THE NEXT WAR

a series edited by

CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART

Propaganda

in the next war

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SIDNEY ROGERSON

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

MODERN war has too wide an effect for its practice to be treated as a "mystery." Statesmen may direct it; generals, admirals and air marshals may manage its operations—but every citizen, man or woman, is perforce a shareholder. The more they know about the way it is conducted the better for their security. The aim of this series is primarily to enlighten the intelligent public as to the probabilities of a future war in its various spheres, if it is hoped that the military reader also may find some stimulus to thought, about his problems.

Large as the part played by propaganda in the war of 1914–1918 there is every indication that it will fill a still bigger rôle in any future "great war." The wars in Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain and China, in addition to the state of war in peace which prevails elsewhere, have already demonstrated that propaganda is expanding. The means have multiplied, while its potentialities have kindled the imagination of those who seek power, or to increase their power. Yet understanding of the subject has not kept pace with faith in its magic properties. As a result its wielders are tending to overreach themselves, and to blunt their weapon by bludgeoning use.

Captain Sidney Rogerson is well fitted to correct the balance and explore the future of propaganda. He is not only an expert in its practical application—having for years managed the publicity side of one of the greatest business enterprises in this country, or the world—but is a keen student of war whose theoretical knowledge is backed by a distinguished fighting record in 1914–1918.

Furthermore, he has contributed to the literature of the war two narratives of personal experience which are of outstanding significance as a photographic record of battle experience on the film of an impressionable mind, and by their power to recreate the atmosphere in which the troops lived. He is thus representative of a class which is hardened by contact with reality against the action of propaganda in its more blatant forms, if its members may still be susceptible to propaganda which is subtly attuned to their instincts and experience. There are, indeed, passages in his own book which seem to me to bear significant witness to the way even a shrewdly observant mind may be unduly impressed by currents of suggestion now prevalent where they accord with its own instinctive trend.

The book is always stimulating and often provocative. Dissent from its interpretation of events, and attitude to the underlying issues, does not make one less ready to appreciate its wealth of knowledge, power of exposition, and the acuteness of so many of its psychological observations. It cannot fail to be of great value to all who are concerned with the problems involved in the working of this most powerful weapon of war.

At the same time, the book arouses reflection on the wider consequences of the intense growth of propaganda in the modern world. While propaganda may be most effective when it keeps closest to the truth, it has a fundamental divergence in nature and purpose from the pursuit of truth. Propaganda is concerned with persuasion, not with scientific investigation. Valuable as an agent of war, it is a dangerous ally for the cause of human progress.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF PROPAGANDA

(1)

ANY attempt to forecast the use of propaganda in the next war must necessarily be hypothetical. Propaganda is neither an exact science like ballistics nor even as yet a carefully coded study as are strategy and tactics. Indeed it is doubtful whether it can justifiably aspire to be classed as a science at all, despite its undeniable connection with psychology, especially the psychology of the mass mind. It is certain that no serious attempt has yet been made to bring together and examine the main rules which govern the subject in the way that military thinkers have collated and expounded the theories and practice governing the conduct of war. Propaganda is still largely an uncharted field. It is also, *sui generis*, one in which methods must shift to meet different sets of conditions.

What are to be the conditions of the next war? The war of 1914–1918, the war which according to allied propaganda was "to make the world safe for democracy," was historically speaking the first in which the value of propaganda as a powerful weapon was definitely recognised. The Great War enormously favoured the development of propaganda, though there is here no cause and effect. It was not an affair of rapid action leading

to a decisive result. There was no Sedan or Waterloo. It was a long drawn-out struggle which ended, as German propagandists are to-day proclaiming with such vigour, without any conclusive defeat of the German armies in the field. It was decisive enough in that the Central Empires were thoroughly beaten, but they were brought to their knees as much by the pressure of economic, moral and propaganda forces as by the actual successes of allied arms on the field of battle. Over four years were necessary for a decision to be reached, and for the whole of this time the main theatre of war remained practically speaking unchanged. Not the least notable feature was this fact, that the centre of action was so closely restricted. The real theatre of operations remained confined roughly in an area bounded on the east by a line fluctuating along the borders of present-day Russia down to Rumania, and on the west by one running through Belgium and the eastern provinces of France to Switzerland and thence along the Austrian-Italian frontier. Though the tide of battle ebbed and flowed on both these fronts, there was surprisingly little change. The war, therefore, was principally fought out in thickly-populated territory, whose inhabitants were acutely nationally-minded. It was not decided in wide open spaces, sparsely peopled by uncivilised tribes or colonial settlers, but in intensively cultivated agricultural country or large industrial areas and between peoples whose racial antipathies were as strongly marked as their histories were long. Lastly, the battlefields were linked up to the newspaper offices of the

countries engaged. Behind the lines, hostels with all technical facilities were established for newspaper reporters, just as facilities are to-day provided for them in the Press gallery of the House of Commons or telephone booths at test matches or race meetings. Press photographers or cinematograph men were on their toes for "shots" to reproduce in the papers or cinemas at home as they are nowadays on the touch-line at rugby internationals or soccer cup-ties. Specially produced trench newspapers were not uncommon, and on the Western Front daily papers were often on sale in the trench area. I have a vivid memory of grubby French urchins wandering round the gun positions in front of Vermelles crying "Eengleesh papaire!"

Because the war lasted so long and was so stationary in character, propaganda was enabled to develop gradually. This growth was facilitated by the ease with which the machinery of propaganda could be set up. Because the war involved a number of nationalities with traditional hatreds and aspirations, propaganda ultimately became recognised as an excellent weapon to play upon the one and encourage the other.

There seems no reason why the next war should resemble the last one at all. So much has the European scene changed, so rapidly have new engines of war been developed and so greatly has the whole tempo of military operations been accelerated, that it seems fairly safe to say that it is unlikely to repeat the salient features of the last war. The mobility of mechanised forces, the enormously increased speed and range of

aircraft and of communications must all tend greatly to reduce the available area of operations, so that it is difficult to envisage a European war on the scale of 1914–1918 waged with modern weapons and equipment. The experts have pointed out that in future the giant numbers of the conscript armies will be a handicap rather than an advantage. That God will no longer be on the side of the big battalions is, so far as Great Britain is concerned, a comfortable doctrine, but whether it will be recognised as such by the Continental Powers it is impossible to say. The one thing certain is that every effort will be made to speed up hostilities, possibly on the model of the *attaque brusquée* ; a dress rehearsal of which was conducted by the German Army in its occupation of Austria. The aim of opposing general staffs will be to get in the first blow at all costs, even without the declaration of hostilities ; and, such is the deterioration that has taken place since 1918 in the morals of warfare between civilised peoples, this blow may include a mass-attack from the air on the populations of capital cities or important industrial centres. War will be carried at once to the hearths where the home-fires are burning.

A drop of water or a grain of sand in the carburettor may bring the most efficient internal combustion engine to a standstill. Equally, some unforeseen occurrence may metaphorically throw a spanner into the most carefully-planned mechanised offensive and lead eventually to a situation in which conditions might approximate to 1914–18, as they have done in the Spanish

civil war, and to some extent in China. Still, such eventualities apart, it is reasonable for present purposes to argue that the next war, wherever it is fought, will be unlike the last, swifter and more ruthless in its attack on civilians. On these general premises, it would appear that the next war will not favour the development of propaganda as the last one did. It will be too full of movement while it lasts, and will possibly not last long enough for the slow wheels of political action to begin moving the propaganda machine. On the other hand, it will greatly increase the importance of propaganda, especially among the citizens of the home front, not only to stiffen their morale against the threat from the air, but to instruct them in the technique for meeting it.

If there is necessarily much conjecture about the conditions which are likely to govern the next war, there is, fortunately or unfortunately, no such uncertainty about the countries with whom it is possible, if not likely. There can be no harm in facing up to the unpleasant truth that our only potential major antagonists are the nations of the Rome-Tokyo-Berlin Axis—Italy, Japan and Germany. Again, it is possible that flares-up arising out of unpredictable incidents with other nations might strike the spark, but even so the train once fired would run swiftly until one or other or all of these nations were involved. It is a depressing thought, and if I may here be excused a parenthesis, I confess I find it difficult to understand how a tragedy so fraught with disastrous consequences for the world, but so certainly disastrous both to Germany and to the British Empire, can

ever be allowed to come about. It would be a struggle *à l'outrance* which would result in the ruin of both and of Europe. If therefore I examine as critically as I am able the course that propaganda would take in the event of war, this must not be taken to indicate that I imagine war to be inevitable or even likely. On the contrary, I hope that frank discussions may help to open the eyes of people in Germany as well as in England to the utter stupidity of ever allowing normal and inescapable points of friction between the two countries to be fanned into flame.

Granted that Germany, Italy and Japan cast themselves *nemine contradicente* for the rôles of villains of the piece, it may be forecast that, unless the unforeseen occurs and after a breathless onset the course of operations begins to drag, the rôle of propaganda against Germany is likely to be principally of a defensive character, the protection of the home front : against Japan and Italy of a more offensive nature, designed to embarrass them by influencing their own peoples.

It will not be practical within the compass of a small book to attempt to plot definite propaganda campaigns against each country, or to study the defensive measures necessary to resist propaganda directed by each one country against Great Britain. This is not intended as a textbook of propaganda but rather as a survey in general terms, written in the hope of stimulating thought and discussion on a subject which at the moment receives less serious attention in this country than it deserves. I shall the better be able to do this if I keep clear of detailed technicalities. Italy, Japan, Germany—

and the greatest of them is Germany, from our point of view. Germany is the main potential enemy, and I propose therefore to consider propaganda in the next war principally with reference to Germany, and only occasionally to Italy and Japan directly. In order to develop the subject in logical order, it will be necessary to consider first the legacy of propaganda left by the Great War, more particularly as it has been developed since 1918 and as it affects the world to-day ; and, secondly, to discuss the technique of propaganda at home and abroad and the instruments which exist for creating it. Then it will be convenient to examine how propaganda may be developed in war to attack the main enemy ; to appeal to neutral and allied countries ; and, finally, to defend the home front, to uphold the morale and fighting spirit of the inhabitants of Great Britain. Lastly, it will be necessary to see what machinery will be required to achieve these several ends and gauge how far it may be possible to build this up.

(II)

But first it will be pertinent to enquire, what is propaganda ? The trouble is that it is a word far more used than understood, a field of activity still seen through a glass darkly—when anyone indeed troubles to peer into the glass ! Few things have surprised and depressed me more than the total ignorance which exists even in high circles in this country regarding the meaning of propaganda. That it is not so disregarded oversea must be abundantly evident. It has come as a shock to

discuss the subject with Ministers of the Crown or leading Civil Servants and to sense by their replies and their reactions that they had little or no idea of what the words I was using were meant to convey. This is not the least tragic feature of propaganda and the next war, for the time to prepare much of our propaganda for the next war is *now*.

Perhaps, after all, this ignorance in high places is less surprising than it appears. Many of those who remain in control of our destinies are men past respectable middle age, whose educations were finished by the beginning of the present century. By 1900 *at latest* most of them had once and for all put aside their school-books with other childish things. If a dictionary or even the *Encyclopædia Britannica* of that date is consulted, the word Propaganda will be found to be dismissed briefly with a reference to the "Concilium de Propaganda," the body set up by the Church of Rome to administer its foreign missions! Indeed at that time propaganda was the name for the institution or organisation which did the proselytising. What we now call propaganda was then known as propagandism. The important point is that almost till 1914 propaganda had no other significance than that perpetuated in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, nor were there any self-styled propagandists other than the missionaries of the Church. It was not until the Great War that the word was dragged from its academic obscurity and invested with a new meaning, the thing itself and no longer the medium through which the thing was done; and it was not until late in the war that in this new

meaning it began to pass into popular currency and take on its present significance. It is therefore a war-baby. It is also one of the "blessed" words like Mesopotamia or rationalisation, that have been so commonly and loosely used that they have come to suggest to the public mind something far different from their real nature.

Propaganda is easily defined in broad terms as "the practice of propagating tenets or principles": more succinctly, as the formulation of a desired opinion or set of opinions in the public mind by the deliberate use of any or all the vehicles of expression by which the public can be reached —the newspapers, tracts or pamphlets, the pulpit or the hustings, the stage or the films, the mechanical voice of the wireless or the whispered breath of rumour. Propaganda is as old as civilisation, if not older. It has always been inseparable from party politics or from the business of government, whether of the city-state or the great empire. In times of peace much of it is done automatically. Every country creates propaganda for itself in the normal course of its activities. Some do it more deliberately than others. These are usually those who feel themselves most in need of it to create goodwill for themselves among other peoples. Great Britain has always enjoyed a great deal, though not until recently has she ever consciously set out on a course of propaganda. The nearest we came to admitting an interest in the subject in the past was to confess to the necessity for "showing the flag," and most British propaganda in the past has been due to the interest of other countries in our

doings plus our control of so many of the international conduits of information. Even to-day, when we are conspicuously backward in propaganda work of the modern type, we continue to make a vast amount of propaganda of the older type out of our State ceremonies, Parliamentary proceedings, athletic meetings, social gatherings and other national activities. The Coronation or the Silver Jubilee; the Derby or Ascot; the sentimental publicity for the Highlands of Scotland, the kilt and the pipes; the steeple-crowned hats of Wales; the *Queen Mary*; Westminster Abbey; "Your policemen are so wonderful": what are all these but instruments of British propaganda oversea? In one sense our monarchy is a propaganda institution, and a very successful one, too. But in modern times by far the most successful, if not the greatest, propaganda force that the world has ever witnessed is the American film industry. Although this is uncontrolled and dictated solely for commercial profit, it has had a greater effect on the outlook, habits and morals of wide sections of mankind of all races in a short time than any other movement, sociological or religious. All these propaganda forces are important, but so loosely harnessed that they cannot be directed to a specific purpose.

Whereas propaganda is a natural corollary to the business of government in times of peace, at the outbreak of war it becomes a first consideration. It is not reasonable to expect even barbaric peoples to fight an enemy whom they regard as "not a bad sort of chap." Any sentiments of this nature must be dispelled before the warlike spirit

can be thoroughly kindled. In wars between peoples there must be hatred of the enemy ; there must be confidence in one's own cause and one's own leaders ; there must be every effort to undermine the morale of the enemy and to strike terror into him. So down the ages the captains and the kings have had recourse to propaganda to achieve their objects, to vilify and write-down their opponents, to warn them of the terrible vengeance they are courting and urge them to yield, and finally to uphold the spirits of their own subjects and prevent them from seeking peace.

It is noteworthy that we shall shortly celebrate the bicentenary of a war which was brought about largely by the propaganda that an English sea-captain made out of the loss of his ear. In 1739 Jenkins came home from the Spanish Main with one of his ears pickled in a bottle. He had been deprived of the unlovely exhibit, he averred, by the Spaniards and called upon his country to avenge the mutilation. So effectively did he state his case that a wave of propaganda was started which inflamed public opinion sufficiently to start the War of Jenkins' Ear. There were, of course, more powerful interests at work behind the earless Jenkins, but the significance lies in the way that a popular demand for war was created by propaganda over an ear.

Among the great captains of modern history it is Bismarck who stands out as recognising the importance of propaganda. Again and again during the war of 1870 he is seen dictating his own trenchant press *communiqués* to counter the newspaper protests of the French. When reports

of Prussian atrocities were printed in London papers, Bismarck at once saw that an answer was sent, and when the French prepared a pamphlet for circulation at home and abroad, he countered by ordering a reply to be produced which should cite "all the cruelties, barbarities and breaches of the Geneva Convention committed by the French." He ended his instructions with the pertinent observation, "Not too much or no one will read it, and it must be done speedily." Towards the end of the war, indeed, Bismarck personally saw every *communiqué* so that he might delete any item which might in foreign papers be used against Germany.

Bismarck must have transmitted his realisation of the power of propaganda, for in 1914 Germany was the only power in Europe which had deliberately built up a national propaganda system. She had been at pains to ensure that news favourable to Germany was disseminated in as thoroughly organised a manner as she had organised her army, her navy and her industry. Whether from the Press Bureau in the Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstrasse, from the embassies or legations oversea, from the official German telegraph agencies or from the head offices of German banks, industrial corporations and shipping companies, a steady volume of propaganda was emitted, designed on the one hand to spread favourable impressions of Germany, the industrious character of her people, the peacefulness of her intentions, coupled with the hint of her potential strength if roused; and on the other hand to neutralise or prevent unfavourable comment, in too-pointed

references, for example, to her commercial penetration of South America and the military designs which were masked under the enterprise of the Berlin–Baghdad railway line. As soon as war was declared in 1914 the advantage that Germany enjoyed as the result of this organisation was apparent. The Allies were thrown at once on the defensive. Their news was scanty and such as there was was undirected. In a short time, however, both sides got into their stride, the Allies well behind the Central Empires, pouring out a prodigious volume of propaganda. Each side bade the world and their own peoples observe that the other had begun the war. Each side called on the Lord to strengthen their arms, the Germans invoking the "Good German God" and the French "*le Christ qui aime les français.*" Both sides proclaimed that they were fighting to end injustice and to liberate the enslaved. We coined the slogan "Remember Belgium" and represented ourselves as crusading to free the Poles, the Czechs, the Croats and the Slovaks from the jack-boot of Prussia or the tyranny of the Habsburgs. German propagandists saw to it that the neutral countries were assured that Germany fought to remove the heavy yoke of British Imperialism from the shoulders of poor Indians, Egyptians and Irish. The Allies asserted that they were fighting to save the world from barbarism, from the Kaiser's "Huns" and Nietzsche's "blond beasts." With equal sincerity and force the Germans declared that they bore the banner of "*Kultur*" against the degeneracy of France and the soul-destroying commercialism of the British.

Both sides represented themselves as the champions of international law: the allied powers making their propaganda out of the "scrap of paper" and Germany's violation of Belgium, and the Germans claiming that they stood for the freedom of the seas so grossly violated by Great Britain, and the right of the smaller nations to trade freely. Waxing more nationalistic, Germans and French repaired to the court of history and proclaimed a war of chosen races. Lastly, each side accused the other of the most hideous atrocities. History appears to have been raked for traditional stories for the propagandists to serve up, *rechauffées* and newly-spiced, and when both history and fact failed, pure invention was summoned to the rescue. A distinguished American professor has catalogued the crimes of which each side accused the other. They are so nearly alike as to cancel one another out! An example may not be amiss. Ardent propagandists lashed the British public into a fury at the work of German Zeppelin and aeroplane raiders raining death and destruction on defenceless women and children. The total casualties from air raids in England during the four years of war were no more than 4,830 of whom 1,414 were killed. The carnage caused by allied airmen in German towns has been kept very quiet, but two instances will be enough to show its quality. In June, 1916, British and French pilots bombed Karlsruhe during the Corpus Christi procession, killing and wounding 26 women and 124 children. In a second raid in September they caused 103 casualties in the same city.

In all this din of war propaganda there was nothing inherently new. In every war the same sort of claims had been advanced by the contestants, the same sort of brutalities laid at the door of their opponents. The difference was rather one of volume and intensity. Never before had conditions so favoured propaganda. Never before had there been so many improvements in the machinery of distribution to simplify the task of the propagandist. And never before had propaganda been held to be so important.

(III)

It was not until the war had been in progress nearly four years and some of the combatants were already reeling with war-weariness that the change was introduced into propaganda, which converted it into the powerful engine that we know it to-day. In 1918 it was suddenly shown that it was possible to create an intensive form of propaganda and to prosecute this under carefully co-ordinated direction to achieve a particular purpose. Like the tank, this was an all-British contribution to the armoury of war. It came about through the formation in 1918 of the Ministry of Propaganda under the presiding genius of Lord Northcliffe. It should here be interpolated that there is surely food for ironical reflection in the fact that Northcliffe's appointment was intended as a way out for the Government of the day, who wished to remove him from the post he was holding and to relegate him to some lesser job, where he would have less power! Northcliffe, whose duties were entirely concerned with propaganda against enemy

countries, as distinct from propaganda on the home front or among neutrals, pointed two great guiding lines for propaganda. First it should be truthful, and secondly, it must always be linked to a definite policy, and whenever possible precede it. I shall have occasion later to refer in greater detail to the work of the Propaganda Ministry, so it must here suffice to say that the change Lord Northcliffe introduced was that he wasted no time in the practice, time-honoured in war, of vilifying his opponents or of shooting rude opinions about them into the air. He was first, foremost and all the time, a " news " man and his propaganda was based on hard facts, tellingly expressed, instead of appeals to history, to law, to humanity or high Heaven. He approached the problem coldly and objectively, hunting for the weak link in the enemy's moral or political chain. Having located this, he played incessantly upon it by making news which would increase this weakness. For example, his first step on taking charge was to concentrate on the threadbare patchwork quilt which was the Austro-Hungarian Empire and which in 1918 was being stretched very uneasily to cover a part of the war front of the Central Empires. Many of the subject races—Poles, Rumanes, Croats and Slovaks—were not only tiring of the war but were well known to cherish national aspirations and therefore hatreds. Northcliffe went straight to the root of these emotions. He did not abjure the Slovaks to mutiny or desert in the cause of freedom or humanity. He demanded of his Government to know what were the intentions of the Allies if

victorious towards the hopes of the Slovaks for autonomy. He saw to it that these intentions were clearly stated by a responsible allied statesman. Here was his first broadside, a concrete piece of news of vital interest to every racially-conscious Slovak, and he pressed every single method of propaganda into service to ensure that this promise of deliverance duly reached every single Slovak soldier fighting in the armies of the Teutonic Powers. This illustrates the difference as well as may be. No longer was propaganda to be merely a matter of loud and partisan crying. There was no virtue in crying at all unless there was something definite to say and something which concerned personally the individual to whom it was addressed. Thus, as soon as evidence began accumulating of hunger or privation among the enemy, Northcliffe brought his energies to bear on bringing home to them pictures of the land flowing with milk and honey which lay behind the encircling Allied lines and in which even prisoners of war waxed fat and were contented. Lest there should be any doubt, photographs of actual prisoners, together with their names and their written evidence of good treatment, were broadcast over the enemy front. There were symptoms of war-weariness, so the enemy was told day by day of the increasing man-power and resources of the Allies due to the arrival of the U.S. troops and material. Were there reports of uneasiness in the German dockyard towns regarding submarines which did not return, then lists, as strictly accurate as the Admiralty could guarantee them, were disseminated by one method

or another, giving particulars of each U-boat sunk or captured together with the fate of the crew.

The method, it will be observed, was to present a concrete piece of information which was truthful, and on the larger issues to secure first a declaration of policy and then use this as propaganda. Although Northcliffe was a great man in his sphere and although much credit must be given him for his peculiar contribution to the development of propaganda, there seems nevertheless little doubt that his actual work has been written up. It should be reiterated that his appointment only dated from March, 1918, and that the next few months were spent in reviewing the subject, in building up his organisation and obtaining a clear definition of Government policy. It was not, indeed, till August, 1918, that Crewe House actually started the preparation of propaganda pamphlets. By this date no fewer than 12 million pamphlets had already been distributed by the War Office. Indeed this propaganda was then having effect. *The Times* "*History of the War*" notes August 8th as "the day when the effect of the propaganda was most felt"; and on August 25th General von Stein confessed that "in propaganda the enemy are undoubtedly our superiors." Yet the first Crewe House pamphlets were not issued for distribution until September 4th, being actually released two days later. This seems to show clearly enough that the responsibility for propaganda had until then been energetically and ably discharged by the Admiralty and War Office. The British naval and military officer—typified in such men as Sir Reginald Hall,

and Generals Macdonogh and Charteris—showed himself an incomparably better propagandist than his German counterpart. Certainly they had in the most difficult period of the war not only laid solid foundations for Northcliffe to build on, but their work had already begun to show concrete results. The trouble was that they were limited in their scope by their departmental functions. Secondly, it is undeniable that Northcliffe's organisation was fortunate in the moment at which it was born. The psychological atmosphere was exactly right when the Ministry of Propaganda set to work. As I shall try to show later, propaganda against the enemy is only deadly when he is tiring and is beginning to doubt the rightness of his cause and the invincibility of his arms. This is not to deny the success of the Ministry, which was one of all the talents. The team was a mixed one—the second-in-command a young Canadian officer recalled from the Embassy in Washington, now Sir Campbell Stuart ; and the staff including an experienced foreign correspondent in Wickham Steed, a distinguished zoologist, Dr. Chalmers Mitchell—taken over from the War Office—and a writer of international fame in Mr. H. G. Wells : but though it had its weaknesses, its success was from the first astonishing. Indeed, the degree to which Northcliffe succeeded is reflected in the intense hatred which his name inspired in Germany during the war and even after the Armistice, and also in the admiration which it evokes in German propaganda circles of to-day. Imitation is still the sincerest form of flattery, and were Lord Northcliffe alive he could hardly fail to be

flattered by Germany's development of the weapon he forged, although I cannot help thinking he would find the German methods most characteristically thorough but lacking the psychological penetration which distinguished his own work. He could not but approve, however, of the organised propaganda which brought shorn Austria into the fold of Gross-Deutschland, in which connection his original memorandum will repay a moment's study in passing. After examining numerically the populations of "pro" and "anti" Germans in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he came to the conclusion that there were roughly 31 million anti-Germans and 21 million pro-Germans. "The pro-German minority rules the anti-German majority." He then made recommendations for detaching the "antis," and ended with the paragraph, "The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated States of Germany. They would in any case tend to secede from a transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule over non-German peoples." History has shown that Northcliffe was endowed with a prescience beyond that of the statesmen of his day.

(IV)

A point which is worth touching on here is the suspicion, if not odium, which attaches to the word propaganda. It is popularly held to signify something unworthy if not discreditable. It seems to be the belief that propaganda consists of the manufacture and dissemination of lies with intent to promote the interests of one party

by damaging those of another. So far as propaganda for war is concerned, the object is obviously to damage the enemy, but experience has clearly shown that the closer that propaganda can march in step with truth the more effective it is. False news, which is almost certain to be shown to be false, or the suppression of the truth, which inevitably leaks out later, are calculated indeed to recoil on the head of the side which perpetrates them; while such obvious fabrications as, for example, the "Kadaver Works" stories, purporting to reveal that the Germans had factories where the bodies of their war-dead were converted into fats useful for explosives manufacture, were shown to have very little lasting effect. Admittedly propaganda is an unscrupulous weapon, but equally it is only keen-edged when truthful. The moral for the propagandist would seem to be "State the truth but interpret it as you wish. Above all never tell a lie, if you can possibly help it, because in propaganda you are finished if you are convicted of untruthfulness." It was the adherence to truth that characterised Northcliffe's propaganda and made it so deadly.

There also seems to be the feeling that, especially so far as the home front is concerned, propaganda is an unwelcome and alien method of forcibly feeding the people with some doctrine or set of opinions which they do not necessarily want to assimilate. The voice of the people cannot be the voice of God if it is the echo of State propaganda. Again it must be admitted that this is substantially true, though one would like to know at the same time why it should be held that there is

anything sinister in such a procedure. It is frequently necessary for public opinion to harden if not to change entirely on a certain aspect of foreign or domestic policy, especially in time of emergency or civil war. It may be argued with a great deal of truth that if the public are right-minded, as a healthy, sound people should be, then they will inevitably come to the altered point of view of their own free will. The question is, will they come to it quickly enough? We live in a world where action and reaction are being accelerated every day, where the declared purpose of the new form of authoritarian state is to ensure that a decision can be come to and acted on in the twinkling of an eye. Our people, as they have proved times without number in their history, have the sovereign virtue of preserving the clearest political sense of any nation in the world. Whatever the crisis which confronts them, they almost always react in the right way if left alone, but they take time to react. The complications are that at the moment there is no guarantee that they will be given such a period of grace; moreover, they are not being left alone but are confused by a medley of conflicting propaganda, British and foreign. Perhaps I can illustrate the position by a recent experience of my own. I was called in by a manufacturing firm to advise on the advertising of a new range of products. The firm were an old-established, conservative undertaking and did not like the idea of publicity. They advanced many objections, but what really weighed most with them was that they had two products which were almost house-

hold words and which they had never really advertised. Why, they argued, should not the new products, if as good as the old—and they were confident that they were—achieve equally striking results? On being questioned, however, they admitted that it had taken twenty years of patient labour to build up the reputation and volume of sales of these products, and my advice therefore was that if time were of no consequence they were possibly right in thinking that they might be able to build up the new products in like manner over a similar period. Meanwhile, however, a change in trade or the advent of new and lively competitors might completely upset their balance. In short, the idea of advertising would be to achieve the same result in a quicker time. "So much to do, so little time to do it," is the great justification for propaganda directed towards the home community. Circumstances sometimes demand that public opinion shall be made to change against time. In war the national safety frequently demands it, and in the next war will probably depend on it.

There is another justification. Years ago Mr. G. K. Chesterton confessed that he could not understand why orthodoxy always remained on the defensive. Why, he asked, should an order, established by years of adjustment and experience, be content to allow itself to be attacked by the unorthodox who were merely backed up by untried theories? The reflection has always remained in my mind, and during the last twenty years I have found it difficult to understand why the orthodox elements in Great Britain have remained

passive under an intelligent and energetic propaganda attack by theorists, so revolutionary or out of touch with reality in other countries, as to be anti-social. It is, of course, always easier to attack an institution or an order by propaganda than to defend it. If it is good it largely defends itself. Its goodness will tell more than the propaganda against it. If it is bad it is indefensible. Moreover there is always more hope of improvement through change than by a maintenance of the existing order, though it may frequently turn out that the hope is ill-founded. Whatever the reason, the unorthodox are usually more energetic at propaganda and do it better.

Finally, he who would study the subject of propaganda in war must come to it in an objective and dispassionate frame of mind. He must try to rid himself of pre-conceived sentiments and especially take care not to approach it while still under the influence of the propaganda of his own country. It is hopeless for an Englishman to discuss propaganda in the next war if his mind is a gramophone still playing the propaganda records of 1914–1918! On the contrary, he must try to see the problem through the eyes of the other side, and to realise that from this viewpoint he appeared in the Great War as a big a brute, a violator of treaties, and a killer of women and children as he imagined his enemy to be. After all, it is another example of the political sense of the British people that, unlike the Continental races, they recognise no traditional enemy, unless it be France, with whom we fought off and on for hundreds of years. Our enemy is that foreign nation which at the

time appears most likely to threaten our interests in any part of the world. If evidence of this is needed, consider how Russia was for years the bogey on the frontiers of India—how glad we were that she was beaten by the " gallant little Japs " in 1904 !—then the " steam-roller " ally (this time with Japan) which was to flatten a way to Berlin ; next the feared and detested country of the Bolsheviks, undermining our Imperial foundations with propaganda for world revolution ; and to-day through France again an uneasy ally. Consider Japan. In 1914 Japan was our gallant ally, " the land of little children where the babies are the kings," the country of the " Mikado," the cherry blossom and the chrysanthemum. While with giant strides she was developing commercially and industrially, she was a rich market for British goods. At one time even her warships were built in British yards, and as recently as the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, she was regarded sentimentally as an ex-ally who, though not possibly able to pay our prices, was an important customer. When she began to put to her own uses the machinery and equipment that our manufacturers had sold her, to shut the British trader out of Japan, to undersell him even in his home market, and to develop an Imperialistic and frankly annexationist policy, public opinion veered round. Forgotten were the cherry blossoms and the chrysanthemums. In their places appeared lurid pictures of sweated peasant labour and of daughters sold to the Yoshiwara to save their parents from starvation. The " gallant little Jap " underwent a startling metamorphosis. His smile

became a grin, and he was dubbed a "yellow monkey" or the "Prussian of the East."

In the early days of the present century it was still the French who were our enemies, whether in Europe, the Mediterranean, or in those regions of Africa where our Empires marched. One need hardly be middle-aged to recall the intense pro-French propaganda that was worked up to secure popular support for the *entente cordiale* which the rising menace of Germany rendered desirable, and which constant propaganda, whether pro-French or anti-German, is necessary to perpetuate. By popular support I mean the backing of the inarticulate masses of the people who, being less intellectually gifted and less concerned with politics, other than those of the weekly family budget, are less susceptible to propaganda, but whose opinion counts ultimately in authoritarian states as well as in democracies. I believe these masses will never be really pro-French. Indeed, except that they may possibly experience vague feelings of irritation at evidences of German intolerance or heavy-handedness, they are inherently pro-German in so far as they are "pro" any foreign nation at all. It was my experience that even during the period of the most savage anti-German propaganda in the Great War, the rank and file were much less touched by it than what, for want of a more accurate description, I will call the officer class. As a generalisation I should say that Mr. Atkins, whether regular or "for the duration," found he could get on more easily with a "Jerry" prisoner than with any French civilian. In 1917 I heard the observation

that " we were fighting on the wrong side. We ought to be with Jerry. Then we'd whop the world," made publicly by the comedian in my divisional concert troupe. It was applauded to the echo and got me into trouble for not having had the script of the programme censored! The troops who went forward with the army of occupation came back with the most disparaging opinions of the way they had been treated by their ex-allies during the war years compared with the reception they had from their ex-enemies afterwards. While these pro-German sentiments were common among the other ranks, they were, I found personally, not so common among the officers. I have gone at such length into this question of our feelings towards foreign countries in order to point the moral that our friendships or antipathies are more often the result of propaganda than of any inherent prejudice. Our sentiments are coloured by propaganda and propaganda is based on national self-interest. It is no doubt very right and proper that this should be so, but it will help in any study of propaganda if the fact is realised.

I never pass the statue in Trafalgar Square to Nurse Cavell without reflecting that after the inscription " Patriotism is not Enough " should be added " Propaganda is also Necessary." If ever there was a propaganda martyr it is Nurse Cavell. This is not to suggest for a moment that she does not amply deserve a permanent memorial in the capital of the country for which she so willingly and unflinchingly gave up her life. Yet it cannot, I hope, constitute any slur on her memory to assert that by the letter of military law

she deserved death. The Germans were guilty of no act of injustice in shooting her, but merely of a gross error of judgment. They had not then, nor am I certain that they have yet, learned the unwisdom of making martyrs, however surely the victims may have qualified for the death penalty. Nurse Cavell's statue stands, *ære perennius*, a monument to the world of German brutality. Yet it is a matter of history that not long after she was executed the French authorities shot two German nurses for similar offences ! Not a hint of this leaked out, nor was the fact, which must have been known to the Germans, proclaimed from the house-tops in every organ of German propaganda. Why ? Because the Teutonic mind is strictly logical, especially the military mind, and soldiers were at the time in control of German propaganda. They could not appreciate why there should be any fuss made because the French authorities in the execution of their duty had taken the obvious and prescribed action against two spies who had been duly found guilty ; any more than they could then appreciate the fuss that the Allies made over the shooting of Nurse Cavell. I should like to emphasise the word " then," because German propaganda is no longer in the hands of the Junker officer caste, and they have learned much since that time.

The raging, tearing propaganda that we worked up out of such cases as Nurse Cavell, Captain Fryatt and others was necessary in order that the fighting spirit should be kept up. It helped to bring the war to an end favourable to ourselves. Unfortunately it formed a precedent, and the

"effect of" similar propaganda over aspects of Peace (blessed word again, so often and so loosely used) and foreign policy has not been nearly so helpful. It has served seriously to embarrass successive Governments in their efforts to extract harmony from the concert of Europe. The paradox has been witnessed of an important clique of idealists —one must give them the benefit of the highest motives, otherwise their action is definitely anti-social and subversive—working up a propaganda for international peace by encouraging disarmament at home and by being challengingly insulting to the most likely and powerful enemies abroad. It is an extraordinary course of procedure, the most extraordinary aspect of which is the thoroughness with which intelligent and, many of them, travelled men and women have hypnotised themselves by their own propaganda. It would be laughable if it were not so tragic that the hundred per cent. idealist and the *soi-disant* expert on foreign affairs should have set out to convert the masses to their point of view, and ended by themselves believing what they manufactured for the consumption of the masses. But because they are immensely active and overwhelmingly articulate they have for some years filled many of the organs of propaganda with their solicitations and laments. It is an education to consult the files of newspapers and see the proportion of letters to the editor which appear over the same set of signatures. There is a coterie whose names are well known, and seldom a day passes without letters from one or more of them appearing in the more important papers. Occasionally they put into practice the " collective

security" which they ideologically pursue, and combine to sign letters over ten to fifteen signatures, the joint importance of the signatories affording a better chance of the letter being published! It will be pertinent to examine propaganda activities of this nature in their proper place, but they are worth noting here. They have been and are a danger because they amount to approaching the man at the wheel of the vessel of state, engaged in a delicate piece of navigation, and, in the words of Humpty Dumpty, "I said it very loud and clear. I went and shouted in his ear."

In democratic English this is referred to as the liberty of the individual. In wartime it would be an actionable offence. For the moment the main interest is to remind us of the danger of self-hypnotism, the commonest and deadliest of the diseases from which the propagandist suffers. Let us accept the omen.

Who or what is the propagandist himself? In his *Technique of Propaganda in the World War*, written in 1927, Professor Lasswell, of Chicago, expressed the opinion that propaganda had become a profession. "The modern world," he wrote, "is busy developing a corps of men who do nothing but study the ways and means of changing minds or binding minds to their convictions. Propaganda is developing its practitioners, its professors, its teachers and its theories. It is to be expected that governments will rely increasingly upon the professional propagandists for advice and aid." As subsequent events have shown, propaganda which was so all-important in the years between 1917–

1920, became thereafter, along with high explosive, the naval blockade or poison gas, an unpleasant reminder of the horrors of the war that had been put behind us once and for all. It fell headlong from its high estate, and all those brilliant public men who had given such effective service in the Ministries of Propaganda and Information took water and washed their hands and returned to zoology or politics, to journalism or the bar, or resumed their careers at the university or in the fighting forces. This enumeration of their various interests or avocations suggests that the successful propagandist need not necessarily be a propagandist by profession. Still it may well be a weakness that Lasswell's professional propagandist hardly exists in this country, though he may be found, complete in a uniform proper to his calling, organised into squads and companies in Germany. When the need arises for someone to direct even one of our modest publicity bureaux, search for a suitable candidate is first made among newspaper men or advertising "practitioners," political organisers and the army or navy. It is indeed worthy of record how many of the more successful have been army or naval officers. Though both newspaper and advertising men make good propagandists, they rarely excel in the direction of propaganda.

It has been stated that the really great propagandist must persuade himself of the essential character of his propaganda. In other words, he must hypnotise himself before he can mesmerise his public. This, as I have said, I cannot believe. The propagandist must be born before he can

be made, but though he must be able to work himself into temporary enthusiasms for the causes he advances, he must never wholly lose the objective vision. The best examples of what I mean are provided by the great advocates, who can go into court and work themselves into a fine frenzy over a case in which, once the wig and gown are doffed, they have little or no personal interest. They are at one and the same time hard-headed lawyers and pleaders with the power to move juries. If to such natural gifts there should be added a training in the A.B.C. of propaganda, the likelihood is that the result will be as near the ideal propagandist as it is reasonable to expect to attain.

CHAPTER II

THE PRESENT POSITION

(I)

ANY estimate of the part which propaganda is likely to play in the next war will be difficult without examining in some detail the position as it exists to-day, and to appreciate this it will be necessary to hark back again to 1919 when the Great War had just come to an end. Let us therefore consider the situation as it then was from the viewpoint of those who had assimilated the propaganda of the war. For four long years the engines of the older propaganda had been pouring out their torrents of self-justification and hate. Germany had striven to persuade her people, the peoples of her allies and wherever possible the neutral countries of the world, of the atrocities perpetrated by the barbaric Russian troops in East Prussia, the soulless determination of the British in their blockade which was starving innocent civilians, and the abominations of the already detested French and the newly-loathed Americans. The " Hymn of Hate " may be to us a comic sidelight, but it expresses sentiments which were very real at the time. The French had played on the traditional antipathy of their people in an effort to keep their hearts in the war and had attempted to enlist the help of other countries for " la belle France." Our own folk, slower to hate

and less fixed in their racial prejudices, had been encouraged to regard all Germans as ruthless savages, crucifiers of babies, violators of women and breakers of every rule of civilised warfare. With this legacy to play with, the victors assembled to clear up the litter of war ; and in order to put an end, as they imagined, once and for all to the question of which side was responsible for the war, proceeded to call the vanquished to the bar of international justice and as judge and jury to condemn and brand him with the mark of war guilt. Meanwhile, although hostilities were at an end and the Central Empires had sued for peace, the blockade continued unrelentingly to complete the starvation of the already undernourished millions of men, women and children. Unmindful of these considerations, the peoples of the successful nations " mafficked " and rejoiced at the termination of the " war to end war "—surely the most immorally mischievous slogan which politicians, more zealous than far-seeing, coined to deceive the masses whom they were supposed to lead.

In this atmosphere of hatred and mortification on the one side, and hatred and celebration on the other, there began to glow the lamp of a new hope ; a hope, be it noted, which was lit and fed by the fuel of propaganda, a propaganda for a new era for mankind, friend and foe alike, an era of hope for subject races, signalising their deliverance from the oppressor. The vision of a League of Free Nations was held up as a symbol of this new epoch which was at hand, an epoch whose watch-word was to be " self-determination "—another " blessed " word—signifying that the small

peoples, including those even who had never shown themselves to have the moral, economic or military resources to stand on their own feet, should be free, like the American high-school girl, to "elect" their future. The effect of such a vision at such a time of exhaustion and disillusionment was comparable with that of a new "cure" on a patient suffering from some malignant disease. The credit for the original idea may be given to Woodrow Wilson, but he has been posthumously saddled with too great a share of responsibility. Though he was its mouthpiece there seems equally no doubt that the formula which was ultimately accepted was developed in the propaganda put out by our own Ministry of Propaganda in their efforts to hasten the defection of the non-German races from the cause of the Central Empires. I have already tried to show how, while the approved war propaganda of hates and guilt and appeals to justice was swirling and raging, Northcliffe had introduced a more effective method. His appeal had been by promises, concrete promises for the future, authentically affirmed by responsible statesmen, and it is on his work rather than the doctrinaire enunciations of the hapless U.S. President that the whole edifice of post-war unreality has been raised. Just as we invented the new propaganda, we must be held largely to blame for the demoralising idealism—however brave and inspiring this may be in itself—which has caused such misunderstanding and trouble in the past twenty years, a tale which is not yet told.

As I have shown, Northcliffe, on taking control

of the Ministry of Propaganda, first concentrated on breaking up Austria-Hungary. His next effort was directed against Germany as the main enemy, the planning of the details of the campaign being entrusted to H. G. Wells. If, in the former campaign, the Ministry succeeded in defining the policy of the Western Allies *vis à vis* the races to whom the propaganda was directed, in the second it appears to have enunciated its own policy, which was afterwards adopted by the powers concerned. In other words, propaganda led policy. In the spring of 1918, Wells compiled a memorandum embodying the propaganda methods to be adopted against Germany, a document which is so important as the key to much that has happened since that it should be better known. After affirming the need for a clear Allied policy to form the subject of propaganda, he goes on: "The real aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to establish a world peace that shall preclude the resumption of war. . . . The points to be brought home to the Germans are :—

"1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepts the Allied peace settlement.

"2. The existing Alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations will be deepened and extended, and the military, naval, financial and economic resources of its members will be pooled until :—

(*a*) Its military purpose is achieved and

(*b*) Peace is established on lasting foundations."

Wells then argues that " it follows that one of the first requisites is to study and lay down the lines of a practical League of Free Nations," and proceeds at length and, with a richness of phrase which sounds almost highfalutin in an official document, to develop the idea. Reading it to-day, it appears that the author was very much under the influence of our own war propaganda, as for example this passage: " Steadfastly the great peoples of the world outside the shadow of the German Imperial domination have been working their way to unanimity, while the ruling intelligences of Germany have been scheming for the base advantages of conquest; while they have been undermining, confusing and demoralising the mentality of Russia, crushing down the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Imperialism, and threatening and cajoling neutrals, there has been a wide, free movement in the minds of their antagonists towards the restraint and wisdom of a greater and nobler phase in human affairs—the thought of the world now crystallises about a phrase, the phrase the 'League of Free Nations.'" There you have a perfect specimen of the " Champion of humanity " claim, on the one hand all nobleness, on the other all baseness.

If we pause to reflect for a second, we shall realise how idle it is to suppose that the effects of all the hate propaganda were wiped out by the mere fact that peace conditions had returned. Impressions made as a result of such long and intensive effort are not removed so easily. We were luckier than any of the major combatants, except the U.S.A., in that our country was less

scarred by war directly or debilitated by it indirectly. We could proceed at once to celebrate victory in the enjoyment of many of our normal creature comforts and in conditions of stability, political as well as economic. In the twenty years that have elapsed we have lived in security, with few alarms or fears and with steadily improving standards of living. Yet not even this good fortune has succeeded in eradicating the effects of war propaganda. Admittedly there has been an intermittent propaganda during this period which has helped to keep these in being, but it is only necessary to listen to conversations on foreign affairs, especially among the older men, and notably those who did not serve overseas, to learn how much of the war propaganda has stuck. How much more senseless it is then to assume that it is not far more deeply rooted in the minds of the vanquished! For it was not for them to celebrate the return of peace. On the one hand, they had neither the spirit nor the resources to do so immediately, or for years to come. On the other, and this is the regrettable feature, if they had been disposed to do so, they were sharply made to realise that although a new era of hope might be opening for Czech and Rumane, Serb or Croat, there was no such hope for them. They heard the ringing chant of "self-determination" as not only their overseas possessions but large populations of their own kith and kin were wrested from them without a chance of saying yea or nay. I am not necessarily to be interpreted as saying that the Allies were wrong in doing this: the politicians of the day could with

justification argue that they could afford to take no chances. I am concerned only to state the facts and to suggest that for the German peoples, the legacy of propaganda was not only hate, but mistrust.

Listen to Mr. Wells again laying down the planks in his propaganda platform. " The design of the Allies is not to crush any people, but to assure the freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under definite guarantees of justice and fair play. . . . The primary war aim of the Allies thus becomes the changing of Germany, not only in the interests of the Allied League, but *in that of the German people itself. Germany has, therefore, to choose between her own permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of Government and policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly in the Allied scheme of world organisation.*" (The italics are mine.) Later he specifies that " the war aims of the anti-German Allies take more and more definitely the form of a world of States leagued together to maintain a common law, to submit their mutual differences to a conclusive tribunal, to protect weak communities, to restrain and suppress war threats and war preparations throughout the earth."

Hope for Wells' new era had been dangled before the eyes of every frantic German mother trying to find food for her child, on the conditions that she realised the sinful way her statesmen had misled her and that she would urge her man, whether employed at the front, in field, or factory,

to throw them over and accept the liberal doctrines of the Allies. It is a matter of history that, in response to these advances, coupled of course with the increasing pressure of the blockade and the growing hopelessness of the military position, the Germans did overthrow their leaders, chase the Hohenzollerns into Holland and set up a republic with a blacksmith as President: only to find that the propaganda promises were entirely empty. With shifts surprisingly resembling those of the Holy Office, the penitent was told he might possibly receive absolution, but must undergo the penalty just the same. Useless for us to argue that our intentions had been honourable and that we would have implemented the promises implicit in our propaganda had it not been for political *force majeure* at the conference table; the German public cannot but have concluded—indeed it is a matter of history that they did conclude—that they had been deceived and that our propaganda had been merely a means of persuading them to end their resistance.

Meanwhile, however, the Allies had also reacted to this propaganda. I have an idea that the French are less susceptible to propaganda than any nation in the world. They are so pre-eminently logical and self-centred that they seem to have been hardly moved at all by anything so idealistic as this League of Free Nations. They were brought up in the belief that Germany was their enemy. The war strengthened that belief, and now that it was over, the obvious motto was not "self-determination" but "*Væ Victis.*" It is doubtful if France, as a nation, ever believed

even perfunctorily in the League, though undoubtedly recognising in it a useful instrument of French policy from time to time. There was no use preaching a time when war would be no more to the French. They are the realists among the peoples.

But with Great Britain, and in somewhat similar fashion, the U.S.A., the story was very different. Both because our domestic experience of war had been slighter and because by nature we are less tenacious of hatred, we were prepared to be more tolerant. The demand to "Hang the Kaiser" was never taken seriously, and our commercial and industrial interests soon pointed out the folly from a business point of view of squeezing Germany for reparations "until the pips squeaked." On the other hand, we proceeded to hypnotise ourselves with the new propaganda. For the first time in our history, we had been drawn into a war as a nation. Ever since we had become a great industrial country our wars had been overseas affairs, usually fought at a decent distance from home, and involving only our paid fighting men Never before had the general public been engaged, and it was a very disconcerting experience. We were determined it should not happen again. We had fought "the war to end war." We had, we were told, "made the world safe for democracy"; and, had we not been so busy in the post-war boom, we might have remembered to make our country "a land fit for heroes to live in." In any event, we fell hook, line, and sinker for the hope embodied in the League of Free Nations "for

the prevention of future wars and the improvement of international relations." This league "was inspired by the resolve of the Associated Powers to create a world in which . . . there shall be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all peoples." This is one of the "indisputable" conditions which governed the propaganda we made in our desire to woo the ex-enemy countries. We made it and believed in it ourselves, and saw in the League a guarantee that war should not again come so disquietingly close to our hearthstones. We did not naturally fall at once. We came to it gradually as the propaganda forces for the new era found concrete expression through the League of Nations Union and other bodies. Fortunately these were not organised as efficiently as they might have been, so that although they were vast and persistent, they acted slowly.

This is necessarily a summary in the most general terms, but it may serve to show that whereas among the poorer, more distracted ex-enemy peoples the war propaganda left hatred plus mistrust, among our own richer, more comfortable peoples it left some though less hatred plus self-hypnotism. It is important to note these two points as both will have a bearing on the course of propaganda in the next war. The former will make it more difficult for us to persuade the same enemies to accept our propaganda a second time; the latter will complicate the problem of rallying our own home opinion in support of our cause.

(II)

One of the most interesting features of the Great War was the manner in which from the outset the main combatants displayed an anxiety to justify themselves by propaganda in the eyes of the world as well as of their own peoples. Empires and republics, near-theocracies and democracies, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, Great Britain, France and Belgium vied with one another in an effort to appeal to the individual, to carry the "general public" with them. This is noteworthy because as a generalisation war had up till the present century, been held to be a normal and correct way of settling differences between nations or of promoting national interests, even, be it noted, at the expense of weaker countries. We may recall the wave of indignation which was caused by what was held to be the unwarrantable declaration of the ex-Kaiser in favour of the Boers during the South African War. What right had he to interfere in our lawful occasions? So long as the formalities were observed, war between nations was very much the same as duelling among individuals, a gentlemanly way of settling disputes—and in those days all civilised countries were gentlemen! There was an exchange of notes leading to the presentation of an ultimatum, the recall of ambassadors and a declaration that on a certain date hostilities would begin. The stage was cleared and the performers assembled in the wings before the curtain was rung up. This ceremonial was respected in 1914, but with the

addition that each contestant displayed this preoccupation to apologise as it were for the necessity which had compelled them to the course taken.

A new note had been struck, the echoes of which ring louder each year as one nation after another tries to drown the noise of some fresh and more bare-faced onslaught under the loud-speaker of propaganda. Japan in Manchukuo, though here the apology was too feebly perfunctory even to muffle the rattle of musketry : Italy calling the world to witness the insults and injuries she had suffered at the hands of the barbarian Abyssinians, their encroachments at Wal-Wal : Japan again, much louder and more effusive this time, justifying her crusade against the lawlessness of China, a crusade which was to make China the close preserve of Japan under the cloak of making her safe for civilised nations, if not democracy ! (There have also been the appeals of both sides in Spain, more reasoned and more effective because each advanced a political idea.) The propaganda of apology and self-justification becomes more blatant as the old formalities disappear. Where once the Governments respected the conventions, but then got to work without more ado, the stage has already been reached where they broadcast their apologies as they release their bombs on the heads of civilians with whose country they have omitted to declare war. Meanwhile, military writers are seriously exploring the possibilities of the "*attaque brusquée*" which, for the sake of surprise, will dispense not only with all the etiquette of declaring war, but also such immediate necessities as

mobilisation. The bombing planes will set off on their missions of destruction straight from routine practice flights, and troops be carried by motor transport from their parade grounds to invade a neighbour State. Neither those engaged nor the civilian populations they leave behind them will know what is taking place until it happens.

While we may deplore the facts, we must recognise in the atavism which underlies them another legacy of the Great War. The authoritarian State is the direct outcome of the condition of exhaustion and demoralisation in which the war left countries such as Germany, Russia, Italy and Turkey, combined with the propaganda, which had been emphatic from the outset, that the war was one of peoples, not of armies. From a statement of fact this grew into a postulate, that in war the whole nation must be engaged. It should not require much reflection to recognise that it is against human nature, even the nature of Slav or Teuton, one of which is too resigned and fatalistic and the other too well-drilled to set such store by individual liberty as, for example, the French or ourselves, to surrender all freedom to one man unless there is some compelling motive for so doing. As I see it, liberty, as we understand the word, is only possible in a society where there is more than sufficient to go round, where in fact anyone can put his finger in the pot and take out what he can, do with it what he likes without seriously jeopardising the welfare or the safety of the community. That is to say democracy—again using the word as it is commonly used to-day—is

a form of government only suited to wealthy countries. When the State is impoverished or when wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of the very few, and there is not enough to go round, there are only two courses open and both lead to dictatorship—the first, and in the old days the commonest, is revolution, mob rule, chaos and the rise of some strong man who restores order: the second is the voluntary bestowal of authority on some strong man who will ration out the meagre food, appoint each individual citizen to his task and prevent the wastefulness and destruction which is the yoke-fellow of revolution. Russia is an example of the first, Germany of the second. In modern history there never has been a pauper democracy nor an opulent dictatorship among the Great Powers. The terms are antonymous. If the Great War gave birth to the authoritarian State, this has matured on propaganda. One of the chief justifications for the dictator is that he shall be able to take a decision and act upon it at once. Having absolute power, he can presumably if he wishes govern by decree backed by force, but such a course would be courting disaster. Just as in 1914 the nations showed their concern for the opinion of the public, so the dictators realise if they are to succeed they must carry their people with them. It is not so much that over any long period the coercion of the masses is impossible, and over a short period difficult and uncertain, but that if decisions and action are to follow one another with the speed which constitutes the *raison d'être* of dictatorship, the public must respond equally swiftly. There can be none of

the long delays in the formulation of public opinion which Lord Baldwin noted as one of the inherent defects of democracy. The people must not only acquiesce ; they must, in the language of the drill sergeant, "jump to it." Does the situation as seen by the Leader demand instant and totalitarian mobilisation ? Then the community must mobilise ; but this they will be unready to do without hesitation unless they have been thoroughly prepared by constant propaganda. Force is there to fall back upon in the emergency, to compel the recalcitrant or hasten the tardy, but the fact remains that the modern authoritarian State rests fundamentally not only on the consent but on the active co-operation of the majority of its citizens. Were it otherwise it would not have become rooted in more than half the civilised countries of the world.

We shall do very well to appreciate this fact in our propaganda for the next war. There is at the moment an undoubted tendency to persuade ourselves that our possible enemies are stirring uneasily under the rule of tyrants, against which they are only waiting the opportunity to rebel. We are inclined to assume that the German working man is bullied, brow-beaten and kept on half-rations and that the Japanese peasant is even more wretched, struggling under a relentless persecution to endure an aching poverty ; and to argue therefore that neither will support his rulers if he can be brought to realise how much more prosperous the individual is under the democratic system, how much better fed, how

much freer to do and say, particularly to say, what he wishes. They will in short be ready to desert their leaders in response to our propaganda of hope expressed in glowing terms. To indulge such illusions is to believe what we wish to believe, a belief which is as ill-founded as it is dangerous.

Admittedly there are undercurrents of disaffection in Germany, Italy and Japan, as indeed there are in any State, bound or free, even in our own: admittedly among the intellectuals and more liberally-minded Germans, Italians and Japanese there must be much passive dislike of and disgust at the constant parades and orations, the restrictions and repression, and all the other paraphernalia of autocratic Government. We should, I think, concede that these sentiments exist in varying degrees among the liberally-minded in every country and at all times. There is also a strong body, or rather one should say a powerful system, of cells of Communism which has been ruthlessly driven into the catacombs. This is a real and ever-present source of disruption, but again it is not one on which we should rely. Communism would certainly help to undermine Germany with propaganda and sedition, but it would be doing precisely the same thing in our own country, for the aim of the political Communist is not the victory of one side or the other but the disorganisation of both, so that they shall be ready to accept the world revolution. In short, if we are to direct any successful propaganda at Germany, Italy or Japan, we shall be better advised to err on the other side and to assume that the totalitarian State is more

firmly fixed in the hearts as well as the mouths of its subjects than it really is.

There is no room for doubt that in all three countries the régime is immensely strong, and not easily to be shaken. And why not? It has on the whole been astonishingly successful from the national if not the individual point of view.

In Germany the Leader has already almost acquired the status of a "Culture Hero," the name given by mythologists to those figures who are believed to have introduced law and order and useful arts into the rude communities in which they arose. "Such heroes were specially regarded and the reverence felt for them measures the need for them," writes Professor J. A. K. Thompson, citing such names as Prometheus, Charlemagne and Alfred, Solon and Numa Pompilius. "A peculiar romance clings about these names," he continues. "Why? Only because to people fighting what must often have seemed a losing battle against chaos and night the institution and defence of law and order seemed the most romantic thing to do. And so it was." To us who are fortunate enough to live in security and under a rule of law and order unmatched elsewhere, and to whom, thank God, the spectres of economic chaos or political night have been unknown for centuries, this romantic canonisation may be difficult to comprehend. This, however, should be no excuse for denying it as a fact. Most of those Germans who to-day dislike Nazism and all its works will not hesitate in the emergency to rally round the Leader, because they dislike also the "chaos and night" from out of which he has

shown his ability to lead them. Nor has he proved it merely ; he dins it into their ears day and night unceasingly by organised propaganda. The " Culture Hero " of history grows slowly by time and the accumulation of legend. The " Culture Hero " of to-day, Hitler, Mussolini or Ataturk, grows rapidly before our eyes by the force of propaganda. He is no less powerful on that account because successful propaganda must, as I have indicated, be based on facts, which are in this connection the achievements of the hero.

Arising out of this is the problem of propaganda directed to disaffected elements in Germany. Here we should remember that these are all Germans by race, and in the hour of crisis relatively few of them will need reminding that their duty is to their country, whatever they think of its régime. In any event, there will be no lack of reminders. The Reich propaganda machine will see to that. Elizabeth of England, we may well remember, sharply persecuted her Catholic subjects. Yet it has been a matter for national pride that under the threat from Catholic Spain the English Catholics rallied to their sovereign, and one of them, Howard of Effingham, actually commanded the fleets which broke the Armada. Why should we rank the Germans as less patriotic than ourselves ? Our intellectuals, measuring the situation by the yard-stick of Bloomsbury, would persuade us that their opposite numbers in Germany are like themselves in England, ready in the event of war to work against the State. I recognise that it is the intellectuals who make revolutions, and that the encouragement of the

German intellectual to do propaganda against his Government will be good tactics at the right moment. That moment is not yet, nor would it come till a war had begun to drag, and doubts to rise in the public mind as to the invincibility of their leaders.

It will be helpful in passing to note that while propaganda must reach and move the mass-mind before it can be said to have succeeded, it should frequently be directed to engage the intellectual mind first. If he is suitably appealed to, the intellectual will catch the message and relay it to the main body of the public.

(III)

I have perhaps laboured this aspect to show that propaganda designed to belittle Hitler as the head of the German State or to bring about a change in régime would, in the early days of a war at any rate, be less liable to succeed than German abuse of King George VI would be to affect the loyalty of the British, or German propaganda against our régime induce us to overthrow the Monarchy and Parliamentary Government. It will only be stupid and irritatingly insulting—so long as Hitler is the successful leader. At the moment he has led his people out of the wilderness and evoked for them a vision of the promised land. If in attempting to reach that desirable country he has difficulties with the Red Sea, which is to say if he should decide to resort to war and not succeed within a short time, then the position would change, but even so, such would be the force of German propaganda to their own peoples,

that hunger and war-weariness would have to become acute before our propaganda against the Leader or the régime could be expected to be effective. With Japan, of course, the position is almost unassailable because of the theocratic character of the Emperor. Here is the only survivor of the " Heaven-born " rulers who held sway over almost every people in the early days of their development, and though popular feeling might be aroused against political leaders, there is no likelihood of shaking the throne of the " Son of Heaven " by propaganda.

The second factor which demands recognition is the amazing success of German propaganda with the Germanic peoples. Statistical proofs of this are to be found in the plebiscites of the Saar and, to a lesser degree, the German-Austrian *Anschluss*, but other equally impressive signs are seen in the active race-consciousness of the Teutonic populations outside Germany. This propaganda among Germans outside Germany is, it should be noted, not the creation of the National Socialist régime. In 1927 the League of Germans Abroad claimed to have 150 branches in Germany and foreign countries, with special organisations for Austria, Schleswig, the Saar, Danzig, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Tyrol, the Danube and overseas. "These associations," Professor Lasswell then noted, " exist to keep alive a sentiment of cultural unity and *may in time of emergency go farther*." (The italics are mine.) All that the Nazis have done is to strengthen these organisations by giving them a concrete policy to advance. There is something supremely ironical in the fact that

Germany is thus putting into practice the principle of " Self-Determination " and obtaining by propaganda methods the return of those possessions which were taken from her by force. It is ironical, but it is none the less true, and to explain away the 99 per cent. results of the plebiscites as due to mass-hypnotism coupled with the threat of force is no more than to endorse the success of the German propaganda, for though force may have been present, it plays no part in hypnotism. The Nazi propagandists have improved upon the old Roman Catholic proselytising precept : " Give us the child for the first seven years of his life. He will always be a Catholic " : they say, " We will take the child from his cradle, and see that throughout his life he is filled with the doctrines of National Socialism." They are teaching, with an intensity possibly equalled, but certainly seldom exceeded in any form of religious training, the young citizen the religion of the German National Socialist State which he must always put first and to whose service he must consecrate his energies. I do not believe anyone will be found to argue that it would in mediæval times have been anything less than suicidal to try to convert the Dominican movement to Judaism. He who tried would have been hurried to the stake in a yellow sanbenito. Nor would many be found ready to argue that it would be anything less than a waste of time to-day to try to inculcate in the Jesuits the doctrine of Karl Marx. Both ideas are laughable in their absurdity. Yet are they more absurd than that implied in directing propaganda for democratic riches, food and freedom at the National Socialist ?

In the present state of affairs I do not think they are. To begin with we should remember that the democracies have been pilloried in German propaganda—and to a less degree in Italian—on account of their riches, riches which are represented as being largely controlled by Jews and which have resulted in a soulless outlook and a blunted moral sense. The German working man, rejoicing in his new privileges as a member of the "*Kraft durch freude*" movement, is taught to look down on his wretched English fellow, who is exploited by international capitalists and, not surprisingly therefore, devoid of any sense of patriotism or national pride. No wonder that the English worker is so unpublic-spirited as to try to improve his lot by striking, for the German is taught that the strike-weapon can only advance sectional interests at the expense of the community, and that is the State, which is sacrosanct.

Similarly, if we advance the propaganda of nourishment we are to the Germans confusing cause and effect. It is no use saying, "Throw over your Nazi system and embrace democracy. Then you will have plenty to eat instead of going butterless or eggless or short of meat." The answer would be that "We have a dictator because we were hungry and demoralised," and not "We are hungry and repressed because we have a dictator." The Italian answer would be in the same terms. To my mind the difference between the two points of view is that one exaggerates the ideal, the other the material. The authoritarian Government gets its results by admitting the stark necessity for short rations and

discipline in pursuance of a racial ideal; the democratic Government by adding to the material well-being of its individual citizens in default of any such clearly-expressed ideal. The dictator urges his countrymen to pull in their belts, but to have faith in their national future. The democratic politician confesses that he finds it difficult to make his people face a national future because he must constantly be adding to their present comforts. I have deliberately underlined both these opposing aspects to point the moral, and the moral as I see it is that in the existing situation and for so long as the German leaders can sustain this faith in a national future, the German morale will be less susceptible to propaganda from outside than that of our own people. In the event of war the morale of the German public will be higher relatively to the British than was the case in 1914. Then there were many powerful and organised elements in Germany openly lukewarm, if not actively disapproving of, the existing régime. On the other hand there was undoubtedly a much more active and deeper national consciousness in Great Britain. We had not then been for twenty years the stamping ground of propagandists pursuing a campaign for peace through the League of Nations, if not for peace at any price.

Italy like Germany has been lifted out of the shadow of the " chaos and night," in which the Great War and Communism had placed her, by the efforts and inspiration of Mussolini. He has not only brought order at home and an Empire abroad, but he has given the Italians a pride and a confidence they never before possessed : to quote

an observation I once heard, " He has taken a third-class country and made it into a second-class country and persuaded the world it is a first-class country." Italy is the inventor of modern totalitarianism, but characteristically she has not applied the doctrine as rigorously or as thoroughly as she might. There is still a more liberal element left in the Fascist State than in the Nazi or Japanese Imperial systems. Nevertheless, the good Fascist is taught in the creed laid down by his " Culture Hero " that democracy is decadent and materialistic in outlook, no fit belief for the young blackshirt called upon to shoulder the empire burdens of old Rome. And Italy has never quite recovered from what she considers the way she was let down by Great Britain and France during and after the Great War. There is not only a post-war anti-democratic bias, but a feeling of resentment which is a legacy of the war. Still, unlike the German, the Italian is not regarded highly by the English-speaking peoples. No matter that he now boasts an Empire, he is still a " wop " or a " dago." Even the Germans rate him as a poor creature. It is difficult to believe that any leader can, in a generation, change the outlook and characteristics of a people. It may be possible to take an habitual down-and-out and by arguing with him, reassuring him, setting him to work, feeding and dressing him well, give him a bearing of confidence. At bottom there must always be the old sense of inferiority. So it may well be with the Italians. Inborn racial characteristics can only be bred out, and not even a dictator who combined the qualities of Mussolini with the

span of Methuselah would be able to carry through such an experiment in selective breeding. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Duce has made an improvement in the individual as well as the collective Italian. He will go into the next war an ardent follower of his leader. The complication is that behind all the anti-democratic, anti-British overlay there is a rich vein of sincere pro-British sentiment. At the moment it is buried under the official Fascist propaganda, but it is there nevertheless. Finally, there is likely to be a powerful influence excited by hard economic considerations. In summary, therefore, Italy is inspired with the same brand of totalitarian faith as Germany, the same regard for the leader, none the less sincere because it is less ecstatic, but the continued pressure of a small liberal leaven in the Fascist lump and a hidden measure of friendship for Great Britain are elements which might materially alter the whole case. Italy is not so difficult a problem for the propagandist as Germany or Japan.

To the Japanese the worship of the State is not a recent idolatry but a traditional religion, stretching back into the mists of history. It will therefore be more difficult for us to understand and infinitely more difficult to approach by propaganda. Moreover, the way of approach is rendered much more tortuous, first because the Japanese are an Oriental people, the working of whose minds is a closed book to the Westerner; and secondly because, in spite of their up-to-date industrialism and armaments, they are still in a stage of political development which is rudimentary. Not only will

they patiently bear a burden of pain, hunger and suffering which would overtax the more highly-developed Western peoples, but they will be more difficult to appeal to : being outside the Western world they will have no standards of comparison which we may use in our propaganda.

In discussing these aspects of the present strength of the position of Germany and Japan, I have been careful to lay emphasis on the qualifying adjective. The present position is strong, and so thoroughly have its foundations been dug and so constantly is it being buttressed with propaganda, that it is idle to expect it to be quickly weakened by our propaganda in time of war. In any event propaganda can seldom, if ever, hope to prevail with an enemy who is fresh and confident. It does not work that way. As long as successes continue to be registered to hang laurels round the national hall of heroes and keep the people's hopes at high pitch, propaganda may knock insistently without avail. It is only when defeats, the news of which, rigidly suppressed maybe by official order, starts leaking out ; when the hospitals become filled with wounded and the tale of those who do not return begins to mount : when enemy planes roar over home cities and lay them in ruins : and when the rations get shorter and undernourishment sets in, that there comes the opportunity for the propagandists. It should be remembered that Northcliffe's effort did not begin until three and a half years of war had passed, and it is certain, as I have said, that a large part of his success, if not the determining part, was due to the fact that he made his offensive at the psychological moment.

Propaganda is at all times a weapon of offence to be reckoned with, but only deadly against a tired foe. And if a future war should come and last so long that the German or Japanese peoples began to doubt whether their leaders had misled them, then the very strength of their present position could be turned against them. Their propaganda would be the more dangerous to them the stronger it had been. To quote Hitler, " The aim of propaganda is to *force* a doctrine upon a people," and very successfully have he and Dr. Goebbels and the Reichs ministerium done so. It is at least debatable whether this operation necessarily also involves keeping the people in ignorance of everything which, in the opinion of the propagandist, may in any way influence them against accepting the given doctrine *in toto*. Is it really necessary, one wonders, for responsible men and women to be treated as if they were children ? Did it greatly help towards the *coup d'état* with Austria that most German citizens knew nothing or very little of what was going forward ? Does it help to prevent the spread of Communistic ideas that all Russian news is suppressed, even, for example, such achievements as the over-the-North-Pole flight of Soviet airmen from Moscow to California ? It must seem to many only to be storing up trouble in the future to keep intelligent sections of the community thus completely in the dark about everything which is happening at home or in the world outside, but the fact remains that such totalitarian States as Germany and Japan act on this principle. During my schooldays I vividly remember seeing a page of a Russian paper

reproduced in an English newspaper. It had many of its sentences blacked out, and the English reader of those days, not thirty years ago, was asked to note with detestation the barbarousness and unenlightenment of a régime which, resting on the power of the secret police, found it necessary to censor ordinary news to prevent the citizen reading it. Our reaction, I remember, was an unexpressed, "What can one expect of a country where they beat peasants to death with the knout or send them to die in Siberia, and where they periodically make bonfires of Jews?" The real measure of the atavism of the post-war period is that in these days it is the normal practice in Germany to suppress all news other than that carefully sifted and prepared by the State propaganda ministry. The same policy persists in Russia, of course, though it is less organised, because, for all his planning, the Slav remains the same poor organiser that he has always been. In Japan suppression is extreme and there the citizen is not only unable to read or hear anything which the régime imagine might warp his State-controlled mind, but is even liable to be persecuted for "dangerous thoughts!" Broadcasting and radio news and views are subject to similar control—on the one hand the State monopoly of broadcasting, on the other rigorous restrictions on reception. The cinema is equally in hand. The best we can say of such a policy is that up to date it has given unmistakably concrete results. It has built up a position of great strength although it is not improbable that a more liberal policy would have achieved almost as definite a

result without the danger that is inherent in the existing situation—the danger of what may happen if ever the community realises how much truth has been kept from it. For the moment we must also recognise that the total suppression in normal times of all undesired foreign news or views must enormously complicate our propaganda problem in the event of war. Not only are our likely opponents fortified by home propaganda, but they are carefully defended against the intrusion of enemy propaganda—unless the war be long and the way hard.

So far, therefore, as offensive propaganda, *i.e.*, against the enemy, is concerned, the present situation appears to be that Germany will be a difficult nut to crack. Her people are most of them zealous in support of the Leader and his régime, almost all of them, except the political Communists, are patriotic citizens of the re-born Germany. They will be as difficult to reach by propaganda as to convert, especially on account of their experience of our propaganda blandishments and our failure to implement our promises in 1918 and since. Japan will also be as difficult to attack because of the nature of her theocracy, the fact that she is an Oriental nation entirely outside the ambit of Europe and because her people are even more rigorously protected from foreign propaganda than Germany. Both countries, however, appear to harbour the ichneumon of destruction in the very suppression that at first seems to have served them well—but this grub will need much time to fatten.

(IV)

As regards propaganda directed towards neutrals and allies, the position is uncertain, though again it would be unwise to assume that our potential enemies appear to other countries in the same unfavourable light that they are too often exhibited to us, or that they will enter a future war without useful allies. In respect of the former, we must remember that German propaganda has been very strong and on the whole intelligently directed for the past five years. Moreover, it has had a definite policy. It has had the new political idea of National Socialism to advance, and it must candidly be admitted that this is not very dissimilar in character, if in itself the political opposite, to the "League of Free Nations" of British propagandists in 1918. Like the League it is a concrete idea which points the way to a new era, an era of hope, of order and security, and particularly of improved conditions for the underdog. Unlike the League, it is national instead of international.

There are many of our own countrymen who would never think of supporting a British Fascist party, yet who detect in the National Socialist idea a hope for the future organisation of society, however much they dislike the methods with which the Nazi party seek to force it on their own people. There must, they argue, be a vitality in a movement which has found acceptance in so many countries. The fact that the form it has taken in each varies according to the racial characteristics of the nation concerned suggests the conclusion that the repression and intolerance of the German

model are not essential to the idea. I believe that a large measure of sympathy with Germany exists in Great Britain, but how far this is inherent or due to German propaganda or to an overdose of anti-German propaganda is not clear. However that may be, German propaganda has, like the Russian, a concrete idea to advance, and just as Russia has succeeded in infecting a section in every country with Communism, so I believe it will be found that Germany has succeeded with National Socialism. The difference will be found to lie in the types of organisation by which the opposing doctrines are to be developed in time of war.

Against this there will be the counterweight of Jewish opposition. Before 1914 Russia was the great persecutor of the Jews and Germany was quick to spot the propaganda capital that could be made out of England's alliance with Russia. "When England is an ally of Tsar Nicholas," they argued, "she must do as Nicholas does, she must make massacres, she must preach against the Jews." In the next war the boot will be on the other leg. All over the world, and especially in the U.S.A., Jews will be active against Germany, and the Jew is a natural and very energetic propagandist, though perhaps not a very far-seeing one. There are, however, cross-currents in the tide of world Jewry—the identification of Russian Jews with Communism, for example, and Palestine, another of our war propaganda hens which may come home to roost!—which should warn us not to rely too much on having it entirely in our favour. The Jews indeed present a problem of their own in propaganda for a future war.

Japan is a very different case. More isolated geographically and more arrogant racially, she has been much less mindful of world opinion than Germany, and such propaganda as she has done to occidental nations has been very poor, a mixture of special pleading and apologies, advancing no new idea, but merely reiterating the divine mission of Japan in the Far East. At the same time the Japanese have always been indefatigable in their efforts to prevent the Western peoples from developing "dangerous thoughts" (*sic*) about them. There is more than coincidence in the fact that whereas "John Chinaman," the "Heathen Chinee," with his "pidgin" English and the umbrella under which, until recently, he set out for war, is a comic figure in the eyes of the English public, the Japanese has always been a reality, whether the "gallant little Jap" of 1904, the "gallant ally" of 1914 or the "yellow ape" of the present day. He has seen to it that we have taken him seriously. From the early days of *The Mikado* onward, he has protested and worked against any play, film or publication which showed him in a ridiculous not less than an unfavourable light, and until recently he has succeeded astonishingly. In fact, his success is a good example of the truth of the boomerang effect of propaganda. We have been shown a mask of such childlike benignity that now it has been torn off, the effect is more shocking than if there had been no attempt at false pretences. There is evidence that the Japanese propaganda to China has recently been fairly subtle, especially as developed through the Hsi Min Huei

or New People's Society. This is an organisation which aims to protect the puppet Governments, but which also propagates the New People's Principle, the gist of which is that China must forsake Western ideas and return to her traditional civilisation. In short the Principle is Japanese propaganda designed to play on the conservatism of the Chinese and detach them from Chiang Kai-Chek and the Kuomintang. It is not held to be likely to succeed, but it is an interesting sidelight on Japanese methods.

In respect of propaganda, as probably of strategy, Japan's weakness lies in the neighbouring territories which she has annexed by force, and holds largely by force. These are countries, the ancient kingdom of Korea, the old province of Manchuria, slices of the semi-independent States of Mongolia and a large part of the Chinese Empire, all of which have a highly-developed racial if not national consciousness, and some of which rejoice in a civilisation older than Japan, against which indeed the Japanese appear as barbarians. These are no Austrias or Sudeten Deutschlands having a racial affinity and an identity of political views, but active elements of disruption, the targets as well as the generators of anti-Japanese propaganda in war. Ill-disposed neighbours or subject peoples are most dangerous : the former provide enemy propaganda with a means of entry and the latter are the forcing beds in which enemy propaganda foments sedition or open rebellion. During the Great War Germany had some very telling experiences of the former. Whereas German papers, in those days still

possessing a degree of freedom, would not naturally quote English propaganda, they were deceived into reproducing a substantial volume of it from Danish, Norwegian, Dutch and Swiss journals. Raemakers, the cartoonist, was also a Dutchman and Dutch workmen, who daily crossed into Germany in hundreds, were one of the most successful if usually unconscious propaganda channels for the Allies. Germany may run up against the same trouble in the next war, but not, I imagine, to anything like the same extent as Japan. Though it is no more than a speculation, it may be suggested that if war were to break out tomorrow or even within the next year or so, Japan will not enter it entirely fresh and confident. Her resources will be more than a little strained, her people a little anxious, if not already conscious of fatigue, and her leaders a little less confident—all factors which the propagandist will register with satisfaction.

What of their allies? "The prerequisite of a solid front against the enemy," writes Professor Lasswell, "is cordial relations among allies." It is also one of the most delicate and tiresome tasks of propaganda in wartime. Yet Campbell Stuart is emphatic: "It is as necessary for allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify military command." The more allies, the more varied the aims and aspirations, and the more difficulties for the propagandist. As far as one can see, Germany and Japan will not be unduly bothered in this respect. There must be an element of uncertainty because the opening of hostilities will always disclose one or two turn-

coats, countries which in the present instance may, for example, have nothing spiritually in common with Germany. At the moment Poland, or Rumania, or Hungary, might be such countries. Italy, on the other hand, might repeat the *volte-face* of 1915. With these exceptions it is tolerably certain that when the whistle blows the German team will line up much as in 1914. It will be militarily weaker as it will no longer have the reservoir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to draw on. It will be geographically weaker because it is unlikely to have Turkey to rely on for a road to the Near East. It is at least questionable whether Italy will be a starter, though Japan may join. On the other hand, some of the more embarrassing races like the Croats and the Czechs will be missing. Germany's propaganda problem will therefore be simpler than it was during 1914–1918, since her front will be almost entirely composed of her own people or of their affinities in spirit and politics. Japan certainly stands outside this front, but with half the world between, the alliance is an uneasy one; and with all the differences in language, outlook and hemisphere and with clashing commercial interests the task of the German or Japanese bureaux charged with propaganda for their distant ally will be no easy one.

The other side must be considered, though briefly here, since it will be necessary to deal with the subject in detail in its proper place. How does Great Britain stand with neutral countries and potential allies? Obviously as

regards the world at large we have a huge advantage, and although our stock has slumped of recent years to the detriment of our active prestige, we still enjoy a far greater reserve of goodwill than any other nation. In part this is the accumulation of past achievements, and in part respect for the British tradition and the British rule of law.

Neutral countries will still tend to be impressed by the great material strength with which we are equipped, our riches and resources. They will expect us to behave and win according to tradition. They will not, I feel, be so much impressed by our constantly reiterating how privileged we are to enjoy the fruits of "democracy." The cherubim of conservatism and the seraphim of radicalism continually do cry the praises of "democracy," a concerted ululation which must be largely meaningless to peoples less tolerant or poorer than ourselves. We forget that intolerance is no more compatible with democracy than is impoverishment. The majority of foreign nations will qualify for one or the other adjective: either intolerant or impoverished and not seldom both, since the former is so often the outcome of the latter.

The common answer of the foreigner to the Englishman who boasts of his political system is in effect "Yes, it is a very beautiful thing no doubt, but it will not work in my country." We should remember that most countries have at one time or another tried unsuccessfully to copy our democratic pattern and have most of them abandoned it as a failure. Some of them remember our democratic propaganda promises of 1919. On all

counts, therefore, I should think we shall be best advised to work out a line of propaganda which will be more practical in its appeal to neutral states. At the same time we shall do well to press the loud pedal on the democratic stop in our home propaganda. This is calculated to be the most telling in a future war as it was in the last.

Unlike Germany we do little or no organised propaganda in time of peace, and such as we do fitfully attempt is, as I shall show, not very cleverly done. On the other hand, although it may be contended with reason that a deliberate and carefully thought out propaganda directed to foreign countries might be increased, it is not such a necessity for us, especially as we continue to cash in the return on our accumulated capital of goodwill. But the great advantage that we enjoy over both Germany and Japan is that we are immeasurably superior psychologists. What they strive to gain by volume, we make up for in direction. Where they set store by organisation, and not infrequently defeat their own ends by over-organisation, we pride ourselves on improvisation and adaptation. "Part of the superiority of British propaganda," Lasswell concludes, "was due to its amazing suppleness." It is not for nothing that we are a world nation and that we have a genius whether inherited or acquired for handling other peoples. If we do not always understand the foreigner, we seem to know how to handle him better than others or at least how to find men who know. I have said that a distinctive feature of German propaganda is its success among German peoples and to some extent among

those who are predisposed to welcome the National Socialist idea. The converse is equally true, that their propaganda has been far less successful with world opinion, owing to the inability of the German to appreciate the psychology of others. Earnestly and assiduously the Germans—or Japanese, or Italians—develop a propaganda designed to present their country in a favourable light, to explain their difficulties, and to persuade outsiders to be forbearing and trust them. The labour is enormous, and at last it begins to succeed. Then in a flash they act in such a manner as to deny everything they have said, and to destroy at one blow the edifice which they have with such patient toil built up. German propaganda was rapidly winning good opinions for the Nazi policies and the Nazi régime, and was dispelling old prejudices formulated abroad as a result of the old-type propaganda of the "blood and iron" and "scrap of paper" days. Wooed by this propaganda, Austria herself was ripe for seduction. Then, without warning, came the rape, demonstrating in the most unmistakable fashion to all men who were free to judge that the Germany of the ex-corporal had not changed from the Germany of the ex-Kaiser. Not only did this shock world opinion, and therefore undo much of the good achieved by propaganda, but—much more damaging—it must tend to discredit that propaganda. The more energetically it is pressed the more it is liable to be represented as the Red Riding Hood masking the same old wolf of the "blood and iron" period. Again I do not censure Germany. On the contrary, I am prepared to argue that in the immediate interests of herself

and Austria she may have done right. What I do say is that it affords a clear example of her inability to weigh the opinion of others, which must in its turn make her less dangerous as a propaganda enemy than her efforts would indicate.

If the Germans are weak in international psychology, the Japanese are mere children, that is if they ever bother to consider outside opinion at all. Their whole attitude is, on the face of it, so intransigently short-sighted, such a combination of arrogance and humility, as to suggest that they believe that the opinion of others does not count.

In any event, this " blind spot " of two of our three potential enemies—for Italy is far abler—is very fortunate for us, for more than any nation are we vulnerable to propaganda directed to the hundred and one races, tribes and peoples in the British Empire. It is one of the penalties of the Imperial mantle. In spite of this undeniable weakness of the Germans, they succeeded in giving us some very anxious moments during the Great War by fomenting trouble in Egypt, India, Ireland and elsewhere. Italy has more recently reminded us how easy it is to embarrass us by propaganda of this nature.

As with neutral countries, so with allies: the enemy will not, unless the unforeseen occurs, find much propaganda material of a sort calculated to make bad blood between Great Britain and France, which is our only certain ally at the moment, or the U.S.A., which might but is not likely to be our ally at a future date. Still, the possibility must be examined, and it will be sufficient to say here that though our prestige

position may have suffered in comparison with 1914 or 1918, several importants of friction have been eliminated.

(v)

Lastly, there is the home front. What is the position regarding propaganda to our own people? Here there should be no room for the differences of opinion which exist regarding the necessity for propaganda to neutral countries. If there is to be another war in the near future, then the time for propaganda at home is now, and even to begin now is to start late. As soon as the first shot is fired, propaganda becomes, as I have shown, one of the first considerations of the central authority, and if it is to be effective the propagandist must have something to build upon. In other words, we should have been laying these foundations for him in time of peace. And this, for reasons possibly known to themselves, our governments have been unwilling or unable to do. From conversations I have had with those in authority, I have gathered variously that propaganda is improper: that it gives only "shallow patriotism": that it could not be done: that it is being done: and that if it were done it would have a boomerang effect. More than one of these answers has been advanced with reckless contradiction by the same spokesman. This is a regrettable feature to which I must return in the proper place. Suffice it to say here that up to a year or so ago the central authority had for the last twenty years done nothing to correct or counterbalance the propaganda of idealism or unreality. During this period orthodoxy had not even defended itself, so that when

to-day it begins to do so, it appears as an animal *très méchant* to the public.

And after fifteen years of hypnotic propaganda, the public is not demoralised perhaps, but definitely confused, in the fuddled condition of a patient struggling back to the blinding light of reality after the gentle twilight of a drugged sleep. There is little wonder at this confusion. For fifteen years they have been alternatively stunned by the propaganda of Fear and soothed by the propaganda of Optimism. Simultaneously they have been misled by the propaganda of Labels, until they do not know where they stand or what to believe. The propaganda of Fear arises directly out of the possibility of another war and is developed as has been suggested out of the remains of our war propaganda of 1918. Political or quasi-political organisations have exploited for their own ends the convictions of eminent idealists and pacifists, the intense sincerity of many of whom has lent momentum to the movement against war, or against dictators, or for "democracy," represented variously by Russia, Republican Spain, Abyssinia or China, or the League of Nations. They seek to advance their interests by playing on the fears of the public as to what will happen if and when the next war comes, and it cannot be denied that they have been successful. Added volume has been lent to this turbid stream of propaganda of recent years by the Government itself, actuated by entirely opposite motives. They have played upon fear with intent to persuade the public to volunteer to keep war away from the home front or, should this prove impossible, to minimise its effects. Propaganda of

this type is recognisable in the attempt to bring home the perils from air bombardment. Lurid indeed are some of the pictures that have been painted, especially with regard to the effect of gas bombs, images which have been joyfully held up by the anti-war or anti-government propagandists as confirmation of their theses. Although it may have panicked numbers of men into the Territorial Army or A.R.P., this "gas from the air" propaganda is thoroughly unsound because it is both untruthful and misleading.

Side by side with the propaganda of Fear has marched the propaganda of Optimism, or perhaps complacency would be the better word. This is the most prevalent of our current propaganda ailments, and from any standpoint except that of the opposition camp it is difficult to see a justification for it. A good recent instance may be mentioned. There has never been a great exhibition which was wholly ready on the opening day. The Empire Exhibition at Glasgow was no exception, and until a last moment spurt and good weather enabled much lost ground to be made up, it looked as if it would be hopelessly behind time. Yet all the time the exhibition authorities were telling the public that it would be "110 per cent. ready on the day." As this grew near, the percentage dropped to 100 per cent., then 95 per cent., but the assurances were as loud as ever. The outstanding exponents of this form of propaganda at the moment are the War Office. Although they are worried at the shortage of recruits for the Regular Army, they crow loudly week by week over the percentage increases that have taken place since, say, the same period last year or the year before.

The effect of this soothing syrup is, first, to defeat the ends for which surely it is intended and to encourage the public to rest on their oars, rather than make a special effort : secondly, it is ridiculed by those who know, who will in future tend to discredit the propaganda which spreads such confident inaccuracies. In other words, it is useless at home and ammunition for the anti-British propagandist abroad.

Thirdly, there is the propaganda of Labels. As this is an age of propaganda, it is one of labels. The propagandist, the commercial publicity man, or the newspaper reporter have all been progressively influenced by a need for simplifying the appeals they address to the public. I once heard a well-known Swedish cinematograph director asking what hopes there could be for art or intelligence in the cinema, " so long as films were made for housemaids," and without accepting the housemaid as necessarily less intelligent than any other, it is to this metaphorically low level that the majority of propaganda of any sort is being depressed. The popular newspapers tend towards the U.S. tabloid model, in which news is sacrificed for bigger, better and blacker headlines, and though the B.B.C. fight a gallant rear-guard action against the habit, they are not infrequently pilloried for their pains. The results of this so-called simplification must inevitably be misleading, especially where the method is applied in the realm of politics. Everything that is to the left of the centre, from British Liberalism through Russian Communism to Spanish anarchism, is " democratic." To fight for any or all these ill-assorted bed-fellows is to strike a blow for " liberty."

This is the Popular Front. Everything to the right is "Fascist," to dare to support which is to be labelled a "Reactionary." The labels admit of no centre, only two extremes. That is only one of the penalties of labels. They divide everything into two irreconcilable halves. This misuse of labels, it has been said, is a pernicious substitute for thought. Perhaps it is. For present purposes it is enough to note that it cannot but lead to further confusion in an already overburdened public mind. It is not merely that Russia is "democratic" and Germany "Fascist." Less than six years ago Germany was the darling of our intellectuals, who were doing and succeeding in some very energetic propaganda to create public sympathy for the condition to which the unjust peace of the capitalist imperialist nations had reduced her. Swiftly the helm was put hard over, and a course steered in exactly the opposite direction. It is not for me to attempt to explain these fitful gusts of opinion, only to suggest the effect they are likely to have. No propaganda can deny itself so quickly, and there are to my mind indications that the original course had a better fundamental appeal to the mass of inarticulate British opinion. The anti-German propaganda that is raging intermittently in the camps of the Left and the pro-French Right is being overdone and, if persisted in, may indeed produce a reaction, helped as it is by skilful and better-concealed propaganda from Germany. I have said already that the Jew is a more energetic than skilful propagandist, but he is undoubtedly energetic. At present we are with traditional readiness giving shelter to large numbers of persecuted Jews from Germany and Austria. It

would be against nature if these immigrants, whether permanent or in passage, did not harbour resentment against the countries which had expelled them, and it should not be grounds for a charge of anti-Semitism to point out that a great many of them are making an active propaganda to incite feeling against Germany.

The voice which is most often in possession of the microphone is that of complacency, but the noises off, the crackles and the breakdowns, are caused by the babel of confusion. So far as the next war is concerned, the situation certainly seems far from reassuring. The public can hardly be blamed if they are not in the mood to give service in anticipation of an emergency, nor is there any certainty that if it arose to-morrow they would rally as they must do if it is to be met. We claim that we are determined to cling to the voluntary system, so it is no wonder that our response to the appeals for volunteers is carefully noted overseas. Yet it is not the voluntary system alone that is on trial, but the British spirit. How is the next war going to come? It is unthinkable that we should be the deliberate aggressor—though the "other side" is always the aggressor in war propaganda!—but I can imagine a situation into which we might be so manœuvred as to enable our enemies to denounce us as the aggressor in their propaganda. Still no country or combination of countries will willingly risk a fall with the British Empire. It is far too strong in material resources. Its weakness may therefore be sought in its moral resources. I have said that our potential enemies are bad psychologists. In 1914 Germany made a fatal error in banking on our degeneracy

and our preoccupation with domestic squabbles. There is a real danger that they may, if we encourage them, fall again into the same error. "The illusion that we are decadent," Sir Arthur Salter said recently, "has begun to be revived" (a revival stimulated by Continental propagandists). "It is the greatest of our dangers. It is essential that we should shatter it now by showing the qualities we showed in the last war, not in a period of war, but in preparation and defence against war." Our confusion may therefore not only be a disquieting weakness in the event of war. It may also, by exposing the cracks in our home façade, be a contributory cause of war, if not actually precipitate it.

Finally, as an instance of our confusion, there is something pathetic about the way in which so many of our better educated youths and maidens try to prove to themselves as well as to others that their hearts are sound. "We are all right," they say in effect. "We'll join up all right when the time comes." Brave new world! still clinging to twenty-five years ago when Britain was an island which had time to train its civilians before it sent them overseas to fight! "We'll join up when the time comes." It is like the producer who announces a wonderful new ballet, the dancers in which are not going to start rehearsing till the curtain goes up on the first night. Those dancers would be defenceless against the fury of the audience, as our young men and women may one day be against the fury from the skies. They have no excuse when before them is being enacted the martyrdom of China with whom Japan is now at war.

CHAPTER III

WAYS AND MEANS

(I)

DURING the last twenty years the instruments available for propaganda purposes have increased enormously in power and scope. In the last war the propagandist could rely on the newspapers, wireless telegraphy, the cinematograph, the aeroplane and the pamphlet-carrying balloon. Since then the aeroplane has been developed almost out of recognition, and the talking film has added to the potentialities of the cinema. Most important of all, there has been the creation of the huge engine of wireless broadcasting, whose precocious offspring, television, is already finding its feet. Greatly though these advances and inventions have facilitated the task of the propagandist and increased his powers, neither they nor new methods and machines of warfare will much affect the technique and practice of propaganda. However many the new instruments, they do not alter the character of the tune, only its volume. The principles will remain the same, whether propaganda is directed through a microphone into the ether, dropped in the form of pamphlets from an aeroplane, or issued from a central bureau to the newspapers. It will still be the message that counts, not the method by which it is delivered. The nature of the message, the time and manner in which it is sent out will have been decided upon

after due attention has been paid to certain recognised precepts.

We have already noted some of these. Thus propaganda should invariably be based on truth, even though it may twist this, especially by implication. " Lies are the least effective form of propaganda. The effect of a lie diminishes, and the effect of a frank statement increases with the square of the time that has ensued since it has been told." Equally propaganda must always be linked closely to policy and when possible precede it. Ludendorff, who saw as clearly as any of the German leaders the rôle of propaganda, was more emphatic. " Good propaganda," he wrote, " must keep well ahead of political events. It must act as the pacemaker of policy." These, truthfulness and alignment with policy, are the two great commandments : the others are like unto them, but subsidiary in character. For instance, if propaganda is to keep in line with policy, it follows that it must be unified. It must come under a central direction which is in the closest touch with those who shape policy in the political, economic and military spheres. A propaganda that is not unified, whether domestic, which I define as defensive, against the enemy, which is offensive, but particularly between allies, will use conflicting arguments in support of the same objective, or even pursue conflicting objectives. It will be so much sound and fury signifying nothing.

Propaganda must wait upon a favourable atmosphere. This summarises what I have already tried to explain, that the mind of the propagandee must be receptive before propaganda can succeed.

This is only axiomatic of offensive propaganda, since it is one of the duties of defensive propaganda to create a state of receptivity in the public mind: this is why defensive propaganda must start before the emergency arrives. In either sphere, however, the right atmosphere can only be achieved and exploited as a result of continuity in propaganda. Not only must it have a concrete policy to advance but it must stick closely to it. We may count ourselves fortunate that much of the subversive propaganda that is being done in the United Kingdom has no continuity. It is continuous and persistent, but it speaks with too many voices, chases too many of the opportunist hares that are started, and above all fails to advance a constructive policy. The corollary to this is that propaganda must be timely, which is not quite the same thing as the right atmosphere. A good example of timeliness was the British publication of U-boat casualties in the last war. The Ministry of Propaganda learned that the German authorities were experiencing difficulties in finding men for their submarine service on account of the growing anxiety in their dockyard towns over the non-return of many ships. The moment was ripe for this piece of propaganda, so that when it was released in Hamburg the effect was an almost total stoppage of recruiting for submarines and something approaching mutiny among the existing crews.

Propaganda must be adapted to the psychology of the public addressed. We may again count ourselves doubly fortunate in that our peculiar sense of humour induces us to react in a manner which upsets the calculations of the foreigner;

and that we ourselves are better psychologists. The "Hymn of Hate" was a first-class joke, Zeppelin raids had their reflection in "Zeppelin parties," "Zeppelin nighties" and "Zeppelin terraces"—for top stories of buildings—and one of the more popular trench songs was "Oh my! I don't want to die. I want to go Home." These things were baffling to the German. On the other hand, H. G. Wells' memorandum shows how clearly he appreciated the susceptibility of the Teutonic mind to systematic statements. "They are accustomed," he wrote, "to discuss and understand co-ordinate projects. The ideas represented by the phrase 'Berlin-Baghdad' and 'Mittel-Europa' have been fully explained to them and now form the basis of German political thought." How fresh this sounds in a day when the changes are being rung on the "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis"! It was, it should be remembered, to oppose an Allied project equally concrete and co-ordinated that the "League of Free Nations" was adopted in our propaganda.

Propaganda must never be obvious. "Propaganda that looks like propaganda is," according to Campbell Stuart, "third-rate propaganda." He refers, of course, only to offensive propaganda, in respect of which I would go farther and say that it was useless propaganda. Nothing could be more laughable than much of the Japanese propaganda which has been reaching this country recently. Business men have been receiving letters from unknown Japanese telling them in very odd English how pitiful it is that Great Britain misunderstands her old friends under the Rising

Sun, and what good fellows they really are. Care must therefore be taken to cover up the source or origin of war propaganda material and also to disguise the form in which it appears. Again, this is more important in offensive than in defensive propaganda, since the Englishman, for sake of example, will not normally resent being openly appealed to by his own countrymen. He may not respond to the appeal, but he will not necessarily react against it in the way that the enemy will if he knows that it comes from the hated, despised nation against whom he is fighting. Yet even in defensive propaganda it will usually be wiser to cover the pill in a little jam.

There are naturally a number of other rules by which the propagandist will be guided, if he will not always follow them. Some of these are quoted in the biography of Sir Robert Donald, such as "Never shove your propagandee to a conclusion he can reach unaided," and "Propaganda that merely threatens achieves nothing." Another maxim is "Never blame your propagandee but his leaders." This definitely needs qualifying. It is true only if the other principles have been correctly observed. For example, it was correct as applied to the tired and dispirited Germany of 1918: it would be wrong if applied to the Germany of to-day.

There are also details of propaganda technique on which opinions as to the right course of action may differ. A notable instance arises out of the handling of news of losses or defeats. The possible methods will range all the way from complete suppression of the unpleasant fact to prompt

disclosure. Examples of two cases during the Great War which were handled quite differently are given by Sir Douglas Brownrigg in his *Indiscretions of a Naval Censor*. When H.M.S. *Audacious* was sunk by a mine in October, 1914, the First Lord of the Admiralty decided to make a clean breast of the loss in Parliament, but allowed himself to be over-persuaded. Rumours regarding the loss of the battleship got about naturally. I remember it was an open secret among the troops in England, but the matter was never officially reported till after the Armistice had been signed in 1918! "This suppression," Brownrigg notes, "cost us the confidence of the public . . . and gave the Germans a useful bit of propaganda to use against us, and confidence in our truth-telling capacity was not wholly restored until the Jutland battle." But the Germans, it appears, must have been foxed, because an enterprising New York paper published a photograph of the *Audacious* as she appeared "when she *rejoined* the Grand Fleet, and described in detail the work done on her during the time she was in dock in Belfast. The story was so circumstantial as to convince anybody . . . and I think the German naval staff must have been very hard put to it to decide whether the ship was sunk or whether or not she had been raised." On balance, Brownrigg considers that we should have been best served by being truthful. This we were over the battle of Jutland.

On 31st May the German wireless announced that "a portion" of their High Sea Fleet had met our Grand Fleet in full force and had defeated

it. The Admiralty could not get accurate facts until June 2nd, although in the meantime rumours piled up like storm-clouds and damaged ships limped back to East Coast ports with many wounded on board. At 7 p.m. on June 2nd a *communiqué* was issued disclosing without reserve the extent of our losses so far as they were known, admitting the sinking of two battle-cruisers, two cruisers and five destroyers and injuries to others, but making less specific claims to have inflicted heavy damages on the enemy. The shock of this announcement was felt round the world. Next day a more explicit message was sent out, giving details of the German losses and showing clearly by inference that the German wireless claim to have won a great victory with "a portion" of their fleet was unfounded. As a result of our frankness, Brownrigg affirms that "our reputation for telling the truth was re-established, and from that time onward, I believe it fair to say that what appeared in our *communiqués* was accepted as fact, whereas the Germans suffered irretrievably by their original lying and vainglorious *communiqué*, which they were compelled to alter in the course of two or three days. Only very gradually did they admit their losses, whereas we did so at once.

Here again is evidence of the value of truthfulness, though as regards the disclosure of losses there is no hard and fast rule. The propagandist must balance the danger that the enemy will ascertain the facts and make propaganda both out of them and the fact that they have been suppressed, against the effects that prompt disclosure will have upon the public.

Such problems constantly present themselves for solution. The manner in which the propagandist will treat them will depend upon his training in the technique of his subject and his experience in practising it. Experience will be of much importance, so that it is the more regrettable that we can muster so few men who have regular experience in propaganda, let alone a full grasp of its technique.

For the moment we should note carefully that propaganda should have a basis in truth, be aligned with policy, be under a unified control, await the right atmosphere and, when that exists, be timely: it should be adapted psychologically and never be obvious.

(II)

While the principles of propaganda remain virtually unchanged, the propaganda band bears as little resemblance to its Great War prototype as a modern dance band with its saxophones and microphones does to a Victorian string orchestra. Even the instruments which were available in the last war have changed in size or character.

Perhaps the most general vehicle of propaganda is the daily newspaper. It is in all civilised countries a necessity in almost every home, however lowly. It lies about all day, to be taken up and its contents unconsciously assimilated during an idle moment. Its practical influence is the greater because it is not obviously propaganda. Certainly there are newspapers which openly identify themselves with a particular

political party or school of thought, some that have a definite denominational bias. In such organs the editorial comment expressed in leading articles is avowedly propagandist, but the individual normally favours the paper which holds the views with which he finds himself in agreement. They express for him in clear language what he is thinking but cannot express for himself. The constitutionalist in England will thus tend to favour the papers with a Right-wing bias, and the radical and revolutionary support those which advocate all the more roseate hues from Liberal pink to the total gules of the dyed-in-the-wool Communist. Newspaper propaganda can be insidious in that a paper, whose editorial comment is childishly impartial or non-political, can so present the news of the day as to give a decided propaganda bias to them. It can alter the balance of news by prominence, position and headlines. I noted recently two paragraphs in a reputedly constitutional daily dealing with the Spanish civil war. Both announced air raids. The first concerned a Nationalist raid on Valencia. The headline caught the reader's eye and was worded " Rebel air raids on Valencia : shocking casualties among women and children." The paragraph itself reported soberly that the raid had taken place, causing casualties to 17 women and children. Underneath it was a second paragraph, altogether less conspicuous, bearing the headline, " Republican raid on Malaga : civilian casualties." Note how the first implies an enormity which is missing in the second. In this case the reason was probably to be sought in the Republican

propaganda being better presented than the Nationalist. Emphasis of this sort is, of course, usually applied deliberately for reasons of propaganda. Again, merely by reporting a given piece of news the paper may be disseminating a particular propaganda. For example, German papers which in 1918 may have reported the departure of the U.S. Expeditionary Force or its arrival in France, or even the presence of "Doughboys" in the line, were assisting the Allied propaganda. In recognition of their importance, the newspapers are the targets of the propagandist of all types, political sociological, commercial or eccentric! It has been estimated that 30 per cent. of all copy received in the offices of London newspapers to-day comes from propaganda sources. Some of it is obvious: much of it is hidden. It is to the credit of our Press that only a relatively small proportion finds its way into print. If they are valuable to the propagandist in times of peace, the newspapers are essential in time of war.

Since 1918 there have been sweeping changes, both in the organisation and character of British newspapers. They have become fewer in numbers and their control vested in fewer hands. Against the tendency of the age towards amalgamation, the old independent journal with its circulation measured by a few thousands and occasionally tens of thousands has fought a gallant but losing battle. Whereas throughout the country there were in 1918 roughly 47 important papers, metropolitan and provincial, in 45 different ownerships, now there are only 35, and the number

of controlling interests has dropped to 27. In the London area the figures are less striking, but the movement has been almost as marked—the evening papers being now only 3 as against 6. Simultaneously there has been a development away from the journal with well-defined sympathies towards the " national popular " paper —I use the inverted commas deliberately—whose preoccupation is circulation rather than influence. The tendency is all away from reasoned exposition and towards headlines and pictures. The newspapers are the symbol of this age of labels. Where once it was the habit to devote a column or half a column to a piece of news, now a wirelessed photograph, two or more headlines, and perhaps three lines of reading matter suffice to tell the same story. They tell it, but how misleadingly, because of what they omit. Commercial advertising has enormously strengthened its claims to space at the expense of news, and one result is that though the " popular " Press has a great power as a medium for the sale of articles to the public it appears to have lost influence in the political sphere. This is not necessarily cause and effect, because since this type of paper no longer attempts to pursue a continuity in advancing a concrete policy, it is unreasonable to expect it to be effective for propaganda. Circulations being the first consideration, it follows that the paper must try to appeal to all sorts of readers, and above all give offence to none. This explains the continual play upon safe labels such as " democracy " and " Fascist." Almost everyone has been taught, like Wells' Germans, to understand these terms, the

former as something to applaud and cherish, the latter to detest and execrate. In short, the national papers of this type—and Great Britain being a small country is covered over almost its entire area by the circulation of these giants—no longer lead the political thought of their readers. They do not set out to do so, except by fits and starts, when the measure of their failure is witness to the soundness of one of the propaganda precepts I have enumerated.

There is possibly one line of continuity which they all follow—or have followed till recently—the pursuit of peace, an object which they make an end in itself. They realise that every one of their readers desires peace and hates war. Therefore they preach peace without reference to the realities of the international situation and devote much space to the activities of peace organisations.

What is the meaning of such a label! It has been said that "to practise non-resistance to evil is to promote the dominion of Satan"—that is to say of the very "dictators" which are one of our most overworked "hate" labels. "Absolute pacifism is the denial of sin's reality"—and of the reality that another war is not only possible but probable.

One other point needs mention. The popular Press flourishes at the expense of the nerves of the public, whose emotions it assaults in each and every edition. "Sensation," "Amazing," "Scandal," "Tragic," "Horrible," "Brutal"—the words come tumbling out of the presses with the jangling crash of granite blocks unloaded on to an iron sheet. Unconsciously the nervous

resistance of the reader is worn down, and all the time he is also subjected to efforts to whip up his indignation, fear or disgust at some happening or threatened happening at home or abroad. This is no sort of preparation for war, when the nerves of the community, individual and collective, must be steadied. Nor would it help immediately if the papers were to drop the "sensation" line of attack for one more restrained, for I imagine sensation will be found to be their foundation as well as their policy.

Our popular papers therefore do not appear an encouraging medium for propaganda in anticipation of the next war. The strength of newspaper propaganda of this character lies in the provincial Press, the papers based on the great industrial centres, but unfortunately though these have changed much less with the times, their circulations have dropped. They are now read chiefly by the educated man and his family or at least by the man of substance, rather than the masses, in respect of whom anticipatory propaganda is not nearly so necessary. There are, however, two points which must be mentioned. The first is that it is unfair to blame the papers entirely for the absence of any continuity of policy. They can justly put forward the weakness of propaganda from the central authority and its total lack of co-ordination as their excuse, though this can only be an excuse and not in itself any satisfactory reason. The second point is that in their effort to be all things to all men, the circulation Press underrates, I think, the intelligence and political stability of their readers. From my

own observations I have no hesitation in saying that the reckless misuse of labels, the contradictory arguments, first for, then against Germany, and the over-insistence of anti-dictator propaganda will bring their own reactions. Inasmuch as these are tending to weary many people and to dispose them to look more tolerantly towards Germany, they are to be welcomed in time of peace. They may not improbably make war less likely, but if war comes the existence of pro-German sentiment will be an embarrassing thing to have to overcome. Similarly, the eagerness with which Jewish partisans seize each and every opportunity to ram home propaganda regarding their persecution is nearing the danger-line. It is bringing the Jewish problem into prominence, always an undesirable thing to do from the Jewish point of view, and thereby indirectly reinforcing the anti-Semitic propaganda put out by Germany.

It is not only the dictators who are sensitive to criticism. Already the pitch has been reached in Great Britain where it is considered bigoted or reactionary to do other than praise the Jews for their industry and ability. Few papers will risk any attack on the Jews, however well-founded, for fear of appearing even distantly anti-Semitic. It is an unfortunate fact, but a fact none the less, that anti-Semitism is endemic in almost every country, but it seldom breaks out except during a period of serious trade depression or unless driven underground. The former may arrive in the near future and the latter is now being done as a result of the Jewish anti-German propaganda.

While by their over-emphasis the Press may be

blunting the edge of anti-German feeling at home, they are inflaming anti-British feeling in Germany and elsewhere. The most scurrilous and insulting references are made to leaders who, though no doubt accurately described as dictators, are equally heads of sovereign States; references which can only exacerbate an already strained situation. This sort of thing passes as a gesture for "Democracy" or "Peace," I am not clear which.

The foregoing will, I hope, show that the newspapers do not as matters stand appear to be propaganda media on which we can at once rely to prepare our public for war. It is not that they are not ready and willing to publish the uncoordinated scraps of information that come to them from departmental press offices or to give publicity to the speeches of political leaders, or to help in any reasonable way. The trouble is that many of them no longer carry weight, and those that do circulate among classes to whom propaganda is less necessary. At the same time, by their constant unfriendly references they are embarrassing the British Government both in chancelleries abroad and in the formulation of public opinion at home.

As soon as war is imminent, the Press is at once subjected to a censorship applied by order in council under the Defence of the Realm Act. This censorship is rigid and absolute so far as military, naval and air matters are concerned. That is, before any paper can print a dispatch relating, for example, to a new type of steel helmet, the account of a minor naval action or a description of an air raid on Birmingham it must submit the copy to

the censor for approval. He has power to pass it, amend it or even to prohibit its publication altogether. According to the letter of the law as it stands, the newspapers are otherwise free to publish what they wish, but it does not work out quite like this in practice. For example, they have their liberty of political criticism. They can still attack the policy of the Government of the day as disclosed in Parliamentary debates, but during war Parliament frequently goes into secret session and though the papers will no doubt know what transpires in these, they must not publish anything. Moreover, though the censorship is definitely directed against the disclosure of facts, it is interpreted more widely with, be it emphasised, the full concurrence of the Press. Not the least praiseworthy thing about the British Press is the degree of voluntary censorship it imposes on itself in the national interest, and observes in peace as well as in war. Still, proof as this is of a sense of trust not encountered in any other country, it has the weakness that one popular paper, less conscientious than its fellows, could in a dark hour disclose something which, once published, the other papers could not ignore. This possibility gives more cause for anxiety now that one or two papers are thinly camouflaged organs of subversive propaganda.

(III)

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a measure of control will be necessary before the hour strikes. The papers are inviting it, and indeed seem to expect it. Any such control, the

form of which I shall suggest in a later chapter, will postulate a centralised control of State propaganda which is so conspicuously lacking at the moment. The one would be unthinkable without the other. The power of a controlled Press—and I believe control can be both benevolent and beneficent—is that the central authority can present a continuity of policy not only to its own people but also abroad. This we are quite powerless to do at present. The activities of bodies operating under private or Governmental auspices to do propaganda for Great Britain oversea are of little avail so long as news from British papers, vastly more sensational than that contained in the propaganda material, is being quoted on its *news value* in foreign newspapers, etc., all over the world. What use is there, for instance, in attempting to show foreign countries how prosperous our trade is, if the Governmental Press on the one hand are declaring in effect "only one and a half millions unemployed! Marvellous! A drop of 15,000 as compared with the corresponding week last year!"; and on the other the Opposition are pointing out that such a total is a disgrace to any civilised country? The resounding noise of this two-handed blow must drown the thin tapping of the propaganda keys.

On the enemy front the changes in the organisation of the Press as well as in its character have been just as sweeping, but in the opposite direction. While our newspapers have been exploiting their liberty in pursuit of circulations and advertising, the German Press has been made a part of the civil service of the Third Reich. To judge merely

from the theories that have been enunciated from time to time in oratory and prose, the rôle assigned to the Press in the National Socialist State is a noble one. It is represented as the intermediary between Government and people to which is entrusted the responsibility for upholding the morale and protecting the morals of the citizen. It is the "organ for the creation of a popular culture and the formation of a collective conscience"—as much against sex-perversion as against subversive politics. But between theory and practice there is a great gulf fixed. All information and propaganda is co-ordinated by the Ministry for National Enlightenment and Propaganda which since the establishment of the régime in 1935 has been under the very capable direction of Dr. Goebbels. This Ministry combines a much wider variety of functions than those involved merely in the supply of propaganda information. Besides supervision of the Press, broadcasting, films, music, art and the theatre, they include general information on home policy; the organisation of national holidays and festivals; tourist and economic propaganda; the organisation of art exhibitions, films and sport in foreign countries. All State and Party meetings, conferences and receptions also come within its sphere. The Ministry is both the stage-manager and the loud speaker of the Nazi régime. Under it the Press is subject to the most stringent regulations and close organisation ever achieved in any country. Journalists must be registered, and the Press Association is a statutory body under the Minister of Propaganda. Newspaper proprietorship and

shareholdings are rigorously controlled, and no joint stock company, co-operative society or public or learned body of any kind may publish a newspaper. Moreover, " redundant " newspapers in any district may be closed down. The results have been a substantial decrease in the number of papers, and also that Dr. Goebbels has implemented his declaration that " The National Press must be a piano on which the Government could play." This quotation comes from an early speech of 1933, and goes on, " Even if the Press had some point on which to censure the Government, it must be so expressed in form and tone that no opportunity be given to the Government's enemies at home and abroad to quote it and to say something they might not say without risking a veto." Since then the sense of this declaration has been crystallised to mean that no censure is permissible.

The full results of this complete control of all newspaper propaganda, with their control of all the other mediums of propaganda, gives the régime a firm grip on their people and also denies us the avenue by which our propaganda used formerly to reach and might again reach them.

Having apparently weighed the merits of control and seen that this was good, Germany has clapped this on with a completeness not approached elsewhere, although one country after another is admitting the necessity for control in varying degrees. In Japan the control is as effective as in Germany though it has been reached by quite different methods. There is no doctrine of the responsibility of the Press. Indeed Article 29

of the Japanese Constitution vaguely defines the freedom of the Press. This constitutional freedom, however, has been reduced by a long series of Press laws and police regulations. The right of censorship is exercised by the Home Office and the Ministries of War and Marine, but wide discretionary powers are delegated to the police force who frequently exercise them in an arbitrary manner. In addition there has grown up a "voluntary" censorship which inclines editors to err on the side of over-caution in their anxiety to avoid possible confiscation, fines or imprisonment or the risk of being banned as unpatriotic. Indirect or direct government control of telegraph and cable facilities makes it possible for messages to be held up altogether by the post office without the sender's knowledge. The Japanese Government have what amounts to an official state monopoly of the importation of news through the Domei Agency, with which is affiliated the semi-official Japanese Broadcasting Company. The Domei Agency, which has absorbed the other important press agencies, is little better than a disguised military propaganda organisation. Besides this control of printed news, the Government has a monopoly over cable lines and wireless. Although behind this machinery of distribution there are a number of Government departments who maintain offices responsible for forming public opinion, the recent appointment of a Commission of Information suggests that Japan is beginning to feel the need of a more co-ordinated system of propaganda machinery on a scale more nearly approaching the German. The whole position

will probably be found to have been tightened up by the provisions of the National Mobilisation Bill which has recently been passed.

According to the letter of the law the Italian Press is almost as tightly controlled as the German, notwithstanding the ambiguous Article 28 of the Fascist Party Statute that " the Press is free, but a law represses the abuses thereof." Newspapers and periodicals can only be published under the sanction of the Royal Procurator, and all proprietors and journalists must be registered, the latter having also to show proof of good moral and political standing. The censorship is of the recognised authoritarian type, and there is the same issue of daily instructions and news from the Ministry of Press and Propaganda. Recently press, or propaganda, attachés have been appointed to the more important Italian embassies and legations abroad.

In the next war the newspaper will still be resorted to by the propagandist for keeping up the morale of the civilian, who will need to be told by " eye-witnesses " of successes in the field, and soothed regarding " reverses "—never " defeat " ! —or the bombing of part of London. He will need to be reminded of his patriotic duty and to be given oft-repeated instructions of what he must do on the air-raid alert being sounded : to be regaled with jokes and cartoons against the enemy, and proofs of the gallantry of his allies, the barbarity of his foes and the invincibility of his own countrymen. The newspaper will still be the most complete vehicle of wartime propaganda of the defensive type. For offensive propaganda it is

likely, at first at any rate, to be less important. Not only have we the physical barrier of rigid control to overcome, but also the psychological obstacle which I enlarged on in the preceding chapter. The longer a war lasts, however, the more useful the enemy newspapers may become.

(IV)

Telegraphy, whether wireless or cabled, had a very important rôle in the Great War, and if since then it has been progressively pushed farther into the background of the popular imagination by more recent marvels, it is by no means a propaganda " has-been." British superiority in wireless telegraphy and our control of the transatlantic cables were an immense asset in enabling us to catch up with the better organised German propaganda. Our cable control affords an excellent example of the interdependence between propaganda and war strategy. On 5th August, 1914, the day after we had declared war, all the German deep-sea cables were cut by our navy. These strands lying on the ocean bed are difficult to locate and haul up, and we may therefore note with satisfaction that we must have been prepared for the cutting some days before ! These cables included two transatlantic ones, one of which was taken by us and led into Penzance, the other by the French and led into Brest. We did not, however, bring our captured cable into service until July, 1917, and in December of the same year it went wrong and was not again in service till the war was over. Incidentally, it was ceded to us in the peace treaty, and is to-day the better of

the two post office cables across the Atlantic! If its possession during the war years was of little propaganda use to us, it denied a very important propaganda conduit to Germany, who was forced to rely upon the wireless telegraph from Nauen to reach the outside world. Nauen's range was wide, from Persia to Mexico, and its news was relayed by other German-owned stations outside Europe, but even so the Germans were at a disadvantage as the British stations were better situated to send news to America, which was the most important neutral continent before the American countries began to come into the war on the allied side. We maintain this favourable position to the present day. No new transatlantic cables have been laid since the war either by Germany or Great Britain, and wireless developments in Germany have been paralleled in this country. Telegraphy will still be important, notably, of course, for all information sent out in code. It is not always desirable openly to broadcast even propaganda news, much less military information. In certain circumstances it is preferable to send over to a correspondent in a neutral country a frank appreciation of some aspect of the war, and to trust to him to use this at his discretion, keeping his foot on the soft pedal where necessary.

The fact remains, however, that the telegraph is a means of transmitting propaganda rather than a vehicle of propaganda like the newspaper. The same is true of the dissemination of propaganda from the air. Here the pamphlet is the vehicle of propaganda and the aeroplane or the balloon merely the mechanical means of distributing it.

Propaganda dropped from the sky is the most direct of written, as distinct from spoken, propaganda appeals. It is openly propaganda, not concerned therefore with concealment, and able to keep straight to the point, to cover one point at a time, in simple, unequivocal language. It is entirely a weapon of offensive propaganda and in view of the difficulty of attacking the enemy through his Press, will be of paramount importance in the next war. Even so, it reached formidable proportions during the Great War. In June and July, 1918, respectively, no fewer than 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 leaflets were dropped over and behind the German lines in France and Belgium. In August a daily average of 100,000 leaflets was exceeded, with a monthly total of 3,958,116 ; in September 3,715,000, October 5,360,000 and in the first ten days of November 1,400,000—a deluge of " English poison raining down from God's clear sky," to quote a German opinion. If the Armistice had not supervened, the deluge would have been immensely increased, and in one week three million leaflets designed for distribution in the interior of Germany were prepared. To quote Campbell Stuart, " These leaflets were written in simple language and aimed at letting the Germans know the truth which was being concealed from them by their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in all theatres and showed at a glance, by means of shaded maps, the territory gained by the Associated Nations. Great stress was laid upon the large number of troops arriving daily from the U.S.A. . . . German losses and the consequent futility of making further sacrifices

in a losing cause were strongly emphasised." At that time our military and economic pressure had begun to have positive effect. The moment was ripe. There was an abundance of lines of appeal for our propagandists to select from and press on the enemy, who was already wilting and dispirited. "The soldier," Hindenburg testifies of the German fighting man, "thought the propaganda could not be all enemy lies, allowed it to poison his mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of others." Far from being all lies, it was almost all truth, which was why it was so effective. In 1918 the problem was not in finding subjects for propaganda leaflets but in their conveyance and safe discharge over or behind the enemy lines. The obvious method was, of course, by aeroplane, but this had been so successfully exploited by the military propagandists on whose work Northcliffe built that the Germans took fright. Forthwith they announced their intention of inflicting severe penalties on British pilots captured on propaganda flights, and promptly carried their threat into action against two of our airmen prisoners. For some reason difficult to understand, we did not retaliate or institute reprisals, but discontinued the use of the aeroplane for propaganda! Northcliffe protested on several occasions and eventually received the reply that "the British authorities were disputing the German contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of war." . . . A month later Lord Northcliffe again wrote . . . but many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes and even then

the Air Ministry raised further objection. It was not until a fortnight before the armistice that we again used aeroplanes, although the Germans had used them intermittently and the French throughout! The result of this curious self-denying ordinance was that at the peak of propaganda activity all the distribution had to be done by the propaganda balloon. After many trials and vicissitudes a satisfactory type was evolved, made of paper, about 20 feet in circumference and over 8 feet in height, and of a capacity of 90 to 100 cubic feet. The standard load for a balloon was fixed at a few ounces over 4 lb. allowing for the carriage of 500 to 1,000 leaflets according to their size. Release was contrived by a lighted fuse timed to burn for so many minutes according to the speed of the wind and the distance to the desired point of discharge of the pamphlets. The method worked very efficiently but it was, of course, entirely dependent upon the vagaries of the wind, though even the direction of the wind was whenever possible turned to account. If it was a south-wester blowing towards Belgium, the balloons were loaded with propaganda designed for the populations in the occupied areas; if a north or north-wester, then with pamphlets for German soldiers or civilians.

It is difficult to imagine the same sort of situation being reached in the next war. Propaganda having now been recognised by the dictator States as essential for peace, they will not denounce it as contrary to the rules of war. Indeed they will be too busy using it themselves! The greatly increased range and performance of aircraft will

mean that no town in Central Europe, or for the matter of that in the British Isles, will be outside the reach of air-borne propaganda. Japan is much less vulnerable, but can easily be reached from the far Asiatic mainland. I can envisage propaganda air squadrons being sent off from China or from the territory of those potential but very doubtful allies, the Russians.

In any event, if the war should drag on any front, there will be less need of such fickle carriers as paper balloons. The Spanish civil war has seen the development of a rocket device which is said already to have reached a distance of 1½ miles, each projectile scattering 1,000 pamphlets. There seems no reason why the range should not be capable of being increased to over double or even treble the present distance, though the device seems only suitable for propaganda among the enemy's front line fighting forces. It will be seldom that substantial concentrations of the civilian population will be found so close to the firing-line in position warfare.

(v)

It is superfluous to stress the value of the cinema as a propaganda medium. It has abundantly proved this for a wide variety of purposes in time of peace, and I have already said that the U.S.-made film represents one of the greatest undirected or spontaneous propaganda forces the world has ever seen. But the cinema has its definite limitations. First, a film takes time to make. A distinction must here be noted between the one-reel news picture, taking 10 minutes to show, and

the longer programme picture, involving the employment of actors and scenery and having to be made in a properly equipped studio. The former is cheap and quick to make, is not dependent on studio facilities and can be shown either in a theatre or from a travelling van. The latter is a very costly form of propaganda. An ordinary film which takes from one hour to an hour and a half to run through might possibly in an emergency be rushed through in a fortnight, but the normal time is three to six months or even much longer, depending on the nature of the scenario, the efficiency of the studio organisation and the other work in hand. As most propaganda must be fresh and up to date, cinema propaganda tends to lag distressingly behind.

Secondly, it is an axiom of film propaganda that it is far easier to make a propaganda picture than to find audiences for it. An important psychological consideration enters here. The public is accustomed to regard the cinema as a stock form of popular entertainment, and so long as they go to the pictures to be thrilled or harrowed or amused they are likely unconsciously to imbibe a great deal of propaganda in the process. This is why the Hollywood film has been such a propaganda force. Its propaganda has been accidental, certainly incidental to the entertainment, and effective because it has neither been intentional nor forced. The difficulty about the picture deliberately produced for a propaganda purpose is two-fold. First, if it is to be shown in the ordinary way in a cinematograph theatre, it must conform to the accepted standards of commercial entertain-

ment pictures. It must be as well directed, as efficiently photographed, tell as good a story—in short it must not fall below the level of the general "box-office" appeal. It must, of course, be a talking picture, for to British audiences at any rate the old silent film is as dead as a magic-lantern slide. Above all it must not be obvious propaganda. The problem is how to gild the propaganda pill to ensure that it is swallowed, but not so that the coating masks the moral that it is designed to convey. Secondly, if the decision is to produce an openly propagandist picture then the public will not readily pay to see it ; nor, if they do, will they necessarily be in the right frame of mind to assimilate its message. The alternative therefore is to hire a cinema theatre or a hall of some sort and beat up an audience. This method has the disadvantage that the audience comes forewarned as it were, and may tend unconsciously to resist the propaganda put over—apart altogether from the likelihood that rigging up the reproduction apparatus in a room not equipped for the purpose may result in poor projection of sound and image, with the result that people will go away disgruntled, which is the last thing the propagandist wishes to happen. Results will naturally depend upon the sophistication of the particular public concerned. A British audience drawn in the majority from people to whom the talking film is no longer a novelty or even a luxury, but a weekly or bi-weekly necessity, will naturally be far less susceptible to screen propaganda, because they will be more critical of the technical failures of the picture than audiences drawn, say, from the peasant

populations of Continental countries, including Germany. These are some of the cinema's limitations of a general character, and in wartime many of them are intensified.

In offensive propaganda there is the question of the time-lag and the language trouble. Far more important is the problem of distribution. Regular machinery exists in normal times for renting, *i.e.*, distributing films to the cinemas, but this will assuredly be under State control in time of war. Granted that it may be possible to smuggle a negative of a film into an enemy country and even to have it shown publicly, what would be the profit ? One film can only be shown for a short time and in one place at a time ; if it is a topical " short," its life will be still shorter.

In the field of defensive propaganda or towards neutrals and allies, the film will be found to have a wider range of uses. It will be invaluable for the home public who, if the war spirit has been effectively kindled, will be less prone to be critical of open propaganda and more avid of entertainment, consequently less suspicious of propaganda disguised in it. The civilian will not only be stimulated and soothed according to circumstances by news-reels and fiction pictures, but will be given instruction in air raid precautions work, the adjustment and care of gas masks, for example. Over and above all this, the cinema has an important function to perform in war as pure entertainment, to distract the minds of the public. We owe a debt of gratitude to the American-made film for the part it played in the Great War. In the dim, far-off days before 1914 we made a

large percentage of the films shown in our cinemas, or imported them from the Continent. This supply soon dried up owing to sterner work being found for the producing personnel. A gap was left in a form of entertainment which was already popular, a gap which the U.S.A. proceeded to fill most effectively. During the war the importance for the public to be distracted and to relax in theatre or cinema is increased by the antithesis—that there shall be as little interference with or curtailment of normal forms of entertainment, which they have come to expect and to rely upon. Against this there will be the danger, from the point of view of air raid precautions, in people being crowded in places of amusement. The one consideration will have to be balanced against the other, but whatever the decision it will not affect the value of the film as a distracter as distinct from a propaganda force.

The value of the cinema in propaganda directed towards allied and neutral countries is potentially very great. It may for instance be used subtly to stir up trouble between two neutrals whose attitudes are uncertain, with the object of preventing either or both of them from siding with the main enemy; for which purpose indeed the Germans actually made an entertainment film in America in 1916. Its real sphere, however, is to give convincing proof of a combatant's sufferings at the hands of the enemy, or of his war effort and his resources in men, material and morale. It is not difficult to imagine what telling propaganda in countries ill-disposed towards Germany might be obtained from well-taken news-reels with clever

commentaries, showing the death and destruction resulting from an air raid on London, and the corollary of how stolidly—we will hope—the Londoners took it all. We have only to remember the damning anti-Japanese propaganda of the *Panay* film.

On the other hand the use of the film to show one nation's war effort or resources to another will undoubtedly need to be more carefully thought out and handled with more imagination than was the case during the Great War. Much valuable informative propaganda was certainly done by war films, especially directed towards allies like Italy and Russia, and to neutral countries. The effect, however, was not always quite what had been intended. Colonel A. C. Bromhead, who had charge of much of our wartime film propaganda, has some entertaining stories to tell of the unexpected reactions to our films from audiences too uneducated or uninformed to grasp their significance. To Russia, for instance, we sent excellent pictures showing our great battleships and lithe destroyers, monitors and sloops, keeping watch and ward in the grey North Sea or in the Channel: combating submarines in the blue waters of the Mediterranean or chasing enemy raiders to destruction in the tropic seas. It was propaganda well calculated to fire those who knew the sea and Britain's naval traditions with enthusiasm and confidence, but unfortunately the majority of Russians to whom the films were shown had never seen the sea and never heard of a destroyer, much less knew our naval record. To

say that the pictures did not impress them would be quite inaccurate. Among the more ignorant troops they caused something like consternation, and most of the audience found the pictures difficult and many of them impossible to grasp at all. Worse still, some had the entirely wrong effect. An instance, again with Russia, is pithily given in the evidence of the American Colonel Robins before a Senatorial committee. " Pictures and written words show how great France is, how tremendous England is, how overwhelming America is. ' We will have 20,000 airplanes on the front in a few weeks. In a few months we will have 4,000,000 soldiers. We will win the war in a walk.' The peasant moujik said : ' Oh, is that so ? Well, if the Allies are going to win the war in a walk, we who have been fighting and working a long time will go back and see the folks at home ! ' " The real effect of Allied propaganda was thus to create an unjustified optimism, which encouraged the propagandee to " mark time " and defer instead of redoubling his efforts.

Since 1918 the cinema has developed so rapidly and largely that it is unlikely that audiences in any country will be as naïve as they were then. The danger may well be that they will be too sophisticated to react to obvious propaganda pictures, and it is not improbable that one film designed for general propaganda circulation in many countries will be useless. In the existing state of film education each country or set of countries, grouped according to the sophistication of their nationals, may demand special consideration, that is specially produced films, which will

be a very expensive and possibly unpractical method of approach.

Besides these topical and news films which are open propaganda, there will be a place for entertainment films showing the villains' parts played by obvious "enemy" characters, or with some subtler propaganda moral. We might for example make pictures of the "Dr. Clubfoot" type, with the sinister German arch-spy brought up to date. Germany or Italy would presumably reverse the rôles, their heroes being Nazi storm-troopers or Fascist corporals and the villains British capitalists or naval officers. The possession of an active film-producing industry will be a very definite national asset in the next war, in which respect, though we shall be better off than twenty years ago, we shall be none too happy. The U.S.A. will still supply the world. Not only is she far and away the greatest producer, but, much more important still, she largely controls the machinery of world film distribution. Whatever degree of anti-British feeling may flourish there, the fact remains that on balance the English type is more generally favourably depicted than the German. The deep-rooted American antipathy towards the dictator states may be trusted to influence the producers of entertainment films to play up to their audiences' sympathies and portray the nationals of these countries in unfavourable lights.

Distribution is as important as production. If distribution is unreliable, the best production may be wasted. Worse, if distribution happens to be with persons ill-disposed towards the point of view expressed in the production, they can turn

the propaganda against its makers. With the silent film it was easy to re-cut and alter the captions. With the talking or sound picture it is less easy to interfere with the sound when this is recorded on the film itself, but child's play if, as is usual with the topical or news picture, the commentary is supplied by a synchronised record. All that is necessary is to substitute a new record which will alter the emphasis and distort the facts, and what was pro-British propaganda becomes effectively anti-British. This sort of thing actually happened during the Great War. Admiral Brownrigg relates how after much pressure the " Silent Navy " was prevailed upon to feature in a silent film of its activities which was issued under the title of " Britain Prepared." Its distribution in the U.S.A., Brownrigg somewhat ruefully admits, " fell into the hands of persons other than those who were solely imbued with pro-Ally sentiments," because it was put out with the name changed to " *How* Britain Prepared," and its message changed ! " The Germans," to quote Brownrigg, " used it as propaganda against *us* ! "

(VI)

The new engine which has changed the whole volume and tempo of propaganda is the wireless, or more conveniently, the radio. During the Great War it was a laboratory embryo, and for three or four years afterwards the plaything of the scientifically-minded experimenter. The voice of the B.B.C. when it was set up in 1923 was no more than a thin treble which quavered over the ether, to be caught and held by a crystal set and a " cat's-

whisker." Thereafter the invention advanced by leaps and bounds, its own naturally rapid momentum quickened by the desire of governments and parties to bend it to their uses. Almost at once it became the medium *par excellence* for the demagogue. Though the papers might be filled with co-ordinated propaganda, and the cinemas exhale the same fragrance, the radio enabled the " spellbinder " to work directly upon the crowds, to play upon their enthusiasms and hates by tone and modulations as well as by words and rhetoric. It enables him moreover to reach a nation of 60 millions with little more preparation than an audience of 6,000. The microphone, it has been said, made the dictators—a generalisation which has only an element of truth—and it also did much to help strengthen the place of the British Monarchy in the hearts of our peoples and even of foreigners, who listened as intently to King George V's broadcasts as those in Great Britain and the Empire. The main achievements of radio must be sufficiently obvious to need no further enlargement here. Its use in peace-time propaganda can be noted daily and throughout the day; whether for undirected and accidental propaganda—the " plugging " of a popular song or a scene from a successful musical comedy; or for direct commercial propaganda, as from Luxembourg and Normandy; or open political or sociological propaganda, as in the talks by Cabinet Ministers, doctors or educationists. Those who are keen or expert enough can pick up the propaganda which the totalitarian States—particularly Russia, Germany and Italy—unceasingly address

to the world: propaganda for revolution, any revolution so long as it is a revolution, or for colonies and German culture, or for the soul of Islam and the future of Fascist Italy as a colonising State. Special stations exist in foreign countries with the sole purpose of blaring forth propaganda day and night, some of it open, most of it concealed, and often very cleverly presented. There is no doubt about the methods or potentialities of radio in peace-time propaganda. The exact part it will play in the next war does not stand out so clearly. Quite obviously each combatant will rush to make every possible use he can of it, but how is this all going to work out? It should be understood that there are three types of wave-lengths, suggesting different propaganda possibilities. There is the short wave or beam wireless which is the long-distance affair. It requires to be aimed in the direction of the country it is desired to reach, but can, of course, be picked up by others on either side of this direction line. Thus if an English short wave station were pointed towards North Africa it would certainly be heard in Malta and probably picked up in India as well. Our great short wave station is Daventry, the most powerful, with Moscow, in the world. It could indeed cover the world. It has three different transmitters working on three different wave-lengths, designed to meet different sets of conditions during listening periods. The direction is altered to coincide with times of listening.

The long wave is definitely much weaker. It is primarily intended for home use, though a station like Droitwich could be heard all over Europe

more or less, even as far as East Germany. Lastly, there is the medium wave which is entirely for home use. For example, London National can hardly be heard outside the Metropolitan area. London Regional on the other hand is stronger and could be picked up in the northerly parts of France and Belgium when conditions were favourable. The short and long waves therefore are likely to be useful in offensive propaganda, and the long and medium waves in defensive propaganda. The most useful overseas will be the short wave on account of its range and the difficulty of jamming it effectively.

Radio propaganda will be divisible into the same main spheres as any other—to attack the enemy, to attach the goodwill of friends and to support the home public. In one sense it is a remarkably easy form of propaganda, because it is so direct and yet needs such little organisation. All that is necessary is a transmitting station of sufficient power and enough propaganda messages based on a constructive policy to fling into the air. These messages will normally reach the propagandee in his own home, at his leisure before his fire, maybe, but in any case at a time when he can take in what he hears. Against these advantages must be weighed first the fact that the propagandee must possess a wireless set on which he can and is willing to pick up the message ; and secondly that radio propaganda must usually be obvious, that is to say it is difficult to conceal its origin. These disadvantages will operate particularly in the sphere of offensive propaganda. A country which has so thoroughly barricaded its citizens as Germany

will naturally not have left any very obvious loop-hole by which radio propaganda can enter. It is estimated that there are in Germany some 6 million wireless sets, but even in peace-time the use of these is restricted to the owner and his family. He cannot, if he should wish, tune in to London or Moscow and ask his friends in to hear the sweet voice of propaganda. In war there is little doubt that these restrictions will be intensified, including possibly the confiscation of any set powerful enough to take a foreign station. This restriction indeed already exists in Japan, where the standard sets are designed only to take Japanese stations. Japan is as close a preserve for wireless as Germany is for newspapers, but in any event, she could only easily be reached from the Asiatic continent or the U.S.A., and it is the regrettable fact that reliable transmitting stations do not exist in China, and Japanese restrictions will be an effective bar to U.S. propaganda on any large scale.

Even if the propagandee is disposed to tune in to our propaganda, it appears likely then that he will only be able to hear it occasionally, with difficulty and at great personal risk, for there is no doubt that such listening-in will be made a treasonable offence involving the death penalty as much as the publishing of treasonable articles is in Germany already. Further, as I have tried to show, there seems no evidence that our potential enemies will wish in the early days of a war to listen to our radio, except to jeer at it.

There will certainly be opportunities for radio messages to be put across before their source of

origin is detected. It is a comparatively easy matter to alter the wave-length of a transmitter, so that it would for example be possible for an English station, powerful enough to be heard in Germany, to change to a popular German wave-length when there was any important piece of news to report, and send the message over as if coming from the German station. Care would have to be taken to select the time when the German transmitter was not working and yet when the public were able or likely to be listening, and the deception would speedily be found out, but probably not before a few propaganda barbs had been planted. Imagine how disquieting it would have been if in the later stages of the battle of Passchendaele in 1917 a German station had sneaked into English homes the real character of our progress and our casualties ! Just a few hard facts and figures would be enough.

There are two more ways of restricting radio propaganda—by jamming the reception or by destroying the transmitter. As regards the former, I have not met anyone, even the experts, who could give a definite account of how jamming would work out. Germany would naturally wish to make assurance doubly sure and make reception from enemy stations impossible. Great Britain and France would be doing the same to German stations. Simultaneously each combatant nation would be shooting out an immense spout of propaganda designed to influence the world, much of which the opposite side would be trying to stop reaching its objective. If all stations, long wave and short wave, were, as is possible, kept on over-

time and at full blast, and the efforts of both sides were also directed to jamming, the result would be Bedlam, the ether a whirling discord of disconnected discourses and tunes, interrupted by whistles, hoots and crackles. It is fairly certain that in their attempts to suppress each other's broadcasts the combatants would impair the efficiency of their own, so that it appears that there is a possibility that jamming will only be of a selective character. Germany might, for example, concentrate on stopping the reception of our short wave broadcasts from Daventry, which would often be designed to reach the German people, and ignore those from Droitwich, which, they would argue, would be less likely to be framed for offensive propaganda.

The other method which will undoubtedly be attempted is the aerial attack on the transmitting station. This is a very serious danger because the radio has a more important rôle to play in defensive propaganda, and the destruction of a big transmitting station would have the result not only probably of stopping a source of offensive propaganda but also of defensive propaganda and, as in the case of the cinema, of normal popular entertainment. Better than any other medium the radio is suited to the task of instructing and directing the civilian population during air raids. The transmitting stations will be the nerve centres of the air raid organisation as well as sources of propaganda. They will therefore be certainly marked down for air attack, and the unfortunate thing is that while a station is working it invites attack with open arms, for every transmitter is a

beacon for air pilots. Suppose, for example, a pilot is lost in the air somewhere over the Channel; he wirelesses Croydon, then circles round till his direction-finding instruments pick up the Croydon wave-length. As soon as the reply comes loudly he knows he is pointing in the direction of Croydon and steers straight for it, by keeping in tune with the wave-length. The same thing, of course, will happen to the enemy air pilot. He has, roughly speaking, only to tune his plane in to one of our active transmitting stations and he will fly right at it. The terrible thing is accordingly that the transmitting station not only invites its own destruction but will be a sure finger-post to areas, either thickly populated or containing munition works, which the enemy seeks to bomb. The possibility can be envisaged where a fleet of pilotless enemy planes, wirelessly controlled by one plane carrying pilot and observers, will be sent into the air to raid a strategic point, near which is an active transmitting station. When the pilot, flying probably 5 to 10,000 feet above the other machines, has fixed his exact bearings with reference to the wave-length of the transmitter, he releases his bombs. Such a raid might cause enormous damage with minute loss to the enemy, and I put the point to show that it will not be unlikely, in the interests of national safety, that most of our transmitting stations will be forced to shut down in a future war, except for limited periods. Such a silence of regular sources of news and entertainment could not fail to have a demoralising effect, so that naturally the authorities would do everything in their power to

keep one station working both to broadcast a popular programme and to warn the public of the approach of air raiders. This station would probably be Droitwich, both on account of its power and the fact that it is situated geographically in the centre of England and near no well-defined landmarks.

Defensively we are very poorly placed as regards radio propaganda. There are no fewer than eight million licence holders for radio in the United Kingdom on whom there are no restrictions whatsoever. These eight million people, numbering with their families, say thirty-two million, can tune in at any time to any foreign station which their receiving sets can reach. They are free to absorb any enemy propaganda they wish, subject, of course, to any suppressive measures, like jamming or destruction of transmitters, that we may decide upon. For their regular news and amusement these thirty-two millions are dependent upon ten stations, all of them within range of enemy aeroplanes and almost all of them located in centres which the enemy will seek to bomb. They may therefore, with the exception of Droitwich, have to close down. John Citizen, uneasy at finding himself sought by the enemy in his own home, will miss the sedative for his nerves of the usual programmes, and also the warning that the raiders are on their way. He may perhaps get a general warning from Droitwich, but no detailed local instruction, which could only be sent out from the local transmitter. This is the critical link in the machinery of radio propaganda. In the event of the silencing of our transmitters by the enemy or their closing down by

our own authorities, what alternative means are available to the Government for warning the public of air attack or, if possible, of keeping them entertained ? The answer to this is the system of relayed radio or rediffusion, which was making such rapid headway in England until recently. Briefly, wired rediffusion or relayed radio consists in taking the ordinary broadcast and relaying it over wires into the home of the subscriber, who has no need therefore of a receiving set, which he must pay for and keep in order, but only a loud-speaker. At the moment these wires have to be specially laid for the purpose, but developments now in hand are likely to make possible the use of existing electric light wires. The disadvantage of the system is that the listener-in is deprived of the satisfaction of " twiddling the knobs," so that rediffusion may not recommend itself to the beginner who likes to travel round the circuit of his set in search of foreign programmes, usually inferior to those of the B.B.C. The normal rediffusion practice is to offer one alternative programme, that is, the subscriber has the choice of two, but no more. It usually happens that the sophisticated listener is satisfied with this, especially as the programme comes to him with a constant efficiency factor and without any more trouble on his part than turning the switch.

The value of this system in defensive radio propaganda can easily be appreciated. It is almost invulnerable. In the first place, it does away with the dangerous necessity of throwing wireless into the ether from transmitting stations, which are a landmark for aeroplanes by day and a beckoning

beacon to them at all times. The programme or the news is transmitted from the studio over lines laid to sub-stations. These are in normal times mere "boosting" stations to hit up the power that inevitably is lost over the wires, and to relay the programme over the individual wires to subscribers. There may be any number of these "boosting" stations in a given area, each of which is convertible in time of war into an initiating station for the use of air raid wardens or other of the defence authorities. It is a decentralised as opposed to a centralised system, capable indeed of almost infinite decentralisation to meet the needs of the defence situation. Thus it would be possible, though hardly practicable, for each sub-station to be turned in an emergency into an initiation station for relaying gramophone records. The point is that this diffusion of nerve centres would enable the central authorities to feel much easier with regard to the maintenance of internal communications than they can do at the present. If one sub-station were hit, only a comparatively few householders would be cut off. If a transmitting station were hit, or equally if it had to close down, whole areas would immediately be out of touch. Newcastle, for example, is an area heavily wired for rediffusion. At Stagshaw, ten miles from the city, there is a B.B.C. regional transmitter which serves the Tyne valley but whose range is so limited that it can hardly be heard even as close as Darlington. In the event of war Stagshaw would be the perfect director for hostile aircraft, and the Tyne being such a vital area, it is virtually certain that it would be shut

down at once. Newcastle would then probably be served from Droitwich, but this station would only be capable of sending out general news. It could not give any information likely to help in an air raid on the shipbuilding yards of Tyneside. On the other hand, if Newcastle were fully wired, Stagshaw could continue working over the wires. In addition there would be thirty or more sub-stations, each of which would be a handy call-box from which the local air raid wardens could send out instructions or orders to householders in the vicinity. This is only a picture in general terms, avoiding technicalities, but it may indicate the merits of rediffusion as against wireless radio. These are indeed fully recognised in informed circles, but the Government, with characteristic indecision, has wavered. It has neither blessed nor damned rediffusion, but by indecision has in effect stopped its extension, as I shall show later.

Radio therefore is the greatest *direct* propaganda medium, from the mouth of the leader to the ear of the led, but it is to some extent an unknown quantity. That it will be used to the limit is certain. Equally is it certain that its use in a period of war will show up limitations and disadvantages which can at present only be descried vaguely.

(VII)

The last method of propaganda is the most effective, that is personal propaganda put about by word of mouth. All other methods of the propagandist come down at last to this. Their aim and object is to get the propagandee to think and consequently to talk about the moral raised in their

propaganda. The propagandist can, however, short-circuit the machine or the vehicle and make his propaganda personally by direct contact and word of mouth. I may here without apology quote the judgment of Professor Lasswell on British propaganda to bring the U.S.A. into the Great War. "The chief emphasis . . . is upon the use of persons as channels of influence. Influence spread from business man to business man, from journalist to journalist, from professor to professor, from worker to worker. Behind the scenes, and behind the news and pictures and speeches, there flows a mighty stream of personal influencing. The war was more debated in private than in public. . . . A sidelight on the method is contained in a letter from Sir Edward Grey to Theodore Roosevelt, dated 10th October, 1914.

> "MY DEAR ROOSEVELT,
>
> J. M. Barrie and A. E. W. Mason, some of whose books you have no doubt read, are going to the U.S. Their object is, as I understand, not to make speeches or give lectures but to meet people, particularly those connected with the Universities, and explain the British case as regards this war and our view of the issues involved."

"When a lance was broken in public for the British cause it was done by an American and not by a foreigner. There were no obnoxiously evident Britishers as there were Dernburgs in America. It was the social lobby, the personal conversation and the casual brush which forged the strongest chain between America and Britain." This evidence is valuable because it is from an American, and the success of our personal methods may well be contrasted with the failure of the more

energetic but less subtle methods of von Papen or those which von Rintelen described in *The Dark Invader*. I fancy that at this sort of tea-time, dinner-table, smoking-room propaganda we shall always be well ahead of our potential opponents. The trouble about it is that it is only utilisable with neutral countries and with allies, highly important in themselves though both these spheres admittedly are.

CHAPTER IV

ENEMIES, NEUTRALS AND ALLIES

(1)

It should now be possible, it is hoped, to see fairly clearly what amount of offensive propaganda will be practicable in the next war and the methods by which it is to be pressed. At the same time it will, for obvious reasons, not be desirable to enquire too closely into the subject, especially so far as it concerns action towards the enemy.

It has been seen that Germany, to a lesser degree Italy, and in a different manner Japan, will constitute difficult problems for the offensively-minded propagandist. Directing our thoughts on Germany, we should remark that whereas in 1914 the All-Highest was enthusiastically supported by the majority of Germans, the régime rested on the basis of a governing caste. On a conservative estimate there must have been from 30–45 per cent. of German opinion opposed politically to the Imperial system and lukewarm or antipathetic to its interests. These radical and socialist elements were powerful, well-organised and owned their own Press. After the first flush of racial patriotism cooled, but before war-weariness had set in, they represented a potentially-receptive atmosphere for liberal propaganda. When the blockade and military pressure became acute, they were readily influenced by our propaganda to become agents of disaffection or peace. We had therefore an

audience to appeal to in the enemy's country. We had also the message to which this audience were by nature or conviction sympathetic—the message of liberty, freedom and equality. There were still parliamentary forms of government in Germany and Austria, based vaguely on our own Westminster model. The radical elements in the two countries had faith in these and believed that the machine could be captured by electoral methods and used to carry out the reforms in which they were interested. The gospel of our propagandists was their gospel. Thirdly, we had the means to reach them through their papers and our pamphlets. The former were naturally subject to war-time censorship, but they were not then bolted and barred against every item of copy that had not been scrutinised and approved by Government propaganda experts trained to detect the faintest suspicion of anti-national propaganda. Substantial was the volume of such propaganda which these papers reproduced, lifted largely from their contemporaries in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark and Scandinavia. Regular news services were supplied by our propagandists to these countries in the certainty that much of them would be copied into the German Press. Then the trench lines ran close together from the sand dunes of Dunkerque to the Alps. Pamphlets were shot over by mortars and grenades to the fighting troops and dropped in millions over the back areas and in Germany. In all this propaganda we had, moreover, very much our own way. We could concentrate on the work in hand in the absence of any concerted German counter-propaganda.

Next time the conditions will be very different. The basis on which the German régime rests has been made much broader. It is now a popular as opposed to a caste régime, and it will have, in the early days, at any rate, the support of the bulk of the German masses, as well as a large percentage of the classes. There will be the antipathetic minority, but this will be much more closely watched and controlled, and moreover will not be inherently susceptible to the old democratic slogans. It will tend naturally to connect these with the dark days of inflation, Spartacist and Communist risings, the occupations by French and African troops, the days of hatreds, humiliations and starvation, and the connection of ideas will have been cleverly fostered by energetic and all-pervading propaganda. Not only will the old slogans be unacceptable, but it will be much more difficult to present them. There will be no papers to rely upon other than those pursuing an effective anti-democratic policy by advancing the concrete gospel of National Socialism. There will, in addition, be less opportunity for the organisation of pamphlet campaigns ; that is, unless a German-French fighting front is again stabilised along the Maginot line, for example. Finally the enemy will not be supine as in the Great War, but engaged actively and efficiently in developing a propaganda offensive against us.

Where, then, are we to look for the weak chinks in his totalitarian armour ? Where, for the matter of that, are we to find a propaganda blade " fit for the deed we have to do " ? The problem as I see it lies not so much in the strength of the

enemy's position as in our difficulty of selecting a constructive line of policy which we can adhere to and which will make any effective appeal to people brought up on totalitarian propaganda. There are some lines which we can rule out from the beginning. We cannot propose a vote of no-confidence in the régime, nor hope to benefit from abuse of Hitler. We cannot advance a propaganda of material well-being. The Germans have been taught that we live in luxury and slothfulness, but that we are soullessly selfish, and that we will see to it that no one else gets a share of our comforts if we can prevent it. We cannot promise the benefits of democratic freedom. The German has too much experience of this or what he thinks it implies, and has risen to that fly once already. We cannot promise territorial rewards. After all, it will be argued, England has had chances innumerable of making some arrangement about colonies, which she would not take. " Now," the enemy propagandist may declare, " Germany is going to force her to disgorge or perish in the attempt."

As with Germany, so with Italy and Japan. None of the old-time rallying-cries of " Liberty " or " Democracy," or some association of free peoples, are calculated to have any influence. While the totalitarian States are fresh and confident, I cannot see any constructive line of propaganda policy that is open to us to pursue against them, and there is no justification for the assumption that they will tire any more quickly than states less organised for war. This need not dismay us, however. Offensive propaganda does not begin to

be effective until the atmosphere is receptive ; in the Great War nearly four years had passed before this condition was reached. It is on this account that I began by saying that it is reasonable to argue that the next war will not favour the development of propaganda directly against the enemy, but as I have stressed throughout, if it should develop into a war of attrition, propaganda will come into its own again. Some constructive idea would then almost certainly be thrown up, and we shall have men clever enough, I hope, to seize on this and exploit it. Unless the war spreads and involves all Europe, and we again attempt to engage in it on the Continent, there will be no points at which Great Britain and Germany will touch. Our frontiers may be the Rhine and theirs the Thames Estuary, but these will only be maintained in the air, if at all. Therefore air-borne propaganda, whether by aeroplane or radio, looks to be the only obvious means of approaching each other at first.

If there is one direction in which we may look with a reasonable hope of results for the creation of a favourable atmosphere, it is to the rigidity of the German propaganda control. We may well take a hint from jiu-jitsu, and see how far we may use the enemy's strength against him. I cannot believe that a healthy and virile people, however conscientious they are in acquiescing in control in the national interest, can feel happy when this control is arbitrarily extended to cover the most trivial items of general interest. There is evidence that good Germans, educated men and many of them loyal members of " the Party," already rely upon

English and foreign newspapers to keep abreast of general non-political developments. The German has a veneration for knowledge. He elevates erudition on a high altar, and is concerned at all times to appear well informed. It is not merely that he is genuinely fond of learning : he senses also that he is the *parvenu* in European civilisation. How often have I not had Germans apologise to me that in political development their country was 200 years behind our own, arguing that this was why we found it so difficult to understand their methods ! It is a manifestation of an inferiority complex that impels the barbarian, conscious of his skins and his cave drawings, to cry down the silks and oil paintings of civilisation as evidence of decadence, the while he furtively but energetically sets about copying them to the best of his ability. This is no very inaccurate description of the German attitude, with the addition that the German leaders from Nietzsche to Ludendorff and Stuermer have tried to make a virtue out of this barbarian inferiority and to raise the idol of the " blond beast " and of " blood and iron." I suggest, therefore, that this sense of inferiority may be played upon and that our propaganda should stress to the Germans their ignorance. There must be no blame laid on their leaders. On the contrary, these must be extolled for their ability in difficult circumstances, the implication being that they, too, are ignorant of what the world is thinking. Excellent fellows, no doubt, but blind leaders of the blind. Once an uneasiness about comparatively small facts that have been kept from them is planted in the minds of thinking Germans,

something important will have been accomplished. In the circumstances, even this much will be difficult, but not impossible. Although German preparedness is avowedly based on the need to defend the Fatherland, the theory that is implied in all the rearming and mass-mobilisation is surely one of attack. Germany is taking over the French doctrine of *élan*, "*l'audace, toujours l'audace,*" and basing her hopes and her organisation on a swift, overwhelming onrush. She has, I think, in her home propaganda, not directly but by implication, lifted the eyes of her people away from the old, humiliating pictures of defence against encircling enemies to the newer visions of all Germans united to assert themselves against those who deny them their rights. It should therefore be psychologically correct to see how this new-found, though as yet untried, confidence can be struck the most telling blow. This seems to me to lie in the organisation, immediately on the outbreak of war, of large-scale air attacks on the German industrial centres in which not only bombs but pamphlets would be dropped pointing out that poor Fritz was probably so ill-informed that he did not know that British 'planes could reach German cities as easily as the converse—and that they would do so. The keynote all through would be obliquely the suppression of information in Germany, coupled with direct revelations, which the propagandee might verify, based on the course of operations. By this method propaganda would be combined with offensive military action, which I believe would be psychologically right.

The same text would be discoursed upon in all

our radio broadcasts directed to neutral countries in the hope that they would be picked up in Germany. We should inform the Dutch, the Swiss and others how amazing it was that even the more ordinary occurrences were withheld from the German. From time to time there would be opportunist sniping of detailed news, such as casualties, over German wave-lengths, and disguised interpolations when a German station was silent during an interval. The latter might be made very effective on the same theme. An even more directly hopeful field to exploit would be the enemy nationals domiciled in foreign countries. There are large concentrations of Germans, Italians and Japanese in South America, notably in Brazil, in the U.S.A. and elsewhere, and it will be the duty of our propagandists to see that a steady stream of information is directed at these and that facilities are tacitly accorded to them to relay the gist of this in their letters home to their countryfolk behind the bars of totalitarian suppression. Sympathetically worked upon, these extra-mural enemy nationals will be the most convincing witnesses to the truth, so many stones dropped into the propaganda pond whose ripples may be readily enlarged upon. Simultaneously every effort would be made to reach disaffected intellectuals and others by having news or pamphlets posted to them inside Germany, though this would be much more difficult than previously, especially in the early stages of a war.

Japan seems to be quite as difficult to attack directly by propaganda, but her Achilles' heel as I have suggested, may well be found in the

countries she has annexed. It should be a first duty to attempt by propaganda to foment sedition in Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and such parts of China proper as she may by then have taken under her control, so that as large a part of her energies as possible are dissipated in dealing with insurrection and revolt. While it seems tolerably certain that there will be plenty of lines of appeal, including some concrete idea of delivery from oppression, calculated to appeal to peoples subjected to a tyranny as harsh as the Japanese, the problem will be how to reach them. Newspapers will be a slender hope : they will only circulate among the educated handful, and their activities and contents will be subject to the most rigorous censorship. The wireless will be relatively useless in regions too far distant from potential transmitting stations and where a receiving set is a conspicuous rarity. The same applies to the cinema. There will be picture theatres in the great cities, but these will be under strict military control. There remain the aeroplane-and-pamphlet and the word-of-mouth methods of propaganda, and both these will be used to the limit. It is difficult to imagine Japan being engaged in a major war which did not also involve Russia, a fact which would immensely facilitate the development of anti-Japanese propaganda throughout the countries of the Far Eastern mainland, though there would be reactions against Russian-made propaganda among sections where anti-Communist views were in the ascendant.

Italy, as I have said, is a more hopeful problem. Both owing to the liberal leaven and to the

existence of a traditional feeling of friendship for Great Britain, there is a chance of making propaganda directly at the Italian peoples. The former will, unless the existing restrictions are greatly tightened up on the advent of war, afford ways and means for the entry of propaganda into Italy ; the latter might constitute a valuable basis for our propaganda, especially, if and when the time should come, against the Duce. It should only be necessary for his speeded-up time-table of war plans to miscarry, for the Italians to learn of reverses as aerial and naval war was carried to their coasts : for us to point out that in the good old days, before they were led into the paths of oppression and conquest by their brilliant leader, such bloodshed of Italians by British airmen or sailors would have been unthinkable. Think of all the thousands of Italians interned in England. But how happy they are ! How well fed and cared for ! Here are some photos of men from Naples, imprisoned in the Alexandra Palace. They send their salutations to their brothers, undernourished and anxious. This line of propaganda attack will, I fancy, be likely to be possible earlier and to work more quickly against Italy than either Germany or Japan. The Germans have always vaguely felt that they had a divine mission : they have a great faith in their race and in themselves. The Japanese are confident to the pitch of bigotry. The Italians are less sure of themselves. I repeat, it is only possible to do so much by precept and teaching, and all this Mussolini has done. He cannot change his raw material, only improve it ; nor make a colonial administration out of men who are more

content to be led. Thus, the morale of the Italian will not be entirely above suspicion and, moreover, his newly-acquired colonial Empire will be a positive source of danger. The Italian Peninsula may poke a dangerous finger into our Imperial communications, and Italian propaganda and intrigue stir up hornets' nests about our ears in the Near East and Egypt, but Italy is very vulnerable herself. The Germans of the Trentino must dislike their Italian masters as much as they must be casting longing eyes across the Brenner. Then there are the Arabs of Libya, over whom the Italian lords it repressively but uneasily, and the freshly-won Empire of Abyssinia. Here are surely foci for propaganda so long as we can select a line of policy which we can advance towards Arabs or Abyssinians without reacting on African peoples under our own flag.

There are then two indicated lines of propaganda action—one designed to shake the Italian's confidence in himself and his leaders : the other to stir up trouble in the lands where Italians rule over other peoples. The Italians are held in low regard not only by the white but by some of the coloured races. This should simplify the direction of propaganda towards their African colonies, and the fact that these march with British possessions or spheres of influence should enable comparisons between the African's lot in Abyssinia under Italian rule to be contrasted with that in Kenya or Tanganyika under the British flag.

There will also be immediately available a wider variety of means for disseminating propaganda

against Italy than against Germany or Japan. Italian newspapers might even in certain circumstances be capable of exploitation fairly soon. Extensive use would undoubtedly be made of the pamphlet-carrying aeroplane, both in Italy and her colonies, and the radio would help with the Italians as well as in certain of her possessions where there are receiving sets.

(II)

Taking it all in all, however, there does not seem to be a great future for the direct propaganda offensive in the next war, unless this should turn out to be a protracted and wearying affair. For offensive propaganda we shall look rather to the indirect variety, directed towards neutrals and allies—to engage the former on our side if possible, but at all costs to prevent their going over to the enemy, and to keep the latter at concert pitch against the enemy. This neutral zone will be the great battle-ground of propaganda, where both sets of combatants will fight each other with all their energies and every known method. Here again, unless I am mistaken, we may find ourselves up against a tough problem at first. Here it is.

During the Great War the world lay under the spell of democracy. It was still a word to conjure with : no one had dared to challenge its meaning. Despite the presence of Japan and Russia in the ranks of the Allies, and of the near-republic of the Young Turks among the Central Empires, the war was fairly accurately represented by Allied propagandists as a struggle between "democracy" and the "forces of reaction," the implication being

that " democracy " was to stop the world from plunging into " chaos and night." Since 1918 democracy has been challenged. It is now on the defensive. Germany and Italy are constructive as well as repressive. They have an idea to put forward : not, many people may say, a first-class idea, but a concrete one all the same. Their battalions of trained propagandists make the very best out of it, representing their countries as the forces of the new progress. Democracy, they assert, led to all sorts of humiliation and trouble —some countries into an uneasy twilight and others into definite " chaos and night." From this sorry state the " forces of progress " have rescued or are rescuing them. Whereas in 1914–1918 democracy could be represented as the new force which held out a hope to a hopeless world, now it is being represented as the force which has been used by unscrupulous countries to cover their seizure of all that is worth having, and, having taken this, to preserve the *status quo* in a world of inequalities of work and wealth. The result of this propaganda is that while the democratic States—whether under a crowned sovereign or top-hatted President—have dwindled, the authoritarian model is very popular. Roughly speaking, the democracies are Great Britain, Belgium, France, the U.S.A., Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. The dictatorships are Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Portugal, Japan, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and practically all the South American republics, led by Brazil. Spain will shortly join their ranks, and possibly China, if she can hold out long enough against the

Japanese. Not all of these are totalitarian in the strict sense of the word, nor necessarily of a National Socialist character, but all are undemocratic in fact and many of them therefore anti-democratic in spirit. Some of them were once seats of British influence, notably South America, but are now under a constant spray of German and Italian propaganda by wirelessed news, short-wave radio talks and personal effort which has begun to percolate. Some of them, like Portugal, are traditional friends and will probably be on our side in sentiment if not in fact in the next war, but what propaganda line, unless the enemy presents us with a special opportunity, can we take with Portugal except our centuries-old friendship? Turkey is a vigorous State which will be most important to us, and which we are assiduously wooing with apparent success, but in the actual field of propaganda what can be put forward against Germany that is constructive? There can be no doubt that the next war will be billed as a fight between Democracy and Dictatorship. It may in fact be nothing of the sort. We might get Italy as a partner and Germany Belgium: authoritarian Portugal is likely to come in with us and the democratic Scandinavian countries may well remain strictly neutral. In the ultimate resort alliances spring from the hope of material advantage, not the possession of a common ideological belief, but in our propaganda we must make the facts fit our case as far as possible. We shall almost certainly represent the struggle in the propaganda we shall be compelled to do towards France, the U.S.A. and our own Empire as

Democracy and Freedom *versus* Dictatorship and Persecution. As propaganda must be unified, how are we to pursue the energetic policy we should to the neutrals, many of whom, like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, are so vital to us? We cannot speak with two voices in our propaganda. This, of course, applies to what, borrowing a military adjective, I may call the grand propaganda. Without this backbone, minor propaganda can only achieve little with much effort, though we shall obviously set out to do as much of this as we can. It will enable us to burke the main issue, and it can, of course, be very embarrassing to the enemy. A storm of quite respectable dimensions was, for example, in 1916 worked up in neutral countries with a snapshot of Bernstorff, the then German Ambassador to America. The photo, which was picked up from Bernstorff's desk by an alert British agent, showed the ambassador in a " swimsuit " with his arm round two " bathing belles " similarly clad. It was entirely innocent, but it was published almost all over the world in such a fashion as to suggest the worst sort of ambassadorial gallantry, conduct unbecoming even a Prussian officer and a gentleman! Again my feeling is that it will be more difficult to prejudice neutral feeling against Germany or Italy than against Japan. How, for example, can we hope to rouse passions against the German dictatorship by reciting the persecutions of Jews who are thrust into concentration camps, thrashed and spit upon, or against the Italian by broadcasting the number of Arabs who have been dropped from Graziani's aeroplanes and

intellectuals forcibly dosed with castor oil : how can we hope by such propaganda to rouse the passions of dictator countries like Spain, Turkey, the Latin-American or the Balkan States, where torture, mutilation and butchery are understandable methods in an emergency ? Where is the point of preaching democratic tolerance to a Turkish leader who solved his parliamentary problem by hanging his whole opposition party ? We may also reflect on the deliberate slaughter by the Turks of the hundred thousand Greeks at Smyrna in 1921, and the Japanese massacre of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in China. Atrocity propaganda will be less effective with neutrals in the next war. They have been sated with it in peace.

Japan's distinction is that she is unpopular. Her drastic underselling methods and her tactless dumping of shoddy articles at cheap prices have combined to create a widespread resentment against her. She is a commercial danger, and therefore the more easily, from the propaganda view-point, saddled with atrocities ! That is a cynical observation, perhaps, but a truism nevertheless, for in war those nations with whom one is in sympathy can do no wrong : those from whom one has something to fear never do right. In addition, Japan does challenge humanitarian opinion everywhere and it is interesting to study the way in which China, largely through the inspiration of Madame Chiang, it is believed, is slowly building up a propaganda case against her. A notable feature of this is the exposure of Japan's deliberate debauching of Chinese populations by

encouraging the opium and cocaine habits. This is indeed a way of waging war which could only be conceived by an Oriental.

Since on paper our case towards neutrals appears to lack a mainspring, it will behove us to manufacture what we can and press it everywhere we can—a task of making bricks with little straw at which we showed ourselves to excel in the last war. We may, of course, find the enemy unconsciously presenting us, as he did last time, with many opportunities to develop propaganda against him, but, however useful opportunistic propaganda may be, we cannot rely on it, nor can it take the place of constructive propaganda. As to methods, there will naturally be a stampede for space in the neutral papers, and we may get an extra share on account of old goodwill or friendship as well as on the merits of our propaganda. It is fortunate that the neutral States lying nearest Germany are those—Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia—which all merit the adjective democratic. They will accordingly be likely to reproduce much of our propaganda—though they will have to be more discreet than last time—and some of it may leak into Germany. In the realm of the cinema we may be able to depend on the natural bias of the U.S. film manufacturers in favour of Great Britain as opposed to Germany, Japan or Italy and on their command of the machinery of international film distribution. This will be an asset both with the stock entertainment picture and the news-reels. Our own pictures will not count any more in Continental countries than they do now. Germany has a better hold on the European market than we

have, though neither of us can seriously challenge the Americans. We shall overhaul and intensify our radio broadcasts to neutrals, especially those who still have democratic sympathies, but we shall have a hard task getting in against the enemy propaganda which through constant effort in time of peace has already won an established position. Germany and Italy have both been broadcasting on the short wave for some years in English as well as other languages. We shall stand a better chance of success in our propaganda to neutral countries if we face the position that many of them, though not necessarily ill-disposed towards us, will not, from the nature of their politics, be receptive to our democratic propaganda. Those that will be likely to be sympathetic will have to walk delicately in the matter of propaganda owing to the sensitiveness of Germany and Italy on the matter.

(III)

There remains the United States—the Great Neutral. In the next war, as in the last, the result will probably depend upon the way in which the United States acts, and her attitude will reflect the reaction of her public to propaganda properly applied. During the Great War the efforts of the rival propagandists in the United States almost stagger belief. The Germans were the more amazing, and their activities amounted to a degree of interference in American domestic affairs which will surely never be tolerated again. They entered the field of United States labour politics, organising their own union. They set up all sorts of propagandist bodies, whether supposedly pacifist

organisations which adroitly blamed the allies for keeping the war going or bureaux to work upon and inflame negro opinion. They appealed to university-trained and professional men. They reached women by forming such bodies as the League of American Women for Strict Neutrality, and working men through Labour's National Peace Council. They even bought a New York daily paper. We were almost as thorough though less blatant in our methods. Among our multifarious activities was the supply of a regular British news-sheet to no fewer than 360 smaller American papers.

For some time the issue as to which side the U.S. would take hung in the balance, and if the final result was a credit to our propaganda, we were helped by the carelessness of the Germans. They continually overreached themselves and, with all their native tendency to over-organisation, forgot to cover up their tracks. Their propaganda was as obvious as it was energetic. I repeat, it is unthinkable that such a dog-fight between non-Americans will again be permitted in the United States. The American peoples have progressed a long way since those days, when foreign politics were hardly touched upon in any but a few of the greater newspapers. Nowadays the American foreign correspondent is one of the most resourceful and best informed in the world. They have what amounts almost to a passion for " debunking " foreign aims and ideas, but while they have encouraged Americans to interest themselves in politics overseas, they have not yet succeeded in transferring their own objective outlook to their

readers. Excellently served though the Americans are by their news-gatherers and reporters abroad, they can perhaps hardly be expected, in the security of their own detached hemisphere, to see European affairs realistically. For one thing, the American is the great champion of the oppressed —and frequently of the *soi-disant* oppressed which may explain why he is so frequently taken in by the "hard-luck" story of London confidence tricksters! Secondly, the American peoples are still under the influence of much of the Great War propaganda. They are more susceptible than most peoples to mass suggestion—they have been brought up on it—and since 1918 they have shut themselves off from reality. Thirdly, they are at this moment the battle-ground of an active propaganda of Labels.

There is no sense in refusing to recognise that there has always been a substratum of suspicion of Great Britain in the United States. The American people may admire some of our traits and hold others in contempt, but they periodically tend to suspect our motives. During the Great War we were particularly vulnerable to indirect propaganda in the United States, and the Germans were able to work up a fierce feeling for the miserable Irish, struggling to get Home Rule; for the oppressed Indians, writhing under a British military despotism; for the fleasome fellaheen in Egypt, kept on the bare subsistence line; and for the poor Jew whose brethren were periodically beaten up or burned by Britain's allies. It is good to feel that in the next war those horses will not run: certainly not in the same colours. The bestowal of

more than Dominion status on Ireland, the Indian constitution and the recognition of the Kingdom of Egypt have removed these dangerous centres of propaganda infection. Whatever, if anything, we may have lost by these concessions, they have made us so much the less vulnerable to enemy propaganda attack in America. It will be difficult again to rally American feeling against us on these counts. There remain the Jews. It has been estimated that of the world Jew population of approximately fifteen millions, no fewer than five millions are in the United States. Twenty-five per cent. of the inhabitants of New York are Jews. During the Great War we bought off this huge American Jewish public by the promise of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, held by Ludendorff to be the master stroke of Allied propaganda as it enabled us not only to appeal to Jews in America but to Jews in Germany as well. Since then our attempts to implement our undertaking have landed us in difficulties with the indigenous Arabs, agitated by Italian propaganda, without satisfying the Jews. We have not satisfied the educated British Jews. How much less have we satisfied the more remote Jew community on the other side of the Atlantic? In addition, the recent realist policy of the British Government has been worked up into a propaganda of significant extent and intensity which represents Great Britain as being " half-Fascist "—excuse the label—all ready and prepared to " sell the democratic pass " and go " all-Fascist " at the first convenient opportunity. This is being developed by the intense Jewish hatred of Germany, and from her

of all dictator countries, and backed by the influence of the Catholic Church and undenominational liberals. At the moment we have a strong section of American opinion against us, but if war were to break out to-morrow between England and Germany this mass of opinion would have to come down on one side or the other and it will be marvellous indeed if German propaganda could succeed in bringing it down on theirs. In general the situation in the United States is more favourable to Great Britain than in 1914, in that the obvious centres of infection have been removed: but less favourable in that we have temporarily at any rate lost caste as a "democratic" State because of the propaganda which represents us as truckling to or at least having truck with "dictators." Though we are not unfavourably placed, we shall require to do much propaganda to keep the United States benevolently neutral. To persuade her to take our part will be much more difficult, so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America, a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen, before the republic will again take arms in an external quarrel. The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan were involved and this might and probably would bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany.

Fortunately with America our propaganda is on firm ground. We can be entirely sincere, as our main plank will be the old democratic one. We

must clearly enunciate our belief in the democratic form of government, and our firm resolve to adhere to it. Our minor propaganda will aim at attaching the support of important sections, such as the Jews, probably by the declaration of a clear-cut policy on Palestine and of our intention if victorious to put an end to anti-Semitic persecution : and of the Roman Catholic community in similar terms. These should not be difficult to pursue, nor to put over to the American public. We shall as before send over our leading literary lights and other men with names well known in the United States to put our point of view over the dinner table. Our trouble here will be to find men with equally commanding reputations to step into the shoes of such as Kipling, Barrie, Shaw, Galsworthy and Wells. Conversely, we should exploit to the full the views and experiences of American nationals who might be serving in our forces or those of our allies. We should make much of them, decorate them, signal them out for mention in dispatches and in the Press and use their stories as propaganda material to their own people. This was a form of propaganda very ably developed by the French during the Great War. American newspaper men in London are of approved mettle, and, though impervious to any obvious propaganda, should nevertheless represent a valuable propaganda force on the strength of the day to day news they send over, quite apart from the fact that many of them like this country. In an experience of knowing many of them over a period of eighteen years, I can echo Admiral Brownrigg's words praising "their absolute reliability, their honesty in preserving secret

information which I had been compelled or perhaps had thought wise to impart to them, and their loyalty in never making use of it until I gave them the word 'go'." We shall see that they are given every facility for observing and reporting and that their messages are censored sympathetically. Similarly with their news-reel men. They should be the first to be allowed to "shoot" pictures of air raids, in order that a proper volume of pictorial "horror" will be available in one of the few great countries where "atrocity propaganda" will still be operative. Our cables and wireless telegraph services will be available for less urgent or secret messages. Our radio propaganda should also be working at full pressure, but there must be a great improvement upon the present lackadaisical outlook. I can best illustrate this by the following personal experience. On the evening that the world was standing expectantly to hear the Prime Minister's pronouncement on Great Britain's attitude if the Germans followed their *coup* against Austria by one against Czechoslovakia, I ran into a friend who is possibly our best-known radio commentator. "Tell me what I'm going to tell America," he asked me. "I've got to do my weekly talk on British affairs over the American 'net-work' in half an hour and I haven't made up my mind what I ought to say." "But surely you're in touch with the Government," I replied. "Haven't they given you a line, knowing that you regularly reach hundreds of thousands of American listeners?" "Not a word," was his surprising answer. "I'm not in touch with any Governmental source of information. They have never tried to get in touch with me, though someone

must know what I'm doing. Still, I've tried to get in touch with them." And he explained how he had previously been down to a certain Government department where he was permitted to see a junior member of the press office who could not be of any real service to him. This is sober fact, and illustrates as well as may be how much our authorities are doing to counteract the anti-British radio propaganda which is growing in the United States.

I must not, however, give the impression that we are doing absolutely nothing at present to direct propaganda towards foreign countries. That would be unfair to that esoteric body, the British Council, which occupies itself in what it calls "cultural propaganda," or more succinctly in spreading a "knowledge and appreciation of our language, literature, art, science and education." It has numerous committees composed of politicians, Civil Servants, manufacturers and merchants and educationists, and sends out British lecturers and musicians, gramophone records, periodicals and literature to various foreign countries, entertains editors and educationists visiting England and generally encourages the young idea, whether in Latvia or Uruguay, to learn and appreciate the English language. Although it has practically no permanent staff it claims to discharge the onerous duties of co-ordinating the propaganda activities of other bodies, excellent in their own spheres, like the Travel Association (the old "Come to Britain" Organisation) and the Film Institute (a body which exists primarily to foster the educational and documentary film) and of linking these up with the British Broadcasting Company's vague operations.

Much of the Council's work is no doubt excellent in its way, but it is emphatically not propaganda. In the present situation it is rather like trying to interest a working-class mother in fancy needlework when other energetic people are instructing her how to make her family budget go farther. Cultural propaganda is a dilettante vision. It advances nothing constructive and, despite its hosts of committees, it is not unified. Moreover, it is not controlled either by experts or a permanent staff, but by a collection of enthusiastically-minded amateurs. The worst that can be said about it is that it spends thousands of pounds of public money which might be more profitably applied; the best is that it can do no harm and may even wring a tear out of some aged native of Bulgaria or Peru who can recall the days before Great Britain thought it necessary artificially to stimulate an interest in her national culture. Also it may provide a skeleton which, strengthened in the calibre as well as the numbers of its personnel and animated by a propaganda spirit, might be padded out as part of the Ministry of Propaganda in a future war.

(IV)

Lastly, if anything is certain about the next war, it is that we shall have France as our ally-in-chief, if not as our only certain ally outside the British Empire. Geographically we are bound to France as inexorably as one member of a chain-gang to the next: also the only things we have in common with her are this geographical contiguity and the desire to protect ourselves from any aggression on the part of Germany. Other than these we have no real community of interests, methods or out-

look. This is not to say that sections, important and very vocal sections of British opinion, are not sincerely pro-French, or to deny that France has probably the highest intellectual standards and the greatest measure of individual liberty of any country in the world, but propaganda unfortunately demands a unification of policy, and on this score our alliance with France is demonstrably weak. How to advance a concrete policy in line with France has been the difficulty ever since the Armistice and will remain in a future war. Had we not been leg-shackled to a logical France determined as a Continental nation to defend her own interests as appeared reasonable to her, the course of European propaganda and therefore history would have been different in the past twenty years. These fetters will hamper our propaganda to neutrals in the next war, and not improbably to the main enemy also. Should we by any fortunate chance evolve a constructive idea for propaganda policy we shall not be able to press it into use unless and until France agrees, and our outlook being so divergent it may seldom be possible for her to agree. Equally, as our ally, we shall have to direct a continuous propaganda to her in the nature of a heart stimulant. Always suspicious, she will tend to question the seriousness of our war effort and the weight of our losses unless we give her constant proof. France is a very feminine partner, needing much patience and more attention, who will insist on approving anything we may wish to do and is capable of distracting us in any course on which we may both have agreed. This is the usual difficulty between allies, perhaps, but I feel that no charge of anti-French bias can

be preferred against me for observing that she is not the easiest partner in a world situation like the present. Much propaganda effort will therefore have to be directed to keep her contented that we are also pulling our weight.

One of the most effective methods of convincing allies and neutrals is to provide their propagandists with facilities to inspect and write up our war effort for themselves. This was a sphere in which we excelled during the Great War, and it is one for which we have a special flair on account of our ability to steer a middle course between rigid secrecy and open publicity. But this sort of propaganda is a tricky business which demands imagination as well as patience and tact on the part of those charged with the propaganda duties, and which is seldom welcomed by the fighting forces, who are required constantly to divert responsible officers to "bear-lead" a stream of visiting foreign statesmen, pressmen, photographers and cinematograph men. Moreover it contains an element of danger. Still it is effective. Seeing is believing, and since the aim of the propagandist is to make news and see that it is reported, how better can he do this than by allowing it to be reported by those whom he wishes to influence? But those who have read Brownrigg's entertaining account of his experiences will have no doubts as to the snares and pitfalls which beset this particular propaganda path.

More attention will also require to be devoted to the countries of the Empire, which, owing to the changed status deriving from the Statute of Westminster, will properly claim to be regarded as allies, and there is no ally, not even a brother, who

does not need special attention. While on general grounds the Empire can be expected to march in step with the Mother Country, there is no definite assurance that she will do so. We should take warning from the recent breakaway of New Zealand on the League of Nations discussion on Abyssinia, and the possibility of racial or anti-Imperial propaganda growing in strength in other Dominions or India. The great relief in respect of propaganda towards allies is that there is no bother about how to reach them. All methods are available. The difficulty is to know just what to say and how much emphasis to lay on it. Indeed the utmost care is necessary for controlling propaganda towards allies. Most of the feeling of one ally for another is manufactured, and this is particularly true of the British, with whom, as I have indicated earlier, a potential enemy may change with the turn of the political weathercock into a trusted friend. For this reason this type of propaganda is really more important at home. If the French are our allies, it will be our concern to ensure that our people think well of the French, and *vice versa*. Then the propagandist must be careful not to overstress the note of confidence. I have indicated the reaction of the Russians to confidence propaganda, and there is always the danger that, whereas in order to bring home the need for a united front it is good to take the line that the allies are hand-in-glove and that therefore all is going well, some minor ally may argue "good, but if things are going well, there is no longer the same need for us to obey the more powerful allied powers. We'll act more on our own in future."

CHAPTER V

THE HOME FRONT

(I)

THE next war will greatly increase the importance of defensive propaganda to the home front, because of the general recognition that an attack on civilian morale appears to be a first and important aim of modern strategy. Ruthless air raids on open cities, particularly capital cities as the nerve centres of the State, and the terrorisation of their inhabitants by bomb-dealt massacre are both contemplated and awaited as the outstanding feature of a future European conflict. In the next war it will be the civilian population who will be packed into the front line trenches, the armed forces acting rather as outpost troops to deflect attack or to counter-attack. This change will be harder for us to accustom ourselves to than any other nation of the old world. First, our population is not only easily reached but is far thicker on the ground: in all Europe there is no target to make the heart of the raiding pilot more glad than London. Secondly, unlike other countries, we have been able for close on three hundred years to regard war much as the United States regards Europe, as something so remote that we can take a detached view of it. The Manchester cotton broker did not stand to be moved by our losses in the Crimea. He was not personally touched

because the South Wales Borderers were cut up in Zululand. The withers of the immigrant tailor in London were not wrung over the slaughter on the Somme or at Passchendaele. But enemy aeroplanes over Cheetham Hill or Whitechapel are a very different story. The shadow of war now hangs over British homes much as it has done over Continental homes since the dawn of history. And, as I have already suggested, this is a new and a terrifying thing which has led large sections of our public to pursue security through the League of Nations and Peace as an end in itself. We stand out as a good target, and also one that, from the nature of the case, must be morally vulnerable.

It is usual, when an attack is known to be impending on a certain sector, to take steps to strengthen the defences at the point threatened. This common-sense course might well, it is arguable, have been followed in respect of our threatened civilian morale, but such propaganda as has been done has been desultory, contradictory and ineffective. The State, as a central authority, has admitted no responsibility. The argument apparently is that in the hour of peril the good British spirit may as ever be relied upon, and also that propaganda is improper and foreign : and, in any case, that it is no fit work for the State. This is a dangerous creed. The British spirit is at least confused. Moreover, the great cities of the United Kingdom, the targets of the morale attackers, have since the Great War received a steady influx of unstable immigrants, whether from Europe or Ireland. One has only to remember the disgraceful

scenes in East London during air raids in 1917 to realise what a danger these elements can be in spreading hysteria among the more stable indigenous population. Next, while the central authority has denied the propriety of carrying out propaganda, it has continually reaffirmed the retention of the voluntary principle. That is to say, we are to rely for the strengthening of the public morale and for recruits for either armed or civil forces upon voluntary effort, which depends upon persuasion, which comes back to propaganda. Caught in this dilemma, the central authority has compromised. What passes for propaganda is being done, but by the respective Government departments. There is, therefore, no central control, only inter-departmental co-ordination. There is no unification or constructive policy. No one concrete idea is steadfastly advanced: instead there is a vague, intermittent warning to the public that democracy is at stake, and unfortunately a far greater appeal to fear; fear of bombs, fear of gas, fear of Germany, fear of the future, all with the idea of getting recruits for various services.

The War Office wants men for the regular and territorial forces: the Air Force wants men: the Admiralty wants men: the Home Office wants men and women for civil duties in connection with air attack: the Ministry of Health wants a fitter nation.

So each department appoints a press officer who, assisted usually by an all-too-small staff, proceeds to work up and give out press information and articles of a propagandist character. He may

make friends with proprietors of newspapers, as well as their editors, and be in with the B.B.C., but strive he ever so manfully and conscientiously he is not making propaganda. He is at best only doing press information or public relations work and even within these limitations his success will depend on the energy and publicity flair of his chief—and, of course, on the nature of the appeal he is advancing—apart altogether from the possibility that he may be used for the personal advancement of a publicity-seeking Minister. All these Ministries are trying to persuade persons to enrol and some of them are meeting with considerable success. Others are not successful, and the measure of their failure is the frequency with which their appeals are repeated. But behind all these efforts there is no evidence of any central control or of any guiding idea. As each Minister wants men, he trusts to his own eloquence over the radio, his own flair and the energy and skill of his press officer to get them for him. When he has a part of the total he asked for, he quite astonishingly weighs in again to tell the public how successful he has been! It is a matter of self-congratulation if he has attracted a percentage of the total for which he asked! If he fails badly, he sets off on a fresh line of appeal. This practice amounts to one Ministry competing with another, first for a place in the various vehicles of propaganda, and secondly for the services of the same willing or more easily-stirred sections of the public. Although almost all the newspapers, the cinemas and the B.B.C. are ready and anxious to support any campaign in the

national interest, their support will naturally depend on the character of the appeal as well as the efficiency with which it is presented. It has been stated without contradiction that the campaign for all sorts of volunteers for the A.R.P., with its broad and fairly concrete appeal, has had the effect of pushing the less concrete National Fitness Campaign into the background, for all that the former has been less efficiently planned and directed. The result will be felt in the standard of recruits presenting themselves for the regular army. In parenthesis it may be recorded that only some 55 per cent. at present conform to our modest standards, against over 80 per cent. in Germany, whose standard is certainly no lower. The other regrettable feature of this system of advancing a number of specific appeals is in effect to beat a tattoo upon the doors of the already converted or easily converted, without rousing the apathetic or unwilling masses. Yet all these appeals have a common basis in the idea of service to the community, the voluntary service of a free people to the democratic system to which they are so loud in giving lip service. The paradox is that a vast amount of propaganda is being made by Left-wing forces to uphold democracy in Spain or Russia or Germany or China, but not by Government propagandists to uphold democracy in Great Britain. The commercial advertising expert has long recognised the necessity for a general goodwill background against which he can press the advertisement of a particular branded product. He knows, too, that advertising, to be successful, must be based on a carefully

thought out plan of campaign. Far be it from me to hold up advertising as a model of efficiency. I well realise how much of it is ballyhoo, but I do say that if the commercial man, concerned with pushing a proprietary article and judged by the cash returns on the money he spends, finds it essential to work to a plan against a background, how much more necessary should it be for a government, who are dependent on the fickle support of the public and yet who are asking service and possible sacrifices *from* their electors through three or four departments? No matter how vibrant and far-reaching the appeal, it will stand no greater chance of success if it is alone and unsupported than a single advertisement, no matter how costly and striking. The classic example is the speech on "Service" made at the Albert Hall in May, 1932, by the Duke of Windsor, then at the height of his popularity as Prince of Wales. Here the place, the occasion and the man were as near the ideal as might be. His subject-matter was excellent and was relayed all over the British Empire. The various voluntary organisations under whose auspices the meeting had been convened had made special arrangements to cope with the rush of volunteers—they got a grand total of no more than 700! The tragedy is that the moral of this princely damp squib has gone entirely unheeded. There are appeals for young recruits for the army, regular or territorial, and for veteran other ranks and ex-officers for different categories of reserves or emergency reserves: for recruits first for air raid wardens, then for a modest million for general air raid precautionary

work, for special constables, for special air raid constables, for police reservists. Thump, thump, thump : one after another. Not only is there no evidence of any plan of which each forms part, but no evidence that any one of them is launched on a pre-arranged plan of its own. The outstanding example is the series of attempts to rouse the public to the dangers of air attack and to defend themselves against it by enrolling in the A.A. engineers and gunners or for air raid precaution work. The early efforts in the realm of fear propaganda played especially on the fear of gas. The propaganda of the opposition " anti-war " forces was joined to the official propaganda and a steady breeze was worked up, culminating in the assertion by one eminent legal gentleman that one gas bomb, " if dropped on Piccadilly Circus, would kill everybody in an area from Regent's Park to the Thames," *i.e.*, about a million people ! This gas peril was early debunked by the scientists. As far back as January, 1934, my friend, Dr. Francis Freeth, who has as much practical experience of lethal gas as anyone in the country, was both laughed at and condemned for saying that gas was emphatically not the danger from the skies ; and indeed that except for its moral effect on a terrified public, no raider would bother to use it against cities in preference to high explosive or incendiary bombs. Not till April, 1938, did the Home Office tardily admit the correctness of this view, that " recent events indicate that incendiary and high explosive bombs are probably more likely to be a grave menace than gas ! " Mark the " recent events " and the delightfully vague " probably." In other

words, the official propaganda had not been founded on truth. Also it had been toiling in the wake of public opinion instead of leading it. When the responsible Minister on a psychologically well-chosen occasion asked eloquently for a million volunteers, it might at least have been thought that his appeal would only have been launched after the most careful preparation, and in accordance with a planned time-table for following it up in co-operation with every municipality throughout the country and in conformity with contemporary appeals which were being made by other departments. There is no evidence of this. In answer to the charge of panicking the public by their false gas propaganda, the Minister excused himself by suggesting that gas might be a "formidable instrument of panic." This is a truism, but it is *only* formidable against a public whose morale is unsound, and whose will be the responsibility for "putting the wind up" the public about gas? It is almost incredible that official propaganda should take a line so calculated to assist the enemy. It needed considerable discipline for troops wearing gas masks for the first time to keep their heads under fire, so that a civilian population in gas masks and without the steadying force of discipline will be a demoralised crowd *before* they come under fire!

In any event, the next stage of A.R.P. was two months later when the Minister made another well-timed broadcast and congratulated himself on having got less than 50 per cent. of his total! Yet he had had meanwhile the ungrudging support of every organ of the official and most of the

opposition propagandists. When I have taxed officials with the poor response to their appeals, I have met the astonishing answer that they could not cope with more at the time. Why then ask for them? Why do we always seem to assume time will wait upon the British? Without our house in order, we are unable to take a strong line in foreign affairs. A weak foreign policy may increase the danger of war. "So much to do, so little time," sighs one Cabinet Minister. "We cannot hurry," murmur his colleagues.

So closely is Ministerial attention riveted on filling their respective quotas that they appear oblivious to the larger issue, to the background of forty-eight million individuals against which they are pressing their appeal, forty-eight millions who though wearing neither uniform nor armlets will nevertheless find themselves in the firing line. It is these millions who will determine the public morale, and their reactions which will decide whether the national heart is sound: millions to whom no constructive idea is being directed, nothing save the tattoo on their nerves of the air raid drummers.

The corner stone, without which the arch of propaganda for the next war will be no more than a pile of bricks, is a broad positive propaganda preaching the gospel that the voluntary system can only survive as a result of the voluntary service of the community; a propaganda to stir the public conscience to a sense of duty to the democratic State to which it is so inestimable a privilege to belong. In other words, the inhabitants of our democracy must be induced freely to make

the effort that those of the totalitarian States are induced to do by propaganda and compulsion. Propaganda is the common factor, but it must be propaganda linked to a constructive ideal: a propaganda of Love of one's own country and not Fear of another. Who knows? if properly worked up it might even bring back into popular circulation the old word "patriotism." This propaganda of democracy should be as potent now as it was in 1914. Though it may be less acceptable as an article for export, it should be as effective as ever at home, if properly directed.

It can never be satisfactorily developed by individual politicians, by generals, air-marshals or admirals. It must be under a centralised control, preferably non-political, and disseminated by those who are not connected in the public mind with any specific interest or party. It must, in other words, not be obvious. It will equally postulate a centralised control, and I believe that with our genius for adjustment and compromise such control could be exercised with the consent and support of the different organs, such as the Press, the B.B.C., the film industry and the public. Already much time and many valuable opportunities have been lost, and the sands may be running out. The really serious aspect that has apparently been lost sight of is the fact that this moral background is not only imperative in its direct bearing on the next war. Eight years ago, when we were unburdened with any large weight of armaments, a major trade slump landed us in a serious situation from which we were able to extricate ourselves by imposing certain economies

which did not really affect our national standard of living or our social services. The public reacted with customary good sense, but an unpleasant shock was given to the national edifice. Since then our mounting expenditure on armaments has been reflected in a burden of taxation which is rapidly approaching the level of the Great War. Simultaneously while the volume of world trade declines, our own share of the decreasing total grows less. With the possibility of another major trade slump, the Government of the day, whatever party may be in power, may shortly find itself in the position not of dangling bigger and better carrots to attract recruits, but of asking the public to give more service and at the same time to accept heavy cuts in relief, wages and various social amenities instead of increased benefits and holidays with pay. There may still be tension in Europe, necessitating the maintenance of a state of armed alertness, and when the problem arises as to whether armaments or social services shall suffer, what will be the answer ? The international situation will demand that armaments shall not be cut down : the domestic situation may conceivably make it dangerous to cut down social services. It is here that I see the greatest danger for the future, a danger not only in itself but in its possible effect of precipitating war by disclosing the cracks in the British morale for which the enemy will be watching. This, to my mind, is justification, even without any immediate likelihood of war, for a constructive propaganda policy to the general public.

(II)

I realise that, in this era of labels, the word "control" implies a tabu and that in discussing any form of control I am prostrating myself for flagellation. Still, I am emboldened to make the suggestions which follow because in wartime the nation acquiesces in control imposed in their interests by the central authority. In "the piping times of peace" there is no need for such control. What shall we call the present? I do not think many will disagree with me in calling it an emergency period. No one who reads his daily paper will deny that the British nation is busily preparing for an emergency; in other words, this is an emergency period, neither peace nor war. Therefore it *should* not be unreasonable to expect an intelligent public to acquiesce in a measure of emergency control. After all, the issue which the opponents of Government propaganda reiterate so loudly in their propaganda is between Democracy and Dictatorship. It *should* therefore not be unreasonable to ask the citizen to give his Government all the assistance in his power to resist the abhorred dictators. My own belief is that the Government will ultimately be forced to institute a control, but I recognise that in the present state of public fuddlement any such attempt will be resisted as fiercely on party lines as the introduction of conscription. The alternative is to work on the voluntary spirit. I will invite castigation by putting up, as bases for discussion, two suggestions which are feasible and might conceivably prove helpful.

The first is that the Government should bring together representatives of the various propaganda forces with the aim of persuading them to set up a central co-ordinating council on which would be represented the newspapers and the film industry, the B.B.C., the rediffusion interests, the British Council and the press officers of the various Government departments. This body would be under the direction of some well-known man, a name which suggests itself being Lord Tweedsmuir, though he is not, of course, immediately available. I mention him to indicate the type of man required, a man whose public reputation is above reproach, who would command respect and who is also qualified by nature and experience. The duties of this central body would include the formulation of a propaganda by contact with the Government, and its co-ordination and development through the various vehicles of propaganda represented. It might also assume a responsibility, on the lines of that implied in the British Board of Film Censors, for what articles or pictures or methods offend against journalistic propriety and public morals, if not strictly against the letter of the existing laws. This is a matter which will surely demand examination in the near future. Such a body might do good work at a time like the present, without necessarily provoking the ire of those who do not always distinguish between Liberty and Licence. In time of war it would be convertible at once into a Ministry of Propaganda as well as a Ministry of Information. It would be enlarged by the inclusion of experts previously marked down for service and could start to work

at once. I have made this suggestion to a prominent Civil Servant who almost shuddered: "You mean," he said in horrified tones, "to set up a Ministry of Information in peace-time!" Why not? In short, this central body could co-ordinate and develop propaganda in touch with the Government now and form the skeleton of a war machine.

Whether an organisation on these lines is immediately practicable or not, it is of the first importance that, in respect of the next war, our propaganda machinery shall be set up before the declaration of hostilities. War has been so speeded up that we cannot expect again to have four years in which to experiment with, adjust and finally settle upon the type of machinery best suited to our purposes. Moreover, although State control of propaganda is agreed to be inevitable, it is never imposed in a democratic country without criticism and opposition. In the last war our arrangements were almost haphazard. Like Topsy, they "just growed" from the modest original Press Bureau through the Department of Information to the Ministry of Information, formed in 1918 at the same time as the Ministry of Propaganda. Through this period of growth they were subject to almost continuous criticism by Parliament and the Press, and though this may conceivably have made for ultimate efficiency it must have embarrassed and prolonged the actual development. On the next occasion it is essential that a skeleton organisation shall be already in existence in preference to a plan to be put into execution in the rush and upheaval of the early days of war. The

organisation finally arrived at in the Great War did not centralise offensive and defensive propaganda, as did that set up in the United States, but allowed these to be directed by two co-ordinate Ministers, both of whom had direct access to the Prime Minister, a very slender unifying link, it will be agreed. It will be wise next time for this control to be unified in one man. It will be difficult enough at any time to select the best man for the post, but more difficult if the appointment is a hurried, last-minute affair. The Director of Propaganda will have as important a position as the officer in charge of the nation's air defences, if not even as important as the commander-in-chief of the army, navy or air force. The problem will be where to look for such a man. I have indicated Lord Tweedsmuir as the type required, and though in the last war he was for a time in charge of the Department of Information, the final choice of Lords Northcliffe and Beaverbrook seemed to indicate a preference for men with newspaper connections. Professor Lasswell and others support the view that newspaper men generally make the best propagandists. I do not agree. In the first place, the appointment of newspaper proprietors—not nowadays synonymous with newspaper men—will invite criticism and opposition as it did before. It was far from popular and was strenuously attacked, on the grounds that the Press might " thereby lose its freedom and with its freedom its authority." Wherever the director is to be found—and I believe it will be among the ranks of the great proconsuls—he should have been sought and selected already. His name

should be on a roster together with those of his helpers, experts and advisers.

In the second place, although any Ministry, whether of offensive or defensive propaganda or both, must be staffed largely with journalists, they do not necessarily make good propagandists. The propagandist's task is to make news: the journalist's training and duty is to report it. They are therefore the opposite ends of the same weapon, so that it no more follows that a journalistic training is a qualification for propaganda work than that an artilleryman's service makes him an efficient munition-worker. Frequently the journalist may be found to have a propaganda flair, a combination which will be as valuable, I think, as it is rare. The best propagandists will be born, not made, which is why the central authority should be looking around for them while there is still time to cover the ground carefully and without undue haste.

We have wandered some way from the first of my two suggestions—a body to co-ordinate and develop propaganda now by contact with the Government. The second suggestion may be either additional or alternate to it, and concerns the formation of an independent body to initiate propaganda.

It would not attempt to scare the public into the armed forces by the bogey of national emergency. It would stand for the defence of Liberty, individual and collective. It might—I am only indicating the type of organisation I have in mind, not making concrete suggestions—adopt as its thesis the argument that compulsion, as expressed in the authoritarian State and so detestable to the

Englishman, is no abnormal excrescence likely to pass in a few years, but something which has come to stay ; that necessity is daily forcing Governments to exercise a greater measure of coercion on the individual in the interests of the community ; that Great Britain is not immune from this pressure and indeed that the democratic countries are standing like isolated peaks in the rising sea of Nazism, Fascism, or Communism. If, therefore, Englishmen wish to preserve their freedom and hand on a birthright to their children, they must without delay unite to do by voluntary co-operation what their less fortunate neighbours are compelled to do by law—the moral being first that in the new undemocratic world the liberty of the British subject will surely vanish unless he is prepared and able to defend it ; and secondly to stress how much better it is to be even an unemployed Englishman on the " dole " with free medical and maternity services, hospitals, milk for the children at school and what have you, than an employed labourer in Spain or Russia or a peasant in Poland or even in near-at-hand France, with none of these advantages. The propaganda must hold a mirror up to reality for the public to see.

There are obviously many forms which such an organisation might take. Probably the easiest to handle would be a cadre, run by an able and energetic council or committee, composed of men and women whose names carried public confidence. Expert opinions will not unnaturally differ as to how this body would set to work. All I can do is to suggest one method. Before any recognisable propaganda campaign was

opened, an approach should be made, by the right person in each case, to such organisations, for example, as the Licensed Victuallers, the Incorporated Society of Retail Distributors, the big insurance companies, the dairies and others who have representatives in normal daily contact with the public either in the public house, over the shop counter, or at the street door. The idea would be to start a word-of-mouth campaign which is important, first because no overt propaganda can hope to succeed unless the ground has been first prepared, and secondly because, as I have already emphasised, there is no propaganda so effective as that passed in conversation from person to person. What is wanted is to start people saying, " I heard from a friend of mine," or " My young man heard in London that," and so gradually accustom the public to the expression of a given set of views. This method flatters the vanity of the tale-bearer who is encouraged to repeat what he believes to be a piece of red-hot information. It is very important among housewives or business girls, who have more opportunities for gossip than topics to discuss.

The next stage would be to secure the enthusiastic services of well-known speakers, especially drawn from the churches, from schoolmasters, educationists, doctors, men of letters or administrators, and as little as possible from the ranks of politicians or soldiers. Having built up a panel of able and willing supporters, the organisation's task would be to find them opportunities for the dissemination of their views on the B.B.C. and from the pulpit, on the films, and on

the stage. No vehicle for propaganda should be neglected. Consequently the body would have to approach, again through the right channel, the great business houses, trade associations and learned bodies, the Livery companies, schools and universities, municipalities and corporations, etc., in order to attach their support and obtain audiences of all kinds for its corps of speakers. Similar efforts would be made to independent bodies, and they are legion, which exist for some specific propaganda purpose, legitimate, superfluous or eccentric. There is such a wealth of energy and money dissipated through this agglomeration of societies, associations, federations and unions that the most desirable end, in the interests of efficiency, would be the abolition of most of them and the addition of any influence or funds of which they were possessed to the central body. As this would be impracticable on any large scale, the alternative method would be to gain their support and work through them. Lastly a leaf might conceivably be taken from the Communist book of tactics, and a " snowball " campaign started for the formation of " cells "— " cells of service " instead of " cells of subversion." One keen man or woman would undertake to enrol two, three or more of his or her friends, who would each promise to do the same.

There should be no limit to the possibilities of such a movement. This is not to claim that all or necessarily any of these methods of approach would be wholly successful, but rather that if the scheme were well founded and energetically pressed, the cumulative effect would be enormous.

The point is that the work would require more energy than money, and a thousand devoted but unknown helpers rather than a few politicians and others seeking kudos or the limelight. Figureheads there would of course have to be, but the bulk of the work would be done by the individual to his friends.

I have been met with the objection in official circles that such propaganda action would be slow and delayed, needing probably years before it made itself felt. If campaigns, conducted with all the crudeness of commercial advertisement and by interested commercial men, can by the repetition of a slogan, and without any inherent psychological foundation, alter the habits of the public in a short time, how much easier should it be for a common appeal of the character in question, directed and supported by men of intelligence and reputation, to bear fruit in a few months? Any study of the rapidity with which the pendulum of national opinion can be made to swing under pressure will, I am confident, confirm this view. In any event, some action would be better than none.

The idea I wish to stress is that the organisation would make use of existing machinery to exploit *existing good will* in an attempt to mould public opinion along the lines of a return to the patriotic virtues, and to a sense of the realities of our position as a nation. There should be no need, nor indeed any purpose, in concentrating on recruiting if the wider message is properly forced home. These specific appeals for service can be left as before to the *ad hoc* departments. The two desiderata, a public-spirited people resolute under attack and a steady flow of recruits, are two

different expressions of the same attitude of mind, but their importance is in that order. This suggestion for a national, non-political propaganda organisation was embodied in a memorandum which I submitted nearly two years ago to various Cabinet Ministers. Nothing came of it, the answer in each case being that the idea might be sound but it was no one's particular departmental " pigeon." One Minister went to the trouble of writing a letter, graciously observing that I was " admirably full of enthusiasm and naturally have sought to canalise your idea of national service, and to attract as tributaries all the idealisms which are, for want of better banks in which to contain them, diverted into impure paths." (It will be profitable to note the use of the word " idealism " as well as the mixed metaphor !) " While yours is a general idea, mine is a particular task, which can in proper measure contribute towards it." How it can contribute towards something which does not exist is beyond me.

(III)

Finally, while the building up of the citizen's morale is by far the most important task of defensive propaganda, there is also the need for propaganda to protect his body and uphold his spirits when the bombs begin to fall. He must receive detailed instructions about air raid precautions and shelters, how and when the latter are to be manned, and how evacuation schemes are to be carried out. He must be warned of approaching aircraft. His war fervour must be kept fanned. He must be cheered by radio programmes and

cinema shows. What is to be the machinery by which this propaganda may be effectively carried on? Means must be devised which will ensure that the public can be reached at all times. There will be the newspapers, of course, but there will be no profit in envisaging a situation in which the use of these would be denied. It would be hopeless. Still, in spite of special war editions, the newspapers will not be swift enough to carry a message all over the country or to warn a certain locality of threatened air attack. Such speed of communication will only be possible through the radio, and this raises again the weakness of the system of wireless broadcasting. The B.B.C. itself will be almost certainly taken over at once, but this, as I have tried to explain already, is less than half the battle. It is so vulnerable to air attack, that it is unthinkable that some plan for an independent or alternative method of communication is not already in existence. We may assume that in face of determined air attacks, many of our more important transmitting stations will be closed down. What alternative method exists to send out warnings or to continue an amusement programme? That rediffusion has already been considered by the central authority is fairly evident.

The Maltese are peculiarly susceptible as well as open to radio propaganda from Italy. With a view to counteracting this, the colonial government encouraged rediffusion experts to wire the island, and the more thickly populated parts of which are now duly wired. Unfortunately, though the rediffusion company operating the Maltese service are not allowed to relay Italian talks, the

local authorities have not prohibited wireless sets, thereby defeating their own object—if they really had one—because the Maltese understand Italian and like opera ! As a consequence, a market has been created for a cheap line in wireless sets which can only take Italian stations ! A boomerang indeed ! The same indeterminate trifling with the problem is apparent in Great Britain. Two years ago the Ullswater Commission reported on the whole subject of radio, and consequently of rediffusion. At that time the wired system was making amazingly rapid headway, especially in the densely-populated districts, and the Commission recommended that it was in the national interest for the system to be taken over and operated by the State. The Government preferred to " wait and see." They neither admitted that rediffusion was so important that it should be run as a State service, nor conversely that it was a fit matter for commercial exploitation and therefore that existing rediffusion companies should be given a charter to continue or accelerate developments. Either course would have been understandable. Instead they solemnly took a middle course and announced that they would look farther into the matter, and raise it again three years hence—this period fortunately ends in October, 1939. This has had the effect of a standstill order. It deferred any decision as to the fate of the operating companies, and thereby lost them public support for the issue of the new capital which alone would have made development possible. The result of this weighty piece of official reasoning is that for three possibly critical years the extension of a highly important

method of emergency communication and propaganda has been held up. The companies have been forced to mark time, and it is good luck not good management that the centres already most heavily wired for rediffusion happen to be those which are important as strategic or munition centres as well as densely-populated areas—Devonport, Newcastle, Hull, Barrow, Swansea. Other wired districts are Nottingham and the Isle of Thanet, which will probably catch the early bombs again as it did in the last war. Still, there are only 300,000 homes wired—say 1,200,000 persons within reach of rediffused communications—as against the 32,000,000 on the wireless radio. We may see our position by comparing Holland where, it is estimated, over 70 per cent. of the population is on the rediffusion system.

As regards jamming, I believe, as I have said, that the enemy might jam Daventry and perhaps also Droitwich when this was sending out overseas propaganda. It is not improbable that he will also on occasions jam the latter for English listeners. This would be quite easy for Germany at any rate to do, but if there were any such interference, our wireless engineers could retaliate by selective jamming of German stations and rely upon our medium-wave transmitters for home needs, as far as the air defence position allowed.

There remain the cinema and the theatre. In wartime as in peace the film will be the stock form of popular entertainment. "Damn the Heinkels (or whatever the modern equivalent of the Gothas may be !), let's go to the movies," will be the attitude, and it is important that in the

entertainment world every effort shall be made to carry on " Business as usual." Unlike the legitimate theatre or its illegitimate half-sister the music-hall, the cinema is part of an industry. Where the others depend on the individual, the cinema depends on the machine. It is simple to organise a concert or a variety programme. It is relatively easy to produce a repertory show. It is quite another matter to put on a film programme, the product of the factory. Entertainment films take a long time to produce. Their distribution rests, like salt or tea, on commercial renting organisations. Arrangements will therefore require to be made to ensure a sufficient supply of films and their distribution, especially in congested areas or in districts where there are heavy concentrations of troops. Our own film industry, which has to struggle hard even in peace-time to uphold the very large notice board marked " British " with the aid of alien technicians and actors, will be quite inadequate. We must rely on the U.S.A. for most of our new films, and we shall have to see that these are adequately distributed, a course which may involve modifications in the policy underlying our cinematograph films legislation, which is to remove the firm grip that America got on the British market during the Great War ! It may even be that with other normal sources drying up, the U.S. supply will be inadequate, necessitating a re-issue of old films. The difficulty here is that only one negative is normally kept of these, again necessitating some arrangements whereby they will be reprinted and distributed. All such arrangements could easily be prepared in

advance by the films section of the central council I have suggested. Indeed somebody with propagandist qualifications will have to censor and select entertainment pictures for war showing. It is imperative that these shall, like the cup of tea, cheer and invigorate : that they shall take the civilian's mind off his anxieties and fears and yet fortify his resolve to fight to the end. The organisation of film entertainment is, as may be imagined, a big thing in itself. To it must be added the making and showing of definitely propaganda films, whether propaganda carried in entertainment pictures or news-reels and topical " shorts." A steady flow of what may be described as authoritative documentary or fact film " shorts " will be very important. The ground will not be covered adequately by the news-reels, and there must be a regular issue, week by week, of one or more documentary films, each not more than 1,000 feet in length. These would be made under official auspices to cover the whole range of information for which the public will be searching and is entitled to know, and which can be twisted or adapted to the propaganda moral it is judged necessary to ram home. The responsibilities of a wartime films board will combine a control of the production, renting and exhibition of films as well as a direction of their propaganda message. The stage, theatre, music-hall or concert party will necessitate less management, although there will be a large amount of work in organising shows of a suitable character for areas in which there are heavy troop concentrations or in the camps to which urban populations are evacuated. The

latter will raise a problem for the propagandist, for it will be essential that they shall be kept informed of what is happening to their homes and yet as far as possible in a sanguine frame of mind. As they may be composed mainly of women and children and old people, whose menfolk may have been left behind or are employed on national service, they will very understandably be liable to panic, and the real danger of mass-hysteria has been at least hinted at by the outbreaks in the camps of the Basque refugee children. It is a terrifying thing and it can spread like a forest fire.

In short, then, the organisation of the machinery of home propaganda is in itself a considerable undertaking. It is not a thing that can be carried through in a hurry as the result of improvisation, however brilliant, but entails much hard work and detailed arrangement. The main plans for it should therefore be laid well before the event, and the drafting of these and the selection of likely personnel should also, I suggest, fall to the appropriate section of the central co-ordinating body whose formation I have recommended. In other words, in order that defensive propaganda may start at once war is declared and be effective, the whole machinery should be standing ready beforehand. It may be well that a tarpaulin is thrown over it, but the engine should be ticking over and the gears ready to engage. Any sinister associations which may cling to propaganda in its offensive uses are absent in its home use. It is admittedly malevolent against the enemy, but beneficent among one's own people. It is at once inescapable and necessary. The modern State, whether

dictatorship or democracy, like the modern man, is a highly nervous organism for whose stability and concentration both the hypnotics and the stimulants of propaganda are increasingly needed.

I have the feeling that force of circumstances will compel us in the not distant future to face the question of propaganda squarely and honestly. When that day comes we shall act as we have never failed to do in the past and carry through a minor revolution overnight without anyone losing his sleep. Having made a fundamental change, we shall proceed as if nothing had happened. It was Lord Tweedsmuir who directed my attention to this national characteristic. The British, according to him, are the most revolutionary people in the world. They are slow to decide that a change is necessary, but when they do they carry it out more swiftly and with less fuss than any other nation, and therefore more thoroughly. Within the last ten years we have changed a form of party government that had stood for two hundred years, abandoned in the same night a fiscal policy which had become traditional, jettisoned the gold standard which was our pride, and consented to the abdication of a king. So when we agree that propaganda control is necessary, we shall impose it instantly, and label our control machinery "democratic" or "voluntary" in large letters. Meanwhile, we are preparing ourselves for a change by loud assertions that we should never tolerate such a control, just as before 1931 we insisted that Free Trade was still a living policy from which we would never depart.

My only hope is that we may come to the

realisation before it is too late. If I advocate the necessity of propaganda in the present state of affairs, I value our democratic privileges none the less. As I see it, the privileges will be at stake in a future war, and it is because I do not want to risk their being lost permanently that I recommend we should surrender some of them temporarily. Just as I value democratic liberty, I dislike democratic licence, and am fearful of its consequences in a world so tense and brittle with organisation. To quote H. G. Wells, " I suppose that the last of the dinosaurs to survive thought it was muddling through quite nicely." It would be a tragedy if democracy entertained the same thought to-day.

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