiles, submarines and air- craft carriers in Categories 1,2,3,4, & 10.	Adversary insp. of declared facilities. Mobile inspection teams.	Incl. of NATO- Warsaw Pact countries. Measures to reduce tension.	Entry may take place at any time parties are satis- fied measures in Step 1 are being com- plied with.
						Production limit fission material.			

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Step	Parties	Duration Years (See Inclosure 1)	Subject	Rate	CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - Primary Element			Associated Element	Annex B Transition Requirements
					Total	Production Limitation	Verification		
3	US USSR NATO Warsaw Pact Red China France with others	Three	Reduce armaments Categories 1-10	OBJECTIVE: 10%/ year	Turn down the arms race. 30% from one limit entry in into Categories Step 1-10. 3	One-for-	Insp. bon- fires, declared facilities, some retained levels. Mobile insp. teams for clandestine. Insp. by international orgn. except by adversary for NATO & Warsaw Pact.	Measures to reduce tension.	Entry may take place at any time parties are satisfied measures in Step 2 are being complied with.
4	US USSR NATO Warsaw Pact Red China all mil. signi- ficant states with others.	Three	Eliminate reserve forces & reserve arms in Categories 1-10. New nations cut armaments Categories 1-10.	33 1/2%/ year 10%/ year	100% 30%	CB wpns As Step 3	Insp. re- ductions & retain- ed levels.	Measures to reduce tension.	Entry con- tingent on adherence of all military significant states and satisfactory implementation other steps.

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Enclosure 1 (Possible Time Phasing) To Annex B Tabular Portrayal



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Annex C (Categories of Armaments) to A Gradual Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament)

CATEGORY OF ARMAMENTS

The following categories of armaments are involved in this program. They are normally referred to by category number: i.e., Category 1,2,3, etc.

1. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater; together with their related fixed launching pads and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater.
2. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in Category 1 having a range between 300 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads.
3. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms.
4. Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads.
5. Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads.
6. Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads.
7. Tanks and assault guns.
8. Armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
9. All artillery, mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater.
10. Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following types: aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines.

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Introduction to NSAM 239 Review

Subject: Can the Genie Be Put Back in the Bottle?


NSAM 239

The smooth road down versus the rough road up.

In NSAM 239, the President wrote to the Committee of Principals and the Director of ACDA calling for "an urgent reexamination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament." In doing so, he said: "The events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an unchecked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc."

The first problem of such a policy review must be the identification and formulation of U. S. national interests. To date, U. S. nuclear policy for armament and disarmament has been based primarily on a bilateral analysis of U. S. and Soviet military capabilities. Accordingly, we find within the government a debate among those who argue for strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Russian's to advance national security and others who argue that we should negotiate reduction of strategic forces by 50 to 75% to increase our national security. Actually both may be profoundly wrong.

A bilateral analysis is not a sound basis for formulating U. S. thermonuclear policy. The world is no longer bilateral. Indeed, the most significant and potentially most dangerous fact of the nuclear world is that it is on the verge of forever losing its essentially bilateral character. The acquisition of even a small number of atomic weapons by China, Israel, or the UAR decreases the power, influence and security of both the U. S. and



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the Soviet Union. Chinese development of 5 fifty kiloton weapons decreases the security of the U. S. more than the addition of 5 one megaton weapons to the current Soviet inventory. The enforced limitation on the diffusion of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is therefore the prime question of U. S. national strategy and consequently a major portion of the NSAM 239 review should be focused on this problem. Clearly, if the U. S. can take steps to insure that other nations do not build atomic weapons, it would be in our interests to do so and we should be prepared to pay a significant price to achieve this objective. The overriding question is whether or not the U. S. government can stop diffusion. The honest answer is that we don't know. It is equally clear that it would be irresponsible not to try.

Such an agreement, to be meaningful to the U. S. and of interest to the USSR, should consist of three parts:

a. The nuclear powers should agree not to assist any non-nuclear power in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (The acceptance by the USSR of France as a nuclear power is a mandatory requirement and is considered feasible provided the FRG is clearly estopped by the terms of the agreement from acquiring such weapons.

b. The nations not currently possessing nuclear weapons would have to agree not to acquire such weapons.

c. Initially on the basis of a private understanding between U. S. and USSR (to which we should make our principal NATO allies privy) and later through agreement by all states which have acceded to the treaty, there should be application of constraints adequate to insure that non-signatory states would not only sign but abide by the terms of the treaty. The non-signatory

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states would be induced by a combination of political and economic rewards and pressures to sign. The primary problem would, of course, be Communist China. In this case, it would probably be necessary to work out an arrangement with the USSR in which that country sought first to win Communist China's accession, but with the understanding that, should she fail, both super-powers would endeavor to apply trade restrictions including POL, chemical fertilizers, food stuffs, etc. Later, if necessary, military attacks could be carried out against nuclear production plants with the tacit consent of the USSR. In the case of the smaller nations such as Israel and the UAR, there would probably have to be a joint super-power guarantee of their borders or other satisfactory arrangements coupled with a clear signalling of intent by the super powers that these states must accede.

To date, there has been relatively little analysis of the possibilities of an enforced international agreement against the diffusion, testing, or production of nuclear weapons. Current strategy appears to be based on the assumption that modest steps such as the test ban are the best means to stop diffusion. There is little evidence to support this assumption and considerable evidence that it is not true. A broad U. S. - USSR agreement on an enforced diffusion treaty may be easier to achieve than the piecemeal approach which we are currently pursuing.

It is clear that the Soviet Union would not agree to enforcing a non-proliferation agreement without agreement on at least some of the other major issues. Therefore, it is the view of the Department of Defense that Presidential interest and the pace of events require a new initiative consisting of a four part inter-related proposal which should be communicated to the

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centers would serve to deter, to some extent, the possibility of clandestine production. Third party participation on inspection teams would be authorized (Annex G).

If by the beginning of this step, nuclear powers have not agreed to limit the production of fissionable materials, it would be necessary to incorporate such an agreement in this step. The agreement should include halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons; limiting production for all non-weapons use to agreed levels; agreeing to transfer and place under agreed safeguards specified quantities of fissionable material from past production; and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons grade fissionable material (Annex D).

4. Step 3

a. The objective. TO TURN DOWN THE ARMS RACE THROUGH A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND AN EXPANDED PRODUCTION LIMITATION. AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO INCLUDE ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND RED CHINA.

b. An example measure.

(1) Primary element. During a period of three years, parties to the agreement, which must include US, other NATO countries (including France), USSR, other Warsaw Pact countries and Red China,

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Soviet Union at a high level at the appropriate time and place.

This package should consist of:

- ✓ a. A non-proliferation agreement including appropriate sanctions to win accession from recalcitrant states.
- ✓ b. An agreement to limit strategic vehicles to agreed force levels.
- ✓ c. An agreement on force levels in Europe combined with a European Non-Aggression Pact.
- ✓ d. A nuclear test ban.

In subsequent papers we propose to analyze such a set of proposals.

We recognize that it is easier to ignore these questions than to face the difficult issues they raise. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember the words of Winston Churchill shortly before World War II:

"Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory can be assured and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance to survive. There may be even a worse case; you may have to fight when there is no hope of victory and it will be better to perish than to live in slavery."

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